Civpro_rules 1 to 2 Digests

8/3/2019 Civpro_rules 1 to 2 Digests

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G.R. No. 146611 February 6, 2007

TANCREDO REDEA,, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEA, Respondent.

special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution ofthe Court of Appeals

petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition against his brother,respondent Leocadio Redea before the then CFI now RTC of SanPablo City, Laguna

the parties common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, aresidential lot, a riceland and another parcel of land

trial court confined the partition to only the property actuallypertaining to the estate of the parties deceased father and co -owned by them, namely, the parcel of land as the rest of theproperties were owned by the defendant

petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appealcourt gave due course to the notice and directed the

elevation of the records of the case to the CA

the CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as appellant, to filehis appellants brief.

Evidently, the period for filing the brief was even extendedby the CA

there being no appellants brief filed within the extended period, theCA issued a resolution[5]considering the appeal abandoned and

accordingly dismissing the same.

8 months after the CA issued the above resolution, petitioner filed amotion for reconsideration

CA denied the motion petitioner filed a Petition for Relief[8] anchored on

38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedurepetitioner prays the CA to set aside its dis

and reinstate his appeal and grant him a forty-five (45) days from notice within wappellants brief

CA held that Petition for relief is not amoavailable in the Court of Appeals as these pwith the trial courts

CA further held that Under Rule 47, ajudgment or final orders and resolutions maCA based on the ground of extrinsic fraud wthe premise of the petition, but it is worththe petitioner if the factual basis of the prerelief may qualify as an extrinsic fraud, unde

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aresolution was likewise denied by the CA

petitioner is now before this Court via the instantsubmission that the CA committed grave abuse of druled that a petition for relief is not an available remof appeals

petitioner prays that the court relax the applicatirules, or suspend them altogether, in favor substantial rights

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to relief

HELD: No
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petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is ofequitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as whenthere is no other available or adequate remedy.A petition for relief may not be availed of where a

party has another adequate remedy available to him,which is either a motion for new trial or appeal fromthe adverse decision of the lower court, and he is notprevented from filing such motion or taking theappeal.

The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks tobe relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of theremedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken modeof procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will betantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has alreadybeen lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to amistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel

Under Section 2 of Rule 38, supra, of the Rules of Court, aparty prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or finalorder of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or

excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in thesame case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be givendue courseThis presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken

precisely because of any of the aforestated reasonswhich prevented him from appealing his case

Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be availedof in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdictionFor sure, under the present Rules, petitions for relief

from a judgment, final order or other proceedingrendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the

court in the same case from which the petition arose.

petition for relief from a judgment, final ordeinvolved in a case tried by a municipal trial couand decided by the same court in the same caprocedure followed in the present Regional Trial

petitioner failed to show diligence in pursuincondition as a farmer, by itself alone, doesexempt him from being vigilant on his right. H

blame solely on his former lawyer. It is settledbound by the mistakes, negligence and omcounsel.[18]While, exceptionally, a client may the failure of his counsel, the circumstances case do not convince the Court to take exceptio

petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38Rules of Court. He was not prevented from filappeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusabin fact he filed one. The relief afforded by Rulgranted to a party who seeks to be relieved frothe judgment when the loss of the remedy of la

own negligence, or a mistaken mode of promatter; otherwise, the petition for relief will breviving the right of appeal which has already because of inexcusable negligence or due tprocedure by counsel.[21]The Rules allow a ponly when there is no other available remedylitigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by n

On a final note, the extraordinary writ of cissued only where it is clearly shown that thergross abuse of discretion as to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refu

duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in conteas where the power is exercised in an arbitramanner by reason of passion or personal hostili
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VDA. DE VICTORIA vs. CA

Mario Victoria, through an appeal by certiorari, seeks to set aside theResolutions of CA promulgated on May 25 and July 12, 2000, which (1)dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorariand (2) deniedpetitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively.

FACTS:

October 27, 1993 Sps. Gibe filed a Complaint for "Ejectment andDamages with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" against:1. Isidra Vda. de Victoria (the mother of herein petitioner Mario

Victoria)2. Eusebio Arida3. Juan and Guillermo Becina

with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauan, Laguna.

>Sps. Gibe alleged:

>1992 they acquired property for the heirs of late Judge Lantin.

>Property was originally part of Lot 1-B-153, which was subdividedinto 7 parcels in 1989 among Judge Gregorio Lantin and his 4 tenants,Felix Victoria, Juan and Guillermo Becina, and Eusebio Arida.

*Felix Victoria is the deceased husband of Isidra Victoria. Alldefendants in this ejectment case were given home lots, while the lotsallotted to Judge Lantin were sold to Sps. Gibe.

>Lot 1-B-153-A was being fenced and it was discovered that:1. The Victoria house was standing on the northwestern portion of theproperty.2. Mrs. Victoria was harvesting and picking fruits from the citrus treesplanted in that area without the knowledge and permission of the Gibespouses.3. Eusebio Arida, Juan Becina and Guillermo Becina were alsosurreptitiously planting palay on the northwestern portion.

> The fencing was discontinued after the children of Mrs.threatened to shoot at the workers of the Sps. Gibe with It left approximately 8,000 sq. m. of the northwestern poopen and unfenced.

>Mrs. Victoria filed her Answer, with Motion to Dismiss Ejdenying the fact that she entered the lot of Judge Lantin Sps. Gibe. She claimed that her farmhouse was construct

lot awarded to her family by DAR.

> Preliminary Conference of the Ejectment Case - partiesto a relocation survey of the property to be conducted byengineer.

>The geodetic engr. submitted the results of the relocatio

>Mrs. Victoria and her co-defendants in the ejectment caManifestation with Motion requesting the trial court to allindependent surveyor, to be paid by them, to conduct an

>Court granted the motion, however, no survey plan wasthem.

May 21, 1998 - MTC rendered decision in favor of SPS. Githe real owners of the property in question.

