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click here for freelancing tutoring sitesArticle VI

Section 21 Legislative Investigation51. SENATE VS. ERMITA - April 20, 2006Facts: The Committee of the Senate issued invitations tovarious officials of the Executive Department and AFPofficials for them to appear as resource speakers in apublic hearing on the railway project of the North LuzonRailways Corporation with the China National Machineryand Equipment Group (North Rail Project). The publichearing was sparked by a privilege speech of SenatorJuan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate thealleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of thecontract covering the North Rail Project.

Subsequently, the President issued E.O. 464.Section 1 provides: Appearance by Heads of DepartmentsBefore Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutionalprovisions on the separation of powers between co-equalbranches of the government, all heads of departments ofthe Executive Branch of the government shall secure theconsent of the President prior to appearing before eitherHouse of Congress.Section 3 further provides: Appearance of OtherPublic Officials Before Congress. – All public officialsenumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure priorconsent of the President prior to appearing before eitherHouse of Congress to ensure the observance of theprinciple of separation of powers, adherence to the rule onexecutive privilege and respect for the rights of publicofficials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.Then, 3 petitions were filed questioning theconstitutionality of EO 464 which allowed executivedepartment heads to invoke executive privilege.Issue: W/N EO 464 is constitutional.Held: CONSTITUTIONAL FOR SECTION 1 AND 2(a).The power of inquiry of Congress is expressly recognizedin Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Anexemption to such Congressional power falls under therubric of executive privilege, which is also a constitutionalconcept. Executive privilege, however, is recognized onlyin relation to certain types of information of a sensitivecharacter. The validity of a claim thereof depends on theground invoked to justify it and the context in which it ismade. Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty todisclose information by the mere fact of being executiveofficials.Validity of Section 1The requirement then to secure presidential consent underSection 1, limited as it is only to appearances in thequestion hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance ofdepartment heads in the question hour is discretionary ontheir part.Section 1 cannot, however, be applied toappearances of department heads in inquiries in aid oflegislation. Congress is not bound in such instances torespect the refusal of the department head to appear insuch inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege issubsequently made, either by the President herself or bythe Executive Secretary.Validity of Section 2(a)Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding only onthe heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what iscovered by executive privilege. It does not purport to beconclusive on the other branches of government. It maythus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by thePresident regarding the nature and scope of executiveprivilege.Unconstitutionality of Section 2(b) and 3Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officialsenumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of thePresident prior to appearing before either house ofCongress.Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justifyhis failure to be present, such invocation must beconstrued as a declaration to Congress that the President,or a head of office authorized by the President, hasdetermined that the requested information is privileged,and that the President has not reversed suchdetermination. There is an implied claim of privilege, whichimplied claim is not accompanied by any specificallegation of the basis thereof.

Certainly, Congress has the right to know whythe executive considers the requested informationprivileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that thePresident, or an authorized head of office, has determinedthat it is so, and that the President has not overturned thatdetermination. Such declaration leaves Congress in thedark on how the requested information could be classifiedas privileged. That the message is couched in terms that,on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilegeonly makes it more pernicious. It threatens to makeCongress doubly blind to the question of why theexecutive branch is not providing it with the informationthat it has requested.The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O.464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It isnot asserted. It is merely implied. It does not provide forprecise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprivesthe Congress to determine whether the withholding ofinformation is justified under the circumstances of eachcase.Congress undoubtedly has a right to informationfrom the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid oflegislation. If the executive branch withholds suchinformation on the ground that it is privileged, it must soassert it and state the reason therefore and why it must berespected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allowthe executive branch to evade congressional requests forinformation without need of clearly asserting a right to doso and/or proffering its reasons therefore. By the mereexpedient of invoking said provisions, the power ofCongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation isfrustrated. That is impermissible.Resort to any means then by which officials ofthe executive branch could refuse to divulge informationcannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not havemerely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire intothe operations of government, but we shall have given upsomething of much greater value – our right as a peopleto take part in government.59. NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ONACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ANDINVESTIGATIONS (March 25, 2008)- This case is an offshoot of the ZTE scandal, whereinvarious resolutions were introduced in Senate toinvestigate the said matter.- Respondent Committees initiated the investigation bysending invitations to certain personalities and cabinetFacts:1. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appearedbefore respondent committees and testifiedconcerning the NBN project, a project awardedby the DOTC to ZTE.2. Petitioner disclosed that Comelec chair Abalosoffered him P200M in exchange for his approvalof the NBN project. He informed GMA of thebribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.3. However, when probed further on GMA and petitioner’s discussions, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.a. Specifically, petitioner refused to answer questions on:i. w/n GMA followed up the NBN projectii. w/n she directed him to prioritize itiii. w/n she directed him to approve it4. Respondent committees persisted in knowing theanswers and required him to testify on it again onNovember 20. On November 15, ExeSecErmitawrote to respondent committees and requestedthem to dispense with petitioner’s testimony onthe ground of executive privilege.

5. Petitioner did not appear on November 20 uponorders of GMA. He said that the reason was hethought the only remaining questions were thosehe claimed to be covered by the executiveprivilege.6. Respondent committees found petitioner’sexplanations unsatisfactory. Hence, he was citedin contempt and ordering his arrest anddetention.7. Petitioner filed his supplemental petition forcertiorari and the court granted it. (see held ofmarch 2008 decision)a. It was part of presidentialcommunications privilegeb. Respondent Committees committedgrave abuse of discretion in issuingcontempt orderIssue: w/n there is a recognized presumptive presidentialcommunications privilege in our legal systemHeld: Yes1. The presidential communications privilege isfundamental to the operation of the governmentand inextricably rooted in the separation ofpowers under the Constitution2. The court added that in previous jurisprudence(e.g. Senate v. Ermita) that there are certaintypes of information which the government maywithhold from the public, that there us agovernmental privilege against public disclosurewith respect to state secrets regarding military,diplomatic and other national security matter andthat the right to information does not extend tomatters recognized as privileged informationunder the separation of powers, by which thecourt meant presidential conversations,correspondences, and discussions in closed-doorcabinet meetings.3. Senate vs. Ermitaa. From the above discussion on themeaning and scope of executiveprivilege, both in the United States andin this jurisprudence, a clear principleemerges. Executive privilege, whetherasserted against Congress, the courts,or the public, is recognized only inrelation to certain types of information ofa sensitive character. While executiveprivilege is a constitutional concept, aclaim thereof may be valid or notdepending on the ground invoked tojustify it and the context in which it ismade. Noticeably absent is anyrecognition that executive officials areexempt from the duty to discloseinformation by the mere fact of beingexecutive officials. Indeed, theextraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that thepresumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor ofdisclosure. (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)b. Obviously, the last sentence of theabove-quoted paragraph in Senate v.Ermita refers to the "exemption" beingclaimed by the executive officialsmentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No.464, solely by virtue of their positions inthe Executive Branch. This means thatwhen an executive official, who is one ofthose mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) ofE.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from

disclosure, there can be nopresumption of authorization toinvoke executive privilege given bythe President to said executive official,such that the presumption in thissituation inclines heavily againstexecutive secrecy and in favor ofdisclosure.4. Thus, if what is involved is the presumptiveprivilege of presidential communications wheninvoked by the President on a matter clearlywithin the domain of the Executive, the saidpresumption dictates that the same berecognized and be given preference or priority, inthe absence of proof of a compelling or criticalneed for disclosure by the one assailing suchpresumption. Any construction to the contrary willrender meaningless the presumption accorded bysettled jurisprudence in favor of executiveprivilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermitareiteratesjurisprudence citing "the considerations justifyinga presumptive privilege for Presidentialcommunications."Issue: w/n there is factual or legal basis to hold that thecommunications elicited by the three questions arecovered by executive privilegeHeld:A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a"quintessential and non-delegable presidentialpower."First, respondent Committees contend that thepower to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power,"because the Constitution does not vest it in the Presidentalone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required togive its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.This argument is unpersuasive.The fact that a power is subject to theconcurrence of another entity does not make such powerless executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the mostperfect embodiment of something, the concentratedessence of substance.24 On the other hand, "nondelegable"means that a power or duty cannot bedelegated to another or, even if delegated, theresponsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power toenter into an executive agreement is in essence anexecutive power. This authority of the President to enterinto executive agreements without the concurrence of theLegislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippinejurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has tosecure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,which shall submit to Congress a complete report of itsdecision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,does not diminish the executive nature of the power.B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laiddown precisely to limit the scope of the presidentialcommunications privilege but, in any case, it is notconclusive.Second, respondent Committees also seekreconsideration of the application of the "doctrine ofoperational proximity" for the reason that "it may bemisconstrued to expand the scope of the presidentialcommunications privilege to communications betweenthose who are ‘operationally proximate’ to the Presidentbut who may have "no direct communications with her."In the case at bar, the danger of expanding theprivilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fearapparently entertained by respondents) is absent becausethe official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus,

properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact,her alter ego and a member of her official family.Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the officialinvolved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in theDecision the organizational test laid down in JudicialWatch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to showthat the operational proximity test used in the Decision isnot considered conclusive in every case. In determiningwhich test to use, the main consideration is to limit theavailability of executive privilege only to officials who standproximate to the President, not only by reason of theirfunction, but also by reason of their positions in theExecutive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondentCommittees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would beunnecessarily expanded with the use of the operationalproximity test is unfounded.C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is notmerely based on a generalized interest; and inbalancing respondent Committees’ and thePresident’s clashing interests, the Court did notdisregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions ongovernment transparency, accountability anddisclosure of information.Third, respondent Committees claim that theCourt erred in upholding the President’s invocation,through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilegebecause (a) between respondent Committees’ specificand demonstrated need and the President’s generalizedinterest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike thebalance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing ofinterest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987Philippine Constitution on government transparency,accountability and disclosure of information, specifically,Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI, Section 10;33 Article VII,Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executiveprivilege is not merely founded on her generalized interestin confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 ofExecutive Secretary Ermita specified presidentialcommunications privilege in relation to diplomatic andeconomic relations with another sovereign nation asthe bases for the claim.It is easy to discern the danger that goes with thedisclosure of the President’s communication with heradvisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as aparty to the agreement. It was actually a product of themeeting of minds between officials of the Philippines andChina. Whatever the President says about the agreement- particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - arematters which China will surely view with particularinterest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It couldadversely affect our diplomatic as well as economicrelations with the People’s Republic of China.In the case at bar, this Court, in upholdingexecutive privilege with respect to three (3) specificquestions, did not in any way curb the public’s right toinformation or diminish the importance of publicaccountability and transparency.This Court did not rule that the Senate has nopower to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibitsrespondent Committees from inquiring into the NBNProject. They could continue the investigation and evencall petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself hasrepeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. OurDecision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answerscovered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner

cannot be compelled to appear before respondents toanswer the said questions. We have discussed thereasons why these answers are covered by executiveprivilege. That there is a recognized public interest in theconfidentiality of such information is a recognized principlein other democratic States. To put it simply, the right toinformation is not an absolute right.For clarity, it must be emphasized that theassailed Decision did not enjoin respondentCommittees from inquiring into the NBN Project. Allthat is expected from them is to respect matters thatare covered by executive privilege.Issue: w/n respondent committees have shown that thecommunications elicited by the three questions are criticalto the exercise of their functionsHeld: YesAt the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did notpass upon the nature of respondent Committees’ inquiryinto the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizesrespondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBNProject in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannotuphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteedprivilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in thecourse of a legislative investigation, the legislative purposeof respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficientlysupported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/orpending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may haverelevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Courtin past decisions on executive privilege is that thepresumption of privilege can only be overturned by ashowing of compelling need for disclosure of theinformation covered by executive privilege.In the case at bar, we are not confronted with acourt’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in acriminal case but rather with the Senate’s need forinformation in relation to its legislative functions. Thisleads us to consider once again just how critical is thesubject information in the discharge of respondentCommittees’ functions. The burden to show this is on therespondent Committees, since they seek to intrude intothe sphere of competence of the President in order togather information which, according to said respondents,would "aid" them in crafting legislation.The presumption in favor of Presidentialcommunications puts the burden on the respondentSenate Committees to overturn the presumption bydemonstrating their specific need for the information to beelicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subjectof this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, thereis simply a generalized assertion that the information ispertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and abroad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills.It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could notbe determined without the said information sought by thethree (3) questions.Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing thatthey would have to "speculate" regarding the questionscovered by the privilege, this does not evince a compellingneed for the information sought. Indeed, Senate SelectCommittee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43held that while fact-finding by a legislative committee isundeniably a part of its task, legislative judgmentsnormally depend more on the predicted consequences ofproposed legislative actions and their political acceptabilitythan on a precise reconstruction of past events. It addedthat, normally, Congress legislates on the basis ofconflicting information provided in its hearings. We cannotsubscribe to the respondent Committees’ self-defeatingproposition that without the answers to the three (3)

questions objected to as privileged, the distinguishedmembers of the respondent Committees cannotintelligently craft legislation.Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, itmust be stressed that respondent Committees’ need forinformation in the exercise of this function is not ascompelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiryis legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft andcorruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.44And if this is the primary objective of respondentCommittees in asking the three (3) questions covered byprivilege, it may even contradict their claim that theirpurpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In anyevent, whether or not investigating graft and corruption isa legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondentCommittees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds setby the Constitution.The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3)questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of thePresident.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor toinvestigate the potential culpability of high governmentofficials, including the President, in a given governmenttransaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate toperform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not todetermine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. OurConstitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature thelatter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neithercan the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.At this juncture, it is important to stress thatcomplaints relating to the NBN Project have already beenfiled against President Arroyo and other personalitiesbefore the Office of the Ombudsman. Under ourConstitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "toinvestigate any act or omission of any public official,employee, office or agency when such act or omissionappears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."51The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properlyequipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarilydetermine whether or not the allegations of anomaly aretrue and who are liable therefore. The same holds true forour courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty todetermine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules ofprocedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courtsare well-defined and ensure that the constitutionallyguaranteed rights of all persons, parties andwitnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.Issue: w/n respondent committees committed grave abuseof discretion in issuing contempt orderHeld: YesThe legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege havingbeen fully discussed in the preceding pages, we see noreason to discuss it once again.Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on theview that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiringinvitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible neededstatute which prompted the need for the inquiry" along withthe "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and thequestions relative to and in furtherance thereof" is notprovided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiterdictum.Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandumdated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference toany pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner ofthe questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoenamerely commanded him to "testify on what he knowsrelative to the subject matter under inquiry."Anent the third argument, respondentCommittees contend that their Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are

beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that thisCourt must refrain from reviewing the internal processes ofCongress, as a co-equal branch of government, however,when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court hasthe duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. Wecannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of theConstitution simply out of courtesy.In the present case, the Court’s exercise of itspower of judicial review is warranted because thereappears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt onthe part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of theRules provides that:"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all itsmembers, may punish for contempt any witness before itwho disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to besworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by theCommittee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud ofdoubt as to the validity of the contempt order becauseduring the deliberation of the three (3) respondentCommittees, only seven (7) Senators were present. Thisnumber could hardly fulfill the majority requirementneeded by respondent Committee on Accountability ofPublic Officers and Investigations which has amembership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondentCommittee on National Defense and Security which has amembership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect torespondent Committee on Trade and Commerce whichhas a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3)members were present.57 These facts prompted us toquote in the Decision the exchanges between SenatorsAlan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. wherebythe former raised the issue of lack of the required majorityto deliberate and vote on the contempt order.In the present case, it is respondent Committees’contention that their determination on the validity ofexecutive privilege should be binding on the Executive andthe Courts. It is their assertion that their internalprocedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into bythis Court supposedly in accordance with the principle ofrespect between co-equal branches of government.Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they appear to beunwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter ofexecutive privilege) or this Court (on the matter of judicialreview). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondentCommittees’ paradigm of checks and balances, what arethe checks to the Legislature’s all-encompassing,awesome power of investigation? It is a power, like anyother, that is susceptible to grave abuse.MR denied.

60. ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO This is a petition for habeas corpus to relieve Arnaultfrom confinement at Bilibid He was confined by Senate for his refusal to namethe person to whom he gave P440,000, and toanswer some questions. The Philippine Government bought 2 estates(BUENAVISTA & TAMBOBONG) worth P5M total. P1Mwas paid to Burt thru atty-in-fact Arnault, P500Kalso paid to Burt, thru Arnault (total P1.5M) However, the Original owner of the Estate was SanJuan De Dios Hospital under a contract with thegovernment for 25 years lease. SJDDH sold it to Burt but Burt paid only the P10Kdown payment. However the estates could have been bought for onlyP3M, and the Tambobong Estate should have beenfree, because it was practically owned by the gov’t!

(when the installments were not paid, it was sold toRural Progress Admin. SENATE ADOPTED RESOLUTION # 8 creating aspecial committee to investigate the estate deals. Among the witnesses examined was Arnault – whydid gov’t have to pay P1.5M to Burt when his interestwas only P20K, which was forfeited anyway? Arnault testified that he received the checks andopened an account in the name of his principal Burt todeposit the P1.5M. He later withdrew them P500K forAssoc Agencies, and P440K payable to cash. THIS P440K was the subject of investigation, todetermine who the ultimate recipient was. Arnault stated that he gave the P440K to someperson, but whose NAME HE CAN’T REMEMBER. Because of his persistent refusal to name therecipient, the Senate cited Arnault for CONTEMPTand thus he was confined Arnault however claims that the questions asked ofhim were incriminatory. He contends that the Senate has no power to punishhim for contempt for refusing to reveal the name ofthe beneficiary, because such information isimmaterial and will not serve any intended orpurported legislation, and that his refusal to answerdoes not obstruct the legislative process.ISSUE: Whether the Senate has the power to cite Arnaultfor contempt?SC: Yes. Once inquiry admitted or established to be withinthe jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, then theinvestigating committee has the POWER TO REQUIRE AWITNESS to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,subject to the consti right against self-incrimination.However, the question must be MATERIAL ORPERTINENT O THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY ORINVESTIGATION. The test of materiality is: direct relationto the subject matter of inquiry and not by indirect relationto any proposed or possible legislation.RATIONALE: necessity of legislative actiondetermined by the information gathered as a whole.The power of inquiry is an ESSENTIAL ANDAPPROPRIATE AUXILIARY to the legislative function.Legislature cannot legislate wisely or effectively in theabsence of information about the conditions which thelegislation is intended to affect or change.When legislative body does not itself possess therequisite information, recourse must be had to others whodo possess it. So the means of COMPULSION is essentialto obtain what is needed.The fact that the Consti expressly givesCongress the power to punish members, does notnecessarily imply exclusion of the power to punish nonmembersfor contempt.But note that, no person can be punished forcontumacy as a witness, unless testimony required in amatter over which Congress had jurisdiction to inquire.Further, the Court has NO POWER TOINTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION. It has nopower to determine what to approve or not to approve, thecourt cannot say what information is material to thesubject matter of inquiry. It is not within the Court’s powerto determine what legislative measures Congress maytake after completion of legislative inquiry.Senate is also a continuing body; NO TIME LIMITAS TO ITS POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.

