112976314 Family Code Cases Article 68 to 148 Case Digest

8/21/2019 112976314 Family Code Cases Article 68 to 148 Case Digest

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Persons and Family Relations Cases - Case Digest Prepared by The Law

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. POTENCIANO ILUSORIO

ACTS:

Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11,1942.They had six children.

Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensiveproperties valued at millions of pesos. He was alsothe Chairman of the Board and President of BaguioCountry Club.

In 1972, the spouses were separated from bed andboard for undisclosed reasons.

Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium – Manilaand when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse, BaguioCountry Club.

Erlinda lived in Antipolo city.

On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda at Antipolo after his arrival from the US.

Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potencianoan overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead ofthe 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by thelatter‟s doctor in New York.

Because of the overdose, Potenciano‟s healthdeteriorated.

On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for the

guardianship over the person and property ofPotenciano due to the latter‟s advanced aged, frailhealth, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolocity after attending a corporate meeting in Baguiocity. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati.

On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petitionfor habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyerPotenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondentsprevented her from visiting her husband and fromgoing home going home to Antipolo.

Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writof habeas corpus. However, the CA granted visitation

rights. The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolutiondismissing the application for habeas corpus to havethe custody of her husband, lawyer PotencianoIlusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.

On the other hand, the petition of PotencianoIlusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of theCourt of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitationrights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and theCourt of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.

SSUE:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in dismissingthe petition for habeas corpus?

HELD: NO. The essential object of the writ of habeascorpus is to release a person illegally detained. TheCA did not err in dismissing the petition of Erlindabecause a writ of habeas corpus is only grantedwhen there is an illegal and involuntary deprivation offreedom of action.

In the case at bar, it was Potenciano‟s choice nreturn in Antipolo city. He did not requesadministrator of Cleveland Condominium to prhis wife from visiting him. Even at 86 years old, still of sound mind which means that he can decisions for himself. He should not be the subjvisitation rights as it will violate his right of privac

2. Was the order granting visitorial rights proper?

HELD: NO. The petition of Erlinda did not includprayer for visitation rights. The Court of Apmissed the fact that the issue involved is betwhusband and wife, not between children or mand parents. The husband or the wife has the lto refuse to see each other.

No court is empowered as a judicial authorcompel a husband to live with his wife.

Under Article 68 of Family CodeFull Text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139_ilusorio.htm

CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and Zosima Montallana bethe registered owners of Lot No. 437-A at the cof Calle Santa Rosa and Rosario in ZamboangNorte on January 1956.

Zosima died on October 3, 1980. Francisco anmother-in-law, Juliana Montallana, executed a of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights.

Juliana waived her share consisting ¼ of the pro

to Francisco. Since Francisco had no children, he asked his

(Leticia), his neice‟s cousin (Luzviminda) awidow (Cirila Arcaba) to take care of his houswell as the store inside.

When Leticia and Luzminda got married, only was left to take good care of Francisco anhouse.

Erlinda Tabancura testified that the source of inof Francisco solely consisted of rentals from lots

Francisco did not pay Cirila her wages but her freceived free board and lodging from him.

On January 1991, Francisco executed a “Dee

Donation Inter Vivos” wherein he donated 15meters lot and his house to Cirila. The latter accesuch donation.

The deed stated that the donation was being maconsideration of “the faithful services that Cirilarendered over the past ten (10) years.”

On October 1991, Francisco died.

On 1993, the nephews, nieces and heirs by intesuccession of Francisco filed a petition for the n

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139789_ilusorio.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139789_ilusorio.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139789_ilusorio.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139789_ilusorio.htm


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of the deed of donation inter vivos. They alleged thatthe donation violated Article 87 of the Family Codebecause Cirila was the common law wife ofFrancisco.

The court granted the petition in favor of the heirsbased on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and thedocuments showing that Cirila was the common lawwife of Francisco (Signed documents bearing thename Cirila Comile).

Cirila filed a motion for reconsideration stating thatthe Court of Appeals erred in stating that she was the

common law wife of Francisco based on themisapprehension of facts. According to her, thepresented evidences were only hearsay.

SSUE:

1.Whether or not the donation was void.

HELD: YES. The donation made by Francisco to Cirilawas void because it was not in accordance with Article87 of the Family Code.

“Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, director indirect, between the spouses during the marriage

shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spousesmay give each other on the occasion of any familyrejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to personsliving together as husband and wife without a validmarriage.”

Respondents having proven by a preponderance ofevidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together ashusband and wife without a valid marriage, theinescapable conclusion is that the donation made byFrancisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of theFamily Code.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Cirilawas a common law wife of Francisco based on thefollowing evidences:

The application for business permit tooperate a real estate business where in Cirilaused the surname Comile instead of Arcaba.

The sanitary permit also showed CirilaComile as signatory.

The death certificate of Francisco was signedby Cirila using the surname Comile.

In Bitangcor vs. Tan, the Supreme Court ruled that

cohabitation is more than sexual intercourse especiallywhen the spouses are already old and may no longerbe interested in sex.

nder Article 87 of the Family Codeull Text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683tm

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. v

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a amounting to P50,300,000 from Ayala Investand Development Corporation (AIDC).

