tt to which these improvementsue of the aforementioned lease-efore not possible accurately to3es. However, in the absence ofted, for the purpose of this ad-mcement amounted to at leastLents made, or 9265.40. Ifow-ne the claimant from an oppor-of that the premises may haverr degree than has herein beenshall not become final until B0ipt of this adjudication by thel she may offer further evidenceires. On receipt of additionalxeto, this adjudication shall bemarket value of the improved

301

CLAIM OF HANNAH M. OGAWA

[No. 146-35-2413?-A. Decidecl October 24, 1.gSLj

InterlocutorY Ruli'ng

The Evacuation Claims Act of July 2, !948, provides

by Section 2 (a):

The Attorney General shall recoive claims for a period'of eighteen months from the date of enactment of thisAct. All claims not presented within that time shall bsforever barred.

The Attorney General has construed this provision as giv-ing him jurisdiction to consider any clainr, received beforemidnight of Tuesday, January 3, L950.

The precise question here presented, therefore, iswhether the receipt of the claim by the United States At-torney at Chicago within that period constitutes compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Statute.Clearly it does. It,witl be observed that the Act does notrequire that the claim shall be received by the AttorneyGeneral at W'ashington, but merely by the Attorney Gen-eral. The question raised, therefore, is whether a UnitedStates Attorney may properly act for the Attorney Gen-eral in such circumstances as the present.

Since the Japanese Evacuation Claims Act of July 2,1948, has been in force, the relations of the Attorney Gen-eral and the United States Attorneys have been governed

by the Act of Congress of June 25,t948, "To revise, codify,and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code en-titled 'Judicial Code and Judiciary"' (80th Cong., 2d

sess., P. L.773,62 Stat. 869). The duties of a UnitedStates Attorney within his district are defined in Section507 (a) of that Act and Section 507 (b) thereof provides

as follows:

tt to which these improvementsue of the aforementioned lease-efore not possible accurately to3es. However, in the absence ofted, for the purpose of this ad-mcement amounted to at leastLents made, or 9265.40. Ifow-ne the claimant from an oppor-of that the premises may haverr degree than has herein beenshall not become final until B0ipt of this adjudication by thel she may offer further evidenceires. On receipt of additionalxeto, this adjudication shall bemarket value of the improved

301

CLAIM OF HANNAH M. OGAWA

[No. 146-35-2413?-A. Decidecl October 24, 1.gSLj

InterlocutorY Ruli'ng

The Evacuation Claims Act of July 2, !948, provides

by Section 2 (a):

The Attorney General shall recoive claims for a period'of eighteen months from the date of enactment of thisAct. All claims not presented within that time shall bsforever barred.

The Attorney General has construed this provision as giv-ing him jurisdiction to consider any clainr, received beforemidnight of Tuesday, January 3, L950.

The precise question here presented, therefore, iswhether the receipt of the claim by the United States At-torney at Chicago within that period constitutes compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Statute.Clearly it does. It,witl be observed that the Act does notrequire that the claim shall be received by the AttorneyGeneral at W'ashington, but merely by the Attorney Gen-eral. The question raised, therefore, is whether a UnitedStates Attorney may properly act for the Attorney Gen-eral in such circumstances as the present.

Since the Japanese Evacuation Claims Act of July 2,1948, has been in force, the relations of the Attorney Gen-eral and the United States Attorneys have been governed

by the Act of Congress of June 25,t948, "To revise, codify,and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code en-titled 'Judicial Code and Judiciary"' (80th Cong., 2d

sess., P. L.773,62 Stat. 869). The duties of a UnitedStates Attorney within his district are defined in Section507 (a) of that Act and Section 507 (b) thereof provides

as follows:

302

(b) The Attorney General shall have supervision overall litigation to which the United States or any agencythereof is a party and shall direct all United States a[-torneys, assistant United States Attorneys, and attorneysappointed under section bOB of this tiile, in the dischargoof their respective duties.

The above-quoted provision eonfers substantially thesame powers upon the Attorney General as he previouslyhad under United States Code, Title 5, Section B1Z, basedon R. S. Section 362. By this provision the Attorney Gen-eral was to "exercise general superintendence a'd directionover the attorneys n n rF of all the districts in the UnitedStates and the territories as to the manner of dischargingtheir respective duties," and the district attorneys wererequired to report to the Attorney General on their officialproceedings as the Attorney General might direct. Theauthority of the Attorney General has been sustained bythe Supreme Court on various occasions. U. S. v. gonJacinto Tin Co. (1888), t2b Il. S. 2ZJ, 2Z&-2g0. InI/. 8. v. Smith (1895), tb8 U. S. 846, that Court said (atp. 355) :

It can hardly be supposed that Congress could haveintended that tho Attomey General should not be atliberty to call upon the ofrcial representatives of theUnited States in each district to defend, as a part of hisofrcial duty, the interests of the Government in anv suitin which it was interested.

* * rT The power of the Attorney General to direct theUnited States Attorney to receive claims under the Actis clear and the receipt of the claims by the united statesAttorney within the statutory period, as agent of theAttorney General, was proper. IIis acts in receivins theseveral claims in question were, therefore, the acts oI theAttorneyGeneral. * * rr