SecuringCitizens’RightsunderArticle50:Reflections on Phase 1 & Considerations for Phase 2 of the negotiations

Contents

I. Introduction......................................................................................................................2

II. ConsiderationsforPhase2ofthenegotiations..............................................................3AddressoutstandingissuesnotdeemedtofallwithinthePhase1mandate.....................3Rethinktheapproach:issueshighlightedbytheEuropeanParliament..............................5Clarifyambiguitiesinscopeandcontent.............................................................................6Ensurenooneisleftbehind.................................................................................................9EnsurecorrectinterpretationinimplementingtheWithdrawalAgreement....................10Considerationsrelatingtothetransitionperiod................................................................11

III. SpecificIssuesinrelationtodomesticimplementationbytheUKgovernment.......13Voluntarystatus.............................................................................................................13Graceperiodanderrors.................................................................................................13Onlineratherthanlocalapplications.............................................................................13Processingperiod...........................................................................................................14EU27citizenswithexistingIndefiniteLeavetoRemain(ILR).........................................14Deportationsandremovals............................................................................................14Appealrights..................................................................................................................14Judicialoversightandaccesstojustice..........................................................................14Errorsandomissionsleadingtoallegationsoffraud.....................................................15Failingtoobtainthenewstatus.....................................................................................15

IV. TheinadequacyofThirdCountryNationallegislationascomparedtoEUcitizenshiprights:......................................................................................................................................16

Introductoryremarks.........................................................................................................16TheEUacquisonthirdcountrynationals..........................................................................16Intheeventofanodeal:defaulttothirdcountrynationalstatus?..................................18TheLongTermResidenceDirective...................................................................................18ImpactofotherEUthirdcountrynationalacquis..............................................................19Healthandsocialsecurity...................................................................................................19IntheeventofadealundertheWithdrawalAgreementthatdoesnotcoverallexistingrights...................................................................................................................................20CanrightsundertheTCNacquismakeupforgapsintheWithdrawalAgreement?.........20WillUKcitizensandtheirfamilymemberswithinscopeoftheWAbeabletobenefitfromrightsundertheTCNacquis?.............................................................................................21

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I. Introduction

InDecember2017,theEUMemberStatesagreedthatsufficientprogressinPhase1oftheUK/EU Article 50 negotiations — including, crucially, on citizens' rights — had beenachieved,assetoutintheJointReport1of8December(the“JR”),clearingthewayforPhase2.Theissueofcitizens'rightshasthuswidely—butincorrectly—beenportrayedasresolved.The3millionandBritishinEurope,aswellastheEuropeanParliament(seeEPresolutionof13December2017),considerthatthestatedaimofensuringthatnothingwouldchangeforEU27 nationals in the UK and for UK nationals in the EU, is not met by the ‘CommonUnderstanding’ reached in Phase 1 owing to glaring shortcomings, omissions andambiguities,beitbecauseissueswereexcludedfromthenegotiationscontrarytotheinitialmandate or because of political expediency to reach a compromise. As things stand, therightsofsome5millionpeopleriskbeingseverelycurtailedandthefundamentalstatusofEUcitizenshipreducedto“lifechoices”.Since‘nothingisagreeduntileverythingisagreed’,theseissuesmustbeaddressedinPhase2andaccordedatleastequalprioritytothataffordedotherissuessuchasNorthernIreland.Themostsalientissuesinclude:• Theneed toguaranteegenuine freemovement for theprotectedgroup, including

lifelong return and associated individual economic rights, recognition ofqualificationsandtherightoffamilyreunificationwithfuturepartners.

• Protection must be extended to vulnerable, ‘at risk’ groups of citizens who arepresentlyeithernotincludedinthescopeoftheWithdrawalAgreement(e.g.familymembers of returning citizens etc.), or those who are likely to face legal, digital,language, or evidential barriers to being registered under the WithdrawalAgreement.

• Citizens’ rights— above and beyond the ‘common understanding’ reached at theend of Phase 1 — must be ring-fenced to ensure that all our existing rights areprotectedinanyevent.

• NegotiationsduringPhase2must be conducted in a transparent and accountableway, allowing us the opportunity to broaden our constructive engagement anddialogue.

• All ambiguities regarding scopeandcontentof theagreementmustbeeliminatedand everything that has been agreed by the parties needs to be meticulouslytranscribed into the Withdrawal Agreement to avoid any misinterpretation inimplementation both in the UK and across the EU27 with potentially devastatingconsequencesforthelivesofhundredsofthousandsofpeoplefollowingBrexit.

Detailed arguments are presented in the sections below setting out the principalconsiderationsforPhase2(Section II),specific issuesrelatingto implementation intheUK(SectionIII)andtheinadequacyofThirdCountryNationallegislationforBritishcitizenslivingintheEU(SectionIV).

1https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-report-negotiators-european-union-and-united-kingdom-government-progress-during-phase-1-negotiations-under-article-50-teu-united-kingdoms-orderly-withdrawal-european-union_en

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II. ConsiderationsforPhase2ofthenegotiations

Therearestillkeyoutstandingandconflictingissues,aswellasalackofdetailandanumberofambiguitiesthatthenegotiatorsmustaddresstosafeguardtherightsofcitizensintheUKandtheEU.

AddressoutstandingissuesnotdeemedtofallwithinthePhase1mandate

Freemovement,economicrightsandrecognitionofqualifications

Box58oftheJointTechnicalNote(“JTN”)2setsoutissueswhichhadbeenraisedbytheUKinthecourseofPhase1,butwhichweresaidtobe“outsidethescopeoftheEUmandatefor the first phase of the negotiation”. Almost all3are related to the Treaty right of freemovement. Inourview,theEUwaswrongtosaythattheywereoutsidethescopeofthePhase1mandate,butmoreimportantlytheymustbenegotiatednowsoastobeincludedintheArticle50agreement.Article 20 of the EU Negotiating Directives of June 2017 opens, “The Agreement shouldsafeguard the status and rights derived fromUnion lawat thewithdrawal date, includingthose theenjoymentofwhichwill interveneata later…aswellas rightswhichare in theprocessofbeingobtained…”BeforeBrexit,asEUcitizensweallhavetherightunderArt.21TFEUtomovetoanotherEUcountrytoliveortoworkasanemployeeorself-employedorrunabusiness,aswellastherightstoprovideservicescross-borderandtomutualrecognitionofqualifications.However,undertheJRonthedayBrexitbecomeseffective,forexample:

• UKcitizensintheprotectedgroupwilllosetheirpresentrighttomovefreelytoanotherEU country for any purpose or to provide cross-border services in any countrywheretheywerenotdoingsothedaybefore;

• EUandUKcitizenswithaUKprofessionaloracademicqualificationwilllosetherighttohavethatrecognisedinanycountrywheretheywerenotrelyingonittoworkthedaybeforeBrexitandwheretheydonothaveaspecificrecognitiondecisionasprovidedforintheJTN;

• EUandUKlawyerswhohavepreviouslypractisedinrelianceonaqualificationobtainedintheirhomestate,astheyareentitledtodo,willhavethatrightremovedcompletely.

