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CHESTERFIELD WFA
NEWSLETTER Number 20 September 2016 issue 19
Welcome to the Issue 20 the December 2016 Newsletter of
Chesterfield WFA.
Once again we have a `bumper ` issue with meeting and
Conference reports, plus other articles which together we hope will
educate and entertain.
The last Chesterfield Branch Meeting for 2016 will be held on Tuesday 6th December 7.30 pm start Making his first visit to our branch as a speaker will be Nick Paul Nick will make a presentation entitled “Barbed Wire Disease” in which he will present some of his researches into the experiences of British soldiers who became captives of the enemy
The Branch meets at the Labour Club, Unity House,
Saltergate, Chesterfield S40 1NF on the first Tuesday
of each month. There is plenty of parking available on
site and in the adjacent road. Access to the car park is
in Tennyson Road, however, which is one way and
cannot be accessed directly from Saltergate.
Grant Cullen – Branch Secretary
Patron –Sir Hew Strachan
FRSE FRHistS
President - Professor
Peter Simkins MBE
FRHistS
Vice-Presidents
Andre Colliot
Professor John Bourne BA PhD
FRHistS
The Burgomaster of Ypres
The Mayor of Albert
Lt-Col Graham Parker OBE
Professor Gary Sheffield BA MA PhD
FRHistS
Christopher Pugsley FRHistS
Lord Richard Dannat GCB CBE MC
DL
Roger Lee PhD jssc
www.westernfrontassociation.com
Branch contacts
Tony Bolton (Chairman ) [email protected] Mark Macartney (Deputy Chairman) [email protected] Pam Ackroyd (Treasurer) Grant Cullen (Secretary) [email protected]
Facebook http://www.facebook.com/groups/157662657604082/ http://www.wfachesterfield.com/
Western Front Association Chesterfield Branch – Meetings 2016
Meetings start at 7.30pm and take place at the Labour Club, Unity House, Saltergate, Chesterfield S40 1NF
January 5th AGM Tony Bolton- "1916 – an Overview of the Year”.
February 2nd David Tattersfield "The Courts Martial of Willie Stone and the DLI Six" – this needs about a dozen 'volunteers' to deliver the lines from a script provided. No acting is required or wanted: this is verbatim transcript of two original courts martial. The first is the famous case of Willie Stones (who claimed he blocked the trench with his rifle to stop pursuing Germans) and the second is a "mass" court martial of six men from the DLI.
March 1st Paul Cobb. "The Easter Rising – a Distraction from the Western Front" – a talk looking at the events in Dublin at Easter 1916 when rebels challenged British rule in Ireland. Events which still affect the politics of Ireland, North and South today
April 5th Richard Pullen. 'The First Tanks - A Wasted Opportunity or a Prelude to Victory?' This talk centres on how the first use of the tanks were basically unsuccessful but ultimately served as part of the greater learning curve
May 3rd Peter Hart "Somme Success: the RFC and the Battle of the Somme, 1916" Peter will discuss the contribution of the Royal Flying Corps to the Battle of the Somme
June 7th Tony Bolton. The Somme - Ist July 1916 - Serre – The Sheffield City Battalion. “Two Years in the Making – ten minutes in the destroying. “
July
5th
Dr. Nigel Hunt “The Forgotten: Shellshock after the First World War” After considering the symptoms experienced and the treatments on offer during the war the talk will focus on those people who remained shellshocked (in the terminology of the day) long after the war ended.
August 2nd Bill MacCormick - "The Long Road to the Somme: Planning the Big Push" – The
failures of tactical and technical development which led to the British disaster of 1st
July 1916 and the lessons learned by the French which led to their success. Includes
the impact of Verdun on the eventual plan as well as the effects of Russian and
Italian campaigns.
September 6th John Beech “Zeppelins over Nottinghamshire” John has (and continues to do) conducted meticulous research into these raids. He will present some of his work.
October 4th Prof. Stephen Badsey. "Could the Battle of the Somme Have Been Won?" - An analysis of alternative courses of action for the BEF in the Battle of the Somme 1916.
November 1st John Chester. “The Unknown Warrior” The story of the Unknown Warrior, buried in Westminster Abbey on Armistice Day 1920.
December 6th Nick Paul. “Barbed Wire Disease” Nick will present some of his researches into the experiences of British soldiers who became captives of the enemy
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Issue 20 – list of contents
1 Meetings and Speakers Calendar
2 Contents Page
3 Personal Note from the Chair; Secretary`s Scribbles
4 Secretary`s Scribbles (continued)
5 & 6 WFA News 7 Advert – WFA Calendars 2017 8 Advert – WFA Branded Goods 9 – 18 October Meeting 19-30 November Meeting 30 – 45 Great War Seminar – Lincoln 24th September 46 - 49 Conference Report – Durham – 1st October 2016 50 Sightings from Shuttleworth 51-52 Conference Report – Milton Keynes – 23rd October 2016 53-57 How an Ethiopian Prince scuppered a German War Plan 57 Sighting at Shuttleworth 58-60 The Munitions Crisis – part 5
`The views and opinions expressed in this members` newsletter do not necessarily reflect the opinion or
views of the Western Front Association or the Chesterfield Branch Committee.’
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A Personal Note from the Chair (13)
Nearly the end of another year of centenaries, about the midpoint in the centenary of the
war and perhaps a time to reflect on the way 1916 was commemorated and the opportunity
to look ahead to the centenary of 1917 with the slough of Passchendaele looming on the
horizon. I have already been approached by a Rotary Club to give a talk on Passchendaele
and I expect to receive more. As you know the January meeting will be the AGM and it has
become the branch practice for me to present a talk after the very quick AGM, on the
centenary of the year ahead. Whilst preparing this talk I have been struck by the
significance of 1917 in the defeat of The Kaiser’s Germany. I hope to offer you some insight
into the year besides the mud of Flanders.
Since the last meeting in November I gave a talk to the retired members of Unison in
Sheffield and they were kind enough not only to make a donation to the Branch but to give
me a copy of the Sheffield City Battalion book which I mentioned in my talk to the branch
earlier in the year, I hope it will be amongst the raffle prizes at the December meeting.
For the December meeting I have once again prevailed upon a colleague from my University
course to come back and to talk to us about Prisoners of War, a talk that grew out of his
family research. I hope we will continue the trend of increasing numbers for the meetings; it
is easier for your Committee to attract speakers when the audience is as healthy as has been
the case lately.
I must also draw your attention to the fact that Pam and Malcolm will be resigning from
the Committee at the AGM and ask you to consider stepping up, the task is not daunting
but it would avoid your existing Committee having to undertake the additional work.
Finally may I take the opportunity to wish those members and friends who do not make it
to the December meeting, a very Happy Christmas and New Year. Oh and don’t forget we
still have 10 calendars to sell for central and branch funds.
Tony Bolton
***********************************************************
Secretary`s Scribbles
Welcome to the last Branch Newsletter for 2016, a year which sees us raidly approaching
our last meeting, next Tuesday. Attendances have exceeded expectations and it appears to your
committee that we must be doing something right ! Not that we are complacent. I am happy to
receive any comments or criticisms from members. If we can improve and do things better then let
us know, all suggestions welcome. The provisional list of speakers for next year is now in place,
just waiting on one or two final confirmations before the list is set in tablets of stone.
Again I have tried to mainly – but not exclusively – focus on events of 100 years ago. I have also
looked to have speakers with a blend of experience eg, Peter Hart, Rob Thompson, and our own
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Chairman, with `new blood` by way of which two of our own `regulars` will be making their
presentation / speaking debut later in the year.