May 22, 1998 Sps. Gibe filed a motion for Immediate EDemolition praying that a writ of execution be issued to ejudgment. The defendants in the Ejectment Case were no

May 29, 1998 after promulgation and receipt of the MTCdefendants filed a notice of appeal, without filing a supers

stay the immediate execution of the decision & depositingrentals.


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June 1, 1998 MTC granted the Motion for Immediate Execution & issueda writ of execution.

July 13, 1998 - Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition (With Prayer forIssuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) was filed with RTCof Calamb, Laguna.

>Petition assailed MTC decision contending that it had no jurisdiction overthe case and committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding in favor of

Sps. Gibe and in issuing Writ of Execution pending appeal.

>Mrs. Victoria died before MTC promulgated the questioned order andshe was substituted by her son, Mario Victoria.

>RTC of Calauan, where the petition for certiorari was raffled, issued aWrit of Preliminary Injunction.

October 7, 1998 - The appeal field by defendants before the RTC ofCalauan,Laguna was dismissed for failure to file the appeal memorandum.

August 3, 1999 RTC dismissed petition for certiorari.

>Petitioner, Victoria, contends that RTC has no jurisdiction to try the caseand t issue the questioned decisions because under PD 27 any disputeinvolving said lands must be referred to DARAB.

> Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in thecomplaint.The complaint filed by the private respondents was forEjectment and Damages With a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.Ejectment proceedings are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of theMunicipal Trial Court.

> Petitioner Victoria did not question the jurisdiction of the Court butprayed for the dismissal of the case below for lack of cause of action.

>The Decision of the Court below is therefore not an error of jurisdictionbut an error of judgment which is not reviewable by certiorari

proceedings. In other words, certiorariis a remedy designcorrection of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgmfunction is to keep and inferior court within its jurisdiction

>Having found [the MTC] to have jurisdiction to issue theMay 28, 1998, the respondent judge likewise has jurisdictexecution of the same pending appeal pursuant to Sectiothe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

>CA: May 25, 2000, the CA dismissed the CA CertiorariP1. The correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial petition for certiorari is an ordinary appeal.2. The instant petition is filed out of time.3. The statement of material dates as to timeliness of thepetition is incomplete.

>Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denResolution of July 12, 2000 for being filed 2 days beyond reglementary period, he filed the petition at bar after he his motion, an extension of thirty days to file the petitionupon the timeliness of the motion for extension.

ISSUE/S:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDGIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOON GROUND OF TECHNICALITY INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE MERITS.

II. RTC OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, COMMITTED GADLEJ BY RTHIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MTTHE DECISION OF THE COURTA QUO WAS NOT AN ERROJURISDICTION BUT AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH IS REVIEWABLE IN CERTIORARI[P]ROCEEDINGS.

HELD:


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Petition is denied.

RATIO:1ST ISSUE> In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that thereglementary period to appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months priorto the filing ofpetitioners motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001.- The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the CA dismissing theCA CertiorariPetition shows that the same was received by counsel for

petitioners agent on June 5, 2000.- Petitioner had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal ora motion for new trial or reconsideration.

> Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it deniedpetitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed two daysafter the expiration of the reglementary period on June 22, 2000.

>The instant petition for review must likewise be denied for having beenfiled on May 12, 2001, almost 11 months after the expiration of theperiod to appeal on June 20, 2000.

>The records indicates that this case should have been terminated asearly as January 4, 2000 with the lapse of the period within whichpetitioner could have appealed from the RTC Decision.

>Duremdes vs. Duremdes: Rules of procedure must be faithfullyfollowed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxedto relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure tocomply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberalapplication of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the

part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain hisfailure to abide by the rules.

2ND ISSUE>The MTC does not automatically lose its exclusive original jurisdictionover ejectment cases by the mere allegation of a tenancy relationship. As

thoroughly discussed inRivera v. Santiago,41the party amust prove the existence of all the essential requisites ofto oust the MTC of its jurisdiction over the case.

> In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as anand/or special defense in their Answer with Counterclaim[Revised Rule on Summary Procedure], the MTC was supa preliminary conference to determine if such relationshipreal issue. We emphasize that the MTC did not autom

its jurisdiction simply because respondents raised tdefense. It continued to have the authority to hear precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction tothe ejectment suit on its merits.

> To determine whether the CA was correct in its reversacourt, it is necessary to keep in mind the essential requiswhich are as follows:(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agric(2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land;(3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the p(4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural product

(5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricult(6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.All these elements must concur. It is not enough that thedivest the MTC of jurisdiction, they must all be shown to

> In the present case, neither petitioner nor his predecessubmitted evidence to substantiate the existence of the erequisites of tenancy. Thus, there is no basis at all to supclaim that the MTC was without jurisdiction to render theDecision.

HERNANDEZ vs RURAL BANK

FACTS:
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>March 21, 1961 Sps. Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank ofLucena a loan payable on March 21, 1962. Loan was cured by a mortgageon 2 lots in Cubao. The interest for 1 year was paid in advance.

>3 mos. after loan was obtained, the bank became a distress bank.-June 6, 1961: Acting Gov. of the Central Bank apprised the

stockholders of Lucena Bank after having found that the officers, directorsand employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted tounsound and unsafe banking practices.

>The Monetary Board advised the stockholders to reorganize the Lucenabank by electing a new board of directors and directed that bank (a) notto grant new loans or renewals; (b) not to accept deposits from newdepositors; (c) to service only the existing deposit accounts and (d) notto issue drafts or make any disbursements without the prior approval ofCentral Bank examiners.

>The Monetary Board gave the warning that, if its directives were notobeyed, the Central Bank. would take over the management of theLucena bank.

June 21, 1961 Instead of bowing to the will of the Monetary Board, theLucena bank and its board of directors filed with the CFI of Manila acomplaint seeking to restrain the implementation of Resolution No. 928.

August 22, 1961 Before the expiration of the one-year term of the loan,Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan bymeans of a check for P6,000 dated August 8, 1961 which was drawnagainst the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which waspayable to Fernandez As the bank's executive vice president was notavailable, the payment was not consummated.

