The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 1 | Number 5 | Article ID 4845 | Jan 01, 2016

1

Coercion and Co-optation of Indochinese Worker-Soldiers inWorld War I: Mort pour la France

Geoffrey Gunn

Summary

Alongside even larger numbers of contingentsdrawn from France's colonial empire, includinga large pool of workers sourced from China,successive contingents of "Indochinese" -Vietnamese in addition to Cambodians - werealso pressed into both military and laborbattalions in World War I battlefields. Besidesexplaining the battlefield experiences of theIndochinese battalions in the European war – alittle studied area – this article seeks to exposethe contradictions raised by France's patrioticappeal for "volunteers," versus the domesticanti-colonial movement. On another level, thearticle examines the juncture between theworker-soldiers in France and the burgeoningsocialist and communist underground in Paris,and back home in Vietnam, as best exemplifiedby the activities and writings of Ho Chi Minh inthe run-up to his now-famous oration at theVersailles Conference.

Introduction

Faced with early setbacks in World War Ibattles on the Western Front, alongside amassive attrition of manpower, France beganto look to its empire and even China as sourcesof labor alongside soldiers. EventuallyIndochina would supply some 30 percent ofFrance's colonial forces alongside even largercontingents of Senegalese, Madagascans, andMoroccans and Chinese, in all totaling abouthalf a million.

French colonial troops

While the lion's share of the "Indochinese"were Vietnamese, Cambodians also made upone battalion. While the transformative andemotional experiences of the soldier (linh tho)-workers in France has been the subject of atleast one dedicated study in English (Hill, 2006;2011a; 2011b), I am equally concerned with theobjective experience of the Indochinese enroute to the battlefields, their wartime actions,

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

2

and intellectual responses. A horrible war byany standards, it was not surprising that manythousands of Vietnamese and Cambodiansmade the supreme sacrifice, or died for France("mort pour la France)" as written on theepitaphs of those buried in France. I am alsoconcerned to link Indochinese participation inthe war with the "anti-war"and/or anti-colonialmovement in Paris and in Indochina.

In sequence, the article seeks; first, to examinelabor and military recruitment at the source,including the special roles of the royal courts;second, to assess the role played by theIndochinese infantry battalions pressed into thetrenches in the Somme as well as in theBalkans; third, to expose the contradictionsposed by France's patriotic appeal for"volunteers" versus the anti-colonial movementat home and in the colonies; and, finally, toexamine the juncture between the émigréworker-soldiers in France and the activities ofthe burgeoning socialist and communistunderground in Paris and, back hone, as bestexemplified by the activities and writings of HoChi Minh including the now-famous petition hepresented on June 18, 1919 at the VersaillesPeace Conference, the international gatheringthat literally bookended the war.

In particular I have examined little knownJournal de Marche et Opérations documents, inturn sourced to the French Service Historiquede la Défense (SHD), Départment de l'armée deTerre, to offer details on the journey of theconscripts to France, as well as their labor andfrontline deployment in France and, in onecase, in the Balkans. Taking the form of a diary,it is possible to track each of the battalionsfrom their date of departure, arrival,deployment, service, and date of disbandment.Indispensable as possibly the only extantbattalion-level documents relating to the actualwork-combat experience of the Indochinese,the journals are nevertheless uneven incomposition, and lacking in mobilization-demobilization details, evasive on casualty

rates, and suffering from over-generalization.Written by French battalion commanders, thesubaltern character of the Indochinese can betaken for granted, just as their voices aremissing.

General Mobilization in Indochina/WarEconomy

Up until the outbreak of the "Great War"(1914-18), the total number of Indochineseimmigrants in France scarcely exceededseveral hundred. But as France turned to itscolonial empire to defend itself in the widerwar with Germany both at home and in theBalkans, the wave of Vietnamese soldier-workers arriving in France spiked in the1915-1919 period to a figure of 42,922tirailleurs (rifle company or infantry) and49,180 workers (Brocheux 2012). Theycomprised together 15 infantry battalions andlogistics formations. Among the latter were9,019 male nurses and 5,339 clerical andadministrative workers. Additionally, therewere 48,981 civilian workers divided betweenspecialists and non-specialists assigned to 129metropolitan establishments. By origin, the93,411 worker-soldier (practically all male)hailed from, respectively, Tonkin or northernVietnam with some 24 percent, Annam orcentral Vietnam, 32 percent, and withCochinchina or southern Vietnam andCambodia with around 22 percent share (Rives2013). The wartime experience of theIndochinese might be compared to that of theChinese recruited by France and Great Britain,140,000 in all, almost exclusively pressed intolabor and logistics work (Calvo and Bao 2015).As explained below, the Vietnamese experiencein France more closely resembled that of thecan contingents.

T h e m e c h a n i z e d w a r t h a t b l e d t h eindustrialized nations of their physicalresources in the production of munitions andweapons of destruction was no less a war forresources calling upon global – read imperial -

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

3

supply networks to feed metropolitan industryand to succor its armies. As with the Britishempire, so the French looked upon its coloniesfor these resources. Notably, on August 8,1914, Paris banned all exports of cereals andcattle from Indochina with the exception ofmarkets in France, England, the NetherlandsIndies, Japan, Russia and other French or Alliedcolonies (ANC 15765 Correspondancesconcernant la guerre...1914-18, GouverneurGénéral Indochine, Aug. 8, 1914). In otherwords, trade with Allies was sanctioned whiletrade with the German enemy was foreclosed

In an order of November 6, 1914, repeatedMarch 28, 1915, the French military inIndochina prepared for a general mobilization.Simultaneously, a "state of siege" was declaredin Cochinchina, administered directly as acolony, and in Tonkin, a de facto colonial setup.Orders went out from the Ministry of War toregister all French males in residence inCochinchina as well as in Cambodia, then aFrench protectorate , wi th a v iew tomobilization. This was accomplished withrespect to those employed in governmentservices according to department. Certaingroups fell through the cracks but were stillliable for conscription. As of September 18,1914, all reservists and French citizens up tothe age of 46 were called up. Alongside theregulatory character of the mobilization, thepatriotism of the French was also called upon.There is no evidence of anti-war opposition onthe part of French in Indochina and, as withmetropolitan French, most were initially stirredby patriotism.

It should be understood that, having invadedVietnam in stages, France also began to raiseloyalist battalions serving as auxiliaries in aversion of colonial divide and rule againstongoing rebellions. This held not only inVietnam, but also in Cambodia and Laos,especially when it came to "pacifying" ethnicminority rebels and other "bandit" gangs. .From May 1900, Vietnamese auxiliaries also

served with French forces in the BoxerRebellion in China, including Vietnamesesailors in service with the French navy (fivewarships). Not all returned home alive. Thegraves of 20 Vietnamese sailors killed in theBoxer Rebellion alongside French officersremain in one of Nagasaki's internationalcemeteries.

Vietnamese grave from Boxer Rebellion inChina, 1900. Nagasaki cemetery (photo creditGeoffrey Gunn)

Mobilization of Indigenous Populations

Alongside the mobilization of French citizens,the colonial administration also sought to tapreserves of indigenous manpower, includingreservists. Besides outright conscriptionwinning over the native population in Indochinawas carried out on a number of levels, frompersuasion, to inducements, to deception.

