CharlesSPeirceThe philosopher Charles S Peirce, founder of American Pragmatism, took a skeptical but open-minded interest inpsychicalresearch.Thisarticleexaminestheviewsandcommentsfoundinhispublishedwritings.

Introduction

CharlesSandersPeirceistheacknowledgedfounderoftheschoolofphilosophyknownasAmericanPragmatism,andhisviews inspired William James’s somewhat better-known variant of pragmatism.[1] James’s contributions toparapsychological research are likewise better-known than those of Peirce, no doubt due in part to his greaterinvolvementinthatresearch.Indeed,psychicalresearchwasthetopicofasubstantialportionofJames’swrittenwork,anditwaspartofabroaderstudyofunusualorextremetypesofhumanbehaviorwhichreaderscanignoreonlyattheriskofmisunderstandingwhatJameswasallabout.

Bycontrast,Peircewassomethingofanoutsider.Apparently,heneveractivelyengagedinpsychicalresearch(althoughone autobiographical remark suggests he may have attended the occasional séance and witnessed ostensiblepsychokineticphenomena).Andsomeofhiscriticalcommentssuggestthathehadnotthoughtascarefullyanddeeplyaboutthetopicashehadaboutothermattersclosertohisheart.Still,Peircehadthingstosaythroughouthiscareerontelepathy(hecommentedlessfrequentlyonspiritualismandpostmortemsurvival).Moreover,Peircehadtakenthetimetoabsorbsomeofthemoreimportantresearchconductedattheendofthenineteenthandthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturies.Indeed,althoughPeirce’sopinionsaboutthemeritsofthedataofpsychicalresearchevolvedandfluctuated,asCrabtree has observed, Peirce was characteristically open-minded in his evaluation of that data.[2] However, he wasconsiderably lessenthusiasticaboutprevailingexplanations of thephenomena. It’sperhapsnot surprising, then, thatPeirce’sinterestinandopinionsabouttheparanormalwereconsistentwiththerestofhisphilosophy,andhisavowedfallibilisminparticular.[3]

BackgroundandSources

Although it was not his most substantial or theoretically penetrating work in the area, the longest of Peirce’scontributionstoparapsychologywashisextendeddialoguewithoneofthefoundersoftheBritishSPR,EdmundGurney.[4]

Gurney,alongwithFWHMyersandFrankPodmore.producedthetwo-volumePhantasmsoftheLiving,whichoffereddetailedpresentationsanddiscussionsofapproximately700casesofapparitionalexperiencescorresponding(sometimesclosely, sometimes only vaguely) with a distant and roughly contemporaneous event. After evaluating differentexplanations of the phenomena,Gurney andhis collaborators settled on telepathy as themost plausible hypothesis.Peircetookissuewiththis,andin1887hepublishedadetailedcriticism.Curiously,James(inthesameyear)hadwritten,whenreviewingPhantasms,‘Thebookhardlyadmitsofdetailedcriticism,somuchdependsontheminutiaeofthespecialcasesreported’.[5]ButPeirce,whohadevidentlyreadPhantasmsveryclosely,headeddirectlyfortheminutiae,inordertochallengetheclaimthattheveridicalapparitionalexperiencescitedinPhantasmscouldnotbeattributedtochance.

Peirce’s initial criticism occupied seven pages of small print in theProceedings of the American Society for PsychicalResearch,anditwasfollowedbyatwenty-two-pagerejoinderbyGurney.ButPeircehadthelastword(atleastinthefirstround), replying to Gurney in thirty-six pages. In a subsequent issue of the Proceedings, Gurney responded again infourteenpages,butsincehediedbeforemakinghisfinalrevisions,Myersappendedatwo-pagepostscripttothatreply.AlthoughthetoneoftheexchangebetweenPeirceandGurneyisnotalwayspleasant(Peirceisoftencharacteristicallycondescending[6] and Gurney makes little effort to conceal his annoyance with some of Peirce’s charges), PeirceneverthelessthoughthighlyofGurney.Inanunpublishedpaperwrittenin1903,entitled‘TelepathyandPerception’byArthurBurks,Peircewrites,‘IhadasomewhatprolongedcontroversywithEdmundGurneywhichwasonlyinterruptedbyhisdeath;andthisbroughtmeintofinetouchwiththespiritoftheman.Iwasmoststronglyimpressedwiththepurityofhisdevotiontothetruth’.[7]

ApartfromPeirce’sexchangewithGurney,thetwomostextensivepiecesPeircewroteonparapsychologyare,first,theaforementioned paper, ‘Telepathy and Perception’[8] and another unpublished paper called ‘Logic and Spiritualism’[9]

writtenin1905andintendedforTheForum.Peircealsowroteasmallpiececalled‘ScienceandImmortality’[10] in1887,publishedintheChristianRegisterandalsoa1901articlecalled‘HumeonMiracles’,[11]which,althoughitdoesnotdealdirectlywithpsychicalresearch,connectsclearlytolatercommentsonmiraclesandparapsychologyPeircemadein1906,in a work entitled ‘Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God’.[12] The remainder of Peirce’s comments onparapsychologycanbefoundinbriefremarksscatteredthroughoutotherworks.