>At the time that the check was issued, the San Pablo Colleges, had adeposit in the Lucena bank amounting to P11,890.16 (27 tsn April 25,1966). Instead of withdrawing P6,000 from that deposit, the San PabloColleges chose to issue a check for that amount w/ Hernandez. It is not

clear whether in August, 1961 the San Pablo Colleges couwithdrawal from its deposit in the Lucena bank.

August 23, 1961 Hernandez sent to the bank by registephotostat of the check and a letter inquiring whether the honor the check and when he should go personally to thepurpose. That letter was received by the bank on August

August 30, 1961 the executive vice-president wrote to H

informed him that the check could not be honored for thebecause of adverse events that had disrupted the bank's What the vice-president meant was that by reason of theCentral Bank Governor dated June 16. 1961 the operationbank were suspended.

>The vice-president explained that because there was a rassets were exhausted, and so the check sent by Hernanwas drawn against the Lucena bank, could not be accepte

>The vice-president said that when Hernandez presentedLucena bank was no longer in a position to honor withdra

had Hernandez paid cash, his payment would have been ahonor the check would have been tantamount to allowing(San Pablo Colleges) to make a withdrawal but the Lucenentertain withdrawals without the consent of the Central Payment by check was a disbursement.

>The VP did not take the trouble of asking the Central Bawhether the payment by check made by Hernandez couldHernandez, who should have known that the bank was inbother to take up his problem with the said examiners.

October 18, 1961 Hernandez again asked the bank whedeliver the check.

October 24, 1961 EVP told him that the bank could not check because it had not resumed its banking operations


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reopen in January, 1962, and that, anyway, the loan would not be dueuntil March 21, 1962.

February 1, 1962 Hernandez sent another letter enclosed the originalcheck (duly endorsed) with his letter to the bank dated March 7, 1962,which was sent by registered mail and special delivery.

March 7, 1962 - the check was returned to Hernandez because the bank'smanager was allegedly in Manila.

April 25, 1962 - Hernandez again mailed the check to the bank on April25, with the request that his mortgage be cancelled.

>In the meantime, the Monetary Board had decided to liquidate theLucena Bank.

February 8, 1962 Governor of the Central Bank in a letter enjoined theLucena bank from transacting business and advised it to turn over itsassets, documents and records to the chief bank examiner. The bankbuilding was sealed.

February 12, 1962 the Lucena Bank filed with the Court of FirstInstance of Lucena City a complaint praying that the Central Bank beenjoined from liquidating the said bank.

February 14, 1962 the court issued an ex parte preliminary injunctionwhich it dissolved ten days later.

>On the same date, FEBRUARY 14, 1962, the Manila court rendered adecision in Civil Case No. 47345, restraining the enforcement of theMonetary Board resolution, which required the Lucena bank to undertakea reorganization and to curtail its operations [THIS IS THE PREVIOUSCASE FILED BY THE LUCENA BANK AGAINST MB]. The Central Bankappealed.

>To implement the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidationof the Lucena bank, the Central Bank, pursuant to section 29 of its

charter and on the assumption that the Lucena bank waswith the Court of first Instance of Manila a petition dated for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the LuIS ANOTHER CIVIL CASE].

March 28, 1963 CFI Manila issued an order directing theturn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized repr

April 2, 1963 Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 426

Superintendent of Banks or his duly authorized representcharge of the assets of the Lucena bank.

November 27, 1963 The Board in its resolution orderedSuperintendent of Banks to convert the assets of the Lucmoney. The Lucena bank, by means of certiorari sought tliquidation proceeding. This Court denied its petition.

October 29, 1963 Hernandez informed the Central Banksent to the Lucena bank on April 25, 1962 the chock for Prequested that his mortgage be cancelled.

December 9, 1963 Associate Superintendent of Banks ireturned the check to Hernandez and informed him that, Lucena bank's executive vice-president, the check could nthe payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank was alwhen he received the check. Moreover, the chock was dracurrent deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bin the process of liquidation. Hernandez was advised to seby paying cash or by means of a chock drawn against a bthe Lucena bank.

December 16, 1963 Hernandez announced to the AssocSuperintendent of Banks in his letter of that he was goingsaid check in the court of First Instance of Lipa City on orDecember 26, 1963.


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January 2, 1964 Hernandez enclosed the check with his letter to theclerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa City. That letter wasreceived in court on January 6, 1964.

January 11, 1964 Hernandez wrote a letter informing the AssociateSuperintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. Copies ofthat letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo Colleges.

October 12, 1964 - Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of

First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., theCentral Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept thecheck and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. TheHernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount ofP10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000.

October 20, 1964 Ventral Bank filed a motion to dismiss contendingthat the venue was improper because the action involved a real propertyso it should have been instituted in QC where the lots are situated. Also,Lucena Bank is under liquidation and its properties and assets are incustodial egis and may only be reached by motion in CFI Manila.

January 30, 1967 the counsel of Lucena offered to compromise the caseby stipulating that the central Bank would apply the check in question tothe mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit of the SanPablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the check ofP6,000 and that, by virtue of that compromise, the complaint andcounterclaim would be dismissed. The compromise did not happenbecause the lawyers of Hernandez and Central Bank did not assent to it.

October 31, 1967 RTC rendered an amended decision ordering Lucenaor Central Bank to honor the check, cancel the mortgage and payHernandez damages and attorneys fees.

ISSUE/S:

The Central Bank contends that the trial court erred:(1) in not holding that the venue was improperly laid;

(2) in not holding that it had no jurisdiction because the Hspouses should have ventilated their claim in the liquidatpending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Instead oseparate action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City(3) in not holding that there was no valid consignation;(4) in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees; and(5) in ordering execution pending appeal in spite of the taassets of the Lucena bank are in custodia legis or in the cliquidation court and the receiver appointed by it.

RATIO:

RTC judgment is reversed and set aside. The case is dismprejudice to the right of the Hernandez spouses to take uliquidation court(proper venue to resolve this case) thetheir mortgage obligation.