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

4

Contemporary (?) official Vietnamese historiesare unambiguous in asserting the forced natureof wartime recruitment of soldier-workers,facts repeated in a number of internationalhistories (e.g. Marr 1971, 229-30). Kimloan Hill(2011a, 55) by contrast has argued that mostrecruits volunteered, noting only isolatedincidents in which individuals were coerced"not a general narrative of mass conscription."She thus falls in line with the general argumentmade by French military historian ColonelRives who highlights the attraction ofmetropolitan France for the Indochinese insearch of adventure as well as new skills. Asevidence of pull factors, Hill mentions that theImperial Court of Hue offered 200 francs toeach volunteer who passed a physicalexamination. Other inducements includedbonuses, family allowances, and – important –exemption from the compulsory and despisedbody tax. The recruits also received a base payof 0.75 francs a day, rising with seniority. Asshe claims, a package arrangement includingbonuses, wages, pensions and familyallowances is simply not consistent with out-and-out conscription (Hill 2006, 259), althoughthis detail might be questioned.

In the absence of village-level documentationthis conundrum is difficult to answer. First, wemust acknowledge the role of the royal housesalong with pro-French mandarins in therecruitment of, respectively, natives ofCambodia and those coming under thejurisdiction of the Court of Hue in Annam, both"protectorates" in the French Indochina set-up.We must also acknowledge government controlover information and pro-France-anti-Germanpropaganda. Recruitment posters promisedprosperity and racial equality. According tomilitary historian Rives (2013), to facilitaterecruitment, propaganda films playing up thelavish lifestyle of the volunteers in France wereshown at the village level. Posters appeared inall the major towns offering an image of asharpshooter pointing out to a crouchedpeasant all the material benefits of recruitment.

Hill (2006) also allows for push factors favoringrecruitment as with hardships stemming fromthe floods of 1913-15 in northern Vietnam,along with drought and rural banditry incentral Vietnam and here I am in agreement.For the indigent landless Vietnamese,especially from the overcrowded northern deltaand the marginal and poverty-stricken centralVietnam coastal region, there was every reasonto move out, just as future generations wouldbe lured into the mining camps of Laos andnorthern Vietnam, or as plantation labor in thesouth or even overseas, more often than not indeplorable conditions and with high mortality.But all labor recruitment in colonial Vietnamwas a mix of inducements and pressure and, asI argued above, we can expect that wartimelabor recruitment was no exception.Undoubtedly, to use the expression of TobiasRettig (2005), these were "contested loyalties."

Cambodian Princes

In Cambodia, the patriotism of the royal familywas used to induce the conscription of theirunlettered subjects or country cousins. Withthe permission of King Sisowath Monivong(r.1904-27), seven royal princes were inductedinto the 20th Bataillon de Tirailleurs Indochinois(BTI) for service in France, three of themactively recruited by the king. The princes weregranted specia l a l lowances, as withsubventions to provide for their families in theirabsence. King Sisowath himself signed off on aroyal ordinance declaiming the "voluntary"action of the princes in joining the 20thBattalion "for the war in France" (ANC 10421"Princes éngagés au 20 Bataillon Indochinois,Oct. 28, 1916). In fact, such members of theroyal family as crown prince SisowathMonivong, a graduate of the Saint-Maixentmilitary academy and a second lieutenant inthe Foreign Legion, actively engaged in therecruitment of Cambodians for the World War Ieffort.

Undoubtedly, in a protectorate of highly

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

5

restricted literacy matched by informationcontrol, recruitment of Cambodians for the"war in France" proceeded more easily with theroyal volunteers stepping into the breech. Atthe moment of their departure for France fromSaigon, the Cambodian volunteers were offereda "spectacular" official salute. Practically, thefirst Cambodians to set foot on a ship, muchless leave their natal provinces, their liveswould never be quite the same again.

Certain Indochinese who had been students inFrance or Algeria were inducted directly intometropolitan units as subjects of France andonly subsequently admitted to the BTI. Amongthem were the Cambodian princes Pinoret andWatchayavong along with the Vietnamese,Nguyên Ba Luan. They were joined by studentsfrom trade and professional schools in Aix-en-Provence and Angers (Rives 2013).

The Journey

Depending upon place of recruitment, asrevealed in Journal de Marche documents, thesoldier-worker battalions departed fromHaiphong, Danang, and Saigon, variouslynorth, central and southern Vietnam.

Vietnamese soldiers enter St. Raphael

Dubbed "Indochinese," especial ly as

"Vietnamese" did not enter French vocabularyuntil after the August Revolution of 1945, theFrench were also careful to maintain thecohesion of these regionally recruitedbattalions. Ships departing from northern portsinvariably staged at Saigon before embarkingupon the long journey to France. Typically theships would bunker at Singapore, Penang insome cases, Colombo, Aden, Suez, and one ortwo Mediterranean ports prior to arrival inMarseilles. One variation was a stage at DiegoSuarez on Madagascar. Another was atDjibouti. Nevertheless, there were a number ofvariations upon the typical six week passage,either delayed departure or circumstances enroute.

Shipboard conditions, in the words of oneanalyst, were the first "disillusionment"experienced by the travelers (Hill 2011a: 55).This is not only a reference to overcrowdedconditions and poor food (at least onecontingent rioted over this question even priorto departure in Haiphong) but illness anddeath. The case of the 13th Battalion, raised innorthern Vietnam is illustrative. DepartingHaiphong on March 29, 1916 on the SSAmazone, an outbreak of cholera forced adisembarkation and the quarantining of thebattalion in Saigon. Obliged to continue theirjourney aboard the SS Pai Ho, the 13thBa t ta l i on , number ing 1 ,023 , wereaccommodated alongside 1,044 workers inatrocious conditions.

No sooner had the vesse l depar tedSaigon/Vung Tau for the long voyage toMarseilles than health problems wereencountered, especially stemming fromovercrowding. Arriving in Marseilles on July 9,the total deaths from cholera and beri berisince departure numbered 129, a terriblea t t r i t i o n b y a n y c o u n t . B e s i d e s"disillusionment," the French also detectedserious "demoralization" among the soldier-workers (SHD 26 N 874/12 Journal de Marcheset Operations de 13th Bataillon de Tirailleurs).

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

6

Adding to the risk, certain ships were alsotorpedoed (Hill 2006: 260).

First Combat

According to Rives (2013), the first Indochineseto see conflict in the war were crew membersof the Mousquet, part of a French naval groupwhich, on October 29, 1914, squared offagainst the German cruiser Emdem in theMalacca Straits. The three Vietnamese whodied in this sea battle can thus be counted asthe first victims of the Great War fromIndochina. In January 1915, the Minister ofColonies, Gaston Doumergue, wrote to hiscolleague (Minister of War) AlexandreMillerand that "the loyalty of the subjects of theUnion would be strengthened if we admit[them] to compete for military operationscurrently being conducted." As a first step,Paris demanded the dispatch of Vietnamesemechanics and lacquer workers to treat thewings of airplanes, with the first arriving in Pauon March 28, 1915 (Rives 2013). The Frenchhigh command then requested the dispatch of35-40,000 men. Accordingly, on October 7,1915 Paris authorized the participation of"Indochinese" military formations in theconflict. By that stage, 4,631 indigenousworkers had already been sent to France.Governor General Ernest Roume (April 1915-May 1916) then authorized the departure of thefirst two battalions made up of careerelements. On October, 21, 213 infantrymen ofthe 1st BTI boarded the SS Magellan, bound forFrance; the remainder following on theMossoul (Rives 2013). Still, it would not beuntil early 1916 before the Indochinesebattalions actually arrived in France, enteringthe war at a crucial stage. While avoidingcertain of the earlier murderous trench warfareepisodes on the Western front – although notentirely – they also bore the full brunt ofGerman aerial bombing as it became morerefined.