Alfredo Ching, PBM‟s Exec. Vice President, exesecurity agreements (Dec. 1980 and Mar. making himself jointly and severally answerablePBM‟s indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. On July 1981, AIDC filed a case to recover the

of money against PBM and Alferdo Ching.

The court rendered judgment ordering PBMrespondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointlyseverally pay AIDC the principal amof P50,300,000.00 with interests

While there was an appeal to the decision of thecase, the lower court issued a writ of execpending appeal. Sr. Deputy Sheriff Magsajo issunotice of sheriff sale to the Ching spouses on thrtheir conjugal properties.

The Ching spouses filed a case of injunction all

that the judgment cannot be enforced against conjugal partnership. According to them, the suloan did not redound to the benefit of the conpartnership.

The lower court issued a temporary restraining to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceedingthe enforcement of the writ of execution and witsale of the said properties at public auction.

ISSUE:

1. Is a surety agreement or an accommodation conentered into by husband in favor of his empwithin the contemplation of debts that redound fobenefit of family?

HELD: NO. The loan obtained by PBM andChing is a corporate loan, not a perone. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exeof an industry or profession nor an acadministration for the benefit of the family.

Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit – payment of personal debts contracted byhusband or the wife before or during the marshall not be charged to the conjugal partneexcept insofar as they redounded to the benefit

family.‟

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the bethe respondent family would reasonably anticwere the following:

The employment of co-respondent AChing would be prolonged and he wouentitled to his monthly salary of P20,0for an extended length of time because loan he guaranteed;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htm


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The shares of stock of the members of hisfamily would appreciate if the PBM could berehabilitated through the loan obtained;

His prestige in the corporation would beenhanced and his career would be boostedshould PBM survive because of the loan. However, these are not the benefits

contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. Thebenefits must be one directly resulting from theloan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of

the loan itself.

nder Article 121 of the Family Codeull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.m

ALFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

ACTS:

On September 1978, Philippine Blooming MillsCompany (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loanfrom Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).

Alfredo Ching together with two other personsexecuted a continuing guarantee with ABC bindingthemselves jointly and severally liable for the PBMCIobligations.

The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 millionpesos.

PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted toP12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties andother bank charges.)

Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, thesheriff levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares ofCity Corporation stocks registered solely to AlfredoChing.

Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the100,000 common shares.

According to her, the shares were purchased out ofthe conjugal funds.

She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did notredound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (orfamily).

SSUE:

1. Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching istenable.

HELD: YES. ABC has the burden of proof to showthat the common shares registered solely to thename of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Justbecause Mr. Ching‟s name appeared as the soleregistrant of the shares in the corporate books ofCityCorp doesn‟t mean that it is his exclusiveproperty and not to the conjugal partnership.

As held in the case of Ayala InvestmentDevelopment Corporation vs. Court of Appealscourt said that “signing as a surety is certainly nexercise of an industry or profession. It isembarking in a business.”

For the conjugal partnership to become liableimportant to show that the family received beand advantages from the liability incurred. Theno presumption that when a husband entered inaccommodation agreement or a contract of suthe conjugal partnership would be benefited.

The benefits must be those directly resulting fromloan.

Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching‟s common shares not be levied because he is not the sole ownsuch stocks. The shares belong to the conpartnership.

Under Article 121 of the Family CodeFull text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/11htm

CLEODIA and CEAMANTHA FRANCISCO vs. JORGE

PURIFICATION GONZALES

FACTS:

The petitioners are Cleodia and CeamFrancisco.

They are the children of Cleodualdo and MiFrancisco.

Mr. and Mrs. Francisco got married on Jun1986. Their marriage is governed by the conpartnership of gains (under the Civil Code, befor

Family Code). In November 2000, the marriage of the spouses

declared null and void.

They entered into a compromise agreement whone of the provisions is:

“Title and ownership of the conjugal proconsisting of a house and lot located in A

Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shatransferred by way of a deed of donatioCleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, whenreach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) yearsrespectively.”

After signing the compromise agreement, Mi

Francisco cohabited with George Matrai at LDrive, Ayala Alabang Village.

Spouses Jorge and Purification Gonzales filed afor Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachagainst Matria and Michele Franscisco.

The Metropolitan trial court ordered Matrai anFrancisco to pay back the rentals, unpaid telepbills and attorney‟s fees.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.htm


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A notice of sale by execution was issued by thesheriff covering the house and lot property located at

Ayala Alabang.

The grandmother (guardian) of Cleodia andCeamantha filed in the RTC an Affidavit of ThirdParty Claim

and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale

by Execution but this was denied. The motion forreconsideration was also denied to the petitioners.

Petitioners filed a petition of certiorari with the Courtof Appeals.

The arguments of the petitioners are as follow:

a. They are the rightful owners of the house and lotas it was donated to them by virtue of theCompromise Agreement entered into by theirparents.

b. Their parents already waived their rights on thesaid property.

c. The obligation of Michele did not redound to thebenefit of the family.

d. Michele Francisco‟s obligation is a joint obligationbetween her and Matrai.

