Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vasquez Jr

8/9/2019 Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vasquez Jr.

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%fter the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident" a $riminal $ase

was filed against %bad but which was subse-uently dismissed for failure to prosecute! So"

the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vas-ue#" r! and ;uisa SoVas-ue#" parents of the deceased Romeo So Vas-ue#" against ose 6en7amin %bad and

$astile: Industrial $orporation! In the same action" $ebu Doctor3s .ospital intervened to

collect unpaid balance for the medical e:pense given to Romeo So Vas-ue#!8)9

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and ;uisa Vas-ue# andordered ose 6en7amin %bad 1hereafter %6%D2 and petitioner $astile: Industrial

$orporation 1hereafter $%STI;BE2 to pay 7ointly and solidarily 1)2 Spouses Vas-ue#" the

amounts of 4(",,,!,, for burial e:penses 4A,",,,!,, as moral damages 4),",,,!,, asattorney3s fees and 4>>(">A'!,, for loss of earning capacity and 1'2 $ebu Doctor3s

.ospital" the sum of 4A,"*'>!(+ for unpaid medical and hospital bills at +G monthly

interest from '> uly )*(* until fully paid" plus the costs of litigation!8'9

$%STI;BE and %6%D separately appealed the decision!

In its decision8+9

of ') @ay )**>" the $ourt of %ppeals affirmed the ruling of the trialcourt holding %6%D and $%STI;BE liable but held that the liability of the latter is Honly

vicarious and not solidary with the former! It reduced the award of damages representingloss of earning capacity from 4>>(">A'!,, to 4')?")AJ!(, and the interest on the hospital

and medical bills" from +G per month to )'G per annum from A September )*(( until fully

paid!

5pon $%STI;BE3s motion for reconsideration" the $ourt of %ppeals modified its

decision by 1)2 reducing the award of moral damages from 4A,",,, to 4+,",,, in view of

the deceased3s contributory negligence 1b2 deleting the award of attorney3s fees for lac0 of

evidence and 1c2 reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to JG per annum fromA September )*(( until fully paid! 8?9

.ence" $%STI;BE filed the instant petition contending that the $ourt of %ppeals erred

in 1)2 applying to the case the fifth paragraph of %rticle ')(, of the $ivil $ode" instead ofthe fourth paragraph thereof 1'2 that as a managerial employee" %6%D was deemed to

have been always acting within the scope of his assigned tas0 even outside office hours

because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner and 1+2 ruling that petitioner hadthe burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned tas0!

ose 6en7amin %6%D merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds

fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased!

On the other hand" respondents Spouses Vas-ue# argue that their son3s death was

caused by the negligence of petitioner3s employee who was driving a vehicle issued bypetitioner and who was on his way home from overtime wor0 for petitioner and that

petitioner is thus liable for the resulting in7ury and subse-uent death of their son on thebasis of the fifth paragraph of %rticle ')(,! Bven if the fourth paragraph of %rticle ')(,

were applied" petitioner cannot escape liability therefor! They moreover argue that the

$ourt of %ppeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the award

made by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regardingdeceased3s wages and by 7urisprudence on life e:pectancy! @oreover" they point out that
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the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds& 1)2 lac0 of an

e:planation for serving the petition upon the $ourt of %ppeals by registered mail" as

re-uired under Section ))" Rule )+ of the Rules of $ivil 4rocedure and 1'2 lac0 of astatement of the dates of the e:piration of the original reglementary period and of the filing

of the motion for e:tension of time to file a petition for review!

For its part" respondent $ebu Doctor3s .ospital maintains that petitioner $%STI;BE isindeed vicariously liable for the in7uries and subse-uent death of Romeo Vas-ue# caused by

%6%D" who was on his way home from ta0ing snac0s after doing overtime wor0 for

petitioner! %lthough the incident occurred when %6%D was not wor0ing anymore Hthe

inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have been situated at such time andplace had he not been re-uired by petitioner to do overtime wor0! @oreover" since

petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by %6%D" it cannot" as the latter3s employer"

inveigle itself from the ambit of liability" and is thus estopped by the records of the case"which it failed to refute!