Worker or Service Troops

Indochina was generally considered by theFrench General Staff as primarily a reservoir oflabor as opposed to a source of combatants.Accordingly, the great majority of theIndochinese battalions (bataillons d'étapes), 15in all, comprised Service Troops. Certainbattalions were pressed into difficult andunsafe employment as in gunpowder andmunitions factories. As Rives (2013) explains,viewed as by the French as more docile thanEuropean workers, the Indochinese were usedas "guinea pigs" in the Taylor systemestablished in these institutions. On the otherhand, French unionists considered themunworthy to be full-fledged workers becausethey refused to go on strike and willinglyworked overtime to collect premiums. Forinstance, in the Bergerac munitions plant, theycontributed 70 percent of production whilerepresenting only 50 percent of the workforce.They also proved to be skilled mechanics inboth the aviation plants and railway workshops(Rives 2013).

As revealed by the Journal des Marches, theworkers entered separate camps pendingassignment to a variety of governmentdepartments such as forestry, agriculture,public works and, especially, munitionsfactories.

Vietnamese munitions workers

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

7

Many of these work detachments were outsidethe war zone. Still others were given specialisttraining as drivers or as telephone operators. Infact, large numbers of workers served asrailroad workers building or repairing vital railor road links in the war zone. Other ServiceUnits maintained lines of communication, suchas with the 3rd and 9th Companies of the 9thBTI transformed into the 53rd and 54thBatteries, charged with building railway lines.Surviving postcards, such as published in Rivesand Deroo (1999), offer graphic images ofVietnamese soldier workers arriving inMarseilles, staging at parade grounds, underinstruction, at work, being conveyed to thefront, and even deployed in the trenches.

For example, the 1266-strong 14th Battalion,raised in Tonkin, and arriving in Marseilles onOctober 5, 1915, spent most of the war (untilDecember 16, 1917) employed in the PoudrerieNationale de Saint-Médard, or gunpowderworks located near Bordeaux (Journal deMarch 26N 874 14). An establishment datingback to the reign of Louis XIV, the atmospherewas intimidating and the health risks high.Short on detail, the incidence of hospitalizationnevertheless appears high in the banal officialaccount, while other evidence suggests thatpowder and munitions plants were operatedunder the most deleterious work conditions.Whatever else, the transition from farm tofactory was telescoped for these peasant-workers. But it is also true that the instantmaking of a Vietnamese proletariat in Francemay also have been temporary as industrialdevelopment back home was deliberatelychoked to favor metropolitan businessi n t e r e s t s . A n d s o , w h e n i t c a m e t odemobilization, as discussed below, very fewcontinued in factory labor in Vietnam, and nonein Cambodia.

Still, others learned new skills. In 1917, the BTIdeployed 5,000 men in the automobile service.Having learned to drive in less than a week,these sections played a major role in bringing

military supplies to the front. In Spring 1918,drivers of the No. 1 Automobile Reserve, twothirds of whom were Indochinese, relayedemergency reinforcements to the front. Somedrivers came under artillery fire or wereengaged by enemy infantry in combat. Theysometimes come in contact with their Thaicounterparts (Rives 2013).

Some Indochinese doctors also volunteeredtheir service. Thus, the 10th BTI, served theHospital Saint-Louis de Marseille, while theCaudéran near Bordeaux hosted a number ofVietnamese practitioners. Notably, from June1916, Dr. Thai Van Du was assigned toMarseille hospital 224. Nurses, numbering9,000, received only minimal training. Themajority of them were deployed in the rearwhile others served as stretcher bearers on thebattlefield. At least two received citations. Onseveral occasions, the companies attached tothe 21st BTI collected the wounded. SeveralVietnamese also became pilots, among them,Captain Do Huu Vi, along with Phan Tao Thatand Cao Dac Minh. Notably, Corporal XuanNha of A 253 Squadron was shot down in 1917by four enemy aircraft (Rives 2013).

The Battlefronts

As revealed by Journal de Marche documents,of the 23 battalions formed from Indochina, themajority arrived in the port of Marseilles.Typically, they immediately proceeded by railto Saint Raphael camp near Fréjus insoutheastern France where they trained andwere prepared pending immediate dispatch tothe front in the case of the rifle companies. Asmall number of battalions were actuallyformed at Fréjus from among arriving riflecompany units.

But certain among the Service troops alsoexperienced considerable risk including death.The experience of the 16th BTI might be takenas an example. Formed on January 19, 1916 atHue in central Vietnam, the 1,000-strongbattalion embarked from Danang on May 30 "to

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

8

take part in the campaign against the "Austro-Hungarians." Touted in official correspondenceas a "purely volunteer" force, the battaliondisembarked at Marseilles on July 18, pendingrelocation to the Saint Raphael-Fréjus camp.Reinforced by new arrivals who had staged inMadagascar, within two months the combinedbattalion was dispatched to Froissy, a stationterminus on the vital supply rail link parallelingthe Somme canal on the Western Front.Notably, the 16th BTI were tasked to supplyartillery positions with shells. On April 11,1917, they were caught in a bombing raid atthe Froissy station, with three killed and fivemore were killed the following year. Initiallyassigned labor and guard duties at Froissy, andsubsequently supplying artillery munitions tothe front, within days of arrival on September20, the battalion came under intense aerialattack, a new innovation in the age ofmechanized warfare. Even so, the first majorcasualties were only recorded on December 11with three Vietnamese killed and eightwounded. Through to September 1918 sectionsof the battalion labored on the Somme-Bionnerail line, others on labor duty, still others astelephone operators. None of the 16th Battalionappears to have been pressed into front linecombat or exposed to trench warfare.Eventually, on June 6, 1919, the infantrymen(1,074 minus fallen comrades) shipped out ofMarseilles for the home journey. Devoid ofcontext, the Journal de Marche descriptionmasks the horrors of war on the Western Front.

The Combat Battalions

The experience of the 7th (Tonkinese Rifle)Battalion was entirely various. Formallycreated on February 16, 1916 at Sept Pagodes,a river town in Hai Duong province in the mid-Red River delta of northern Vietnam – themajor source of conscript labor for mines andplantations both inside Vietnam and in thecolonies – the 1,000 strong "volunteers"battalion sailed for Marseilles on October 5.Once in France the battalion made an

obligatory stage at the Fréjus boot camp, priorto leaving direct for the Western Front on April4, 1917. Within 10 days they were in placepoised to launch attacks on German positions,literally to kill or to be killed. According to aninternal French military memorandum, fromMay 27, until July 30, 1917, the 7th Battaliondeployed at Linge in the Vosges sectorsuccessfully held their ground. As the reportnoted, "Great satisfaction in the manner inwhich they comported themselves both fromthe point of view of attitude towards the enemyand point of view of discipline" (Journal deMarch 26N 87/4/5). The Journal de Marcheoffers no details but Linge in the Vosgesmountains in Alsace on the France-Germanborder, was the site of trench warfare reachingmurderous intensity in 1915 with both sidessquared off at close proximity across alabyrinth of trenches and stone strong points.

