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Habit as Memory Incarnate Author(s): Marion Joan Francoz Source: College English, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Sep., 1999), pp. 11-29 Published by: National Council of Teachers of English Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/378897 Accessed: 08/05/2009 14:35 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ncte. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. National Council of Teachers of English is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to College English. http://www.jstor.org

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Habit as Memory IncarnateAuthor(s): Marion Joan FrancozSource: College English, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Sep., 1999), pp. 11-29Published by: National Council of Teachers of EnglishStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/378897Accessed: 08/05/2009 14:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ncte.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

National Council of Teachers of English is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toCollege English.

http://www.jstor.org

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Habit as Memory Incarnate

Marion Joan Francoz

n The Shadow Man, Mary Gordon's painstaking excavation of memories of her father, the novelist expresses considerable embarrassment at the possibil- ity of a connection with the virtual industry that has grown up around the phenomenon of memory. From television talk shows to the pages of The New

York Review of Books, controversy rages around the question of the integrity or falli- bility of the faculty. Among scholars such as Ian Hacking, Elizabeth Loftus, and Frederick Crews, the notion has stirred serious debate: Can false memories be implanted into the mind, later to assume a life of their own? On another front, philosophers John Searle and Daniel Dennett do battle over the questions of con- sciousness, memory, and artificial intelligence: Can the most sophisticated of neu- rally based computer technology ever grasp the driving force in the construction of memory-meaning? And does it matter to human functioning? Linguists Johnson, Lakoff, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch dispute the ancient notion of abstract cate- gories that shape our knowledge of the world. Rather, they believe, it is the body that gives form to memorial categories whose manifestation emerges in the metaphors of everyday use. Again, semantics-patterns of meaning-rather than syntax seem to be the driving force behind the development of these memorial representations. Mean- while, eminent psychologists and neuroscientists such as Schacter, Edleman, Rose, and Damasio attempt to demystify the esoteric world of the brain sciences. Each writer, in his own way, vigorously attempts to lay to rest the still prevalent model of memory: the digital computer with its store of decontextualized information. In con- trast, memory, each author maintains, is dynamic; elaborated; generative; transfor- matory; dependent on context, meaning, and emotion; biologically unique, and yet, equally, shaped by social environment. In fact, over the past three decades, research

M a rio n J o0a n Fran co z began her teaching career in elementary schools in East London and the Bahamas. She teaches English and speech at Napa Valley Community College. Her articles have been published in New Orleans Review, Teaching English in the Two Year College, and College English.

College English, Volume 62, Number 1, September 1999

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findings on the structure of learning in memory have been so compelling that the whole history of comparing mind to machine has been turned on its head (Sacks 369). The formal algorithmic procedures of artificial intelligence have given way to patterns of neural networks. In a reversal of the machine/mind analogy, the most sophisticated of connectionist networks seek to simulate in a machine the complex parallel and dis- tributed function of brain cells and their neuronal connections (Penrose 18).

Yet, curiously, little of this ferment has touched the field of composition in any integral way. As Jan Swearingen notes, psychological or neuroscientific explanation tends to raise fears of determinism (15); however, even such mistrust cannot com- pletely account for composition studies' attachment to a conservative and mimetic model of memory, long since abandoned by other disciplines. Most problematic, it is this outdated conception of the faculty of memory that informs judgment regard- ing its usefulness. Certainly, scholarly works by Yates, Carruthers, and Spence have shed light on the intimate historical connection between memory and rhetoric, enhancing our understanding of the rich and strange systems of mnemonic loci by which classical, medieval, and renaissance rhetors memorized their orations. Sharon

Crowley's The Methodical Memory reveals how the theories of eighteenth- and nine-

teenth-century faculty and associationist psychology, and concomitant models of

memory, shaped a composition pedagogy so enduring it outlived its psychology. Current-traditional rhetoric, which according to Crowley appears to be alive and well, still conceives of composition as the emptying of a logically organized thought process onto paper (143-49). Janine Rider's The Writer's Book of Memory celebrates memory as object and subject, means and medium of inquiry and invention across a variety of disciplines. In Rhetorical Memory and Delivery, John Frederick Reynolds and his co-essayists attempt to redress the balance of the rhetorical canon, long skewed toward invention, by advocating the restoration of memory and delivery to their proper places as. vital parts of the reinvented classical canon. In order to refute the idea that historically memoria was concerned only with memorization of the ora- tion for subsequent delivery, Reynolds draws on Yates, Carruthers, and Mahony to reveal the complex and many layered relationship between memory and rhetoric (5-7). Nonetheless, given this historically intimate relationship, a disturbing silence prevails concerning the rift between memory and postmodern rhetorical theory and practice. Yet in seeking reasons for the demise of memoria, this estrangement reveals a far deeper antipathy than has been conceived by Reynolds and colleagues. After all, the whole enterprise of postmodernism has been devoted to the lifting out and dismantling of epistemological foundations, to the deconstructing of the body of privileged knowledge. The memory as a mirror of nature and culture has become an agent of insidious "reproduction." And when knowledge itself is suspect, the expert is seen as the agent of cultural cloning, "the source of many of the major ills in West- ern society" (Geisler 54).

