Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 81969 September 26, 1988JOCELYN RULONA-AL AWADHI,petitioner,vs.HON. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, District Judge of the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court and NABIL AL-AWADHI,respondents.Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.Talib Umpar for private respondent.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:A petition for review on certiorari was filed by Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi, assailing the order dated January 12, 1988 of the Sharia Judicial District Court of Marawi City which denied her motion to dismiss Special Proceedings No. 011-87, entitled "Nabil Al-Awadhi, Petitioner, vs. Jocelyn Rulonba, Respondent" for custody and guardianship of their minor children named Abdul Wahab Nabil, 5 years old, Adare Nabil, 3 years old, and Sabihab Al Abdullah Nabil, 6 months old.The petitioner and the private respondent were married in Kuwait on August 1, 1981. The petitioner is a Filipino nurse and a Roman Catholic. Her husband, the private respondent is a Kuwaiti student. The petitioner resides with her children in Sta. Cruz, Calape, Bohol, while the private respondent resides at 49-7 Pamaong Street, Tagbiliran City.On or about August 25, 1987, she filed an action for support and guardianship of her three (3) minor children (who are in her custody) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in Tagbilaran City (Civil Case No. 4170, entitled "Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi Petitioner, vs. Nabil Al-Awadhi Defendant"). Upon her motion, she was appointed the children's guardian by order of the court dated August 25, 1987 (Annex B, p. 20, Rollo). The defendant, her husband filed in the same court a motion to be allowed to exercise joint parental authority over their children (Annex C, p. 21, Rollo). However, without waiting for the action of the Tagbilaran Court, he filed on November 4, 1987 a petition for custody and guardianship of their minor children in the Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi City (Annex A, p. 10, Rollo). It was docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 011-87.After having been summoned, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the petition, nor over the parties, least of all, herself; (2) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (3) improper venue (Annex B, p. 45, Rollo).In its order dated November 20, 1987, the Sharia District Court denied her motion to dismiss (Annex C, p. 23, Rollo). Its order was based on Section 13 of the Special Rules of Procedure in the Sharia Courts which provides:Section 13.Pleadings and Motions Disallowed. The court shall not allow the filing of the following pleadings, petitions or motions, to wit:(a) Motion to dismiss or to quash;(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings or any other paper;(d) Motion to declare defendant in default;(e) Reply, third party complaints, or intervention;(f) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;(g) Petition for relief from judgment;(h) Motion for new trial or re-opening of trial; and(i) Any dilatory motion for postponement.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of that order (Annex D, p. 24, Rollo) was also denied by the court on January 12, 1988. Hence, this petition for review raising only the legal issue of jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the respondent Sharia District Court over the parties and the subject matter of the case. Only the Sharia District Judge filed a Comment on the petition; the private respondent did not.Article 13, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD 1083) provides:BOOK TWOTITLE IIChapter OneAPPLICABILITY CLAUSEArt. 13. Application (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim, and the marriage issolemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, theCivil Code of the Philippines shall apply.(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. (Emphasis supplied.)In view of the following admitted facts:(1) That the plaintiff husband in Spl. Proc. No. 011-87 is not a Philippine Muslim but aKuwaiti national;(2) That he resides at 49-7 Pamaong Extension, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, not in Marawi City where the Sharia court sits;(3) That the defendant wife (herein petitioner Jocelyn Rulona) is a Filipino citizen and a non- Muslim (a Roman Catholic Christian);(4) That their Muslim marriagewas not solemnized in anypart of the Philippines,for they were married in Kuwait (Annex A, par. 2, p. 40, Rollo); and(5) That they do not reside within the Fourth Sharia District, embracing the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the cities of Iligan and Marawi (Art. 138-d, P.D. No. 1083), for both of them reside in the province of Bohol; it should have been self-evident to the Fourth Sharia District Court that it had no jurisdiction over the spouses of their marriage, nor over the custody and guardianship of their children (Art. 143, P.D. No. 1083).The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, at Tagbilaran City which had assumed jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for support and guardianship of her children on August 25, 1987 (p. 19, Rollo), may not be divested of its jurisdiction over the parties (the husband having voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by filing a motion therein for joint custody of his children) by the Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi City by the husband's filing therein three (3) months later his own petition for custody and guardianship of his children (p.10, Rollo). The rule is that once a court has assumed jurisdiction of a case, its jurisdiction shall continue until the case is finished. It may not be ousted from its jurisdiction by a co-equal court (People vs. Layno, 111 SCRA 20; Denila vs. Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63; Lat vs. