Camic (1986). the Matter of Habit

8/12/2019 Camic (1986). the Matter of Habit

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/camic-1986-the-matter-of-habit 1/50

The Matter of HabitAuthor(s): Charles CamicReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 5 (Mar., 1986), pp. 1039-1087Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780121 .

Accessed: 22/02/2012 17:39

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

American Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780121?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780121?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress



The Matter of

Habit1

CharlesCamic

University f Wisconsin-Madison

This

article s a historical

nvestigation

f the

concept

of

habit

n

sociology.

Beginning

with the claim that historians f

sociology

need to

lookbeyond he now-famous

deas

that ppear

n

the fore-

ground fthe

works fthe

ociologicalmasters,he rticle

xamines

the

neglected dea

of

habit o document hat

his

oncept

was

long

stapletermntheconceptual ocabulary fWesternocialtheorists

and that t continued o function

s

a

major

background

actor n

the substantive

writings

of both

Emile Durkheim

and Max

Weber-a

factor

that

previous

scholarship

on Durkheim

and

Weber has almost

completely

verlooked. t

is

shown

that

Dur-

kheim

iewedhabit

notonly

s

a chief eterminant

f

human ction

in

a

greatvariety f areas but also as one of the

principal

upports

for

he moralfabric f modern

ocieties.

imilarly,

abit

s

found o

be

significant

n

Weber's

treatment

f

modern conomic nd

polit-

ical

life,Calvinism and the

spirit

f

capitalism,

nd

the

force f

traditionalism, hich s so central factor n his frameworkor

comparative-historicalnalysis.

Although

he

dea

of

habitwas also

used

extensively

n

American

ociology

own to around

1918,

n

the

course

of

the

two decades that followed

he

concept

was

purpose-

fully

xcised from he

conceptual

tructure f the

field.

This

dra-

matic

hange

s shown o be a result

f

the

nterdisciplinaryisputes

that

urrounded he

nstitutionalization

f

sociology

s an

academic

AUTHOR'S

NOTE. -To

make

it possible to provide the

relatively

arge amountof pri-

marysource documentationthat appears in this article, two space-savingmeasures

have

been employed. First,

in a number

of instances, quotations

are reported

with

words or

short

phrases

enclosedwithin

square brackets, the

enclosed material

repre-

senting

an

effort

n my part

to render concisely yet

faithfully

oints that are for-

mulated n

a less

abbreviatedway by the

original

uthors. Second, when

reporting he

dates of

the sources cited, the

text gives

only the year of original

publication

or the

original

date of

delivery

n

thecase of

ecturecourses). Information

bout the

particu-

lar

editions hat have used is

contained n

the ist ofreferences.

age citations

efer o

those

editions.

1

I

would iketo

thank

Warren

Hagstrom,

Maureen

Hallinan,Donald

Levine,Hal

Winsborough,

ndErik

Wrightor

heir

nstructive

dvice n

this rticle,

esearch or

whichwasfacilitatedygrants romheGraduate choolResearch ommitteefthe

Universityf

Wisconsin-Madison.

Requests or

reprintshouldbe

sent oCharles

Camic,

Department

f

Sociology,

University f

Wisconsin,

Madison,

Wisconsin

53706.

?

1986

by

The

University f

Chicago.

All

rights eserved.

0002-9602/86/9105-0001$0150

AJS

Volume

91

Number

5

(March

1986):

1039-87

1039





Habit

currentlyuffusesociological argumentst every heoretical

evel

and

of every deological tripe, rom xchange heory o phenomenology

o

neo-Marxism1982a, pp. 67-80). Rangingover similarmaterials, awe

is likewisepleased to find

road agreement hat ction nvolvespurpose-

ful agents reflecting ver

alternative atterns,

lternative

equences,

alternative ossibilities 1978, pp. 379, 413).With esssatisfaction,try-

kerobserves n symbolic

nteractionisms well

an

emphasis

n reflexiv-

ity as the essence of thehuman condition, at

the

expenseof]

a

serious

consideration f habit

1980, p. 152).

A

kindred iew has been

adopted

even by theorists uch as Collins, who

combine the

insights

f eth-

nomethodologistsnd

sociologists f emotion o criticize ociology or ts

rationalistmodels of cognition nd decision-making ut then bring

back

a less wooden kindof reflectivection

by proposing

hat he struc-

tures of the social

world

rest

on

continuous

monitoring

nd self-

interestedmaneuver byacting ndividuals 1981, pp. 985, 996, 1012).

So

obviously ppropriate

as the reflective odel

come to

appear

that

those who employ t seldom concern

hemselveswith

providing

rea-

soned

defense, r

even an

explicit ustification,

or heir

ractice

f

uni-

formly astinghuman conduct nto this one mold.

That

theprocess

of

actionmight e modeleddifferently,nd was

in

factmodeleddifferently

by some of the so-called masters f sociological hought, as generally

passed altogether

nnoticed.And

for

the

persistence

f such

parochial

innocence, cholarswriting

n sociology's ast

bear considerable

espon-

sibility. lacing

an

overlynarrow

nterpretation

n the

demand

thathis-

torical

esearch e relevant o the

present,

hese cholarshave channeled

too much of

their ffort

owardextracting

rom he standard

lassics

of

sociology hose nsights hatare

seemingly

most

pertinent

o

questions

f

currentociological nterest. o do

this, however,

s

simply

o endorse

current

ways

of

approaching

he

social world: t

s

not

to

take ssue with

thosewaysand toquestion hepresentbout the imitationsf ts overall

approach.

If

research n the history f sociology s to contribute o the

present n this latter and

larger sense, it must, as much as possible,

bracket

he

mmediate oncerns f

contemporaryractitioners

f sociol-

ogy

and strive o

understand

he

ideas

of the

past

in

their wn

terms,

since

these

re

the

only erms

n

which

apsed

alternativeso

entrenched

present-day erspectives

ctuallydisclose themselves o us. The whole

matter

f

habit

s

one

such

lapsed alternative.

METHODOLOGICAL

INTRODUCTION

The

suggestion hat the

student

f

past ideas should seek to understand

those deas

in

their

wn terms s

not,

of

course,

n

original

ne. The

same

basic

argument as been

forcefullyut forth y scholars

n

other ields

1041



AmericanJournal

f

Sociology

(see Gunnell1978; Skinner 969; Stocking 968), nd historians f sociol-

ogyhave recentlyounded he ame note n growing umberssee Collini

1978;Jones1977; Simonds 1978),thus ssuing call for new history f

sociology

Jones

1983). To date, however, the preachments f

this

emerging ieldhave inevitably utrun ts accomplishments,s a result f

whichthe whole approach has come undermounting riticismsee Ger-

stein

1983; Seidman 1983; Turner 1983).

One

wonders, hough,

whether he new

historiography

ould not

be

more convincing f it worked to carry out its revolt against pres-

entism -the practice f reading he past through he filter f the pres-

ent-in a more thoroughgoing ay. Thus far, too manyof the new

historians' fforts ave been spent traversing he same territorieshat

theirmorepresentistdversarieshave charted.One consequence f this

has been theirreluctance o move much beyond the well-established,

classic sociological hinkersthe Marxes, the Durkheims, he Webers),

eventhough t s by highly resentisttandards hatthese hinkers ave

been

elevated ntothe classical pantheon see Camic 1979, 1981).

A fur-

ther,more subtle consequenceof the ingering resentism as

been the

tendencywhen dealing with classic figures o concentrate n the ssues

that are

in

theforeground f theirwritings-the very ssues that made

thesewritings, ot thoseofothers, tand out to thepresentn the first

place-rather than on the themes, concepts, and ideas that

remain

largely n the backgroundsee Polanyi'sdistinction etween focal and

subsidiary

wareness

1958, pp. 55-57]).

By narrowing he focus to classic

thinkers nd

then to

foreground

issues, even antipresentist istorians f sociology

have

provided

a se-

verely runcated icture

f

social theories ast.

In

these

ircumstances,

t

is not urprisinghatbasic changes

n

theconceptual

rameworkf ociol-

ogy

have

gone argely

nstudied r thathabit

n

particular

as received

little ttention n previousscholarship n sociology's ast.

In

fact,

not

only

has this

scholarship eglected

lmost

ntirely

hose

episodes

n

the

development

f habit that fall outside the

classics,

t has failed to

ap-

preciate he place of the idea even

in

the amply tudied

worksof

Dur-

kheim nd Weber. Hence, to take only hemostrecent xample,

Alexan-

der

declares hat

Durkheim

was done

with henotion

fhabit

prior

o his

first ook Alexander 982b,pp. 108-28) and thatforWeber heconcept

was

merely

a

residual

ategory,

educible

o

action

motivated

y

affects

and values (Alexander 1983, p. 152, n. 36). The evidence marshaled

below

makes suchpronouncementsxtremely oubtful;

nd

therehave

been

a

few

scholars

who

have come somewhat

nearer he

mark,notably

Roth

1968), Wallwork 1972), and Cohen, Hazelrigg,

nd

Pope (1975).

But the

fact

hat heroleof habit

n

the

thought

f

Durkheim

nd Weber

1042



Habit

has yet to be

sufficientlyrought ut

offers strikingndication f the

extent

fthepractice foverlooking

amifying

deas

n

the

background f

theirwritingsn the course of going over and over the standardfore-

ground opics.

What has been missed, s a

consequence,

s the

verykind

of

developmental rocess hat hehistorianf sociologyeeksto uncover:

the

change

in

underlying onceptual

structure

hat

separates

us

from

the age ofDurkheim

and Weber.

It is

with

the

aim of

demonstrating

that such

a

change occurred,

nd

not-I should

emphasize-in

the

n-

terest of

further verextending

reliance

on the

classics,

that

this

paper treatsDurkheim nd Weber

at some

ength,

n

addition

o

consid-

eringcertain

mportant nstallments

n

the earlier

and later

history

f

habit that are located outsidethecurrentlyecognized lassicsof sociol-

ogy.

It hardly

need be said, however, hatthestudent f sociology's ast s

concernednotonly with dentifyingow

the fieldhas changedbut also

with

xplaining

why t

has

done

so.

Accordingly,

will

attempt riefly

o

provide

sociological ccountfor heelimination

f

habit by American

sociologists f theearly20th century.n

doing so,

the

analysiswill

call

attention o the

ntellectual onsequences f

the widespread oncern

n

the

part

of those

sociologistswith securely stablishingheir ield s

an

autonomous

isciplinewithin heuniversitiesf

the

time.

n

stressing

he

significance

f

the factor finstitutionalization, y arguments simply

following he ead

of

research

n

the

sociology

f

science esp. Ben-David

1971),whichhas alreadybeen nstructively

ppliedto thedevelopment f

sociology

in

America and

elsewhere (Abrams 1968;

Clark

1973;

Oberschall

1972; Shils 1970). The twist s

that,

while

most

of this

work

focuses n

how

institutionalizationltered the social-structuralspects

of

culture

production, but] ignor[es] he content f culture Kuklick

1983, p. 300),

here the emphasiswill be on how the quest forgenuine

academic

autonomy ctually id affect he

conceptual abric f ociology.

In

this regard,

especiallywant to urge the mportance f studying ot

onlywhat was goingon in the sociological

iterature ut also what was

taking lace

in

the

iterature f thedisciplines romwhich ociologywas

seeking o secure ts autonomy.We have all

been taught hat sociology

took

hape

n

oppositionofields uch as

economics, istory,nd psychol-

ogy. But, to

date, the real significancefthispointhas been ost because

there

as

beenvirtually o efforto divest

urselves four currentmages

ofthesefields nd to investigate ow theywere pecificallyonstitutedt

the

time

hat

ociologywas first cquiringntellectual orm.By examin-

ing

someof

the ubstantive haracteristicsf

psychology uring hisdeci-

sive period,

hope to take a preliminary

tep toward correcting his

situation.

1043



AmericanJournal f Sociology

CONCEPTUAL

CONSIDERATIONS

At this uncture, omething hould be said about what theconceptof

habit refers o in this

study.At first lance, specifyinghis

may appear

problematic, iven hat

heword habit or ts French rGerman quiv-

alent)

has

been used

in

a variety fways by differentocial

thinkers rom

different

ges. Fortunately, owever,

he core

meanings

f

the term-as

the

OxfordEnglish

Dictionary shows-have been fairly onstantfor

many centuries; he variabilityhas exhibited tself hieflyn

different

loadingsonto the common

ore.

The core

meaning hat

s

pertinent ere

stands utmost harply

when heprevious efinitionf

reflectiveonduct

is recalled,for habit ordinarily esignates ctionsthat are relatively

unmotivated Giddens

1979, p. 218),

actions for

which

means-ends

relations . . are [from he

actor's tandpoint]not subject oargument'

(Hartmann, 939, p. 91).

Since

definitions

ith

uns and nots

may be

rather nsatisfying,t s

perhaps ppropriate o restate hesepointsposi-

tively:

the

term

habit generallydenominates

more or

less

self-

actuatingdisposition

r

tendency o engage

n

a

previouslydopted

or

acquired

form

f

action.2

Within his broad

definition,

ertain

distinctionsan be

made.

In the

first ncyclopedia of theSocial Sciences, Murphyfound t convenient,

for

nstance, o differentiate

above the

evel of

motor

abits ) cognitive

habits, emotional

abits, nd moralhabits 1932, p. 238).

But

rather

2

Severalpoints

f clarification

re

perhaps

n

order

here. First,

he definitionust

offered

s designed o indicate

he

typical

way

in which he

majority

f thinkers

included

nthis tudy ave used

habit; t snot claim

bouthow

the erm hould e

used.Second, s the

definition

ndicates,hepresentnalysis

s concerned

otwith

he

vagariesf heword habit utwith hangingoints fview n thephenomenonhat

theworddesignates.

t happens, hough,

hat

n

the ountries

ndtheperiod

onsid-

ered

nthis

tudy, he

onventionas been

ctually

o referothephenomenon

fhabit

bythe erm

habit or tsFrench

r German

ounterpart)see Funke

1958)

o

that n

only few cases

will it

be

necessary

ereto

take account f

other erminological

pointers.

hird,while

he

definition

nd much

f he ollowingiscussion

recouched

in

terms

f thehabits

fthe ndividual,t

shouldbe

noted hatmostwriters

n the

subject

maintain hat

membersf ocialgroups

xhibit

many ommon abits.

Weber,

in

fact,

mployed

he separate erm custom

o denote

uch collective ay[s]

f

acting

hat

erive

rom abit ather

han romelf-interestr

hared orms

1922a,

.

319; 1922b,p. 187).

But this

particular sageremains

n idiosyncratic

ne,for, s

MacIver nceremarked,ustom enerallyefersocollectiveracticeshat rebacked

bya social anction,

a quality

which s inno

sensepartof the

meaning f . .

'the

habits f the group'

(1931,p.

294; see alsoT6nnies

1909,pp. 35-36). Fourth,

he

definitioneavesopen

thequestion fthe

origins

fhabit, ince pace

imits

reclude

taking p this ssue.

t

must uffice

o record

hat hemostwidespread

iewhas

been

thathabit

s

produced yrepetition:

hat

orms f ction hat

refrequentlyracticed

tend

ver

ime obecome

abitual. pinions

avedifferedreatly,owever,

s tohow

thisprocess

f

habit

formation

s actuallyet ntomotion.

1044



Habit

than place

primary mphasis

hereon

thisclassification

ccording

o

the

content

f different abits, t will be helpful or

historical urposes o

differentiatehe variousempiricalreferentsf the conceptof habit in

terms

of a dimensionthat crosscuts the

cognitive/emotional/moral

classification,amely,

whether he form faction hat s being

epeated

is

simple and

circumscribed r generalized nd complex. Since this

s

obviouslynot a

black-and-whitessue, it is probablybest to envision

long

continuum fpossibilities. he two end

points nd the midpoint f

thiscontinuum

merit eparatecomment.

To begin at the

beginning: abit sometimes

efers o the disposition o

perform

ertain relatively

lementary

nd

specific

ctivities

killfully.