ThislossofrightsisclearlyinconsistentwiththeNegotiatingDirectivesdated22May2017.It has come about because EU negotiators introduced into the JR a qualification to theirmandatewhichwasnotthereattheoutset-“toprovidereciprocalprotectionforUnionandUKcitizens,toenabletheeffectiveexerciseofrightsderivedfromUnionlawandbasedonpast life choices…” (JR para. 6). Without this qualification these rightswould have beenunarguablywithinthescopeofthenegotiation.Further,evenifthislimitationhadbeenintheDirectivesfromtheoutset,thefundamentalrights of free movement and the related economic rights and mutual recognition of

2https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-technical-note-expressing-detailed-consensus-uk-and-eu-positions-respect-citizens-rights_en3Weexclude“futurehealthcarearrangements”fromthisdiscussion,asitistheoneissueinBox58whichweagreeisoutsidethescopeofArticle50.

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professionalqualificationswouldstillbeinscope,becausethe“pastlifechoice”ofacitizenmoving cross-Channel in either direction was founded in these rights. Two practicalexamplesillustratethis:

• EUcitizensmovedtotheUKandobtainedaprofessional,oracademic,qualification inthe reasonable belief that it would be valid across the EU28. When theymade thatchoice they had no reason to believe that negotiators representing the EU woulddepriveitsowncitizensofthatright.

• Likewise,manyUKcitizensmovedtootherEUcountriestoworkpreciselybecausetheEUisaterritorywithoutinternalborders:fromlawyersandlorry-driverstocaterersandIT contractors, this freedom tomove forwork and to provide services across borderswasanessentialpartoftheirlifeplan.

Wehavealreadysubmitteddetailedargumentswhichdemonstratebeyonddoubt(i)thatasa matter of law these are existing EU rights and (ii) their practical importance to theprotectedgroup.See:• Fordetailedlegalargumentonfreedomofmovement-BiEAddendumtoJointResponse

toRound24pp.1-6aswellasBiESupplementalAddendum;• For detailed argument on recognition of qualifications and economic rights – Joint

ResponsetoRound35pp.9-10,andJointResponsetoRound4pp.3-46;• Forcasestudiesshowingtheimpactonpeople’sdailylives–BiECaseStudies7.It has been suggested that the free movement rights of UK citizens in the EU will beguaranteedunder the Long TermResidenceDirective (2003/109) andother EU legislationrelatingtothirdcountrynationalsornon-EUcitizens.Adetailedexamination(seeSectionIV)clearlyshowsthat if thatDirectiveandthat legislationprovideforanyrights,theyfallwayshortofthepresentrightsandwouldresultinadramaticchangeinthedailylivesofmany.We have also heard it suggested that freemovement for UK citizens in the EUmight bediscussedinPhase2,butthatthismightnotextendtotheircontinuingtohavetherighttoworkinotherEU27countriesandcertainlynottoprovidecross-borderservices,asthesearemattersforthefuturerelationship.Weemphaticallyrejectthatcontentionforthereasonsgivenabove.Thereisnorationalbasisforbreakingtherightoffreedomofmovementupinthiswayasitrelatestoindividualswhohaveexercisedit.Werecallthat,initsresolutionof13December2017,theEuropeanParliamentmadeitclearthat full freedomofmovement forUK citizens throughout the EU27must bemaintained.This includes the related economic rights and right to recognition of qualifications. AnyotherapproachwouldbecontrarytotheletterandspiritoftheTreaties.Further,theUKofferedEUcitizenswithintheprotectedgroupa lifetimerightofreturntotheUKpost-Brexit,inexchangeforfreemovementforUKcitizensintheEU.WhentheissueoffreemovementisconsideredinPhase2ofthenegotiations,theexistingJRprovisionfora

4https://britishineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/BiE-and-t3m-response-to-20.7.17-week_FINAL.pdf5https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0d3854_4c470417a5484580898ff7194f7c6c96.pdf6https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0d3854_75cc82d8c64249c9a5531a4d459ebe3f.pdf?index=true7https://britishineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/BiE-Case-Studies-June-2017.pdfandhttps://britishineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/British-in-Europe_Free-Movement_Master-Case-Studies_EC.pdf

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5-yearrightofreturnforthosewithpermanentresidencerightsshouldalsobereconsideredforbothgroups.

Rethinktheapproach:issueshighlightedbytheEuropeanParliament

TheEuropeanParliamenthighlightedanumberof issuesas requiring tobe revisitedorasbeingoutstanding:thefollowingareissuesthatneedtoberevisited.

Declaratoryversusconstitutivesystemofregistration

Paragraph 3 of the EP resolution of 13 December 2017 requires, “ensuring that theadministrativeprocedureislight-touch,declaratoryinnatureandfreeofcharge,placingtheburdenofproofontheUKauthoritiestochallengethedeclaration,andenablingfamiliestoinitiate the procedure by means of a single form”. For this requirement to be met, thecommonunderstandingoftheJRwillhavetobereconsidered.TheEUandtheUKagreedattheendofPhase1thatrespectiveMemberStatescanchoosehowtheywish to 'register'EU27citizens in theUKandBritishcitizens in theEUfromtwooptions: the current declaratory approach in accordance with EU law or to apply aconstitutiveorconditionalapproach. British inEuropeandthe3milliondonotdisputetheneed for a registration system, but we do not recognise the ‘constitutive approach’ as asimplesystemof‘registration’.UndercurrentEUlaw,citizens’rightsarederiveddirectlyfromtheEUTreaty(TFEU)andanyregistration systems put in place by EU Member States under Directive 38/2004 (the“CitizenshipDirective”)aresimplydeclaratoryorconfirmthoseprimaryrights. ThismeansthatanEUcitizenneednotapply foranewstatus, theyneedonlydemonstrate that theypossesstheright.However, the agreement reached by the EU and theUK in the JR indicates thatMemberStatesmayadoptaconstitutiveapproachtoregisteringEU27citizensintheUKandBritishcitizens in the EU. This wouldmean that only thosewhomake a formal application and,critically,whoseapplicationisthensuccessful,wouldacquirethenewstatus.ThisisinkeepingwiththeUK’swishtoobligeEU27citizenstoapplyfor‘settledstatus’–animmigration status already in existence under domestic immigration laws - rather thansimplytoconfirmtheirexistingrightsunderEUlaw.

TheEUthusacceptedthisdeparturefromEUlaw.AtthelastminuteanoptionwasincludedintheJRsothatEU27countriesmayrequireUKcitizensintheirboundariestomakefreshapplications. This was a proposal on which there was no prior consultation. Were thisconstitutive approach to be applied— in the UK to EU citizens and potentially in EU 27countries toUKcitizens—following theUK’sexit,existingEUrightswould ‘fallaway’andcitizens could potentially be without a legal status with dire consequences for them andtheirfamilies.EUcitizenship isthefundamentalstatusofEUcitizens.Whatdoesthis fundamentalstatusmeanifitortherightsattachedtoitcanbewithdrawnfromanEUcitizenwhohasexercisedher/hisrightsoffreemovementduetotheactionsofaMemberState?EUcitizenshipandtherightsattachedcannotsimplybereducedtolifechoices.

