Case digest article 7.pdf

7/27/2019 Case digest article 7.pdf

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PONTEJOS VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 483 SCRA 83

Facts:

Sometime in 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed an Affidavit/Complaint before theOmbudsman against Emmanuel T.

Pontejos (arbiter), Wilfredo I. Imperial (regionaldirector) and Carmencita R. Atos (legal staff), all of them officials of the

Housing andLand Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).Several documents were adduced during the preliminary investigation

findingprobable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of estafa, direct bribery and illegalpractice of profession in

violation of RA 6713. Consequently, criminal cases for estafaand bribery against Pontejos were filed before the RTC of

Quezon City. Prior to that,Atos was extended immunity as a state witness by the Ombudsman Aniano A.Desierto.

Pontejos motioned for reinvestigation to be conducted by the CityProsecutor without remanding the case to the

Ombudsman. The Assistant CityProsecutor, after conducting reinvestigation, recommended amending the

Informationfor estafa to include Atos as accused reasoning that the power to grant immunitypertains solely to the

courts not to the prosecution which can only recommend. TheOverall Deputy Ombudsman disapproved the prosecutors

report in May 21, 2002Review and Recommendation. The March 14, 2003 Order denied reconsideration. Thus, the

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed byPontejos.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion of the Ombudsmanamounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction

when it granted immunity to Atos tobecome a state witness.

Held:

The court held in the negative. The power to choose who to discharge as statewitness is an executive function. It is the

prosecution that could essentially determinethe strength of pursuing the case against an accused. The prosecutorial

powersinclude the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimonyagainst another. Essentially,

it is not a judicial prerogative. The fact that an individualhad not been previously charged or included in an information

does not prevent theprosecution from utilizing said person as a witness

Note:

Can the Ombudsman grant immunity from prosecution?

Yes, any person whose testimony or production of documents or other evidence is necessary to determine the truth in

any inquiry, hearing, or proceeding being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman or under its authority in the

performance or furthermore of its Constitutional functions and statutory objectives, including preliminary investigation,

may be granted immunity from criminal prosecution by the Ombudsman, upon such terms and conditions as the

Ombudsman may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

How is the immunity from prosecution granted by the Ombudsman?

The immunity from prosecution may be granted upon application of the concerned party, the investigating, and hearing,

or prosecuting officer, or at the instance of the Ombudsman. However, in all cases, the concerned party shall execute an

affidavit reciting the substance of his proposed testimony and/or nature of the evidence in his possession.

How is the immunity from prosecution granted by the Ombudsman?

The immunity from prosecution may be granted upon application of the concerned party, the investigating, and hearing,

or prosecuting officer, or at the instance of the Ombudsman. However, in all cases, the concerned party shall execute an

affidavit reciting the substance of his proposed testimony and/or nature of the evidence in his possession.


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BIRAOGO vs PTC

SC: Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Void

At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth

Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of

graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and

accessories during the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and thereafter to submit its finding and

recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after the issuance of EO No. 1, two

cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity and constitutionality of the said EO.

The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and

taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1,

Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to

appropriate funds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because there is no provision in the

Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.

The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B.

Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House

of Representatives. Petitioners-Legislators argue that the said Order is unconstitutional because the creation of a public

office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding bodysuch as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the

President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. According to the

OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-

finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its

administrative functions.

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize

the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by

virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. The OSG

concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.

1. Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised

Administrative Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates

reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of

the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from

one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or

vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice


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versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of

economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a

modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less

envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

2. May the President legally create the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)? Is there a valid delegation of power from

Congress empowering the President to create a public office?

Yes.The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the

President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that

the laws be faithfully executed.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the

powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powersof the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This

flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of

a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds

already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to

appropriate funds. fellester.blogspot.com Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the

operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided

for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that

would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the

funding.

3. According to petitioners, E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the

Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman

created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987. Is

this correct?

No. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-

judicial agency or office. Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ

or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two

offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall

task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.

The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is

certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section

2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of

determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ

and the Ombudsman.


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4. Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and

prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it

excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Are the petitioners correct?

Yes! Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court

finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the

equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The

classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing

conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a

valid classification.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection

clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the

reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous

administration is plain, patent and manifest.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of

past administrations. fellester.blogspot.com It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly

situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation

clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations,

these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous

administration only. (Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303,

December 7, 2010)

Senate vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006

Requisites of Judicial Review

Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege

Executive Privilege, defined

Kinds of Executive Privilege

Executive Privilege as applied to an official

Constitutionality of EO 464

FACTS:


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This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery

and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to

appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President

Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and

opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its

investigation. Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that all heads

of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing

before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the

executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent.

Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the

investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern

Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its

publication in a newspaper of general circulation

RULING:

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise

stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct

injury as a result of its enforcement;

the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest opportunity; and

the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.


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LEGAL STANDING

Standing of the Senate

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a

democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the

ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its

individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to

assail the constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and

privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action

which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Standing of an ordinary citizen

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,

presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be direct and personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives,

this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen

satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets

involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the

public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and

specific interest in raising the questions being raised.

ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY

The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of

the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is

concerned. For EO 464 does not require either a deliberative withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing

from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of

petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present

case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing

on the constitutionality of EO 464.

The power of inquiry


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Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which

exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege.

Executive privilege, defined

Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the

courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as the right of the President and high-level executive branch

officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.

Kinds of executive privilege

One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the information is of such nature that its

disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the

privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to

officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to

attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising

part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered

privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not

only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege

should be honored in a given procedural setting.

The principle of executive privilege

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain

types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may

be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is

any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being

executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily

against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

xxx


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When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by

a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive

official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach

of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive

branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing

custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency,

judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of

powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of

legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour

contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question

hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is

discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is

not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim

of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons.

Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information

and not to categories of persons.

The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereof

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not

suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the


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President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested

information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem

like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of

why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly

asserted xxx

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it

falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be

respected xxx

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity

as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the

requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination xxx

The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely

implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an

announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine

whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the

power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated.

EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain information as privileged

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information

is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the

official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing

the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere

silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege. Executive privilege...is

recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role

and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the

discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact


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that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The

privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the

necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to

invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which

case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally

consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the

executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.

How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official

xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by

executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the

possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary

with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of

that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer

bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal

means to compel his appearance.

Neri vs. Senate

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess.

However, when probed further on what he and the President discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,

invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it

Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on

November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense

with Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said that the information sought to be

disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China. Neri did not appear before the

Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention until

such time that he would appear and give his testimony.


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Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive Privilege. xxx we are convinced that the

communications elicited by the questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the

communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an

executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without

the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the

communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner

can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate

showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of theinformation elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the Right of the people to information on matters

of public concern. Is the senate correct?

ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a

highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the

peoples right to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear

distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people

to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant

to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.

Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These

powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking E.O. 464. Is there a recognized

claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?

ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is

because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by

order of the President. Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of

the President?


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ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as

the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of

executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring

to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.

May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with particularity?

ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as

to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a

coordinate and co-equal department. (Senate v. Ermita)

Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?

ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from

constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita

that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with

the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find

merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,

requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees

issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not

first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his

explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate

arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)

AKBAYAN vs. Aquino

G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

JPEPA

Diplomatic Negotiations are Privileged

Executive Privilege, an Exception to Congress' Power of Inquiry

Treaty-making Power

Executive Privilege vs. People's Right to Information

FACTS:

This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in

goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc.


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Prior to Presidents signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons,

citizens and taxpayers sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of

the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent

attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into

the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is

completed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing

Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged

Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in

treaties, from the negotiation process

RULING:

Standing

In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right

by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficientto show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present

petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of

citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as

such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.

JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a

matter of public concern xxx

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers

submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not

dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus

constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.


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Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations

on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on inter-government exchanges prior to

the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national

interest.

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept

perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the

offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is

reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic

confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not

only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future

Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears

wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any

negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to

grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national

interest.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting

no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,

recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only

after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls

for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security?

While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving

military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the

Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers

charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national

security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the

most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly

prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.


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Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without

distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the

privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure

by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise

Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.

In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon,

so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security.

It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant

qualification being that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general

confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions

into possible criminal wrongdoing. This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a

judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

Closely related to the presidential communications privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the

United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers

documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which

governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the

need to protect national security but, on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among

themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to

enhance the quality of agency decisions.

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential

communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic

negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical.

The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage

a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view.Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same

means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as the sole organ of

the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. And, as with the deliberative

process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the

information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public

interest, must be presumed confidential.