Even in the heyday f theconcept f habit,activities f this yperarely

attracted he

sustained nterest

f

social theorists.

he

situation

as

long

been

otherwise

n

psychology, owever, nd

in

thevenerable radition

f

William

James 1890, p. 107)

the

modern

sychologistquates

habitwith

sequencesof behaviors,

usually imple,

. .

thathave become

virtually

automatic nd then llustrates henotionwith he

practice

f

putting

n

a

left ock before

right

ne

(Lefran?ois 983,

p. 393).

Still

within he

lower

portion f the habitcontinuum, ut

getting eyond

he

minutiae,

one

might

lso

locate habitsof

writing, peaking,

erceiving,valuating,

taskexecution, roblem olving, nd thelike,to whichsocial thinkers

have

devoted

more

attention, articularly

hen

discussing

he

require-

ments

oror

impedimentso reflectivection tself.

But

proceeding

o

what

may

be looked on as the vast middle

range

of

the

continuum,

heform f

ction

designated

s habitbroadens o various

more

extended ines or more nvolvedpatterns f conduct

n

the social

world.

Such

phenomena

were

frequently

n

evidence

n

thework

f ocial

thinkers rom he

mid-18th o theearly20th

century, nd

in

canvassing

this

work,we will encounter

abits

of

nterpersonalnteraction; abits f

economic, olitical,

eligious, nd domestic ehavior;habits

f

obedience

to rules

nd to

rulers;

habitsof

sacrifice,

isinterestedness,nd

restraint;

and so on.

This is not to

say that those who

speak

of these

kindsof

conduct

ropose hat hey re

uniformlyabitual.

When

he

habit abel

s

applied,

it

is

generally o

suggest hat

an

action, which may

in

some

situations

ome about

as

a

motivated ctor elects

ppropriate

means to

his

or her

ends, has-in the instance of the

actor beingdescribed-

emerged

apart

from

such

a

reflective

rocess.

That habitual

and

nonhabitual reflective r other)considerationsmay actuallybe mixed

together

imultaneouslys

something

o

commentatorknowofdenies.

Yet it

s

onlyWeberwho

explicitlyonceives

f

habitual ction s a pure

type,

which

concrete ases

approach

n

varying

egrees 1922a, pp.

25-

26)-and this s a

formulationhat ncourages s

to appreciate, nmany

of

the

allusions

by past thinkers o economic,

olitical, eligious, omes-

1045



AmericanJournal

f

Sociology

tic, and other habits,

an implicit

laim

for the

preponderance

f

the

habitualelement

n

a

givenpattern

f action.

In the upper reaches ofthe habit continuum, ne can situate still-

broaderusage of theterm.According o thisusage,

habit s the durable

and generalized isposition

hat uffuses

person's

ction hroughoutn

entire omainof

ife

r,

n theextreme

nstance, hroughout

ll of ife-in

which

ase

the erm

omes

o

mean

the

whole

manner,

urn, ast,

or

mold

of thepersonality. oday the word

character

robably

omesclosest o

evoking his nearlyforgotten

eaning

f

habit, although

ven charac-

ter ends o suggest systemmade up ofnumerous,

more

pecific erson-

ality ttributes, hereas

hepoint f usinghabit

n

ts

broadest

ense s

to

denotenota sum ofpartsbuta morenearly ll-encompassing odalityf

action hat

ifone mayborrow

ut ofcontext vivid

formulationromhe

Grundrisse)

hen

assigns

rank and influence o other

omponents

f

the

personality.3 mongEuropean

thinkers,hisdistinct onceptionf habit

has often een denotedbyleaving the word n its Latin

form, abitus.

This,

as

we shall see,

is a

practice

hat both

Durkheim

nd Weber fol-

lowed, and it s a practice hatBourdieuhas made

a

notablerecent ffort

at

long

ast

to revive

see,

e.g.,

Bourdieu and Passeron

1970).

These definitionalreliminarieserve

to

make one

waryof some com-

monstereotypes.o many, he notion f habit mmediatelyonjuresup

behavior

hat

onsists

n

a fixed,mechanical eaction

o

particular

timuli

and

is,

as

such,

devoid ofmeaning

from he actor's

point

of view.

In

sociology,

his

mage

s one

that

became

fairlywidespread

arly

n

this

century, hough

t was

already

current

n

the

1780s

see

Reid 1788, pp.

114-17) and alive during he

nterims well. The point o note, hough, s

that

the

mage

has also

met with substantial

pposition.

n

place

of

the

idea of a

fixed,

mechanical

eaction o

stimuli,

t has

been

held

that

habit

creates

stable

nner

orethat ffords

mmunity

rom xternal ensations

and

impetuous ppetites Ferguson1792, p. 225; Hegel

1821, p. 260;

1830, p. 144); that

t

s

not

by such stimuli

s

these,

butby theego itself,

that habit is called into

play

and allowed

to

proceed,

with

eeway

for

situational

daptation Hartmann1939, p. 88; James

1890, p. 116;

Ton-

3 It

may, in fact, be helpful

o regard

theconceptionof habit

under discussion here

as

the analogue in

the

personality o thedominant mode of

production

s seen byMarx:

It is a general

illumination which bathes all

the other colours and

modifiestheir

particularity. t is a particular ether which determines he specificgravityof every

being which has

materializedwithin

t

(1857, p. 107). The

only

American

writerwell

known among

sociologists

o make use of such an idea

was John

Dewey, who defined

habit as that orderingor

systematization f [themore]

minor elements of [human]

action, which is

projective,dynamic

in

quality,

ready

for overt

manifestation, nd

[operative] even

when

not

obviouslydominating

ctivity

1922, pp. 40-41;

see also

Kestenbaum 1977; Petras

1968).

1046



Habit

nies 1909, pp. 32-33); and that,however

much habitualaction

may

be

removedfrom hesitation nd

reflection,

uch action

s still

no

more

mechanical than actionof the same typethatemergesfromwholly

reflectiverocesses Stewart1792-1827, pp. 54, 55-57).

And

in

place

of

the claim thathabit s devoid of subjectivemeaning,

oth

phenomenolo-

gists nd psychoanalysts ave proposed hathabitual ctiondoes exhibit

a

meaningful

haracter -either

aken

for

ranted y

the ctor

r

odged

in

the unconscious Berger nd Luckmann 1966, p. 53;

Hartmann

1939,

p. 89;

Kestenbaum

1977, pp. 3-4;

Schutz

1932, p. 19).

I am not

suggest-

ing that heseviews be directly ubstituted or

he

stereotype;pokesper-

sons

on

all sides have been

sufficiently

eluctant o

specify

o

which

instances fhabit, nd to whatextent, heir tatementspply hat aution

is mandated all around if one is out for a description f some

of

the

auxiliary eatures

f habitualaction.

f

one is concernedwith he

history

of the

concept

f

habit, however,

t is best

simply

o set

stereotypes

nd

counterstereotypesside from he start nd

to eave them side until

hey

become

an essential

part

of the

story

tself.

HISTORICAL PROLOGUE

To understand he transformationhattheconceptofhabithas under-

gone

n

sociology,t is necessary o take notice

of

certain riordevelop-

ments

that occurred

chiefly

outside the classics

of

sociology.

The

provenance

f

habit

s

remote. he notionwas already

n established

ne

among ncientGreek hinkers,nd

it

thereafterrovedresilient, laying

a

consequential

role

in

the

writings

f medieval

scholastics,

eformed

theologians, nd numerous arly

modern

philosophers nd

litterateurs

(see

Burnham

1968a, pp. 8-9; Dubray 1905, pp. 17-23;

Fuchs

1952;

Funke 1958, pp. 32-344; Passmore 1970, pp. 161-62).

During the 18th century, he concept received till more systematic

attention

see Funke 1958, pp. 345-496), most conspicuously

rom

number f the major figures f the Enlightenment.peakingformany

thinkers f

the FrenchEnlightenment, elve'tius, or xample,proposed

that

habit

is a] principle y

which

humans verywhere]

re actuated

and that t s

also

the

greatwellspring

f

morality, othprivate nd public

(1758, pp. 57, 108, 180); as well, Rousseau proclaimedmany forms f

social

inequality uniquely he work ofhabit and held that aw should

rest n

theforce f habit, rather han on] the force f authority 1755,

p. 138; 1762, p. 81); and Condorcet orecast he progressive ransforma-

tionof

habits

.. adoptedthroughmiscalculation y freely ontracted

habits . . inspiredby nature nd acknowledged y reason 1793, pp.

192, 194). In Scotland, nlightenersuch as Hume (1739-40, pp. 104-5,

503-4) and Ferguson 1792, pp. 209-34) expressed imilar pinions; nd

1047



AmericanJournal

f

Sociology

even cerebralGermanAufkldrer

uch as Kant

nsisted

n

giving

habit

ts

due,

if

only better

o master

t. In

fact,

t was Kant's

opinion

hat all

acquiredhabits re objectionable, hat virtue s moral trengthnpur-

suit of one's duty, dutywhich

should never

be a matter

f

habit,

but

should always proceed,fresh nd original,

rom

ne's

mode of

thought

(1798, pp. 32, 34). The idea continued o

hold

itsown, moreover,

ven

when reaction o the

Enlightenment

et

n

during

he

early

19th

entury.

Indeed, theconcept

emained

n

active

duty

with hinkers

ootherwiset

odds as Englishutilitarians

n the mold of

James

Mill

(see

Woodcock

1980) nd German dealists, ncluding egel

himself,

ho

postulated

hat

habit s indispensable or he existence

f all intellectual

ife

1830, p.

143).

But far-reachinghangeswereabout to engulf he

concept fhabit.As

thepreceding uotationsmay suggest,when thinkers f the 18th and

early 19thcenturies poke of habit, they poke principally

t a level of

generalityhat corresponds o

the

middlerange of

the habit continuum

described bove. What ncreasingly

ame

to

the

fore

n

the course

of

the

19thcentury, owever,was the practice f equatinghabit moreexclu-

sively

with

activities

f a

relatively lementary

ypeand

then

treating

these

n

a manner

hat

ed

away

from he

analysis

f

action

n

the social

worldaltogether. his transformationas brought n by two develop-

ments hat

occurred

near the

center tage ofEuropean

ntellectual

ife.

The first fthesewas a rapidgrowth fthebiological

ciences-chiefly

through

he efflorescencef

evolutionary heory

nd of experimental

physiology. he well-known istory f evolutionary

heory eed not be

detailed here, save for

one basic item.

Habit,

it

emerges,

was a term

prominentlysed by evolutionists hen theydescribed

he elementary

behaviorsof lower

species.

It was

in

this sense that Lamarck talked of

giraffes brows[ing] n the leaves of trees and called this theirhabit,

talkedof snakes

.. crawling

n

the

ground

nd called

this habit

oo

(citedby Oldroyd1980, p. 31),

and

it

was

in this ense

also thatDarwin

spoke freely

n

On

the

Origin of Species

of

such

things

s the

feeding

habitsof British nsects, he climbing abitsof

the larger itmouse,

and the

flowering

abits

of

plants

when

transported

into]

nother li-

mate 1859, pp. 11, 183). This same usage oomed till argerwhen,

n

his

later writing, arwin hastenedfromhorses'pacing

habits,caterpillars'

eatinghabits,

and

pigeons'flying abitsdirectly

o the habitsof human

beings 1872, pp. 29-31).

Here Darwin's workhappenedto linkup with he

physiologicalitera-

ture of the

time: a noteworthy ody

of

research

hat had the effect f

confirming

he

equation

between habit

and elementary

ehavior and

driving he phenomenon ntirely ut of the social

world

and

into

the

recessesof the biophysical ciences on

this

research,

ee

Liddell

1960;

1048



Habit

Thomson1968,pp.

37-53;

Young 1970).This effect ame

about as

physi-

ologistswere

drawn, by their nterest

n

the movements

f

decapitated

chickens, eadlessfrogs, ndthe ike,to theexperimentaltudy f reflex

actions, which were conceived as motor

responses

ctivated

by

nerve

cells

excitedby stimuli

xternal

o a givenorganism see

Fearing1930).

This is significant,

or to view reflex

ctions

n

this

way was

also to

physiologize he

conceptof

habitthoroughlyecause the

physiological

literature ad

long since

adopted habit as the standard

synonym

or

acquired reflexesBurnham

1968a, p. 52; Fearing

1930).

More

signifi-

cantly

till,

physiologists

howed ittlehesitationn

extending

o

human

beingswhatwas said

about thechickens

nd

the

frogs.

Humans,

after

ll,

exhibitedcquiredmotor eflexes r habits oo,and much-if not ll-of

humanaction

might,by

extrapolation, e reducedto tendencies f the

nervous ystem to grow to

the modes

in

which t has been

habitually

exercised

as

the

English

physiologistarpenter ut

it in

the

1870s;

see

Danziger 1982, p.

130).

What made

this

eemingly

soteric

sage consequential

was its coinci-

dence

with a secondmajor

development: he

gradualemergence

f the

science

of

psychology, riorto the 19th

century,

sychological pecula-

tion

was

something enerally

arried out by

philosophers

ngaged

n

rather nspecialized nquiries.Thereafter,owever, s theera of ntellec-

tual

differentiationet

n,

students f the mind

ought

greaterutonomy

for

their

field, nd by thelast

quarterof the 19th

century

heir

fforts

beganto

pay off.Not

only

did

psychology

manage,

head

of

many

other

fledglingpecialities

f the

time,

o

establish tself s

a

recognized

ield

n

the

universities,

specially

n

Germany see

Ben-David and

Collins

1966;

Ross

1967;

Woodward 1982),but even

when theacademic

inkages till

left

much to be

desired, here

was an impressive

utpouring f

research

concerned

with

the

sensations, magesand

feelings

. .

out

of

which

complex tates

of

mind

were built

up (Thomson1968,

p. 89;

in

general,

see

Boring 1957;Hearnshaw

1964;

Thomson

1968; Watson1968).

This

newpsychology, s it

was often

alled, was onthewhole

lmost

militantlycientistic. erhaps

as a result

of a still low-status

ield['s]

attempt

o

upgrade

[itself] y borrowing

he

methods f a

high-status

field

Ben-David and

Collins

1966, p.

460), 19th-century

sychology

leaned

heavily n

the chievements fthe

biological

ciences, articularly

evolutionism

nd, above all,

physiological

xperimentalismsee

Murphy

and Kovach 1972,pp. 65-75, 126-47;Thomson 1968,pp. 92-124, 168-

73).Habit

was depicted

ccordingly.What

reliablyppeared n

recurring

psychological

iscussions f thesubject

was the dea of

habit as a phe-

nomenon

elonging mong the

primary

rocesses fthe human)

organ-

ism

(see Andrews1903, pp.

122-27;

Dubray 1905,pp. 64-73;

Fearing

1930,

p. 239;

James 1890, pp. 104-27). It

was thusthat Bain

equated

1049



AmericanJournal

f

Sociology

habit withreflex ction and a narrowing f the sphere f nfluence f a

sensational r active stimulus to] one solitary hannel in] the

cerebral

system 1859, pp. 11-12); and it was thus too that Dumontdiscussed

how the mpressions f outerobjects fashion or hemselvesn the ner-

vous systemmore and more appropriate aths and thenproposed hat

these

well-fashioned euralpathways re our habits 1876, p. 324; trans-

lationby James 1890, p. 106).

This distinctive onceptualization f habit was to

be

triumphant, ut

the triumph till ay abroad in America. n late 19th- nd early 20th-

century urope, the new psychologists' iews, widely ired though hey

were, never held the intellectual ieldunchallenged, or the fieldwas

already rich n more traditional tatementsbout habit. Hence, when

used in

social-scientificiscourse, he concept ended o retain he same

basic

character t had had prior o the changes ust enumerated. ne

can

see this

n

writings s diverse s thoseof Bagehot 1872, p. 9; 1879, pp.