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Moreover, there is clear case law that thepositionof a citizenwhohas exercisedhis/herrightoffreemovementisnotcomparabletothatofacitizenwhohasnot.CitizensacquirerightsunderArticle21throughtheirexerciseoftheirfreemovementrights(see§§55and58Lounes). This is the position ofUK citizens in the EU. In addition, EU27 citizens in theUKremainEUcitizens.TheEUshouldpushtheUKsimplytoconfirmtheirexistingrightsandtoupholdtherightsattachedtothatfundamentalstatus,whichuntilnowhasbeenrecognisedintheUK.Giventheconstitutiveelementof theproposednewstatus, it isdifficult toseehowrightscanbeprotectedundertheWithdrawalAgreementbeforethenewstatushasbeengranted.Weareconcernedthatthissituationmightcreatea legalandevidentialvoid intheperiodbetweenexitandanapplicationforthenewstatushavingbeengrantedandalsoafterthegrace period (which may need to be longer than the transition period in order to allowsufficient time for over three million nationals in the UK to be registered). It also raisesquestionsastothestatusofapplicantswhoseapplicationhasbeenrejectedduetoerrors,omissionsoralleged‘fraud’,orthosewhohavebeenrefused.ExtendingfamilyreunificationtofuturespousesAnother concern of the EP resolution of 13 December 2017 is “extending coverage ofcitizens’rightstofuturepartners”.Future spouses of citizens in the protected group are not currently covered by the JRagreement.ThiswouldmeanthatsuchspouseswouldfallunderdomesticUKorotherEU27immigrationlawsoffamilyreunion.ThisisaparticularconcernintheUKasitwouldmeanthatfuturespouses,whetherfromtheEU27oroutsidetheEU,wouldhavetocomplywiththeonerousandrigidUKimmigrationrulesrelatingtofamilyreunion,whichwouldbelikelytoresultinnumerousrefusals.Weforeseethatthiswilldisproportionatelyimpactyoungergenerations, aswell as citizenswho following a divorce or the deathof their spousemaywishtoremarryafterBrexit.

Clarifyambiguitiesinscopeandcontent

TheJR covers broadly EU27 citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU and their familymembers,whohavelivedintheirrespectivecountriesofresidenceinaccordancewiththeCitizenship Directive prior to the UK's exit from the EU. This means those who haveexercisedand reliedupon their rightsof freemovementbefore theUK’swithdrawal fromtheEU.Essentially,citizensmayberequiredtodemonstrate-atthediscretionofindividualMember States - that they have lived in their countries of residence in accordance withArticles 6 and 7 of theDirective. Thismeans that a citizenmust be and continue to be aworker, self-employed person, student, or self-sufficient person, or lawfully retain thoserights,atwithdrawaltobeeligible.Personalscope:areaswhereclarityisneededastothecategoriescovered

Whowillbe“LegallyResident”?TheJRappliestocitizenswhoare“lawfullyresident”intheircountryofresidence.This,asset out above, is defined in accordance with the terms of the Citizenship Directive2004/38/ECandArticle21TFEU.ItiswellknownthatnumerousEUcitizensintheUKhavestruggledtoregisterashavingpermanentresidenceowingto theComprehensiveSickness

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Insurance requirements and the ‘genuine and effective’work test. The JR, however, doesnot preclude a Member State from adopting a less stringent assessment of “lawfullyresident”.OnDecember12th2017 the thenUK ImmigrationMinister said inevidence toaHouseofLordsCommittee8thatanEUcitizenapplyingintheUKwouldonlyhaveto(i)showthats/heisanEUcitizen,(ii)showthats/heisresidentintheUKand(iii)passthecriminalitytest.“Simpleasthat”hesaid.We assume that the Minister’s evidence to Parliament was accurate and we agree thatsimple, light-touch, localevidenceof residenceand IDshouldsuffice to register in theUK,albeitwithoutsystematiccriminalityandsecuritychecksthatarenotinthespiritofEUlaw.Giventheimportanceofthemattertomillionsofpeople,andtoensurethattheUKislegallybound,thenegotiatorsshouldensurethatthesesimpleregistrationcriteriaarerecordedintheWithdrawalAgreement.Ifthathappens,anumberoftheambiguitieswerecordbelowwillfallaway,atleastasfarastheUK isconcerned,andcitizenswillbekeptsecurefromtheUK’s ‘hostileenvironment’9.ThiswouldbeafurtherrelaxationofthelawfulresidencetestassetoutinUKproposalonCitizens’Rightsdated26June10andthefurtherUKtechnicalnote11publishedinNovember.However, despite thismove away froma stringent applicationof the requirements underthepotentialWithdrawalAgreement,thereisstillmuchscrutinyrequired.

DualcitizensThe JRmakes no reference to how dual citizens (UK and EU 27) are to be treated. Untilrecently,theUKdidnotrecognisethatEU27citizenswhoacquiredBritishcitizenshipwereable to exercise freemovement rights. The recent Court of Justice of the EU judgment inLounes confirmedthatEUcitizenswhoacquiredualcitizenshipcan invoke freemovementrights in the country in which they have acquired nationality, in this case the UK. All UKcitizensintheEUandEUcitizensintheUKwhohaveacquireddualcitizenshipshouldhavethesamerightsundertheWithdrawalAgreementasthosecitizens intheprotectedgroupwhohadnotacquireddualnationality,includingarighttofamilyreunion.

CitizenswhoReturntotheirMemberStatesofOriginThere is also ambiguity as towhether or not citizens returning to theirMember State oforiginfromanotherMemberStatecancontinuetobenefitfromrightstheyenjoyedthere.This right is commonly associated with the case of Surinder Singh. This is potentiallysignificant,whenUKcitizens return to theUKhaving livedandworked inaMemberStateandwhowishtheirnon-Britishfamilymemberstoaccompanythem.Butitisalsosignificantasregardstheacquiredrightsoffamilymembersofcitizenswhohavealreadymovedbacktotheircountryoforiginpre-withdrawal.

8https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-justice-subcommittee/news-parliament-2017/brexit-citizens-rights-minister/9FormoreinformationandadditionalresourcesandcasestudiesontheUK’shostileenvironmentpleasevisit:https://www.the3million.org.uk/hostile-environment10https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-the-position-of-eu-citizens-in-the-uk-and-uk-nationals-in-the-eu11https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-administrative-procedures-in-the-uk/technical-note-citizens-rights-administrative-procedures-in-the-uk

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Inorder toensurethat thosecitizenswhoserightsderive fromArticle21TFEU,suchas inthecasesabove,havefurtherassurances,theseambiguitieswillneedtobeclarifiedintheWithdrawal Agreement.Further details will therefore be required when the legal textemerges.

FrontierWorkersThe detail of what rights frontier workers will have as agreed in the JR requires moreclarification, in particular, the rights of self-employed workers or those who travel atirregularintervalsratherthanonaweeklyordailybasis.Thisisanissueofespecialconcernto many UK citizens in the EU and a particular issue for self-employed workers will beproving their status and thus that they fall within the scope of the final WithdrawalAgreement.

'Misuse'provisionsThe ‘misuse' provisions of the CitizenshipDirective 2004/38/EC havemade theirway intotheJTN.Theseprovisionsapplywhereacitizenhasbeenfoundtobemisusingtheircitizens’rightsinthehostmemberstate.Itwillbeveryimportanttoclarifyifandhowgovernmentsintend to use the 'misuse' provisions. TheWA needs to set out clearly if and how theseprovisionscanbeusedintheUKandacrosstheEU27.

'Temporarystatus'Thosewhohave lived in thecountryof residence for less than5yearswillbe required toapplyfortemporarystatusinordertobuilduptheirtimetowardsmakinganapplicationforthegrantofanewpermanentstatus.Therequirementsforthisapplicationareunclear.Forexample,itispresumedthat:• therewillbeanapplicationforsuchstatuswheretheconstitutivesystemisapplied in

theUKandanyEU27countrybutnotwhereEU27countrieschoosetocontinuewiththe declaratory approach under EU law. This however needs to be spelt out. TheconsequencesofnothavinganyproofofatemporarystatusareespeciallyconcerningintheUK,whichofcoursewillnolongerbeaMemberState.