PeirceonTelepathy

After his debate with Gurney, Peirce’s next published comment on parapsychology appeared in 1894, in a work co-authoredwithpsychologistJosephJastrow,called‘SmallDifferencesinSensation’.Thepaperdealswiththeexperimentalinvestigationofapsychologicalproblem,namely,whethersubjectscouldidentifywhentheyhadbeenpresentedwithslightvariationsinstimuli.PeirceandJastrowfoundthatevenwhensubjectsclaimedtodetectnodifferencebetweentwosensationsofpressure,theycorrectlyguessedwhichofthetwowasgreaterinthreecasesoutoffive.Peirceclaimedthatthisresulthas‘highlyimportantpracticalbearings’,[13]becauseitsuggestedthatourabilitytoextractinformationfromourenvironmentismoresubtleandextensivethanwemighthavesupposed.Peircesays,‘itgivesnewreasonforbelievingthatwegatherwhat ispassinginoneanother’smindsinlargemeasurefromsensationssofaintthatwearenotfairlyawareofhaving them,andcangivenoaccountofhowwe reachourconclusionsabout suchmatters.The insightoffemalesaswellascertain“telepathic”phenomenamaybeexplainedinthisway’.[14]

ItisdoubtfulthatPeirce’suseofscarequotesaround‘telepathic’indicatedageneralskepticismregardingtelepathy.Morelikelyhewanted to refer tophenomena thatweremerelyostensibly (rather thangenuinely) telepathic.What is clear,however, is that inhis earlier exchangewithGurney,Peircehadalreadyacknowledgeda general skepticism regardingtelepathy,whileatthesametimedemonstratingthathebothknewtheevidenceandtookitseriously.InthediscussionofPhantasms,Peirceconcedesthat‘ThedegreeofmydisbeliefintelepathyingeneralissuchthatImightsaythatIthinktheoddsagainstitarethousandstoone’.[15]Healsosays,‘Icertainlyprofessalegitimateandwell-foundedprejudiceagainstthesupernatural’.[16]Butheconsidersthatbiastobelittlemorethanaprudent‘conservativecaution’.[17]Indeed,healsoclaimsthat‘thereisaconsiderablebodyofrespectableevidenceinfavoroftelepathy,ingeneral’.[18]

Peirceraisesseveral,arguablysuperficial,problemswiththetelepathichypothesis.First,heclaimsthattelepathy,ifitoccurred,wouldbe‘contrarytothemainprinciplesofscience’.[19]Peircealsomakestheoddclaimthat‘everyforceorothercauseweknowworksalmosteverywhereandatalltimes.Buttelepathy,astheevidencestandsatpresent,ifitactsatall,doessowiththeextremestinfrequency’.[20]Thatargumentissuspectforatleastthreereasons.First,intherealmofhuman psychology, it is simply false that every cause works almost everywhere and at all times. In fact, mostpsychologicalcapacitiesarehighlysituation-sensitive.Second,onecouldargueplausiblythattheevidencefortelepathydemonstrates, atmost,only consciousorovertmanifestationsof thephenomenon.Forallweknow, telepathycouldoccurbelowthethresholdofconsciousawarenesswithgreatfrequency,andonlyoccasionallybubbleuptothesurfaceinwaysthatcommandattention.Andthird,oneis likelytodetecttelepathicexperiencesonlywhentheyoccurbetweenacquaintances(andpossiblyonlybetweenpeoplewhoknoweachotherwell).Telepathybetweenstrangersisunlikelytobediscovered.Atanyrate,Pierce’sexperimentswithJastrowwerestillafewyearsinthefuture.SoperhapsbythattimePeirce’sskepticismhadbecomelessextremeoratleastmoresophisticated.

Butnomatterhowdifficultitmaybetodistinguishoccurrencesoftelepathyfromthoseofclairvoyance,itisnotdifficulttoimaginethattelepathycouldbeasfragileandsituation-dependentasmanyotherformsofhumaninteraction(suchastheabilitytoshowcompassion,makesomeonelaugh,ordisplayone’ssensuality).ItisparticularlysurprisingthatPeircedidnotconsiderthislastresponsetohisobjection.Foronething,theresponseisfairlyobvious.Andforanother(aswewill seebelow),a fewyears laterPeirceadopteda similar strategyagainstanequally superficialattempt to reject theevidenceforpsychokinesisonthebasisofitsrelativeinfrequency.

Atanyrate,PeircewasbothclearandfirmaboutthedefectsofthecasefortelepathypresentedbyGurneyetal.Usingatonethatwasperhapsneedlesslycontemptuousandsupercilious,hedismissesasdeeplyconfusedtheirattemptstoruleoutthehypothesisofchancebymeansofstatisticalarguments.AlthoughGurneyandhiscollaboratorswerenotasnaiveaboutsuchargumentsasPeircealleged,atonepointPeirceremarks,‘Thecontinuanceoftheorderofnature,therealityoftheexternalworld,myownexistence,arenotasprobableasthetelepathictheoryofghostswouldbeifMr.Gurney’sfigureshadanyrealsignificance’.[21]

Peircealsooffereddetailed criticismsof the casedescriptionsprovidedbyGurney,Myers, andPodmore, arguing thatmany of the cases were not as evidential as those writers had claimed. It is unclear whether a careful re-reading ofPhantasmswouldrevealPeirce’scriticismstobeaspetty, irrelevant,orconfusedasGurneyseemedtothink.ButonecouldprobablymakeadecentcaseforsayingthatPeirce(perhapsduetohisadmittedbias,atleastatthattime,againsttelepathy)wasoneofthosewholackedwhatJames(inhisreviewofPhantasms)dubbed‘aninvestigator’s instinct,ornose,asonemightcallit,forgoodandbadevidence’.[22]

Approximately nine years after his exchange with Gurney and two years after his experiments with Jastrow, in amanuscriptcalled‘LessonsFromtheHistoryofScience’,Peircecommentedbriefly,andperhapsmorethoughtfully,on

theevidencefortelepathy.Inasectionentitled‘Someaprioridicta’,[23]Peirceillustratesanddefendstheclaimthat‘Thelastfiftyyearshavetaughtthelessonofnottriflingwithfactsandnottrustingtoprinciplesandmethodswhicharenotlogicallyfoundeduponfactsandwhichserveonlytoexcludetestimonyfromconsideration’.[24]Asanexample,hecitesClaudeBernard’sdictumthatadiseaseisnotanentity,whichPeircerightlynotesisametaphysicaldoctrinewhichtheobservationofmanyfactshasrefuted.

