CIA Political Relationships

1CIA Political Relationships and Activities

CIA Political Relationships and Activities

Dylen P. Setzekorn

University of North Georgia

POLS 7220

April 13, 2015


Introduction

The American Government operates according to a system of checks and balances to ensure

that no one branch of government is capable of harnessing excessive power. This system of

checks and balances highlights a tremendous degree of interdependency between the executive,

legislative and judicial branches of government, each with individual roles to play within the

giant spectrum of American government (Van Horn et al., 2011, p. 4). According to a strict

interpretation of this system, in instances of military conflict congress has the power to declare

war. In reality, however, it is clear that the concept of shadow warfare has arisen as an alternative

to congressionally approved declarations of war (Hancock, 2014, p. 1). Covert operations

conducted under the authority of the commander in chief and his appointed director are the

responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. The mission of the Central Intelligence

Agency is to preempt threats and further U.S. national-security objectives by collecting

intelligence that matters, producing objective all-source analysis, conducting effective covert

action as directed by the President, and safeguarding the secrets that help keep our nation safe

(CIA Vision, 2013). The operations of the CIA produce tremendously political consequences,

requiring coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and a variety of other political

players both foreign and domestic. The CIA is unique among the 17-member U.S. Intelligence

Community in its ability to conduct covert operations that generally have tremendous political

consequences. Through the evaluation of the agency’s origins, the political coordination that is

required to maintain its operations, its role within the National Security Council, and various


other factors, this paper seeks to describe the political relationships and activities that permeate

the agency’s processes and functions.

The CIA: Political Origins and Enduring Problems

The ideological foundations for the organization of a centralized, peacetime intelligence

agency can be traced back to William Donovan. Through his work in the Office of Strategic

Services, Donovan set the ball in motion towards the formulation of a centralized organization

that could be used to synthesize intelligence information for use by policy makers. As WWII

progressed, the OSS developed into an organization that was capable of analyzing intelligence

and carrying out covert operations through the establishment of branches that were responsible

for counterintelligence, espionage, sabotage and physical subversion, interaction with foreign

nationalities, and psychological warfare (Darling, 2007).

The concept of a centralized intelligence agency sparked heated opposition, chiefly from the

State, War, and Navy Departments which were wary of relinquishing their traditional

intelligence procedures and competing for federal funds. This concern reflects the traditional

tendency of departments to manipulate program responsibilities to maximize their ability to

receive funding. (Seidman,1998, p. 23). The State Department had traditionally served as the

primary source of foreign intelligence, while the military typically maintained its own

intelligence operations. Though opposition continued in response to the proposal for an

independent intelligence agency, many officials recognized the need for the strengthening of the

OSS and the potential of a permanent intelligence agency that would continue on after the

conclusion of WWII. The formation of such an agency required significant relinquishments of

intelligence authority by the Navy, State, and War Departments, causing a highly contested


struggle for domination of post-war intelligence (Van Horn et al., 2013, p. 170). A battle ensued

in which various agencies submitted proposals designed to promote their own department’s

authoritative capacity within the post-war intelligence era, all of which struggled to fairly address

the issue of leadership over centralized intelligence. Donovan submitted a proposal designed to

both preserve the OSS and establish it as the central authority over national intelligence, while

his opponents continued to push for a less centralized peacetime intelligence community. In

1945, in an effort to combine Donovan’s recommendations with the proposals of the services, the

Joint Intelligence Committee drafted a plan that proposed a National Intelligence Authority. The

NIA was to be comprised of the secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the presidential chief of

staff. A centralized intelligence agency was to be formed under the direct supervision of the

NIA, and whose director was appointed by the president based on the recommendations of the

Intelligence Authority (Darling, 2007, p. 43).

The authority of the director of central intelligence was a major point of dispute in the

drafting of the compromise plan. Some believed that the intelligence agency should be

autonomous but that the DCI should be directly accountable to the president as a means of

promoting accountability while minimalizing limitations on the agency’s freedom of action

(Sideman, 1998, p. 199). Opponents to this approach asserted that agency should be a

subordinate entity of the NIA, so as not to create unnecessary power struggles based on the

likelihood that the director of central intelligence would be a military officer (Darling, 2007, p.