Notoriously the war of attrition in the WorldWar I trenches and battlefields brought about agreat sense of unease in France. Social unrestwas on the rise as a result of both the lengthand the brutality of the war (Duiker 2000, 54).In December 1915, antiwar protests evenreached the French parliament. By 1917, heavyloss of life and economic crisis led to defectionsof French soldiers along with worker strikes,injecting an element of contention into theconduct of the war. While it remains unclear ifthe Vietnamese actively participated in themilitary mutinies discussed below, they beganto participate in the labor movement (Hill 2006,274-75).

Entering a long stalemate in 1917-18, thebalance on the Western Front only began toshift with the entry of American forcesfollowing the American declaration of waragainst Germany on April 6, 1917. CertainIndochinese battalions would come under thewing of the Americans, as with the 12 t h

Battalion formed in February 1916 in northernVietnam. Facing down enemy bombardments atChalons sur Marne (Champagne) in March

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

9

1918, where they labored on a railway line, the1st Company earned a special citation forbravery. Meantime, the 2nd Company wasplaced at the disposal of the Franco-AmericanMission, including building the Americanhospital and, on August 10, 1918, joining theGénie Americain engineering brigade in railwork at Nevers in the Loire valley down untilthe end of hostilities.

The Balkans Campaign

In October 1915 a combined Franco-Britishforce landed at Salonika (Thessalonika),present-day Greece to defend Serbia againstAustro-Hungarian invasion as well as preventBulgarian aggression. Part of a broader Balkanwar, the conflict pitted the French, British,Italians and Russians against the Austro-Hungarian enemy, backed by Germany andBulgaria. Romania entered the war on the sideof the Allies in 1915 and Greece in 1917. Fromlate 1916, the Indochinese 1st Battalion wouldjoin the French expeditionary forces alongsideother colonial forces as with those drawn fromSenegal and Madagascar.

Some writers such as Dutton (1979, 97), havetried to explain the paradox of the Frenchposition in operating on two fronts, the vitalWestern Front versus the Balkans, wheremilitary activity was limited and with thecampaign enduring over three long years, evenwhen the Germans were in striking distance ofParis. As Dutton found, this was small solacefor the participants or victims. Frenchenthusiasm for the "largely abortive"Macedonian campaign – only triumphant in thelast stages of the war – actually turned uponthe vicissitudes of French domestic politics andparliamentary debates rather than strictmilitary contingencies.

Two of the four Indochinese combat battalionswere sent direct to the broad Balkans theater.One was the 10 th Bataillon de Tirailleurs(Tonkin Rifles) which left Hongay port on the

Gulf of Tonkin on July 14, 1916, and staged atVarna on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast onOctober 15, 1916 en route to Constantinople.Unfortunately, this campaign is not welldocumented. The other was the 902-strong 1st

Indochinese (Tonkin Rifles) Battalion, whoseexploits I will describe in some detail,especially as standard accounts of theVietnamese in World War I have ignored theBalkans episode, just as their historic role hastended to be folded into French militaryexploits.

Raised in Bac Ninh in the impoverished andovercrowded lower Red River delta, the 1st

Indochinese (Tonkin Rifles) Battalion embarkedHaiphong on January 17, 1916. Staging inDjibouti, they were divided into four companieseach comprising some 226 infantrymen.Additionally, a group of 32 formed a machinegun section. On April 28, they embarkedDjibouti with the goal of joining the ArméeFrançais d'Orient (French Eastern Army). OnMay 6 they arrived in the British bastion ofSalonika.

Initially charged with static "guard anddefense" duties in and around the Salonikacamps, they were subsequently deployed with aview to securing the road connecting withMonastir (Bitola) in south Serbia, deemed a keystrategic corridor in the campaign. FromAugust 3, 1916, the 1st Indochinese battalionbegan to enter the Macedonian theater joiningSenegalese and Malagasy forces already inplace. Between August-September 1916, theybegan to deploy in the lower Vardar River areain Macedonia, staging at Kozani (northernGreece) between January-June 1917, inter alia,protecting convoys, guarding trains,marketplaces, , and prisoners, such as atTrikali-Kalabaka (southwest of Thessalonika)(July 1917). On August 30, 1917, they sufferedthe first casualty following an enemy bombingof a railway station (Journal de March 26 N874/1).

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

10

The disposition of the forces changed onSeptember 17, 1917 with the battalion placedat the command of the French Eastern Army.They were then redeployed into mountainoussouthwest Macedonia and adjacent areas inAlbania, specifically around Lake Ochrida(Ohrid), prior to entering the battlefront.Notably, on October 14, the 4 th Companycoming under enemy grenade and aerialattacks lost one rifleman, with one wounded,and 12 "disappeared." On the offensive atPogradac (southeast Albania) on October 19,1917, they also took casualties (with fiveinfantrymen killed, and another 15 wounded)."The offensive continued" with the battalionoccupying the heights of Lake Ochrida andcontrolling the road to Pogradac. On October22, 1917 under constant pressure and takinglosses, owing to "extreme fatigue" the 4th

company was relieved by the 1st company.Coming under a massive enemy attack, theytook more casualties from grenade attacks,suggesting close range fighting. Constantlybivouacking through this campaign, on October25 both companies were withdrawn from activecombat to focus upon road building activities,and with the roads also becoming targets ofenemy bombing (Journal de March 26 N 874/1).Although seasonal or health conditions are notmentioned in the Journal de Marche account,we may assume that this was also a tacticalretreat made necessary by a punishing winterwith snow covering the higher elevations andpeaks.

In early July 1918, the campaign entered a newphase with the Battalion now engagingoffensive actions against Austrian positions. OnJuly 10, a reconnaissance of Austrian positionsrevealed that the enemy had withdrawn in thedirection of Bulgaria (Journal de March 26 N874/1). The general enemy retreat in Albaniawas actually confirmed by the New York Timesunder such banner headlines as, "Foe Forcedfrom Tomonica Valley and Austrian AttacksFail: Bulgars also Menaced," and "Viennaadmits retreat in Albania" (New York Times,

July 10-11, 1918).

Sti l l , that was not the end of the war.Meantime, the second and third companiestook up front line positions in the vicinity ofPorocani (Albania), at high elevation. On July31, 1918, the first companies faced down a"violent Austrian attack" on the Porocani front.At the cost of one casualty, they successfullyrepulsed the Austrian force and maintainedtheir ground. But in August 1918, the battalionalso began to take casualties in the form of"violent bombardments" by Austrian forces."Violently attacked," the first and thirdcompanies held fast At this time (August 25), aretreat by the Italians in the Tomorica andDevoli valleys weakened French lines (Journalde March 26 N 874/1). But the Bulgarians werealso crumbling (New York Times, July 11,1918).

While this brief account elides the broadergeopolitical issues at play in the Balkans, byOctober 31, 1918, French and Italian forceshad expelled the Austro-Hungarian Army fromAlbania. At war's end (the Armistice went intoeffect on November 11, 1918), having enduredtwo winters in the course of this punishingcampaign, the brigade returned to Salonika,arriving on January 11, 1919. Now assigned tovarious logistics duties, the 1st Battalion stagedat Fiume (present-day Croatia), Zagreb, andBelgrade, before departing on March 25 forFrance and home (Journal de March 26 N874/1). To the extent that the French EasternArmy facilitated an ultimate Serbian victory,then the Indochinese battalion undoubtedlyplayed its part, holding the line against theAustrians and pushing back the Bulgarians.