141-64) and Bradley nd Bosanquet Collini 1978, pp. 12-14)

in

Britain

(cf. Spencer 1855, pp. 525-30); Comte 1830-54, pp. 235, 253, passim)

and

LePlay 1855-81, pp. 139, 143,passim)

n

France;

and

Jhering1883,

2:239-47), T6nnies 1887, pp. 33-170; 1909), Simmel 1900), Vierkandt

(1908, pp. 103-9), and Lederer 1918-19)

in

Germany.

t

is

true

hat

n

none ofthisworkdid habitexhaust hedomainofaction.Morereflective

types fconductwere consistentlyn the cene

as well. But these

did not

yetstandalone-and

this s

thepoint. Despite

the

effortsf

biologists,

physiologists,nd psychologistso carryhabit

off

n

other

directions,

t

remained standard erm y which ocialtheoristsaptured

hoseforms

of

action n the social worldthatwere

seen to

be less reflectivend

more

self-actuating.

t was

in this

context hat

Emile Durkheimand

Max

Weber

wrote.

HABIT

IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

Durkheim

Habit

was well exercised y Durkheim, nd it was exercised hroughout

much of his career, even as he underwent, ccording o at least some

scholars, ertain ar-reachingheoretical hanges.

The

conceptwas, to be

sure, rarely t the forefrontf his attentions,nd all thosewho see only

theforefrontave accordingly lossedover it altogether. ut, however

little hetermmaymean to contemporaryommentators,t was nonethe-

less a tool n Durkheim's onceptual oolbox, ne thathe brought ut and

put

to

work on the mostvaried

occasions.

Some

scattered llustrations

may

introduce

he

point. Take,

for

n-

stance,Durkheim's bservations n the mpirical oleofhabit t different

1050



Habit

points

n

the evolutionary

rocess.

Primitive

eoples,

n

his

udgment,

live to a

largeextent y the

force fhabit nd under

he

yoke fhabit

(1893, p. 159; 1912, p. 103),for when thingsgo on happening n the

sameway, habit . .

suffice[s]

or onduct nd

moral

behavior tself s

easily

transformedinto habitmechanically arried

ut 1898-1900,

p.

90;

1902-3b, p. 52). Much the

same was true,he claimed,

n

advanced

cities f

theMiddle Ages,

where habithas ...

dominion

verpeopleand

over

things

without

ny

counter-balance 1898-1900,p. 38).

Neither o

modern ocieties ispensewith

t. A social order

based on the division f

labor, Durkheim maintained,

requires more and

more ntensive nd

assiduous

work,

and

[such

work

becomes]habitual -and

habitual

n

a

particularway, since civilization . . imposes upon manmonotonous

and

continuous

abor, [which]

mplies n absoluteregularity

n

habits

(1893, p.

242; 1902-3b, . 70,

m.t.; 1902-3a, p. 80).4Thus, for a worker

.

. . to

take his

place

in

society, he mustdevelop]

the habit of

exerting

himself

nd other habits ofwork that were

simply

nknown

mong

the torpidprimitives1902-3b,

pp. 173, 181;

the

general

rgument

ere

bears

comparison

withthatof E. P.

Thompson 1967]).

Habit

was a recurrentactor, oo,

in

Durkheim's

nalysis

of

suicide:

habitsof passive obedience,

of absolutesubmission, f mpersonalism

increase

the suicide rate

among military fficers, e asserted,whereas

the habit

of domestic

olidarity ecreases he ratewithin ariousother

populations 1897b, p. 238;

1888c, p. 234).

The

concept

was also

in

operation

n

certain iscussions fthedevelopmentfcollective

epresen-

tations.

n

his earliest

writings,

urkheim

proposedthat

religion

tself

first

merges s a theory oexplain nd make senseof

everyday] abits,

and

in

subsequentwork he held that the ideas and

reasons

which de-

velop

in

our consciousness arise, nter lia, from]

ngrainedhabits of

whichwe are unaware 1887a, p. 35; 1897a, p. 168). And his specula-

tions on

social and culturalchange repeatedly

harked back to habit,

which

he viewed

as one of thegreatest mpediments

o progress

f

any

sort. It

is always a laborious peration o pull up the

roots f habits hat

time

has fixed nd organized n

us (1893, p. 241);

operating utside he

sphere

f

the

clear

consciousness, .

.

habits

.

. resist

ny change since]

what cannot

be seen is not

easily modified 1898-1900, p. 84). Hence,

Durkheim

amented,manysocial facts continue . .

to exist merely

through

orce

f

habit, amongthem ntiquated

penal, educational, nd

4

M.t. within

citationndicates

hat have

lightly odifiedhe

English ranslation

of

the citedpassage to

preserve

omethingbout

habit that

has beenlost in the

translation-and his

ery ftensthe

oncept fhabit tself.nsuch

ases,

reference

to

thetranslation ill

appear

first, ollowed y a

cross-reference

o theforeignan-

guage ource.

1051





Habit

theDurkheimian cholarship as

sacrificed bove all else,

therefore,s a

more

adequate understanding f Durkheim'swhole approach

to the

alarmingpoverty f morality n his age (1897b, 387); for goodpart

(thoughnot

the whole) of the solution o this predicamentwas

seen by

himto lie in

the domain of habit.

This

becomesparticularlyvident t three unctures.The first f

these

is in

TheDivision ofLabor, where

Durkheimmaintained hatthe

moral

normsnecessary o end the crisis f

anomieactuallywould come

directly

intobeing with

the development fhabitsof nteractionmong

the spe-

cialized partsthat

constitute

he

world

of

divided

abor. There

are, he

stated, certain

ways

in

which [differentiatedunctions] eact

on one

another,which,beingmore n accordancewith henature fthings, re

repeatedmoreoften nd become habits;

hen he habits, s they

cquire

force, retransformedntorules f

conduct....

In

other

words,

certain

selection f

rightsnd duties s made by

habitualpractice

nd these

nd

up by

becoming bligatory 1893, p. 366; retranslationy

Lukes

[1973,

p. 164]; see

also Durkheim 1886, p. 213; 1887b, p. 275; 1888a,

p. 66;

1898-1900,

pp. 7-9; 1902, pp. 14-15;

Durkheim nd Buisson 1911, p.

153; cf. the

criticisms f Lukes [1973, p. 164]

and

Parsons 1937,

p. 321]

with

he rgumentf

Berger nd Luckmann

1966,pp. 53-67]).

In

his

ater

work on occupationalcorporations, urkheim oncluded hat thisfirst

formulation

as incomplete 1902, p. 4), but he mmediately ent

n to

incorporate abit nto his plans for

moral regeneration

n

a

second

way.

He urgedhis

celebrated roject o revitalize ccupational roups

n

part

because he

believed such institutionsble to createand implantmuch-

neededhabits fmoral onduct. o long s the

familyprovides

he

only]

collective ife

n

which

specialists]

articipate, heywill,

Durkheim ea-

soned, become nuredto the habit of

acting

ike lone wolves and ac-

quirean

inclination owarda fierce ndividualism

1902-3b, pp.

233-

34).

He then

posed

the

problem,

How

can we

learn

the

[opposite]

habit? -that of disinterestedness,

self-forgetfulness,nd

sacrifice ?

(1902, p. 4). His proposal for

occupational corporations

ollowed

m-

mediately

n

direct nswer

see 1902, pp.

4-31).

But

this

was

not theonly nswer,for thirdwayofpressing abit

nto

service

readily

suggested

tself-the

prospect

of

instilling ood

moral

habitsfrom arliest hildhood nward

nstead fwaiting or

ccupational

lifeto get

under way. Durkheim eized

upon this possibility ithgreat

enthusiasm, nd hiswritings n education ndeed constituteerhaps he

fullest

tatement

n

recordof the

habitual

basis

of

social morality.

t is

well

known

hat,

n

Durkheim's

iew,

modern ecular

ociety equires

moral code

emphasizing a) group

attachment,

r devotion o collective

ideals; b)

regularity,r behaving imilarly nder ike

circumstances ;c)

authority,

r

dutiful ubmission

nd

self-restraint

n

accord

with

obliga-

1053



AmericanJournal fSociology

tory ules; nd (d) autonomy, r reflectiveonsciousness oncerningth-

ical principles see esp. 1902-3b, pp. 17-126).

What has never

been

appreciated s the place of habit nthiswhole affair. ut,forDurkheim,

certain

omponents f

moralityre nherently atters

f

habit:

o

become

attached to collective

deals,

one must have

developed

the habits

of

acting nd thinkingn

common ;

to assure

regularity,

t s

onlynecessary

thathabitsbe strongly

ounded 1902-3b, p. 233, 28, m.t.; 1902-3a, p.

32). Furthermore, hile

somethingmore than habit s required,

n

his

view, to produce ubmission

o rules nd reflectiveonsciousnessas we

shall see), even this

somethingmore develops

from he base of

early

habits, articularlythe

habitof elf-controlnd restraint nd thehabit

of ucid thought 1902-3b,p. 149; 1904-5, p. 347).Thisfact, longwith

the

postulate hat children re creature[s] f habit, ed Durkheim o

arguethat ducational

nstitutionsould go far

n

laying

he

groundwork

for ll

elements f his

secularmorality: y offering

he

example

of

com-

mon

classroom ife,the school could

induc[e]

n

the

child

the

habits

of

group ife and attachment;

y enforcing regimen f rules and disci-

pline, t could accustom thechild] o regularity nd develop . . the

habitof self-control ;ndby teaching atural cience, t could encourage

the

child o acquire wholesome ntellectual abits,which

will

strengthen

his moralconduct 1902-3b, pp. 135, 143, 149, 249, 297; see also 1904-

5, pp. 275, 318, 331-48).

This argument s,

in

fact,

one of the chief

reasons hat chooling ameto playso indispensable role

n

Durkheim's

continual

ffortst moral reform.

It should be noted,though, hat when advancing

this

position,

Dur-

kheim's ocuswas

principally n primary ducation see 1902-3b, p. 17).

In

his

analysis f secondary ducation, very

different

pirit

eems o be

at work.

n

Durkheim's

udgment, econdary chooling

s

not,

nd

should

not

be, a process evolvingbout the cquisition

f certain

pecific

bili-

ties or habits 1904-5, p. 30). This contentions an outgrowthf two

aspects

of

his moraltheory

mentioned,

ut

not

elaborated,

bove:

first,

his nsistenceesp. in his aterwritings) hat nsofar s

it

nvolvesdutiful

conformityo rules,morality ecessarily

ranscends

abit,

since a rule

. .

. is

not only habitualmeans

of

acting,

t

s,

above

all,

an

obligatory

meansof

acting -a meansof

acting

hat

s

imperative1902, p. 4;

1902-

3b, p. 28;

see

also 1888b,pp. 214-15; 1903-12, p. 649; 1912, p. 482,

n.

10; 1920, p. 265, n. 1);

second,

his belief

hat,

under

he

dynamic

ondi-

tionsof the modern ge, any viable moralityntails as well continual

reflectiont the upperreachesof thesocial order1898-1900, pp. 88-94;

1911a, p. 84; 1904-5, pp.

315-16).5

It was

in

hopes

of

fostering

hese

5

Despite thisbelief, t

was

Durkheim's

udgmentthat

evenpersons

n

professional

nd

managerial

positions,which

demand

constantreflection

nstead of

fixedhabits, be-

1054



Habit

obligatory nd

reflective

eatures

f

moral ifethatDurkheim's

writings

on

secondary

ducation et aside

the ssue of

cultivating articular

abits

ofconduct.Moral education,nhisview,clearly equiredmore han his.

Yet what the requirement urnsout

to be

comes as

a

considerable

surprise-particularly

fwe

expect

Durkheim o

propose,

ike

sociologists

of

today, hatreflectiveonduct

n

accord

with

bligatory

ules

hinges

n

the

transmissionf

moralbeliefs, alues,

and norms.

For this s not

t

all

Durkheim's

wn position.Making

t

the task ofsecondary ducation o

impart a

certain

number f true beliefs

and] specific

rticles f faith

and

to

decorat[e he]

mind

withcertain deas

[and]

certain

ormulae s

nearly s

inappropriate, e argued,as

concentrating

t this evel on the

contract[ing f] certain specifichabits

(i904-5,

p. 29). Both pos-

sibilities,

n

his

opinion, mount

o

a

reversion o the

dubious ducational

objectives f

antiquity,

n

place

of

the

proper edagogical rogram

f

the

ChristianMiddle

Ages,

where

t

was

recognized

hat

if

we are

truly

o do

our

ob

as educators

nd have

an effect hichwill be

durable,

we

must

concern urselveswith

developing

n

the individual

a more

profound

conditionwhich

determinesheother

specific

spects

of

personality]

nd

gives hem heir

nity, namely,] general ispositionfthemind ndthe

will : a

habitus

f

moral

being 1904-5,

pp. 28-29;

see also

1902-3b,p.

21). Here, as habit nthemostgeneralized ense selevatedoverall more

specificusages,

Durkheim

vindicated

his

faith

n

the

transformative

moralpower

of

educational

nstitutions.

t was his

conviction hat the

Christian

onception

f the missionof

educationwas

theoretically

he

correct

ne;

were

modern

econdary

chools

only

to work to

create a

dutiful

nd

reflective

ecular

habitus

o

replace

he

religious

abitus

f

he

past,

the

exacting

moral

demands

of the

contemporaryge might et

be

well

satisfied

1904-5, pp. 30, 317).

If

this

sprawling ccount by Durkheim f the vital nterplay

etween

thehabitual and themoral attestsfurther o the fact that the ancient

concept

of

habit was

still alive and well in

his work, there

remains n

illuminatingxception o this conclusion.

The concept s all but

absent

from

urkheim's requent nd fervent rogrammatictatements n

the

field f

sociology

tself

see 1888a, 1890,

1892, 1895b,1898b,1899,1900a,

1900b, 1901,

1901-2, 1908a, 1908b, 1909, 1915). The omission

bears

witness, would

suggest, o the subtleways

in

which the

conceptual

have in

[nonwork]

ontexts s

simple

persons

acting by

routine,

who

neither hinknor

act

otherwise

than

the ignorant

populace

(1904-5, pp.

315-16;

1905-6, p.

138). It

should be

noted,

moreover, that the

objective of

the

type

of

reflection

urkheim

advocated is

not to

dislodge

habits but to

maintain them

in

the

state

of

necessary

adaptability

and flexibility

1905-6, p.

137).

1055




structuref sociological hought as been

shaped through

he

apparently

peripheralmovement

o institutionalizehe

discipline

f

sociology.

Durkheim's rogrammatictatements ere, after ll, integral o what

Lukes has described s a lifelong campaign

o win recognitionor ociol-

ogy's

scientific

tatus

n

an

ossified cademic environment

xtremely

reluctant o concede he cientificegitimacy

fthenew field Lukes 1973,

p. 36; see also Clark 1973; Shils 1970). It

was Durkheim's onviction,

furthermore,hatthe egitimacy f a would-be

ciencecould

be

securely

grounded nlywhen its subject matter s an

order f factswhichother

sciencesdo not study 1895b,p. 162).

Differentiatingociology rom he

moreestablished ield f individual

psychology hus became an issue of

cardinal concern o him.This, of course, s a pointthat previous om-

mentators ave oftenrecorded, lbeit in such general erms hat Dur-

kheim's ncounterwithpsychologymerges

s a struggle ith n almost

facelessopponent.

n

fact, however,

he

enemy

was

an

eminently

ull-

bodied one: chiefly,

t

was the aggressive

new

psychology f

the

time.

When Durkheim described

psychology,

e

spoke

of researchon

the

organic nd physical onstitutionf man

(1900a, p. 363);

when

he ad-

verted to specificpsychologicalwritings,

t

was the English, French,

German,

and

Americanrepresentatives

f

the

new

psychology

hat

he

repeatedly ited see 1898a; 1902-3b; 1913-14), even drawingon Du-

mont'spsychophysical iscussion f I'habitude, whichwas mentioned

above

(see 1898a, p. 5). Operating gainst

his

backdrop

nd determined

to

endow sociology

with a

subject

matter

eculiarly

ts own

1895b,p.