SSUE:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred inaffirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court to

proceed with the execution, levy and sale of thesubject property.

HELD: YES. The Court finds that it was grave errorfor the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy andsale of the subject property.

To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored thatthe property in question is in the name of "CleodualdoM. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco." Onits face, the title shows that the registered owner ofthe property is not Matrai and Michele but

Cleodualdo, married to Michele. The liability incurredby Michele arose from a judgment rendered in anunlawful detainer case against her and her partnerMatrai.

Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Noticeof Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001, therewas already annotated on the title the followinginscription: Entry No. 23341-42/T-167907 -Nullification of Marriage: “Title of ownership of theconjugal property consisting of the above-describedproperty shall be transferred by way of a Deed ofDonation to Cleodia Michaela U. Francisco and

Ceamantha Maica U. Francisco, as co-owners whenthey reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) yrs. old tothe condition that Cleodualdo, shall retainusufructuary rights over the property until he reachesthe age of 65 yrs. Old.”

From the foregoing, it is clear that both Michele andCleodualdo have waived their title to and ownershipof the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners.

The property should not have been levied and sexecution sale, for lack of legal basis.

Under Article 124 of the Family CodeFull text:http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Dns%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=1222753297470223

HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE v. COURT OF APPEA

FACTS:

Christina Ayuste married Rafael AyusteSeptember 24, 1961.

The couple resided in Manila but they operamachine shop in Lucena City. This businessmanaged by Rafael Ayuste.

The couple purchased on August 1982 a parland with an area of 180 square meters on whresidential house was built situated at Lucenafor Mr. Ayuste‟s temporary residence.

A deed of sale was executed and signed bparties and filed with the Register of DeedLucena City. The property was purchased spouses Pedro and Aida David.

On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, with the conseMrs. Ayuste sold the said parcel of landP40,000 to Malabonga.

Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Afound out that the parcel of land was sold bdeceased husband without her knowledgconsent.

In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulmethe sale, cancellation of the title issued in the of private respondent and for the payment of mexemplary and actual damages. In her comChristina Ayuste alleges that her signature o

deed of sale was forged. The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste.

Both parties appealed in the Court of Appeathe decision rendered by the RTC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioners are entitled toannulment of the contract of sale entered inRafael Ayuste without the consent of Chr

Ayuste?

HELD: The trial court erred in giving due cour

the action for annulment of sale. The Dee Absolute Sale executed on February 27, 1987 bbetween defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appehusband is declared VALID and BINDING upoplaintiff-appellant.

The only issue which remains to be resolvewhether petitioners are entitled to the annulmethe contract of sale entered into by Rafael Awithout the consent of Christina Ayuste.

http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223


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Under the Civil Code, although the husband is theadministrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannotalienate or encumber any real property of theconjugal partnership without his wife‟sconsent, subject only to certain exceptions specifiedin the law. The remedy available to the wife in caseher husband should dispose of their conjugalproperty without her consent is laid down in Article173 of the Civil Code which states that:

“The wife may, during the marriage, and within tenyears from the transaction questioned, ask the courtsfor the annulment of any contract of the husbandentered into without her consent, when such consentis required, or any act or contract of the husbandwhich tends to defraud her or impair her interest inthe conjugal partnership property. Should the wifefail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after thedissolution of the marriage, may demand the value ofproperty fraudulently alienated by the husband.

A sale of real property of the conjugal partnershipmade by the husband without the consent of his wifeis voidable. The action for annulment must bebrought during the marriage and within ten years

from the questioned transaction by the wife.”

In the present case, the deed of sale was executedon February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died onOctober 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2,1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint withthe lower court asking for the annulment of thesale. Although the action was filed within ten yearsfrom the questioned transaction, it was not broughtduring the existence of the marriage which wasdissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina

Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.

The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the saleafter the death of her husband is not material.

nder Article 173 of the Family Codeull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/118

84.htm

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR REYES v. CIPRIANO and

FLORENTINA MIJARES

ACTS:

Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but hadbeen separated de facto since 1974.

In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property(lot) to spouses Mijares for P40,000 on 1983.

She also found out that Vicente misrepresented herin the MTC declaring that she died on March 22,1982 and that the heirs left are him and the 5 minorchildren.

On September 1983, the court granted guardiaover the minor children to Vicente and authorizelatter to sell the estate of Ignacia on October 198

On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her cousent a letter to respondent spouses demandinreturn of her ½ share in the lot.

Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia fileJune 4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of against respondent spouses.

In their answer, respondent spouses claimedthey are purchasers in good faith and that the

was valid because it was duly approved by the c Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended

what he sold to the spouses was only his share.

On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendedecision declaring the sale of lot void with respethe share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicenreturn ½ thereof or P55,000.00 to responspouses.

Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decpraying that the sale be declared void in its enand that the respondents be ordered to reimburher the rentals they collected on the apartments

on Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 19 Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spo

appealed the decision to the Court Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died andwas substituted by her compulsory heirs.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the sale is valid, void or mvoidable?