Inthesamespirit,Peircethendecriesarelativelyfamiliar,dismissiveattitudeaboutthereliabilityofhumantestimony(especiallyfromthedistantpast),andalthoughhedoesnotexploretheimplicationsofhisownviewforthehistoricalevidenceinparapsychology,thatviewwouldseemtorequireamoretolerantapproachtoparapsychologicaldatathanthedatahasusuallyreceived.Peircecriticizesthe‘dictabymeansofwhichtheinternalcriticismofhistoricaldocumentswascarriedtosuchaheightthatitoftenamountedtotherejectionofallthetestimonythathascomedowntous,andthesubstitutionforitofadreamspunoutofthecritic’sbrain’.[25]Hearguesthat‘ancienttestimonyoughttobetrustedinthemain,withasmallallowanceforthechangesinthemeaningsofwords’.[26]ItwouldhavebeeninterestingtoseehowPeircewouldhaveevaluatedtheabundantandexceptionallyimpressiveseventeenth-centurytestimonyforthelevitationsofStJosephofCopertino.[27]

Peirce concludes this section by mentioning certain types of observed or putative mental phenomena, includingtelepathy.Hecriticizesthe

dictabywhicheverythingofthenatureofextraordinarypowersconnectedwithpsychologicalstatesofwhichthehypnotictranceisanexampleweresetdowntotricks.Atpresent,whiletheexistenceoftelepathycannotbesaidtobeestablished,allscientificmenareobligedbyobservedfactstoadmitthatitpresentsatleastaveryseriousproblemrequiringrespectfultreatment.[28]

Thisisfollowedbyadiscussionofthecurrentandforeseeablelimitationsandfragmentarynatureofscientificknowledge.

By far, Peirce’s most extensive and subtle treatment of the topic of telepathy is the discussion in ‘Telepathy andPerception’.ThispaperweavestogethervariousthemesCforexample,concerningthenatureofperceptiongenerally,thedifferencesbetweentherawingredientsofperceptionandperceptualjudgments,thenatureoftime(andinparticular,anargumentinthespiritofStAugustineaboutthenatureofthepresent),andfinally,arecurringPeirceanthemeaboutthetendencyofthehumanmindtohaveaninstinctforthetruth.

Peirce’sargument,inbrief,isthis.Hebeginsbyexpressinghiscontinuedreservationsabouttheevidencefortelepathy,andalsofortelepathyasanexplanatoryhypothesis.If,byprovingtheexistenceoftelepathy,weproveonlythat‘veryrarelymindactsuponmindinawayutterlyunlikethenormalway’,[29]thenthisisnocontributiontoscience.Itdeclarestelepathytobeamysteryforwhichwecanestablishnoexactconnectionswithotherphenomena.Peircecautionsthatthisisnottosaythattelepathyisnotreal,because‘Sciencenomoredeniesthattherearemiraclesandmysteriesthanitassertsthem’.[30]Itwouldmerelybetoconcedethatsciencecanhavenothingfruitfultosayabouttelepathy.

PeircealsospeculatesaboutwhetherGurneyandotherinvestigatorsfromtheSPRhadbeenmoredominatedbyadesiretobelieveintelepathythantoseekthetruth,whereveritmaylie.Heconcludesthattheseinvestigatorsweregenuinetruth-seekers,althoughtheymighthavebeenunpreparedforthecriticalthinkingtheirinquiriesdemanded.Andhenotesthatthereisnothingparticularlycomfortingaboutabeliefintelepathy,oratleastnothingsocomfortingthatitwoulddivertone’sattentionfromseekingthetruth.Infact,Peircearguesthatbeliefintelepathytendstoweakenthebeliefinahypothesisthatmostwouldconsidertobemorecomfortablethanthehypothesisoftelepathy,namely,thehypothesisofpostmortemsurvival.Thatisbecausetheapparentevidenceforsurvivalcanbereinterpretedasevidencefortelepathyamongtheliving.

Peircethenembarksonadiscussionaboutperception,inwhichheconcludes(amongmanyotherthings)that‘thereisnodifference between a real perception and a hallucination, taken in themselves’.[31] The difference is ‘in respect to therelationsofthetwocasestootherperceptions’.[32]Thisisfollowedbyadiscussionoftimeanditsrelationtoperception.Peircearguesthat‘inthepresentmomentwearedirectlyawareoftheflowoftime,or inotherwordsthatthingscanchange’.[33]Buthecautionsthat‘thereisnosuchthingasanabsoluteinstant,thereisnothingabsolutelypresent eithertemporarilyorinthesenseofconfrontation’.[34]AccordingtoPeircethepresentmomentalwayscontainsabitofthepastand a bit of the future, and our experience of it always has in it something of the nature of memory and also ofanticipation.Thatistruenomatterhownarrowlywefocusourattentiononthepresentmoment.So‘thereisnothingatallthatisabsolutelyconfrontitial,althoughtheconfrontitialiscontinuallyflowinginuponus’.[35]

NowPeircehasalreadymadetheKantianmoveofdistinguishingapercept(i.e.,asense-datumoringredientofperception)

from‘theperceptasitisimmediatelyinterpretedintheperceptualjudgment’,[36]whichhecallsthe‘percipuum’.SoaftermakingsomefamiliarPeirceanobservationsabouttherealbeingwhatit is independentlyofhowwethinkitmustbe,Peircearguesthat

the percipuum is not an absolute event. There is no span of present time so short as not to contain somethingremembered, that is, taken as a reasonable conjecture, not without containing something expected for theconfirmationwhichwearewaiting.Thepeculiar elementof thepresent, that it confrontsuswith ideaswhich itforcesuponuswithoutreason,issomethingwhichaccumulatesinwholesintimeanddissipatesthemoreminutelythecourseoftimeisscrutinized.[37]

What thismeans is that there isno cleardistinctionbetweenapercipuumandeithermemoryor anticipation, and itrevealsaninherentdifficultyinsayingtowhatextentapercipuumaccordswiththefacts.Italsomeansthat‘thereisnopercipuumsoabsoluteasnot tobesubject topossibleerror’.[38]ThispartofPeirce’sargument therebyoffers furthersupporttohisfallibilism.