50),

Durkheim id

notwait ong

to

question

which

discipline

houldhave

custody f habit, and

it

did

not take

ong

for

him

to

answer

by explicitly

declaring

hat

the

phenomenon elonged

o

psychologysee, e.g., 1888a,

p. 51; 1901,p. 44; 1911b,p. 111).Never

mind

hat,byhis

own

testimony,

habitsmetthesame criteria s the socialfacts hatwereat thecore of

his sociology: hat theywereexternal o the ndividual

n

the sense that

theywereamongthe tendencies hat educationhas

impressed pon

us

(1912, p. 389; see also 1893, p. 320; 1895b,

pp. 50-54; 1902-3b, p. 244;

1904, p. 127) and thatthey

were also

constraining,dominat[ing]

s and

impos[ing] eliefs nd practices pon us

(1901, p. 44). For all this,

he

idea

of habit remained,

n

Durkheim's

mind,

oo

closely

ssociatedwith

psychologyo merit nclusion

n

his

sundry

ronouncements

bout what

the

discipline f sociology ught

o

study;

o

mnake

he

concept part

of

sociology ould onlyrisk hewhole causebysuggestinghat henew field

was not uch an

autonomous

ne after ll.

It is

true hat

Durkheim

might

have stressed he differenceetween he view

of

habitthat

ppears

else-

where

n

his

own writings nd

the

physiological

otioncurrent

n

the

psychological iterature,

ut it

was

safer to make a clean break

and

officially

oncede

his

pawn

to

the

psychologists,

or

ociology

ad

enough

1056



Habit

to do in

studyinghose phenomena hat

possessed

the

obligatory

moral

character

hathabitwas

now

said to ack.

And f

habitcould cometo

this

end withDurkheim-at the same time thathe employed he concept

throughout is substantive ork,held

that

t

describedmost

f

the ction

that

goes

onin

the ocialworld, nd made

t

central o

his

plans

for

moral

regeneration-itsfate could only be

worse at the hands

of sociologists

across

the ocean who fell hort n muchof this nd who were

embroiled

in

institutional

truggles hat appearedmore threateningnd more

ur-

gent.

Weber

BetweenDurkheim

nd Weberthere s

little ommon round;

n

terms f

assumptions,

roblems,

nd

methods,

he two were

greatly

t odds. Yet

Weber

was

easily

as

inclined

s Durkheim o make serioususe of

habit,

though

n

doingso he

ultimately

arried he

concept long paths

that

diverged rom he

moralizing ighroad

f his French

contemporary.6

It so happens,

however, hatto

understandWeber'sposition n habit

properly, ne must

ttendnot only ohis explicit

eferenceso habitand

its

cognates ut also

to his observationsn custom-in the

trictly ebe-

rian enseofcollective niformitiesf ctionrooted implyn habit 1913,

pp. 170-71; 1922a,

pp.

29,

319-20, 652;

1922b,p. 187)-as wellas tohis

use

of the

special

term

Eingestelltheit. his

expression,

orrowedby

Weber

(less

its

psychophysical

rappings)

rom

psychologists

uch

as

Kraepelin nd Wundt,was employed

y him to designate

he phenome-

non

he had

in

viewwhen speaking f

habit,namely, n unreflective,et

disposition

o

engage

n

actions

thathave been long practiced

1908-9,

pp.

93-94; 1922b,pp. 192, 442). Here

the

word

disposition

ill be used

as

a

shorthand

or hiskind

of habitual

disposition nd thus s

thetrans-

lationfor

ingestelltheit.7

6

That

Weber

steered

clear of

the

moral-reformist

ath of

Durkheim

does

not mean

that

he

was

without

his own

moral

udgments on

the

value of

habitual

action. On

the

contrary, he

Weberian

ethic

of

responsibility,

s

Levine

has

observed,

extolled

the

freedom

f

actors

to make

their

own

decisions

and

enjoined

individuals

to be con-

stant n

employing

orrectives

gainst

unthinking abit

(1981, p.

20). The

difference

between

this

estimate

of habit

and

Durkheim's

assessment

of

the same

phenomenon

s

noteworthy,

hough

an

examination

of this

evaluative

discrepancy

falls

outside

the

bounds of thisarticle.

7

With one

evident

exception

(Roth's

translation

of

Weber

1922b, p.

570,

in

Weber

1922a,

p. 988),

Weber's

Eingestelltheithas

been

rendered

attitude,

attitude-set, r

the

like,

presumably

because

of its

root in

Einstellung,

which is

a

modern

German

equivalent for

attitude.

But

it

is

important o

recognize

that,

in

Weber's

day,

the

term

attitude

had yet

to

gain wide

intellectual

currency see

Fleming

1967;

cf.

Bendix

1960, p.

272, n.

24).

Indeed,

in

the

psychological

iterature

rom

which

he

1057



American

Journal f

Sociology

If

these semantic omplications re kept

n

mind, Weber's views on

habit emerge uite clearly.Consider, o startwith,his declaration f ts

far-reachingconomic ignificance. n Weber's estimate, the evel of

economicneed, which constituteshe basis of all 'economic ctivity,' s

comprehensivelyonditioned y mere ustom, whichplays ts part also

in determininghe means of exchange nd the utilization f such basic

economic dvantages as labor and the means of production; urther-

more, the patterns f use and of relationshipmong modern] conomic

units are determined y habit (1922a, pp. 67-68, 78, 89, 320, 335).

Work

tself,

s Weber aw

it,

rests

eavily

n

a habitual oundation.The

smallPolishpeasant succeeds n agriculture]n acountof he ow evel of

his physical nd intellectual abitsof ife 1895, p. 434); Germangirls

[work nefficiently

n

factories ecause of an inner] tonewall of habit

(1904-5a, p. 62); the freedmenof antiquity] rospered, ortheyhad

acquiredhabits of ndustry nd thrift hileslaves 1909, p. 59).

In

the

modernworld,a similar ituation btainswithin apitalist actories nd

bureaucratic ffices, hese nstitutionseing he offspring f discipline,

which

Weber

defined s the

probability

hat

by

virtue

of

habituation

a

command

will receive

prompt

nd automatic

bedience

n

stereotyped

forms

1922a, pp. 53, 1149, 1156 [emphasis dded]). Accordingly,

is

writingsnindustry iscussed tlengthhereplacementf the habits' f

the old

occupation[s] y

docile habits

in

line

withthe demandsof the

[factory]

ork

procedure 1908b,p. 130; 1922a, p. 1156;

see also

1908b;

1908-9; 1922a, pp. 731, 1155-56), while

his

analysis

of

bureaucracy

placed great weight on officialdom's disposition Eingestelltheit)

o

painstaking

bedience

and

to

the]

habitual and

virtuoso

mastery

f a

single

function

1922a, p. 988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).

By Weber's reckoning, abit

is also

plainly

n

operation

utside the

sphere

of work and economic

activity.

t is there

on the

battlefields,

where

uccesseshave been secured

s well

as

forfeited

y various

mar-

tial]

habits

(1922a, p. 1152);

there ikewise amid

processes

of

group

formation,

ith mere custom

.

.

facilitatingntermarriage,

the for-

mation f

feelings f

ethnic'

dentification,

nd

thecreation

f

commu-

nity 1922a, p. 320, m.t.;

1922b,

p. 187); and there, oo,

at the

base

of

modern olitical-legal rders,where the broad mass of the participants

act

in

a

way corresponding

o

egal norms,

ot out of

obedience

egarded

as a

legal obligation,

ut

[in

a

greatmany cases] merely

s

a

result

f

borrowed

he

word

ingestelltheit,

instellung

tself

as

generally

ithout

ts

modern

meaning of

attitude ;

e.g.,

Baldwin's

Dictionary

of

Philosophy

and

Psychology

(which

was

compiledn

collaboration

ith

wo

well-placed

erman

cholars,

Mun-

sterberg

nd

Groos)

officially

ranslates

instellung s

acquired

disposition

see

Baldwin

1901,

1:287,

2:679-80).

1058



Habit

unreflective

abit

1922a, pp. 31,

312, m.t.;

1922b,pp. 16, 182;

see

also

1913, p. 178).

But notonlydoes habitpromote onformityith egal as wellas other)

norms, t s also involved

n

the

genesis

f such norms.

n

a manner hat

recalls the early

Durkheim,Weber

held that customs re

frequently

transformed

nto

binding orms,since]

hemere act

f

he

regular

ecur-

rence of certain events somehow confers on

them the

dignity

of

oughtness.

n

other

words,

whatwere

originally lain

habits fconduct

owing o psychological isposition

Eingestelltheit),

ome ater o be

expe-

riencedas binding;then,with the awareness

of

the diffusion f such

conduct mong plurality

f

ndividuals,

t comes

to be

incorporatedin]

'expectations' s to the meaningfullyorrespondingonductof others;

[until inallyhese

xpectations]

cquire

the

guaranty

fcoercive

nforce-

ment

(1922a, pp.

326, 754, m.t.; 1922b, pp. 191,

442).

In

remarks uch

as these,one sees theplace of habit

n

Weber's

reat-

ment of

processes

of

change.

More

typically,

however,

what

Weber

stressedwas the nertia f the habitual

1922a, p.

321, m.t.; 1922b,p.

188).

n

his

udgment,

the nner

ispositionEingestelltheit)to

continue

alongas one has

regularly one]

contains

n

itself

such] angible

nhibi-

tions

gainst

innovations,'that

t

s

problematic]

ow

anything

ew can

ever arise n thisworld 1922a, p. 321, m.t.;

1922b,p. 188).Moreover,

he

continued, ven where

revolts, anics,

or

other

atastrophes

ave

forcibly

ntroduced

hanges,

he status

quo

ante has often

een restored

simply by an appeal to the conditioned

isposition

Eingestelltheit)

o

obedient ompliance n the

part

of

ubjects

nd officialslike

1922a, p.

988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).

That Weber

thus adverted to the significance

f habit in so

many

important ontexts

was nothappenstance.The

examples hat have

just

been

mentioned-the

majority

f

them, t anyrate-were not ncidental

comments

ut reasoned

formulationsully

n

accord withWeber's

direct

testimony. ot

onlydo we discover, e

wrote, thefurther e go

back in

history, . . that conduct, and

particularly ocial

action, is determined n

an

ever

more

comprehensivephere xclusively y

the disposition

Ein-

gestelltheit)

owardthe

purelyhabitual

1922a, p.

320, m.t.; 1922b,p.

188),

but

we find

hat individuals

re stillmarkedly nfluenced y . .

.

custom

even

today, so much so

that the great

bulk of all everyday

action

[approaches

an] almost automatic reaction

to habitual

stimuli

whichguidebehavior n a coursewhich has beenrepeatedly ollowed

(1922a, pp. 25,

337). Despite such testimony,

owever, the

habitual

undercurrentn

Weber'sworkhas

yet o be much

ppreciated. ixatedon

foreground,he

burgeoning

Weberian cholarship f hepast two

decades

has

gone

far

odissectWeber's

views on rationality,

ut-aside from he

perceptive eginnings

f

Roth

1968, pp. xxxv,xc,

lxix) nd Cohenet al.

1059



AmericanJournal

f

Sociology

(1975, pp. 231-33, 239)-habit has been eft ut of the accounting. his

omission s the morepeculiarfor, n the widely ead ntroductoryection

ofEconomy nd Society,Weber himself ointedly potlightedhe realm

of

the habitual when he placed traditional ction among his basic

types f social action, conceived f thisform f conduct s action de-

termined y ingrained abit, and then added to thistheabove-quoted

claim that thegreatbulk of all everyday ction pproximates his ype

(1922a, p. 25, m.t.; 1922b,p. 12). Students f Weber,nonetheless, ave

failed o take due heed ofthis; t best, heyhave made noteof heconcept

of

traditional ction, recorded

ts

definition,nd

then et the matter

o

(see, e.g., Alexander1983, p. 25; Aron 1967, p. 221; Giddens 1971, p.

153).

For Weber himself, owever,traditional ction was by no means a

residual ategory. he fact hatthistypeof action s defined s deriving

from ingrained abit serves o unite t directly ith he very spect of

Weber'sworkthat

has just

been

considered,

hat

s,

his

treatmentfthe

marked ffect f habit on economic nd

political ife,

ocial

stability

nd

change, and a good deal

else.

WithinEconomy

and

Society tself,

he

concept

f

traditional

ction

s a

link, oo,

to

the

detailed

nalysis,

which

immediatelyollows heconcept's ntroduction,fthenature f ocial

and

economic elations, or his analysisreverts epeatedly o the roleofthe

traditional-in structuringommunal elationships,stablishing

he

ex-

pectations hat underlie table organizations, anking lternative co-

nomic nds, canalizingworkeffort,nd so on (1922a, pp. 40-41, 49, 88,

129, passim). In fact, unless one is to believe that Weber, at

his ter-

minologically ostprecise,

ltered

withoutwarning

is definition

f tra-

ditional,

he

only

fair onclusion

s

that

n

all thishe was

again observing

what to him

werebasically he

ramificationsf habit.

But even more mportant,traditional ction provides bridge ut-

ward to

Weber's

vast

writings

n traditionalism.

his is a connection

that

Parsonswas

the

firstand

is still

mong

the

few)

to have

discerned,

thoughhe

then

beclouded

he ssue

by recastingWeber's

formulations

o

fit

his own emphasis on beliefs nd values at theexpenseof habit see

1937, pp. 646-47). But, as Webermade

clear when

defining

is

terms,

although

raditionalism

may

become a

pattern

f belief round which

reflectivection

s

structured1915e, p. 296; 1922a, p. 25),

in the first

instance t is

exactly

what habit

is: the

psychic disposition Einge-

stelltheit)owardhabituated outine s thebasis of ction 1915e,p. 296,

m.t.; 1915a, p. 269).

Insofar

s Weber

was serious bout this

quation

of

traditionalism ith

habit,

one

would

have to conclude hathabit

was

in

operation

well

beyond

hose

portions

f

his

workexamined

o

far;

hat

t

was

actually

ne of

the underlying

oundation

tones f the

comparative-

historical

tudies that constitute

he

core

of

Weberian

sociology,

ince

1060



Habit

traditionalisms amongthe central

oncepts

sed

n

these tudies.

To

see

justhow seriousWeberwas, it s not

necessary

o

ook far: orwhether

is

subject was the economic, religious,or political dimensionof tradi-

tionalism, e continuallytressed hefirm

inkagebetween raditionalism

and habit.

Economic raditionalism,ccording

o Weber, s the dherence o ong-

practiced conomic forms,particularly to productswhich are stereo-

typed n quantity nd qualityor to [an

accustomed] evel

of

earnings,

r

both

1922a, p. 151; 1923b,p. 16).

n

his

udgment,

conomic

ctivity

f

thiskind has been extremely

revalent, ccurring ot only mong peas-

ants the world over but also among medievalguildsmen, dventurer-

capitalists, ndian artisans,Chinese petitebourgeoisie,nd numbers f

modernwage-laborerssee, e.g., 1904a,

pp. 364-65; 1904-5a, pp. 59-76;

1906,pp. 321-22; 1915c,pp. 3-20; 1916-17, pp. 111-17).Whendiscuss-

ing such examples,Weber freely

cknowledged

hat certain ctors

may

proceed n traditionalistic ays

because doing so

is

in

their conomic

interest r is mandated by theirvalues and beliefs.Yet he explicitly

denied

thatthesereflectiveonsiderations

re the

principal

ases

of eco-

nomic raditionalism.ndeed, he was very areful o set

the

atter part

from atterns f economic ctivity ooted n self-interestr absolute

values and to

conjoin

t instead with

habit, ust

as he elsewhere

or-

trayed raditionalism

n

economic ffairs s

a force hat s

virtually

n-

stinctive,

ccurs

by nature,

and is

great

in

itself,

ven

without

utilitarian

nd

moral

supports

1904-5a, p. 60; 1915d,p. 356; 1916-17,

pp. 84, 112; 1922a, pp. 150-51;

1923b,p. 16). And,

in

his most

ystem-

atic

treatmentfthe

topic,

conomic raditionalism

as

depicted rimar-

ily as a manifestationf humankind'sgeneral ncapacity nd indisposi-

tion

to

depart fromhabituatedpaths

(1923a, p. 355, m.t.; 1923b, p.

303)-or, inotherwords, s a matter fhabit seealsoMarshall 1980,p.