• theconditionsonwhichsuchstatuscouldbelostwouldbethesameasthoseundertheCitizenship Directive but this needs to be spelt out. For example, we presume thatArticle14oftheCitizenshipDirectivewouldapply.

• Article16asregardscontinuousresidencewouldapplybutthisneedstobespeltout.

TemporaryabsenceWedonotknowifthosecitizenswhohavepreviouslyresidedintheUKoranEU27countryandwhoare temporarily absentatexitwill be coveredby theagreement.Therewill beaconsiderable number of citizens who, for example,may have lived andworked formanyyearsintheircountryofresidencebutwhoaretemporarilyabsentfromthecountryontheday of exit e.g. due to awork posting. Claritywill be needed onwhat testwill apply toevaluate whether they fall within the personal scope – will this be a test of habitual ornormalresidenceorothersuchtesttodeterminewhetherornottheyshouldbedeemedtoberesidentintheUKorEU27countryonthedateofexit.

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RetainedrightsoffamilymembersintheeventofdeathordivorceTheretainedrightsoffamilymemberslivingwitharightholderatexit,intheeventthattherightholdersubsequentlydiesordivorces,arenotclear.WepresumethatitistheintentionforArticles11and12ofDirective38/2004toapplybutthisisnotspecifiedandJTNbox20ondurationof rights refers to life-longprotection for the rightholdernotof the retainedrightsofsomeonewhooriginallyderivedtheirrightsfromarightholder.

Criminalityand'security'checksforallIn the event that the country of residence decides to apply the constitutive system,systematiccriminalandsecuritychecksapply,evenwherethecitizenisacurrentholderofapermanentresidencecertificate.ThisisadeparturefromEUlaw,whichdoesnotallowsuchsystematicretrospectivecriminalchecks.ThiswillapplytoallEUcitizens intheUK,andtoUKcitizenswho live inacountrythatdecidestoapplytheconstitutivesystem. Thescopeandextentofthesechecksisunclear.Questions arise such as to the level of criminal offence that might lead to failure of acriminalandsecuritycheckwhenanEUcitizenappliesforthenewsettledstatus;andintheUKastowhethertheremightbenewpublicinterestcertificatesanddeportationsafterexit,combiningpast sentenceswith freshsentencesand thereby indicating thatsomebodyhadtoberemovedinthepublicinterestforaminoroffence.In the EU 27, on the other hand, there is currently no information on whether EU 27countries intend toapply the constitutive system,and thuswhetherorhowsuch criminalandsecuritychecksmightapply,andthusUKcitizensintheUKareentirelyinthedarkastotheramificationsforthemofthislastminuteagreement.

PotentialdataprotectionrestrictionsforEUnationalsinUKAbill going through theUKParliamentatpresent is proposing that accessbyaperson todataheldonthembytheHomeOfficeandothersforimmigrationpurposesshouldinsomesituationsbedenied.WeareconcernedthatthiswillpreventEUcitizensapplyingundertheWAfrombeingabletoeffectivelychallengerejectionbyaccessingtheirfileandchallengingerrors.ItissaidthataccesswillonlybedeniedwhereitisinthepublicinteresttodosobutthiscreatesaKafkaesquesituation,asitisonlybyhavingaccesstothedatathatthesubjectisinapositiontochallengethedecisionthats/heshouldnotbeallowedtodoso.AsimilarproposalintheUKwasmadebygovernmentsomeyearsagobut,rightly,dropped.InorderthatEUcitizensshouldnotfaceinsuperablebarrierswhenapplyingforregistration,theWAshouldprovidethatthisnewrestrictionshouldnotapplytotheWAregistrationscheme.

Ensurenooneisleftbehind

We are concerned that some of the most vulnerable groups of citizens appear to beexcludedfromthescopeoftheagreementandthatotherswillbe‘atrisk’underthecurrenttermsofthedeal.Inparticular:• Zambrano carerswho benefit from rights deriving fromArticle 20 of the TFEU do not

featureintheagreementatall.Asaresult,thirdcountrynationalswhorelyonrightsas

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primarycarersofBritishchildrenwillbeatriskofremovaliftheydonotfallunderUKorEU27immigrationrules.Thiswouldputthewelfareofthesechildrenatrisk.

• Citizensfacingbarrierstoapplication:Thecurrentconstitutive ‘settledstatus’proposalin the UK is centred on applicants who have worked and engaged with the UKgovernment,communicateinEnglishandarecomputerliterate.TheUKgovernmenthasindicated that serviceswill beprovided at some local libraries and that in exceptionalcases home visits will be carried out to assist with applications for the new status.However, the details of this have been scarce. It is understood that the UK will notprovidelibraryservicesinLondon(exceptinMerton?).Witharecentlylessenedbudget,there are concerns that theUK government’sHomeOffice (whowill beadministeringthe online application process) will not be sufficiently funded and equipped. Theproposedtaxandworkstatuschecks,criminalityandsecuritycheckswouldincreasethepossibilityoferrorsandmaladministration.Therearegroupsofpersonswhowillbeatrisk should sufficient flexibility not be adopted to assist all EU27citizens.Particularconcerns have been raised about the elderly, disabled, children,victims of trafficking, those experiencing homelessness and other groups.This raisesissuesofequalityandhumanrightsaswellasgeneralaccesstojustice.ItgoeswithoutsayingthattheissuesraisedhereasregardstheUKcouldequallywellapplypotentiallytoUKcitizensresidentinEU27countriesiftheyapplytheconstitutiveapproach.

EnsurecorrectinterpretationinimplementingtheWithdrawalAgreement

The framework for enforcing rights under the futureWithdrawal Agreement will see theconcepts of direct effect and supremacy of EU law being implemented. ExistinginterpretationsofEU lawwillapply.TheEuropeanCourtof Justicewill continuetohavearoleforalimitedperiodofeightyearsintheUK.TheprovisionsoftheWithdrawalAgreementwillbeimplementedintoUKlawthroughaBillandwillhaveeffect inprimarylegislation,saidtoprevailover inconsistentor incompatiblelegislation. The JR states that this will apply unless Parliament repeals the primarylegislation. We assume that this statement is simply by way of explanation of the UKprincipleofParliamentarysovereignty. However,weresuchastatementtobe included intheWithdrawalAgreement,itmightbeinterpretedasgivingtheUKaunilateralopt-out.Toavoid any such risk, it should be an express term of the Agreement that any repeal orreduction of the citizens’ rights part would be a breach of the Agreement and ofinternationallaw,andsubjectfullytothedisputeresolutionmechanismsoftheWithdrawalAgreement.ItseemsfairlyclearthatmonitoringwillbecarriedoutbytheCommissioninrelationtotheEU, while the UK intends to set up an independent nationalauthority to monitor theimplementationofthepartassociatedwithcitizens’rights.Thescope,functionandpowerofthebodyintheUKremainsunclearandrequiresclarification.Wewouldliketobeabletoinput into discussions as to how this UK body will be established in order to have anunderstandingofthoseissues.There is then thequestionwhat sortofdispute resolution system therewillbeunder theWithdrawal Agreement itself whereby, for example, the EU could bring infringementproceedingsagainsttheUKorviceversaincaseofbreachesoftheWA.

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We would request that we are involved in the governance issues of the WithdrawalAgreement as they significantly affect our status, even if they are discussed in a separatestreamfromcitizens’rights.