The first meeting in the New Year (January 3rd) will follow the successful format that we have
adopted in recent years. The first part will be the Branch AGM, including election of Office Bearers
for 2017. When those formalities are dispensed with Branch Chairman, Tony Bolton, will present
an overview of the year 1917. Last January several members brought in Great War memorabilia
which created a great deal of interest and was welcome addition to the proceedings. Again, I
would welcome similar contributions for display / discussion after the AGM. I also intend to have a
book sale – we accumulate quite a lot of books which never seem to get picked as raffle prizes –
so these will be available on a `Pay what you think its worth` basis.
There will be two changes to our Committee for next term as Pam and Malcolm Ackroyd
(Treasurer and Committee Member respectively) have indicated that they wish to retire and
neither will be standing for re-election. Pam has penned a note separate from this Newsletter
which has already been circulated. Both are branch founder members and no one should
underestimate the time and effort they have put in to get the Branch to where it is today, financially
healthy and hosting quality meetings with growing attendances. Although they will no longer be on
the Branch Management, I am sure they will get along to as many meetings as they can. Their
interest in The Great War runs very deep. Thanks to Pam and Malcolm for all they have done for
Chesterfield Branch.
Things are progressing – albeit slowly – with our plans to run a one day conference some
time in 2018 – and I wish to thank the member who went to the trouble of sounding out a potential
venue, including catering – thanks.
I have already approached several potential `Big Name` speakers and received a
favourable response. Now that the speakers are in place (almost) for next year, we can start to
seriously look at having the conference.
I have managed to include part five of the continuing story of the Munitions Crisis which
hindered the BEF in the early part of the war and ultimately led to a change in Government and
with it a change in direction of the war itself which up until then had been very much conducted on
a `business as usual` basis. I recently acquired a book by Phillip Harding entitled `The British
Shell Shortage of the First World War` which I eagerly started to get into. Disappointing is an
understatement as it is riddled with errors – factual or just inadequate proof reading. For example
on page 26 he refers to the Schlieffen Plan, deployment plan seventeen – Plan seventeen was the
French equivalent. On the same page he refers to Asquith receiving a communique from the
Belgian legation on August 3rd 1915 advising London the German ultimatum to Belgium. I kind of
gave up after that.
As always I am looking for content for future Newsletters…perhaps you visited a cemetery looking
for a relative…maybe a museum…or indeed just some anecdotes to share. You will see some
excellent aircraft photos in this issue – these were taken by Ade Spencer and passed on by Jane
Lovatt – thanks Ade – excellent stuff
Please send all items for inclusion to [email protected]
Thanks.
Grant Cullen
Branch Secretary
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Now for some WFA news…….
New WFA Branch Coordinator A message from David Tattersfield – WFA Development Officer Dear Branch Chairman/Secretary
I am delighted to tell you all that the WFA has recently appointed a new Branch Co-ordinator. Garry Trown has kindly agreed to act in this role following the resignation of Dave Durham.
Garry has considerable experience at branch level, being the chairman of the Lincoln and N Lincs branch.
There will be no change to the email address here, as Garry is using the familiar [email protected] email address.
Obviously it will take Garry a little while to pick up speed on all matters that fall within his remit, but is keen to get going in this role and will no doubt be pleased to hear from branches with any queries they may have.
I am personally delighted Garry has come on board as it frees up some of my time to concentrate on my own role.
Best wishes
David
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Appointment of Sir Hew Strachan as Patron of the Western Front Association
Sir Hew Francis Anthony Strachan FRSE FRHistS is a Scottish military historian, well known for
his work on the administration of the British Army and the history of the First World War. He is
currently Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, and a council
member of the Royal Company of Archers, the Queen’s Bodyguard for Scotland. Since May 2014,
Sir Hew has been Lord Lieutenant of Tweedale. Before moving to St Andrews, Sir Hew was the
Chichele Professor of the History of War at All Souls College, Oxford - See more at:
http://westernfrontassociation.com/all-about-the-wfa/wfa-news-events/wfa-latest-news-
releases/6221-announcing-the-appointment-of-sir-hew-strachan-as-a-vice-president-of-the-
western-front-association.html#sthash.wXEQGJ4I.WXG630tb.dpuf
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October Meeting.
Branch Chairman, Tony Bolton, opened the meeting at
7.30pm prompt in front of a capacity attendance, by
welcoming all present. He introduced our speaker for
the evening, Professor Stephen Badsey, as being one
of the `Big Beasts` in the world of research, writing,
speaking and education on all aspects of The Great
War conflict.
Stephen is Professor of Conflict studies at University of
Wolverhampton and in his opening remarks, he took
the opportunity to `plug` the courses and upcoming
activities regarding the First World War, that his
Department has on offer, including reference to one of
our Branch members who is about to start his MA
course.
He also took the opportunity of mentioning his wife, Dr. Phylomena Badsey who had
accompanied him to Chesterfield. Dr. Badsey has recently been appointed by the
WFA as their Universities Liaison Officer.
Prof. Badsey then commenced his presentation, entitled `Could the Battle of the
Somme have been won? ` which he immediately acknowledged was a provocative
question. In terms of `winning` he of course meant the Allies in general the British in
particular. We have recently witnessed the public outpourings which accompanied
the 100th anniversary of the commencement of the Battle of the Somme on July 1st
1916, most of which has rightly focussed upon the human tragedy, the 57000 British
casualties, of whom 19200 were killed. Stephen was pleased to note that most
commentators got the figures right and he compared that with the then Prime Minster
David Cameron`s `gaffe` at the IWM in 2012 during the launching of the Centenary
Commemorations when he stated that the British dead on July 1st 1916 was
`200,000`, although this was subsequently corrected to 20,000 in the published
version of his speech. He then said that much of his work as a historian was on the
politics and military strategy of the war which involves analysing statistics, diagrams
etc. However, when considering the battle, given the massive number of casualties,
for many soldiers, on a personal basis winning the battle was simply staying alive.
Stephen then said that, whilst he had given this talk many times before, he always
tried to create a local context with respect to the human side of the conflict and in
this he made honourable mention of the brothers Adrian and Richard Verner of
Calow, a village just east of Chesterfield. They were the sons of Julius Verner, a
Russian emigrant, who was manager of the Staveley Iron and Steel works. Both
were killed on the first day of the battle at Serre and are commemorated on the
Theipval Memorial as both have no known grave.
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DOUBLE BEREAVEMENT
Chesterfield Brothers Killed in Action
The other day Mr and Mrs Verner of Spring house Calow received the devastating news that their two sons
at the Front had been killed. The information was conveyed in the following letter;
It is my painful duty to have to inform you of the death of both of your sons. They both fell during the
attack we made on the first of the month with many friends. They could not possibly have had more noble
deaths, though that is poor consolation I know for such terrible news. It was just such men as your two
sons who has made the name of this battalion.
They were both held in great respect and it was a pleasure for me to recommend them for their
commissions. The remnants of the battalion mourn for you and for the many brave parents left at home
who have lost sons.
The two sons referred to are Privates Adrian and Richard Verner who in the September following the
outbreak of war gave up lucrative positions to render what service they could to their country. Both boys
were educated at Chesterfield Grammar School.
Professor Badsey said that these men had as much right to an answer to his question as anyone.
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The level of casualties suffered on all sides has always been the most painful way of measuring victory or defeat in the Battle of the Somme. The statistics are complex and controversial given the differing ways of recording casualties on the different sides.
The official British figures for the Battle of the Somme from July 1st until 30th November 1916 are 419,656, that of the French 194,457, giving an Allied total of 614,113. This should be set against an unadjusted German total, which includes lightly wounded, of 582,919, although German figures, as supplied to Winston Churchill in the 1920s indicates half that number. Anyone who considers these figures as accurate are in Stephen`s opinion, deluding themselves. What we can say with certainty is the terrible nature of the battle, which, in respect of the Great War, is far from unique.