=e shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some

alleged procedural lapses in the petition!4rivate respondent3s contention of petitioner3s violation of Section )) of Rule )+ and

Section ? of Rule ?A of the )**> Rules of $ivil 4rocedure holds no water!

Section )) of Rule )+ provides&

SB$! ))! Priorities in modes of service and filing! =henever practicable" the

service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally! B:cept

with respect to papers emanating from the court" a resort to other modes must be

accompanied by a written e:planation why the service or filing was not done

personally! % violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not

filed!

The e:planation why service of a copy of the petition upon the $ourt of %ppeals was

done by registered mail is found on 4age '( of the petition! Thus" there has been

compliance with the afore-uoted provision!

%s regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section ? of Rule

?A" the same is unfounded! The material dates re-uired to be stated in the petition are the

following& 1)2 the date of receipt of the 7udgment or final order or resolution sub7ect of the

petition 1'2 the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration" if any and 1+2 thedate of receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion! $ontrary to private respondent3s

claim" the petition need not indicate the dates of the e:piration of the original reglementaryperiod and the filing of a motion for e:tension of time to file the petition! %t any rate" asidefrom the material dates re-uired under Section ? of Rule ?A" petitioner $%STI;BE also

stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for e:tension of time to file

the petition!

Now on the merits of the case!


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The negligence of %6%D is not an issue at this instance! 4etitioner $%STI;BE

presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the in7uries and

subse-uent death caused by %6%D!

4etitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of %rticle ')(, of the $ivil $ode should

only apply to instances where the employer is notengaged in business or industry! Since it

isengaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not coveredby said provision! Instead" the fourth paragraph should apply!

4etitioner3s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate! The phrase Heven

though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph

should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in anybusiness or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the

scope of his assigned tas0!8A9

% distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what isapplicable! 6oth provisions apply to employers& the fourth paragraph" to owners and

managers of an establishment or enterprise and the fifth paragraph" to employers in

general" whether or not engaged in any business or industry! The fourth paragraph coversnegligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the

occasion of their functions" while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of

employees acting within the scope of their assigned tas0! The latter is an e:pansion of the

former in both employer coverage and acts included! Negligent acts of employees" whetheror not the employer is engaged in a business or industry" are covered so long as they were

acting within the scope of their assigned tas0" even though committed neither in the service

of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions! For" admittedly" employeesoftentimes wear different hats! They perform functions which are beyond their office" title

or designation but which" nevertheless" are still within the call of duty!

This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged ina business or industry such as truc0 operators8J9and ban0s!8>9The $ourt of %ppeals cannot"therefore" be faulted in applying the said paragraph of %rticle ')(, of the $ivil $ode to this

case!

5nder the fifth paragraph of %rticle ')(," whether or not engaged in any business orindustry" an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his

assigned tas0s! 6ut it is necessary to establish the employeremployee relationship once

this is done" the plaintiff must show" to hold the employer liable" that the employee wasacting within the scope of his assigned tas0 when the tort complained of was committed! It

is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due

diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee! 8(9

It is undisputed that %6%D was a 4roduction @anager of petitioner $%STI;BE at thetime of the tort occurrence! %s to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned

tas0 is a -uestion of fact" which the court a quoand the $ourt of %ppeals resolved in the

affirmative!

=ellentrenched in our 7urisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the $ourt of

%ppeals are entitled to great respect" and even finality at times! This rule is" however"

sub7ect to e:ceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations" surmises" or
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con7ectures!8*9Such e:ception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this $ourt of

the finding of the $ourt of %ppeals that since %6%D was driving petitioner3s vehicle he

was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager!

6efore we pass upon the issue of whether %6%D was performing acts within the range

of his employment" we shall first ta0e up the other reason invo0ed by the $ourt of %ppeals

in holding petitioner $%STI;BE vicariously liable for %6%D3s negligence" i.e!" that thepetitioner did not present evidence that %6%D was not acting within the scope of his

assigned tas0s at the time of the motor vehicle mishap! $ontrary to the ruling of the $ourt

of %ppeals" it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same! It was enough for

petitioner $%STI;BE to deny that %6%D was acting within the scope of his dutiespetitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment! Ei incumbit probatio

qui dicit, non qui negat1.e who asserts" not he who denies" must prove2! The $ourt has

consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff" upon whom rests the burden ofproving his cause of action" fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his

claim" the defendant is under no obligation to prove his e:ception or defense!8),9

Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that%6%D was acting within the scope of his assigned tas0s!