Considerationsrelatingtothetransitionperiod

TheUK and EU have agreed to negotiate a transition period. According to the EuropeanCouncilguidelinesof15December,theEUwouldseektoensurethattheUKwouldcontinuetoparticipateintheSingleMarketandallfourfundamentalfreedomsduringthatperiod.Inotherwords,itisourunderstandingthatnotonlyfreemovementofworkers,butalsofreemovementofpersonswillcontinueduringthisperiodandthusthatArticle21TFEUrightsoffreemovementwillcontinue.Consequently,duringthisperiod,UKcitizensintheEUandEUcitizensintheUKwouldkeeptheirexistingrightsoffreemovementinthecountrieswheretheyliveandworkacrosstheEU.

Generalissues

1. Whatwillbethedateof implementationof thecitizens’ rightspartof theWithdrawalAgreement? Presumably thiswill be theday after endof transition and the specifieddate in the Withdrawal Agreement would also be amended in line with thisimplementationdate.

2. Howwouldanyconstitutiveapplicationsystembeappliedduringthetransitionperiod?Would, for example, EU citizens already have to apply for the new status during thisperiodandwouldthistwo-yearperiodeffectivelybecomethegraceperiod?ThesamequestionwouldariseasregardsUKcitizensinrelationtoanysuchsystemappliedinanEU 27 state. However, full application of free movement would imply otherwise, ascitizens would be covered by the existing declaratory system under the CitizenshipDirective and that the two-year grace period should begin following the transitionperiod.

3. Howwillthosewhoarriveduringtransitionbetreated?Thisgroupofpeoplewouldalsoenjoy full free movement rights during transition and will thus have exercised thoserights. Itcouldbearguedthattheyhavenotreliedonthemas irrevocablerights,andthusthattheyshouldbetreatedinthesamewayasthosewhomoveafterthetransitionperiod,butthatdoesimplywithdrawingrightsthathavebeenexercised. Moreover, ifthe transition periodwere in effect to be the grace period, and this group could notalreadyapply fortemporarystatus,citizenswouldsimplybe leftwithoutanyrightsonthedayaftertransitionandit isnotclearwhethertheywouldbeabletoapplytostayunder any new immigration system to be introduced. Similar concerns arise if adeclaratorysystemapplied.

4. Linkedto this,will thosewhoarrivepostUKexit fromtheEUbutduring transitionbecovered by the personal scope and become part of the protected group under theWithdrawalAgreement?

SpecificissuesrelatingtoUKcitizensintheEU

5. What will the rights of UK citizens in the EU be? Will they only have rights of freemovementorwill they continue tobenefit fromEUcitizenship rightsunderArticle20TFEUaswellduringtransition?

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6. Guarantees should be sought that the protection fromdiscrimination that applies (byvirtue of Article 18 TFEU and Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 on freemovement) willcontinuetoapplytoUKcitizensduringthetransitionperiod;

7. UK citizenswhoholdpositions in local councils in otherMember States (for example,representatives of communities of UK citizens in local councils in Spain) should beallowed to continue in post at least until the end of the period of their mandate;changes innational lawshouldbeexplored inareaswith largeBritish communities sothatsuchrepresentationcancontinue.

8. Clarificationshouldbesoughtas towhetherMemberStateswillwithdrawtherightofconsularprotectionfromUKcitizenstravellingoutsideoftheEUsothataninformationcampaign can be undertaken to inform UK citizens – perhaps as regards key thirdcountrylocations-ofthisfact;

9. Petitions lodged by UK citizens before the date of Brexit should be protected;clarificationshouldbesoughtfromtheEPastowhetherinpracticetheyadmitpetitionsfromthirdcountrynationalsconcerningtheirrightsunderEUlaw;

10. ClarificationshouldbesoughtfromtheEUabouttherightofUKcitizens(generally)towritetotheEUafterBrexit;

11. European Citizens Initiatives launched by UK citizens before Brexit should be givenprotectionandallowedtoruntheircourse.

Nationallawissues

12. Therewill also be issues as regards how national rules e.g. on dual citizenshipwheresuchdualcitizenshipisonlypossibleifthesecondcitizenshipisanotherEUcitizenship,butalsoinrelationtomatterscoveredbytheWithdrawalAgreemente.g.thecontinuedrecognition of professional qualifications during this period, as the WithdrawalAgreementwillnotyetapply(suchqualificationswillneedtobedeemedtobeMemberStatequalificationsforthedurationoftransition).

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III. SpecificIssuesinrelationtodomesticimplementationbytheUKgovernment

Several key issuesarisewhenconsideringhow theUKgovernmentwill look to implementthisagreement12.

Voluntarystatus

The UK government intends to roll out a voluntary scheme by the end of the year. Weunderstandthatthedesign,rulesandimplementationofthiswillrunalongsidethepartiesdraftingof theWA.Wehaveconcernsabout theriskofdivergenceand lackofscrutinyofthese rules and wish for the UK government to be transparent in its approach. Whilstthe3millionandothergroupshavebeen invited tousergroupmeetings,whichhavebeenwelcomed, they do not provide sufficient urgent insight into the scheme. Given thescheme’s significance,wehope foramore forwarddiscussionondetailsas setout in thispaperandthosethatariseinthefuture.Itisnotclearhowtheproposedschemewillworkinpractice,andwhatthestatuswouldbeofpersonswhomadeavoluntaryapplicationforthenew status prior to the Withdrawal Agreement being ratified and who were refused. Inaddition,itisnotclearifthenewvoluntaryapplicationprocesscouldbeusedtoproceedtoanapplication forcitizenship.Notably, thosewhodonotapply fororarenotsuccessful inacquiring the new status may then be illegally in the UK. The consequences of this areexpandedonbelow.

Graceperiodanderrors

Agraceperiodofatleasttwoyearsafterexithasbeenagreedwithinwhichcitizenswillbeobligedtoapply for thenewstatusor face illegalityand/or removal fromtheUK. It isnotclear how this status will be documented and what employers, landlords, the NationalHealthSystem(NHS)andotheragencieswillknowwhattodointhecircumstances,andhowtheycanbechallengedinthecaseoferrors.Giventhenumbersinvolvedintheapplicationprocess, great concerns have been raised about thecriteria that will be applied,theaggressiveapproach by the UK government previously adopted andthehistoricalproblemsithasconsistentlyhadwithmanagingapplicationsorcomplyingwithcourtorders. Inaddition, recenterrorratesofapplications forpermanentresidenceintheUK have been 10%. This has all been extensively reported on in theUK13andGermany14.

Furthermore,budgetcuts,lackofcaseworkersandtrainingandgenerallackofresourcesinthe Home Office are also cause for concern and have been addressed in previoussubmissionstothenegotiators.

Onlineratherthanlocalapplications

Themethodologyofapplicationweunderstandwill incorporateanewonlinesystemusingexisting data held by UK government on tax, pensions andbenefits and on policedatabases.It isnot clearwhetherandhow international criminaldatabaseswouldalsobechecked. Tax (HMRC),work and pensions (DWP) systems in the UK experience their own

12WehavemaintainedconsistentcritiqueoftheUKGovernment’sapproachtothesenegotiationsandhaveprovideddetailcommentontheirproposal,previousbehaviourandcurrentactivities.Fordetailedanalysispleasereviewthepublicationssectionofthe3millionwebsiteat:https://www.the3million.org.uk/publications13https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/dec/25/asylum-offices-constant-state-crisis-say-whistleblowers-home-office14http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/as-brexit-nears-harrassment-of-eu-citizens-in-uk-rises-a-1181845.html

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errors and data processing problems 15 16 . This will place another burden on onlineapplications17. Moreover, there are no provisions for those who cannot access onlinesystemsorwhoarenotITliterate.Thereisnoexplanationastowhatothermeansofdataminingwouldbeusedasverificationofanapplicant’sIDoremploymentstatusifapplicantstonotappearonHMRCorDWPdatabases18.