The Battle of the Somme could be broken down into 12 individual battles and three subsidiary actions taking place from July 1st and ending on 18th November 1916, giving a total of 141 days plus the 7 days preceding July 1st for the artillery bombardment. Thus for all sides during this period, there was total of 1.2 million casualties, or 8000 casualties per day of whom 3000 were British. Looking at it from another perspective this was the equivalent, for the British, of an infantry brigade being wiped out for every day of the battle! If we assume that those killed or died of wounds was approximately one in three, we are looking at the equivalent of an infantry battalion being killed on each day of the battle. For some, these figures, particularly the losses on that first day, will always preclude calling the Battle of the Somme, a victory. That, of course takes us into the field of opinion rather than fact and particular the difficult question of what, at the time, the men and their families back home thought, and what was their conclusions. The other argument against calling the Somme a victory is the small amount of territory gained during the advances during the 140 days. For the Allies that amounted to approximately 180 square miles which equates to just over 1 square mile per day for a total loss (on all sides) of 6500 men for each square mile of advance. For those who have visited the Somme battlefields and as Stephen said, many in the room have done, the smallness of scale is an abiding impression, the many small villages and woods, often within sight of each other which bear silent witness to such human tragedy
Stephen went on to make the second major point of the question `Could the Battle of the Somme have been won` must confront the claim and that it was won and that it constitutes an Allied victory, not a German one. That challenge was really thrown down very emphatically in the book of Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig`s wartime despatches, particularly this paragraph from his final despatch written 21st March 1919.
I am urged thereto by the conviction that neither the course of the war itself nor the military lessons to be drawn therefrom can properly be comprehended, unless the long succession of battles commenced on the Somme in 1916 and ended in
November of last year on the Sambre are viewed as forming part of one great and continuous engagement.
That interpretation is a straight line cause and effect from 1st July 1916 until 11th November 1918.It has , of course been challenged, notably by Winston Churchill in his multi volume `The World Crisis` Churchill commented that the great offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917 were ` needlessly and wrongly conceived and of infinite cost`
But of course it was Haig who set the terms of the debate and they have not changed much in popular perception ever since. Some British historians have taken up Haig`s argument, most notably John Terraine who has described the Somme as both a tragedy – and a victory. More recently William Philpott entitled his book on the Somme as `Bloody Victory` - although Bill views the Battle as a French victory rather than British. Stephen agreed that that was certainly an
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argument that had to be taken seriously but it is vulnerable to the events from 1916 to 1918. If the German offensives of spring 1918 what would have become of Haig`s `continuous engagement `?. If a line can be drawn from the Somme of 1916 to the armistice of 1918 a better median is now be drawn to by British and German historians as to where that line led in the intervening two years. It also leads us into a debate which is common to many discussions of the First World War, but more particularly to the Somme – Counter-factual history, better known as `What if` conjecture.
Inevitably, any discussion as to whether the Battle of the Somme could have been won, must explore the possibilities of `what if` In doing so we have to observe two limitations, the first to avoid being blatantly unhistorical, for example had the British possessed the quantity of artillery pieces and quality of shells or the number of tanks available in 1918 – they just didn`t. Certainly by 1917, for example at the Battle of Arras new artillery spotting and registration techniques and the 106 contact fuse had eliminated the need for prior registration which had given away the location of the artillery pieces. This `hurricane` bombardment made it possible to surprise the enemy and it was that new element of operational surprise that changed the warfare of 1918 – but in 1916 on the Somme it simply wasn`t available. The second point when considering counter factual history is to avoid the `what if` becoming `if only`. For example arguments that instead of fighting the Battle of the Somme, the Allies had sought a negotiated peace in 1916, 100 years later no one would notice the difference in the modern world, fall into that category, we just can`t possibly know . What counterfactual history can do is identify those decisions and events which might have turned the Battle of the Somme into an undisputed British victory, and whether the British in particular might have done better.
The starting place is the second Chantilly Conference of 6th to 8th December 1915 because the starting place as to how things might have been done better is to ask why the allies fought the Battle of the Somme, what they considered at the time what victory might be. Very importantly, from the perspective of the allies’ high command the Battle of the Somme was not first and foremost about territory. Origins of the battle lie with this conference, the only occasion in the war in which the allied powers, Britain, France, Italy and Russia attempted to coordinate their operations on land in a decisive fashion. The basis of this idea was that each of them would launch an offensive in early summer 1916 close enough to each other to prevent the German – and indeed the Austro-Hungarians – switching reserves from one front to another. That produced the agreement for a joint Anglo-French offensive which would become the Battle of the Somme, coordinated with a renewed Italian attack on the Isonzo and a Russian attack which would become known as the Brusilov Offensive. The combination of allied attacks and initial successes also prompted Roumania to enter the war on the Allied side on August 27th 1916. The object of these attacks was not necessarily to take ground, it was to break the German and Austro Hungarian armies by inflicting such heavy casualties on them they would disintegrate, or failing that they would become so weak that they would be unable to defend further attacks and indeed be so shocked that Germany and Austria-Hungary would sue for a negotiated peace, and is what would, to the High Command constitute victory on the Somme. With respect to High Command it was General Joseph Cesare Joffre that formulated this strategy, oversight by the British and French government was astonishingly low – governments were told this was happening, very different from the later part of the war. With the objective of weakening or breaking the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, the main features of the Anglo-French offensive also start to fall into place, a broad front attack rather than a narrow one, a protracted long bombardment rather than a short one with the British and French armies attacking along one axis rather than converging attacks from the northern and southern parts of the line. It has also been used to support Haig`s argument of one long, continuous engagement and the oft repeated quote by a German staff officer Von Hinton who said that the Somme was `the muddy grave of the German field army` an experience from which it never recovered and indeed, there is some basis for believing that . From that perspective, the purpose of the Battle of the Somme was to strain and damage also provides a further justification of one of Haig`s most criticised decisions during the battle – to continue it into
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October and November despite the appalling conditions as the weather deteriorated. We must also acknowledge during that time Gough`s Reserve army`s assault in the swamp of the Ancre valley, which did in fact capture all its objectives. The pressure on Haig to continue his attempts to break the German army also derived from Britain`s highest political objectives of the war. There is no actual document from Prime Minister Asquith demanding Haig deliver victory in 1916, nor an equivalent document from Haig to Asquith promising victory – because there did not have to be – it was implicit in the British government agreeing to the battle. At the beginning of 1916, against the advice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Mckenna, the British government gambled of victory in that year or in early 1917 and that Britain therefore could afford to support both its allies and its credit financially while also creating on the Somme a mass army with all its implications for manpower and industry. Haig`s own assessment, in a confidential briefing to the confidential correspondents at GHQ in 1916 was `…the aim for which the war is being waged is the destruction of German militarism, three years of war and the loss of one tenth of the nation`s manhood is not too big a price to pay for so great a cause`…goes right to the heart of the argument, not only what price were the British willing to pay – but what they were buying with it.
Since capturing ground was of relatively little importance the Somme battlefield was selected on little more than that was where the British and France armies joined.