At this point, the discussion takes an interesting turn back in the direction of telepathy. Peirce reviews some of hisstandardpointsabouthowwetendtoseeconnectionsbetweenthingsandtherebysystematizeourobservations.This,ofcourse,isthewayPeircesayssciencegrows.Scientificgrowthwouldbeimpossibleifhumanbeingsdidnot‘possessatendencytoconjecturerightly’.[39]Ourabilitytoguessrightasoftenaswedocannotbeexplainedonthehypothesisofchance.[40]Foranyobservedfact, therearesimplytoomanyhypothesesonecould comeupwith toaccount for it.AsPeirceputsit,‘Thetruthisthatveryfew[ofthesepossible]hypotheseswillappear...tobereasonable;andtheonetruehypothesisisusuallyofthissmallnumber’.[41]Whyisthat,heasks?Itisbecause,fromprimitivemantothepresent,wehave had ‘some decided tendency toward preferring truthful hypotheses’. So Peirce concludes that ‘it is absolutelynecessarytoadmitsomeoriginalconnectionbetweenhumanideas,andtheeventsthatthefuturewasdestinedtounfold’.[42]

But,heargues,‘thatissomethingveryliketelepathy’.[43]Andthatisbecauseiftelepathywereanestablishedfact,‘itwouldthen be proved that people not very infrequently have hallucinations [which Peirce has already argued do not differintrinsicallyfromgenuineorveridicalperceptions],andthatonehallucinationoutofagreatnumber(butmorefrequentlythan chance coincidence could account for) coincides with subsequent experience to such a degree as to attractattention’.[44]Peircenotes thateven if telepathyoccurs,humannature issuchas toexaggerate justhowclosely thesehallucinationsaccordwiththetruth.ButthenPeircesaysthattelepathy,inthatcase,wouldbeaphenomenonthatdiffersonlyslightly fromphenomenawhoseexistencewealreadyacknowledge.Telepathywouldbe ‘somewhatmore remotefromperceptionthantheconjecturesbywhichphysicistssooftenhituponthetruth’.[45]Telepathy,inotherwords,maysimplybecontinuouswiththepowerofconjecturewhichdistinguisheshumanbeingsfromcreaturesofothersorts.

Somemight find it odd that Peirce would try to link the power of conjecture to telepathy rather than precognition,premonition,ordivination–thatis,theostensiblypsychicabilitytoforetellthefuture.Granted,manyparapsychologistsmaintainthatprecognitionisnotapsychicphenomenondistinctfromESP(telepathyorclairvoyance).TheywouldsayitismerelyoneformormodeorESP.PerhapsitdidnotoccurtoPeircetomakeanysuchdistinction.Infact,inlightofhisearlierremarksaboutthenatureofthepresent,hemighthavethoughtthattherewasnogenuinedistinctiontomakebetweenESPofcontemporaneousasopposedtofutureevents,orbetweenreal-timeandprecognitiveformsoftelepathy.Nevertheless,itissuretofrustratesomereadersthatPeirce’sdiscussionatthispointisnotfleshedoutfurther.

Atanyrate,Peirceseemedclearlytowanttotakesomeofthemysteryoutoftelepathybylinkingittomorefamiliarcognitive capacities. Now as noted above, Peirce evidently did not recognize some of the profound methodologicalproblems inherent in investigations of psychic functioning generally and telepathy in particular (e.g., the apparentdifficulty(ifnotimpossibility)ofconductingcontrolledexperimentsgenerallyinparapsychology,muchlessexperimentsfor telepathy that could rule out the operation of clairvoyance). Parapsychologists themselves have been slow toappreciate these difficulties.[46] So his concluding remark is perhaps unjustifiably optimistic or hopeful. According toPeirce,whetherornot thehumanpowerof conjecture exists in suchaway that ‘onemind canknowwhatpasses inanotheratadistance’,[47]thatis‘aquestiontobeinvestigatedassoonaswecanseeourwaytodoingsointelligently’.[48]

PeirceonSpiritualismandPsychokinesis

Peirce’sviewsonparapsychologyextendedbeyondthetopicoftelepathy.Inparticular,hecommentedseveraltimesonspiritualism and the belief in postmortem survival, and he also had a few things to say about the evidence forpsychokinesis.Itisnotsurprisingthathesometimesdiscussedthesetwotopicstogether,becausemanyconsideredthephenomenaofphysicalmediumship(especiallytableturning)tobetypesofevidenceforpostmortemsurvival.ButPeirce

knew the evidence well enough to know that the physical phenomena ofmediumshipmight instead be evidence ofpsychokinesisCthatis,somesortofparanormalcausalinfluenceofalivingagentonthephysicalworld.