HELD: Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Codgoverning laws at the time the assailed salecontracted, provide:

Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared acompos mentis or a spendthrift, or is underinterdiction or is confined in a leprosariumhusband cannot alienate or encumber anyproperty of the conjugal partnership without the wconsent. If she refuses unreasonably to giveconsent, the court may compel her to grant the s

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriagewithin ten years from the transaction questionedthe courts for the annulment of any contract ohusband entered into without her consent, when

consent is required, or any act or contract ohusband which tends to defraud her or impaiinterest in the conjugal partnership property. Sthe wife fail to exercise this right, she or her after the dissolution of the marriage, may demanvalue of property fraudulently alienated byhusband.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conproperty of Ignacia and Vicente. Therefore, the


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of said lot to the Mijares spouses, without theknowledge and consent of Ignacia Reyes, isvoidable. The action to annul the sale made on 1983was filed on 1986 which is within the prescriptiveperiod under Article 173.

The Court finds that respondent spouses are notpurchasers in good faith. They already know aboutthe discrepancies and irregularities in the deathcertificate presented by Vicente. The said errorsshould have prompted them to question the sale andpertaining documents.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed ofSale executed by Vicente and respondents wasannulled. The guilty husband is asked to paydamages to Mijares spouses and to his children(petitioners).

ull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/143826tm

ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS

and ROMULO NICOL

ACTS:

Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against ErlindaNicol.

On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decisionordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners.

The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient topay the damages.

The sheriff levied and auctioned the property ofErlinda.

An auction sale was held with the petitioners as thehighest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in

favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda,

Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment ofcertificate of sale and damages with preliminaryinjunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.

He argued that there was no proper publication andposting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the

judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted toP40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained theP500,000 worth of property for only P51,685.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition ofRomulo Nicol.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the

RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to acton the complaint filed by the respondent in this case.

The petitioners filed a petition where they said thatthe Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion for reversing the decision given by theRTC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol afrom her criminal liability is chargeable to the con

partnership.

HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargto the conjugal partnership.

Unlike in the system of absolute community wliabilities incurred by either spouse by reasoncrime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the abscommunity of property, in the absenceinsufficiency of the exclusive property of the despouse, the same advantage is not accorded isystem of conjugal partnership of gains. The conpartnership of gains has no duty to make advpayments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the arising from her criminal liability is chargeable tconjugal partnership. The Supreme Court doeagree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.

In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that th

which was claimed by the third party complainabe conjugal property was being levied upoenforce "a judgment for support" filed by a person, the third-party claim of the wife is psince the obligation which is personal to the husis chargeable not on the conjugal property but oseparate property. Hence, the filing of a sepaction by Romulo Nicol was proper.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Full text:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_1452

009.html

DAVID and LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI PEREZ

FACTS:

David Pelayo sold two parcels of agriculturallocated in Panabo to Melki Perez on January 19

The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sa

Loreza Pelayo, wife of David, and another whose signature is illegible witnessed the execof the deed.

Mrs. Pelayo signed only the third space in the s

provided for the witnesses. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and se

pages but the latter refused.

As a result, Mr. Perez instituted an action for speperformance.

Perez countered that the lots were given to himdefendant Pelayo in consideration of his servicehis attorney-in-fact to make the necesrepresentation and negotiation with the iloccupants-defendants in the ejectment suit


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Defendant Pelayo said that the deed was without theconsent of Mrs. Perez and invoked Article166 of theCivil Code to support his argument.

SSUE:

1. Did Mrs. Pelayo expressed his consent in the deedof sale executed by Mr. Pelayo?

HELD: The Supreme Court said that the petitionerexpressed her consent to the Deed of Absolute Salewhen she fixed her signature on the document.

The consent need not be expressed. It can beimplied. In the present case, although it appears onthe face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed onlyas an instrumental witness, circumstances leading tothe execution of said document point to the fact thatLorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugalproperty and consented to the sale.

Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still ineffect on January 11, 1988 when the deed inquestion was executed, the lack of marital consent to

the disposition of conjugal property does not makethe contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Saidprovisions of law provide:

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civilinterdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, thehusband cannot alienate or encumber any realproperty of the conjugal property without the wife‟sconsent. If she refuses unreasonably to give herconsent, the court may compel her to grant thesame.

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, andwithin ten years from the transaction questioned, askthe courts for the annulment of any contract of thehusband entered into without her consent, whensuch consent is required, or any act or contract ofthe husband which tends to defraud her or impair herinterest in the conjugal partnership property. Shouldthe wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,after the dissolution of the marriage, may demandthe value of property fraudulently alienated by thehusband.

Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until

the court annuls the same and only upon an actionbrought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.

The petition of Mr. and Mrs. Pelayo was denied.

nder Articles 166 and 173 of the New Civil Code.ull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/

41323.htm

HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ SR. vs.

PLARIDEL and DOLORES MINGOA

FACTS:

The petitioners are the heirs of Domingo Hernanamely Sergia Hernandez (surviving spoDomingo, Jr. and Maria Leonora Wilma (children

Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez were awarded a property by the Philippine Homesite and HouCorporation (PHCC) by way of salary dedu(Central Bank.)