61. SABIO VS GORDONIn 1986, former President Cory Aquino issued EO No. 1,creating the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon thisCommission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gottenwealth accumulated by the deposed President FerdinandE. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and closeassociates. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "Nomember or staff of the Commission shall be required totestify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative oradministrative proceeding concerning matters within itsofficial cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensurePCGG's unhampered performance of its task. Theconstitutionality of this provision is being questioned onthe ground that it tramples upon the Senate’s power toconduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 ofthe Constitution.Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introducedSenate Res 455, directing an inquiry in aid of legislationon the anomalous losses incurred by the PhilippinesOverseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation(PHILCOMSAT) and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation(PHC). Charmain Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG wasinvited to be one of the resource persons in the publicmeeting to deliberate on Senate Res 455. Sabio declinedand invoked Section 4(b) of EO 1.Senator Gordon issued a subpoena adtestificandum requiring Sabio and other PCGGcommissioners to appear in the public hearing and testifyto what they know relative to matters in Senate Res 455.Sabio did not comply. Sabio was then arrested andbrought to the Senate premises where he was detained.Issue: Is EO No. 1 constitutional? Was it repealed by the1987 Constitution?Held:- American courts have considered the power of inquiryas inherent in the power to legislate. “The right topass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtaininformation upon any matter which may become thesubject of a law. It is essential to the full andintelligent exercise of the legislative function.”Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the powerof investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "anyof its committee." This is significant because itconstitutes a direct conferral of investigatory powerupon the committees and it means that themechanisms which the Houses can take in order toeffectively perform its investigative function are alsoavailable to the committees.- It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry hasgained more solid existence and expansive construal.The Court's high regard to such power is renderedmore evident in Senate v. Ermita, where itcategorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broadenough to cover officials of the executive branch."Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that"the operation of government, being a legitimatesubject for legislation, is a proper subject forinvestigation" and that "the power of inquiry is coextensivewith the power to legislate."- Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we findSection 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members andstaff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannotbe countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is anyprovision granting such exemption. The Congress'power of inquiry, being broad, encompasseseverything that concerns the administration of existinglaws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.It even extends "to government agencies created byCongress and officers whose positions are within the

power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."PCGG belongs to this class.- Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent withArticle XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that:"Public office is a public trust. Public officers andemployees must at all times be accountable to thepeople, serve them with utmost responsibility,integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotismand justice, and lead modest lives."- The provision presupposes that since an incumbent ofa public office is invested with certain powers andcharged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty,the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trustfor the people and are to be exercised in behalf of thegovernment or of all citizens who may need theintervention of the officers. Such trust extends to allmatters within the range of duties pertaining to theoffice. In other words, public officers are but theservants of the people, and not their rulers.- Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, isinconsistent with the principle of public accountability.It places the PCGG members and staff beyond thereach of courts, Congress and other administrativebodies.

Sec. 23 War and Emergency Powers64.Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004)FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners: 1. Sanlakas& PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased. 2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert thatS18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President 3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution 4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion 

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions standing of petitioners

ISSUES: 1. whether or not petitioners have standing2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper 

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas& PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez"… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas& PM are "people's organizations" in the language ofSs15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance" regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion. 

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plusMarcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance

for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

65. Ampatuan v Hon DILG Sec. PunoFACTS:On 24 Nov. 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issuedProclamation 1946, placing “theProvinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City ofCotabato under a state ofemergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppressall incidents of lawless violence” in the named places.

Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners DatuZaldyUyAmpatuan, AnsaruddinAdiong, and RegieSahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. The alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state ofemergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE/HELD:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Sec. 16 Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 1 Art. V of RA 9054 (The Expanded ARMM Act)

NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2.  Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City

The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x xx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.  And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.   The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or   suppress   lawless violence in such places is a power that   the Constitution   directly vests in   the President.   She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.

The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x xx

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgmenton the matter.  As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to   the President   that   the Constitution   entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent andsuppress   lawless violence.   Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to   the President’s   judgment . Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Courtcannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at suchjudgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.  Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there

is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has avast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x xx.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state ofemergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issuedProclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.  Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.  Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action.  She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state ofemergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, theCourt must respect the President’s actions. (Ampatuan vs. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

Sec 24 Origin of Money Bills, Private Bills and Bills Local Appication66. TOLENTINO VS. SOF petitions filed in these cases for the declaration ofunconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise knownas the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc,,Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of RealEstate and Builders Association [CREBA]) reiterateprevious claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 didnot "originate exclusively" in the House ofRepresentatives as required by Art, VI, § 24 of theConstitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in theHouse of Representatives where it passed threereadings and that afterward it was sent to the Senatewhere after first reading it was referred to the SenateWays and Means Committee, they complain that theSenate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its ownversion (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senatecommittee should have done was to amend H. No.11197 by striking out the text of the bill andsubstituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, itis said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senateversion just becomes the text (only the text) of theHouse bill." Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" wasInserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as inany other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to showthat these bills were not to be like other bills but mustbe treated as a special kind,. The addition of the word "exclusively" in the PhilippineConstitution and the decision to drop the phrase "ason other Bills" in the American version, according topetitioners, shows the intention of the framers of ourConstitution to restrict the Senate's power to proposeamendments to revenue bills.

Issue: Whether the Senate had the power to introduceamendments? Would it still be considered a bill thatoriginated from the house?SC: LAW VALID.The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance inwhich the Senate proposed an amendment to a Houserevenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill.The power of the Senate to propose amendments must beunderstood to be full, plenary and complete "as on otherBills." Thus, because revenue bills are required tooriginate exclusively in the House, the Senate cannotenact revenue measures of its own without such bills.After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the

House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its ownversion on the same subject matter. This follows from theCOEQUALITY OF THE TWO CHAMBERS of Congress.The power of the Senate to propose or concurwith amendments is apparently without restriction. It wouldseem that by virtue of this power, the Senate canpractically re-write a bill required to come from the Houseand leave only a trace of the original bill.The above-mentioned bills are supposed to beinitiated by the House of Representatives because it ismore numerous in membership and therefore also morerepresentative of the people. Moreover, its members arepresumed to be more familiar with the needs of thecountry in regard to the enactment of the legislationinvolved,The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway inthe exercise of its power to propose or concur withamendments to the bills initiated by the House ofRepresentatives. It is also accepted practice for theSenate to introduce what is known as an amendment bysubstitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated inthe House of Representatives.

In the exercise of this power, the Senate maypropose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Aspetitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, acommittee to which a bill is referred may do any of thefollowing:(1) to endorse the bill without changes;(2) to make changes in the bill emitting or adding sectionsor altering its language-, (3) to make and endorse anentirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it ",III beknown as a committee bill, or(4) to make no report at all.

Sec. 25 AppropriationsLimits67. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of  advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of  Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

68. GARCIA VS. MATA Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who wasreversed to inactive status. He filed an action formandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstatehim to active service and readjust his rank and payemoluments. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status isviolation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion ofofficers with at least 10 years of service. On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend thatthe said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance orpertinence to the budget in question or to anyappropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was anappropriation law for 1956-57).

ISSUE: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider inan appropriation bill?

SC: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident.Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance toany appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation lawfor the operation of government while Section 11 refers toa fundamental governmental policy of calling to active dutyand the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers inthe AFP.Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEMINSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, inviolation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERSto the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new andcompletely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject.The subject to be considered must be expressed in thetitle of the act. When an act contains provisions which areclearly not embraced in the subject of the act, asexpressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperativeand without effect.SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannotcompel the AFP to reinstate him.

Transfer of Funds69. Demetria v AlbaDemetria et al as taxpayers and members of the BatasanPambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations

Act or approved after its enactment.” Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.HELD: Sec. 16[5].  No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

71. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ Petitioners assail validity of RA 7663: The GeneralAppropriations Act for 1994. The GAA contains a special provision applicable toCongress. It allowed any member of congress theREALIGNMENT OF ALLOCATION FOROPERATIONAL EXPENSES, provided that the totalof said allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only the Senate President andthe Speaker are the ones authorized under theConstitution to realign savings, not the individualmembers of Congress themselves. Later, President FVR signed the law, but VETOEDcertain provisions of the law and imposed certainconditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorizedto use savings to augment the pension funds underthe Retirement and Separation Benefits System of theAFP.ISSUE: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art 6.Whether the enumeration is exclusive?SC: YES. Under the special provision applicable toCongress, the members of Congress are given the powerto determine the necessity of realignment of the savings inthe allotment for their operating expenses. They are in thebest position to do so because they are the ones whoknow whether there are savings, or deficiencies inappropriation. HOWEVER, ONLY THE SENATEPRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AREALLOWED TO APPROVE THE REALIGNMENT.Further, 2 conditions must be met: 1) the funds tobe realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is forthe purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures towhich said transfer is to be made.As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chiefof Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those who may beauthorized to transfer funds is exclusive.