Haig would have preferred in 1916 to have launched an attack in the Ypres area as he considered that here if the Germans retreated they would give up strategically important land, and that produces a `what if` regarding the Battle of the Somme, that there was something wrong with the Allied command structure which was predicated upon the French army taking the leading role as part of this wider Allied strategy promoted by Joffre. The French command structure went through Joffre at French Headquarters, GQG, to General Ferdinand Foch, commanding Army Group North, to 6th army under General Fayolle and 10th army commanded by General Joseph Richelieu. The main change, of course came with the German offensive at Verdun which started in February 1916 and the progressive reduction in the French contribution to the Battle of the Somme with 10th army playing a relatively minor role. That left Haig as a an army commander dealing with Joffre as an equal in respect of the terms of his orders, but also cooperating and coordinating with Foch and with an ambivalent command relationship with Fayolle and French 6th army. Given the relatively small size of the British army on the Western Front before 1916, what had previously been understood as cooperation between armies across national boundaries would have been a very large leap in 1916 to the kind of side by side operations that were commonplace by 1918? However, improvements between the Allies could have been made, that exact command relationship could have been sorted out better and what obstacles arose from the French commanders’ view that the British on the Somme were amateurs, generals and soldiers far below French standards and incapable of mounting an attack, but that the British must attack much harder and more often. The other main `what if` at this highest level in the Battle of the Some is that there was something wrong with British planning, in particular the differing concepts of the battle held by Haig and 4th army commander, Sir Henry Rawlinson both before the battle and during its course. Rawlinson was committed at this stage to what was called `step by step` or `bite and hold` tactical approach, making short and small advances. The extent to which Haig actually disagreed with this, is in itself a matter of considerable disagreement amongst historians. Some maintain Haig held totally to a doctrine of `breakthrough` whilst others believe Haig accepted the need for `step by step` whilst linking this to greater advances should the opportunity present . Regardless, the fact is Haig and Rawlinson were simply not in agreement as to what they were trying to achieve. It has long been recognised that as a result of this, there was something wrong with the British artillery on the Somme, especially the seven day preliminary bombardment, the failure of which led directly to the massacre of the British infantry on the 1st July. It was a comparative failure, but along two – thirds of the line that was enough, sufficient numbers of German soldiers survived to defend their positions effectively.
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Many cases have been cited of British soldiers being told that the power of their bombardment would destroy the German defences and defenders in front of them which turned out to be wrong.
About 1.5 million shells were fired during this seven day bombardment, of which 1 million were 18 pdr shrapnel shells which, with the technology available in 1916 were not accurate or effective enough so that in many cases the German wire remained uncut. With the massive expansion of the British army quality control of guns, shells and fuses was a major problem. In his classic study of the First Day published in 1917, Martin Middlebrook claimed that as much as one third of all shells fired failed to explode and that has since been oft repeated as hard fact. There are reports from German sources of British shells fired during the preliminary bombardment failing to explode, being subsequently recovered for examination, found to be of American manufacture – and found to have been filled with sawdust. In 1976 John Keegan attempted a very rough calculation about how much high explosive had actually been fired at the German positions and he reached a figure of 30 tons for each square mile. Now this sounds a lot but is in fact 1 pound of explosive for every ten square yards – the equivalent of two hand grenades! In doctrinal terms, the British army had not yet made the important advance from firing to kill the enemy and destroy his positions, to firing to suppress the enemy`s ability to defend himself from coordinated infantry assaults. Tactics which again were developed more in the second half of the war. Now that level of artillery firepower and tactics was not something that in 1916 could have been changed very much and yes it varied between divisions. However, as pointed out by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson 1992 the plan of how the artillery should be used prior to July 1st was also a source of major disagreement between Haig and Rawlinson, Haig`s strategic imperative being to bombard the German lines to a penetration to at least the defensive second line, the third still being work in progress whereas Rawlinson wanted to bombard to a depth of 1250 yards which, according to another rough calculation by Prior and Wilson would have produced 300 pounds of shells per yard of German trench, a little more than that at Neuve Chappelle, where the bombardment had largely succeeded. Haig, however, ordered Rawlinson to double this to 2500 yards leading most historians to the conclusion that he halved the effect of the bombardment, fatally weakened it with catastrophic results. Indeed Watson`s most recent book has described that as incompetence on Haig`s part. There are two problems with that analysis, firstly the figures are about as stable as the `roots of Birnham Wood`, the calculations and the arguments based upon them are too much conjecture and a wide range of unknown variables. The second, just because Haig`s artillery plan across two thirds of the front on the first of July failed, does not mean that Rawlinson`s would have succeeded. It is a `what if` question and we simply do not know the answer. Haig`s artillery plan was only one aspect of a wider tactical dispute between Haig and Rawlinson, that of the Reserve Army concept. Both Foch and Haig drew up their plans in the expectation that they might in the first few days create what the French called a rupture, the British a gap, in the German lines which could then be exploited by the cavalry forcing a large scale German withdrawal. That was the original purpose for which the Reserve Corps was created by Hubert Gough in March 1916 and expanded to become the Reserve Army in May. Haig broke up his two Cavalry corps into three British and two Indian divisions which were then put to training as cavalry and infantry formations. By 16th June Reserve army had combined the 25th infantry division with the 2nd Indian cavalry division with 2nd corps of three divisions and two cavalry divisions behind them. Haig intended that that force, after the first two German lines were captured, to provide a combined cavalry and infantry advance. However, of the 21st June, Rawlinson convinced Haig to place Reserve army under 4th Army command rather than leave it under GHQ. Rawlinson did not waste time, next day he dismantled Reserve Army leaving Gough with command of only the three cavalry divisions, about 5 miles behind the British front. However, as we know, on July 1st, the British army succeeded where Rawlinson least expected it, the southern part of the line, where he had set as the objective the
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taking of the German first line, rather than the second. By mid-afternoon on the 1st, XIII corps under Lt. General Walter Congreve had captured Montauban and the surrounding area with 18 th Eastern and 30th divisions. On its flank, Henry Horne’s 15th Division had captured Mametz. Walter Congreve came forward on a personal reconnaissance to that new front line confirming that the woods on either side of Montauban were not being held by the Germans and that the enemy had fallen, or been driven back a further two miles from that new front line. The front facing 18th Eastern Division, commanded by the very capable Ivor Maxse between Caterpillar wood and Bernafay wood on one side and Trones wood on the other was effectively undefended and would remain so for another three days, indeed on July 3rd two Scottish divisions did push east of Bernafay wood for a further 1000yards, secured the wood having found it virtually undefended, for the loss of only six casualties. Moreover, on the first of July, Congreve`s reserve division, 9th (Scottish) Division and the South African Brigade were the best divisions in the British army, were fresh and unengaged. Facing them, on a front of only four miles either side of Montauban was four German battalions. That may have been the greatest chance for a major British victory on the Somme, the difficulty of moving eight divisions of Reserve army as it existed before Rawlinson took command should not be underestimated, but if the order had been given it does look as though 9th Division could have taken Bernafay wood on the morning of July 1st. The following morning it could have continued its advance to capture Trones wood whilst 25 th division would have passed through 18th (Eastern) division at the same time. At that point the fresh attacking 25th division would have run into a counter-attack by elements of the reserve battalions of the four German regiments in this sector, overcoming these with ease (as happened in the real battle on July 2nd) and therefore allows an unopposed advance of 4000 yards to Longueval and the ridge at High Wood with the Indian cavalry division following up. As you know the Indian cavalry division of this period represented the equivalent fire power of an infantry brigade which, if used conservatively could have at least advanced eastwards, keeping step with the neighbouring French XX corps which was keen to capture Hardicourt and whose reserves were still quite fresh for the next day. Of course, beyond High woods and Flers there was still a complete third line of German defences and beyond that open country. We can push that speculation just a little bit further, if the ground up to High Wood had been in British hands on 3rd July then the famous night attack of 14th July would have been unnecessary and some of its troops and resources could have been used elsewhere on the same date. The obvious point would have been to capture Pozieres which actually took place on 23rd July marking the first use of Australian troops in the Battle of the Somme. Due to the shape of the ground, from the windmill at Pozieres, it is possible to see High Wood 3000 yards away. If the British had held both Pozieres and High wood by the third week of July then the whole German line south of the Albert – Bapaume road would have been untenable. The possibility of investing the German forces north of the Bapaume road seem very real indeed. None of that happened. On the afternoon of July 1st Rawlinson refused Congreve permission to attack and ordered consolidation of the existing positions. It was also midday when, with the three cavalry divisions decided there was no chance of an exploitation, he stood them down, two hours before receiving Congreve`s request for an advance. Congreve`s chief of staff spent most of the day at 4th army headquarters without seeing Rawlinson and with no idea of what was happening although Haig did visit Rawlinson after lunch, but took no direct involvement. The next day, of course, Gough, at Reserve army HQ was sent to take over VII and VIII Corps in the northern part of the battlefield. Rawlinson`s failure to take advantage of that opportunity on 1st July, is a controversy which is reflected in many books about the Somme, including, if you look carefully, the Official History.