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In an ironic twist of the Platonic hierarchy, writing has now become a source of knowledge, while memory is consigned only to a species of "reminder." One of the most frequent, albeit implicit, claims for writing is that it can out-memory memory. We can "discover" through writing, "know," "understand," "construct," and "decon- struct." In addition to storing and communicating information, writing, in the pro- cess of revision, can "transform" and "refine" knowledge. If Plato believed in the sanctity of memory, Jasper Neel contends that "writing, for those of us who now call ourselves composition specialists or writing theorists, has become sanctified" (3; emphasis added). As opposed to the static and ideal form of memory proposed by Plato, both the process and product of writing represent a more desirable conception of the faculty-dynamic, epistemic, linguistic, socially constructed, and amenable to study, short-term manipulation, and remediation.

However, Plato's mnemocentrism represents only one epistemology-that most clearly oppositional to writing. In order to understand what animates antipathy to the faculty, I believe it is necessary to examine the variety of models of memory that have been woven into the historical fabric of rhetoric and composition. In this essay, I intend to examine three such conceptions of memory: first, memory as con- tainer; second, memory as hydraulic system; and third, memory as body. The last is further divided into the nourished body and, conversely, the anorexic body. As I hope to show, even an aversion to memory manifests a particular idea of the faculty. Important to the essay will be an aspect of memory rarely discussed except in pejora- tive terms: the idea of habit. Modemr theory has tended either to trivialize the idea of habit as "rote memory" or to demonize it as a means of "cultural reproduction." Yet, however contradictory, these critiques of habit can both legitimately be evoked when memory is conceived as a storage medium. And, undoubtedly, over the past thirty years the theories of memory most influential on the field of composition have cen- tered on a spatial conception of the faculty, whether concerned with the topology of localized brain function, the mechanics of information processing and storage, the taxonomics of memory functions, or the schematics of representation in memory. Given Elizabeth Wilson's characterization of a cognition constituted through a "masculine morphology" of "containment, reserve and conservation that operates at the expense of the psyche's interpretative mobility" (87), it is little wonder that in an attempt to escape such "phallic economy" the postmodernist body, particularly the memorial body, has become what Susan Bordo understands as "no body at all" but a palimpsest of cultural texts (Unbearable 229).

Psychologist Alfonso Caramazza, a specialist in the neurophysiology of lan- guage processes, attests to the fact that indeed twenty years ago language skills were "associated with a specific brain region." However, he notes, "[t]hings are consider- ably different today." Reading, for example, "is assumed to be the product of a vast network of perceptual/cognitive/motor mechanisms involving many areas of the left

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and right hemisphere. There is no single brain center for reading, writing, or com- prehension" (132-33). Even new imaging techniques such as PET scans and MRI fall short of providing definitive information about the infinitely complex nature of lan- guage acquisition, memory, and production (135). In light of a dynamic and elabo- rated conception of brain structure and function, I believe that the idea of memory as

receptacle must also change. Further, when memory is conceived as complex, flexi- ble, and transformative, habit can no longer be dismissed as rote learning or cultural indoctrination but may be understood as a similarly complex and innovative process. In contrast to the conservative and mimetic conceptions of memory that have long dominated the discipline's imagination, habit offers the idea of a memorial body con- stituted and transformed over time. The neglect of this body may be to deny our stu- dents the emotional investment (the imaginative inhabiting of other's lives and points of view necessary for what MarkJohnson calls "empathic imagination" [Moral 199]) as well as the cognitive complexity and reflexivity necessary for critical thought.