115;

Cohen et

al. 1975, p. 232).

A

similaremphasis appears in

Weber's writings n religion nd on

domination. hroughout he former, here s muchconcernwithwhat s

variously called the traditionalism f the laity, magical tradi-

tionalism,

r

magical stereotyping,

xpressions

hat

generally esig-

nate

theformerlylmostuniversal endency or magically roved orms

of

actionto be

repeated

n

the form nceestablished, sometimes ith-

out]

he

lightest eviation 1915d,p. 341; 1922a, pp. 405, 456; 1923a,p.

161; 1923b,p. 303). Like other ctiontendencies, hisone, Weber held,

has often een sustainedby religious

onvictions nd by practical nter-

ests

1915d, p. 331).

But

having aid this,he hastened irectly o connect

magicaltraditionalismlso with he

habitual:

with

the persisting abits

of

the

masses

1922a, p. 467, m.t.;

1922b,p. 285; see also Warner1970,

p. 86).

In

his

telling,

he

magical habits

of the

laity antedatedthe

1061




development f systematic eligious ctivity nd retained lifeof their

own even afterward,s manyworldreligionseft hevast majoritymired

in its originaltraditionalism1915c, pp. 229-30; 1915e, pp. 275-88;

1916-17, p. 342; 1922a, pp. 466, 470, 629, m.t.; 1922b,p. 284; 1923a, p.

363). Traditionalism's abitualunderpinningsre clearly rought ut as

well

in

Weber's treatment f politicaldomination, articularly hen he

examined he natureof traditional uthoritynd sought he foundation

for

his oldest nd mostuniversal ype f egitimacy 1922a, p. 37). His

statements ere peak for hemselves: traditional structuref domina-

tion is based] on the belief nthe nviolabilityfwhat has always been;

[thisbelief]derives . . effectivenessrom he nnerdispositionEinge-

stelltheit)o theconditioned owerofthepurely abitual -that is,from

actors' habitual rientationo conform nd general sychologicalnhi-

bitions

gainst ny

sortof

change

n

ingrained

abits f

action 1918, p.

79; 1922a, pp. 37, 1008,

m.t.;

1922b,pp. 19, 582).

At

thispoint,

t

s perhapsworth bserving hat,

n

addition o ndicat-

ingthatWeberretained he ncient oncept fhabit nd put t to work o

understand

what

he saw as the

great,protean

forceof

traditionalism,

Weber'swritings n traditionalism ay

be

seen as developing in a way

that,

o

my knowledge,

as

nowhere een

matched) macrosociological

perspective n habit. f Durkheim's eformisteal propelled im oexam-

ine the micro-level evelopment

f

specific

moral

habits,

Weber's com-

parative-historical

rientationed

him

away

from his ssue

and into a

more

horoughgoingnvestigation

f the

arger

ocial and cultural

ondi-

tions under

which general

ocietal

patterns

f habitual action wax

and

wane.

It

was Weber's

belief hat habitual

action does

not occur

at random.

While

ndividuals

verywheremay

act out of habiton

occasion, hey

re

not ll equally nclinedn thisdirectionn alldomains ftheir ctivity,or

there s a

strong ffinity

etween

he

way

of ife

within

differentocial

groups and

the

propensity

f

group

members

oward various sorts of

habitual

or reflectiveonduct.

Peasants,

for

xample,

ive a

simple

nd

organic

xistence

evolving

round

recurringcycle

f

natural

vents,

with the result hat traditionalism

ypically goes

without

aying ;

he

situationwith rtisans

s sometimesmuch

he ame

1915d,pp. 344, 346;

1916-17, pp. 104, 112, 313; 1922a, pp. 468, 1197).

n

contrast,

members

of

civic

strata

exhibit ] tendency

owards

practical ationalism,for]

theirwhole existenceis]basedupon technologicalnd economic alcula-

tions

and]

the

mastery

f natureand man

(1915e, p. 284).

Reflective

tendencies,

f this nd other

ypes,

an be

detected, oo, among ay

and

religious ntellectuals nd among

incumbents

f

rulershippositions

(1915c, pp. 41-44, 142-43; 1922a, pp. 467-518). Yet,

as Weber con-

tinued,groups

hat

have been imbuedwith

hesenontraditionalenden-

1062





American

Journal f

Sociology

inthe modernworlddepends ess on simply rading ne set of beliefs or

another hanon theformationf n entirelyew moralhabitus, o Weber

maintained hatCalvinism spurred ational conomic ction because it

wentbeyondthe articulation f ideas that favoredsuch activity nd

produced, nstead, fundamentallyifferent 'habitus' mong ndivid-

uals

which prepared them

n

specificways to

live

up to the specific

demands

of

early

modern

apitalism 1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 242-

43).

Weber's

thesishere s of a

piece

withhis other

writings

n

religion.

n

his view, t has been one ofthehighest ims ofmany alvation eligions o

impart o religious virtuosi totalcharacter : specificallyeligious

habitus or charismatichabitus, or permanenthabitus -which

transcends he ordinaryhabitus of everyday ife, that is, the often

unshakablenaturalhabitusofthe majority hat takes ifeas a miscel-

laneous

successionof discrete ctions and thus

makes

do

with

tradi-

tionalistways and an adherence o thehabitual 1915c, pp. 231-32,

m.t.; 1915b,pp. 517-18; 1922a, pp. 534-40, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 325-28).

The

exclusively irtuoso ects

of

Calvinism

went the furthestn

this

regard;

from heir

eligious ife,

ut of their

eligiouslyonditioned

am-

ily traditions nd from he religiouslynfluencedife-styleftheir nvi-

ronment merged central nnerhabitus - a methodically nified

dispositionEingestelltheit) -which,

henchanneled

nto

nner-worldly

activities,

esulted

n a

historically

omentous

fflorescencef

sustained

rational onduct 1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 240, 244, m.t.; 1915b,pp.

527, 531).

In

this

ense,

modern ational ction tself

ests,

or

Weber,

on

a

foundation f habit:

on a

dynamic

habitus

that

supplants

he

static

habitus

hatunderlies

imple

habitual ction.

t

is

true hat hese re not

the

terms

n

which

he

Weberian

position

s

ordinarily

ummarized.

hey

are, however,

he terms

n

whichWeber

himself

ought

o

represent

is

argument. ndeed, Weber notonlydeclaredexplicitly hat,when The

Protestant thic speaks of

the

development

f the

capitalist pirit,

t

means the

development

f

[a] particular abitus,

he

stated

unequivo-

cally

thathis controversial

tudy intentionallyconcentratedn]

the as-

pect

mostdifficult

o

grasp

and

'prove,' the spect]relating

o

the

nner

habitus 19lOb, pp. 157, 186,

n.

39;

latter ranslation

y

Tribe

n

Hennis

1983, p. 146; see also Weber 1904-5b, p. 182).

For

all this

emphasis

on the

habitual,

here s nonetheless

ne

way

in

which heconcept f habitoccupies n uneasyplace inWeber's hought.

To

understand his,

t

s

important

o

recognize hat,during

he ate

19th

and

early

20th

century,

he

German

academic

world

was,

like its

counterpartslsewhere, competitive

rena

in

which

the

advocates

of

many hen-emergingisciplines, ociology ncluded, truggled iercely

or

1064



Habit

a securepositionwithin he universities

longside he older branches f

thenatural nd

sociocultural ciences nd such

upstart

ields s

psychol-

ogy see Ben-David and Collins 1966, pp. 461-63; Eisenstadt nd Cure-

laru 1976, pp.

30-34; Oberschall 1965, p. 13). Writing rom distin-

guished nd

easily won chair of economics,Weber actually xhibited

good deal

more openness regarding hese

interdisciplinaryorderdis-

putes than

many of his contemporariesHennis 1983, p. 161). He, too,

however,was

an activeparticipantn the

Methodenstreit,hecelebrated

controversyver

thenature f

cience hat

provided

he

ntellectual ack-

ground o the

disciplinaryquabbles see

Burger1976,pp. 140-53; Cahn-

man

1964;Oakes 1975, pp. 16-39).

In positioning imself mid thiscontroversy,Weberset the natural

sciences part

from he

sociocultural

ciences,holding

hat t s

only

he

latter isciplines-those withwhichhewas

allied-that

treathumans s

cultural

eings whose action embodies

subjectivemeaning, which]

maybe moreor

ess clear to the actor,

whether onsciously oted

or

not

(1904b, p. 81;

1913, p. 152).

The

objectiveof such sciences, herefore,

s

to

understand uman action

by identify[ing]

concretemotive' . . to

which

we can

attribute he conduct

n

question

1903-6, p. 125).

The

naturalsciences, n contrast, schew this

subjectiveunderstanding

f

action and

favor]

he

explanation

f

ndividual

acts

y applying general

causal

laws] (1922a, p. 15). Accordingly,t

was

among

the natural ci-

ences

that

Weber classifiedmost

contemporary sychology,

with its

search

for

he

laws of psychophysics nd itsfragmentation

f

experi-

ence into such 'elements'

as] 'stimuli,' sensations,' reactions,' and]

'automatisms'

(1903-6, pp. 136, 140;

1908a, p. 31).

In

his

opinion,

he

sociocultural

ciences-economics, history,

nd

also

sociology-could

do

without ll

this,

for

ction does not

.

. become

more

understandable'

than t wouldotherwise y the introductionf]psychophysical oncepts

(1908a, p. 29).

Yet, as Weber'swide reading fthe

European and

Ameri-

can

psychological

iterature isclosed, hese wereprecisely he concepts

under

whichthe

business

of

habit was

commonly

ubsumed

see 1908b,

pp. 112-34; 1908-9, pp. 64-65, n. 1,

72-106).

For a

more sectarianacademic, this

circumstancemightwell have

sufficedo

place habit

altogether eyond

he

purview

f the

sociocultural

sciences.

Weber

did

not succumb

o

this

knee-jerk eaction, owever.

f

the

workof

psychologistsrained he ubjectivemeaning ut ofhabit,

his

ownresearchesended ntheopposite irection, otonlywhen xamining

such

greatvessels of

meaning

s the

habitusof Calvinism nd of other

salvation

eligions ut also when

considering oremundaneworkhabits,

military abits,

politicalhabits,magical

habits,and the ike. For at no

point

did

Weber treat such

phenomena,

n

the mannerof

the natural

1065



American

Journal

f

Sociology

scientist studying human

activity, as incomprehensive tatistical

probabilit[ies] 1922a, p. 12);

that s, as nonunderstandableehaviors or

which tis impossible o identifyny conscious r nonconsciousmotive.

Nevertheless, ven Webercame within he spell of psychological o-

tionsof habit. He thus couched

his definitionf traditional ction n the

psychophysical rgot of stimuli and automatic reactions, nd he

tended ikewise o portray hisform f

action s existing by nature nd

antecedent o culture see above,

and 1922a, pp. 17, 320-21, 333, 1134).

Given the

nterdisciplinaryontroversiesf

his

age and his commitment

to

study culturalbeings while

setting side

the natural

cientificp-

proach of the psychologists,

hese views on habit could but raise grave

doubts bout the concept's elevancewithin heWeberian onception f

the

sociocultural ciences. Such

doubts were codified

n

Economy and

Society, where Weber urged the

sociologist

o

investigatemeaningful

social

action and

then

nnounced hattraditionalr habitualconduct-

describedhere

n

psychophysical

erms,

ather han

n

the

interpretive

languageused in his empirical

tudies- lies very lose to the borderline

ofwhat

can ustifiably e called

meaningfully

riented

ction,

nd indeed

often

n

the

otherside (1922a, p. 25).

This

formulation

as

a

risky

compromise.t left hedoor tothe

domainof

habit

ufficientlypen

that

Weber's sociologycould still incorporatehis own ample analyses of

habitualaction,but it set that

door precariously nough jar

that

those

withother nclinationsmight

uickly

lose

t, and close

t for

good.

The American cene

To

American ontemporariesf Durkheim nd Weber,

the

concept

of

habitwas

also

a

familiar

tem.

n

the ast

decades

ofthe

19th

entury

nd

the

earlydecadesof the20th-to goback

no

further-onefinds

he

dea

all over

he ntellectual

andscape, nvoked

like

bypopularreformers,y

solemn

Harvard philosophers, y

social evolutionists ith Lamarckian

leanings, nd by evolutionaryhinkers f

a

moreDarwinian

bent,

uch

as

Sumner n the

right nd Veblen

on

the

eft

see

Curti

1980, pp. 233-34;

Kuklick

1977, pp. 74-75, passim; Stocking1968, pp. 238-69; Sumner

1906; Veblen 1899, pp. 107-8,

passim). Mentionof

these

evolutionary

currentstself uggests omething

f

the

biologisticight

n

which

habit

was seen at

this time. But the

best ndication

f

this,

as well as of the

concept's ontinuing tilization,ppears n theworkof the earlyAmeri-

can

psychologists.

his work is

particularly

nstructiveince not

only

does it

contain

he

age's

most

ystematictatementsbout

habit,

t also

reveals

the

point

of

departure or he sociological reatmentsf the sub-

ject

thatwere

producedduring he same period.

To

appreciate

he

psychologists'

iews

properly, owever,

few

words

1066






habits re nothing ut concatenated ischargesn thenerve-centers,ue

to the presence here f systems f reflex aths 1890, pp. 107-8, 112).

Congruent iews werewidely xpressed: y theveteran cholarBaldwin,

to whom habitswere lowermotor yntheses 1897, p. 55, n. 2); by the

risingyoung experimentalist

erkes,

who regardedhabit, whether n

turtles,frogs,

or

humans, as

a

tendency oward

a certain

action

[resulting rom hedevelopmentn theorganism] f a track alongwhich]

nervous

mpulse[s]

ass (1901, p. 545); by the eclectic heoretician n-

drews,who concluded

n

an important

ffortt

synthesis

hat

habit

..

is at bottom physiological henomenoninvolving] euralmodifications

[caused] by the

neural

excitations 1903, pp. 139, 149). Similar

tate-

mentswere nscribed ntothetextbooks f the periodby authoritiesuch

as

Angell,Judd, Pillsbury, nd Swift see Fearing 1930, pp. 242, 247;

Watson

1914, pp. 252-56).

The complete riumph f this pointofview came whenJohnWatson

launched, early n the second decade of this century, he behavioral

movement

n

Americanpsychology. etermined o make psychology

even moremanifestlycientifichan

t

had alreadybecome,

o

purge

he

field f all

introspectively

solable

elements such as] sensation, ercep-

tion, imagery, tc., and to write psychology instead]

n

terms

of

stimulus nd response 1913, pp. 199, 201), Watson adopted a thor-

oughly hysiologized onception

f

habit nd thenplaced

this

oncept

t

the

very center

of

his program

or

the analysis

of human

conduct.

n

Watson's

view,

habit is

simply system

f

[acquired]

reflexes r re-

sponses, or,

in

other

words, part

of the total

striped

nd

unstriped

muscular and glandular changes which follow upon

a

given

[environmental]timulus 1914, pp. 184-85; 1919, p. 14;

see also

1914,

pp. 184-276; 1919,pp. 169-347).

He

contended, urthermore,

hat man

is the sum of his instincts nd habits, meaninghereby hat all nonin-

stinctive

ctivity

s to be

seen as

habit

n

his

particular

ense of the term

(1917, p. 55; 1919, p. 270). So insistent as Watsonon this ount hat

he

actually onceivedof thinking

tself-which

had long

been

regarded

s

the

ultimate asis of

reflective

uman

action-merely

as

an

operation

f

the

tongue, hroat, nd laryngeal

muscles

.. moving

n

habitual

rains

(1919, p. 11).

Had Watson's pronouncements

een

idiosyncratic utpourings,

ne

might,

f

course, asily

write hem

ff.

n

fact,however,

is behaviorism

notonly representedn integrationf a good deal ofpreviouswork n

American sychology,

t

also became, by

the

mid-1920s,

ne of the

great

intellectual rthodoxiesmongprofessional sychologists, any f

whom

were

utterly

electrified

y

.