Now, as you may expect, Haig`s intelligence staff were trying, with significant effort, to track what was happening to the German army on the Western Front as a result of the Somme attack and on the 2nd of August, Haig finally recognised the chance of creating a breakthrough based upon temporary German weaknesses had now passed. The Germans had reorganised and committed their reserves and further attacks, to quote Haig could only be undertaken `with careful methodical preparation`. That style of battle depended upon an effective artillery plan which was best made
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when the front was as near a straight line as possible, hence a lot of emphasis during the summer on `line straightening`. Between the 15th July and 14th September 4th army conducted over 90 attacks, but only 4 of those were on the whole army front and only 5 used more than 20 battalions, out of 4th army`s total strength of 120 battalions. During that period of `line straightening` 4 th army barely advanced more than 1000 yards on a 5 mile front at a cost of 82000 casualties, or one casualty for each 10 by 10 yards patch of ground gained. If the idea of a step by step or bite and hold battle was accepted then there was very little alternative and although the attack famously using tanks on 15th September again rocked the German positions and led to further British gains there was no longer any realistic chance of breakthrough and with Rawlinson`s conservative tactics prevailing, no breakthrough was attempted. So, from the start of August, it is all about `step by step`
On the Somme it was possible for the allies to punch a hole through the German defences but only on a narrow sector, which the French did on 10th September, but to force a gap in the German lines, sufficiently free of enemy fire to force a major exploitation, simply could not be down with the troops and technology of the time. Step by step was not compatible with the wider British strategic objectives. All that could be achieved by these methods was to take ground slowly and inflict casualties on the enemy. The best explanation for this was put forward about 10 years after the war for JFC Fuller in a book called `Future Warfare`, Fuller posed a diagram similar to the Somme front which he postulated that an attack on a front of about 25 miles in order to produce a gap of 15 miles of which the middle 5 miles or so would be out of range of effective flanking enemy fire. The problem was, to achieve such a breakthrough to blast a hole on that gradually converging 25 mile front, shoring up with flanking divisions, there would not be enough divisions left to exploit, would require, according to Fuller`s calculations, a force of 77 divisions, 21 divisions more than the entire British army in 1916, whilst moving and supplying such a large force in such a small area was utterly impractical, Even disregarding the abilities of the German defenders to strengthen and deepen their defence, not enough force could ever be generated in the salient to produce a final attack to secure the enemy, bypass the trenches and allow for exploitation. It just couldn`t be done! In fact the whole British Somme salient was subjected to German flanking fire throughout the entire battle. The solution, if you look at the tactics of 1918 was to use double or converging attacks on a much greater scale.
If you want to look at the question `Could the Battle of the Somme have been won` it is necessary to look at the enemy perspective as well. Of course much of the evidence is missing, much of the records and archive being lost in the Second World War, but the Chief of the German General Staff during the first part of the battle Erich von Falkenhayn could have given even Kitchener lessons in secrecy, concealing his ideas even from his closest staff colleagues and, because his plans eventually failed they were afterwards covered up by misleading statements. The one factor for which Falkenhayn made no secret was that he wanted the British and the French to attack on the Somme in the summer of 1916. Falkenhayn`s pre-emption of the Allied offensive by his own attacks at Verdun distorted the Allied plans and led to a French scaling back of their contribution to the Somme but that was only the first half of Falkenhayn`s strategy. When the allies attacked on the Somme in July with the equivalent of over 30 divisions, including reserves, the defending German second army under Fritz von Bulow had only the equivalent of 13 divisions to defend against them and 844 artillery pieces, against the allies 3300 and that was because was because despite of Fritz von Bulow`s frequent protests, the bulk of the German reserve forces were not opposite the Somme but somewhere to the north opposite Arras with German Sixth Army and that only made sense if Falkenhayn was expecting a weak contribution from the French to the Somme and that the British army would prove so inept it would shatter itself on second army`s positions, allowing a German counter offensive with sixth army at Arras bringing decisive results. The shock of the British and French attack on the 1st July and the British success on the southern part of the front had a considerable impact on those plans. On 2nd July 7 German divisions were rushed to 2nd army on the Somme with a further 10 divisions by July 13th, thereby
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wiping out the chance of Falkenhayn`s counter attack at Arras. In the first ten days of the battle German 2nd army lost over 40000 casualties, a comparison perhaps with the British army losing 57000 on July 1st. When Gough`s Reserve Army took the place of 4th Army on the northern part of the front, the Germans also divided their forces by creating a new 1st army commanded by von Bulow, north of his former second army, now commanded by Max von Gallwitz. Gallwitz also briefly took command of Army Group Gallwitz before the appointment of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria as army group commander. That point is worth more attention than it usually gets. There were very good reasons at the beginning of 1916 for believing that the British army would fight no better than – say – the Italians, Russians or Roumanians, all of whom the Germans habitually and decisively defeated. In their last major war, the Anglo Boer war of 1899-1902 the British performance had been poor and the volunteer forces, the Imperial Yeomanry, inept. The Germans had formed a very low opinion of what the Germans called the `English militia`. The recent 1914 and 1915 performance of British Imperial troops against the Ottoman Turkish army, considered one of the least competent in the war had, again, been one familiar including the withdrawal from Gallipoli and the surrender at Kut in Mesopotamia in April. All Generals, British, French and German simply could not believe that an effective army could be recruited, created, trained and equipped from scratch in under two years. Hence that passage in Haig`s diary which always gets quoted `It is not an army I have in France, just a collection of divisions untrained for the field, the actual fighting army will be evolved from them. The understandable focus on the 1st July has obscured the fact that the British army on the Somme fought as well as it actually did outperforming realistic expectations. Haig`s delight was palpable when the attack of 27 th and 28th July the 5th Brandenburg division, which he described correctly as the crack corps of the German army was driven from Delville wood. The British really could defeat the best the Germans had. That argument can again be taken further by looking at the German response to Verdun and the Somme by the end of 1916 and a path can be traced from the allied attack on the Somme in 1916 to the armistice in 1918, but not quite a straight path along the western front which Haig described in his Final Despatch. In late August 1916 Falkenhayn was dismissed from his post as Chief of the General Staff, not generally the fate of generals successful in battle, but also by the end of August over 30 German Divisions had been fed into the Somme sector and the German strategic reserve for the Western Front was one division – the Guards Ersatz Division. By the start of October the Germans even sent to the Somme the Marine Infantry Brigade whose role had been to hold the Flanders coast. Just before his dismissal Falkenhayn had written in an official letter `We have no forces to spare, ever move we make in one direction leaves a serious weakening in another – this was the effect of the Chantilly Conference strategy. Shortly after Roumania entered the war, Falkenhayn was dismissed but as we know the Roumanians were massively unsuccessful. The new German commanding team of Paul von Hindenburg and Colonel General Erich Ludendorff arrived from the Eastern front in September 1916 and were appalled by what they saw on the Somme.