It’sunclearhowthoroughlyPeircehadstudiedtheevidenceforbothphysicalandmentalmediumship.Butitisclearthathehadreadsomeofthemoreimportantcaseinvestigations.Forexample,inhis1906‘AnswerstoQuestionsConcerningMyBeliefinGod,’Peircenotes,apparentlyapprovingly,theevidenceconcerningJames’sstarsubjectLeonoraPiper.AndheremarksthattheresearchesofWilliamCrookes,LordRayleigh,andRichardHodgsonmakefora‘verystrong’caseformediumisticphenomena.[49] And earlier, in ‘Telepathy and Perception’, he again expresses his admiration forWilliamCrookes,whoconductedaseriesof ingenious,pioneering,andcompellingexperimentswiththemediumDDHome.[50]

Moreover,inhis‘LogicandSpiritualism,’hecommentsinsomedetailoncreativeandcarefulexperimentsmadebytheGermanscientistJohannZöllnerwiththemediumHenrySlade.[51]Tohiscredit,Peircerecognizedthis,describingZöllneras‘eminentastronomerandmathematicalphysicist,manoftruegenius,keenandsubtle’.[52]

PeircecommentedononeofthemanyexperimentswithSladethat,accordingtoZöllner,suggestedtheexistenceofafourth spatial dimension. This discussion occurs after some typically Peircean remarks about the value and generalrightnessofcommonsense,andhowdifficultitisforspecialexperiencetooverthrowcommonsense,especiallywhencommonsenseis‘inharmonywithindividualgoodjudgmentfromgeneralexperience’.[53]TheexperimentPeircediscussesisoneinwhichSladeseemedtomakeaknotappearinastringwhoseendsZöllnerhadtiedtogetherandsealed.Zöllnerattemptedtoexplainthisintermsoftheexistenceofafourthdimension.AndPeirceconsiderswhatsortofimpactthisexperimentmighthaveonthedictatesofcommonsense.

He notes, first, that ‘no experiences, familiar or otherwise, are absolutely inconsistent with space having fourdimensions’.[54]Forexample,heconsidersthefollowingargument.Ifspacehadfourdimensions,thensteam,subjectedtogreatpressureinaboiler,wouldhavewaystogetfrominsidetooutsidetheboilerviathatfourthdimension.Sincesteamdoesnotescape, thatcountsagainst thehypothesisofa fourthdimension.Peirceconsiderssomereasonablewaysofgettingaroundthisobjection.Thenheconsidersanotherargument.Allexperience(sotheargumentgoes)countsagainstthehypothesisofafourthdimensionbecauseifitweretrue,phenomenasimilartotheanomaloustyingofaknotwouldbemorecommon.ButPeircecountersbyarguing,‘Ifspacehasfourthdimensionthereisnodeterminingapriorihowoftenitwouldhappenthatsomethingwouldprojectintoit;experienceseemstoshowithappenssorarelythatMr.Sladefurnishesthefirstconclusiveinstanceofit’.[55]Hethenadds,‘noexperiencewhatevercanfurnishtheslightestreasonforthinkingthataneventofanyconceivablekindwillabsolutelyneverhappen’.[56] Infact,evenifaccumulatedexperiencesuggestedthatbodiesneverjuttedoutintoafourthdimension,onecouldreasonablyholdthatthisoccurssomewhere,‘sinceeveryrulehasexceptions’.[57]Still,hesays,commonsensecompelsustoholdthatthisjuttingissoinfrequentthattheprobabilityofitsoccurring‘inanyparticularcase,asinthepersonofMr.Slade,isbeyondallcomparesmallerthantheprobabilityoftrick,evenwereweatalosstoconceivehowtrickcouldbe’.[58]

TheselastcommentsbearonPeirce’spositionregardingHumeonmiracles,atopicwhichwillbeconsideredshortly.ButtheupshotofPeirce’sdiscussionisthattheSladephenomena,and(moregenerally)thephenomenaofferedasevidenceforspiritualism,arelikelytoberegardedasevidentialonlytothosewhoarealreadypredisposedtorejectthedictatesofcommonsense.ButPeirce’sattitudetowardtheinvestigationofostensiblyparanormalphenomenaisclearlyrespectful,justasitwasinhisearlierdialoguewithGurney.Here,asbefore,hebalanceshisavowedopen-mindedskepticismwitharespect (and sometimes an admiration) for parapsychological research, and he recognizes the tension between theseattitudes. He writes that even though the results of parapsychological investigations will encounter a great, andreasonable, obstacle from common sense, ‘those who are engaged in psychical research should receive everyencouragement...scientificmen,workinginsomethinglikescientificways,mustultimatelyreachscientificresults’.[59]

Peircecommentsagainonpsychokineticphenomena inhisearlierwork, ‘LessonsFromtheHistoryofScience’.Thispassageoccursinasectiondealingwiththeclassificationofsciences.Peirceisdiscussingthelegitimacyofdistinguishingphysical from psychical sciences, and he appears to be arguing for their relative autonomy and appropriateness indifferentcontexts.Forexample,hesays,‘Therecanbenoobjectiontoaman=sengagingatonetimeintracingoutfinal,ormental,causation,andatanothertimeintracingoutmaterial,orefficient,causation.Buttoconfoundthesetwothingstogetherisfatal’.[60]HethenmakesaclaimthatmighthavebroughtasmiletoSpinoza:‘Toaskwhetheragivenfactisduetopsychicalorphysicalcausesisabsurd.Everyfacthasaphysicalside;perhapseveryfacthasapsychicalside’.[61]Thenheappliesthisconclusiontosomeofthephenomenaofparapsychology.