. Watson's

deas,

whichworked o well to

consolidate

he

cientific

tatus

f

their

ising

ield

Cravens

nd Burnham

1971,p. 645; see

also

Baken 1966;

Burnham

1968b;Curti1980,pp.

373-

1068





AmericanJournal

f

Sociology

these thinkerswidely

and

frequently redicated

heir

nalyses

ofsocial

lifeon the findings f the more stablished

cience

of

psychology,ust

as

psychology ad in its turn ppealed tothedistinguishediological ields

(Cravens 1978, p. 141).

Accordingly,mong sociologists f the time,

he concept f habitcon-

tinued o

function-alongside

erms ncompassing he reflectiveide of

human conduct-as an active partner

n the enterprise f social theory.

Examples are plentiful:Giddings ccepting he notion hat habit s an

affair f the nervous pparatus and then making

t

the verytask of

sociology o study the nature of the soci[al

man], his habits and his

activities

1900, pp.

1

1,72); Cooley

nodding ikewise oward hephysio-

logical usage of habit and concerning imselfwithhow habit exerts ]

fixing nd consolidating ction n the growth f the self, with hedevel-

opment f the habit of conscience, withthe way the modern conomy

generates a whole system

f

restless]

abits, nd

so on

(1902, pp. 187,

368, 370, 379; 1909, pp. 328-29);

Ross

attending

n

detail to habitsof

consumption nd

habitsof

production

1908, pp. 262-66); theyoung

W. I. Thomas

asserting

hat all

sociological

manifestations

roceed

rom

physiological onditions nd placing the

habitsof the group nd their

vagaries mong heprimarynterestsfthe ocial theorist1905, pp. 446-

47, 449-51; Stocking1968, p. 260); Hayes (a decade later till)defining

habits s established erebroneuralendencies

nd describing hem s

decisivemolders f the human personality

1915, pp. 297-98, 394); and

Ellwood adopting neurophysiologicaliewof habitand thendeclaring

that

for

he ndividual nd

for

ociety

habit s of

supreme mportance,

[since

t

s]

themain

carrier fall thoseforms f

ssociation . . which ise

above the

merely

nstinctive

evel, and

is

thus]

hechief aw material

n

which

cultural volution

must act. The higher tages

of human culture

[have actually] een builtup by thegradualdevelopmentof]higher ypes

of

habit, [and]

the social

order

of even

the

very highest

ivilization s

almost

ntirely

made

up

of habitual

ypes

f

individual]

eaction

1912,

p. 107; 1917, pp. 62-63). Even Robert

Park, ust embarking pon his

academic

career, umped

on the

bandwagon,

xuberantlyauding

work

on the

physiology

f

the

nervous

ystem,

efining

character

as]

noth-

ing

more

han he um ..

of

thosemechanisms

hichwe call

habit,

nd

announcing

that ducation

nd

social control

re

argely ependent pon

our

ability o establish

abits

n

ourselves nd

in

others

1915, pp. 82, 84;

see also 1904, p. 39).

Despite all this,

the

concept'sdays

were

numbered.

As behaviorism

grew

n

strengthmongpsychologists

n

thedecade or soafterWorldWar

I

and made its advances into sociological

erritories,ociologists efen-

sively

recoiledfrom he

conceptual

ramework

f

physiological sychol-

ogy. That they eacted

n this

way,

moreover,

s more

commentary

n

1070



Habit

the

tate f ociology

tself hanonbehaviorism,

or he

better-established

social sciences

of

the

time

were

generally

nruffled

y

the behaviorist

challenge see Curti1980, pp. 395-98). Sociology, owever, emained n

a vulnerable

osition, aggingbehind

n

terms f academic nstitutional-

ization s late as the

arly1920s,when

hediscipline till onsistedmainly

of

a scatteringf

undergraduateourses aught romwithin ther

epart-

ments see Cravens 1978, pp.

129-30; Ross 1979, pp.

124-25).

Com-

mitted

pokesmen or

he

field

hus

became

ever more

passionatelyon-

cerned

with the vigorous assertion f

[the]

disciplinary utonomy

f

sociology Matthews1977, p. 149; Cravens

1978, pp. 121-22, 147-53)

and

respondedwith

alarm

at the

behaviorists' ncroachments.

ndeed,

formanypractitionersf ociology,hewholepostwar eriod tood ut as

an

age when extreme

ehaviorism

hreatened o dominate

hesociolog-

ical

scene Odum 1951, p. 450).

Fearfulof

ust

such

an

outcome, ociologistsmoved with

dispatch

o

stem

the

apparent

ide of

behaviorism,

nd it was

in

so

doing

that

they

purposefully

bandoned the venerable

concept

of

habit.

There

are,

of

course, exceptions

o the rule-Bernard

(1926),

who

sought compro-

mise

withthe behaviorists hat

preserved abit

n

its

physiological rap-

pings;Maclver

(1931), who was

steeped

n

a traditionf Europeansocial

theory ntedatingbehaviorism nd continued o speak ofmoral,reli-

gious,political, nd economichabits

cf. Sorokin1947,pp. 43-51). But,

increasingly,hesewereminorityoices.

n

theview of

many ociologists,

habitwas the

behavioristdea of habit:

o countenancehiswas to accept

behaviorism's

hysiologicallyeductionistccount

fhuman

ction

n

the

social world

nd

to

ruleout

all

those

nstances freflective

ction

hat

had

long held

an

important lace

in

American

ociology longwithhabitual

action. That

broader

conceptualizations

f habit

might

have been sub-

stituted or he

behaviorist ormulationnd

were

actually

vailable

in

so

ready sourceas Dewey (1922; see n. 3 above) matteredittle.Dewey's

statements

n

habit wereread but

not seized as an alternative

Allport

1954, p. 59), for n

an intellectual ettingwhere

habit was so closely

associated

with

psychology,ny use

of

the

concept

eemed o exhibit

ust

the

kindof

rel[iance]

n

concepts orrowed rom nother

iscipline hat

jeopardized

the

autonomy f

sociology Matthews

1977, p. 149)

8

It

is

true,

as

sociologists

rankly dmitted, hat breakingwith

psychology

meant

hat

ociology

ould no

longer nhance ts scientificredentials

y

leaning on the reputation f thephysical ciences Ellwood 1930, p.

8

Mead's

social

behaviorism,

owever,was

palatablebecause

t

concentrated

n

the

ctivity f

ndividuals

nsofars

they re

acting s

self-conscious

embers f

a

social

group, ven

though

Mead

himself

saw

most acts

as

habituated

esponses

proceeding

ithout

elf-conscious

eflection

Lewisand

Smith

980,pp.

144,

160).

1071





Habit

below

him

1918, p. 789). Increasingly

ritical

f

thewhole dea

of

habit

and of the

Behaviorist whoneglects

verything]xcept

he

modification

ofhabitsor reflexes, llwood devotedmuch of his later workto the

reflective

intellectual lements ywhichhumans ranscend hehabitual

(1927, p. 65, 75; 1930, p. 204). In due

course,Park, too, came

to

argue

that

whatwe do whenwe behave

most

ike

human

beings is]pretty

ure

to escape the

behavioristswho focus n]

habits ;

hathuman haracter

s

neither

instinctive or

.

. habitudinal, ut

an outgrowth f present

attitudes, hich

he

ociologist

an

study

without

ecourse

o

the

physi-

ological

term . .

habit 1930, p. 98;

1931, pp. 17-32;

cf. Park

and

Burgess 1921,

pp. 438-39; Park and

Miller

1921, pp. 82-83).

Faris

sounded imilar hemes, ashing utagainst he physiological sychology

and

neurological

sychology

f

the

behaviorists, isdaining

heir defec-

tive

theory

f

habit and concluding

the

word habit'

s

quite

unsatisfac-

tory o capture all the

thinking

nd

striving

hat constitute uman

social

conduct;

orhim

lso,

attitude

was the

preferableoncept 1921, p.

194; 1924, p.

41; ca. 1930a, p. 236; ca.

1930b,pp. 244-46).9

In

fact, o

readilydid thisgeneralpoint

of

view make

its mark

that,by

the

early

1930s,Queen

could approvingly eport hat

in

recent ears .. students

of

human relationshave talked less about habits and more about at-

titudes 1931, p. 209), while histories fAmerican ociology rom he

same

periodcould

identify

o

contemporaryociological

reatmentsf

habitsave for

hose of Bernard nd Dewey and

digressed nstead

o the

topicofattitude

Bogardus 1929, pp.

518-19; Karpf 1932, pp. 334-42,

408-9).

And

a few

years ater,whenZnaniecki ssuedhismassive reatise

Social

Actions,he could confidentlyeiterate

he

point,made years

be-

forewith

Thomas,

that 'habit'

is an expression hat

ociologists] refer

notto use, since

t denominates biological

behavioral' atternthat] s

of no

importance

or

he

study

f

social] ctions 1936, pp. 40-42) and,

with

that,

et the matter

rop altogether.

In

the

following ear, a youngTalcott

Parsons added to the chorus.

One

often-overlookedeitmotif f The

Structure f Social Action s, in

fact, what Parsons

later described s its vigorous . . polemicizing

against behaviorism 1978a, p. 1353).

Attacking the behavioristic

scheme for

reducing the individual to

a biophysical unit and

9

Like

many

natural

cientist

hohas

practiced

nder

ne

paradigm

ndcan

never

entirelyhiftoanothernthewake of scientificevolutionseeKuhn1962, p. 144-

59),

Thomas,

Ellwood,

Park,

nd

Faris

all had

moments

hen

hey

apsed

back

nto

talk

about

habit,

ven

after

hey

had

formally

enied

he

sociological alue of

the

concept see,

e.g.,

Thomas

1927,

pp.

143-47;

Ellwood

1925, pp.

88-93;

Park

1930, p.

96;

Faris

1937,

p.

182).

Only

n

the

generation

hat

ucceededhese

ioneers

as their

conceptual

reak

with he

pastfully

arried

hrough-again,much

s

in

the

case of

scientific

evolutions.

1073



American

Journal f

Sociology

exclud[ing

he] subjective spect of human conduct,

Parsonswas led,

like his early ontemporaries,o equate habit directly ith

the psycho-

logical oncept fhabit or, n otherwords,with hebehaviorists'ndless

talk

about organically conditioned eflexes r habits 1937,pp. 76-78,

116, 380, n. 3, 647; see also 1934, pp. 437-40)-an

equation he was to

retain ormuch of his career 1959, p. 687; 1975, pp. 667-68; 1978b,p.

389; cf. Parsons and Shils 1951, pp. 78, 89, 125). But such

an equation

could onlyprove nimical o habit since, when writing he Structure f

Social Action,Parsonswas as eager as others

n

the

sociological

ommu-

nity o differentiatehe sociologist's pproach from he

behaviorist p-

proach,for he atter eemedto imply hattherewas no place for he

young ield f sociology 1937, pp. 115-17, 773-74). He accordingly ro-

posed to establish ociology s one of a handful f

independent ciences

of

action, ach of whichwould have as its domainone ofthefour emer-

gentproperties f action ystems-with thehereditaryasisof

person-

ality falling

o

psychology, economic ationality

o

economics,

coer-

cive

rationality opolitical cience, nd common-value

ntegration

o

sociology1937, pp. 760-73).

For

present urposes,

what s most

triking

aboutthis eeminglyncompassingcheme sthat,beyond he

residuum

...

referable o heredity 1937, p. 769),

t

s

a

mappingwholly

imited o

the provinces f reflective ction, a limitation hat accordswell with

Parsons's premise hat action consists f a reasonedselection

f means

and

ends

by

the

application

f

guiding

orms

1937, pp. 26,44-45, 48).

Twist and turnhis groundplan for he sciences f action s

much s

we

like, t yieldsno nichewithin ociology, r even within llieddisciplines,

for

he tudy fhabitualforms fhuman ocial action.

For

Parsons,

s

for

other

ociological pponents

f behaviorism

uring

he

1920s

and

1930s,

habithad abruptly eased to be an acceptable,going oncern f

the

ocial

theorist.

There are, however, factors hat make Parsons's

own treatment f

habit in

The Structure f Social Action especially ignificant. or

one

thing,

histreatment as

presented

n

conjunction

with

lengthy-and

ultimately ery

nfluential-accountof the

development

f

European

social

thought,which,

aside from

few

dismissive

emarks

1937, pp.

321, 646), wrotehabit

out

of the whole history

f modern ocial

theory,

even when

considering

urkheim nd

Weber.

This was

so

despite

the

fact

that, throughout

he actual course

of this

history,

abit had often

referredo innerdispositions nd tendencies hatwereverymuchpartof

the

subjective ide

of

humanconduct hatParsons

now

counterposed

o

habit.Parsons's analysis tands out,

in

addition,because it

articulated,

far

more explicitly han the work of Thomas, Ellwood, Park,

and

the

others ad

done,

the

underlyingonception

faction t which

ne arrives

once the

dea

of

habit

s

set

aside.

This

conception,

s

clearly

tated

by

1074



Habit

Parsons,postulates hat all action exhibits common

tructure :

hat

actionprocesses o not vary

n

their orms, nly

n

their ubstance-that

is, only n terms fthe particularmeans, ends, and normswithwhich

given ctors re

concerned 1937, pp. 733-34; see

also Warner1978,pp.

1321-22; Zaret 1980, p. 1194). And here ies the

problem.

* * *

If we take a

largerhistorical erspective n the

matter

f habit than

that adopted by

those who dispensed with the

concept,

then to

homogenize ction

processes n the way thatParsons'swork llustrateso

well s, I submit, nsatisfactoryor hree easons.First, hehomogenized

view

of

action

ffectivelylocks

out

consideration

fthe

empirical

ole

of

habit

n

the social

world. For thinkersike Durkheim

nd Weber,habit

was

of

significant

onsequence

in

economic,

political, religious,

nd

moral ife, nd elsewhere s well; but ts consequences re not

something

one s at all

prompted o nvestigate,

r

even to

notice,whenone

assumes

that action always

takes

the form f a reflective

eighing, y

various

normative

tandards, f means to ends. Parsonshas, it s true, cknowl-

edged

that the

adequate understanding

f

many

concrete

henomena

mayrequire heemploymentf nalytical ategories rawnfrom utside

the

ciences

f

action 1937, p. 757). But

this

declaration

as

proved

o

be

a

dead letter oth

n

his

own later work and

in

most

contemporaneous

linesof sociological

esearch, orhabitual

phenomena imply o not con-

geal as salient mpirical ealities or hosewho operate

with

model

of

action

that allots

no place to habit.

A

second

problemwith hismodel s itsneglect f

the

heoretical

mpli-

cationsof

habitual ction, ncluding hose hatrelate

directly o the cen-

tral

askthat

Parsons etsfor theory f ction-the taskof

account[ing]

for he element forder n social relationships 1937, p. 102). In accord

withhis

reflectiveonceptualizationf action,Parsonsholds

in

Munch's

[1982, p. 776]useful ummary) hat ocial order

derives rom the recip-

rocal penetration

f nstrumental. . andnormativelybligated ction.

Neither

he nor

critics

f

his

position

on

this

point

raise

any question

whatever bout

the extent

o

which social

regularities

btain because

humans also act in more nonreflective,abitual

ways. Nowhere does

Parsons confront

he Durkheimian hesis about the place of habit

in

moral educationand consider he degreeto whichthe reflectivemoral

action

that he finds o necessary o sustain social

ordermay reston

a

foundation f

habits mplanted arly on and maythereafterrystallize

only insofar as there are numbers of activities

that remain largely

habitual. Even less does the Parsonsianmodel of

action ccommodate

more

Weberianmacrosociological erspective n the

ssue: thepossibility

1075



American

Journal f

Sociology

that ome actorsmayderivereal or deal advantagesbecause other ctors

proceed in some areas) in habitualways, with he result hat he advan-

taged ctorsmaypursue ourses fconduct hat erve o perpetuate, r to

refashion,hesehabitualways and theorder hey mply cf.Bourdieu nd

Passeron 1970).