Processingperiod

TheUKhasindicatedthatitwouldresolveapplicationswithina2-weekperiod.However,afirm commitment to such a 2-weekperiod as soughtby theHouseof Lordshasnotbeenforthcomingtodate.Inviewofthemanybarrierstoa‘constitutive’,on-lineapplicationandwell-documentedHomeOfficeproblemswehaveseriousdoubtsaboutthistimeline.

EU27citizenswithexistingIndefiniteLeavetoRemain(ILR)

It is unclearwhether or not EU27 citizenswho already possess indefinite leave to remaindocumentswillbeabletoacquirethenewstatusforfreeandwhethertheyhavetoundergoabsence,criminalityandotherchecks.Serious insurmountableevidential issuescouldariseintheircase.

Deportationsandremovals

TheUKgovernmenthasahistoryofaggressivelypursuingandremovingforeigncriminals19.Thesedecisions arenot always lawful. Thiswas recentlydemonstratedby theCJEU rulingthatconfirmedthatroughsleepingdidnotconstituteanabuseofrightsbyEUnationalsthusjudging the deportation of such citizens by the UK government as unlawful20. The UKgovernmentwillcontinuetohavetheabilitytoremovepotentialdeporteespendingappealsofdecisions.

Appealrights

These are not always guaranteed, for instance there are none in respect of voluntaryapplicationsduringtheperiodbeforetheschemebecomesstatutory.Thereisnorightofin-countryappealincaseofrejectionsduetoallegedfraud.

JudicialoversightandAccesstoJustice

In view of the above it is particularly important to ensure that the UK government issufficientlyresourcedandmonitored.Accesstojusticewillbeessentialinsuchcases.Legalaidisnotstrictlyavailabletothosewhowishforlegalassistancewithimmigrationmatters.The issue of access to justice, and specifically the cost of litigation, is rightly becoming amajor constitutional issue in the UK21. This raises concerns about how EU27 citizens,especiallythosewithfewerresources,willaccess legalrepresentationshouldtheyneedto 15https://www.ft.com/content/a913f086-7838-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca7116http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/dwp-blunder-sees-75000-disability-1154145017https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/20/civil-servants-bordering-onclueless-over-brexit18http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/public-health-england-nhs-department-of-health-doctors-of-the-world-immigrants-data-sharing-a7709856.html19https://theconversation.com/when-britain-can-deport-eu-citizens-according-to-the-law-86896?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=facebookbutton20http://dpglaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Approved-judgment-RGureckis-v-SSHD-Ors.pdf21https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/10/26/tom-hickman-public-laws-disgrace-part-2/

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challengetheUKgovernment.Thecourtssystemisalreadyunderstrain,andpeopleseekingto challenge refusals or rejections of their applications or allegations of fraud in theapplicationprocessfacebarrierstoaccessingjustice.

Errorsandomissionsleadingtoallegationsoffraud

Simple errors or omissions inmaking an application for thenew statusmay also result ingovernment allegations of fraud. This is a criminal offence with grave consequencesincluding detention and deportation. This could result in applicants having to take legalactiontocleartheirnamefromoutsidetheUKoraspartofcriminalproceedings.

Failingtoobtainthenewstatus

Theramificationsofnotacquiringthenewstatus—whichmightbeasaresultofanerrorbythe UK government — are sizeable.Firstly, those who do not acquire the status will beillegally in the UK and at risk of criminal prosecution.Secondly, they will be liable todetentionandremovalfromtheUK.TheUKistheonlycountryintheEUtohaveindefinitedetention for immigration cases.Thirdly, they will become victim to the ‘HostileEnvironment’, a set of measures, both administrative and legislative, to make life somiserable for anyone without immigration status that they will 'self-remove'. It includeslimitingaccess toemployment,housing,healthcare, confiscatingadriving licence, freezingbank accounts, restricting rights of appeal against the Home Office's decisions. And theHome Office has a tendency to appeal decisions then delay the appeal processunnecessarily. There is even a historyof non-compliancewithorders of the courts. Theseissuesarewelldocumentedinthepublicdomain.[6]

The3millionhaveshown in theirAlternativeProposal22that there isaviablealternative tothe constitutive ‘settled status’ proposal. The EU and UK can and should agree a moreflexible,fairapproachtoregistrationthat isrootedintheabsolutepreservationofexistingrights.TheUKandEUshouldagreethatonlyadeclaratory, local, lighttouchapproachwillremovetheriskofEUcitizenslivingintheUKfallingintothehostileenvironment.

22https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0d3854_fb9c73b134584fc6aebe335b29604322.pdf

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IV. The inadequacy of Third Country National (TCN) legislation as compared to EUcitizenshiprights:WhyaDefaulttoThirdCountryNationalStatusisnotacceptableorcomparabletoEUcitizenship

Introductoryremarks

When the UK leaves the EU it will be a third country andUK citizenswill become, in EUterminology,thirdcountrynationals(TCNs).Moreover,theywillbethirdcountrynationalswithout the usual TCN entry and residence documents. One aim of the WithdrawalAgreement, as we see it, is to protect UK citizens and their family members, currentlyexercisingrightsasEUcitizensinEUcountries,fromtheseharshconsequences.WesetoutbelowwhyitisnotacceptableforBritishcitizenslivinginEUcountriestobe“transferred”toTCNstatusunderEU lawand furthermorewhy it shouldnotbeaccepted thatgaps in theWithdrawalAgreementcanbesomehow“plugged”withrightsundertheEUacquisforthirdcountrynationals.

As the analysis below sets out, the rights given to third country nationals resident in EUMember States are in many circumstances inferior to those enjoyed by EU citizens. Inparticular, there are a range of issues of central importance for the ability of UK citizensliving in the EU to carry on living their lives and making their livelihood as at present –mobilitybetweenMemberStates,rightsofself-employment,abilitytoprovidecross-borderservicesandrecognitionofprofessionalqualifications–whicharenotadequatelyprovidedforintheEUacquisforthirdcountrynationals.Thesegapswillbelookedatinmoredetailbelow in the context of “no deal” and Withdrawal Agreement scenarios, in addition toconsideringsomeofthepositiveaspectsthattheEUacquisonTCNmayprovide.

TheEUacquisonthirdcountrynationals

Theguidingapproachtotherightsofthirdcountrynationalsresiding legally intheEUwasgiven in 1999 in the Tampere European Council conclusions, namely that third-countrynationalswhohadresidedlegallyinaMemberStateforaperiodoftimeandholdingalong-termresidencepermitshouldbegrantedinthatMemberStateasetofuniformrightswhicharenearaspossibletothoseenjoyedbycitizensoftheEU.

Since Tampere therefore, the EU, on the basis of its common immigration policy, hasgraduallydevelopedabodyofsecondarylegislationdealingwiththeentry,residence,righttoworkandotherrightsofthirdcountrynationalsintheEU(includingthoseoftheirfamilymembers). Denmark however does not participate in the common immigration policy,meaningitdoesnotapplytheEUacquisonTCNs.Ireland(alongwiththeUK)hasarighttoopt in. This immediately shows the problem with falling back on this acquis: this issecondarylegislation,whichappliesatmostEU-26andinsomecasesEU-25.