HELD:(1)Defendants-appellants contend that the action of the Hspouses to compel them to honor the check in question a

mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title twhich should have been filed in the Court of First InstancQuezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated.

>Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for parcondemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real propcommenced and tried in the province where the propertythereof lies".

>The rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estbut does not mention an action for the cancellation of a rthe instant case, the action is primarily to compel the moaccept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has


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the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession ofthe mortgaged lots.

>Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estatemortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a realmortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel themortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release themortgage.

>The venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendantor any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiffor any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action isnot the same as an action in personam.

We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because thevenue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" insection 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or domicile.

GO vs UCPB

Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 31 July 2002of the Court of Appeals, where the respondent judge is directed todismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

FACTS:

>Go & Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International and a lot moreof Noahs Ark Enterprises. Sometime in August 1996, they both appliedfor an Omnibus Line accommodation with UCPB for 900M, which the UCPBapproved.

>Transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over lands located in

Mandaluyong and registered under Looyukos name and another lotregistered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.

July 21, 1997 the approved Omnibus Line accommodatthem was cancelled by UCPB. As a result, Go demanded freturn of 2 TCTs covered by the Real Estate Mortgages exrefused to return of the TCTs. It proceeded to have the 2Estate Mortgages notarized and caused for its registrationof Mandaluyong on September 2, 1997.

June 15, 1999 UCPB filed with the Sheriff of Mandaluyoextrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered

non-payment of the obligation secured by said mortgageauction sale of the property was set on 11 April and 3 Ma

Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgdamages, with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injuthe bank and its officers and the sheriff, with the RTC of Pamended complaint alleged:

>Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT, auctioned, although it was registered only in the name of

>UCPB was aware that he is a co-owner as he was deeds of real estate mortgage covering the said property

>The approved omnibus credit line applied for by Gdid not materialize and was cancelled by UCPB on July 21the pre-signed real estate mortgages were cancelled;

>He demanded from UCPB the 2 TCTs to be returnebank refused;

>Despite the cancellation of the credit line, UCPB hor real estate mortgage notarized and caused the extrajuforeclosure;

>That the auction sale be enjoined;>TCTs be returned to him and bank be ordered to p

damages.

June 7, 2000 UCPB filed motion to dismiss stating that:> that the court has no jurisdiction over the case d

nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees;> that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;


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>an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleadedand, therefore, the complaint states no cause of action;

>that the complaint was improperly verified; and>that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an

insufficient and false certification of non-forum shopping.

June 7, 2000 RTC issued an order enjoining the auction sale andgranted the writ for preliminary injunction.

August 9, 2000 RTC denied banks motion to dismiss the case. The MRwas denied as well on November 8, 2000.

January 3, 2001 UCPB questioned said orders before CA via petition forcertiorari alleging that the RTC acted w/o or in excess of jurisdiction w/grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order that denied the motion todismiss and the MR.

July 31, 2002 CA set aside the orders of RTC and ordered for thedismissal of the civil case on the ground of improper venue.

14 November 2002 Gos MR was denied.

ISSUE/S:

Whether petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage isa personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue?

HELD:

Petition denied for lack of merit. The assailed decisions denying themotion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.

RATIO:

>In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or asprovided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting titleto or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include

partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage property. The venue for real actions is the same for regioand municipal trial courts -- the court which has territoriaover the area where the real property or any part thereof

>Personal action is one brought for the recovery of persothe enforcement of some contract or recovery of damageor for the recovery of damages for the commission of an person or property.22The venue for personal actions is lik

for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of tthe plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or whdefendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at tthe plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.

>It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determcases of the above nature is the primary objective for whare filed.

>The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,31is more painstructive. There, we held that an action for nullification documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real athe court having jurisdiction over the territory in which thwhich is the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

>In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, suinstant petition, is a real action, considering that a real esis a real right and a real property by itself.35An action forreal estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting theproperty. It is, therefore, a real action which should be cotried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject pr

Rule 1, Sections 1 6 Rules of CourtPaderanga vs. Buissan (September 1993)

TO DETERMINE THE PROPER VENUE OF AN ACTION TO FIOF A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH PRAYER FOR DAMAGESFACTS:
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- In 1973,PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA Industriescompany as represented by its General Manager JOSE ELUMBA

entered into an oral contract of lease

o For the use of a commercial space in a building owner byPADERANGA

o The lease was for an indefinite period, but the rent wasagreed as P150/month

o The leased area was used as the sales office of Allied AirFreight in Ozamis City

- 1977 PADERANGA subdivided the leased area into twoo He took possession of the other halfo Repossession was allowed by the local manager of ELUMBA

- July 1977, ELUMBA instituted an action for damages and PRAYEDFOR THE FIXING OF THE PERIOD OF LEASE AT 5 years.

o They filed the action before the CFI of Zamboanga del Nortebased in Dipolog City

- PADERANGA then moved for the dismissal of the case because theaction was a REAL ACTION which should have been filed before CFI

of Misamis Occidental in Ozamis City, because the property was

situated there.- 1978 Judge BUISSAN denied the Motion to dismiss

o Because it was an enforcement of the contract of leaseo No question of ownership was raisedo The venue was then proper

- MR of PADERANGA was also deniedo Although there was an action for recovery of possession, it

was not the main issue raised (remember, Dean said that the

main issue/contention is what is alleged in the initiatory

pleading, in this case, the recovery of possession was ONLY

incidental to the contract of lease, and claim for damages)- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

o PADERANGA

Since it is a real action, venue is laid in jurisdiction over the territory where the

o ELUMBA The recovery of possession being incide

action is for breach of the contract of le

damages

The action is one in personam (betweennot in rem (against the whole world)

Therefore, the venue may be laid where plaintiff-defendant resides

ISSUE: Whether the action filed is a personal action or a HELD:

- The case is deemed a real action and must be tried WHERE the property lies (OZAMIS CITY).

o The instant action is for damages, and the fixperiod

Although there the recovery of possessIT IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE

Karas train of thought DAMAGES

BREACH OF CONTRACT, a portion of the

was repossessed by the lessor IF the

granted the repossessed portion will

returned to the lessee THEREFORE, t

possession IS INCIDENTAL the initial ac

Even though the action did not seek forpossession, it is the ULTIMATE PURPOS

and as such, it is a real action because

recover something.