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425; and People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218).Moreover, Article 3 of the Muslim Code (P.D. No. 1083 expressly provides:Art. 3. Conflict of provisions ...(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a Non-Muslim.The application of the Muslim Code to the Christian wife will be prejudicial to her.The Code of Muslim Personal Laws was promulgated to fulfill "the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced intheir communities" (Exec. Order No. 442, Dec. 23, 1974). Those communities are found in the ten (10) Mindanao provinces and six (6) cities comprised within the five (5) Sharia judicial districts which were created under Article 138 of the Muslim Code. As neither the petitioner nor the private respondent and their children live in or are members of those communities, they do not come within the ambit of the Sharia courts' jurisdiction.Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54; Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 6; Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 856).WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. All the proceedings in special Proceeding No. 011-87 of the Fourth Sharia District Court at Marawi City are annulled and the petition therein is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.FIRST DIVISIONMOCARAL MACAWIAG,Petitioner,-versus-JUDGE RASAD BALINDONGand SORAIDA A. MACAWIAG,Respondents.G.R. No. 159210Present:PANGANIBAN,C.J., Chairperson,YNARES-SANTIAGOAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.Promulgated:September 20, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court for the nullification of the Decision[1]of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District,MarawiCityand its Order[2]denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.The assailed decision reversed the Decision[3]of the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Iligan City, declaring that the house and lot with an area of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City is not a part of thefixed dower given to Soraida Macawiag, herein private respondent, and directing her to pay attorneys fees in the amount ofP40,000.00.The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:Private respondent Soraida Macawiag and Pangampong Macawiag contracted marriage onMay 27, 1987, solemnized by Imam Macmod Ganzo.Private respondent claims that before the celebration of their marriage, the representatives of the bride and bridegroom agreed and the solemnizing officer announced, that the customary dower (mahr)[4]wasP20,000.00 in cash, one head of live carabao, and house and lot consisting of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-28, 147(a.f.).However, despite the oral and written declaration that the subject house and lot was amahr, Mocaral M. Macawiag, herein petitioner, and her children, refused to recognize it as such, without valid and lawful ground.Hence, onOctober 27, 1998, private respondent filed an action(dawa)[5]against Mocaral M. Macawiag and her children, for claim, declaration, change of name, and issuance of new duplicate certificate of title ofmahrwith damages and attorneys fees, before the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District,IliganCity. Private respondent prayed that:1.The said house and lot is Mahr property and absolutely owned by and both possession and name be transferred to the Moddai (plaintiff) and her children;2.The name appeared (sic) in the certificate of title of said house and lot be changed from Sarimanoc Macawiag to the Moddais name and her children;3.The Register of Deeds of Iligan City be ordered to issue duplicate certificate of title while still in the name of Sarimanoc Macawiag, and new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the new owner, the Moddai and her children;4.That the Moddaalai (defendant) shall be ordered to pay moral damages ofP5,000.00, exemplary damages ofP5,000.00, attorneys fee ofP20,000.00, plusP500.00 per appearances (sic) in the court in the total amount of at leastP30,500.00 and compensatory damages as maybe (sic) proved in the course of the trial plus cost;And such other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable on the premises.[6]Prior to the filing of thedawa, Pangampong Macawiag executed an affidavit of loss of the title covering the subject house and lot.The Register of Deeds of Iligan City thereafter issued a new duplicate certificate of title.In their Answer,[7]petitioner and her children admitted the fact of marriage between private respondent and Pangampong Macawiag.However, they denied that themahrconsists ofP20,000.00 cash, one head of live carabao and the house and lot subject matter of the present controversy.They alleged instead that the dowry in consideration of their marriage was cash in the amount ofP5,000.00.They, likewise, averred that the title to the house and lot had not been lost; rather, it was in the possession of Antonio Camama, having been used as collateral for a loan ofP500,000.00.Moreover, out of theP500,000.00 loan,P400,000.00 was given to Pangampong Macawiag which he used to buy a vehicle and merchandise and subject to the condition that the amortization would be paid. Since Pangampong Macawiag failed to pay, petitioner took possession of the vehicle.During the hearing before the Sharia Circuit Court, private respondent presented the following witnesses: Imam Mahmod Ganzo, who testified that before he solemnized the marriage, he asked the representatives of the parties if themahrhad been agreed upon, and the mother of the bride and the bridegroom said that per agreement, themahrconsists of theP20,000.00 cash, the head of a live carabao, and the subject house and lot;[8]Pangampong Macawiag, who confirmed the above testimony and further testified that his marriage to private respondent was duly registered with the Office of the Sharia Circuit Court Registrar which also specified the amount ofmahrunder Registry No. 98-137, and that his father Sarimanoc Macawiag specified in writing that the house and lot had been set aside as hismahr;[9]Diora Dimacaling, the mother of the private respondent who witnessed the celebration of the marriage between Pangampong Macawiag and private respondent, and corroborated the testimonies of the two witnesses;[10]and private respondent herself who likewise confirmed the testimonies of the first three witnesses.