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It was not simply the power of the allied attacks which concerned them but it was readily possible to envisage in the near future that the British would have sufficient guns and shells to do what they couldn`t do yet – bombard the complete depth of the German defensive system simultaneously with sufficient force. At the Somme the confidence in German supremacy was crushed by British industry and shells. Meanwhile, on July 4th Reinhard Scheer, Commander of the German High Seas Fleet, submitted his official report following the Battle of Jutland the following `the best possible outcome of any sea battle (in the future) would not force England to make peace in this war`. Put simply, in August 1916, the senior officers in the German army and navy were saying the war was lost and that was also reflected in German public opinion. Germany financed its war effort by a series of war loans in six month intervals and in effect it is like asking the affluent middle class to `bet` that their country is going to win the war. If they bought the war bonds and their country won the war they would get a great return in the 1920s – but if they lost the war they would lose their money. Every German war bond issued at six month intervals was a success – except for one – the 5th War Loan of September 1916 as the confidence of the German public shook under the force of the Allied attacks. Hindenburg and Ludendorff`s response on the western front was to order a change in German tactical doctrine abandoning the automatic counter attack in favour of defence in depth. The physical manifestation of this was the building of the new defensive system, the Hindenburg line. The Germans withdrew to this new line, up to 25 miles behind the original lines in March 1917 ahead of the Nivelle offensive leaving a deliberately devastated and scorched earth area behind them. That voluntary German withdrawal, up to five times which the allies had driven them back at the Somme has often been taken has some kind of insulting appreciation of the Somme offensive. In fact it represented something more significant, it was a German recognition that their army could not defeat the allies on the western front. The German options in the autumn of 1916 was to offer a negotiated settlement or find another way to attack their enemies and it produced an intense political debate with the German Chancellor Theodore von Bethmann-Hollweg complaining that the German military leaders were intent on an `all or nothing` strategy which came out as the introduction of large scale unrestricted submarine warfare on 1st February 1917 which was confidently predicted to bring about a British defeat by starvation no later than July, the German calculation having even taken into account the calorific value of the British breakfast ! Instead, it produced a declaration of war against Germany by the United States on 6th April 1917 and that is a plausible line of argument for, without the Somme, no German unrestricted submarine warfare, without unrestricted submarine warfare, no American entry into the war, with perhaps no allied victory on the western front.
That interpretation continues to divide historians today, but it is an argument worth pursuing. Any argument about the Somme being a precursor to victory does require a great deal of hindsight. Had there been an allied defeat in 1917 or 18 it would have been easy to point to the Somme as the origin of that defeat but that is a line historians finding increasingly worth pursuing, that link from the western front offensives, through naval warfare, to American entry into the war. Of course the negotiated peace did not happen, but if there had been any chance of that happening before November 1918, it was probably late 1916. However with the belligerents in late 1916, early 1917 new leaders took over who were more than ever determined to win the war, Hindenburg and Ludendorff in Germany, Nivelle in France, Lloyd George in Britain, even Kerensky in Russia. On the Somme, the allies and the Germans both thought they had fought well and taken a measure of their enemy and that the war was still there for the winning and that is the saddest thing about the Battle of the Somme, at the end of it, both sides believed it. And so ended Professor Badsey`s thought provoking presentation. After a short break there was an excellent Q & A session with Stephen responding in detail to a number of extremely good points and questions from what had been a most attentive audience.
The meeting was brought to a conclusion by Branch Chairman, Tony Bolton, who thanked Professor Badsey for his efforts asked the attendees to join with him in according their appreciation of an excellent, memorable evening.
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November Meeting
Branch Chairman, Tony Bolton, opened the meeting in time honoured manner with Tim Lynch delivering
Binyon`s immortal Exhortation. These formalities concluded, Tony introduced our speaker for the evening,
John Chester, saying that this is a welcome return to Chesterfield for John as he in fact had been the
speaker at the Branch`s inaugural meeting. John organises the WFA`s Cenotaph Ceremony on November
11th each year and remarked that on occasions the Prime Minister of the day attends but for security
reasons he is not usually advised of the PM`s attendance until about ten minutes before the ceremony
commences. He also quipped that he (John) can order the PM around – you stand here etc.
John opened by asking members a question – how many of you know there are more than 50 `Unknown
Soldiers` commemorated around the world ?. To this end he said he would split his presentation into two
parts, the first he would look at some of those around the world, whilst part two would focus entirely on
Britain`s Unknown Warrior.
John began by looking at France. The idea of having a Tomb of an Unknown Soldier had first been mooted
in 1916 but nothing was done about it. The idea was resurrected in 1919 and in 1920 it was decided that
one of their `Unknowns` would be exhumed and reburied in Paris in Les Invalides – where Napoleon is
buried but there was such a `hue and cry` with the public and in the press demanding that the `Unknown`
be buried under the L`arc de Triomphe that these plans were changed and on November 11th 1920 the
Unknown Soldier – one of eight selected from the battlefield at Verdun – was brought to Paris for interring
in the tomb. But, despite having months to prepare the tomb was not ready and for the next six months
France`s Unknown Soldier reposed in a little room at the top of the L`Arc de Triomphe . When the tomb
was ready, there was another ceremony and blessing and this now became the focal point for people to
come and pay their respects. In 1923 an Eternal Flame was installed.
John then showed an excellent picture of the ceremonial with US General `Black Jack` Pershing
commander of the American Expeditionary Force prominent. He had come to bestow the United States
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highest military honour, the Congressional Medal, on France`s Unknown Soldier. John also showed a
photograph of a man in full Nazi uniform saluting at the Tomb – who was he? Joachim von Ribbentrop,
Germany`s Foreign Minister, who was visiting Paris on a visit several months before the outbreak of the
Second World War. When France fell to the German invaders in 1940 The Tomb became a focal point for
grieving Parisiens, similarly when Paris was liberated in 1944, General De Gaulle paid a visit to the Tomb
on his arrival in the city, as did many GIs in the aftermath.
Moving on, John then described the Belgian Unknown Soldier Tomb in Brussels. The Congress Column (Colonne des Congrés) is the national monument of Belgium, located in the capitol city of Brussels. The tall spire was erected in 1859 as a symbol of Belgian independence and in tribute to the congress which drew up the Belgian constitution in 1830. At its peak is the statue of King Leopold I of Saxonia-Cobourg-Gotha, who became the first king on July 21, 1831. On November 11, 1922 (two years after the Unknown Soldiers of Great Britain and France were interred and one year after the burial of the American Unknown), the Unknown Belgium Soldier was laid to rest in similar circumstance and ceremony as had been his predecessors from World War I. In preparation for the ceremony, five unidentified Belgian soldiers who had been killed in World War I were exhumed to lie in state at the railway station of Bruges. The five were selected from the five largest battlefields of World War I: Liége, Namur, Antwerp,
Flanders, and the Yser.
On November 10, 1922 Raymond Haesebrouch, a crippled veteran from Bruges viewed the five coffins. General de Longueville asked him to choose one, and he selected the fourth to represent all of the
unknown Belgian soldiers who gave their lives during World War I.
The following day, the fourth anniversary of the armistice that concluded the war to end all wars, eight one-
armed Belgium veterans accompanied the flag-draped casket as it was carried to the Colonne des Congrés. There the Unknown Soldier was laid to rest in a vault at the front/base of the column.
John then discussed Italy, bringing up a slide showing the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Rome – set into the King Victor Emmanuele II memorial which is more commonly called the `wedding cake` memorial. Italy had six armies and each was tasked with recovering a body from each of the fronts that had seen Italian
soldiers in combat. The tomb was an idea by General Giulio Douhet.
The body of the Unknown Soldier was chosen on 26 October 1921 from among 11 unknown remains by Maria Bergamas, a woman from Gradisca d`Isonzo who had lost all her sons, and her husbands. None of her son's bodies, nor that of her husband had ever been never recovered. The selected unknown was transferred from Aquilea, where the ceremony with Bergamas had taken place, and buried in a state funeral on 4 November 1921. Italians do not commemorate on November 11th, the date of the ending of the war,
they commemorate on November 5th, that being the date that the Austrians surrendered.
