Upload
marcus-morrison
View
212
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Introduction: Deceptive Tactics Second line of defense behind standard information security tactics. Proactive countermeasures. 1.Concealment 2.Camouflage 3.Ruses (use of enemy equipment + procedures) 4.Demonstrations (of capabilities) 5.Disinformation/Lies 6.Displays - “techniques to make the enemy see what isn’t there” 7.Insight (“deceiving the opponent by outthinking)
Citation preview
Counterplanning DeceptionsTo Foil Cyber-Attack Plans
Paper by: Neil C. RowePresentation by: Michael E. Aiello
Agenda
• Introduction- Deceptive Tactics• Counterplanning• MECOUNTER• Building a ploy strategy• Questions
Introduction: Deceptive Tactics• Second line of defense behind standard
information security tactics. Proactive countermeasures.
1. Concealment2. Camouflage3. Ruses (use of enemy equipment + procedures)4. Demonstrations (of capabilities)5. Disinformation/Lies6. Displays - “techniques to make the enemy see
what isn’t there”7. Insight (“deceiving the opponent by outthinking)
Cyber Deceptive Tactics
1. Lies - powerful because users are accustomed to truth from computer systems
2. Displays - I.E. simulating virus infection while actually destroying the infection
3. Insight - combination of lies and displays integrated into an overall defensive strategy designed to cause the attacker the maximum amount of trouble
Obstructive Counterplanning• Definition: Planning to interfere with or frustrate
and existing plan• Tool needed to define computer intrusion
plans/goals.• MECOUNTER: A tool to define attack models
with mostly-declarative definitions of actions. Allows users to create model for
1. Anticipating what an enemy would do2. Defining disruption models3. Observe how the enemy responds to disruption
MECOUNTER example: “decompress action”
1. If the system does not want a file to be compressed, it should decompress it
2. Decompressing a file on a system requires that it is known to be there, it is compressed, it is known to be compressed, the actor is logged in to its system, and the actor is not currently running any other program there.
3. Normally when a file is decompressed, this deletes the fact of its compression and adds no new facts
4. 10% of the time decompression fails with the error message “Wrong Format”
5. Decompression requires a mean time of 5 seconds and has a Poisson distribution
Example Markov model for ten runs of a simplified model for rootkit and port-software installation on a computer system.
Counterplanning
• Develop “ploys” to keep the attacker connected to the machine for tracing/logging purposes.
• GOAL: Annoy attackers, keep them connected, but do not make them suspicious
• GOAL: Avoid annoying legitimate users.• A successful ploy meets both of these
goals
Probability equation for successful ploys
Building a ploy strategy
• Build a Markov model for an attack sequence
• Define probability variables for each state (the j’s)
• Use a greedy search to permutate all of the available ploys against each state.
• Define threshold for successful ploy and report results.
High impact ploy strategy for buffer overflow + root kit example
• Delete the connection at port 80• Delete the fact the buffer is overflowed• Add the fact there are problems in the file
system• Report the connection is terminated• Delete administrator status
Questions??