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Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character

of the deliberative process.

Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?

In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose definite propositions of

the government, such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic

secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

Treaty-making power of the President

xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever

power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of

Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No.

1464.

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international

agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII the article on the

Executive Department.

xxx

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President

only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly andexclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for

the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations

provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not

be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty

negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of

Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant

provisions of the Constitution.


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It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the

field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the

validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is

not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making

power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of

Representatives fail to present a sufficient showing of need that the information sought is critical to the performance

of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Did the respondents alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?

That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean

that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioners position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege

should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have

waived it.

xxx (but) Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be

construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee and

petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself

refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de

Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.

The privilege is an exemption to Congress power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such

power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents failure to invoke the privilege during

the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof.

Showing of Need Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a sufficient showing of need only means, in

substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of

privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not

new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.


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xxx However, when the Executive has as in this case invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the

subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely

asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required?

Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation

on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a

matter of public concern.

Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege

xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific

showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public

concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is

indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that

information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably

participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

Prof. Randolf S. David, et al., Vs. Gloria Macapagal-Aroyo et al.,

G.R. No. 171396

Facts : On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo

issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, she cited that over the past three months, element in the

political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the

extreme, right, represented by military adventurist the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are

now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly

constituted Government elected in May 2004, On the same day, The President issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

By the virtue of power vested upon the President by the Constitution and Commander in chief of the Republic of the

Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, the president call upon the Armed Forces

of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in

the country.

The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary

celebration of edsa people power 1; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.

Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purpose of

destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrest and take-

over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public protest would not be allowed, members of Kilusang Mayo Uno

and National Federation of Labor Unions, marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging


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at the EDSA shrine. Those who where already near EDSA were violently dispersed by huge cluster of anti-riot police. The

same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and the corner of Santolan

street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot police broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue

and Paseo de Roxas street in Makaty City.

During the dispersal of the rallyist along EDSA, police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a Proffesor of

the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president

of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group

of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune Offices in Manila. The raiding team

confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.

A few minutes later after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune. The police surrounded the premises of another

pro-opposition paper, Malaya and its sister publication, tabloid Abante.

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis party and

Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno, while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest

gated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed form a case of inciting to rebellion filed during

the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit beltran,

they were told they could not be admitted because PP 1017 and G.O. No.5. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampoeluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. Retired Major

General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, were arrested while with his wife and golfmates at

the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite. Attempts were made to arrest Bayan Muna Represenatative

Satur Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Anakpawis Representative Rafael Mariano, Gabriela Representative Liza Maza, Bayan

Muna Representative Jose Virador was arrested at a PAL ticket Office in Davao City, Later, he was turned to the custody

of the House of Representative where the Batasan % decided to stay indefinitely.

March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had

been filed, the president lifted PP 1017, and issued Proclamation No. 1021.

Issue: Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutional, Whether the provision of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to

enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, and provision declaring

national emergency under section 17, article VII of the Constitution is Constitutional. Whether G.O. No. 5 is

Constitutional Whether the dispersal and warrantless arrest, the warrantless search are Constitutional.


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Held: PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitute a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress Lawless

violence. The proclamation is sustained by section 18, article VII of the constitution. However, PP 1017s extraneous

provisions giving the President express or implied power to issue decrees to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws

even those not related to lawless violence as decrees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media

or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under section

17, article XII of the constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned publicutility and private business affected with public interest.

In the same element, the court finds G.O. No. 5 valid It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander in Chief

addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides valid standard that

the military and the police should take necessary and appropriate actions and measure to suppress and prevent acts of

lawless violence. But the word acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been denounced generally in media, no law

has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in

carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear trhat the warrantless arrest of

petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal of rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-

KMU members; the imposition of standard on media or any prior restraint on the press; and the warrantless search of

the tribune offices and whimsical seizure of some article for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the

Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Wherefore, The Petitions are partly granted. The court rules that PP 1017 is Constitutional insofar as it constitute a call

by the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions

of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the

President, are declared unconstitutional. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under

section 17, article VII of the Constitution is constitutional, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take

over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is Constitutional since it provides a standard which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, whatever

is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that

acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declaredUnconstitutional.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronal Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of KMU and NAFLU-

KMU members during their rallies, in absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless

violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint

on press, as well as the warrantless search of the tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and

other materials, are declared Unconstitutional.