Mistrust of memory is not new. But, historically, suspicion of the faculty has been animated by the very opposite of the current idea of memory as a logocentric monolith. It is the very lack of stability, consistency, and predictability that has proved a consuming preoccupation in both philosophy and rhetoric. From ancient ideas of

memory as a wax tablet, as a store or treasure-house containing the dismembered stock of res and verba, to the model of the digital computer with its bits of informa- tion, the abiding conception of the faculty has remained that of an agent of conser- vation (Rosenfield 1). The idea of memory as a medium of impression and storage, whether of ideal or sensory origins, not only provides a functional answer to how we know but also reflects a desire to ensure that what we do know remains intact and true to its physical or metaphysical source. The spatial nature of storage provides form and stability to the temporal exigencies of experience. And to further ensure integrity, recollection-whether Plato's dialectic, Aristotle's reminiscence, Ramus's method, or cognitive science's memory search-proceeds by orderly laws that care-

fully guide the recollector from one memory to another without altering the struc- ture or contents of the faculty. Likewise, the hardware/software distinction of the

computational paradigm perpetuates the idea that memorial representations main- tain a life separate from the machinery of the brain (Iran-Nejad, Marsh, and Clements 401). "Image schemata," which Lakoff and Johnson propose as dynamic alternatives to abstract schematic representations in memory, find their most basic manifestation in the spatial aspect of the body, "from our experience of physical con- tainment" (Johnson, Body 21). Ironically, it is this methodical stabilizing and con-

straining of memory that has come to be seen as its essential character-a character

distinctly at odds with a radically destabilized postmodern universe. Of the ancient division between natural and artificial memory, the contempo-

rary bias accords with the author of the oldest surviving treatise on memory, Ad C.

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Herrennium (c. 1 B.C.), that the "theory and technique" of artificial memory is "much the more reliable" of the pair. (III.xxi.34). Loci, rules, precepts, logic, method, heuris- tic, metacognitive strategy are techne' generally designed to remedy the problem of the fallible and idiosyncratic memory. Patrick Hutton illustrates how the great Renais- sance memory systems of mnemonists such as Camillo and Bruno finally disengaged themselves from the frail human faculty to become mystical and unchanging struc- tures that purportedly held the Faustian key to all knowledge:

The structure of knowledge envisioned by the Neoplatonic philosopher was spacial. It was based upon an unchanging reality, as all of these mnemonic images implied. Journeys into memory moved along fixed trajectories to be traveled again and again. The wheel, the palace, and the theater were mementos of repetition. Working from a conception of a timeless cosmos, the Neoplatonic mnemonist possessed no sense of development.

Thus the traditional aide memoire finally became a thing in itself and "the mne- monist viewed himself as a magus, dealing in an esoteric knowledge that made him privy to the workings of the universe, with all of the powers such omniscience implied" (375).

In an ostensibly scientific but actually no less ideal and mystical vein, Descartes banished the fallible memory from his Method. In his procedure of "enumeration," he undertakes to compress the temporal thought process into a moment of "intu- ition." Thus one passes " 'from first to the last so quickly, that no stage of the process [is] left to the care of memory,' and one can 'have the whole intuition' before one 'at the same time' " (Schouls 40). For Descartes the memory in its temporality can only be identified with the machine of the body, res extensa, and not with the "ghost" of the rational soul, res cogitans. Crowley shows how current-traditional rhetoric had its roots in the eighteenth-century concern with "the potential fallibility of memory" (22). The regulation of memory through nineteenth-century associationist peda- gogy, like that of Alexander Bain, resulted, Crowley argues, in a commodification of knowledge-the handing over of information verbatim and intact "from investigator to reader," whose minds obey identical laws (162-63). The naturalizing of method as "the writer's thought process" in current-traditional rhetoric (147) may well have set the stage for the suspicion with which memory has since been regarded. For if tradi- tional mistrust of memory has arisen from fear of its fallibility and has resulted in a subsequent search for certainty, surely much of the current aversion has issued from the very models and mechanisms designed to shore up the integrity of the faculty. The inscribed image in determined space preserved by methodical constraint can hardly be more alien in a poststructural universe of linguistic indeterminacy. The very terms of containment, whatJohnson calls the "in-out" orientation (21), suggest a rigid distinction between individual memory and the flux of "the social and histor- ical world outside" (Bowden 373).

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Yet as early as the 1930s, constructivist psychologist Frederick Bartlett offered a radical challenge to a static and mimetic model of memory. Experimental work with the memorization of narratives led Bartlett to conclude that "[r]emembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an imag- inative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experience ..." (213). Pioneering French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, whose life was cut short in Buchenwald just before the end of World War II, also challenged the idea of mem- ory as a theater of private images. Halbwachs believed that our memories of the past are social and discursive in nature, that "to discourse upon something means to con- nect within a single system of ideas our opinions as well as those of our circle" (53).