In this theater, according to Rives (2011),figures also corresponding to my reading, 23infantrymen were killed, 41 wounded, with 10missing. Among them would have been the lossof one rifleman and five wounded as the resultof a grenade accident on June 10, 1918 (Journalde March 26 N 874/1). The sparse and terse

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

11

Journal de Marche report offers no accolades,just as the heroics of the 1st Battalion wereforgotten.

No overall casualty figures for the Indochinesein World War I service are offered in theJournal de Marches. But compared to France(with a 30 percent casualty rate) and otherbelligerents, the Indochinese battalionsundoubtedly suffered less. Yet morale cannever have been far from French thinking anddoubtless the risk of defection outweighed thebenefit of pushing colonial forces to the limit(although that also happened as well).According to Blanc (2005, 1160), it isimpossible to say with accuracy how manywere killed, although many war cemeteriesaround Marseilles offer eloquent testimony tothe attrition of lives, workers included.

Nationalist Response to WartimeConscription

Of the latter Nguyen dynasty emperors ofVietnam, one stands out in modern Vietnamesehistory today for his patriotism, namely theboy-king Duy Tan, born on August 14, 1899 toEmperor Thanh Thai (r.1889-1907) as PrinceNguyen Vinh San. In this narrative, asVietnamese historian Nguyen Khac Vien (1975,12-17; 22-25) embellishes, with his fatherremoved from office ostensibly for insanity, theprince took his place on the Golden DragonThrone in 1907 at the age of 7, assuming thereign name Duy Tan, or "friend of reforms."Chosen for his youth, naivete, and pliability,Duy Tan (r.1907-16), however, proved to be asobstinate as his father before him. OstensiblyFrancophile, the young king nevertheless calledfor a revision of the 1884 Protectorate Treaty.Against the background of local indignation atconscription for France's wars in Europe, DuyTan acting on the counsel of "patriotmandarins," notably, Thai Phien and Tran CaoVan, organized a revolt on behalf of troopsabout to be sent to France. Timed for May 3,1916, the plot was discovered, the French

disarmed the soldiers, and Duy Tan wasdetained, dethroned, and exiled, joining hisfather in the French Indian Ocean colony of LaRéunion. The two concerned mandarins wereexecuted amidst a wave of repression.

It is of no small interest that, on May 3, 1917,the 16th BTI battalion which, as mentioned, tookcasualties on the Froissy-Somme front, wasvisited by a high ranking northern Vietnamesemandarin or imperial delegate, both talking upthe kingdom of Annam and the cause of Franceagainst the "barbarians." Commended inFrench dispatches for making a goodimpression on the troops, the mandarin alsosuggested a distribution of croix de guerre tothe Vietnamese heroes of the bombardment. Asthe French military authority commented uponevents back in Hue, the battalion was the firstto be created in the wake of the deposition ofthe boy-king Duy Tan, exiled to Réunion, for"treachery" (actually, for falling in with theanti-French party). Duy Tan's successor, as theimperial delegate observed, had swung theauthority of the court and mandarins in supportof the French cause. Notwithstanding thesolicitations of the revolutionary party, as withdistributing arms days before the events inquestion – the defection of the boy-king – thetirailleurs were to be commended for notparticipating in any anti-dynastic or anti-French movement, thus confirming theirpatriotism. Hence, in this narrative, theexemplary discipline of the battalion in facingdown the enemy bombing was to be especiallycommended. This of course was pure cant.Obviously, if the emperor defected from theFrench cause, then the game of winning overthe masses to voluntary conscription was acharade. The model the French respected, asexplained, was that of the King of Cambodiawho even rallied his own family. But Frenchmorale was also low. In May 1917, Frenchveterans of the Battle of Verdun, mutinied, justas France lost more casualties relative to itspopulation than any other power on the side ofthe Allies.

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

12

The 1916 Cambodian Revolt

In 1916, a revolt dubbed by the French the1916 affair brought tens of thousands ofpeasants to Phnom Penh to petition KingSisowath for a reduction in taxes. Since 1912 alarge-scale road-building program had beenlaunched involving the mobilization ofconsiderable numbers of corvée laborers. AsForest (1980: 67) points out, such conscriptionwas poorly received by the peasantry. At theepicenter of the rebellion in Kampong Cham,some 100,000 peasants rose up prior to amarch upon on the capital. Official opinion wasdivided as to the cause of the rebellion,whether a purely domestic affair stemmingfrom discontent with the tax system along withofficial abuse, or as being manipulated byexternal actors. As Tully (2005, 96-99)summarizes , resentment at mi l i taryrecruitment for France's war in Europe alongwith long standing resentment over rising taxand corvée requirements contrived to pushordinary people to rebellion. The event endedtragically with the "autocratic" ResidentSuperior Baudoin ordering a violent crackdownleading to the death of an indeterminatenumbers of protesters.

In Cambodia, the war also opened a breachbetween contending members of the royalfamily. On one of his trips to Europe in August-September 1900, Prince Norodom Yukanthor(1860-1934), heir presumptive to theCambodian throne, criticized French rule inCambodia (Osborne 1969: 244-5). Having beene x i l e d f r o m C a m b o d i a f o r " a c t s o fdisobedience," Yukanthor then based himself inThailand after having created an oppositionmovement. According to an official Frenchsource, Yukanthor was also involved in secretacts against the Protectorate and the royalgovernment during World War I (AOM IndoNF/48/585), code for dalliance with theGermans.

Vietnamese Nationalist Response

The notion that making contacts with France'senemy might help the anti-colonial cause wasnot lost upon certain Vietnamese nationalists.Confucian scholar and leader of the Look Eastmovement (to Japan), Phan Boi Chau was one.First making contact with potentiallysympathetic German consular officials in HongKong in 1906, again in 1910 he looked to Berlinfor sources of funding for his activities (Marr1971, 127; 151). He may also have influencedPrince Cuong De, a renegade scion of the royalfamily of Hue and a follower of Chau whovisited Germany in 1913 more or less bankingupon a German victory (Tran My-Van 2005, 97).

Other nationalists, such as Nguyen ThuongHien, appealed in print for his countrymen torefuse conscription. He also received seedmoney from the German and Austrianconsulates in Bangkok in support of armedrebellions against French border posts,although easily quashed by the French.Nevertheless, the numerous revolts and coupsinside Vietnam continuing through World War Idemonstrated (Marr 1971, 228-29) a lack ofsupport for France in its war with Germany.

Political Backlash

We should not ignore the radicalization processexperienced by sections of the worker-soldiersin metropolitan France. It is notable that themajority of the immigrants arriving in 1915were illiterate (23,234 out of 34,715). But, asBrocheux (2012) points out, the literates wouldemerge as the proponents of the independencemovement alongside such auxiliaries as thoses e r v i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e t w o r k s(restaurateurs), l iaison persons, andpropagandists (sailors, workers, house boys,and sometimes, soldiers).

Arriving in Paris from London in late 1919,where he may well have been awaiting the endof conscription for France's war (Duiker 2000,54), the young Ho Chi Minh registered

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

13

opposition to conscription in his first extantwritings. Appearing in the French SocialistParty newspaper, L'Humanité, published inParis on November 4, 1920 under thesignature, Nguyen Ai Quoc, he wrote, "Weoppose sending Annamese soldiers to Syria. Wemust make the highest authorities understandthat many of our ill-fated oriental brothers werekilled in battles between 1914 and 1918 duringa war for "culture and justice." 'Why, then, dowe not have culture and justice?'" (cited inBorton 2010, 38). As Ho Chi Minh decisivelyshifted his allegiance away from the SecondInternational to the Third InternationalCongress, especially around the colonialquestion, he also came to rationalize World WarI as an "imperialist war," with colonial rivalryas one of its causes (Ho Chi Minh, La VieOuvrière, Sept. 7, 1923 cited in Fall 1967, 34).