The third

difficulty ith homogenizingction as Parsons does lies

in

the

resulting onception

f

the relationship etween hehumanpersonal-

ity nd the social world. n his famous ttack n theutilitarianradition,

Parsonsdeclares hat themostfundamental riticism f utilitarianisms

that t has had a wrongconception fthe concrete umanpersonality

(1937, p. 387). What he does not perceive,however, s the marked imi-

larity between the alternativehe develops and the formulation e

criticizes. or

whether

ction s

depicted s

the

pursuit

f

economic

nds

via

normsof efficiency,r whethermore sublimeends and obligatory

moralnorms re also taken nto onsideration,heunderlyingssumption

is thatthe human personalitys essentially he aggregate f variousend

preferencesnd normative rientations-attributes hose content ar-

sons sees as varying

n

differentocial groups

nd

constituting

he

basic

substance f the

socialization

process.Missingaltogether

ere

s an

ap-

preciation or he point hatDurkheim nd Weberurged

when

adopting

the

concept

f

habitus,namely, hatpersonalitys

a

good

deal more han

the

tidy sum of attributes ike these; that the implications or actual

conduct

f

any particular orms, eliefs, nd ideas

are

highly ontingent

on

the basic cast or form

f

the whole

personality

f

which

hese

ompo-

nents are parts-on a generalizeddispositionwhose very shape may

differ

ithvariations

n the

ocialization

ractices

f

different

roups

nd

may undergomajor reorganization

s social formations

hange

histori-

cally.

This

way

of

eeingpersonality

as lost

ight f, oo,

as the

homoge-

nized view of action proposed by Parsonscodified he outcomeof the

campaign gainsthabit hat

he

and

his

older ontemporaries

ere

waging

on behalf f

the cause

of

sociology.

CONCLUSION

For

the present, here s no need to carry his historical nvestigation

forward

n

time.

t is

enough

to record

hat,

s habit was

progressively

discarded

rom

he

anguage

of

ociology,

ew cohorts

f

ociologists

ho

learned his anguage fresh nevitably ameto couchtheir wnthoughts

and theoriesn terms ther hanhabit,whether rnottheywereat all

cognizant

f the

rejection

f the

conceptby

the ikes

of

Thomas, Park,

Faris, Znaniecki, r the ncreasingly rominent arsons.

Since the terms

that were

current mbraced

action

only

to the extent hat

t was of a

reflective ariety, he work of these cohorts ended neluctablythough

often

unwittingly)

o

recapitulate

arsons's course

n

The

Structure

f

1076



Habit

Social

Action:

to

portray

ll

social

actionas

possessing

common

truc-

ture

nd

then

o

overlook

boththe

empirical

nd

theoretical

ignificance

of habitual conductand the role of habitus n theorganization f the

human personality.

One

might rgue,

to

be sure,

that

ociology

s a whole

benefited,

n

a

very angibleway,

from

eaving

thesematters side and

getting

n

with

other

usiness: hatthe excision f habiteffectivelybetted nstitutional-

izationof the discipline s well as the various

substantive chievements

that nstitutionalizationade possible.But thesebenefits ave ong ince

been

secured;theyhave ceased to

afford

rounds

or

rampling

n

con-

ceptualresources

hat

wereblighted

n

the

heat

of

ong-forgotten

ircum-

stances.By uncovering hese ircumstancesnd thusbringingo ight he

historical rocess hroughwhich heconceptual

tructure

f

ociology

as

cometo have

itsdelimited ocus,

esearch n

sociology's ast

constitutes

clear

invitation o those who currently ork

within hat

structure

nd

take

tsfocus orgranted t last to ook without nd consider

eriously

he

broader

lternatives

hat are

in

fact vailable

to

them.

In

undertaking o examine the history f the alternative hat s

the

concept fhabit,this rticle

has

proposed

hatrecent ffortso overcome

presentistpproaches o the study f sociology's ast be

expanded

o that

works ther hanacknowledged ociological lassics nd ideasother han

those

occupying heforegroundftheclassicscome to

be

recognized

s

integral o understandinghehistory f sociological hought.t

has

main-

tained, furthermore,hat to appreciate how the

conceptual

fabric of

sociology nitially cquired certain f ts basic

properties,t s instructive

to

investigate he

intellectual

onsequences

f

the

interdisciplinaryis-

putes

hat

ccompanied

he

establishmentfsociology

s an

independent

academic discipline and,

in

so doing, to examine the conceptual

framework f thosefields romwhich sociologists

f earliergenerations

were

seeking

o

differentiate

heir

wn discipline.Applyinghese ugges-

tions, his tudy asfound hat heconcept fhabit

was long staple tem

in

the

idiom of Western ocial thinkers; hat t

served as a ramifying

background orce

n

the work of both Durkheim

nd Weber,exerting

decisive effect

ven

as

theycame to termswith the central

ociological

issues

posed

in

theirwritings; ut that,during he

earlydecades of the

20th

entury,he ermwas intentionallyxpunged rom hevocabulary f

sociology

s

American ociologists ttempted o

establish

he

utonomy

f

theirdisciplineby severing ts ties with the fieldofpsychology, here

(esp.

in

connectionwith he

growth f

behavioralism) restricted otion

of

habit had

come into

very widespread usage. As struggles o, this

particular

onfrontation

ithpsychology as

one

that ndedquickly nd

was soon

forgotten-though orgotten

t

the ame time hat t eft

erma-

nent

effects n the nner onceptual tructure fsociological hought.

1077





Habit

3-81 in Handbook of

Personality Theory and Research, edited

by Edgar

F. Bor-

gatta and William M.

Lambert. Chicago:

Rand

McNally.

.1968b.

On the

Origins of Behaviorism.

Journal of

the

History of

the

Behav-

ioral Sciences 4:143-5 1.

Cahnman, Werner J. 1964.

Max Weber and the

MethodologicalControversy

n

the

Social

Sciences. Pp.

103-2 7

in

Sociology

and

History,

edited

by

Werner

J.

Cahn-

man and Alvin

Boskoff. New York: Free Press.

Camfield,

Thomas

M. 1973.

The Professionalization f American

Psychology,1870-

1917. Journal of the

History of

the

Behavioral Sciences 9:66-75.

Camic, Charles. 1979. The Utilitarians Revisited. American Journal

of Sociology

85:5 15-50.

.1981.

On the

Methodologyof the Historyof Sociology.

American

Journal

of

Sociology 85:1139-44.

Clark, Terry

N. 1973.

Prophets

and Patrons.

Cambridge,

Mass.:

Harvard

University

Press.

Cohen, Jere, Lawrence E.

Hazelrigg,

and

Whitney Pope.

1975.

De-Parsonizing

Weber:

A

Critique

of Parsons'

Interpretation

f Weber's

Sociology.

American

Sociological

Review

40:229-41.

Collini,Stefan. 1978.

Sociology

and Idealism

in

Britain,

1880-1920.

European

Jour-

nal of Sociology 19:3-50.

Collins, Randall. 1981.

On

the

Microfoundations

of

Macrosociology.

American

Journalof Sociology

86:984-1014.

Comte, Auguste.

(1830-54) 1975. Auguste

Comte and Positivism:

The

Essential Writ-

ings, edited by

Gertrud Lenzer, New York:

Harper & Row.

Condorcet, Marquis de,

Antoine-Nicolas Caritat.

(1793)

1955. Sketch

or

a

Historical

Picture of the Progressof the Human Mind. Translated by JuneBarraclough. New

York: Noonday.

Cooley,

Charles Horton.

(1902) 1922/1964.

Human Nature and the

Social

Order. New

York: Schocken.

. (1909) 1962. Social Organization. New York:

Schocken.

Cravens, Hamilton. 1978. The

Triumph of

Evolution:

American

Scientists

and the

Heredity-Environment

ontroversy,

900-1941. Philadelphia: University

f

Penn-

sylvania Press.

Cravens, Hamilton, and John C. Burnham. 1971.

Psychology and

Evolutionary

Naturalism

in

American Thought, 1890-1940.

American

Quarterly

23:635-57.

Curti,

Merle. 1980. Human

Nature

in

American

Thought.

Madison:

University

f

WisconsinPress.

Danziger, Kurt. 1982.

Mid-Nineteenth-Century ritish

Psycho-Physiology: Ne-

glected Chapter

in

the History of

Psychology. Pp. 119-46 in The Problematic

Science:

Psychology

n

Nineteenth-Century

hought, dited by William

R.

Wood-

ward

and Mitchell G. Ash. New York:

Praeger.

Darwin, Charles. (1859)

1964. On the Origin

of Species. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard

University ress.

.

(1872) 1965.

The

Expression of

the

Emotions

in

Man and Animals.

Chicago:

University

f

Chicago Press.

Dawe, Alan. 1978. Theories of Social Action.

Pp. 362-417 in A History ofSociolog-

ical Analysis, editedby Tom Bottomore

and Robert Nisbet.

New York: Basic.

Dewey, John. 1922) 1945. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Holt.

Dubray, Charles A. 1905. The Theory of

Psychological

Dispositions. Psychological

Review, Monograph Supplements, vol. 7,

no. 2.

Dumont, Leon. 1876.

De l'habitude. Revue philosophique

1:321-36.

Durkheim, Emile. (1886) 1974. Review of

Herbert Spencer,

Ecclesiastical Institu-

tions.

Translated by Robert Alun Jones.

Sociological Inquiry 44:209-14.

1079




. (1887a) 1975.

Review of M.

Guyau, L'irrligion de

l'avenir, etude de

sociologie.

Pp.

24-38 in Durkheim

on

Religion, edited

by W. S.

F.

Pickering.

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

. (1887b) 1975. La science positive

de la morale en

allemagne. Pp. 267-343 in

E1mile

Durkheim: Textes,

vol. 1. Edited by Victor

Karady. Paris: Les Editions de

Minuit.

. (1888a) 1978.

Course in Sociology: Opening

Lecture. Pp.

43-70 in Emile

Durkheim

on Institutional

Analyses, edited by Mark

Traugott.

Chicago: University

of

Chicago Press.

. (1888b) 1978.

Introductionto the Sociology of

the Family.

Pp. 205-28 in

Emile

Durkheim on Institutional

Analyses, edited by

Mark Traugott. Chicago:

University

f

Chicago

Press.

.

(1888c) 1975.

Suicide et natalit6:

Etude de statistiquemorale.

Pp. 216-36 in

Emile Durkheim: Textes,

vol. 2. Edited

by Victor Karady. Paris: Les

Editions de

Minuit.

.

(1890) 1973. The Principles of

1789 and

Sociology. Pp. 34-42 in Emile

Durkheimon Morality

and Society,

edited by RobertN. Bellah.

Chicago: Univer-

sity

of

Chicago Press.

. (1892) 1960.

Montesquieu's Contribution o the

Rise ofSocial

Science. Pp. 1-

64 in

Montesquieu and

Rousseau:

ForerunnersofSociology.

Translated by Ralph

Manheim. Ann

Arbor:

University f Michigan Press.

. (1893) 1933/1964.

The Division ofLabor in

Society. Translated

by George

Simpson.

New York:

Free

Press.

(1895a) 1919. Les

regles de la methode sociologique. Paris: Alcan.

(1895b) 1982. The

Rules of

Sociological Method, edited by Steven

Lukes.

Translated by W. D. Halls. New York: Free Press.

. (1897a) 1982.

Marxism and

Sociology: The Materialist

Conception of His-

tory. Pp.

167-74

in

The

Rules

ofSociological

Method,

edited

by

Steven Lukes.

New York:

Free Press.

.

(1897b) 1951.

Suicide:

A

Study

in

Sociology.

Translated by John

A.

Spauld-

ing and George Simpson. New

York:

Free Press.

(1898a) 1974.

Individual

and Collective

Representations.

Pp.

1-34 in

Sociology

and

Philosophy.

Translated

by

D.

F. Pocock. New York: Free Press.

.

(1898b) 1960. Preface

to

Volume

I

[of L'annee

sociologique]. Pp.

341-47

in

Emile

Durkheim, 1858-1917,

edited

by

Kurt H.

Wolff. Columbus: Ohio State

University

ress.

. (1898-1900) 1958. ProfessionalEthics and Civic Morals. TranslatedbyCor-

nelia Brookfield.

Glencoe,

Ill.: Free Press.

. (1899)

1960. Preface

to

Volume

II

[of L'annee

sociologique]. Pp.

347-52 in

Emile

Durkheim,

1858-1917,

edited

by

Kurt H. Wolff.

Columbus: Ohio State

University

Press.

. (1899-1900) 1978.

Two

Laws

of Penal Evolution.

Pp.

153-80

in

Emile

Durkheim on Institutional

Analysis,

edited

by

Mark

Traugott. Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press.

. (1900a)

1960.

Sociology

and Its

Scientific

ield.

Pp.

354-75 in Emile Dur-

kheim, 1858-1917, edited

by

Kurt H. Wolff. Columbus:

Ohio

State

University

Press.

(1900b) 1973. Sociology in France in the NineteethCentury. Pp. 3-22 in

Emile

Durkheim on

Morality

and

Society,

edited

by

Robert N. Bellah.

Chicago:

University

f

Chicago

Press.

. (1901) 1982.

Preface to the

Second

Edition.

Pp.

34-47

in The

Rules

of

Sociological Method,

edited

by

Steven

Lukes. New York: Free Press.

.

(1901-2)

1960. Rousseau's Social Contract.

Pp.

65-138

in

Montesquieu

and

1080



Habit

Rousseau: Forerunners of

Sociology.

Translated by Ralph Manheim. Ann

Arbor:

University

f

Michigan Press.

. (1902) 1933/1964. Some Notes on Occupational Groups. Pp. 1-31 in The

Division of Labor

in Society. Translated

by George

Simpson. New York: Free

Press.

. (1902-3a)

1934.

L'education morale. Paris: Alcan.

.

(1902-3b) 1961. Moral

Education.

Translated by Everett K.

Wilson and

Herman

Schnurer. New York:

Free Press.

. (1903-12)

1973.

Durkheim as Examiner. Pp. 621-54

in

Emile Durkheim:

His

Life and Works, by Steven

Lukes.

Harmondsworth,Middlesex:

Penguin.

.

(1904) 1979. Review of

Emile

Durkheim, Pedagogie et sociologie

and

Paul

Barth, Die

Geschichte der

Erziehung

in

soziologischer

Beleuchtung. Pp.

126-28

in

Durkheim:

Essays on

Morals and Education, edited

by W. S. F.

Pickering.

London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul.

. (1904-5)

1977.

The

Evolution of

Educational

Thought. Translated by Peter

Collins. London: Routledge &

Kegan Paul.

.

(1905-6)

1956. The

Evolution and the Role of

Secondary Education

in

France. Pp. 135-53 in

Education and

Sociology. Translated by Sherwood

D.

Fox.

Glencoe,

Ill.: Free

Press.

. (1908a) 1982.

Debate

on

Explanation

in

History

nd

Sociology.

Pp.

2

11-28

in

The Rules of

Sociological Method,

edited by Steven

Lukes. New

York:

Free

Press.

. (1908b) 1982. The

Method of

Sociology. Pp. 245-47

in The

Rules

of

Sociological

Method, edited by Steven Lukes. New York:

Free

Press.

. (1909) 1978.

Sociology and the Social Sciences.

Pp.

71-87

in Emile

Dur-

kheimon InstitutionalAnalysis, edited byMark Traugott. Chicago: University f

Chicago

Press.

. (191 a)

1956. Education: Its Nature and Role.

Pp.

61-90

in

Education

and

Sociology. Translated

by Sherwood

D.

Fox.

Glencoe,

Ill.: Free Press.

.

(19 1b) 1956.

The

Nature

and

Method of

Pedagogy. Pp.

91-112 in

Educa-

tion

and Sociology. Translated

by

Sherwood D. Fox. Glencoe,

Ill.:

Free Press.

.

(1912) 1915. The

Elemenary

Forms

of

the

ReligiousLife.Translated

by Joseph

Ward

Swain. New York: Free Press.

.

(1913-14) 1983.

Pragmatism

nd

Sociology. Translated

by J.

C.

Whitehouse.

Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity

Press.

.

(1915) 1960.