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.
As can be seen in picture, there is a daily guard of honour at the Tomb, on this occasion they are
cavalrymen – no horses – but they carry lances.
In 1993 Australia approached the CWGC and said that they, as a nation, wished to have their own Unknown Soldier, a request which the Commission subsequently approved. In March 1993 the French exhumed, from the CWGC cemetery, Adelaide, near Villers Bretonneaux an unknown from the Great War and this was subsequently handed over by the French to the Australians at a ceremony at the Australian National Memorial at Villers Bretonneaux. The Unknown Soldier was transported to Australia and after lying in state in King's Hall in Old Parliament House was interred in the Hall of Memory at the Memorial on 11 November 1993. He was buried with a bayonet and a sprig of wattle in a Tasmanian blackwood coffin, and
soil from the Pozières battlefield was scattered in his tomb.
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The original grave, from which the Australian Unknown Soldier was exhumed from Adelaide CWGC
Cemetery in France, having lain there for 75 years, is marked and appropriately inscribed.
By 1997, the only Commonwealth nations not to have an Unknown Soldier was Canada and New Zealand
and the Royal Canadian Legion suggested that Canada should have one as well. After some time had
elapsed, on 25th May 2000, on Vimy Ridge, at the Canadian Memorial, a disinterred on the afternoon of
May 28, the body of the Unknown Soldier was transported to the National War Memorial on a horse-drawn
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) gun carriage. Governor General Adrienne Clarkson, her husband,
and Prime Minister Jean Chretien, as well as veterans, Canadian Forces personnel, and members of the
RCMP were in the funeral cortege. Then, with full military honours before a crowd of 20,000, the body, in a
silver maple casket, was re-interred in a sarcophagus in front of the war memorial. Legionnaires placed a
handful of soil from each of Canada's provinces and territories, as well as from the soldier`s former grave
site, on the casket before the tomb was sealed.
The tomb has become a focal point at all commemorative events at the National War Memorial. At the first
Remembrance Day following the tomb's installation, what became a tradition started spontaneously as
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attendees placed their poppies on the tomb. This act expanded to include the leaving of cut flowers,
photographs, or letters to the deceased. The spontaneous display of respect has also carried over to
Canada Day, when the public leaves small, paper national flags on the tomb.
In New Zealand it had been discussed off and on over the years to have a memorial containing the remains
of an Unknown Soldier and in 1999 it finally gained the support of the government and in 2002 agreement
was reached with the CWGC to repatriate the remains of a New Zealand killed in the First World War. It
was eventually decided that the National War Memorial was the most appropriate place for the tomb and
that the tomb should be outside rather than inside the Hall of Memories to allow greatest public access. In
2004 the contract was placed to design and construct the tomb and in November 2004 ceremonies were
held in France and New Zealand to disinter from Caterpillar Valley Cemetery in the Somme valley,
repatriate and re-bury the New Zealand Unknown Soldier.
John then asked the question – how many of you here tonight knows that Roumania has an Unknown
Soldier? – and not only that, he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor by the Americans!
In 1923 it was decided to choose one of the fallen soldiers to represent all who had sacrificed their lives during the war. Ten unidentified soldiers were exhumed and laid in oak coffins, doubled with zinc, inside the `Assumption of Mary` " Church in Marssesti. On May 13, 1923, the war orphan Amilcar Sandulescu, student at the Military High School, knelt in front of the fourth coffin and said: "This is my father". After the
Unknown Soldier had been chosen, the other nine coffins were buried with military honors in the Heroes' Cemetery in Mărăşeşti. On May 15, 1923, the Unknown Soldier's coffin, wrapped in a Roumanian flag was placed on board of a special train to Bucharest, where it was waited for by the King Ferdinand, state officials and an honour guard. Laid on a cannon carriage pulled by eight horses, the coffin was transported in a long procession to the Mihai Voda Church and remained there for 2 more days, so the people could pay their last respects.
On May 17, 1923 the coffin was buried inside a crypt in Carol Park with full military honors in the presence of the Royal family, the Government, members of Parliament, and numerous members of the public. The stone slab of the crypt read: "Here lies at rest happily unto the Lord the Unknown Soldier, who sacrificed his
life for the unity of the Romanian people. On his bones lies the land of united Romania. 1916–1919."
On the night of December 22/23, 1958, the Unknown Soldier’s monument was dismantled and moved, in great secrecy, to the Marasesti Mausoleum by the Communist Regime to make room for the `Mausoleum of Communist Heroes`, where several leaders of the Communist Party were later interred. In 1991, after the
fall of the regime, the Tomb was moved back into the Carol Park, closer to its original location.
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John then posed another question, by putting up a picture and asking members if they knew what Unknown
Soldiers tomb this was
The answer – Poland
The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (Polish: Grób Nieznanego Żołnierza) in Warsaw, dedicated to the unknown soldiers who have given their lives for Poland. The monument, located at Pilsudski Square, is the only surviving part of the Saxon Palace that occupied the spot until destroyed by the Germans in World War Two. Since 2 November 1925 the tomb houses an unidentified of a young soldier who fell during the defence of Lwow. At a later date earth from numerous battlefields where Polish soldiers have fought was added to the urns housed in the surviving pillars of the Saxon Palace. The Tomb is constantly lit by an eternal flame and assisted by a guard post by the Representative Battalion of the Polish Army. It is there that most official military commemorations take place in Poland and where foreign representatives lay wreaths when visiting Poland. The changing of the guard takes place on the hour of every hour daily and
this happens 365 days a year.
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Moving on, Germany`s Unknown Soldier. The Neue Wache, New Guardhouse, was built in 1816 to 1818
for the Royal Palace Guard of Prussian King, Frederick William III. The building was damaged in WWII,
rebuilt, and in 1969 the remains of an unknown soldier and an unknown concentration camp prisoner were
laid to rest.
An enlarged replica of the sculpture by Kȁthe Kollwitz, "Mother with her Dead Son," stands in the centre of
the memorial. Very moving.
Whilst this in re-unified Germany is the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, if you go to Munich to the old military barracks there is a memorial tomb built in the 1930s of large concrete blocks to represent a bunker
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Inside this Tomb there is a Saxon Unknown soldier in greatcoat, helmet and clutching his rifle
This Tomb is surrounded by government buildings and is not open to the public – only by request – when they will permit you to enter the compound.
And that concluded John`s quick tour of other Tombs of Unknown Soldiers.
After a short refreshment break John carried on with part two of his talk, focusing entirely on the British Unknown Warrior. The concept of a British Unknown Warrior came about from an idea by a British army Chaplain, Padre Railton, to have a representative of all those who went to war to fight for King and Country and who never returned, be buried on home soil. By being a completely unidentified body, devoid of any indication of rank or regiment, there was no risk of any perceived `snobbishness` - of someone boasting that it `was my son they chose’. When the war ended there was a huge victory parade in London and elsewhere around the country. Most went well, but some didn`t - in one Lancashire town ex-servicemen were excluded from a banquet organised by the town council – an exclusion which led to riots lasting three days.
At the parade in London, the focal point was the Cenotaph – or as John pointed out `A ` Cenotaph – a
structure made of wood and plaster. Today`s Cenotaph is very similar to the original – except – the original had real laurel leaves on the end faces – what we see today has the laurel leaves carved into it.
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On the first and subsequent anniversary of the Armistice – eleventh hour of eleventh day of the eleventh month – the entire country stopped in silence for two minutes, trains and buses stopped, people came out of shops, and factories came to a standstill
The idea of a Tomb of the Unknown Warrior was first conceived in 1916 by the Reverend David Railton, who, while serving as an army chaplain on the Western Front, had seen a grave marked by a rough cross,
which bore the pencil-written legend 'An Unknown British Soldier'.