Ho Chi Minh addresses Tours Conference

From London, Ho Chi Minh had been in lettercontact with another Vietnamese who made thevoyage to France during the war years. Thiswas Phan Chu Trinh (1872-1926), also knownas Phan Chau Trinh, a pioneer nationalistalongside Phan Boi Chau in seeking an end toFrance's occupation. Calling for the abolition ofthe monarchy and its replacement with ademocratic republic, he then went to Japanwith Phan Boi Chau. Back in Vietnam in 1907,after peasant tax revolts erupted in 1908, he

was arrested. Sentenced to death, butcommuted to life imprisonment, in 1911 he waspardoned and deported to France. From Parisin 1915, he sought to win the support ofprogressive French politicians and Vietnameseexiles. According to Vinh Sinh, (2009: xiii),when Germany attacked France, Chau refusedto be conscripted for French military service.He was duly arrested and spent 10 months inSanté prison in Paris (September 1914-July1915) on suspicion of asking Germany for helpto fight against France. Phan Chau Trinh,radical lawyer Phan Van Truong, and Ho ChiMinh (Nguyen Ai Quoc) jointly drafted the setof demands presented by Ho on June 18, 1919at the Versailles Peace Conference. Theseincluded a complete amnesty for Indochinesepolitical prisoners, and reform of the justicesystem (Vinh Sinh 2009, xvii).

We should not ignore as well the presence inParis in the 1919-1921 period of such keyfigures in Chinese communism as DengXiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, and Li Lisanalongside some 1,500 Chinese work-studystudents many deeply touched by internationalevents and left-wing politics (Bailey 1988: 442).But if we compare the Vietnamese with theChinese national experience, as discussed byCalvo and Bao (2015), then we would have tosay that Vietnam had no equivalent to China'sMay 4th Movement arising out of failure tosecure any gains at Versailles. To be sure,Prince Cuong-De sought to make capital fromthe event by writing a missive of February 12,1919 to US President Wilson. As Cuong-De'sbiographer Tran My-Van (2005: 102) writes,while the French authorities took serious noteof the exiled Prince's actions, at the same timethey were able to dismiss Ho Chi Minh'spetition as mere "libel." In any case, departingthe scene for Moscow, the future Vietnameseleader literally remained out of the picture forthe next fifteen years, and with the Tokyo-based Cuong-De increasingly beholden toJapanese patrons and remote from themainstream of Vietnamese nationalist politics

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

14

The Paris-Based Foyer Indochinois

The end of the war and the demobilization ofworkers only signaled a new problem for theFrench authorities, namely one of communitycontrol, especially as the numbers ofVietnamese resident in France grew, alongwith their political engagements. As Duiker(2000, 56) remarks, of the 50,000 oddVietnamese remaining in France at the end ofthe war, a few hundred had arrived to study,mainly the children of wealthy families. Theyentered a highly politicized atmosphere.

The authorities looked to guide theseindividuals not only towards French culture butaway from subversive activities. The authoritiesclosely monitored student and otherVietnamese circles throughout France. Thedossiers are huge just as the spying andsurveillance exercise must have consumedconsiderable resources and ingenuity. But onNovember 26, 1920, with the approval of theminister of colonies and with the specialsupport of the minister of interior and formergovernor general of Indochina, Albert Sarraut,the authorities pressed ahead with the creationof an Association Mutuelle de Indochine alsodubbed the Foyer Indochinois. Furnished withpremises at 15 Rue de Sommerand, vested withan annual subvention of 50,000 francs, andunder the directorship of a former Vietnamesemember of the colonial council, the medicaldoctor, Le Quan, the Foyer went about itsprofessed mission of socializing its membersinto French culture, doling out social welfareassistance, and keeping up links with theirhomeland (AOM SLOTFOM III 40 "AssociationMutuelle de Indochine").

By 1926, however, as a newer generation ofVietnamese arrived in Paris, the conservativeleadership of the Foyer dominated by the"constitutionalists" (the Parti ConstitutionalistIndochinois which attracted a studentmembership), came under challenge. By thisjuncture, Vietnamese organizations active in

Paris also included the Annam IndependenceParty, the Annamite Union, and the Associationof Annamite Workers (active in Le Havre). OnFebruary 26, 1926, on the occasion of aleadership ballot, "violent" scenes emergedwith members of the "bloc de progressistes,"shouting nationalistic and communist slogans,including the words "Vive l'independence del'Indochine." In elections on May 2, theconstitutionalists lost ground to the progressivebloc . In e lect ions on October 31 theprogressives strengthened their hand winning110 votes out of 130. This success was madepossible through the recruitment of a newmembership largely comprising Vietnamesecooks working in Paris. Behind them stoodformer Nguyen Ai Quoc associate Nguyen TheTruyen, founder of the Annam IndependenceParty and editor of three left-wing newspapers,Viet-Nam-Hoc; Phuoc-Quoc and l 'AmeAnnamite. Nguyen The Truyen was also theforce behind an Association des TravailleursManuelle (or manual workers' association),which had hitherto avoided political issues. Asdescribed by a judicial inquiry into the election"fiasco," the association comprised 150members, for the most part "communist cooks,"members of the radical "Association desCuisiniers," along with Bolshevik students, ledby the anti-French Vietnamese Nguyen TheTruyen. As the head of the Sûreté Générale orpolitical police then advised, "It seems that themoment has come in Indochina to suppress theliberalities accorded such groups which, oneafter the other, fall under the influence of theBolsheviks." In the meantime, he advised, theFoyer should be brought back under thecontrol of "healthy" elements as with ex-Indochina bureaucrats outside of the"excesses" of young extremists (AOMSLOTFOM III 40 "Association Mutuelle deIndochine," Note pour le Ministre de la Policeet de la Sûreté Générale en Indochine).

At the end of 1927 Nguyen The Truyenreturned to Vietnam traveling up the coast toHue and meeting Pham Boi Chau, but breaking

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

15

with the communists. Back in France duringthe progressive Popular Front period(1936-37), although home in Vietnam in 1938,he was arrested by the French in 1941 (Quinn-Judge 2003: 329). He was not alone and one byone other France-based intellectuals(Trotskyists and "Stalinists" alike) would returnto Vietnam injecting a new dynamism into theanti-colonial movement, especially in the worldof literature and political journalism whichblossomed in Saigon, at least until thesuppression of liberals "liberalities" became areality by the end of the decade.

Demobilization

The demobilization of the battalions (astesti f ied by the Journal de Marche etOpérations) progressed rapidly. As of July1920, just 2,000 Vietnamese soldiers remainedin such diverse locations as Germany, China,the Levant, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco and theBalkans. By contrast, the demobilization of theworkers in France was delayed especially asthey were pressed into reconstruction projects,although essentially completed by December1920. Nevertheless, some 2,900 Vietnamesesoldiers and workers gained permission toremain in France for work, study or marriage,literally the first Vietnamese "immigrants"paving the way for waves of newer arrivals.Confronting discrimination, they too organized,as with the formation of workers' organizations.Others gravitated to French Communist Partyaffiliate organizations, with some, such assailors, linking up with the undergroundcommunist movement back home. By the late1920s France would be somewhat supplantedas a center of anti-colonial activity, especiallyas French police surveillance became tighter.Increasingly, Vietnamese nationalists looked toChina and with Canton (Guangzhou) especiallya major pole of attraction such as documentedby scholars such as Marr (1971) and Duiker(2000).