33). Even today, controversies surrounding the role of centralized intelligence leadership,

management of intelligence assets, and methods of intelligence analysis continue to be repeating

catalysts in interagency disputes. The modern era continues to see the manifestations of conflict

in interagency political relationships as individual government organizations seek to


advantageously utilize technical systems and personnel instead of recognizing them as resources

to pursue national priorities (Darling, 2007, p. 42).

National Security Act of 1947

The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1971, demanded an increased

emphasis on premonitory intelligence as a means of preventing future attacks. This attack

highlighted the main problems with the traditional intelligence system: inadequate distribution of

intelligence, and unsatisfactory analysis of intelligence (Goodman, 2008, p. 4). The clear

intelligence tragedy of Pearl Harbor, combined with the rise of the Soviet threat during the onset

of the Cold War, essentially overwhelmed American cultural opposition to the organizations of a

permanent intelligence agency and highlighted the political appeal of a specific intelligence

program (Seidman, 1998, p. 23). Though the formulation of an independent intelligence agency

within the executive office of the president drew vehement opposition from the FBI, the

Department of State, and the Department of Defense, it was becoming clear that the rising threat

mandated an agency that could assess national threats without a policy bias (Goodman, 2008, p.

4). The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA as an independent agency that would

serve to assist the National Security Council on matters of intelligence in an advisory capacity,

and preform duties related to intelligence (Van Horn et al., 2011, p. 4). The vague nature of the

“other such duties” description has served as the ambiguous mandate under which the CIA has

operated relatively unchecked by the traditional system of checks and balances in an effort to

maximize operational security and deniability (Hancock, 2014, p. 5)

Implications of “Other Such Duties”


Since the establishment of the CIA in 1947 as a Level II agency, the agency has operated to

collect intelligence and conduct operations without any clearly definable measure of authority

(Seidman, 1998, p. 171). Congress guaranteed the independence of the agency and granted it the

authority to operate outside the influence of policy-making departments in an effort to assist the

agency in “correlating and evaluating intelligence related to national security” (Warner, 2001, p.

4). The DCI, which was operated outside an military chain of command, was granted the right to

inspect any foreign intelligence held by other agencies and was charged with leading the CIA in

providing for the government “services of common concern,” a phrase that in practicality has

transformed into espionage and the collection of information from foreign sources as well as

citizens (Warren, 2001, p. 5). Congress granted this authority under the assumption that the

executive branch would manage the CIA with respect to the traditional system of checks and

balances. History has shown that this has not been the case. In fact it was not until the 1970s that

it became required for the President to present information relating to the initiation of covert

operations to specific members of Congress, notifying them of clandestine operations that were

going to be conducted or that were already in progress (Hancock, 2014, p. 2).

The aim of the National Security Act of 1947 was to arm policy makers with the best

possible information available at the time and to establish an organization that could be

responsible for the growing emphasis on premonitory intelligence (Warner, 2001, p. 17). When

congress faced was faced with the problem of having an independent intelligence system, it

essentially left the executive to its own initiative. The ambiguity with which the CIA was

established continues for many of the same reasons that it was formed in the first place. There

have been numerous proposals aimed at adjusting the degree of accountability for centralized

intelligence such as the re-alignment of the intelligence community under the Director of


National Intelligence. This established the DNI as the head of the intelligence community, a

position that was previously held by the director of the CIA, following the security concerns that

arose after 9/11.

The exigencies of modern warfare have placed a greater emphasis on Alexander Hamilton’s

notion of decisiveness in command and the role of advisory bodies to the president (Seidman,

1998, p. 197). The ambiguous language concerning the responsibilities of the CIA has bolstered

the traditional notion that there are circumstances in which the enemies of national security have

initiated a state of war and that a congressional invitation to engage the enemy is not required

(Hancock, 2014, p. 4). “Other such duties” essentially serves as the legitimizing language for the

clandestine operations of the CIA. Outside their responsibilities as analysts of premonitory

intelligence, the CIA operates as the shadowed extension of the presidential (and congressionally

recognized) responsibility to act in defense of the nation. Since 1947, almost all the American

presidents have taken such actions based on the language of the National Security Act (Hancock,

2014, p. 5). The vague language of the National Security Act of 1947 has allowed the agency to

operate at the discretion of the president as the driving force behind covert, deniable warfare.