PersonalAction RTC where the defendant or any of the defenwhere plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resideReal RTC having jurisdiction over the territory in w


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Action property or a portion thereof lies

INCIDENTAL ISSUE: Whether or not the venue for an action to fix theperiod of a contract of lease should be before the CFI Misamis Occidental OZAMIS CITY(where the property is) or the CFI of Zamboanga delNorte DIPOLOG CITY (where ELUMBA is based)?HELD: The venue should be in Ozamis City.

- The court pointed out that ELUMBA is confused with the concept ofpersonal and real actions vis--vis actions in personam and in rem.

We will focus on personal and real actionso The action instituted is in personam but this does not mean

that the action is PERSONAL. A personal action may not

necessarily be an action in personam and a real action may

not be an action in rem

Action inpersonam

An action against a person on the basis of hisPERSONAL liability

Action in rem Is an action against the THING itself, instead of theperson

PNB vs. CA (1987)*GUYS Im not sure if this is the correct case, I dont have the SCRA copy.So, Im saying sorry if this is the wrong one.PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION OF THE CAWHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGESFACTS:

- In 1952, Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUGmortgaged several parcels of land situated in Pampanga, the

property served as a guarantee for the loan granted by PNB

o LOAN TO Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani- In 1963, MONTEMAYOR also mortgaged 2 parcels of land to

guarantee the loan of her son VITUG

- The TCTs mortgaged were all in the name of Donata MONTEMAYOR

- VITUG failed to pay, and the properties were foreclopublic auction

o Jaramilla and Bacani also failed to settle the lo Cert of Sale was issued to PNBo PNB later on sold the properties

- HISTORY (sorry, this is important to understand theo Clodualdo Vitug was married twice, his second

MONTEMAYOR

o He died intestate (with no will) and his estatedistributed MONTEMAYOR was the administratix (m

court made her the administer the esta

MONTEMAYOR entered a contracttwo of her children

o But then the other children filed an action for reconveyance and damages against the admi

MONTEMAYORS estate (by this time Montema

passed away)

o They also included PNB in the action, becthe mortgaged properties THE SUBJECT of the action is 30 parcels

they claim to be CLODUALDOs and MO

They argue thato The mortgage to PNB as weo The PUBLIC AUCTION are n

They invoke a previous court deciproperties were decided to be of c

1975, the lower court dismissed the com Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA

Reversed lower court decision stapublic auction of the properties ar

HALF.


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SO NOW, PNB filed a petition for certiorari.ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a party to action for reconveyance anddamages?HELD: NO.

- Remember that there was a previous decision stating that theparcels of land are of conjugal nature

o PNB cannot be a proper party thereto.o PNB was only included because the subject properties were

sold. REMEMBER LAND TITLES (and this will apply to your

Credit Trans): A mortgaged property should be in the

name of the mortgagee, because the assumption is the

mortgagee will be in default (eventually). The property

is a security for the payment of the loan.

PNB relied on the Torrens title, why would they evenquestion the validity of the titles? The titles were in the

name of MONTEMAYOR. Therefore, they dont have to

look beyond the title.

- Actions for the recovery of real property and for partitionARE REAL ACTIONS, but they are also actions in personamthat bind particular individuals who are parties thereto.

o PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by saiddecisions

PNB was also not aware of the case and the saiddecision, because of they knew the conjugal nature of

the property, they would have required the consent of

all the heirs (co-owners).

WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ishereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby renderedDISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay

attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNof P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

Tesorero vs. Mathay (1990)PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE DECISION OOF ENERGYFACTS:

- 1980 respondent Davao Light (DALIGHT) filed with respondent BOE an application for the approval of t

appraisal of its properties worth P339Mo The appraisal was made by the Technical and

Service (TAMSPHIL)

- June 1981, the BOE disapproved the TAMSPHIL Appdue to deficiencies and discrepancies

- 1982, DALIGHT again filed an application for the apappraisal, this time Asian Appraisal Co conducted th

- 1983, DOE approved P282M as the fair and reasonaDALIGHTs properties, and DALIGHT received the sa

- Jan 1984 (17 days after receiving the decision)filed an MR but the same was denied, but the petiti

receive the decision- June 1984, petitioners prayed that a hearing be con

resolution be issued on their MR

- BOE replied that the MR has been denied, and provthe decision

ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy inHELD: NO.

- The proper remedy is to appeal to the Office of the DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF ITS DECISION

- It must be noted that the decision was received on but the petitioners ONLY filed their MR on Jan 5, 19after from receipt of the said decision


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- They received the copy of the denied MR on Dec 1984- The Court in the broader interests of justice has in a number of

cases given due course to a petition for certiorari, although the

proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant

recourse and considering the dismissals on technicalities are viewed

with disapproval

- It is also well settled that litigations should, as much as possible bedecided on the merits and not technicalities, that this Court, in the

exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided to disregard technicalities inorder to resolve the merits.

- A careful review of the records show that this case will not onlyaffect herein petitioners but also the more or less 70,000

consumers in Davao City and its environs. It appears more

appropriate to consider the petition on its merits rather than

dismiss it on technicalities.

Manila Hotel vs CA GR No 143574 July 11 2002MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SAMUEL ALCORDO, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside theResolutions1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57760, whichdismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari assailing theOctober 29, 1999 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission inNLRC NCR CN. 00-12-09877-98.3

Facts: Private respondent was hired by petitioner on as Food and

Beverage Director. On November 30, 1998 his services were terminated on the ground

of loss of confidence due to his inability to improve the profitability

of the restaurants under his responsibility. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against

petitioner.