72. SANCHEZ V. COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts: In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180(R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the GeneralAppropriations Act of 1992. This law provided anappropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set asidethe amount of P75, 000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability

Building Program. The stated purpose for the creation ofthetas force was to design programs, strategize andprepare modules for an effective program for localautonomy. The estimated expenses for its operation wasP2, 388,000.00 for a period of six months beginning on 1December 1991up to 31 May 1992 unless the aboveceiling is sooner expended and/or the project is earlierpre-terminated. The proposal was accepted by the DeputyExecutive Secretary and attested by then DILG SecretaryCesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein,who consequently issued a memorandum for the transferand remittance to the Office of the President of the sum ofP300, 000.00 for the operational expenses of the taskforce. An additional cash advance of P300, 000.00 wasrequested. These amounts were taken from the Fund.Two (2) cash advances both in the amount of P300,000.00 were withdrawn from the Fund by the DILG andtransferred to the Cashier of the Office of the President.The "Particulars of Payment" column of the disbursementvoucher states that the transfer of funds was made "to theOffice of the President for Ad-Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy.The transfer of fund from DILG to the Office ofthe President to defray salaries of personnel, officesupplies, office rentals, foods and meals, etc. of an AdHoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination toImplement Local Autonomy taken from the CapabilityBuilding Program Fund is violative of the SpecialProvisions of R.A. 7180. A Notice of Disallowance dated29 March 1993 was then sent to Mr. Sarino, et al. holdingthe latter jointly and severally liable for the amount anddirecting them to immediately settle the disallowance.Issues:1. Whether there is legal basis for the transfer offunds of the Capability Building Program Fundappropriated in the 1992 General AppropriationAct from the Department of Interior and LocalGovernment to the Office of the President;2. Whether the conditions or requisites forthe transfer of funds under the applicablelaw were present in this case;3. Whether the Capability Building Program Fund isa trust fund, a special fund, a trust receipt or aregular appropriation; and finally4. Whether the questioned disallowance bythe Commission on Audit is valid. The partieswere required to simultaneously submit theirmemoranda in amplification of their argumentson the foregoing issues.Ratio/Doctrine: The transfer of funds from the DILG tothe Office of the President has no legal basis and thatCOA's disallowance of the transfer is valid. According tothe OSG, the creation of a task force to implement localautonomy, if one was necessary, should have beendone through the Local Government Academy with theapproval of its board of trustees in accordance with R.A.No. 7180.Moreover, Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitutionauthorizes the transfer of funds within the OP if made bythe President for purposes of augmenting an item in theOffice of the President. In this case, it was not thePresident butte Deputy Executive Secretary who causedthe transfers and the latter was not shown to have beenauthorized byte President to do soothe COA, in itsMemorandum dated 18 July 2005, reiterates its positionthat there is no legal basis for the transfers in questionbecause the Fund was meant to be implemented by theLocal Government Academy. Further, transfer of fundsunder Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution may be made

only by the persons mentioned in the section and may notbe re-delegated being already a delegated authority.Additionally, the funds transferred must come only fromsavings of the office in other items of its appropriation andmust be used for other items in the appropriation of thesame office. In this case, there were no savings fromwhich augmentation can be taken because the releases offunds to the Office of the President were made at thebeginning of the budget year 1992.The COA also positsthat while the Fund is a regular appropriation, it partakesthe nature of a trust fund because it was allocated for aspecific purpose. Thus, it may be used only for the specificpurpose for which it was created or the fund received. TheCOA concludes that petitioners should be held civilly andcriminally liable for the disallowed expenditures.Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSEDand the assailed Decision of the Commission on Audit isAFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Sec 26 Subject and Title of Bills74. PHILCONSA vs. GIMENEZ Philconsa assails constitutionality of RA 3836, whichallows retirement gratuity and commutation ofvacation and sick leaves to Senators andCongressmen. They contend that the provision for the retirement ofmembers and officers of Congress was NOTEXPRESSED IN THE TITLE OF THE BILL. (It wasmerely titled as “An Act Amending Sec 12 of CA 186186, as Amended BY Ra 3096”) Under the bill, retirement and gratuity will be allowedto members of Congress who have served at least 12years, regardless of age, of an amount equal to 1year salary for every 4 years service. They contend that the title does not give any inkling ornotice to the public about the retirement gratuities andprivileges.ISSUE; Whether the title of RA 3836 is germane to thesubject matter in the act?SC: CA 186 = provides for both retirement and insurancebenefits RA 3096 = says retirement benefits are granted toGSIS members Under RA 3836, the retirement benefits are granted tomembers of GSIS who have rendered at least 20 years of service. This is related and germane to the subject of CA 186. HOWEVER, SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS refers tomembers of Congress who are NOT MEMBERS OFTHE GSIS. Thus, to provide retirement benefits tothese officials would relate to a subject matter whichis NOT GERMANE TO CA 186. In other words, the portion of the amendment(retirement benefits for Congress members) is notrelated in any manner to the subject of CA 186. Thus, RA 3836 is not really amending / relating to RA3096 or CA 186. THE LAW DOES ONT EXPRESS THE SUBJECT OFTHE ACT.The Purpose of the requirement that the subjectof an act should be expressed in its title:1) to prevent surprise, fraud upon the Legislature,(because on the 3rd reading, only the title will be heard!!)2) to fairly appraise the people through such publication oflegislation, (to inform the public of a pending bill, so theycan come forward and object)3) to prevent a law with several subject matterThe Constitutional requirement is satisfied when:1) ALL PARTS of the law relate to the subject expressed

in the title AND2) it is not necessary that the title be a complete index ofthe content.No technical construction is required, onlypractical construction.There is SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE if the titleexpresses the general subject but the provisions of thestatute are germane to the general subject.RA 3836 NULL and VOID.

75. TIO v Videogram Regulatory BoardTio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made.” Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the Board.” That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

76. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADOFacts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 ofR.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine PostalCorporation through its Circular No. 92-28. Thesemeasures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA,RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commissionand its Registers of Deeds, along with certain othergovernment offices. The petitioners are members of thelower courts who feel that their official functions as judgeswill be prejudiced by the above-named measures. Thepetition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.Issues: (1) whether or not its title embraces more thanone subject and does not express its purpose(2) whether or not it did not pass the requiredreadings in both Houses of Congress and printed copiesof the bill in its final form were not distributed among themembers before its passage;(3) whether or not it is discriminatory andencroaches on the independence of the JudiciaryHeld: (1) Article VI, Sec. 26 (l), of the Constitutionproviding that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall

embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in thetitle thereof." The purposes of this rule are: (1) to preventhodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to preventsurprise or fraud upon the legislature by means ofprovisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, andwhich might therefore be overlooked and carelessly andunintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise thepeople, through such publication of legislative proceedingsas is usually made, of the subject of legislation that isbeing considered, in order that they may have opportunityof being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if theyshall so desire.It is the submission of the petitioners that Section35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilegefrom the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law,nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled"An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for OtherPurposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners'contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not requiredto be an index to the body of the act, or to be ascomprehensive as to cover every single detail of themeasure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicatesthe general subject, and reasonably covers all theprovisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead thelegislature or the people, there is sufficient compliancewith the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, therepeal of a statute on a given subject is properlyconnected with the subject matter of a new statute on thesame subject; and therefore a repealing section in the newstatute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on thesubject. The reason is that where a statute repeals aformer law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject ofthe statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law,which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. Thewithdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies isgermane to the accomplishment of the principal objectiveof R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficientand effective postal service system.(2) It is a matter of record that the conferenceCommittee Report on the bill in question was returned toand duly approved by both the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with itscertification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales andSpeaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representativesas having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress.It was then presented to and approved by PresidentCorazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine ofseparation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond thecertification of the approval of a bill from the presidingofficers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive uponthe Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered inthe journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading ofthe bill).(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 isdiscriminatory because while withdrawing the frankingprivilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for thePresident of the Philippines, the Vice President of thePhilippines; Senators and Members of the House ofRepresentatives, the Commission on Elections; formerPresidents of the Philippines; the National Census andStatistics Office; and the general public in the filing ofcomplaints against public offices and officers. Thewithdrawal of the franking privileges was indeeddiscriminatory. If the problem of the respondents is theloss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy isto withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,including those who do not need it. The problem is not

solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it fromothers, especially where there is no substantial distinctionbetween those favored, which may or may not need it atall, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. Theproblem is not solved by violating the Constitution. Theclassification was not based on substantial distinctions.

77. FARIÑAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARYFACTS:SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE:Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.78. TOLENTINO VS. SEC OF FINANCE

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E-VAT law(RA 7716) Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in theHouse of Representatives where it passed threereadings and that afterward it was sent to the Senatewhere after first reading it was referred to the SenateWays and Means Committee, they complain that theSenate did not pass it on second and third readings.Instead what the Senate did was to pass its ownversion (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,1994. There was also an argument by Tolentino that theSenate Bill 1630 did not pass 3 READINGS ONSEPARATE DAYS, as required by the Constitutionbecause the 2nd and 3rd readings were done on thesame day. March 24, 1994. SC: This was because on Feb 24 and March 22, thePresident had certified S Bill as urgent. Thepresidential certification dispensed with therequirement not only of printing but also that of thereading of the bill on separate days.The phrase “except when the President Certifies thenecessity of its immediate enactment” qualifies the 2stated conditions before a bill can become a law:1)the bill has passed 3 readings on separate days, 2)it has been printed in its final form and distributed 3days prior to its final approval. THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION. The fallacy inthinking that House Bill 11197 and Senate Bill 1630are distinct and unrelated measures also accounts forthe petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contentionthat because the President separately certified to theneed for the immediate enactment of these measures,his certification was ineffectual and void. Thecertification had to be made of the version of thesame revenue bill which at the moment was beingconsidered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, itwould be necessary for the President to certify asmany bills as are presented in a house of Congresseven though the bills are merely versions of the bill hehas already certified. It is enough that he certifies thebill which, at the time he makes the certification, isunder consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 theSenate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that billwhich had to be certified. For that matter on June 1,1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 92 10for immediate enactment because it was the onewhich at that time was being considered by theHouse. This bill was later substituted, together withother bills, by H. No. 11197. As to what Presidential certification can accomplish,we have already explained in the main decision thatthe phrase 44 except when the President certifies tothe necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.VI, § 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that"printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be]distributed to the members three days before itspassage" but also the requirement that before a billcan become a law it must have passed "threereadings on separate days." There is not only textualsupport for such construction but historical basis aswell. The exception is based on the prudentialconsideration that if in all cases three readings onseparate days are required and a bill has to be printedin final form before it can be passed, the need for alaw may be rendered academic by the occurrence ofthe very emergency or public calamity which it ismeant to address.

Petitioners further contend that a "growing budgetdeficit" is not an emergency, especially in a countrylike the Philippines where budget deficit is a chroniccondition. Even if this were the case, an enormousbudget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No.7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for itsenactment any less an emergency. Apparently, the members of the Senate (includingsome of the petitioners in these cases) believed thatthere was an urgent need for consideration of S. No.1630, because they responded to the call of thePresident by voting on the bill on second and thirdreadings on the same day. While the judicialdepartment is not bound by the Senate's acceptanceof the President's certification, the respect duecoequal departments of the government in matterscommitted to them by the Constitution and theabsence of a clear showing of grave abuse ofdiscretion caution a stay of the Judicial hand.At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 receivedthorough consideration in the Senate where it wasdiscussed for six days. Only its distribution in advancein its final printed form was actually dispensed with byholding the voting on second and third readings onthe same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficienttime between the submission of the bill on February 8,1994 on second reading and its approval on March24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by theSenate on third reading. The purpose for which three readings on separatedays is required is said to be two-fold- (1) to informthe members of Congress of what. they must vote onand (2) to give them notice that a measure isprogressing through the enacting process- thusenabling them and others interested in the measure toprepare their positions with reference to it. ( J. G.SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 [1972]) Thesepurposes were substantially achieved in the case ofR.A. No. 7716.

79. Tobias vs AbalosFacts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?

(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districtThe petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

80. BANAT V. COMELECFacts:--Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the fullnumber of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by theCOMELEC en banc.--BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.--The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaimingthirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. TheCOMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-listresults, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.--Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked theCOMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.--Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus andprohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use theVeterans formula.ISSUES:--Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling--Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional--Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 toqualify for one seat is constitutional--How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?--Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in theparty-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participatingin the party-list elections?RULING:

--The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-listrepresentatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that aqualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device thatprevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.--The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than twopercent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relationto the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to thefull implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents theattainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interestsin the House of Representatives."--In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest tothe lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking inparagraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)seats.--Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties fromparticipating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitutionclearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections throughtheirsectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections aseither "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended thatmajor political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, theCourt decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Sec 27 Procedure in Law-MakingPassage of bills83. Arroyo v De VeneciaFacts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the

respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House 

Held:Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

84. AbakadaGuro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. ErmitaPost under case digests, Political Law at Monday, March 05, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic MindFacts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso inSections 4, 5 and 6: “That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raisethe rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%)”

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress ofits exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which can’t be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory

power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution(c) delegation to the people at large(d) delegation to local governments(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally

permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

Item Veto85. CIR v Court of Tax AppealsFACTS:Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law".By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses.

DECISION:The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it.

86. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill1989. It eliminated or decreased certain itemsincluded in the proposed budget as submitted by thepresident. When presented to the President for her signature, itwas signed but 7 SPECIAL PROVISIONS and Sec 55(General Provision) were VETOED. The senate then passed a resolution saying that thePresident’s Veto was unconstitutional. Sec 55 provided a: “Prohibition Against theRestoration or Increase of RecommendedAppropriations / Disapproved or Reduced byCongress” – No item of appropriation recommendedby the President in the Budget which has beendisapproved or reduced shall be restored or increasedby the use of appropriations authorized for otherpurposes by augmentation. An item for appropriationfor any purpose recommended by the President shallbe deemed to have been disapproved by Congress ifno corresponding appropriation for the specificpurpose is provided in the GAB” The reason why the President vetoed the provisionwas: that it violates Section 25(5) – nullifying thepower of the President to augment any item fromsavings in other items. Gonzales et al claim that the President’s Line-Veto inappropriation bills is limited to items and does not

cover provisions. They claim that Cory exceeded her authority whenshe vetoed Sec 55 which are PROVISIONS, such thatwhen the President objects to a PROVISION of anappropriation bill, she cannot exercise the ITEMVETOPOWER but should veto the entire bill. They further claim that the Item-Veto Power does notcarry with it the power to strike out conditions orrestrictions for that would be legislation. Lastly they claim that Sec 25(5) of the Constitution(which provides for the President’s AugmentationPowers) – has to be provided for by law thusCongress has the prerogative to limit the exercise ofthe same. On the other hand the Solgen claims that Sec 55 isactually a rider because it is extraneous to anappropriation act, therefore the President validlyvetoed it. Solgen further claims that the constitutionempowers the President to veto PROVISIONS orother distinct and severable parts of an AppropriationsBillISSUE: Did the President exceeded the item-veto power?Can the President veto PROVISIONS of an appropriationsbill? What is the scope of item-veto?SC: VETO WAS VALID. CORY WAS CORRECT.Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 1 = refersto the general veto power of the President. If exercised, itwould result to the veto of the ENTIRE BILL.Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 2 = refersto the ITEM VETO power or LINE VETO. It allows theexercise of veto over particular items in anAPPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. Thepower given to the President to disapprove any item in anAppropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto apart of an item and to approve the remaining portion of thesame item.The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different.An ITEM = refers to the particulars, details, thedistinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisiblesum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It obviouslymeans an item which in itself is a SPECIFICAPPROPRIATION of money, not some general provisionof law, which just happens to be put in an appropriationbill.The claim of the petitioners that the Presidentmay not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill notonly disregards the basic principle that a distinct andseverable part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto,but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that anyPROVISION in the general appropriations bill shall relatespecifically to some particular provision therein, and thatany such provision shall be limited in its operation to theappropriation to which it relates.In short, A PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited inits operation to some particular appropriation, and DOESNOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL.(The President may veto provisions.)Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers,Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OFINAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. Sec 55:1) is a provision that does not relate to any particularappropriation (violates Sec25)2) the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to befound on the face of the bill3) the vetoed sections are more an expression ofCongressional policy regarding augmentation powersrather than a true budgetary appropriation.Sec 55 is thus an inappropriate provision thatshould be treated as ITEMS FOR PURPOSES OF VETO

POWERS.As to the claim that Congress should be allowed toimpose restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill(which they claim is beyond veto-powers) It cannot be denied that Legislature has the power toprovide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Billsas to limit how the money shall be spend, etc. Also, itcannot be denied that the Executive is not allowed to vetoa condition or qualification but allowing the appropriationitself to stand.HOWEVER, for these to apply, THERESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH IN THE REALSENSE OF THE TERM, not some matters which are moreproperly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions orConditions must exhibit a CONNECTION WITH MONEYITEMS IN A BUDGETARY SENSE IN THE SCHEDULEOF EXPENDITURES.Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS.Sec 55 appears to be a condition but actually they areGENERAL LAW MEASURES MORE APPROPRIATEFOR a substantive, separate legislation.

87. BENGZON VS. DRILON Petition assailing the constitutionality of thePresident’s Veto of certain provisions of the GAA1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensionsof retired SC and CA justices RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirementpensions of retired SC and CA justices. This wasamended by RA 1797, giving identical benefits tomembers of Con-Coms and members of the AFP. Later however, under PD 644, the AUTOMATICADJUSTMENT for the retirement pensions forJUSTICES was not restored. (the automaticadjustment applied only to AFP officials) Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination againstjustices, Congress approved a bill for the reenactmentof the repealed provisions of RA 1797.Congress wanted to restore the retirement pensionsof Justices. Thus, in the GAA of 1992, Congress madeappropriations for the Judiciary for the payment ofadjusted pension rates. Meanwhile, the retired justices filed a case to thecourt for readjustment of the monthly pensions,arguing that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 did notbecome law for lack of valid publication. The courtgranted the petition. President Cory however vetoed the house bill: that itwould erode the very foundation of the Gov’tcollective effort to adhere faithfully and enforce strictlythe policy on salary standardization. She also claimsthat the government should not permit the grant ofdistinct privileges to groups already enjoyingpreferential treatment. The retired justices filed this case claiming that:o 1) the subject veto is not an item vetoo 2) the veto is violative of the doctrine ofseparation of powers, there being a SCdecision favorably to them,SC: INVALID VETO.The general fund adjustment is an ITEM whichappropriates P500M to enable government to meets itsobligations. The general fund adjustment is the item itself.This was not vetoed by the President. What were vetoedwere METHODS AND SYSTEMS placed by Congress toinsure that permanent and continuing obligations to certainofficials (such as retirement pensions) would be paid asthey fall due.