The real property was later awarded to DoCamisura who then sold the said property toMingoa spouses.

In April 1983, Mr. Hernandez died intestate.

When Mr. Hernandez died, his heirs found out the title of the property was already registeredthe respondents.

On February 1994, the petitioners filed a compagainst respondents.

They are praying for the annulment andeclaration of nullity of the Dead of Absolute SalReal Estate.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of

petitioners.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the title of the subject property inname of respondent Mingoa may still be reconveto the petitioners.

HELD: Article 173 of the Civil Code provides thwife may file for annulment of a contract enteredby the husband without her consent within tenyears from the transaction questioned. Petitifiled the action for reconveyance in 1995. Twelveyears have lapsed since such discovery, andfiled the petition beyond the period allowelaw. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, togwith her children, filed the action for reconveythe conjugal partnership of property with HernaSr. had already been terminated by virtue olatter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therepetitioners‟ action has prescribed.

In sum, the rights and interests of the spoHernandez over the subject property were vtransferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandezwas without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the

is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled.

Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her rigask for the annulment of the sale withinprescribed period, she is now barred questioning the validity thereof. And more so, sprecluded from assailing the validity of subsequent transfers from Camisura to PlMingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa.


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Therefore, title to the subject property cannotanymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reasonof prescription and laches. The issues of prescriptionand laches having been resolved, it is no longernecessary to discuss the other issues raised in thispetition.

ull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/decemb

r2009/146548.htm

ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ

ACTS:

Judie and Gilda Corpuz were married on December1968 in Bacolod City before a judge.

Mr. and Mrs. Corpuz purchased a lot in Koronadal,South Cotabato.

In April 1988, the couple sold one half portion of theirlot to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Guiang.

Gilda Corpuz went to Manila on June 1989 to searchfor employment abroad but she became a victim ofan illegal recruiter.

While she was in Manila, Mr. Corpuz (the husband),sold the other half of their residence to spousesGuiang (petitioners).

The daughter of Mrs. Guiang sent a letter to Gildaand the latter replied that she does not consent thesale.

In March 1990, Gilda went home. She lived in theirresidence with their children but the husbanddisappeared. The children said that Mr. Corpuz hada new wife already.

As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Guiang filed a complaintagainst respondent for trespassing.

Gilda field for the declaration of nullity of the deed ofsale.

The trial court held that the deed of transfer of rightsand amicable settlement are void. The CA affirmedthe decision of the lower court.

SSUE:

1. Whether or not the deed of transfer of rights wasvalidly executed, or it not, ratified by the execution ofthe amicable settlement.

HELD: The disposition or encumbrance isvoidable. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the

husband cannot generally alienate or encumber anyreal property of the conjugal partnership without thewife‟s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if somade however is not null and void. It is merelyvoidable. The offended wife may bring an action toannul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, theprovision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, to wit:

„Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriagewithin ten years from the transaction questioask the courts for the annulment of any contrathe husband entered into without her conwhen such consent is required, or any accontract of the husband which tends to defraudor impair her interest in the conjugal partneproperty. Should the wife fail to exercise this she or her heirs after the dissolution ofmarriage, may demand the value of propfraudulently alienated by the husband.‟

This particular provision giving the wife ten years during [the] marriage to annul the alienatioencumbrance was not carried over to the FaCode. It is thus clear that any alienationencumbrance made after August 3, 1988 whenFamily Code took effect by the husband ofconjugal partnership property without the consethe wife is null and void.

Insisting that the contract of sale was mvoidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratifiethe contending parties through the “amisettlement” they executed on March 16, 1990

position is not well taken. Doctrinally and cleavoid contract cannot be ratified.

Full text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jun1998/125htm

THELMA JADER-MANALO vs.

NORMA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA

FACTS:

Thelma Jader-Manalo saw an advertisement i

classified ads section of the newspaper BuToday (April 1992 issue).

The advertisement was about the sale of the tenapartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Camaisa.

Thelma was interested in the purchase of lot sonegotiated to purchase the property through aestate broker Mr. Ereno.

The parties agreed in a hand-written contractmode of payment agreed was installment.

The following day, both the parties met and sthe typewritten contract. Manalo issued Uchecks.

After one day, Norma called Thelma Manalo and

that they are cancelling the sale becausespouses need spot cash and not checks.

Thelma filed a complaint to compel Norma to sigcontracts to sell.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the husband may dispose conjugal property with the wife’s written consent.


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HELD: The law requires that the disposition of aconjugal property by the husband as administrator inappropriate cases requires the written consent of thewife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article124 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of theconjugal partnership property shall belong to bothspouses jointly. In case of disagreement, thehusband‟s decision shall prevail, subject to recourseto the court by the wife for a proper remedy, whichmust be availed of within five years from the date ofthe contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated orotherwise unable to participate in the administrationof the conjugal properties, the other spouse mayassume sole powers of administration. These powersdo not include the powers of disposition orencumbrance which must have the authority of thecourt or the written consent of the other spouse. Inthe absence of such authority or consent thedisposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,the transaction shall be construed as a continuingoffer on the part of the consenting spouse and the

third person, and may be perfected as a bindingcontract upon the acceptance by the other spouse orauthorization by the court before the offer iswithdrawn by either or both offerors.