EU competence in this area is sharedwith theMember States. Thismeans that nationallegislationconcerningthirdcountrynationalscaninsomecasesapplyinparallel.Inaddition,given that competence is shared and rights are given via national implementation of EUdirectives, there can be significant differences in the wayMember States deal with thirdcountrynationalsundertheirnationallaw(soaUKcitizeninItaly,forexample,mayfaceaverydifferentsituationtoaUKcitizenlivinginGermany).ItisverydifferenttothepositionofEUcitizenswhoenjoyuniformrightsbyvirtueofthedirecteffectofTreatyprovisions.

ThekeyinstrumentsdealingwithrightsofthirdcountrynationalundertheEUacquisareasfollows:

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• Directive 2003/2009 concerning the status of third-country nationals who arelong-termresidents(“thelong-termresidencedirective);

• Regulation1231/2011onsocialsecuritycoordinationforthirdcountrynationalslegallyresidentandincross-bordersituationintheEU;23

• Directive2003/86/EContherighttofamilyreunification;• Directive2004/114/ECof13December2004ontheconditionsofadmissionof

third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange,unremunerated training or voluntary service (to be replaced as from 23May2018byDirective2016/801-seebelow);

• Directive 2005/71 on admitting TCNs for purpose of scientific research (to bereplacedasfrom23May2018byDirective2016/801-seebelow);

• Directive2009/50/EContheconditionsofentryandresidenceofthird-countrynationals for the purposes of highly-qualified employment (“the Blue Carddirective”-proposaltoreviseunderconsiderationbyco-legislators);

• Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for third countrynationalstoresideandwork(“SinglePermitdirective”);

• Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-countrynationalsforthepurposeofseasonalemployment;

• Directive2014/66/EUontheconditionsofentryandresidenceofthird-countrynationalsintheframeworkofanintra-corporatetransfer.

• Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntaryservice, pupil exchange schemesor educational projects and aupairing (to betransposedbytheMemberStatesby23May2018).

The relationship between the various directives dealing with the rights of third countrynationals(atableofwhichisattachedatend) iscomplexandtheEuropeanCommissioniscurrentlylookingatthecoherenceandrelevanceofcertaininstrumentsinthecontextofaso-calledREFITFitnessCheck,theresultsofwhichareexpectedtobepublishedinmid-2018.Moreover,Directive2009/50/ECon theconditionsofentryand residenceof third-countrynationals for the purposes of highly-qualified employment (the so-called “Blue CardDirective”) is intheprocessofsubstantial revision(Commissionproposalof June2016stillunder negotiation: adoption expected summer 2018). It cannot be discounted that therevisionofthislegislationmayinsomewaytakeintoaccountthefactthatUKcitizenswillinthefuturebewithinitspersonalscope.

The revision of the Blue Card Directive is of particular interest as one of the main aimsbehind its revision is to make better provision for the intra-EU mobility of third countryhighlyskilledworkersintheEU.24TheproposalunderlineshowtheCommissionseesaneedtoimprovetheprovisionforintra-EUmobilityofthirdcountrynationals.ThisisunderlinedbytheEuropeanMigrationNetwork’s2013studyontheintra-EUmobilityofThirdCountryNationals,whichfound:25

“The EU migration Directives that provide for mobility of third-country nationals, leavesignificantareasofdiscretiontoMemberStates,andthereforetonationallawsinshapingmobility. Member States, acting legally, can and do limit or encourage such mobility,according to their national policies and priorities, thus creating differences in rules and 23Ireland opted into this regulation but the UK did not. The UK did opt into the similar but older Regulation 859/2003, suggesting that the EU-27 may apply this older Regulation vis-a-vis UK citizens 24 COM(2016) 378 final, see for example the explanatory memorandum and recitals 38-41. 25 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/immigration/docs/studies/emn-synthesis_report_intra_eu_mobility_final_july_2013.pdf

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practice across the Member States…On a practical level, burdensome requirements forentrepreneursandself-employedpersonscanpreventmobilethird-countrynationalsfromsettling in another Member State. Burdensome processes related to the recognition ofdegrees and diplomas and particularly, the associated cost, duration and documentationrequirementsmaydeterthird-countrynationalsfrommoving”.

Intheeventofanodeal:defaulttothirdcountrynationalstatus?

BritishinEuropehasbeenaskedonanumberofoccasions:“Whatwouldbetheeffectofnodeal?” The short answer to the question is that nobody knows for certain. The longeranswer is that the default position for UK citizens in the EU would be a mixture of EU,national, and international law (including the EuropeanConventiononHumanRights). Interms of EU law, the application of the EU acquis on third country nationals would becentral,atleastinthose25MemberStateswhereitapplies.

TheLongTermResidenceDirective

Directive2003/109 concerning the statusof TCNswhoare long-term residents (“the LongTermResidenceDirective”)wouldbeparticularly important inthiscontext. ThisDirective,following on from the mandate given at Tampere, grants a specific “long-term resident”statustoTCNswhohaveresidedlegallyandcontinuouslywithintheterritoryofaMemberStateforfiveyears.Applicantsforthisstatusmustshowthattheyhavestableandregularresources to provide for themselves and their families and comprehensive sicknessinsurance. There is also provision for Member States to apply national integrationconditions (forexample,attendanceat languagecourses). Theconditionstoacquire long-term resident status are therefore more stringent than those that apply to permanentresidenceforEUcitizens.Similarly,thefamilymemberswhocanenjoyrightswiththelong-termresident,aredefinedmorerestrictivelythanfamilymembersundertheEUCitizenshipDirective.

Asregardsrights,long-termresidentsenjoyequaltreatmentrightswithnationalsinarangeof areas (e.g. access to employment, education and vocational training, social security(including healthcare) and social assistance) but a series of derogations apply. There is arighttoequaltreatmentasregardsrecognitionofprofessionaldiplomasandqualifications–thisishoweverrecognitioninnationallawonlyandnationalproceduresandcostswillapply.As regards intra-EU mobility, long-term residents have the possibility to reside in theterritory of anotherMember State for the purposes of employment or self-employment,pursuitofvocationaltrainingorstudies,or“otherpurposes”.ThedirectivemakesclearthatthisrightishoweverwithoutprejudicetothesecondMemberState’scompetencetoapplyitsownlabourmarketpolicyasregardsadmissiontoitslabourmarket.So,forexample,ifaMemberStateappliesquotasonthenumberofthirdcountrynationalsadmittedtocertainjobs or professions, it would still be entitled to apply these. There is also an explicitexclusionwith regard to residence inanotherMemberState forprovidersof cross-borderservices.26Inshort,thestatusgrantedundertheLongTermResidenceDirectiveismuchless favourable than EU citizenship: there is no free movement and no right to provideservicesinasecondMemberState.

Wealsonotethe2011EUCommissionreportintothetransposition/implementationoftheDirective which described the situation, five years after it entered into force, as

26Article14(5)(b)ofDirective2003/109/EC.

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“deplorable.”SeveraloftheMemberStatesthatarehometothelargestcommunitiesofUKcitizens in the EU were found to be in contravention of key provisions of the directive,includingdefinitionofstatus,refusalofstatus,givinglongtermresidentstherighttochoosebetweenapermitundernationalimmigrationlaworEUlaw,costsofapplyingforapermit,higher fees for tertiary education than are charged to EEA nationals and quotas onworkpermitsforlongtermresidentsmovingfromoneEUmemberstatetoanother27.UnderitsFitness Check (referred to above), the EU is currently reviewing the workings of thisDirective,butitcouldbesomeyearsbeforeanyreformismade.