The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS, they werePROVISIONS. There was no specific appropriation ofmoney involved. It can be seen that portions of the itemhave been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts.General Rule: The president must veto the bill in itsentirety.Exception:1) appropriation, revenue, tariff bills item-veto allowed –to avoid riders being attached to appropriations measures but only a particular item may be vetoed (ITEM refers toparticulars, details, the distinct and severable parts)The constitution provides that only a particular item oritems may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any itemor items in an appropriations bill does not grant theauthority to veto a part of an item and to approve theremaining portion of the same item.Additionally, the President cannot set aside orreverse a final and executory judgment by the Courtthrough the exercise of veto power.

88. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ Congress enacted the GAA of 1994. Congressappropriated P86.323B for debt servicing but itappropriated only P37B for education. Petitionersclaim that Congress cannot give debt servicing thehighest priority for it would be violative of theConstitution requiring education to have the highestfunding. Congress also added a special provision whichprovides that:o 1) The Appropriation for Debt Service shallbe used for the payment of principal andinterest of foreign / domestic debts. That anypayment in excess of the amountappropriated shall be subject to the approvalof the President and with concurrence ofCongress. The President vetoed this provision but did not vetothe P86B appropriation for debt service. Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto theSpecial provision without vetoing the entire amount ofP86B. The Solgen however countered that the Specialprovision did not relate to the item of appropriation fordebt service, and thus could very well be the subjectof an item veto. The President, in his veto message,said that there is already an automatic provision ondebt servicing provided for under the ForeignBorrowing Act. The GAA cannot be used to amend toForeign Borrowing Act.ISSUE: is the veto valid?SC: It is readily apparent that the special provision is anINAPPROPRIATE PROVISION referring to funds otherthan the P86B appropriated in the GAA. The vetoedprovision is clearly an attempt to repeal the ForeignBorrowing Act and to reverse the debt payment policy.Thus, the repeal of said law should be done in a separatelaw, not in the appropriations law.The general rule is that the President has to vetothe entire bill, and not merely parts thereof. The exceptionis the power of the President to veto any particular item(item veto) in an appropriations bill. Here, the presidentmust veto the entire item.A GAB is a special type of legislation whosecontent is limited to specified sums of money. Because theConstitution requires that provisions in an appropriation billmust relate specifically to some particular appropriation towhich it relates, any provision which does not relate to anyparticular item or which extends its operation beyond the

item will be considered an INAPPROPRIATEPROVISION, WHICH CAN BE VETOED SEPARATELY.Thus the scope of this item veto (inappropriateprovision) should be any provision:1) which does not relate to any particular item2) which extends the operation beyond the item ofappropriation3) an unconstitutional provision which are intended toamend other laws.Thus, the veto of the special provision on debtservice is VALID. It is an inappropriate provision. It refersto funds other than the P86B appropriated in the GAA.This should be the subject of a separate legislation, notthrough the GAA.(this is a complicated case.. read the orig).There are other vetoes made:VALID VETOES:1) the debt servicing2) the State Univ and Colleges. revolving fund3) the purchase of military equipment – this is aninappropriate provision. It is a rider. It provided forCongressional approval..4) the AFP pension – the AFP Chief of Staff has no powerto augment5) Deactivation of CAFGU – another rider, inappropriateprovision.INVALID VETOES:1) the 70%-30% (administrative vs. contract) ratio for roadmaintenance. Congress provided that only 30% of the totalappropriation for road maintenance should be contractedout, but the President wanted 70% to be contracted outbecause it would be more efficient, economical. When thepresident vetoed, he argued that it was inappropriate.VETO INVALID. The provision is APPROPRIATE. Itspecifies how the said item shall be expended, 70%administrative, 30% contract. This cannot be vetoedseparately from the items to which they relate so long asthey are appropriate in the budgetary sense.2) purchase of AFP medicines- this is also APPROPRIATE PROVISION. This is incompliance with the drug policy of the DOH, it directlyrelates and is inseparable from appropriation.

Sec 28 TaxationScope and Purpose89. PLANTERS PRODUCTS V FERTIPHILFACTS: Petitioner and respondent are both domesticcorporations engaged in the fertilizer, pesticide andagricultural chemical business. President Marcos issued LOI 1465 requiring a CapitalContribution Component (CCC) equivalent to 10pesos per bag of fertilizer bought by fertilizercompanies to be collected by the Fertilizer andPesticide Authority (FPA) and in favor of petitioner. Pursuant to such LOI respondent paid 10 pesos perfertilizer bag it bought. FPA then remitted the said payments to Far EastBank and Trust Co., the depositary bank of petitioner. After the EDSA revolution, respondent stoppedpaying the CCC and sued petitioner for refund.Respondent claimed that LOI 1465 is unconstitutionalfor being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalidand an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denialof due process of law. Furthermore, it contends thatthe LOI favored petitioner, a private corporation,which used the CCC to maintain monopoly over thefertilizer industry. SolGen contends the LOI was a valid exercise of

police power to stabilize the price of fertilizer.Moreover, it contends that respondent did not sufferany damage as the levy fell on the ultimate consumerand not the sellerISSUE: Was the exaction valid? Can respondent ask for refund? Did respondent have locus standi? Can the LOI be collaterally attacked in a collectionsuit?HELD: NO. It is not for public purpose. The letter of the LOIitself was explicit in saying that the CCC was toaugment petitioner’s capital until it becomesfinancially viable. Worse, the LOI did not provide anystandard as to when petitioner may be consideredalready viable. Thus, the effect is to require paymentof CCC almost indefinitely. Furthermore, the CCCwas to be used for payment of petitioner’s corporatedebts – obviously not public purpose. YES. The contention of petitioner that the doctrine ofoperative fact1 be applied. The doctrine is only anexception to the general rule. The general rule is thata void law produces no legal effect except whenequity demands. There is nothing iniquitous inrequiring petitioner to make the refund. YES even if the ultimate consumer will bear theburden of the levy. Applying the Direct Injury Test,there is no doubt that respondent will sustain injurybecause of the LOI. Remember that through the LOI,respondent will be directly liable for the levy. If it doesnot pay, it will be punished. YES. The constitutionality of the LOI is the very lismota of the collection suit. A law that is declaredunconstitutional is a void law. No right or obligationarises in a void law. Thus if declared unconstitutional,respondent is not obliged to pay

Limitations on Power91. Commissioner vs. Lingayen Gulf ElectricFacts: Lingayen Gulf Electric Power operates an electric power plant serving the municipalities of Lingayenand Binmaley, Pangaisnan, pursuant to municipal franchise granted it by the respective municipal councils.The franchises provided that the grantee shall pay quarterly to the Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan 1% ofthe gross earnings obtained through the privilege for the first 20 years (from 1946), and 2% during theremaining 15 years of the life of the franchise. In 1948, the Philippine President approved the franchise (RA3843). In 1955, the BIR assessed and demanded against the company deficiency franchise taxes andsurcharges fro the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on gross receipts from 1948 to1954. The company asked for a reinvestigation, which was denied.Issue [1]: Whether the Court can inquire into the wisdom of the Act.Held [1]: The Court does not have the authority to inquire into the wisdom of the Act. Charters or speciallaws granted and enacted by the Legislatur are in the nature of private contracts. They do not contitute a partof the machinery of the general government. They are usually adopted after careful consideration of theprivate rights in relation with the resultant benefits of the State. In passing a special charter, the attention ofthe Legislature is directed to the facts and circumstances which the act or charter is intended to meet. TheLegislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstance of the particular case. The Court ought not

to disturb the ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals on the constitutionality of the law in question.Issue [2]: Whether a rate below 5% on gross income violate the uniformity of tax clause in the Constitution.Held [2]: A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject ofit is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. The legislaturehas the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptionshave never been deemed violateve of the equal protection clause. Herein, the 5% franchise tax rate providedin Section 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. Section 259 expresslyallows the payment of taxes at rates lower than 5% when the charter granting the franchise precludes theimposition of a higher tax. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts,but made it in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. “The company, hence, is not liable for deficiency taxes.

92.TOLENTINO VS. SOF Same case assailing constitutionality of expanded vatlaw. The law is challenged for being regressive, andviolates uniformity and equality of taxation because:o Low income groups would be a higherproportion from their incomes than paymentsmade by higher-income groups.o That a uniform 10% tax is regressivebecause when before the tax onconsumption of goods by higher-incomebrackets paid a rate higher than 10%, this isnow reduced. Similarly, those from the lowerincome brackets used to pay only 3%- 5%,but now they pay higher.ISSUE: Is EVAT regressiveSC: IT IS EQUITABLE!!It distributes the tax burden to as many goodsand services as possible particularly to those which arewithin the reach of higher-income groups, even as the lawexempts basic goods and services. The goods andproperties subject to VAT are those used or consumed byhigher-income groups. On the other hand, smallbusinesses with annual gross sales of less than P500Tare exempt.Regressivity is not a negative standard forcourts to enforce. What Congress is required by theConstitution to do is to evolve a progressive system oftaxation. This is a directive to Congress. These provisionsare put in the constitution as MORAL INCENTIVES TOLEGISLATION, not a judicially enforceable right.

93. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF TRADENowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measureswithout a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or evenreview the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress has the putative authority to abolishthe Tariff Commission or the DTI. It is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalitieswhich do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize thelegislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the

legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.The case centers on the interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8800, theSafeguard Measures Act (“SMA”), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon after thePhilippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World TradeOrganization (WTO) Agreement. The SMA provides for the structure and mechanics for theimposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries andproducers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a petition seeking for theimposition of safeguard measures on Gray Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA. Afterthe DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure, the application was referred to the TariffCommission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its ImplementingRules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguardmeasure on imports of gray Portland cement. After public hearings and conducting its owninvestigation, the Tariff Commission came out with a negative finding. Notwithstanding suchfinding, the DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose adefinitive safeguard measure. The Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do sounder the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein he expressed theDTI’s disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time,ultimately denying Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures on the ground that the hewas bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings.Philcemcor filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamusseeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commission’s Report. Philcemcorargued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is notbound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, asit is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology. TheCA held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commissionsince such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretary’sdiscretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary thepower to make a final decision on the Tariff Commission’s recommendation.Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the factual findings of the TariffCommission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of generalsafeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or nonexistenceof conditions warranting the imposition of safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary

HELD: Petition is granted.

The DTI Secretary is barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absenta positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The required positivefinal determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutionallimitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to thePresident under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. The provision states: “TheCongress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subjectto such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the nationaldevelopment program of the Government.”These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power oftaxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature. But this provision is also anexceptional grant of legislative power to the President which is why the qualifiers mandated bythe Constitution on this presidential authority attains primordial consideration. First, there mustbe a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled inby the law. And Third, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions onthis presidential authority.The authority delegated to the President may be exercised by his/her alter egos, such asdepartment secretaries. For purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs underthe above provision, it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as the alter ego of thePresident. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI orAgriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of thePresident, to impose such measures.Both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents ofCongress in the implementation of the said law. Indeed, even the President may be considered asan agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures since it is Congress, notthe President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts.The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, throughthe DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs andsimilar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA,captioned “Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures,” and stating: “The Secretaryshall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the[Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities,whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of seriousinjury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agriculturalproducts, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will bein the public interest.

Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress on thepresidential authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts. The positive final determination by the Tariff Commission is plainly required by the law and so it must be strictly complied with.Philcemcor raised a question as to whether such requirement run counter to our legalorder since under the said provision, a body of relative junior competence as a TariffCommission can bind an administrative superior and cabinet officer such as the DTI Secretary.No provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a generalsafeguard measure despite the absence of a positive final recommendation of the TariffCommission. On the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary “shall applya general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission.”Under the SMA, it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an investigation as to whetherthe conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard measures. These conditions areenumerated in Section 5, namely; that a product is being imported into the country in increasedquantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial causeof serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the investigation of the TariffCommission, it submits a report to the DTI Secretary, which states whether the above-statedconditions for the imposition of the general safeguard measures exist. Upon a positive finaldetermination that these conditions are present, the Tariff Commission then is mandated torecommend what appropriate safeguard measures should be undertaken by the DTI Secretary.Section 13 of the SMA gives five specific options on the type of safeguard measures the TariffCommission recommends to the DTI Secretary.At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt therecommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTISecretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest,notwithstanding the Tariff Commission’s recommendation on the appropriate safeguardmeasure upon its positive final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes apositive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguardmeasure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that recommended by the Tariff Commission.It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive finaldetermination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into thecountry in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), asto be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. Anydisputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful thinking.The Tariff Commission’s finding is not merely recommendatory. Section 5 bluntlydoes require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before the DTI Secretarymay impose a general safeguard measure. This is a duty imposed on a public officer by the law

itself which must be given a controlling effect. In fact, the Department of Justice (DOJ)Secretary himself rendered an Opinion with the same conclusion.Another issue was raised as to whether the DTI Secretary, acting either as alter ego of thePresident or in his capacity as head of an executive department, may review, modify or otherwisealter the final determination of the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The Court answered inthe negative. Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played thereinby the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, orhis/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If

Congress intended to allow the traditional “alter ego” principle to be established by the SMA, itwould have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to theNational Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). The Tariff Commission is anattached agency of the NEDA, which in turn is the independent planning agency of thegovernment.The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision of theDTI. On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the NEDA and the TariffCommission is established not only by the Administrative Code, but similarly affirmed by theTariff and Customs Code.At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or influence isallocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact, the long-standing traditionhas been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed independently in the exercise oftheir respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant interplaybetween the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No.8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition ofanti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the SMA. In all these threelaws, the Tariff Commission is tasked, upon referral of the matter by the DTI, to determinewhether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a countervailingduty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively. In all three laws, thedetermination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual conditions exist is necessarybefore the DTI Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in allthree laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse thefactual determination of the Tariff Commission.The SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere flunky of theDTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final recommendation of the former beindispensable to the latter’s imposition of a general safeguard measure. What the law indicatesinstead is a relationship of interdependence between two bodies independent of each otherunder the Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the DTI Secretary

to disregard the Tariff Commission’s recommendations as to the particular safeguard measuresto be imposed evinces the independence from each other of these two bodies. This is properlyso for two reasons – the DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent of each otherunder the Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTIitself is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures, pursuant toSection 6 of the SMA.Considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in thePresident but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the congressionalprerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do not normallybelong to the executive in the first place. Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTISecretary may impose general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by theTariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factualdetermination made by the Tariff Commission.Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities on either the Tariff Commissionor the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the imposition of general safeguardmeasures under the SMA. In doing so, the same Congress, which has the putativeauthority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or

expand its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms inthe bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative toprescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislativepower to restructure the executive branch of government.Assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may conduct suchreview following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDA’s decision in turn isreviewable by the Office of the President. The decision of the Office of the President theneffectively substitutes as the determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basisof the DTI Secretary’s decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA underSection 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review of the TariffCommission’s determination may be sustained without violating the SMA and its constitutionalrestrictions and limitations, as well as administrative law.In any event, even if we concede the possibility of administrative review of the TariffCommission’s final determination by the NEDA, such would not deny merit to the presentpetition. It does not change the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTISecretary was not bound by the negative final determination of the Tariff Commission, or thatthe DTI Secretary acted without jurisdiction when he imposed general safeguard measuresdespite the absence of the statutory positive final determination of the Commission.

Exemptions

95. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINOappropriation for public purpose AVC is an educational corp. The school sought theannulment of a “NOTICE OF SEIZURE” and NOTICEOF SALE of its lot and building in Banged Abra forNON-PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES(P5140). The school offers primary, high school and collegecourses. It has a population of more than 1000students, located right in the heart of Bangued. Thestructure iso High school and college at the main buildingo Rented to a commercial establishment = 1stflooro Director and his family = 2nd floor AVC argues that the primary use of said lot andbuilding is educational and thus exempt from RPT.Thus, AVC claims that the seizure and sale arewithout legal basis. The municipal treasurer however contends that the lotand building are used for:o 1) educational purpose = collegeo 2) as permanent residence of the Presidentand Director and his family, including in lawsand grandchildreno 3) commercial purpose = 1st floor is rented toa commercial establishmentISSUE: Whether the lot and building is exempt from RPT?Whether it is used exclusively for educational purposes?SC: The test of exemption from taxation is the USE OFTHE PROPERTY for purposes mentioned in theConstitution.It must be stressed however, that while this Courtallows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation ofthe phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes”reasonable emphasis has always been made thatEXEMPTION EXTENDS TO FACILITIES WHICH AREINCIDENTAL TO OR REASONABLY NECESSARY FORTHE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MAIN PURPOSE.Thus, while the use of the 2nd floor is forresidential purposes (of the Director and President), itfinds justification under the CONCEPT OF INCIDENTALUSE. Hence, it is complimentary to the main or primarypurpose = educational.BUT, the lease of the 1st floor to North MarketingCorporation CANNOT be considered incidental to thepurpose of education.Hence, the school building and lot should betaxed BECAUSE THE FIRST FLOOR IS BEING USEDFOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. Thus, since only aportion is used for commerce, it is only fair that HALF OFTHE ASSESSED TAX be returned to the school.

96. Bayan v. ZamoraI.      THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

II.    THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

97. John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. LimFacts: Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of Military Reservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing

Funds Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and AsiaworldInternationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in

accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

Sec 29 Control of Public FundsFiscal Powers of Congress98. Pascual v. Secretary of Public WorksFacts:1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by the President.

2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the local government, though the donation was made a few months after the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.

3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said donation, hence it dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the

petition

YES.1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the country. 

2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether it is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of a stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed subsequent thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law.

Guingona v CaragueFacts:Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget which was authorized by  PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2) restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. While respondents contend that the petition involves a political question (repeal/amendment of said laws)

Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by the 1987 Constitution

NO.(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

99. GUINGONA, JR. VS. CARAGUEFacts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion inautomatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debtservice) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831,otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or atotal of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for theDECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.The said automatic appropriation for debt serviceis authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending CertainProvisions of Republic Act Numbered Four ThousandEight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign BorrowingAct), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the BudgetProcess in Order to Institutionalize the BudgetaryInnovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967,entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee andPayment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on itsContingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent andGuaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For ThePurpose.”The petitioners were questioning theconstitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt

service, it being higher than the budget for education,therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of theConstitution which mandates to “assign the highestbudgetary priority to education.”Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation fordebt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than thebudget for education.Held: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), ArticleXIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assignthe highest budgetary priority to education,” it does notthereby follow that the hands of Congress are sohamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to theimperatives of the national interest and for the attainmentof other state policies or objectives.Congress is certainly not without any power,guided only by its good judgment, to provide anappropriation that can reasonably service our enormousdebt. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect thecredit standing of the country. More especially, the verysurvival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the processCongress appropriated an amount for debt service biggerthan the share allocated to education, the Court finds andso holds that said appropriation cannot be therebyassailed as unconstitutional.

