Controversial Role of GPOs in Healthcare-Product Supply Chains r2

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    By Qiaohai Hu and Leroy B. Swarz

    Purdue Krannert School of Management

    Group 1 :

    Babu John

    Parlin Marbun

    Petri Lahdekorpi

    Controversial Role of GPOs in

    Healthcare-Product Supply Chains

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    Contents

    Facts of GPOs

    GPOs Controversies

    Flow chart of GPO

    GPOs Benefits and Criticism Research Model Hotelling Duopoly

    Model

    Different Research Questions

    Research Results

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    Facts

    Group PurchasingOrganizations are profit ornon-profit organization owned

    typically by hospitals 7280% of every healthcare

    dollar is acquired throughgroup purchasing

    GPOs account for over 85% ofhospital purchases

    Largest GPO, Novation,contracted for over 2,400

    hospitals with purchasing

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    Facts

    Highest cost with lowest life expectancy?

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    The Research Qiaohai and Leroy:

    Build a highly style modelthat include the contractadministration fees.

    Address questionsrelevant to healthcare-product supply chains.

    To view of the gaps

    between the simplicity ofthe model and thecomplexity of GPOs.

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    GPO Group PurchasingOrganizations

    Lower Prices through

    product expertise over a wide range of products

    buying power of their members

    Non profit organizations which want to maximizetheir owners/members surplus.

    GPO revenue sources

    Contract administration fees charged to

    Manufacturers. membership fees charged to provider-members

    administrative fees charged to distributors Miscellaneous fees for services

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    GPOs Controversies The fees GPOs charge to Manufacturers (3% of

    contracted sales), forcing them to charge higherprices for products.

    The role they play in healthcare-product supplychains.

    The concentration of their purchasing power.

    Some of business practices they employ.

    GPOs promote or stifle competition ?

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    GPOs Controversies Total annual revenue generated:

    $5 Billion - $6 Billion

    which legitimately belongs to their member

    hospitals! GPO contract did not guarantee that hospital

    saved money:

    GPOs prices were often higher than prices paid

    by hospital negotiating with vendors directly. GPO contract blocks or slows the innovation or

    improvement of existing products.

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    GPOs Reaction to Criticisms Arguing that GPOs

    reduce prices andcompetitive in 2 ways:

    Pool purchasing

    leverage of hospitalsbuying products onnationwide contracts.

    Establishment of price

    ceilings beneath whichhospitals negotiate ontheir own.

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    GPO Flow chart

    Author: http://www.ccpharm.com/01_wholesaler.php 12th December 2011 4.19pm

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    Top 5 Areas in Hospitals Interest

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    The Research Model - TheHotelling Model - Example

    The cost and choice of ice-cream is the same for eachdistributor. Buyers are evenly distributed along thebeach. The first pattern of market share has the twosalesmen positioned so that each is at the centre of

    his half of the beach and the market is split up evenly.

    Author: http://www.answers.com/topic/hotelling-model 12th Dec 2011 2.39pm

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    The Hotelling Model - Example

    If A now moves nearer to the middle of the beach,he will increase his market share.

    Author: http://www.answers.com/topic/hotelling-model 12th Dec 2011 2.39pm

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    The Hotelling Model - ExampleThe logical outcome of this will have both salesmen back to backat the centre of the beach, as long as some customers are willingto walk nearly half a mile for an ice-cream, i.e. that the consumerprovides the transport. This analogy indicates that locationaldecisions are not made independently but are influenced by the

    actions of others.

    Author: http://www.answers.com/topic/hotelling-model 12th Dec 2011 2.39pm

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    Hotelling Model is to representcontracting costs:

    Product-search cost

    (what alternatives areavailable?)

    Product-assessment cost

    (which is best?)

    Contract-negotiation cost

    (what price for whatquantity?)

    Transaction processingcost

    (buying or selling?)

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    Will GPO be formed?

    Symmetric preference

    Two identical manufacturers

    Contracting costs are lower due to competition

    Contracting costs are moving up supply chain tomanufacturers

    Asymmetric preference

    Two un-identical manufacturers due to:

    Product Brand

    GPO preferred charges lower CAFs, less profitfor manufacturer

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    Can off-contract price be lowerfrom on-contract?

    There is no obligation to buy on contract products

    Compliance is the ratio between on/off contract

    Higher compliance means higher market share

    and bigger purchasing power and lower prices

    GPO results lower off-contract prices

    GPOs are not anticompetitive, instead it

    presents the equilibrium that maximizesmanufacturers profits

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    Competition and Safe harbor

    provisions (CAF)

    Should GPOs be allowed to charge CAFs?

    CAFs charged to manufacturers result lessinvestment on innovation or R/D

    However, there is no effect on any parties profit

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    Extensions

    Monopoly

    If contracting through the GPO, it lowers theproviders contracting cost

    The monopolist can charge a higher price

    Profit seeking GPO

    the safe-harbor provisions of the Social SecurityAct are limited to average 3%, reports are

    required providers equilibrium price is unaffected by the

    size of the CAF

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    Extensions

    Profit seeking GPO

    Sources of revenue GPOs profits are extracted from the manufacturers

    profits, not the providers surplus

    GPOs is to charge their provider-members a fixed

    contracting fee GPOs offer a wide range of additional business

    services to their members that can be used either togenerate profit or to offset contracting costs

    Given the 3% CAF, that for-profit GPOs have anincentive to reduce their own contracting costs

    Whether GPO operates on a profit or not-for-profitbasis, the result for providers is the same.

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    Research Results GPO increases competition between the manufacturers

    and lowers costs, if there is no monopoly

    price competition, lowers the manufacturers incentive to

    introduce innovation

    off-contract price might be lower than the on-contract priceso GPOs are not anticompetitive

    Lower off-contract prices are not evidence ofanticompetitive behavior on the part of GPOs.

    Eliminating CAFs have no effect on any partys profit or

    cost

    Results are same whether GPO operates for profit or notfor profit

    for-profit GPOs reduce manufacturers profits

    for-profit GPOs have an incentive to reduce contracting

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    Thank YouQuestions and Answers?

    Group 1 : Babu John, Parlin Marbun, Petri Lahdekorpi