CANON 2ROMERO V. VALLE, A.M. NO. R-192-RTJ JANUARY 9, 1987

CASTILLO V. CALANOG, A.M. NO. RTJ-90-447 DECEMBER 16, 1994

MACALINTAL V. TEH, 280 SCRA 623

Facts: Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a case against Judge Angelito Teh, the Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 87 of Rosario Batangas. His case stemmed from Atty. Macs Election case. In that case, Atty. Mac received an adverse resolution from the Judge Teh. Mac then questioned the resolution, via a petition for Certiorari with the Comelec. While the case was pending with the Comelec, Judge Teh actively participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition, and by also filing an urgent manifestation. Mac filed a motion for inhibition, but what Judge Teh did was to hire his own lawyer and files his answer before his OWN court. Teh ordered that Mac pay P100T in attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Issue: W/N Judge Tehs actions were correct.

Held: No. Judge Teh was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and he is dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice for reemployment. The active participation of Teh being merely a NOMINAL or FORMAL party in the certiorari proceedings is not called for. Judges cannot also act as both party litigant and as a judge before his own court. Tehs gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest.

CANON 3PARAYNO V. MENESES, 231 SCRA 807RULE 137, ROCRULE 137Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.Section 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

LORENZO V. MARQUEZ, ADM. MATTER NO. MTJ-87-123 JUNE 27, 1988

CANON 4ARBAN V. BORJA, A.M. NO R-281-RTJ AUGUST 26, 1986SABURNIDO V. MADRONO, SEPT. 26, 2001

Facts:Spouses Venustiano andRosaliaSaburnido filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Florante Madro Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing themby filingnumerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty. The cases filed were:

1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.

2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two others.

3.Crim. Case No. 93-67,for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.

4. Adm. Case No. 95-33,filed by respondent againstRosalia

Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.Previous to this case, complainants (spouses Saburnido) also filed 3 separate administrativecases againstrespondent, which led to the latters dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement benefits.

SC referred this case to the IBP, the latter concluded hat complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Madronos act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross misconduct that will warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Held:YES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commandsall lawyersto at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondents tenacity in pursuing severalcases againstcomplainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.

SISON V. CAOIBES, JR. A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1771, MAY 27 2004OMPOC VS. JUDGE TORRES, A.M. NO. MTJ-86-11, 17 SEPT. 1989

CANON 5IN RE JUDGE ROJAS, A.M. NO. 98-6-185-RTC. OCTOBER 30, 1998IN RE: AGUAS, G.R. NO. 12, AUGUST