Political Relationships of the CIA

Public Affairs

The CIA Office of Public Affairs serves the agency by managing the media and handling

public relations. The Director of the OPA serves as a senior advisor directly accountable to the

Director of the CIA. The OPA is responsible for the agency’s interactions with the media, and

the general public through the offices comprisal into three primary mission areas: media

relations, public communications, and internal communications


The public communications component of the OPA seeks to manage agency interaction

with the public. Public communications seeks to promote the highest reasonable degree of

transparency through a variety of efforts which include responding to letters, calls, and emails

from the public, overseeing the content of the agency website, and distributing publications that

are meant to inform the public on the history of the CIA and its mission to protect national

security. PC also manages the public appearances of the Agency’s Director and conducts

outreach efforts to various civic, academic, and government groups (Offices of CIA, 2014).

The goal of the media relations component of the OPA is to be responsive to the media

while ensuring the protection of sensitive information. Part of OPA’s responsibility for managing

media relations pertains to interaction with actors, directors, and screenwriters within the

entertainment industry seeking to portray the CIA in their creative endeavors. The interaction

with the entertainment industry is managed by the Agency’s Entertainment Industry Liaison. The

Entertainment Industry Liaison is responsible for balancing the protection of national security

equities with promoting the accurate portrayal of the CIA in the creative ventures of the

entertainment industry (Offices of CIA, 2014). This cooperation is especially surprising

considering the CIA’ reputation for secrecy and the agency’s legally recognized interpretation of

the freedom of information act. The CIA exemption from disclosing information that would pose

a significant national security risk has served as the foundation for a tremendous amount of

informational secrecy over the years. The end of the cold war and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet

Union demanded a new approach to the traditionally accepted degree of transparency, and it is

for this reason that the Agency began to approach the possibility of working with the

entertainment industry to improve a public image that had previously been negatively affected by

a growing national concern over excessive secrecy and classification practices (Jenkins, 2012, p.


34) By opening their doors to Hollywood filmmakers the CIA could make a stronger claim

towards transparency while simultaneously leveraging their interactions with Hollywood to

produce a more suitable public image (Van Horn et al., 2011, p. 18) The CIA typically exerted a

very strong influence over these interactions. Filmmaking script material selected from CIA case

files, but these files were selected directly by an Agency archivist in the hopes of effectively

negotiating with producers in the preproduction stage to ensure a positive portrayal of the

Agency. It is difficult to truly define the amount of influence that the CIA has on the content of

programs or the attitudes of production officials towards the agency, as there is little to no

documentation or recorded conversation pertaining to the CIA’s notes on originally submitted

drafts. The CIA media-relations team, however, is undoubtedly attempting to shape the

production ideas of directors through a series of subtle and psychologically complex processes as

a means of circulating a positive public image (Jenkins, 2012, p. 52). Interestingly enough this

influence methodology is similar to the agency relationship with news media in the 1970s.

During this time period the CIA conscripted the aid of a variety of columnists and commentators

to circulate stories that were cooperative with agency views or to publish stories that were

sometimes the product of the agency itself. This media relationship typically involved senior-

ranking agency officials working with a single management representative of a news

organization. The nature of these media relationships, both with the news media and Hollywood,

are difficult to monitor by outside researchers which allows the CIA to make claims of

transparency and openness while manipulating public image through it’s influence on

productions (Jenkins, 2012, p. 53).

The CIA and Congress


Following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 up until 1974, the congressional

role in the intelligence community was generally limited to the appropriation of funds while the

executive dominated intelligence policy (Smist, 1994, p. 4). The congressional tendency to defer

to the executive branch on matters of intelligence policy serves two purposes. Deferring to the

executive allows the elected representatives to avoid negative publicity in the instance of failed

military commitments. The deference of the legislative on matters of intelligence operations

presented a political advantage by allowing congress to dodge the resultant political fallout of

failed covert operations. This historical hands-off approach to intelligence by the legislative

branch served to “collectively establish the president’s authority to issue directives involving

external affairs” (Hancock, 2014, p. 6). As far back as the Truman administration, the

traditionally accepted interpretation of the National Security Act of 1947 meant that CIA covert

operations required no public congressional authorization and were authorized under presidential

discretion. The broad interpretation of the National Security Act has gone so far as to have

legitimized the initiation of assassination projects during the Eisenhower, Clinton, and Bush

presidencies (Hancock, 2014, p. 6).