The properties subject of the contracts in this casewas conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to beeffective, the consent of both husband and wife mustconcur.

The Supreme Court said that being aware of thetransaction is not consent.

Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if thewritten consent of the other spouse cannot beobtained or is being withheld, the matter may bebrought to court which will give such authority if thesame is warranted by the circumstances. However, itshould be stressed that court authorization under Art.124 is only resorted to in cases where the spousewho does not give consent is incapacitated.

In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove thatrespondent Norma was incapacitated to give herconsent to the contracts. In the absence of suchshowing of the wife‟s incapacity, court authorization

cannot be sought.

ull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/147978.m

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs.

MIGUELA C. DAILO

FACTS:

Miguela and Marcelino Dailo were married on A1967.

During the marriage, the spouses purchased situated in San Pablo City from Dalida.

The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favthe husband (exclusion of his wife).

On December 1993, Marcelino executed a Sp

Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one LiGesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan to be secured by the spouses Dailo‟s house andSan Pablo City.

Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a lothe amount ofP300,000.00 from petit(Homeowner‟s Bank).

As security, Gesmundo executed on the same Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the suproperty in favor of petitioner.

All the two transactions were made by Marcwithout the knowledge and consent of Miguela D

The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. Hinstituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings omortgaged property. The said bank was the hibidder.

In December 1995, Marcelino Dailo died. Herfound out that the house and lot in San Pablowas already mortgaged. As a result, she filpetition for the Nullity of Real Estate MortgageCertificate of Sale, Deed of Sale and damagainst petitioner.

The petitioner prayed for the dismissal ofcomplaint on the ground that the property in quewas the exclusive property of the husband. Halso contended that the loan obtained by Marcredounded to the benefits of the Family.

ISSUE:

1. Was the disposal of the property executeMarcelino valid?

HELD: NO. In Guiang v. Court of AppealsSupreme Court held that the sale of a conproperty requires the consent of both the husand wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Cthis Court declared that the absence of the consone renders the entire sale null and void, incl

the portion of the conjugal property pertaining thusband who contracted the sale.

The same principle in Guiang squarely applies tinstant case. As shall be discussed next, there legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Cod


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Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. weremarried on August 8, 1967. In the absence of amarriage settlement, the system of relativecommunity or conjugal partnership of gains governedthe property relations between respondent and herlate husband. With the effectivity of the Family Codeon August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on ConjugalPartnership of Gains in the Family Code was madeapplicable to conjugal partnership of gains alreadyestablished before its effectivity unless vested rightshave already been acquired under the Civil Code orother laws.

The basic and established fact is that during hislifetime, without the knowledge and consent of hiswife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estatemortgage on the subject property, which formed partof their conjugal partnership. By express provision of

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of(court) authority or written consent of the otherspouse, any disposition or encumbrance of theconjugal property shall be void.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted forthe benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies

with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Eiincumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he whoasserts, not he who denies, must prove).

On the issue about the “loan redounded tothe benefit of the family,” the Supreme Court heldthat the petitioner did not assert such contentionwhen they filed their complaint in the lower court.When a party adopts a certain theory in the courtbelow, he will not be permitted to change his theoryon appeal, for to permit him to do so would not onlybe unfair to the other party but it would also beoffensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and

due process.

ull text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802tm

PATROCINIA and WILFREDO RAVINO vs. MARY ANN

VILLA ABRILLE

ACTS:

The respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille is married to

Pedro Villa Abrille. The spouses have four children. In 1982, the spouses purchased a parcel of land in

Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao city with an area of555 square meter. The property is registered undertheir names.

Adjacent to the said lot is a parcel of land owned andacquired by Pedro before the marriage.

Mr. and Mrs. Villa Abrille built a house on Lot 7(owned by both spouses) and Pedro‟s lot. They also

made improvements such as poultry houseannex.

In 1991, Pedro had illicit relations with anwoman and neglected his family.

As a result, Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortheir movables to support the family.

Pedro sold the property (house and two lotPatrocinia and Wilfredo Ravino without the consMary Ann.

While Mary Ann was out, Pedro and armed memof the CAFGU transferred the properties of the f

from the house to an apartment. Respondents Mary Ann and her children fil

complaint for Annulment of Sale, SpPerformance, Damages and Attorney‟s FeesPreliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedroherein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of DCity.

During the trial, Pedro declared that the housebuilt with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Rtestified that they bought the house and lot Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner WiRavina, examined the titles when they boughproperty.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mary Ann Villa A(sale of ½ share is valid, payment for damaWhen the petitioners appealed, the CA modifiedecision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the property covered by TCT N88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or con

property. Whether its sale by Pedro was considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent .

HELD: There is no issue with regard to thcovered by TCT No. T-26471, which was

exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquirhim before his marriage to Mary Ann. Howevelot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquire1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary The house built thereon is conjugal property, hbeen constructed through the joint efforts ospouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBconstruct the house.

Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conproperty concluded after the effectivity of the FCode on August 3, 1988, is governed by Articleof the same Code that now treats such a dispo

to be void if done (a) without the consent of bothusband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spoinability, the authority of the court. The partprovision in the New Civil Code giving the wif(10) years to annul the alienation or encumbwas not carried over to the Family Code. It isclear that alienation or encumbrance of the conpartnership property by the husband withouconsent of the wife is null and void.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802.htm


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Hence, just like the rule in absolute community ofproperty, if the husband, without knowledge andconsent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such saleis void. If the sale was with the knowledge but withoutthe approval of the wife, thereby resulting in adisagreement, such sale is annullable at the instanceof the wife who is given five (5) years from the datethe contract implementing the decision of thehusband to institute the case.

Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action forannulment of sale within five (5) years from the dateof sale and execution of the deed. However, heraction to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugalhouse and lot and does not include the lot covered byTCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging toPedro and which he can dispose of freely withoutMary Ann‟s consent.

The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are notbuyers in good faith. The sale of the conjugalproperty was annulled while the sale of Pedro‟sexclusive property was valid. When a contract isdeclared void, there must be a restoration of thesubject of the said contract.

ull text:tp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_160708_2

09.html

MANUEL and LETICIA FUENTES vs CONDRADO ROCA

ACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a 358-sq. m. lot inZamboanga city.

In October 1982, the said lot was sold to TarcianoRoca (her son) but the latter did not transfer the

registry of title to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to Manuel and

Leticia Fuentes.

The parties entered into an agreement to sellprepared by Atty. Plagata. The said agreement wasto take effects six months after April 29, 1998.

In the agreement, Tarciano required the Fuentesspouses to pay for a down payment of P60,000 forthe transfer of lot title.

Within six months, Tarciano was to clear thestructures and occupants of the lot. At the same time,he needs to get the consent of his estranged wife toagree with the sale. The petitioners agreed to pay the

remaining P140,000 or P160,000 upon Tarciano‟scompliance to the agreement.

Atty. Plagata met Rosario (Tarciano) and asked herto sign the agreement of sale.

The contract of sale was perfected and the Fuentesspouses became the owner of the said property.

In 1997 (after 8 years), the children of the Rocaspouses filed a complaint against petitioners prayingfor the annulment of sale and reconveyance of thelot.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the docuof consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was foWhether or not the Rocas’ action for the declarof nullity of that sale to the spouses alr

prescribed; and Whether or not only Rosario, thewhose consent was not had, could bring the actiannul that sale.

HELD: The Court of Appeals found out thasignature of Rosario was forged. The Supreme held the same. There is dissimilarity betweespecimen signature of Rosario and that of seen agreement of sale.

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, ththat applies to this case is the Family Code, noCivil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosariomarried in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal proto the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, amonths after the Family Code took effect on A3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil code pplace the system of conjugal partnership of gaintheir property relations. While its Article 165 mTarciano the sole administrator of the conpartnership, Article 166

prohibited him from s

commonly owned real property without his wconsent. Still, if he sold the same without his wconsent, the sale is not void but merely void

Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have theannulled during the marriage within ten years the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her may demand, after dissolution of the marriage,

the value of the property that Tarciano fraudusold.

The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale dJanuary 11, 1989 by Tarciano T. Roca, executfavor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to LeticFuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of T90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboangaissued in the names of the latter spouses pursuathat deed of sale are declared void.

The Fuentes spouses are buyers in good Therefore, they are not required by law to pay

amount of damages to the Rocas. HoweverRocas are indemnified to reimburse the coimprovements made by the Fuentes to the prope

Full text:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_1789010.html


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JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER vs. ISMAEL and FLORA

FERRER

ACTS:

Josefa is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer.

Alfredo Ferrer is the half brother of respondentsManuel and Ismael Ferrer.

Before Alfredo got married, he purchased a piece oflot and applied for a loan with the Social SecuritySystem (SSS) to build improvements on the property(residential house and two-door apartment).

The loan was fully paid during the marriage of Alfredoand Josefa using conjugal funds.

According to the petitioner, spouses Ismael and FloraFerrer asked Alfredo to sign his last will andtestament which turned out to be a contract of sale.

The sale involved the property acquired by Alfredobefore the marriage but was fully paid using theconjugal funds.

Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for the Annulment of the said sale against respondents. TheRTC dismissed the petition because it found out thatthe terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are notcontrart to law, morals, good customs and public

policy. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Courtaffirmed the decision.

Alfredo died on September 1999.

Josefa filed a petition for the reimbursement for thecost of improvements in Alfedo‟s lot.

SSUE:

Whether or not Josefa Ferrer must be reimbursed by thespondents.

ELD:

o. Petitioner failed to show that there is an obligation on theart of the respondents to respect or not violate her right. Theupreme Court ruled “While we could concede that Civilase No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouses contemplated in Article 120

[22] of the Family Code to be

imbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation toimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the

ntire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part ofe purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold bye owner-spouse.”

deed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining thewnership of the improvements that are made on the

eparate property of the spouses at the expense of theartnership or through the acts or efforts of either or bothpouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and anysulting increase in value are more than the value of the

roperty at the time of the improvement, the entire property ofne of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership,ubject to reimbursement of the value of the property of thewner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, saidroperty shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,kewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the

improvement. The subject property was precisely decas the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of A120 of the Family Code.