[11]When she testified, petitioner denied that it was announced during the celebration of the marriage that themahrincluded the subject house and lot, and that it was mortgaged to Antonio Camama who now possessed the title to the property.[12]Antonio Camama testified that the subject house and lot was mortgaged to him, subject to the condition that if Sarimanoc Macawiag and petitioner could not comply with the agreement, the mortgage would be considered as a sale.In view of the non-fulfillment of the agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Sarimanoc Macawiag in his (Antonios) favor.He stated that Pangampong Macawiag knew of such transaction, and that the transfer certificate of title covering the subject house and lot was in his possession.[13]Tocod Macawiag, Papiel Macawiag, Disimban Didato, and Tadmera Gandamato testified that there was no house and lot mentioned as part of the dowry.[14]OnApril 13, 2000, the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court rendered a decision[15]in favor of petitioner and her children.Thefalloof the decision reads:WHEREFORE, the house and lot with an area of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay,IliganCity, registered in the name of the deceased Sarimanok Macawiag under Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. T-28, 147 (a.f.) is not a part of the fixed dower (mahr musama) given to Soraida A. Macawiag, herein plaintiff, in connection with her marriage to Pangampong Macawiag.Plaintiff is hereby directed to pay defendantsP40,000.00 in attorneys fees and the cost of this proceedings.SO ORDERED.[16]In finding that the subject house and lot was not part of private respondentsmahr, the Circuit Court ruled that, in the first place, she never acted as owner of the house and lot allegedly given to her as dowry.Even if there was a fixed dowry, it never included the house and lot under litigation, which happens to be registered under the name of Sarimanoc Macawiag.Moreover, the Circuit Court observed that private respondents claim that the subject house and lot was part of her fixed dowry had not been annotated on the title to the property despite the lapse of considerable length of time.[17]Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the Sharia District Court, which, onMarch 14, 2003, reversed the decision of the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court.Thefalloreads:WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is REVERSED and another one entered:(1) DECLARING plaintiff Soraida Abbas Macawiag the exclusive owner of the house and lot, situated at Bo. Mahayahay,IliganCity, with an area of 300 square meters, more or less covered by TCT No. T-28,147 (a.f.) which is still in the name of the late Sarimanoc Macawiag, being her mahr;(2) ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff (1)P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[18]The Sharia District Court ruled that one of the essential requisites of a marriage contract is the stipulation of customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.It is both an inalienable and imprescriptible right which the wife can demand from her husband.It is inalienable in the sense that even if not expressly stated in the contract of marriage, is nevertheless due to the wife and is not lost through prescription.[19]It further held that the positive testimonies of the witnesses for private respondent should prevail over the negative testimonies of petitioner and her children. The court gave credence to the testimony of the Imam, belonging as he does to the group of the learned (theulama).Lastly, the district court found that even if the property was used as collateral for a loan by the late Sarimanoc Macawiag, private respondent can still recover the same since the transaction involving her property is null and void (insofar as the private respondent is concerned).[20]Petitioner now comes before this Court in this special civil action forcertiorari, on the sole ground of whetherJUDGE BALINDONG ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR EXCESS IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF WHEN HE REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE SHARIA CIRCUIT COURT AND DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[21]Petitioner insists that the ruling of the Court inPeople v. Bundang[22]is not applicable in this case, since as against the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the statements of the accused, the former ordinarily deserves more credence than the latter. In such case, mere preponderance of evidence will suffice.[23]Petitioner alleges that the Sharia Circuit Court already weighed the testimonial and documentary evidence, and found preponderance of evidence in favor of petitioner; as such, this ruling should have been respected and upheld by the Sharia District Court. Petitioner questions the credibility of the testimonies of Pangampong Macawiag and private respondent, as their testimonies are false.[24]Petitioner likewisequestions the authenticity of the Deed of Donation signed by Sarimanoc Macawiag involving the subject house and lot[25]and the two (2) sets of Certificates of Marriage and Municipal Forms (Nos. 97-31 and 98-131) registered with the Civil Registrar.Petitioner, likewise, questions the findings of the Sharia District Court on the credibility of Imam Ganzo.[26]In her Comment,[27]private respondent contends that the petition was filed out of time; it, likewise, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts since it should have been filed before the CA.