On June 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decdismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Petitioner was, however, ordered to pay private resmonth salary of P80,000.00 in lieu of the 30-day addismissal, plus an indemnity of P5,000.00 for its fawith procedural due process.

Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arordered petitioner Manila Hotel to pay full backwagpay equivalent to one month salary for every year moral and exemplary damages.

A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decis A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with

Appeals which dismissed the petition on the followio 1) the petition was not accompanied with cop

decision of the Labor Arbiter and the positionparties;

o 2) the certificate of non-forum shopping was Martin B. Isidro, petitioners counsel and AssiPresident, Personnel Department; and

o 3) the petition was not accompanied with a bauthorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to act for anpetitioner.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitionerthe failure to attach said documents to the petitioninadvertence or oversight.7 Attached to the motionthe omitted decision of the Labor Arbiter, the positwell as the required board resolution.8

Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsiderathat under Rule 46, Section 3, in relation to Rule 65the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to appendrelevant documents is sufficient ground for the dismpetition.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure.

The petition is without merit.


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Issue: Whether or not procedural rules can be liberally construed?Held: NoRatio:Pertinent portion of Rule 65, Section 1 and Rule 46, Section 3 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, provide:SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of thejudgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings anddocuments relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification ofnon-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule46.SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance withrequirements. -It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof ofservice thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for thecourt indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by aclearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,order, resolution or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of therecord as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant orpertinent thereto. . . . .The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoingrequirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.(Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals outrightly dismissed petitioners action on theground that the petition was not accompanied with the required boardresolution authorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to institute the petition; aswell as copies of the Labor Arbiters decision and the position paper oftheparties.The issue posed before the Court of Appeals is the validity of thetermination of private respondents employment. Hence, the need toappend copies of the Labor Arbiters decision and the position papers ofthe parties. Under the circumstances, there was a necessity for theappellate court to review the facts and the law on which the conclusions

were based, considering the conflicting findings of the NLRC and theLabor Arbiter.

Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed bythe following cases: (1) where a rigid application wmanifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especiallysuccessfully shows that the alleged defect in the quand executory judgment is not apparent on its face recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of

justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of thaddressed solely to the sound and judicious discretcourt; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse pacommensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessnecomplying with the procedure prescribed.9

Petitioner contends that the omission of the required doc"oversight" or "inadvertence." In Sea Power Shipping EntCourt of Appeals, et al.,10 however, the Court held that and "excusable negligence" have become an all tooready excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their to comply with established rules.Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote eforderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of jusstrict adherence thereto is required. The applicationmay be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a equity and substantial justice.In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown any cogent rCourt to be liberal in the application of the rules.11Hence, the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeagrounds must be sustained.Petition is DENIED. Resolution of Court of Appeals affirme

Rebollido vs CA GR No 81123 February 28 1989CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA anREBOLLIDO, petitionersvs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC


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The issues raised in this petition for review on certiorari in an action fordamages arising from a vehicular accident are lack of jurisdiction over thedefendant and absence of due process.

Facts: August 7, 1984, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. 8113 for

damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines,Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Pepsi Cola) and Alberto Alva beforethe Regional Trial Court of Makati.

The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1, 1984,involving a Mazda Minibus owned and driven by petitionersCrisostomo Rebollido and Fernando Valencia, respectively and atruck trailer owned at that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by AlbertoAlva.

September 21, 1984, the sheriff of the lower court served thesummons addressed to the defendants (PepsiCola).

It was received by one Nanette Sison who claims to be authorizedto receive the summons as she was the secretary of the legaldepartment of Pepsi Cola.

Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. The lower court heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the

defendants jointly and severally liable for damages. When the default judgment became final and executory, the

petitioners filed a motion for execution, a copy of which wasreceived no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by privaterespondent PEPSICO, Inc.

At that time, the private respondent, a US corporation, wasalready occupying the place of business of Pepsi Cola at LegaspiVillage, Makati to prepare for the expected dissolution of Pepsi Cola.

The dissolution of Pepsi Cola was approved by the SEC, one dayafter the accident occurred, March 2, 1984.

The Board of Directors and the stockholders of Pepsi Cola adoptedits amended articles of incorporation to shorten its corporate term.

Immediately after such amendment, Pepsi Cola cause thepublication of a notice of dissolution and the assumption of liabilitiesby the private respondent in a newspaper of general circulation.

Realizing that the judgment of the lower court wouexecuted against it, respondent PEPSICO, Inc., oppfor execution and moved to vacate the judgment onlack of jurisdiction.

The private respondent questioned the validity of thsummons to a mere clerk.

The lower court denied the motion of the private reholding that despite the dissolution and the assumpby the private respondent, there was proper serviceupon defendant Pepsi Cola. The lower court said tha122 of the Corporation Code, the defendant continuexistence for three (3) years from the date of disso

The private respondent filed a special civil action foprohibition with the respondent court (CA) to annulthe judgment of the lower court and its order denyivacate the judgment, for having been issued withou

The Court of Appeals granted the petition on the grjurisdiction ruling that there was no valid service ofappellate court stated that any judgment rendered Cola after its dissolution is a "liability" of the privatewithin the contemplation of the undertaking, but sesummons should be made upon the private respond

remanded the case to the lower court and ordered trespondent be summoned and be given its day in co

A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:(1) whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corpor

real party in interest to whom summons should be scivil case for damages; and(2) whether or not there was valid service of summons thSison, allegedly the secretary of the legal department of there was valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola, the

to whether or not such service validly vested jurisdiction court over the person of the respondent corporation.


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Held:(1)Pepsi Cola is the real party in interest .(2) There was valid service of summons

Ratio:(1)On the first issue, the petitioner maintain that it is Pepsi Cola which is thereal party in the case before the trial court because when the accidenthappened one day before the date of legal dissolution, Pepsi Cola was stillthe registered owner of the truck involved. Being solidarily liable with itsdriver for damages, there appears to be no question that the complaintand summons were correctly filed and served on Pepsi Cola.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that:Parties in interest- Every action must be prosecuted and defended in thename of the real party in interest. ... .In the case ofSamahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga TextileMarket, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals real party-in-interest as the party whostands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled tothe avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule meansmaterial interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, asdistinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest.In the case ofWalter Ascona Lee vs. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr, a real partyin interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party ininterest-defendantis one who has a correlative legal obligation whose actor omission violates the legal rights of the former.For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the realparty in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners notonly because it is the registered owner of the truck involved but alsobecause, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as acorporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legalright of another.