Special Funds100. John Osmena vs. Oscar Orbos,Facts:Pres. Marcos created Special Account in the General Fund (P.D. 1956),designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed toreimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleumproducts resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the worldmarket prices of crude oil.. Pres. Aquino, amended and promulgated E.O. No. 137,expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible costunderrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleumproducts, the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. The petition claimed that the status of the OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a ―Terminal Balance Deficit‖ of some P12.877 billion and to abate such, the Energy Regulatory Board issued an Order approving the increase in pump prices of petroleumproducts. The OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a span of 6 months butOscarOrbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;JesusEstanislao, in his capacity asSecretary of Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory Board—arepoised to accept, process and pay claims not authorized under P.D. 1956.Issue: What is the purpose of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund?

RULING: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established ―for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.‖ It is clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes; they are exacted inthe exercise of the police power of the State.

Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fundis plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the generalfund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fundnonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court issatisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "specialfund."The Court cited Valmonte v. ERB and Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,―Thetax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatorypurpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar (petroleum products)industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.

101. COCOFED vs. Republic,

FACTS:In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut InvestmentFund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked to collect and administer theFund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, therecognized national association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Cocofundreceipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller.During the Martial Law regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued severalPresidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry. The mostrelevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund for the―acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stockof the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers‖ (Sec.2).Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUB’s outstanding capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangcoin behalf of the coconut farmers.”The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were giventheir corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUNDreceipts were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/partof their UCPB shares to private individuals.Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to variousprojects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years. After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealthaccumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file casesfor sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPBregistered in the name of ―over a million coconut farmers‖ held in trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment thatthe Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PDNo. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.The COCOFED representing the ―over a million coconut farmers‖ via Petition for review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that the sequestration amounted to ―taking of private property withoutjust compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.‖

ISSUE: What is the NATURE of the Coconut Levy Fund?RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the REPUBLIC. To begin with, the Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the State’s inherent power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature of TAXES. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.The Funds were collected to advance the government avowed policy ofprotecting the coconut industry.The SC took judicial notice of the fact that thecoconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the countries’ export products.Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also toprovide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest.

Sec 30 Appellate Jurisdiction of the SC102. First Lepanto Ceramic v CAFacts:

1.    Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

   BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." OppositorMariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

   CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

    Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

    Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

    While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

103. Diaz vs. Court of AppealsFacts :Petition for Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before theCourt assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1)the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode ofappeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.on 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals todisregard the circular.In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.Issue :Did the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition .Held :On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took effect(, with Sec. 30.)On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board of Energy.Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

Consequently, theauthority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, nowERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).Hence, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held â Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's Resolution dated September 8, 1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for further disposition" was not a directive for this court to disregard the above circulars and precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could mean only that this court should dispose of the subject petition in conformity with, and not in violation of, those circulars and precedents (Rollo, p.26).Both Circulars Nos. 1-88 and 2-90 were duly published in newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Hence, lawyers are expected to keep themselves abreast with the decisions of this Court and with its Circulars and other issuances relating to procedure or affecting their duties and responsibilities as officers of the court (Teehankee, Jr. v. Hon. Madayag, G.R. No. 102717, 12 December 1992).

104. FABIAN vs DESIERTOFACTS:Fabian was the major stock holder and president ofof PROMAT Construction Development Corporation(PROMAT) who participated in the bidding forgovernment construction project including thoseunder the FMED. Agustin had an affair withFabianthst resulted in the former giving public workscontracts and for it in problems concerning thesame in his office as his gift. Due to someunpleasant incidents between the two, Fabian triedbreaking up with Agustin but the latter refused andeven employed acts of harassment, intimidation,and threats. Thus Fabian filed an administrativecase wherein the Office of the Ombudsman ruledin favor of Fabian resulting to the dismissal ofAgustin. A motion for reconsideration was filed;however, Desierto inhibited himself as the newcounsel of the former is his associate. The case wastransferred to Guerrero who set aside Desierto’sorder and exonerated Agustin from the case.Fabian, then, appealed with the argumentanchored in Sec 27 of RA 6770 which states that: “Inall administrative disciplinary cases, orders,directives or decisions of the Office of theOmbudsman may be appealed to theSupreme Court by filing apetition forcertiorariwithin ten (10) days fromreceipt of the written notice of the order, directiveor decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of theRules of Court.”

ISSUE:--Whether or not Section 27 of Republic ActNo. 6770 is valid--Whether Section 27 of Republic Act No.6770 is substantive or procedural

HELD:Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their truelegal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 ofRepublic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize anappeal to this Court from decisions of the Office ofthe Ombudsman in administrative disciplinarycases. It consequently violates the proscription inSection 30, Article VI of the Constitution against alaw which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of thisCourt.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by theSupreme Court, for the practice and procedure ofthe lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies anysubstantive right, the test is whether the rule reallyregulates procedure, that is, the judicial process forenforcing rights and duties recognized bysubstantive law and for justly administering remedyandredress for a disregard or infraction of them. Ifthe rule takes away a vested right, it is notprocedural. If the rule creates a right such as theright to appeal, it may be classified as a substantivematter; but if it operates as a means ofimplementing an existing right then the rule dealsmerely with procedure.

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutesinvolving a transfer of cases from one court toanother, are procedural and remedial merely andthat, as such, they are applicable to actionspending at the time the statute went into effect or,in the case at bar, when its invalidity wasdeclared. Accordingly, even from the standpointof jurisdiction ex

hypothesis the validity of thetransfer of appeals in said cases to the Court ofAppeals can be sustained.WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770(Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules ofProcedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), andany other provision of law or issuance implementingthe aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide forappeals in administrative disciplinary cases from theOffice of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court,are hereby declared INVALID and of no furtherforce and effect.

Sec 32 Initiative and Referendum105. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITYvs.COMELECFACTS:--On March 13, 1992, Congress enactedRA. 7227(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declarednational policy of converting the Subic military reservation intoalternative productive uses.--On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left by the American navy.--On April 1993, theSangguniang Bayanof Morong, Bataan passedPambayangKapasyahanBilang 10 ,Serye 1993, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.--On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed apetitionwith theSangguniang Bayan of Morong toannul PambayangKapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.--The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special EconomiZone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.--TheSangguniang Bayanng Morong acted upon the petition bypromulgatingPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993, requestingCongress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.--Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under theLGC of 1991.--On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on theground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not anordinance.--On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein theportion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipality of Morong.--On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issuedResolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities forlocal referendumandproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of thereferendum--On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition forcertiorari contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent isintent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes anamendment of a national law

ISSUE:1.WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of thereferendumproposing to annul or repealPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 102.WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to enact; ie., whether such initiative "seeksthe amendment of a national law."

HELD:1.YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE butrespondentComelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.In

fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislativebody and which in most cases would without action on the part of electorsbecome a law.In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration andsupervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.These law-making powers belong to the people, hence therespondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or thecontent of legislation.2.The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet anapproved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligationscan be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to theproposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. TheCommission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncementsabout the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply includedverbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in theexercise of its review powers.

106. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELECFacts:P r i v a t e   r e s p o n d e n t   A t t y .   J e s u s   D e l f i n ,  p r e s i d e n t   o f   P e o p l e ’ s   I n i t i a t i v e   f o r   R e f o r m s ,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of  the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the  right of the people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petit ion and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for  hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-IpagtanggolangKonstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.SenatorRoco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator  Santiago, Alexander  Padilla, and Isabel  Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of  Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onp e o p l e ’ s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n o n l y b e i m p l e m e n t e d b y l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such law has been passed; (2)

The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lift ing of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore i t isoutside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of init iative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lift ing of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.Held:S e c .   2 ,   A r t   X V I I   o f   t h e   C o n s t i t u t i o n   i s   n o t   s e l f  e x e c u t o r y ,   t h u s ,   w i t h o u t   i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatw h a t   h a s   b e e n   d e l e g a t e d ,   c a n n o t   b e   d e l e g a t e d  ( p o t e s t a s   d e l e g a t a   n o n   d e l e g a r i   p o t e s t ) .   T h e delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e t e r m l i m i t s w a s h e l d t o b e t h a t o f a r e v i s i o n , a s i t w o u l d a f f e c t o t h e r   provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

107. LAMBINO vs. COMELEC Requirements for Initiative Petition Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.

ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an

amendment or revision Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient

compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

RULING:Initiative   petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by peopleSec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text.

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.

2 elements of   initiative 1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.

No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be

embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full textof the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.

Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitutionrequires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x xx in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The   initiative   violates Section 2, Article XVII of   the Constitution   disallowing revision through initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A people’sinitiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Group’s   initiative   constitute a revision of   the Constitution?Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one

chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Amendment vs. RevisionCourts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes

change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revisionA change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.