[28]Moreover, private respondent points out that petitioner is not assailing the very jurisdiction of the Sharia District Court, but only its findings of facts; this is a ground for an appeal and not a petition forcertiorari.[29]Lastly, private respondent claims that petitioner is trying to mislead the Court by including in her petition annexes/documents which were not appreciated and passed upon by the Sharia Circuit Court.[30]Petitioner counters that the petition was timely filed because she received the order denying her motion for reconsideration onMay 29, 2003; thus, she had sixty (60) days therefrom or untilJuly 29, 2003.Before the period expired, she filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days or untilAugust 13, 2003within which to file the petition.Having filed the petition onAugust 12, 2003, it is within the requested period of extension, and thus filed on time.Petitioner, likewise, claims that the rule on hierarchy of courts was not violated, in view of the rule on finality of decision set forth in P.D. No. 1083.[31]As to the questioned documents presented before this Court, petitioner admits that they were not presented during the hearing before the Sharia Circuit Court.[32]The parties submitted their respective Memoranda where they reiterated their earlier arguments.The petition is dismissed.The decision sought to be reviewed was rendered by the Sharia District Court which is thus governed primarily by special laws.Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 6734, An Act Providing for the Organic Act For the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9054 or the New Organic Law for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, provides:The Sharia Appellate Court shall:x x x xb) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Sharia District Courts as established by law.[33]While the Supreme Courten bancauthorized the creation of the Sharia Appellate Court, it has not yet been organized; in any case, it should begin with the appointments of the Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Consequently, aggrieved parties can come up only to this Court in view of the rule set forth in Article 145 of Presidential Decree No. 1083,viz:Article 145.Finality of decisions. The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final.Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution is not altered.Specifically, this refers to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over petitions forcertiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,andhabeas corpus.[34]It likewise refers to the power of the Supreme Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal orcertiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue[35]and all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.[36]In fine, the decisions of the Sharia District Courts may reach the Supreme Court by way of special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if there is a question of jurisdiction, or petition for review oncertiorarias a mode of appeal under Rule 45.From the circumstances surrounding the present case, as well as the allegations set forth in the petition, the remedy available to petitioner is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 and not a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65.Indeed, when a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action forcertiorari.[37]The well-settled rule is thatcertiorariis not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being thatcertioraricannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action forcertiorari.These two remedies are mutually exclusive.[38]Consequently, when petitioner filed her petition in this Court, the decision of the Sharia District Court was already final and executory.In view of the foregoing, as much as we want to review the merits of the petition, we are constrained by the procedural lapse which this Court cannot ignore. When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the power to review a judgment that has acquired finality.Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.[39]Moreover, the complaint filed before the Sharia Circuit Court included as defendants the children of Mocaral Macawiag, who are the heirs of the late Sarimanoc Macawiag.On the other hand, the present petition was filed only by Mocaral Macawiag without the inclusion of the other parties.Considering that the other heirs of Sarimanoc are indispensable parties who had not been impleaded below, the Court is further prevented from previewing the merits of the case.Admittedly, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, this Court has the discretion to treat a petition forcertiorarias having been filed under Rule 45,[40]but not when the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor.[41]The Court ruled inSebastian v. Morales[42]that:Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.[43]The fact that petitioner used the Rule 65 modality as a substitute for a lost appeal is made plain by the following:First.While the petition was filed within the 60-day period for filing a petition forcertiorari,it was nevertheless filed beyond the 15-day period for filing a petition for review.As earlier stated, petitioner received the order denying her motion for reconsideration onMay 29, 2003.She thus had untilJune 13, 2003within which to file the petition, but instead of doing so, filed onJuly 24, 2003, a motion for extension of time[44]to file petition forcertiorari.The Court granted the motion in a Resolution datedSeptember 1, 2003.Thus, onAugust 12, 2003, which is within the extension period, petitioner filed the instant petition.Second. The petition makes specious allegations of grave abuse of discretion but questions the credibility of witnesses and the authenticity of documents that were either presented during the trial of the case before the Sharia Circuit Court or submitted for the first time before this Court.In short, petitioner seeks the review of the factual findings of the courts below.Admittedly, the Court has, in previous cases, reviewed the factual findings ofthe Sharia District Court.