Sociology. Pp. 376-85

in Emile

Durkheim,1858-1917, edited

by Kurt H. Wolff.Columbus: Ohio State UniversityPress.

. (1920) 1978.

Introduction

o Morality. Pp. 191-202

in

Emile

Durkheim on

Institutional

Analysis, edited by Mark

Traugott.

Chicago: University f Chicago

Press.

Durkheim, Emile,

and Ferdinand Buisson.

(1911) 1979. Childhood.

Pp. 149-54

in

Durkheim: Essays on Morals and

Education,

edited by W.

S. F. Pickering.London:


Eisenstadt, S. N., and M.

Curelaru. 1976.

The

Form ofSociology. New

York: Wiley.

Ellwood, Charles A.

(1912) 1915.

Sociology

in

Its

Psychological Aspects.

New York:

Appleton.

1917.

An

Introduction to

Social

Psychology. New York:

Appleton.

1918. Theories of Cultural Evolution. American Journal of Sociology

23:779-800.

. 1925.

The

Psychology of

Human Society: An

Introduction to

Sociological

Theory. New

York: Appleton.

1927. Cultural

Evolution. New York:

Century.

1930. The Uses and

Limitationsof

Behaviorism

n

the Social

Sciences. Pp.

1081



AmericanJournal f

Sociology

187-211 in Behaviorism: A Battle Line, edited by William P. King.

Nashville,

Tenn.: Cokesburg.

Faris, Ellsworth. 1921. Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses? American Journal of

Sociology 2

7:184-96.

.

1924. The

Subjective Aspect of Culture.

Publications

of

the

American

Sociological Society 19:37-46.

. 1928. Attitudes nd Behavior. AmericanJournal of Sociology 34:271-81.

(ca. 1930a) 1937.

Discipline

in

the Modern

Family. Pp.

234-40

in

The

Nature of Human Nature. New York: McGraw-Hill.

. (ca. 1930b) 1937. The

Implications

of Behaviorism for Character Educa-

tion. Pp. 241-48

in The

Nature of

Human

Nature. New

York:

McGraw-Hill.

. 1937. The Nature ofHuman Nature. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Fearing, Franklin. 1930.

Reflex

Action: A Study

in the

History of Physiological

Psychology.Baltimore:Williams & Williams.

Ferguson, Adam. 1792. Principles ofMoral and Political Science, vol. 1. Edinburgh,

Strahan.

Fleming, Donald. 1967. Attitude:The Historyof a Concept. Perspectives n Ameri-

can

History 1:287-365.

Fuchs, Oswald. 1952. The

Psychology of Habit according to William Ockham. St.

Bonaventure, N.Y.:

Franciscan Institute.

Funke, Gerhard. (1958)

1961. Gewohnheit. Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte,ol. 3.

Bonn: Bouvier.

Furner, Mary 0. 1975.

Advocacy and Objectivity:A Crisis in the Professionalization

of American Social Science,

1865-1905. Lexington: University

ress of

Kentucky.

Gerstein,

Dean

R.

1983. Durkheim's

Paradigm: Reconstructing

Social

Theory. Pp.

234-58 in Sociological Theory-1983, edited by Randall Collins. San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass.

Giddens, Anthony.

1971.

Capitalism

and

Modern

Social

Theory. Cambridge:

Cam-

bridge UniversityPress.

. 1979. Central Problems

n

Social Theory. Berkeley

and Los

Angeles:

Univer-

sity

of

California Press.

Giddings,

Franklin

Henry. 1900.

The Elements

of Sociology.

New York:

Macmillan.

Gunnell, John

G. 1978.

The

Myth

of the Tradition.

American Political Science

Review

72:122-34.

Hartmann, Heinz. (1939) 1958.

Ego Psychology

and

the

Problem

of Adaptation.

Translated by David

Rapaport. New York: InternationalUniversity

ress.

Hayes, Edward Cary. (1915) 1918. Introduction otheStudy ofSociology.New York:

Appleton.

Hearnshaw, L.

S.

1964. A Short

History of

British

Psychology,

1840-1940. New

York: Barnes & Noble.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1821) 1942.

Philosophy ofRight. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford:

Clarendon.

. (1830) 1971.

Philosophy of Mind. Translated by

William Wallace and A. V.

Miller.

Oxford: Clarendon.

Helvetius, C.

A.

(1758) 1807.

De

l'esprit. Translated by William Mudford. London:

Jones.

Hennis, Wilhelm. 1983. Max Weber's 'Central Question.' Translated by Keith

Tribe. Economy and Society 12:135-80.

Hinkle, Roscoe C. 1980.

Founding TheoryofAmericanSociology, 1881-1915. Boston:


Hinkle, Roscoe C., Jr., and

Gisela J.

Hinkle. 1954.

The

Development of

Modern

Sociology.

New York:

Doubleday.

Hume, David. (1739-40)

1978.

A Treatise

of

Human Nature. Edited and revised

by

P. H. Nidditch. Oxford:

Clarendon.

1082







Habit

Rousseau,

Jean-Jacques. (1755) 1964. Discourse

on the Origin and

Foundations

of

Inequality

amongMen. Pp.

101-81

in The First

and Second Discourses.

Translated

by Roger

D.

and JudithR. Masters. New York:

St. Martin's.

. (1762) 1954. The Social Contract. Translated by

WillmooreKendall.

Chicago:

Regnery.

Samuelson, Franz.

1981. The

Struggle

for

ScientificAuthority:The

Reception

of

Watson's

Behaviorism,

1913-1920. Journal

of

the

History of

the

Behavioral

Sci-

ences

17:399-425.

Schutz,

Alfred.

1932) 1967.

The

Phenomenology f

the

Social

World.

Translated

by

George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert.

Evanston,

Ill.: Northwestern

University

Press.

Seidman, Steven. 1983.

Beyond

Presentism nd Historicism:

Understanding

he

His-

toryof Social

Science.

Sociological Inquiry 53:79-94.

Shils,

Edward.

1970.

Tradition, Ecology,

and

Institution

n

the

History

of

Sociol-

ogy. Daedalus 99:760-825.

. 1981. Tradition.

Chicago: University f

Chicago

Press.

Simmel, Georg.

1900. Philosophie

des Geldes.

Leipzig:

Duncker & Humbolt.

Simonds,

A. P.

1978. Karl Mannheim's

Sociology of Knowledge.

Oxford: Clarendon.

Skinner, Quentin.

1969.

Meaning and

Understanding

n

the

History

of Ideas. His-

tory nd

Theory 8:3-53.

Smith,

Lawrence

D. 1981.

Psychology

and

Philosophy:

Toward

a

Realignment,

1905-1935.

Journal of theHistory ofthe

Behavioral Sciences

17:28-37.

Sorokin,

Pitirim

A.

(1947)

1962.

Society, Culture,

nd

Personality.

New York:

Cooper

Square.

Spencer, Herbert. 1855.

The

Principles of

Psychology.

London:

Longman, Brown,

Greer,& Longmans.

Stewart, Duguld.

(1792-1827)

1854. Elements

of

the

Philosophy

of

the

Human

Mind.

Edited

by Francis Bowen. Boston:

James

Monroe.

Stocking,George W., Jr.

1968.

Race, Culture,

and

Evolution.

New York: Free Press.

Stryker, heldon.

1980. Symbolic nteractionism:A

Social StructuralVersion.

Menlo

Park, Calif.:

Benjamin-Cummings.

Sumner, William

Graham.

(1906)

1979.

Folkways

and

Mores.

Edited

by

Edward

Sagarin.

New York:

Schocken.

Thomas, William I. 1905. The

Province of

Social Psychology. AmericanJournal

of

Sociology

10:445-55.

. (1927)

1966. The

Unconscious: Configurations f

Personality. Pp.

140-53 in

W. I. Thomas on Social Organization and Social Personality,edited by Morris

Janowitz. Chicago: University

f Chicago

Press.

Thomas, William I., and

Florian Znaniecki.

(1918) 1958.

The

Polish Peasant

in

Europe and

America. 2 vols. New York:

Dover.

Thompson, E.

P. 1967. Time,

Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.

Past

and

Present 38:56-97.

Thomson,

Robert. 1968. The Pelican History of

Psychology.

Harmondsworth,Mid-

dlesex:

Penguin.

Tonnies, Ferdinand. (1887)

1963. Community nd Society.

Translated by Charles P.

Loomis. New

York: Harper & Row.

. (1909)

1961. Custom: An

Essay on Social Codes.

Translated by A.

Farrell

Borenstein.Chicago: Regnery.

Turner, Stephen P. 1983.

'Contextualism' and

the Interpretation f the

Classical

Sociological Texts.

Knowledge and Society

4:273-91.

Veblen,

Thorstein. (1899) 1979. The Theory of

the Leisure

Class. Harmondsworth,

Middlesex:

Penguin.

Vierkandt,

Alfred. 1908. Die

Stetigkeit mKulturwandel: Eine

Soziologische

Studie.

Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.

1085



American

Journal

f Sociology

Wallwork,

rnest.

1972.Durkheim:

Moralitynd

Milieu. Cambridge,

Mass.:

Har-

vardUniversity

ress.

Warner, . Stephen. 970. The RoleofReligiousdeasand theUse ofModels n

Max

Weber'sComparative tudiesof Non-capitalistocieties. ournal f Economic

History 30:74-99.

. 1978.

Toward

a Redefinition

f Action heory: aying heCognitive

le-

ment ts

Due. American

ournal

f ociology 3:1317-1349.

Watson, ohn

.

(1913)

1975.

Psychology

s

theBehaviorist

iews t.

Pp. 199-207

in

A History fModern

sychology,

yDuane

Schultz. d ed.

New

York:Academic

Press.

. 1914.Behavior:

An

Introductiono

Comparativesychology.

ew York:

Holt.

. 1917.

Practical

ndTheoretical

roblems

n nstinct

nd Habits. Pp.

53-99

in Suggestionsf

Modern

cienceConcerning

ducation,

yHerbert

. Jennings

t

al. New York: Macmillan.

. 1919.Psychology

romhe tandpoint

f Behaviorist.

hiladelphia:

ippin-

cott.

Watson,

obert. 1965. The Historical

ackground

orNational rends

n Psychol-

ogy: United States.

Journal of

the

History of

the

Behavioral

Sciences 1:130-

38.

.

1968.

The

Great sychologists:

romAristotleo Freud.2d ed.

Philadelphia:

Lippincott.

Weber,

Marianne.

1926)

1975.

Max Weber:

Biography.

ranslated

yHarry

ohn.

New

York:

Wiley.

Weber,

Max.

(1895)

1980.

The

National State

and Economic

Policy.

Translated

by

BenFowkes.Economy nd Society

:428-49.

-

.

(1903-6)

1975.Roscher

nd

Knies.

Translated

y

GuyOakes.

New York:

Free Press.

. (1904a)

1946.

Capitalism nd

RuralSociety

n

Germany.

p.

363-85

in

FromMax

Weber: ssays

n

Sociology,

dited

y

H.

H. Gerth

nd C.

Wright

ills.

New York:

Oxford niversity

ress.

.

(1904b)

1949. 'Objectivity'

nSocialScience

nd SocialPolicy.

p.

49-112

in

TheMethodology

f

he ocial Sciences,

dited

y

Edward

A. Shils nd

Henry

.

Finch.

New York:

Free Press.

. (1904-5a)1958.

TheProtestant

thic

nd

the

pirit fCapitalism.

ranslated

by

Talcott Parsons.

New

York:

Scribner's.

. (1904-5b)1920. Die protestantischethikund derGeist esKapitalismus.

Pp.

17-206

in

Gesammelte

ufsatze

ur

Religionssoziologie,

ol. 1.

Tiubingen:

Mohr/Siebeck.

. (1906)

1946.

The Protestant

ects

nd the

Spirit

f

Capitalism. p.

302-22

in FromMax Weber:

ssays

n

Sociology,

dited

by

H.

H.

Gerth

nd C.

Wright

Mills.

New York:

Oxford

niversity

ress.

. (1908a)

1975.

Marginal

Utility heory

nd

'The Fundamental

aw

of

Psychophysics.'

Translated y

Louis Schneider.

ocial

Science

Quarterly

6:21-

36.

. (1908b)1971.

Methodological

ntroduction

or he

Survey

fthe

Society

or

Social

Policy oncerning

election

nd

Adaptation

Choice

nd Course f

Occupa-

tion) or heWorkersfMajor ndustrial nterprises. p. 103-55 nMax Weber:

The Interpretation

fSocial

Reality,

ditedby J.

E. T. Eldridge.

New York:

Scribner's.

(1908-9)

1924.

Zur

Psychophysik

er ndustriellen

rbeit.

p.

61-255

in

Gesammelte

ufsitze

ur

Soziologie

nd

Sozialpolitik.iubingen:

ohr/Siebeck.

.

(1909)

1976.

The

Agrarian

ociology

f

Ancient ivilizations.

ranslated

y

R.

I.

Frank.London:

New

LeftBooks.

1086



Habit

.

(1910a) 1978. Anticritical ast

Word

on 'The

Spirit

of

Capitalism.' Trans-

lated by Wallace M. Davis. American

Journal of Sociology 83:1105-31.

. (1910b) 1968. Antikritisches

um

'Geist' des Kapitalismus.

Pp.

149-87

in

Die protestantische Ethik II, edited by Johannes Winckelmann. Miinchen:

SiebensternTaschenbuch.

. (1913) 1981. Some Categories of nterpretive ociology.

Translated

by

Edith

Graber.

Sociological Quarterly22:151-80.

.

(1915a) 1920. Einleitung.

Pp. 237-75

in Gesammelte

Aufsdtze

ur

Reli-

gionssoziologie,vol. 1. Tuibingen:

Mohr/Siebeck.

. (1915b) 1920. Konfuzianismusund Taoismus. Pp. 176-536

in

Gesammelte

Aufsdtze

ur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1. Tuibingen:Mohr/Siebeck.

.

(1915c) 1951. The Religion of

China. Translated by

H. H.

Gerth.

New York:

Free Press.

. (1915d) 1946. Religious Rejections of the World and

Their

Directions. Pp.

323-59 in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerthand C.

Wright

Mills.

New

York: Oxford

University

Press.

.

(1915e) 1946. The Social

Psychology f the World Religions. Pp. 267-301

in

From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth nd C. WrightMills.

New York:

Oxford UniversityPress.

.

(1916-17) 1958. The Religion

of ndia. Translated by

H.

H.

Gerth

and

Don

Marindale. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

.

(1918) 1946. Politics as a Vocation. Pp. 77-128

in From

Max Weber:Essays

in

Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth

and C. Wright

Mills. New

York:

Oxford

University

Press.

. (1922a) 1978. Economy and

Society.

Edited

by

Guenther

Roth

and Claus

Wittich.2 vols. Berkeley: University fCalifornia Press.

. (1922b) 1976. Wirtschaft nd

Gesellschaft.

dited

by JohannesWinckelmann.

2

vols. 5th rev. ed.

Tiibingen:Mohr/Siebeck.

. (1923a) 1927. General Economic History. Translated by Frank H. Knight.

Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

. (1923b) 1958. Wirtschaftsgeschichte.d ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt.

Woodcock,

Michael

Bernard.

1980.

Educational

Principles

and Political

Thought:

The Case of James Mill. History of

Political Thought 1:475-97.

Woodward,

William

R.

1982.

Stretching

he Limits of

Psychology'sHistory. Pp.

1-

14

in

The Problematic Science:

Psychology n Nineteenth-Century hought, dited

by William R. Woodward and Mitchell G. Ash. New

York: Praeger.

Yerkes, Robert Mearns. (1901) 1965. The Formation of Habits in the Turtle. Pp.

544-51

in A

Source Book

in

theHistory ofPsychology, dited by Richard J. Herrn-

stein and

Edwin G. Boring.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University ress.

Young, Robert M. 1970. Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century.

Oxford:

Clarendon.

Zaret, David. 1980. From Weber to

Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History n

Modern Social

Theory. American

Journal of Sociology 85:1180-1201.

Znaniecki, Florian. (1936) 1967. Social Actions. New York: Russell & Russell.

Documents

Camic (1986). the Matter of Habit