In 1915 a battalion of the 3rd Regiment of

Tonkinese Rifles (3rd RTT) was sent to China togarrison the French concession in Shanghai.The rifle companies remaining in Indochinasaw service in 1917 in putting down a mutinyof the Garde Indigène (native gendarmerie) inThai Nguyen province in northern Vietnam. InAugust 1918, three companies of the TonkineseRifles formed part of a battalion of FrenchColonial Infantry sent to Siberia as part of theAllied intervention following the RussianRevolution (Rives and Deroo 1999, 53-54). Inthe course of conflict, Indochinese units won 11military medals and 333 "croix de guerre"(Rives 2013). Four regiments of TonkineseRifles continued in existence between the twoWorld Wars, seeing active service in Indochina,Syria (1920-21), Morocco (1925-26) and in thefrontier clashes with Thailand (1940-41) (anon.,1991).

The Soldier Returnees

As described by Rives (2013), when theIndochinese soldiers returned home, they wereofficially informed of their rights. In addition,by province, an Assistance Committee assumedresponsibility for sending them parcels duringthe hostilities. Very soon, however, indifferenceor annoyance set in against the unruly"returnees from France" as they were called. Inturn, they tended to reject the traditionalauthorities and sought to deal directly with thecolonial administration whose language theyhad learned to speak. Some of them received ashare of ricefields reserved for them along theBach Ghia canal in Thai Nguyen province,while others received a bonus that allowedthem to set up as an artisan or farmer. Thosedemobilized from Annam and Tonkin werehonored with a mandarinal grade. Those fromCochinchina were given a right of precedencein ritual ceremonies. The Cambodians weredecorated with royal honors (Rives 2013).

Others, however, began to pursue more activistcareers. In the wake of the suppression of theNghe Tinh peasant rebellion of 1930-31, a

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

16

partly communist-inspired affair also leading tothe creation of "soviets," an official commissionof inquiry collected a large number ofdepositions, basically, confessions fromsuspects (Gunn 2014, 94-95). Taking thedeclaration of one peasant-cultivator cumsoldier returnee from France, Bui Hat, asemblematic, the judicial official asked, "Whydid you join the communist party?" To which heanswered. "It took me by surprise. It happenedthat I was forced to join the communist party.""What is communism? he was asked, to whichhe replied, "I deny having been a communist. Ispent several years in the military infirmary. Ispent three years at Fréjus after the war" (AOMIndochine NF/334/2689 "Commission d'enquêtesur les evénéments du Nord Annam," July 9,1931).

Ton Duc Thang

The most celebrated returnee, at least inVietnamese communist historiography, wasundoubtedly future Democratic Republic ofVietnam president Ton Duc Thang (1888-1980)who, upon return to Vietnam from France in1920 formed the Association of Workers of theSaigon Arsenal. Setting aside disagreementsover Ton's involvement with a Saigon laborunion in the 1920s and the naval-yard strikethere in 1925, Giebel (2004, 13-14) questionswhether he participated in a mutiny on aFrench ship sent to the Black Sea in 1919 tohelp defeat Bolsheviks. Shipping rosters andnaval records reveal he was not on any of theships on which the most decisive revolts brokeout, and also did not participate in any of thecore revolts on the Black Sea in 1919.Nevertheless, as Giebel (2004, 24) allows,having heard stories of the Black Sea mutinieswhile serving as a French conscript in Toulon,the future president was involved in the massprotests in southern France.

Postwar, the first major defection from withinthe colonial army ranks occurred in thenorthwest of Vietnam. On February 9, 1930,

part of the 4th Regiment of Tonkinese Riflesstationed at Yen Bai mutinied against theirFrench officers. Led by the major non-communist political party, the Kuomintang-modeled VNQDD or nationalist party, the YenBai mutiny, obviously premature, was not onlydoomed but the leadership collectivelyexecuted. Other rifle companies eventuallydefected from the French cause in themid-1940s, lending crucial support to the thenembryonic Viet Minh (Gunn 2014, 61-63). But itis another matter to suggest that their actionswere a result of distantly remembered WorldWar I experiences, especially as other riflecompanies remained loyal.

It is hard to trace the career tracks ofCambodian soldier returnees, but some were inthe vanguard of future social movements,especially as their loyalties were tugged bynationalists just as their eyes were opened byexperiences – shipborne and in battle – that fewat home could have imagined. One who did playa key future role in the development of modernCambodian nationalism was Pach Chhoeun, aformer interpreter for the troops. Another whohad fought for France was Khim Tit. Joining thecolonial service during the Pacific War, he tookhis place in the Japanese-sponsored cabinet,later becoming a governor of Kampot province.A pro-monarchist but also a pro-independencepolitician, he also played a cameo role at theend of the war (Kiernan 1985, 20-21).

Summing Up

From the above it is clear that there was nostraight line evolution of thinking on the part ofthe near 100,000 Vietnamese worker-soldiersserving in France and other World War Itheaters and the iniquities of imperialist war or,for that matter, even the paradox of dying forFrance while Vietnam remained enslaved. Infact, the majority of soldiers were cocoonedfrom politicization and, for the survivors,doubtless glad to be alive and to receive theirhard won wages and pension packages. Unlike

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

17

the France-based workers, many of the riflecompany battalions served outside of France.Even those who served in France were moremobile or quarantined from contact with locals.. Not so the workers who were more closelyexposed to the realities of grinding munitionsfactory, and agricultural work and, doubtless,discrimination. Certainly, as with those exposedto the French labor movement, they were easilymobilized. Although this essay has mostlyfocused upon the soldier's actual experiences,we have also noted the role of the "communistcooks" in Paris in the early postwar period. Butothers, especially lacquer workers employed inthe aircraft industry, were also radicalized andunionized.

As revealed by the Indochina Foyer story, thereal struggle for the French in both France andin Indochina, was for the hearts and minds ofthe young intel lectuals torn betweencollaboration with the French project andthose, as with the young Nguyen Ai Quoc/HoChi Minh, who understood Indochina'spredicament as one of colonial subjugation inthe vice of imperialist war, and looked tointernational solidarity. Ultimately, theintellectuals including the France-trainedreturnees would galvanize the anti-colonialmovement.

Denied credible prior knowledge of the horrorsof the Western Front, and pumped up by falseloyalty to France, plus inducements, the mostlyilliterate peasants from the poverty strickenand famine-prone provinces of the Red RiverDelta and north-central Vietnam made readyrecruits, even short of coercion. To be sure, asBrocheux (2012) has commented, Franceinvoked the same patriotic call for men andresources during World War II. In 1939,Minister of Colonies Georges Mandel calledupon 80,000 Indochinese. In June 1940 at thetime of the French capitulation to Germanythere were 28,000 (8,000 infantry and 20,000unspecialized workers) on French soil.

The tombs of fallen Indochinese soldiers, suchas those of the Douaumont ossuary innortheastern France and at sites in Albania,attest to sacrifices made during the Great War(Rives 2013). The same can be said of Fréjus,site of the military camp for forces arrivingfrom Indochina, where a pagoda, an Indochinawar memorial-necropolis, and a marinemuseum recall this link with the past but onlyfor those "mort pour la France" or who "diedfor France."