[45]However, the petitioners in these cases came before this Court via petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45, not an original action forcertiorarias in the present case.In a petition forcertiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope.It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; an error of jurisdiction is one where the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.[46]Indeed, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof.[47]An examination of these issues would require the elevation of the records below, which cannot be done in the present case.IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is herebyDISMISSED.SO ORDERED.ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief JusticeChairpersonCONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOMA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaSECOND DIVISIONATTY. MARIETTA D.ZAMORANOS,Petitioner,- versus -PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINESandSAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,Respondents.x--------------------------------------------------xATTY. MARIETTA D.ZAMORANOS,Petitioner,- versus -SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,Respondent.x--------------------------------------------------xSAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,Petitioner,- versus -ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,Respondent.G.R. No. 193902G.R. No. 193908G.R. No. 194075Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:June 1, 2011

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition forcertiorarifiled by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos)in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,Quezon City.A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce bytalaq.The dissolution of their marriage was confirmedbytheShariaCircuitDistrictCourt,1stCircuit,3rdDistrict, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows:DECREE OF DIVORCEThis is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of thePhilippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the marriage betweenMarietta(Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.Issued this 18thday of June, 1992, at Isabela,Basilan Province,Philippines.(signed)HON. KAUDRI L. JAINULPresiding Judge[3]Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC,IliganCity. However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two werede factoseparated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit:1.Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and voidab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.2.Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.3.Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the administrative case was still pending resolution.Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.[4]Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, findingprima facieevidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.[5]Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6]Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.[7]Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005.[8]Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.[10]Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1)for Reconsideration; (2)to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3)to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice.[11]Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17, 2006.[12]Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise denied.On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of thePhilippines:From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce byTalaqwas entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083.Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce byTalaqdissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x.Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:ApplicationThe provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:x x x x2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:a)Marriage;b)Divorce recognized under this Code;x x x xThe above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before theShari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment.In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted.The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.SO ORDERED.[13]On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[14]In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15]Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.[16]On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.[17]Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition forcertiorarifor the nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity. As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition forcertiorarito assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:A petition forcertiorarialleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim ofcertiorariis to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition forcertiorarimust clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.Simply put, in a petition forcertiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.x x x xIn the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6,IliganCitys] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assumingarguendothat the denial of petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.[18]Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos petition forcertiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:1.Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites;2.Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;3.Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce bytalaqto De Guzman severed their marriage ties;4.Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.5.Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and6.On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.