ImpactofotherEUthirdcountrynationalacquis

Other instrumentspartof theEUTCNacquiscouldalsoprovidesomedefaultrights inthecaseofno-deal.Inparticular,theso-called“SinglePermitDirective”(Directive2011/98/EU),whichprovidesacatalogueofequaltreatmentrightsto“thirdcountryworkers”–personslegally residingandallowedtowork–couldprovidesomerights for thoseUKcitizensnotyet covered by the Long-term Residence Directive. Equal treatment with nationals asregards recognition of qualifications and equal treatment as regards social security(including healthcare) is, for example, covered. For students and researchers and theirfamilymembers,Directive2016/801,governingconditionsofentryandresidenceforTCNsfor purposeof research, studies, training and volunteering, sets out the various residenceconditions and certain limited intra-EU mobility rights for the purposes of study andresearch.

Healthandsocialsecurity

In a no-deal situation, the reciprocal healthcare system based on Regulation 883/2004would fall away with potential implications for provision of healthcare for UK citizenscovered by an S1. However, most of the EU TCN instruments mentioned above give topersons within their scope a right to equal treatment with nationals as regards socialsecurity(atermunderEUlawwhichalsoincludeshealthcare).28TheseTCNequaltreatmentprovisionscouldthereforeprovideapotentialsolutiontothisparticularissue.29Theywouldnothoweverprovidea solution to thequestionofpensionupratingby theUK,which is amatter which could best be solved by the UK unilaterally or, alternatively, via bilateralagreementsmadebetweentheUKandeachMemberStateofresidence.

Regulation 1231/10 extends the EU’s social security coordination rules (in Regulation883/2004) to thirdcountrynationals,whoare legally resident inaMemberStateand inacross-border situation. Thismeans that the rules in Regulation 883/2004 could thereforecontinuetoapplytoUKcitizensresidinginanEU-27countryandmovingtoanotherEU-27countryiflegallyresidentandinacross-bordersituation.So,aUKcitizenlivingandinsuredfor healthcare in Germany could use an EHIC card when going on holiday to Spain, for

27ReportfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliamentandCouncilontheImplementationofDirective2003/109/ECCOM(2011)585final:https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/http%3A//ec.europa.euwhat-we-do/policies/pdf//1_en_act_part1_v62_en.pdf28SeeArticle11(1)(c)LongTermResidenceDirective(Directive2003/109/EC);Article12(1)(f)SinglePermit;Article11(2)ofDirective2016/801inthecaseofaccesstohealthcareforstudents.29ThisisprovidedthatMemberStatesapproachreasonablytherequirementtohavecomprehensivesicknessinsuranceinordertoobtainforexamplelong-termresidentstatusinthefirstplace.TheCommission’s2009CommunicationinterpretingtheFreeMovementDirective(COM(2009)313)ishoweverhelpfulinthisregard:seepoint2.3.2,whichmakesclearthathealthcareprovidedonthebasisofanS1istoberegardedascomprehensivesicknessinsurance.

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example. Similarly,thepossibilityforaUKcitizentoaggregate insuranceperiodsforworkundertakeninEU-27countrieswouldalsocontinueonthebasisofRegulation883/2004.

In theeventofadealunder theWithdrawalAgreement thatdoesnot coverall existingrights

IntheeventofadealundertheWithdrawalAgreement(“WA”)toprotecttherightsofUKcitizenslivingintheEU,thequestionarisesastohowtherightsgivenbytheWAwillinteractwith the rights in the EU acquis for third country nationals. There are two key issues forBritishinEuropehere:(1)cantherightsintheEUTCNacquisbeusedtomakeupforgapsintheWA;and(2)GiventhatthatcitizenscoveredbytheWAwillhave“specialstatus”,30willitnonetheless be possible for UK citizens with such “special status” to benefit from rightscontainedintheEUacquisforTCNs?

CanrightsundertheTCNacquismakeupforgapsintheWithdrawalAgreement?

IthasbeensuggestedtoBritishinEuropethat,wheretheWithdrawalAgreementdoesnotprovide rights for UK citizens, they can nonetheless fall back on the EU acquis for TCNs.The gaps in the WA of most concern are free movement between Member States,recognition of professional qualifications, the possibility to work in an employed or self-employed capacity in anotherMember State (or a number ofMember States) and/or toprovidecross-borderservices.YetthebriefanalysisoftheTCNacquisaboveshowsthatitispreciselyintheseareaswhereitisatitsweakest:thirdcountrynationalsmayhavearighttoworkinanemployedorself-employedcapacityinoneMemberStatebutmovingtoworkortakeupself-employmentinanotherMemberStateusuallydependsonanauthorisationbythenewMemberState;whilethereisarighttomoveforupto90dayswithintheSchengenzone, there is no right to carry on a business activity in anotherMember State. Variousinstruments(e.g.longtermresidencedirective/SinglePermitDirective)containarighttobetreatedequallywithnationalsasregardsrecognitionofprofessionalandothereducationalqualifications, but this is very different from a guarantee that the qualification will berecognised(if it isnotrecognisedforanational, itwillnotberecognisedforaTCNeither)anditcaninvolvelengthynationalproceduresandconsiderablecost.

Inshort,relianceontheTCNacquiscannotmakeupthesemajorgaps intheWA. Certaininstruments, such as Regulation 1231/10 on social security coordination formobile TCNs,willhoweverbebeneficial.

WillUK citizensand their familymemberswithin scopeof theWAbeable tobenefit fromrightsundertheTCNacquis?

TheCommission’sCommunicationof8.12.2017onthestateofprogressofthenegotiationswith theUK acknowledges thatUK citizens covered by theWAwill have “special status.”Theimmediatequestioniswhetherwecanhavethis“specialstatus”butatthesametimebenefitfromrightsgiventoTCNundertheEUacquis.Will“mixandmatch”ofspecialstatusandotherTCNrightsbepossible?

Secondly, as set out above, the EU’s acquis on rights of TCN is complex: a particularcomplexity is that, if apersonhas rightsunderone instrument,he isoftenexcluded fromrights under other instruments. So, for example, long-term residents are excluded fromrightsundertheSinglePermitDirective,theBlueCardDirectiveandfromrightsunderthe

30Commission’sCommunicationof8.12.17onthestateofprogressofthenegotiations.

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third country researchers and studentdirective. It cannot thereforebe taken for grantedthatUKcitizenscoveredbytheWAwillbenefitfromrightsundertheEUacquisforTCNs.Inaddition,inthemajorityoftheinstruments,theapplicanthastofulfilcertainconditionsforadmissiontotheEU,oneofwhichcanberesidingoutsideoftheterritoryoftheEUatthetimeofapplication:forUKcitizens living intheEU,theseconditionscannotbefulfilled.Tocircumventthesevariousproblems,wesuggestthattheWAshouldexplicitlyguaranteethatweareentitledtobenefitfromrightsgivenundertheTCNacquis.

Thereisalsothequestionofourfamilymembers.AnumberoftheTCNdirectivesexcludefrom their scope family members of EU citizens who have exercised their right of freemovement.Thisgeneralexclusion(whichcouldcatchpotentiallybothEUandthirdcountryfamilymembers)shouldintheinterestsoflegalcertaintyalsobedealtwithintheWAandsetaside.

BritishinEuropeandthe3million

23January2018