Geoffrey Gunn is emeritus professor, NagasakiUniversity, and visiting professor, University ofMacau (2014-15). Books include, Rebellion inLaos: Peasant and Politics in a ColonialBackwater (1990); Encountering Macau: APortuguese City-State on the Periphery ofChina, 1557-1999 (1996); Timor Lorosae: 500years(1999), First Globalization: The EurasianExchange, 1500-1800 (2003) History WithoutBorders: The Making of an Asian World Region,1000-1800 (2011); Rice Wars in ColonialVietnam: The Great Famine and the Viet MinhRoad to Power (2014).

Recommended citation: Geoffrey Gunn,"Coercion and Co-optation of IndochineseWorker-Soldiers in World War I: Mort pour laFrance", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 14, Issue1, No. 1, January 1, 2016.

Related articles

Alex Calvo and Bao Qiaoni, Forgottenvoices from the Great War: the ChineseL a b o u r C o r p s(https://apjjf.org/-Bao-Qiaoni/4411/article.html)

Bibliography

Archives

Archives Nationale du Cambodge (ANC)

Centre des archives d'Outre-mer (AOM)

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

18

Service Historique de la Défense (SHD),D é p a r t m e n t d e l ' a r m é e d e T e r r e(http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/jmo/ead.html?id=SHDGR__GR_26_N_II&c=SHDGR__GR_26_N_II_e0033487)

Service de liaison avec les orginaires desterritoires français d'Outre-mer) FondsMinistèriel (SLOTFOM)

Ministère de la Défense. Memoires des hommes- Journaux des unités. Bataillons de tirailleursindochinois > 7e bataillon: J.M.O. • 16 février1916-15 mars 1919 • 26 N 874/5

References

anon. 1991. Les Troupes de Marine 1622–1984,Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle.

Bailey, Paul.1988. "The Chinese Work-StudyMovement in France", The China Quarterly,Volume 115, pp. 441-461.

Blanc, M-E. 2004. "Vietnamese in France." inMelvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and IanSkoggard, eds., Encyclopedia of Diasporas:Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around theWorld. Vol. 2, Diaspora Communities, NewYork: Springer, pp. 1158–1166.

Borton, L. 2010. Ho Chi Minh: A Journey,Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, (2nd ed.).

Brocheux, P. 2012. (September 20) "Unehistoire croisée – l'immigration politiqueindochinoise en France, 1911-1945,"(http://indomemoires.hypotheses.org/728)Mémoires d'Indochine, accessed December 1,2013

Calvo, A. and Bao Qiaoni. 2015. "Forgottenvoices from the Great War: the Chinese LaborCorps", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue49, No. 1, December 21.

Duiker, W.J. 2000. Ho Chi Minh, New York:Hyperion.

Dutton, D.J. 1979. "The Balkans Campaign andFrench War Aims in the Great War," TheEnglish Historical Review, Vol. 94, No. 370.Jan., pp.97–113

Fall, B. 1967. ed, intro., Ho Chi Minh onRevolution: Selected Writings, 1920-66, NewYork: Praeger.

Fores t , A . 1980 . Le Cambodge e t l aColonisation Française: Histoire d'unecolonisation sans heurts (1897-1920), Paris:L'Harmattan.

Giebel, C. 2004. Imagined Ancestries ofVietnamese Communism: Ton Duc Thang andthe Politics of History and Memory, Seattle,WA: University of Washington Press.

Gunn, G.C. 2014. Rice Wars in ColonialVietnam: The Great Famine and the Viet MinhRoad to Power, Lanham, MA. Rowman &Littlefield.

Hill, K. 2006. "Strangers in a Foreign Land:Vietnamese Soldiers and Workers in Franceduring World War I," in Nhung Tuyet Tran andAnthony Reid, eds., Viet Nam BorderlessHistories, Madison WI, University of WisconsinPress, pp.256-289.

_________.2011a. "Sacrifices, sex, race:Vietnamese experience in the First World War,"in Santanu Das, ed., Race, Empire and FirstWorld War Writing, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, pp.53-69.

________. 2011b. Coolies into Rebels: TheImpact of World War I on French Indochina.Paris: Les Indes Savant.

Kiernan, B. 1985. How Pol Pot Came to Power:A History of Communism in Kampuchea,1930-75, London: Verso.

Lockhart, G. 1989. Nation in Arms: The Originsof the People's Army of Vietnam, Sydney: Allenand Unwin.

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

19

Marr, D.G. 1971. Vietnamese Anti-Colonialism1885-1925, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

New York Times

Nguyen Khac Vien 1975, Nguyen Khac Vien,The Long Resistance (1858-1975), Hanoi:Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Osborne, M. E. 1969. The French Presence inCochinchina & Cambodia: Rule and Response(1859-1905), Ithaca and London: CornellUniversity Press.

____________1978. "Peasant Politics inCambodia: The 1916 Affair," Modern AsianStudies 12 , pp.217-243.

Quinn-Judge, S. 2003. Ho Chi Minh: TheMissing Years 1919-41. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Rettig, T. 2005. Contested Loyalties:Vietnamese Soldiers in the Service of France,1927-1939, Ph.D. dissertation, University ofLondon.

Rives, M. 2013. "Les militaires indochinois enE u r o p e ( 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 ) . "

(http://www.anai-asso.org/NET/document/anai/historique/les_militaires_indochinois_en_europe_19141918/index.htm) Website of L'AssociationNationale des Anciens et Amis de l'Indochine(ANAI) Accessed 5 March 2013.

Rives, M. and E. Deroo. 1999. Les Linh Tap:Histoire des militaires indochinois au servicede la France, 1859-1960. Panazol: Lavauzelle.

Tran My-Van 2005. A Vietnamese Royal Exile inJapan' Prince Cuong De (1882-1951), London:Routledge.

Tully, J. 2005. A Short History of Cambodia:From Empire to Survival, Sydney: Allen &Unwin.

Vinh Sinh. 2009. ed. and trans. Phan ChâuTrinh and his political writings, Ithaca, NY:Cornell Southeast Asia Program.

In particular, the author thanks Alec Gordon forsoliciting this article first published as part of aspecial edition on the Great War, "'Mort pour laFrance,': Coercion and Co-optation of'Indochinese' Worker-Soldiers in World WarOne," Social Scientist, vol.43, nos 7-8 (July-August 2014, pp. 63-84).

Now emeritus from Nagasaki University, I continue to live in the port city. Mostly my research andpublications deal with Southeast Asia as with, Rice Wars in Colonial Vietnam: The Great Famine and theViet Minh Road to Power (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). I have also authored books on Laos and Cambodiaand with research ongoing in archives in Phnom Penh. Looking beyond strictly national and area studies,in 2010 I published History Without Borders: The Making of an Asian World Region, 1000-1800 (http://www.hkupress.org/Common/Reader/Products/ShowProduct.jsp?Pid=1&Version=0&Cid=16&Charset=iso-8859-1&page=-1&key=9789888083343)(University of Hong Kong Press). My most recentpublication is Wartime Macau: Under the Japanese Shadow (University of Hong Kong Press, 2016). I amalso tracking over earlier research on “Nagasaki and the Asian Bullion Trade Networks.”

For the last couple of years I have also served as a co-editor of Journal of Contemporary Asia.

APJ | JF 14 | 1 | 5

20

Information on my other research themes and interests can be read off my website on

https://geoffreycgunn.com/