Itsphysicalaspect–asameremotion–isdueexclusivelytophysicalcauses;itspsychicalaspect–asadeed–isdueexclusivelytopsychicalcauses.Thisremainstrue,thoughyouaccepteverydoctrineoftelepathy,table-turning,orwhatyouwill.IfIcanturnatablebytheforceofmywill,thiswillsimplyestablishthefactthatsomethingbetween

meandthetableactsjustasastickwithwhichIshouldpokethetablewouldact.Itwouldbeaphysicalconnectionpurelyandsimply,howeverinterestingitmightbetoapsychologist.Butontheotherhand,asmyhandobeys,inageneralway,mycommands,clutchingwhatItellittoclutch...sothetable-turningexperimentwould,Isuppose,show that I could give similar general orders to the untouched table. That would be purely psychical, or final,causation,inwhichparticularsaredisregarded.[62]

Later,inBookIIIofThePrinciplesofPhilosophy,whendiscussing‘PolarDistinctionsandVolition’,[63]Peirceonceagaintakesupthetopicoftableturning.Here,theinterestofthepassagedoesn’tsomuchconcernanytheoreticalorempiricalclaimsPeircemakesaboutthephenomena.Rather,itisinterestingbecauseitseemsautobiographical.ItsuggeststhatPeircehadsomeapparentlysuccessfulexperiencestryingtoaffecttablesatadistance.Peirceissuggestingthatvolition(orwilling)‘isnotperfected,andperhapsdoesnottakeplaceatall,untilsomethingisactuallyeffected.Tryingtoshovesomethingtooheavyforthemantostirneverthelessaccomplishes,inconsiderablemeasure,theonlythinghedirectlywilledtodo–namely,tocontractcertainmuscles’.[64]Atthispoint,Peirceseemstowaxautobiographical.

Inthedaysoftable-turningweusedtobecommandedtositquiteawayfromatable,and‘withallourmight’towillthat the table shouldmove;and ...whilewewerepossessedofnoother ‘might’over the table than throughourmuscles,weusedtobespeedilyrewarded,byadirectconsciousnessofwillingthatthetablemove,accompaniedbythevisionofitswondrousobedience.[65]

BeforeconsideringPeirce’sgeneralpositiononmiracles,itisworthmentioninganinterestingcommenthemakesinalongfootnotetohis‘LecturesonPragmatism’(1902).HerePeircereassertshisfamiliarendorsementofthespontaneousconjectures of instinctive reason,which in this passage he dubs ‘anthropomorphic’.Hewrites, ‘Every single truth ofscienceisduetotheaffinityofthehumansoultothesouloftheuniverse,imperfectasthataffinitynodoubtis.Tosay,therefore,thataconceptionisonenaturaltoman...isashigharecommendationasonecouldgivetoitintheeyesofanExactLogician’.[66]

In a footnote appended to that passage, Peirce applies this view to a venerable dispute in parapsychology - namely,whethertheevidenceforpostmortemsurvivalmightbeexplainedinsteadintermsoftelepathy(orESPgenerally)amongtheliving.Peircewrites,‘otherthingsbeingequal,ananthropomorphicconception,whetheritmakesthebestnucleusforascientificworkinghypothesisornot,isfarmorelikelytobeapproximatelytruethanonethatisnotanthropomorphic’.[67] He then considers how wemight decide between the hypothesis of telepathy and the hypothesis of spiritualism.Telepathy, he suggests, is the better working hypothesis ‘because it can be more readily subjected to experimentalinvestigation’. Here, some may consider Peirce simply to be mistaken, insofar as he does not appreciate themethodologicalproblemstostudyingtelepathy.Nevertheless,hearguesthatsolongastheonlyevidencefortelepathyisevidencethatspiritualismis‘equallycompetenttoexplain’,then‘Spiritualismismuchmorelikelytobeapproximatelytrue,asbeingthemoreanthropomorphicandnaturalidea’.Hethenaddsthathesimilarlywouldchoosebelievinginananthropomorphic‘old-fashionedGod’ratherthanamodernpatentAbsolute... if it isaquestionofwhichisthemorelikelytobeaboutthetruth’.

Peircealsomakessometantalizingcommentsonthetopicofpostmortemsurvival,manyofwhichanticipatepresent-daydiscussionsaboutsurvivalandidentity.Forexampleinhis‘AnswerstoQuestionsConcerningMyBeliefinGod’,hewrites,‘IfIaminanotherlifeitissuregoingtobemostinteresting;butIcannotimaginehowitisgoingtobeme’.[68]Infact,Peirceabruptlyendsthismanuscriptwithathoughtexperimentaboutidentityandmemorysimilartothoserecentlyinphilosophicalvogue.Heconsiderswhethertheprospectoflosingallrecollectionofourearthlyexistencematterstoouranticipationofafuturelife.Soheimaginesacaseofadministeringadrugpriortosurgerywhichwipesoutmemory,andhethenconsiderswhetherthiswouldmakeusloseinterestinthesufferingwecanexpect.[69]

Andinhisearlierwork,‘ScienceandImmortality’,writtenataboutthesametimeashisexchangewithGurney,Peircevoicestherelativelyfamiliarcomplaintaboutthebanalityofmostostensiblespiritcommunications.Healsoremarksonthe peculiar solemnity ofmost of those communications (aswell as the behavior attributed to ghostly apparitions),arguingthatonewouldexpectliberatedspiritstoregardtheirsituationasa‘stupendousfrolic’.[70]Since these remarkswerewrittenrelativelyearlyinPeirce’scareer,itisperhapsnotsurprisingthattheybetraythesortofsuperficialitythatmarred Peirce’s exchangewithGurney. The issues regarding ostensiblemediumistic communications aremuchmoresubtle than Peirce seemed to realize.[71] And it would appear from his later comments on parapsychology that hesubsequentlybegantoappreciateatleastsomeofthosecomplexities.