The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages againstPepsi Cola, A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission ofone party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and

its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintobligation of the defendants and an act or omissiondefendant in violation of said legal right."The law provides that a corporation whose corporate termstill be made a party to a suit according to the CorporatioIn American jurisprudence, a similar provision in the Corp1896 was construed with respect to the kinds of suits thaprosecuted against dissolved corporations:xxx xxx xxx... The words 'defending suits against them mean suits atequity, in contract or tort, or of what nature soever, and before or after dissolution.The rationale for extending the period of existence of a dcorporation is explained in Castle's Administrator v. Acrog(145 Ky 591,140 SW 1034 [1911]) as follows:The person who has a valid claim against a corporation, win contract or tort should not be deprived of the right to paction for the enforcement of his demands by the action ostockholders of the corporation in agreeing to its dissolutidissolution of a corporation does not extinguish obligationdue by or to it.

In the case at bar, the right of action of the petitionPepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time whenwas filed but when the acts or omission constitutingaction accrued, i.e. on March 1, 1984 which is the date and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong.

(2)Although it maybe true that the service of summons was person not authorized to receive the same ..., nevertheleappears that the summons and complaint were in fact reccorporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that thesubstantial compliance, with the rule on service of summo

purpose of said rule as above stated to assure service of corporation had thereby been attained. The need for speeprevail over a technicality.' (at p. 469; Emphasis supplied


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The valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola operated as a sufficientservice of summons upon the private respondent. The lower court canenforce judgment against the private respondent.Therefore, we rule that the private respondent is bound to satisfy thejudgment by default which has become final and executory. The lowercourt did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of the privaterespondent to vacate judgment.

G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, andROMEO HUGHES, respondents.

OVERVIEW

The petitioner is a duly organized corporation with a valid authorizationfrom the Board of Transportation to operate a bus line. The privaterespondent was hired by it in 1966 and continued serving therein as abus driver until the incident in question, when he was relieved of hisduties.

The incident occurred on August 10, 1974. Romeo Hughes was drivingBaliwag Transit Bus No. 1066 when it was stalled at the railroad crossingin Calumpit, Bulacan, because the vehicle ahead of it had stopped owingto a jeep that was making its way into a garage. As thus positioned, thebus was hit at its rear end by an onrushing train of the Philippine NationalRailways that dragged it several meters.Eighteen passengers died and fifty six others suffered serious physicalinjuries.

Baliwag filed a complaint for damages against the Philippine NationalRailways, which was held liable for its negligence in a decision renderedon April 6, 1977, by Judge Benigno Puno. Hughes was absolved of any

contributory negligence.

Hughes claims that soon after the decision against the PNdriver's license renewed and then sought reinstatement wTransit. He repeated his request several times even aftethe criminal case. He then decided to seek the assistanceOple, who wrote the petitioner on April 24, 1980, and "imprivate respondent's re- employment. As this request waHughes finally demanded his reinstatement on May 2, 191980, the petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstadriver's license had already been revoked and his driving dangerous to the riding public."

CIV PRO FACTS

The private respondent's reaction to this rejection was to1980, a formal complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Eillegal dismissal against the petitioner, with a prayer for hwith back wages from May 10, 1980.

On January 22, 1981, the complaint was dismissed by DirL. Estrella, National Capital Region, on the ground of presappearing that although the private respondent was sepaservice on 10 August 1974 (date of the accident), it was

1980, or a little less than 6 years thereafter, when he filecomplaint."

The regional director was, however, reversed by Minister dated May 21, 1981.

The question that has to be settled is the date when the accrued and from which the period shall commence to ruof Baliwag is that it should be August 10, 1974, when theoccurred. Hughes insists it is May 10, 1980, when his demreinstatement was rejected by the petitioner.

SC = Hughes is correct its May 10, 1980.


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It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, (1) aright in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever lawit arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the nameddefendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act oromission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of theplaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to theplaintiff.

We hold that the private respondent's right of action could not haveaccrued from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August10, 1974, as he was not considered automatically dismissed on that date.At best, he was deemed suspended from his work.

There was no apparent disagreement then between Hughes and hisemployer. As the private respondent was the petitioner's principal witnessin its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, wemay assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of termswhen the case was being tried.

We agree with the private respondent that May 10, 1980, is the datewhen his cause of action accrued, for it was then that the petitionerdenied his demand for reinstatement.

Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legalright of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but alsoan act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right thecause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses,expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.

Hughes's complaint was filed not later than three months only after suchrejection, there is no question that his action has not prescribed.

G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,vs.

ESTEBAN ICARAGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL defendants-appellees.

On June 11 , 1930, defendant Esteban Icaragal, for vaexecuted in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Incnote for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614security for its payment, said Esteban Icaragal executedmortgage on a parcel of land in Pagil, Laguna.

Promissor defaulted in the payment.

Plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila collection of the amount due.

Judgment was there rendered for Bachrach.

A writ of execution was subsequently issued.

The provincial sheriff of Laguna levied on the properties odefendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff.

Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party clthat by virtue of a writ of execution, the property which wof the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the salready been acquired by it at the public auction on May

The sheriff desisted from the sale of the property, as a cojudgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsa

Bachrach instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rentook the present appeal.

Whether or not Bachrach is barred from foreclosing the remortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a persona


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against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the paymentof which the mortgage was constituted as a security.

SC = Yes Bachrach is barred. We rule against splitting a single cause ofaction.

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a singlecause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists inthe recovery of the credit with execution of the security.

In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, thepayment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But bothdemands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and,for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Both refer to oneand the same obligation.