At its onset, intelligence oversight of the CIA was entrusted by Congress to the special

intelligence subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, indicating a

certain degree of awareness by Congress as to the importance of committee jurisdictions

(Seidman, 1998, p. 49). Meetings were held unannounced to prevent unwanted attention from the

public and press. These oversight hearings were highly secretive, keeping no written or recorded

records, and the location of the meeting was released only an hour before the meetings were set

to begin. Though the CIA at the time was willing to answer any and all questions by the

appropriations committee, members rarely asked any questions or requested specific insight


(Seidman, 1998, p. 44). As one former CIA legislative member observed, “We allowed Congress

to set the pace, but one of the problems was that you couldn’t get Congress to get interested.

Congress chose not to be involved and preferred to be uninformed” (Smist, 1994, p. 5). Though

these committees met infrequently and showed little desire to be informed specifically on U.S.

intelligence activity, they were generally supportive of U.S. action in the intelligence field.

Congress chose instead to differ on matters of intelligence to the executive branch. Congress

essentially took the stance of supportive deference. In fact, when the CIA briefed the

subcommittees about the 1953 overthrow of the Iranian prime minister, committee members

marveled at the cost efficiency of the operation as opposed to being indignant that they had not

been briefed in advance (Smist, 1994, p. 5). Congressman Robert F. Ellsworth summed up the

political relationships of the CIA during the period between 1947 and 1974 by saying, “When

you think back to the old days, it was a different world and a different perception of us and our

role in the world. The political zeitgeist of the time was that the CIA was wonderful. In politics,

anyone that wanted to make trouble for the CIA was seen to be a screwball and not to be

countenanced” (Smist, 1994, p. 5). The traditional institutional oversight approach for the

intelligence committee reflected a tremendous amount of trust in the intelligence community.

This approach came to an end on January 27, 1975, when the Senate appointed an

investigative committee to delve into charges of illegal activity within the intelligence

community (Smist, 1994, p. 10). In 1973, CIA director Richard Helms misled the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee by refusing to acknowledge the role of the CIA in overthrowing the elected

government in Chile. The wake of these scandals brought forth the era of intelligence oversight

in 1980 when the Carter administration gave exclusive oversight jurisdiction to the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence


(Goodman, 2008, p. 287). Though the selection of oversight committees has certainly indicated

an attempt by the legislative branch to become more involved in intelligence oversight, there has

been very little actual reform to support the idea that congress is actively monitoring the actions

of the intelligence community. The modern era has produced a number of reports, such as the

National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, that have been extremely

critical of the congressional oversight process. In an era that has seen a variety of intelligence

failures such as the Indian nuclear testing failure, the Soviet intelligence failure, 9/11, and the

initiations of the Iraq war, there have been very few noticeable attempts by congress to

implement significant reform (Goodman, 2008, p. 290). The intelligence committees have made

very little effort to challenge the executive branch’s tendency to withhold information from the

American public. In addition to this failure, there has been no vote of authorization by congress

to allow the Government Accountability Office to monitor the quality of the programs being

produced by the intelligence community (Goodman, 2008, p. 295). The issue in the political

relationship between congress and the CIA is not a lack of institutional authority, but rather a

tendency to not enforce the provisions of the existing system. Despite the formation of various

oversight committees and the blatant need for reform in the intelligence community, congress

has made very little significant effort to move past it’s traditional approach of deference to the

executive branch in any way beyond words.

The CIA and the Courts

Analyzing the political relationship between the CIA and the Courts requires an

understanding that the openness of our society in America demands a balance between liberty


and security. There is undoubtedly a tradeoff in America between the freedoms of the individual

and the government’s efforts to protect national security, especially in the modern era where we

are forced to balance counter-terrorism and democratic liberties (Radsan, 2005, p. 7). In matters

of national-security, the judiciary branch is similar to the legislative branch its deference to the

executive branch. Though the Supreme Court is specifically suited to handle constitutional law

cases, it has traditionally deferred espionage related decisions to the discretion of the President

(Van Horn et al, 2013, p. 189). In a judiciary system that is tasked with protecting civil liberties,

this deference is especially startling when taking into account the implications of judicial

determinations related to the constitutionality of espionage practices.