Peircealsoargues,inthatearlywork,thatspiritualistictheoriesandthepossibilityofanotherlifewillseemmorecredibleaspeoplerecognizethe‘palpablefalsity’[72]ofmechanisticviewsofnature.Hearguesthattheuniverseisnotgovernedbyblind law,andthatstrict,deterministicmetaphysicsmustgivewaytomorespiritualisticviewsthatmayestablishthe

realityofafuturelife.[73]

PeirceonMiracles

PeircewasquiteclearonwhathetooktobetheerrorsinHume’sdiscussionofmiracles.Writinginabout1901,inapapercalled ‘Hume on Miracles’, Peirce argues that an assessment of the evidence for miracles should focus on objectiveprobabilities,ratherthanmerelikelihoods.Theformerexpressrealfacts(e.g.,thatinafairdietheprobabilityisoneinsixthatanyparticularfacewillturnup).Thelatteraremerelyexpressionsofourpreconceivedideas.[74]TheproblemwithHume’sargumentagainstmiraclesisthatitis‘basedontheassumptionthatweoughttojudgeoftestimonybybalancingthelikelihoodthatthewitnessestellthetruthagainstthelikelihoodthatnosucheventasthattowhichtheytestifyevertookplace’[75]And‘noregardatall,orverylittleindeed,oughttobepaidtosubjectivelikelihoodsinabduction’.[76][77]PeirceconcludesthatHume‘hascompletelymistakenofthetruelogicofabduction’.[78]

Butquiteapart fromhis specificobjections toHume,Peircewasunsympathetic toanyattempt to legislategenerallyagainstanomalousoccurrences.ThelinePeircetakesin1906,in‘AnswerstoQuestionsConcerningMyBeliefinGod’,is(first)thatthereisnowayto‘ascertainaprioriwhethermiracles (betheyviolationsofthelawsofnatureornot)andspecialprovidencestakeplaceornot’.[79]Henotes that if therearenomiraclesnowadays, that tends tocountagainstclaimsofmiracleshavingoccurredinthepast.But,heasks‘aretherenomiraclesnowadays?Idonotfeelsosureofit’.[80]

PeircethenmentionsMrs.PiperandtheinvestigationsconductedbyCrookesandothers.Thatevidence,hesays,issostrong, that ‘but for one circumstance I should unhesitatingly accept it. That circumstance is that every surprisingdiscoveryofscience...issoonfollowedbyotherscloselyconnectedwithit’.[81]Whathappensthenisthattheoriginallyanomalousphenomenon isno longeranomalous.Butmiracles,Peirceclaims, ‘arealwayssuigeneris’.[82] Nevertheless(echoingapointweencounteredearlier),hecautions,‘Theisolatednessofthemiracleisreallynoargumentagainstitsreality’.[83]However,‘iteffectivelypreventsoureverhavingsufficientevidenceofthem.’.[84]

Conclusion

Inlightofhismoregeneralphilosophicalpositions,Peirce’sviewsontheparanormalarenotespeciallysurprising.Hiscommentsonmiracles,andonthegenerationandassessmentofnovelhypotheses,fallsquarelywithinhisfamiliarandlong-heldviewsonthenatureofscienceandthegrowthofknowledge.Theyarealsonotsurprisinginlightofhisclearcynicismregardingtheattitudesofmanyscientists.In‘TelepathyandPerception’henotesthat‘thegeneralpublicisnofoolinjudgingofhumannature;andthegeneralpublicisdecidedlyoftheopinionthatthereissuchathingasascientificpedantrythatswellswithcomplaisancewhenitcansneeratpopularobservations,notalwayswisely’.[85]

Even if thephilosophical and scientific communitieshave failed to acknowledge thedepthofPeirce’s interest in theparanormal,onemighthaveexpectedmore fromPeirce’sbiographer.[86]However,Brent raises the subjectonly twice,almostinpassing.HeobservesthatPeircehad‘stronginterestintheoccult’[87]andthebearingofspiritualisticphenomenaonourviewsofmindandbody,butheapparentlydismisses theseconcernsas less important thanPeirce’s ‘farmoreserious cosmological speculations’.[88] And later, he offers a brief paragraph in which Peirce’s interest in psychicalresearch generally, and the topic of postmortem survival in particular, are simply and inadequately characterized as‘skeptical’.[89]

SomemightfinditsurprisingthatPeircegaveasmuchattentionashedidtothedataofparapsychology.Butit’sdifficultto see how one could have expected anything else without dismissing, implausibly, Peirce’s fallibilism, his avoweddedication to the truth, andhis respect fornovelhypotheses arising from the spontaneous conjecturesof instinctivereason.

StephenEBraude

Literature

Braude,S.E.(1997).TheLimitsofInfluence:PsychokinesisandthePhilosophyofScience,RevisedEdition.Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica.

Braude,S.E.(1998)."PeirceontheParanormal."TransactionsoftheCharlesS.PeirceSociety,34:199–220.

Braude,S.E.(2003).ImmortalRemains:TheEvidenceforLifeafterDeath.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.

Braude,S.E.(2014a).CrimesofReason:OnMind,Nature&theParanormal.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.

Braude, S.E. (2014b). "The Possibility ofMediumship: Philosophical Considerations." In A.J. Rock (Ed.),The SurvivalHypothesis:EssaysonMediumship(pp.21-39).Jefferson,NC:McFarland.

Brent,J.(1993).CharlesSandersPeirce:ALife.Bloomington&Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress.

Broad,C.D.(1962).LecturesonPsychicalResearch.London:Routledge&KeganPaul.(Label:65)

Crabtree, A. (2015). "Continuity ofMind: A Peircean Vision." In E.F. Kelly, A. Crabtree& P.Marshall (Eds.),BeyondPhysicalism:TowardReconciliationofScienceandSpirituality(pp.423-453).Landham,MD:Rowman&LIttlefield.

Dobbs,A. (1967)."TheFeasabilityofaPhysicalTheoryofESP." InJ.R.Smythies(Ed.),ScienceandESP (pp.225-254).London:Routledge&KeganPaul.

