EIN Seminar, Thame 6 February 2010 Demographic outlook:

the shape of things to come?

D.A. Coleman

University of Oxford

david.coleman@socres.ox.ac.uk http://www.spsw.ox.ac.uk/oxpop

Some implications by 2050 - or earlier

Two problems at once in the 21st century: rapid increase in poorest countries; rapid ageing and (?) decline in richer ones.

Most rapid increase in poorest-poor, environmentally vulnerable populations.

New world order – Indian population overtakes Chinese.US only developed country left in global top ten.Demographic eclipse of Europe.UK and France overtake Germany, Russia?

Population decline in Japan, Korea, parts of Europe.

The longer-term future of population: what

we know we don’t know.

Effects of global warming on population and migration.

Is ethnic transformation inevitable in the developed world?

Why does anyone ever have any children?

What are the limits to lifespan, if any?

Variant world population projections, 2008-

based. Source: United Nations

World population estimates and variant projections 1950-2050 (millions). Source: United nations 2008-based

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

1950

1955

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2050

Medium variantHigh variantLow variantConstant fertility variantEstimate 1950 - 2005

Population projections, major world regions to 2050 according to level of development.

Population estimates and projection 1950 - 2050, world regions according to development level (millions). Source: United Nations 2008

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

1950

1955

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1965

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2050

More developed regions

Least developed regions

Less developed regions, excluding least developed

The demographic future is not European….Population estimates and projections, selected countries 1950-2050. UN 2008-based medium variant projections

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

200019

50

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Brazil

China

India

Sub-Saharan Africa

Europe

Northern America

Japan

Estimates Projections

The US: the only (relatively) large developed country by 2050.

Projections to 2050: major developed countries (millions). Source: UN World Population Prospects 2006.

0

50

100

150

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350

400

450

1950

1955

1960

1965

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1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

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2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Japan

Russia

Germany

United States

No such thing as ‘Europe’? Major European regional trends, and US, 1950-2050

Population estimates and projections, USA and major European regions 1950 - 2050 (millions). Source: UN 2008 - based medium variant projections.

0

50

100

150

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450

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1955

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2010

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United States

Eastern Europe

Northern Europe

Southern Europe

Western Europe

Estimates Projections

A closer view – selected European populations 1950-2050

Projection, total population, major European countries 1950 - 2050 (thousands), Source: UN 2008 World Population Prospects (pre-publication data)

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Germany Italy

France United Kingdom

Spain

Estimate Projection

Migration paramount

Population change in selected European countries 2008 - 2055, percent, with and without migration. Source: Eurostat 2007

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Nor

way UK

Sw

eden

Spa

in

Fra

nce

Den

mar

k

Fin

land

Net

herl

ands

Ital

y

Ger

man

y

Percent projected population changewith migration

Percent projected population changewithout migration

Projection of UK population to 2081, Principal Projection and

alternative migration assumptions, 2008-based. Source: GAD 2009. Population projection, United Kingdom 2008 - 2081 (millions).

Principal Projection and variants. Source: ONS 2009.

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

2008

2011

2016

2021

2026

2031

2036

2041

2046

2051

2056

2061

2066

2071

2076

2081

Principal Projection, 180k netmigration

High Migration, 240k net migration

Low Migration, 120k net migration

Natural change (zero migration)

Immigration can go down as well as up: Germany 1954 - 2007

Migration to Germany 1954 - 2007, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.

- 300 000

- 200 000

- 100 000

-

+ 100 000

+ 200 000

+ 300 000

+ 400 000

+ 500 000

+ 600 000

+ 700 000

+ 800 000

1954

2)

1956

2)

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

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1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

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1988

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1994

1996

1998

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2002

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2006

Net migrationGermans including aussiedlerForeignersGermans without aussiedler net flow

Aged potential support ratio, selected countries 2000

and 2050. Source: UN 2004 medium variant.

4.174.00

4.17 4.17

3.70

2.63

2.13 2.00

1.52 1.45

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

UnitedKingdom

France Germany Spain Italy

2000 2050

UK population broken down by age and sex,

2006, 2056 (percent). Source: GAD Principal Projections 2008.

UK population distribution by age and sex 2006 (percent)

4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

100+

males females

UK population distribution by age and sex 2056 (percent) GAD 2008-based PP assumptions

-4.00 -3.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

100+

males females

From demographic bonus to demographic onus: China and India in 2050

Contrasts in demographic bonus - population of China and India 2050 by age-group (millions). Source: United Nations 2006-based projections.

-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150

0-4

10-

1420

-24

30-

3440

-44

50-

5460

-64

70-

7480

-84

90-

9410

0+

China 2050 India 2050

China dependency ratio: 63.9India dependency ratio: 48.5

Youth dependents aged 0-14

Working age population aged 15-

64

Older dependents aged 65 and over

Japan population pyramid 2000, 2050.

source http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/suikei_g_e.html

Why worry about ‘Europe’s’ ageing or population decline?

Issue is growth in UK, Sweden, Netherlands, France etc as well as ageing.

Population change will change balance of international order in medium term. Nothing that European countries can do about it

Military, economic power related to population. GDP per head not related to population growth or size in

Western developed world.Little known about modern economics of decline. Usually

assumed axiomatically to be bad.Modest, very slow decline might be welcome (as long as it

stops).Rapid, substantial decline harmful: population ageing,

investment and labour force, ‘confidence’. Tthreatens economic viability (e.g. Southern Europe, Bulgaria), may not be ‘manageable’.

No fertility decline. ‘Total fertility’ trends, groups of Western countries, 1950-2006.

TFR trends Major Regions 1950 - 2006 Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

CEE unweighted mean

Southern unweighted mean

FSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova)

Northern Europe

Western Europe

USA

Fertility can go up as well as downTotal Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2008

Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.519

45

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

Denmark

France

NZ

USA

Norway

United Kingdom

Managing population ageing

• Improve the actual support rate• (a) increase workforce participation• retraining unemployed, discouraging early retirement and perpetual students, • more flexible labour market arrangements • help women to combine work with childcare (part-time work, school hours)

• (b) increase the average age of retirement• increase pension entitlement age • remove tax and other disincentives for working pensioners• end of ‘cliff-edge’ retirement.

• Moderate financial burden• limit state pension, 'second and third pillar' funded pensions .

• Increase labour productivity

Concluding pointsSome important demographic changes predictable. Re-arrangement of demographic rank-order: major losers

(Europe, espec. FSU) and winners (Asia, Africa, USA).In long run economic and strategic rank follows

population size (cf. India and China), as in the past.Western consumption levels cannot be globalised.Fastest growth in the poorest countries risks serious

security and environmental problems.Global warming on a collision course with population

growth.Migration pressure on Western countries will persist for

decades, may lead to ethnic transformation.In the long run, equilibrium position of birth and death rates

(if any) is unknown.