There are five major factors that contribute to the trend of judicial deference: the Court’s

lack of technical skills and vocabulary specific to covert operations and foreign intelligence, the

slow and deliberate nature of judicial resolution, the Court’s distance from the sphere of

accountability related to the success or failure of covert operations, the Court’s lack of

perspective as to the intricate framework of sensitive information, and the Court’s inability to

protect secrets from unauthorized disclosure (Radsan, 2005, p. 11). There have been a number of

Supreme Court decisions that, alongside the five major factors, have supported the notion of

judicial deference in espionage matters. In Totten v U.S. the Supreme Court ruled that the

government could not be responsible for enforcing the terms of an espionage deal. The case,

which involved a man named Lloyd who had been recruited by President Lincoln to spy behind

confederate lines, essentially objected to any legal action concerning the deal on the grounds that

legal action violated the critical secrecy of the espionage deal (Radsan, 2005, p. 16). The Totten

decision has served as a judicial standard under which much of the covert action by agencies

such as the CIA has been justified for much of this nation’s history. In essence the CIA has been


allowed to conduct operations with limited judicial oversight on the grounds that, “public policy

forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead

to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it

will not allow the confidence to be violated,” (Radsan, 2005, p. 17). The efforts of the legislative

branch and the executive branch to manipulate the court’s realm of jurisdiction have also

impacted the degree of oversight that the courts have had over the actions of the CIA. The

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 amended the Habeas Corpus Statute and effectively limited the

ability of the judiciary to decide in matters related to specific espionage matters (Gibbons, 2010,

p. 1111). The act prevented the courts from considering cases on behalf of an “alien” being

detained at Guantanamo Bay or from any individual that, “has been determined by the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [which has exclusive jurisdiction] in

accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of

2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant,” (Gibbons, 2010, p. 1112). The

President, with the help of a congressional majority, was able to effectively manipulate the

judicial realm of jurisdiction. This severely limited the capabilities of judicial oversight

pertaining to intelligence collection, and covert operations conducted by agencies such as the

CIA.

The CIA and Foreign Government

The United States seeks to maintain a governing structure that balances liberty with justice

and personal freedoms with security (Seidman, 1998, p. 21). This desire has placed restrictions

on agencies such as the CIA in their ability to conduct intelligence collection, detainment, and

covert operations domestically. This has made international cooperation a requirement to

effectively conduct the operations that are not suited to be maintained within the national


borders. The CIA, due to the nature of its operations, cooperates extensively with foreign

governments. The full scale of this international cooperation is extremely difficult to determine

as a result of the tremendous degree of secrecy that is maintained by the U.S Government and its

international operational partners (Singh, 2013, p. 61). Specific operations such as secret

detention and rendition operations require a tremendous amount of international cooperation as

they are conducted outside the U.S. The government does not release the names of cooperating

governments or the location of international operations facilities for obvious security reasons,

however, there are a few international partners that have been identified as participants to various

degrees in CIA secret detention and extraordinary renditions (Singh, 2013, p. 61). These

international partners have assisted the CIA by capturing and transporting detainees, permitting

use of airspace, providing intelligence, and conducting interrogations. Countries such as

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt,

Germany, Italy, and Morocco all have been implicated to some degree in the assistance of CIA

operations. Morocco for instance has been reported to have not only hosted CIA detention, but

also captured and tortured detainees. Morocco also permitted the use of national airspace for the

CIA’s rendition operations. Poland, another of the CIA’s international partners, hosted a CIA

prison and routinely handled the transfer of detainees in and out of the country. Similar CIA

detention facilities have been reported in Romania, Syria, Thailand and Zimbabwe (Singh, 2013,

p. 97).

The CIA and the Executive Branch

History has made it clear that the CIA maintains a close political relationship with the

executive branch. However, history has also shown us a tendency of the executive to maintain a

degree of political distance during the commencement of covert operations. When a president


makes the decision to engage in covert warfare, the details, management, and execution of

clandestine operations tend to become the responsibility of the operations directorate of the CIA.

The Truman administration is an example of this tendency. At the onset of the Cold War,

Truman utilized the economic, political and psychological operations of the CIA to target

international communism. By channeling these operations through the CIA, Truman was able to

utilize unvouchered executive funds, protecting operations from the public accounting of the

OMB and from congressional budgetary oversight (Hancock, 2014, p. 33). The use of

unvouchered executive funds was a practice that politically insulated the covert operations

decisions of the President.