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The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, as noted in the brackets above.

1. Calling-out power

The validity of this power is already settled in Sanlakas. However, there is a distinction between the Presidentsauthority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. In

declaring a state of national emergency under PP 1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of

the Constitution. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over

privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an

awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written,

as in Sanlakas.

2. Take Care Power

PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my

direction. The first part is valid. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the

President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. This is based on Section

17, Article VII which reads:

SEC.17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the

laws be faithfully executed.

However, the President cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos under PP

1081 (declaring martial law). Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes.

PP 1017 is, therefore, unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.

3. Power to Take Over

PP 1017 authorizes the President to call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, but

also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII:

Sec.17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and

under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned publicutility or business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? According to

the Supreme Court, the answer is simple - during the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to

grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any

privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

However, Section 17 must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. When Section 17 speaks of the

State, it refers to Congress, not the President. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately


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owned public utility or business affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress in accordance with

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, the requirements of which are:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency

and to exercise emergency powers. The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency. However,

without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the takeover of privately-owned public

utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances haveceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with

public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of

the SBeltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory

herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit

because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot

be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts

jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the

president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

BELTRAN VS MAKASIAR

SSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of

Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of

the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the

holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal

case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from

proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded

the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of

whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be

assumed and imposed by any other person.tate under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act

passed by Congress.


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SOLIVEN V MAKASIAR

PER CURIAM; November 14, 1988

NATURE

- Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of Manila RTC

FACTS

- This case consists of three consolidated petitions (Soliven v Makasiar, Beltra v Makasiar and Beltran v

ExecutiveSecretary).- The President asked for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of

the editorialboard, the business manager and the managing editor for libel.

Petitioners Claims

- With regard to the third issue, the Presidents immunity from suit results to an automatic correlation that he is also

not allowed from filing suits- If criminal suits were allowed, the President may subsequently become a prosecution

witness.- This would, in an indirect way, defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,

shewould be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUES

1. WON petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the findingof

the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by

thePresident2. WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for

his arrestwithout personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause3. WONthe President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against thepetitioners through

the filing of a complaint-affidavit

HELD

1.

Ratio

Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavitsbefore the

preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given theOpportunity to

submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Reasoning -

Instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed", in effect waiving hisright

to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.-The first issue was rendered moot and academic because of events

that unfolded.- March 30, 1988

DOJ secretary denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners and upheld the resolutionof the DOJ

undersecretary which sustained the findings of the city fiscal of a prima facie case against the petitioners.- April 7, 1988


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a second motion for reconsideration was denied by the DOJ secretary- On appeal the President (through the Executive

Secretary) affirmed the resolution of the DOJ secretary- The argument of the petitioners that they have not been

granted the administrative remedies available does nothold water.-

With regard to Beltrans arguments that he was denied due process of law in the preliminary investigation:

2.

Ratio

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge tosatisfy himself of

the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for theissuance of a warrant of

arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Reasoning

- It is not accurate to say that the judge should personally examine the complainant and the witnesses in

determiningprobable cause.- Procedure to be followed by the judge (based on established doctrine and procedure):

1. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of

probable cause and, on based on these documents, issue a warrant of arrest2. if he finds no basis for probable cause, he

may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at

a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause- The Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular # 12 which

established the guidelines for the issuance of awarrant of arrest.- In this case, there is no showing that the respondent

judge has deviated from the established procedure.The second issue calls for an evaluation of Sec. 2 of Art. 3 (on the

right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures).

The said provision states that the judge

should personally determine the probable cause before a search warrant can be issued.

3. The privilege of immunity from suit granted to the President may be waived should the Chief Executive choose

tosubmit him/herself to the jurisdiction of the Court since no Constitutional provision bars her from doing so.-

In the issue regarding the chilling effect this suit would have on freedom of speech, the Court has decided to defer

judgment on that

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001


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FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend the President, alleged that he had personally

given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based

numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of

Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-

tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court wasformed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by

students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as

lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for

Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he

will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove

him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with

congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively

resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd

at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of

her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.

Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.


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A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with

a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any

further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment

confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to

discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the

President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a

president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in

their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or

executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular

measure.

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the

Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973

Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government

exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The

question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court

held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by

acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the

palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation

On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president

despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court

held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and

circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer

entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life

to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive

immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the

framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which

the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of

right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another)


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Documents

Case digest article 7.pdf