He wrote to the Dean of Westminster in 1920 proposing that an unidentified British soldier from the battlefields in France be buried with due ceremony in Westminster Abbey "amongst the kings" to represent the many hundreds of thousands of Empire dead. The idea was strongly supported by the Dean and the
then Prime Minister David Lloyd George.
Selection, arrival and ceremony
Above - The van in which the body of the Unknown Warrior was carried from Dover to Victoria Station, before restoration in 2010.
Replica Coffin of the Unknown Warrior; interior of the Cavell Van, Bodiam
Arrangements were placed in the hands of Lord Curzon of Kedleston who prepared in committee the service and location. Suitable remains were exhumed from various battlefields and brought to the chapel at Saint-Pol-sur-Ternoise near Arras, France on the night of 7 November 1920. The bodies were received by the Reverend George Kendall OBE. Brigadier L.J. Wyatt and Lieutenant Colonel E.A.S. Gell of the Directorate of Graves Registration and Enquiries went into the chapel alone. The remains were then placed in six plain coffins each covered by Union Flags: the two officers did not know from which battlefield any
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individual soldier had come. Brigadier Wyatt with closed eyes rested his hand on one of the coffins. The
other soldiers were then taken away for reburial by Kendall.
The coffin of the unknown warrior then stayed at the chapel overnight and on the afternoon of 8 November, it was transferred under guard and escorted by Kendall, with troops lining the route, from Ste Pol to the medieval castle within the ancient citadel at Boulogne. For the occasion, the castle library was transformed into a chappelle ardente a company from the French 8th Infantry Regiment, recently awarded the Legion
D`Honneur en masse, stood vigil overnight.
The following morning, two undertakers entered the castle library and placed the coffin into a casket of the oak timbers of trees from Hampton Court Palace. The casket was banded with iron, and a medieval crusader's sword chosen by The King personally from the Royal Collection was affixed to the top and surmounted by an iron shield bearing the inscription 'A British Warrior who fell in the Great War 1914–1918 for King and Country'.
The casket was then placed onto a French military wagon, drawn by six black horses. At 10.30 am, all the church bells of Boulogne tolled; the massed trumpets of the French cavalry and the bugles of the French infantry played Aux Champs (the French "Last Post"). Then, the mile-long procession—led by one
thousand local schoolchildren and escorted by a division of French troops—made its way down to the harbour.
At the quayside, Marechal Foch saluted the casket before it was carried up the gangway of the destroyer, HMS Verdun, and piped aboard with an admiral's call. The Verdun slipped anchor just before noon and was
joined by an escort of six battleships. As the flotilla carrying the casket closed on Dover Castle it received a 19 gun Field Marshal`s salute. It was landed at Dover Marine Railway Station at the Western Docks on 10 November. The body of the Unknown Warrior was carried to London in South Eastern and Chatham General Utility van no. 132, which had previously carried the bodies of Edith Cavell and Charles Fryatt. The van has been preserved by the Kent and East Sussex Railway. The train went to Victoria Station, where it arrived at platform 8 at 8.32 pm that evening and remained overnight. (A plaque at Victoria Station marks the site: every year on 10 November, a small Remembrance service, organised by WFA, takes place
between platforms 8 and 9.)
On the morning of 11 November 1920, the casket was placed onto a gun carriage of the Royal Horse Artillery and drawn by six horses through immense and silent crowds. As the cortege set off, a further Field Marshal's salute was fired in Hyde Park. The route followed was Hyde Park Corner, The Mall, and to Whitehall where the Cenotaph, a "symbolic empty tomb", was unveiled by King-Emperor George V. The cortège was then followed by the King, the Royal Family and ministers of state to Westminster Abbey, where the casket was borne into the West Nave of the Abbey flanked by a guard of honour of one hundred
recipients of the Victoria Cross.
The guests of honour were a group of about one hundred women. They had been chosen because they had each lost their husband and all their sons in the war. "Every woman so bereft who applied for a place got it".
The coffin was then interred in the far western end of the Nave, only a few feet from the entrance, in soil brought from each of the main battlefields, and covered with a silk pall. Servicemen from the armed forces stood guard as tens of thousands of mourners filed silently past. The ceremony appears to have served as
a form of catharsis for collective mourning on a scale not previously known.
The grave was then capped with a black Belgian marble stone (the only tomb in the Abbey on which it is forbidden to walk) featuring this inscription, composed by Herbert Edward Ryle, Dean of Westminster,
engraved with brass from melted down wartime ammunition:
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BENEATH THIS STONE RESTS THE BODY OF A BRITISH WARRIOR
UNKNOWN BY NAME OR RANK BROUGHT FROM FRANCE TO LIE AMONG
THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS OF THE LAND AND BURIED HERE ON ARMISTICE DAY 11 NOV: 1920, IN THE PRESENCE OF
HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE V HIS MINISTERS OF STATE
THE CHIEFS OF HIS FORCES
AND A VAST CONCOURSE OF THE NATION
THUS ARE COMMEMORATED THE MANY MULTITUDES WHO DURING THE GREAT
WAR OF 1914 – 1918 GAVE THE MOST THAT MAN CAN GIVE LIFE ITSELF
FOR GOD FOR KING AND COUNTRY
FOR LOVED ONES HOME AND EMPIRE FOR THE SACRED CAUSE OF JUSTICE AND
THE FREEDOM OF THE WORLD
THEY BURIED HIM AMONG THE KINGS BECAUSE HE HAD DONE GOOD TOWARD GOD AND TOWARD
HIS HOUSE
Around the main inscription are four texts:
THE LORD KNOWETH THEM THAT ARE HIS (top) UNKNOWN AND YET WELL KNOWN, DYING AND BEHOLD WE LIVE (side)
GREATER LOVE HATH NO MAN THAN THIS (side) IN CHRIST SHALL ALL BE MADE ALIVE (base)
A year later, on 17 October 1921, the unknown warrior was given the United States' highest award for valour, the Medal of Honor, from the hand of General John Pershing; it hangs on a pillar close to the tomb.
On 11 November 1921, the American Unknown Soldier was reciprocally awarded the Victoria Cross.
When Elizabeth Bowes Lyon married the future King George VI on 26 April 1923, she laid her bouquet at the Tomb on her way into the Abbey, as a tribute to her brother Fergus who had died at the Battle of Loos in 1915 (and whose name was then listed among those of the missing on the Loos Memorial, although in 2012 a new headstone was erected in the Quarry Cemetery, Vermelles). Royal brides married at the Abbey now have their bouquets laid on the tomb the day after the wedding and all of the official wedding photographs have been taken. It is also the only tomb not to have been covered by a special red carpet for the wedding of Prince Albert, Duke of York, and Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon. Before she died in 2002, Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother (the same Elizabeth who first laid her wedding bouquet at the tomb) expressed the wish for her wreath to be placed on the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior. Her daughter, Queen
Elizabeth II, laid the wreath the day after the funeral.
John explained why the British Unknown is a `Warrior` - not a `Soldier`. This is because no one could tell if the unknown was in fact a soldier – he could have been an airman who died in combat over the battlefield – or indeed he could have been a sailor – as the Royal Naval Division had served with distinction, suffering many killed and wounded, on many of the battlefields of the Western Front.
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It was very obvious that John is passionate about this subject and at times during his presentation he was a tad emotional – but then who isn`t when they contemplate the sacrifice made in our name in the Great War. Who of us have not stood in some foreign field surrounded by hundreds of portland stone grave markers and shed a tear?
That wound up John`s presentation and after expertly fielding a number of questions from our members was recipient of a warm vote of thanks from Branch Chairman Tony Bolton for which the members showed
their wholehearted agreement.