The Eisenhower administration took a unique approach to deniable military activities by

promoting the coordination of CIA operations with the State Department, the secretary of

Defense and the branches of the armed services. To channel the necessary coordination between

the branches of the military, the State Department, and the CIA, Eisenhower utilized the

Operations Coordinating Board. The OCB ensured that the CIA gave advance notice of

operations to the Departments of State and Defense. This practice was not consistently or

effectively duplicated after the Eisenhower Presidency (Hancock, 2014, p. 34)

The CIA intelligence disaster in the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy began to transfer a

greater degree of deniable warfare operations from the CIA to the Military. Alongside this

transfer of responsibility came the formation of the Special Group, which was responsible for

review and planning of covert operations proposals as well as the management of

interdepartmental coordination (Hancock, 2014, p. 34). President Johnson continued the

operations of the Special Group under the name of the 303 committee. These special oversight

groups approved 163 covert actions under President Kennedy and 142 under President Johnson.


President Nixon took a contrasting approach to national-security decisions especially with

respect to his use of an advisory council in coordinating the relationship between the CIA and the

executive branch. Nixon frequently bypassed the oversight committee and also encouraged the

Central Intelligence Agency to conduct operations without coordinating with the secretaries of

Defense and State (Hancock, 2014, p. 35). During the covert operations by the CIA in Chile to

essentially instigate a military coup, Nixon decided to involve the oversight committee only after

the initial agency effort to block the election of Salvador Allende failed. The Nixon initiative to

directly coordinate covert operations in Chile was troubling to a number of government officials

and even to agency officers. Senior Clandestine Officer David Phillips, who was tasked with the

lead in the covert operation in Chile, stated that “The effort to thwart Allende’s inauguration by

whatever means had not gone to the oversight committee. This was disturbing: a covert action

scheme to be launched directly by a President and his intimates without being on the agenda of

the oversight committee or at least wafted by the Secretary of State and Defense” (Hancock,

2014, p. 36). This degree of Presidential autonomy and limited openness had become almost

standard practice towards the end of the Reagan Presidency (Van Horn et al., 2011, p. 170).

By utilizing only a small degree of its oversight authority, Congress has essentially

supported the tremendous degree of presidential autonomy in matters of preemptive national

defense through the initiation of covert operations. This traditional deference supports the notion

that it is the responsibility of the president to balance national interests (Seidman, 1998, p. 51).

Successful covert operations receive little to no public recognition. It is only in instances of

failure that clandestine affairs draw major public, political blowback, and it is for this reason that

Congress has traditionally been content to leave the risks of preemptive action to the commander

in chief (Hancock, 2014, p. 42). This congressional stance is clearly executed with careful


consideration to potential political implications, sparing the legislative from political blowback

and leaving the executive branch holding the match when operations go up in flames (Seidman,

1998, p. 52).

Conclusion

The CIA is an organization that has had a hand in nearly every matter of national security

since its formation at the hands of the National Security Act of 1947. Since that time, the agency

has operated with a startling degree of independence and varying degrees of accountability. The

agency’s relationship with congress has been distant at best since its formation, with the period

from 1947 to 1975 displaying little to no significant congressional oversight of agency activities.

Even after the initiation of the oversight era following a series of intelligence failures and an

investigative inquiry into the illegal activities of the intelligence community in 1973, the

legislative branch has been content to defer matters of preemptive security to the President in the

hopes of preserving political advantage should covert failures become public knowledge. The

CIA has maintained a close relationship with the President, with each administration

demonstrating varying degrees of presidential autonomy in national security decision making

involving the utilization of the CIA in deniable warfare operations. Eisenhower generally

promoted interdepartmental coordination, mandating that notice of operations be coordinated

between the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. Nixon, on the other hand, as can be

seen in his organization of a military coup in Chile, chose to bypass oversight efforts and almost

singlehandedly manage a covert operation. Nixon’s tendency to rely very little on the utilization

of advisors and his domineering management style is commonly considered to be one of the

reasons for his downfall (Van Horn et al., 2011, p. 170). The CIA relationship with the American

Citizens is characterized by a delicate balance of protecting national-security interests through a


combination of intelligence analysis and covert operations, and general attempts to promote

transparency, which can to some degree be seen in the cooperation of the CIA and Hollywood.

The CIA is an agency defined by a delicate balance of political relationships with the executive

and legislative branches that seeks to protect the interests of national security by collecting

intelligence, conducting covert operations, and securing the secrets that keep America safe.


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Documents

CIA Political Relationships