Gauld,A.(1982).MediumshipandSurvival.London:Heinemann.

Grosso,M.(2016).TheManWhoCouldFly:St.JosephofCopertinoandtheMysteryofLevitation.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.

Gurney,E.(1887a)."RemarksonProfessorPeirce'sPaper."ProceedingsoftheAmericanSocietyforPsychicalResearch,1:157-180.

Gurney,E.(1887b)."RemarksonProfessorPeirce'sRejoinder."ProceedingsoftheAmericanSocietyforPsychicalResearch,1:286-300.

James,W.(1887)."ReviewofPhantasmsoftheLiving."Science,9(Jan.7):18-20.

Myers, F.W.H. (1887). "Postcript to Mr. Gurney's Reply to Professor Peirce." Proceedings of the American Society forPsychicalResearch,1:300-301.

Peirce,C.S.(1887a)."Criticismon'PhantasmsoftheLiving'."ProceedingsoftheAmericanSocietyforPsychicalResearch,1:150-157.

Peirce,C.S.(1887b)."Mr.Peirce'sRejoinder."ProceedingsoftheAmericanSocietyforPsychicalResearch,1:180-215.

Sudduth,M.(2014)."IsPostmortemSurvivaltheBestExplanationoftheDataofMediumship?"InA.J.Rock(Ed.),TheSurvivalHypothesis:EssaysonMediumship(pp.40-64).Jefferson,NC:McFarland.

Sudduth,M. (2016).APhilosophicalCritique of EmpiricalArguments forPostmortemSurvival. NewYork and London:PalgraveMacmillan.

Zöllner,J.C.F.(1888/1976).TranscendentalPhysics(C.C.Massey,Trans.).Boston/NewYork:Colby&Rich/ArnoPress.

References

Footnotes

1.ˆThisarticleisadaptedfromBraude,1998,whichappearedintheTransactionsoftheCharlesS.PeirceSociety,34:199–220.ItfollowsthestandardprocedureofcitingreferencesfromTheCollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce,volumes1-6editedbyC.HartshorneandP.Weiss(1931-1935)andvolumes7and8editedbyA.W.Burks(1958)(Cambridge,Mass:BelknapPress).Soforexample,vol.7,para.597wouldbe7.597.2.ˆCrabtree,2015.3.ˆRoughly,fallibilismistheviewthatnoempiricalstatementisimmunefromrevision.4.ˆGurney,1887a,1887b;Myers,1887;Peirce,1887a,1887b.5.ˆJames,1887,p.24.6.ˆPeircehadanotoriouslypricklypersonalilty.HisdefinitivebiographyisBrent,1993.7.ˆ7.6128.ˆ7.597-7.6889.ˆ6.557-6.58710.ˆ6.548-6.55611.ˆ6.522-6.54712.ˆ6.494-6.521

13.ˆ7.3514.ˆ7.3515.ˆ1887b,p.18816.ˆ1887b,p.18917.ˆp.18918.ˆp.18719.ˆForaclassicchallengetothatview,seeDobbs,1967.20.ˆ1887b,p.18821.ˆ1887b,p.18222.ˆ1887/1986,p.2623.ˆ1.110-1.11524.ˆ1.11025.ˆ1.11326.ˆ1.11327.ˆBraude,1997;Grosso,2016.28.ˆ1.115,29.ˆ7.60130.ˆ7.60131.ˆ7.64432.ˆ7.64433.ˆ7.64934.ˆ7.65335.ˆ7.65336.ˆ7.64337.ˆ7.67538.ˆ7.67639.ˆ7.67940.ˆ7.68041.ˆ7.68042.ˆ7.68043.ˆ7.68144.ˆ7.68145.ˆ7.68146.ˆBraude,1997,2014a47.ˆ7.68748.ˆ7.68749.ˆ6.51450.ˆsee7.68551.ˆZöllner,1888/197652.ˆ6.57453.ˆ6.57454.ˆ6.57555.ˆ6.57556.ˆ6.57557.ˆ6.57558.ˆ6.57559.ˆ6.58760.ˆ1.26561.ˆ1.26562.ˆ1.26563.ˆ1.330-1.33164.ˆ1.33165.ˆ1.33166.ˆ5.4767.ˆ5.4768.ˆ6.51969.ˆ6.521

70.ˆ6.55071.ˆSee,e.g.,Braude,2003,2014b;Broad,1962;Gauld,1982;Sudduth,2014,2016.72.ˆ6.55373.ˆ6.55574.ˆ6.53575.ˆ6.53776.ˆ6.53677.ˆAbduction(sometimescalled‘retroduction’)istheformofinferencethatPeirceclaimsisresponsibleforanygenuinescientificgrowth.Thegeneralformofanabductiveinferenceisthis:

SurprisingfactCisobserved.

ButifhypothesisAweretrue,Cwouldbeamatterofcourse.

Therefore,thereisreasontosuspectAistrue.

Thisisnotadeductiveargument,sincetheconclusiondoesn’thavetobetrueifthepremisesare.Andit’snotaninductiveargumentbecause thehypothesisA isnotanobserved fact,and thepremisesof inductiveargumentsalwaysstateobservedfacts.Peircebelievedthatscientificexplanationalwaysbeginswithabduction,bygeneratinghypothesestoaccountforsurprisingfacts.Andit’stheonlyformofinferencethatgeneratesnewconceptsandkeepssciencegrowing.

78.ˆ6.53779.ˆ6.51480.ˆ6.51481.ˆ6.51482.ˆ6.51483.ˆ6.51484.ˆ6.51485.ˆ7.68586.ˆBrent,199387.ˆp.20588.ˆp.20589.ˆp.311

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