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despitallegations contained in the Complaint that they arebuyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner‟s spnor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligatioreimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Othestated, respondents do not have the obligation to repetitioner‟s right to be reimbursed.

In the case at bar, the respondents has not obligation toany cost of improvements to Josefa Ferrer. Thereforepetition is denied.

Full Text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november266496.htm

ELENA MURRER vs HELMUT MERRER

FACTS:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller respondent Helmut Muller were married in Geron September 1989.

The couple resided in Germany at a house ownthe parents of respondent.

In 1992, the spouses decided to move and rpermanently in the Philippines.

During that time, Helmut Muller inherited the houhis parents which he sold. The proceeds of thewere used to purchase a parcel of land in AntRizal and the construction of the house (P528

and P2,300,000 respectively). The Antipolo property was registered under the

of Elena Murrer.

Due to incompatibilities and respondent‟s alwomanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spoeventually separated.

On September 1994,Helmut Muller filed fseparation of property before the Regional Trial of Quezon city.

On August 1996, the trial court rendered a decwhich terminated the regime of absolute commof property between the spouses Muller.

The court also decreed the separation of prop

between the spouses and ordered the equal parof personal properties located within the coexcluding those acquired by gratuitous title.

Helmut Muller said that he is not praying fotransfer of ownership of the property but oreimbursement of his personal funds.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/166496.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/166496.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/166496.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/166496.htm#_ftn22


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SSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitledto the reimbursement of the funds used for theacquisition of the Antipolo property?

HELD: NO. Mr. Muller is not entitled to thereimbursement of the funds used to purchase the

Antipolo property.

The Constitution prohibits alien from acquiring privatelands in the Philippines for the conservation of thenational patrimony.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an impliedtrust was created and resulted by operation of law inview of petitioner‟s marriage to respondent. Save forthe exception provided in cases of hereditarysuccession, respondent‟s disqualification fromowning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not evenan ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where thepurchase is made in violation of an existing statuteand in evasion of its express provision, no trust canresult in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.

Further, the distinction made between transfer ofownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futileexercise on respondent‟s part. To allowreimbursement would in effect permit respondent toenjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowedto own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.

The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannotseek reimbursement on the ground of equity where itis clear that he purchased the property despiteconstitutional prohibition.

ull text:tp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2

06.html

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN

ACTS:

Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once hada blissful married life.

They were blessed to have one son.

Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgiliodiscovered that private respondent was having illicitsexual affair with her paramour.

The petitioner filed a case of adultery against privaterespondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour.

Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted ofthe crime charged and were sentenced to sufferimprisonment.

Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition forDeclaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution andLiquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains andDamages on 2001.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitionerespondent entered into a Compromise Agreeme

Partial settlements are as follows:- P500,000.00 of the money deposited ibank jointly in the name of the spouses shwithdrawn and deposited in favor and in trtheir common child, Neil Maquilan, withdeposit in the joint account of the partiesbalance of such deposit, which presently sat P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn divided equally by the parties;

- The store that is now being occupied bplaintiff shall be allotted to her while the boshall be for te defendant. The defendantbe paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his shathe stocks of the store in full settlement the- The motorcycles shall be divided betthem such that the Kawasaki shall be ownthe plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall bthe defendant;- The passenger jeep shall be for the plwho shall pay the defendant the suP75,000.00 as his share thereon and isettlement thereof;- The house and lot shall be to the com

child. The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion prayin

the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement ogrounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligand judiciously apprise him of the consequeffects of the said agreement.

The RTC and CA dismissed the petition oMaquilan.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the partial voluntary separati property made by the spouses pending the pe

for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

HELD: YES. The petitioner contends thatCompromise Agreement is void becauscircumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spwho was convicted of either adultery or concubinfrom sharing in the conjugal property. Sincrespondent was convicted of adultery, the petitsaid that her share should be forfeited in favor ocommon child under Articles 43(2) and 63 oFamily Code.

To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the l

disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery sharing in the conjugal property; and becausCompromise Agreement is void, it never becameand executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites A2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adis a ground for legal separation, the Compro

Agreement is therefore void. These argumentspecious.


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Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of thelaw prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in theconjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and

jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

The conviction of adultery does not carry theaccessory of civil interdiction.

Neither could it be said that the petitioner was notintelligently and judiciously informed of the

consequential effects of the compromise agreement,and that, on this basis, he may repudiate theCompromise Agreement. The argument of thepetitioner that he was not duly informed by hisprevious counsel about the legal effects of thevoluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake orvitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioneras his basis for repudiating the settlement, couldhardly be said to be evident.

ull Text:tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/june2007/15540htm

ase digest prepared The Law Chic. Facts and rulings were

ken from the full text of the case.
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Documents

112976314 Family Code Cases Article 68 to 148 Case Digest