We impale the foregoing issues into the following:1.Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition forcertiorari; and2.Whether the RTCs, Branch 2,IliganCityand the CAs separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.As a rule,certiorarilies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[19]The writ ofcertiorariserves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.[20]The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.[21]Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action forcertiorariand prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of amotion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith tocertiorarior prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[22]However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations,certiorariis considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;[23](d) to promote public welfare and public policy;[24]and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.[25]The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash.First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, declared that it was the Sharia Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle ofres judicata. The provision reads:SEC. 47.Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of thePhilippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:(a)In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person,or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,the judgment or final order is conclusiveupon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition,status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only beprima facieevidence of the death of the testator or intestate.The requisites forres judicataor bar by prior judgment are:(1)The former judgment or order must be final;(2)It must be a judgment on the merits;(3)It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and(4)There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[26]The second and fourth elements ofres judicataare not present in this case. Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:1.Affidavit of Confirmation[27]executed by theUstadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:1.I am anUstadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;2.On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman andMarietta(Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;3.Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the subsequentTalaqby the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court;4.Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;5.In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;6.This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact; and7.This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve.2.Certification[28]issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.3.Affidavit[29]executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part:1.I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City ofPagadian;2.The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;3.The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the oldCapitolBuilding, in the City ofIsabela,Basilan,Philippines;4.As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;5.In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that gutted down the oldCapitolBuildingin the City ofIsabela;6.This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, is correct when it declared that:The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created theShariaDistrict Courts andShariaCircuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.[30]Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, and the CA.The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, should havesuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of

Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce bytalaqentered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition forcertioraribefore the CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.In a pluralist society such as that which exists in thePhilippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies.Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:TITLE II.CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMSArticle 3.Conflict of provisions.(1)In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall prevail.(2)Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.(3)The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of thePhilippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon:The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31]On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCEChapter OneAPPLICABILITY CLAUSEArticle 13.Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of thePhilippines.(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of thePhilippinesshall apply.x x x x

Chapter TwoMARRIAGE (NIKAH)Section 1.Requisites of Marriage.x x x xSection 3.Subsequent Marriagesx x x xArticle 29.By divorcee.(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.x x x xChapter ThreeDIVORCE (TALAQ)Section 1.Nature and FormArticle 45.Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);x x x xArticle 46.Divorce by talaq.(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed idda.(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).x x x xArticle 54.Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this Code;(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated.For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of thePhilippines:If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of thePhilippineswill govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocabletalaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,entitling one to remarry.[33]It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by anUstadzand Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 isGRANTED.The petition in G.R. No. 194075 isDENIED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy isGRANTED.SO ORDERED.ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairpersonDIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate JusticeROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

JOSE CATRALMENDOZAAssociate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Second DivisionC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.RENATO C. CORONAChief JusticeRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN,Petitioners,vs.SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO,C.J.:This Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061and September 21, 2006.2On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.4On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.5On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court.6The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.9Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.13On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners opposition.14Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said motion.15The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence.18In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:I.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.II.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.III.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.IV.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."V.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.In their Comment to the Petition forCertiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased MuslimsPetitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:x x x x(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.21The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "afalsa descriptioor defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings."22Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.24These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25or a motion to dismiss.26Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires ana prioridetermination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.Special ProceedingsThe underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the courta quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the courta quoare for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.32Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action33applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"34necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"36has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37pay its liabilities,38and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39Docket FeesPetitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the proceeding before the courta quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.41In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42As "every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.43However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.Exception to Notice of HearingPetitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.45The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof."46However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."47Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."48In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.49The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.50The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.52In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."53In the case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.Prescription and FiliationPetitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.54The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.SO ORDERED.REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeRENATO C. CORONAAssociate JusticeADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA,petitioners,vs.HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:pQuestions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding are herein raised.Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left various properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly said and that the properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having had a conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be issued Letters of Administration instead.In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she was legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix was maintained.On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for impro