There exists only one cause of action for a single breach of thatobligation. Plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing acomplaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint forforeclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaintwill bar the subsequent complaint.

The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to preventrepeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the samesubject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation;and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits."

It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eademcause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause).

We hold, therefore, that a mortgage creditor may institute against themortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action toforeclose the mortgage. He may pursue either of the two remedies, butnot both.

G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985

GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator ofEstate of Susana Agustin, petitioner-plaintiff-appellantvs.LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFFrespondents-defendants-appellees.

Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a by the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentalrepeated demands an action to eject him was filed.

A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-Agustin, as adininistrator of the Intestate Estate of Susanagainst defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Cour

Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immthe place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum orepresenting arrearages in rentals plus the correspondingactually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and

Bacalans answer included a counter-claim alleging that taction was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it malice and bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of th

plaintiff against the defendant, the latter suffered, and wsuffer, actual and moral damages in the amount of no lesP50,000.00; P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damagedefendant has been compelled to retain the services of uncounsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless, malicious and frivolouprotect and enforce his rights for which he obligated himsfurther sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees."

City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the couordering the defendant to vacate the premises in questioplaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals andP150.00 as attorney's fees.

The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the CourtInstance of Cebu.


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The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is herebyrequired in favor of the defendant. 1. Ordering the plaintiff to paya) P10,000.00 as moral damages;b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and2. With costs against plaintiff

The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ ofexecution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auctionreal properties belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by

the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment.

Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion wasdenied.

With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V,Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the DeputySheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-citeddecision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectmentcase on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was nulland void from the beginning for the following reasons:

(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs)distributed thus:P10,000.00 as moral damagesP5,000.00 as exemplary damagesP1,000.00 as attorney's feeswhich is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu.

A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that theplaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant andruled: This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a validcause of action.

Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file anappeal before the Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed dowhich granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reaseeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgmen

Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appdefendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceedinjurisdiction of the court of origin?

SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of

jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximumaward of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of nbeing the case, an action to declare the nullity of the awathe plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First Instance ois a proper remedy.

The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appecannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the acSince the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the dcounterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the alikewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same.

G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986

REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,vs.HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BIFERNANDO CALION, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the ord

Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio City and BeProvince which dismissed his complaint for lac

jurisdiction.

Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of histhe erroneous belief that the entire original record obe transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second


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Section 39 of BP129. This provision applies only to ordinary appealsfrom the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 ofthe Interim Rules).

The order appealed from states two causes of action; the first causeof action is against respondent Binongcal for refusing to pay theamount of P11,643, and the second one is against respondentCalion for refusing to pay the amount P10,212.

On December 15, 1983, respondent Binongcal filed a Motion toDismiss on the ground oflack of jurisdiction since the amount ofthe demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00 (RTC

has exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of thedemand is more than P20,000).

It was further averred in said motion that although another person,Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount ofP10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct fromthat of the other respondent.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the

case following the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:THIS IS THE PRESENT RULE

... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes ofaction between the same or different parties, embodiedin the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall bethe totality of the claims in all the causes of action,irrespective of whether the causes of action arose outof the same or different transactions. ...

Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:

Application of the totality rule.-In actions where thejurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved,

the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all themoney demands, exclusive only of interest and costs,irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are

owned by or due to different parties. If andamages in a civil action, the amount thereofspecifically alleged.

Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions wportion of the FORMER RULE under Section 88 of tof 1948 as amended which reads as follows:

... Where there are several claims or causes obetween the same parties embodied in th

complaint, the amount of the demand shall bof the demand in all the causes of action,of whether the causes of action arose outor different transactions; but where the claof action joined in a single complaint are sepaor due to different parties, each separate clfurnish the jurisdictional test. ...

Issue: W/N Court was correct in dismissing the case due t

jurisdiction

Held: Yes. RTC does not have the proper jurisdiction over

Ratio: There is no difference between the former and pres

cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or mcauses of action. In such cases, the amount of the dthe totality of the claims in all the causes of action whether the causes of action arose out of the sametransactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty ththen the regional trial court has jurisdiction.

On the other hand, there is a difference between thpresent rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs causes of action against a defendant join in a singleseparate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.


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In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that thejurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of partiespursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rulesof Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, itappears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason thatthe claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion areseparate and distinct and neither of which falls within its

jurisdiction.

[G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005]

SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners,vs.SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondents.

Facts: The petitioners were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house

constructed thereon, located in Paranaque, Metro Manila. On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents

executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the formersold the property to the latter payable in six installments via

postdated checks. It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to

transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of theMOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would bedishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged toreconvey the property to the petitioners.

On May 17, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint against therespondents with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for theannulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession anddamages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did nottransfer the property to and in the names of the respondents asvendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in

payment for the purchase price of the property were dishonored bythe drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demandstherefor.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the coground, inter alia, ofimproper venue and lack ofover the property subject matter of the action.

On the first ground, the respondents averred that taction of the petitioners for the rescission of the Mrecovery of the possession of the property is anot a personal one; hence, it should have been broof Paranaque City, where the property subject maaction was located.

In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their actand attorney's fees is a personal action and not a rehence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where They averred that while their second cause of actiorecovery of the possession of the property is a real same may, nevertheless, be joined with the recauses of action for damages (legal basis: Sec 5

On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order gramotion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.principal action of the petitioners was a real actionhave been filed in the RTC of Paraaque City whersubject matter of the complaint was located. Hencerecourse.

Issue: W/N the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Malo

Held: No, petition was correctly dismissed for lack of juris

Ratio: The Court ruled that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rul

not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as placourt a quo, had only one cause of action against thnamely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter's ref

first two installments in payment of the property asand turn over to the petitioners the possession of thas well as the house constructed thereon occupied


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respondents. The claim for damages are merely incidental to themain cause of action, and are not independent or separate causesof action.

Being a real action, it should have been filed in the proper courtwhere the property is located, namely, in Paraaque City,conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Documents

Civpro_rules 1 to 2 Digests