%6%D" who was presented as a hostile witness" testified that at the time of the incident"

he was driving a companyissued vehicle" registered under the name of petitioner! .e was

then leaving the restaurant where he had some snac0s and had a chat with his friends afterhaving done overtime wor0 for the petitioner!

No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer

to the problem of whether at a given moment" an employee is engaged in his employer3sbusiness in the operation of a motor vehicle" so as to fi: liability upon the employer because

of the employee3s action or inaction but rather" the result varies with each state of facts!8))9

InFilamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court"8)'9this $ourt had theoccasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employee3s assigned tas0s includesHany act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the

account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the in7ury or damages!

The court a quoand the $ourt of %ppeals were one in holding that the driving by amanager of a companyissued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tas0s regardless

of the time and circumstances!

=e do not agree! The mere fact that %6%D was using a service vehicle at the time of

the in7urious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for thenegligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within

the course or scope of his employment!

The following are principles in %merican urisprudence on the employer3s liability forthe in7uries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer3s motor

vehicle&

I. O+er$-o% o Em+/o0er( oor e-c/e -% Go-%4 o or rom e$/
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It has been held that an employee who uses his employer3s vehicle in going from his

wor0 to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to wor0 from a meal is not ordinarily

acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some specialbusiness benefit to the employer! Bvidence that by using the employer3s vehicle to go to

and from meals" an employee is enabled to reduce his timeoff and so devote more time to

the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within thescope of his employment while so driving the vehicle!8)+9

II. O+er$-o% o Em+/o0er( e-c/e -% Go-%4 o or rom 5or

In the same vein" traveling to and from the place of wor0 is ordinarily a personal

problem or concern of the employee" and not a part of his services to his employer! .ence"

in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance ofthe services available at the place where he is needed" the employee is not acting within the

scope of his employment even though he uses his employer3s motor vehicle! 8)?9

The employer may" however" be liable where he derives some special benefit fromhaving the employee drive home in the employer3s vehicle as when the employer benefits

from having the employee at wor0 earlier and" presumably" spending more time at his actual

duties! =here the employee3s duties re-uire him to circulate in a general area with no fi:edplace or hours of wor0" or to go to and from his home to various outside places of wor0"

and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his wor0" the courts have fre-uently

applied what has been called the Hspecial errand or Hroving commission rule" under which

it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actuallyreaches home! .owever" even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of

his employment in going to or from wor0 in his employer3s vehicle" the employer is not

liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident" the employee has left the directroute to his wor0 or bac0 home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own!

III. Ue o Em+/o0er( e-c/e O7-&e Re47/$r 5or-%4 )o7r

%n employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter3s personal use

outside of regular wor0ing hours is generally not liable for the employee3s negligent

operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use" even where the employercontemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for

personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the

employer! Bven where the employee3s personal purpose in using the vehicle has beenaccomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally

0ept" it has been held that he has not resumed his employment" and the employer is not

liable for the employee3s negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip! 8)A9

The foregoing principles and 7urisprudence are applicable in our 7urisdiction albeit

based on the doctrine of respondeat superior" not on the principle of bonuspater familiasas

in ours! =hether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as
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in %merican law or 7urisprudence" or merely gives rise to the presumptionjuris tantumof

negligence on the part of the employer as in ours" it is indispensable that the employee was

acting in his employer3s business or within the scope of his assigned tas0! 8)J9

In the case at bar" it is undisputed that %6%D did some overtime wor0 at the

petitioner3s office" which was located in $abangcalan" @andaue $ity! Thereafter" he went

to 9% witness for the private respondents" a sidewal0

vendor" testified that Fuente Osme/a is a Hlively place even at dawn because A!8+94er Vas-ue#" $! r!"#." with De 4ano" N!" and Salas" 6! r!" ##." concurring! $ollo" ??A)!8?9$ollo" AJ!8A9 V %rturo @! Tolentino" $ivil $ode of the 4hilippines J)A 1)**'2!
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Documents

Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vasquez Jr