The recent history of the neurosciences has been shaped by attempts to under- stand the basis of dynamic changes in brain structure and function that take place as the result of experience. In the 1940s Canadian neurologist Donald Hebb docu- mented the strengthening and elaborating of neurological structures that occurred as the result of learning. Over the past twenty years, work on Aplysia (giant sea slugs) has uncovered "the neurobiological, cellular and biochemical underpinnings of learning and memory" (Yin and Tully 134). But perhaps the most radical account of the brain's

plasticity has come from immunologist Gerald Edleman. His theory of neuronal

group selection (TNGS) describes a dynamic "conversation" between layers of inter- connected or "reentrant" brain maps that categorize and recategorize an "unlabeled world." Even though Edleman believes that the origins of categorization are prelin- guistic, shaped by the interaction between the body and its environment, the process is infinitely enriched by language and the self-referential processes of higher con- sciousness. Edleman's extensive critique of the computational paradigm (211-52) rests on the observation that the brain, unlike the computer, is radically indeterminate, an open system in continuous interaction with the natural and social world.

The preceding brief summaries hardly do justice to notions of memory so anti- thetical to the containment model. Yet these ideas of memorial dynamism are not entirely without conceptual precedent. In the case of the storage model of memory, as with all dominant paradigms, a competing model lurks in the shadows. This alter- native conception involves neither a container nor an inscriptive medium, but a hydraulic model in which fluid flows through various channels. Ironically, Aristotle uses this idea to explain certain pathologies of memory since water will neither take nor store an impression but runs into various courses and tributaries of its own iner- tia ("De Memoria" 453 a. 14-31). A conception of memory and its contents as run- ning into a network of conduits was inherent in the classical and medieval view of animal spirits that poured through "cerebral ventricles" (Mazzolini 70). Descartes's neurophysiology also involved a complex hydraulic system in which the pineal gland (a single rather than paired structure in the brain) played the crucial role of gate-

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keeper between body and soul (Rose 76-77). However, as John Sutton points out, such fluid and volatile models of memory posed a threat to the idea of a stable, logi- cally organized repository under the executive of the will or the soul and thus were linked "in the minds of their opponents not only with materialism and atheism, but also with a dangerously irrational picture of remembering and cognition" (129). Nonetheless, the paradigm gains ground, although in a more controlled mode, when, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, neuroanatomical structures began to be seen as the basic mechanism of memory. Mazzolini points out that early neu- roanatomists exploring the structure of nerves tended to remain "faithful to a doc- trine dating back to antiquity and held that the nerves were devised as hollow tubes allowing the flow of a pneuma, animal spirit, or nerve fluid" (81).

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the flow of water began to be seen as an apt image for describing the dynamics of habit. At its root, habit certainly denotes having, possessing, even containing. But, paradoxically, the hydraulic model involves a process defined by fluidity and temporality. Just how contained and directed the fluid seems to be provides a clue to the particular conceptualization of habit, be it an emphasis on drop-by-drop repetition and practice, on collection and recollection, or on a self- directed flow. The emphasis also changes depending on the desired end, be it the "solid citizen" or the "free-thinking individual." Unlike the container model, how- ever, in general the hydraulic model allows for the modification of ideas in memory.

Associationism, pragmatism, and behaviorism all found the image of fluid run- ning along well-worn pathways an apt metaphor for the sensorimotor action of elec- trical impulses running along nerves. In his treatise on habit (1890), William James finds his theme in a tradition of French materialist philosophy that dated back to the Enlightenment:

'Water, in flowing, hollows out for itself a channel, which grows broader and deeper; and, after having ceased to flow, it resumes, when it flows again, the path traced by itself before. Just so, the impressions of outer objects fashion for themselves in the ner- vous system more and more appropriate paths....' (69)

Thus James describes the brain as "an organ in which currents pouring in from the sense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do not easily disappear" (70). These paths, then, constitute the memory trace. James's important idea that practice eventually leads to an unconscious facility had been anticipated by French philoso- pher Maine de Biran in his 1804 treatise, The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Think- ing. Biran described the process whereby practiced learning eventually becomes analogically and thus qualitatively restructured in memory. But the idea that much formally conscious endeavor becomes with practice lost to consciousness causes Biran enough discomfort to devise ways of restoring an enlightened rationality (210). In a more Darwinian vein, James celebrates the economy of habit since "the more details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automism, the

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more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work" (80). ThusJames describes the manifestations of a process by which declarative knowledge (knowing what) becomes procedural knowledge (knowing how), a process in which the capacity of working memory is augmented and freed to undertake tasks requiring higher levels of conscious thought. The complex nature of this transformation

explains why novices seem to need at least ten years of disciplined engagement with their field to gain a level of facility (Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer 366). Yet, clearly, James's social Darwinism has its costs. The habit that liberates some, shack- les others. While James subscribes to a dynamics of memory, for him the reproduc- ing of the status quo represents a desired end. The idea of habit as the "fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent" (79), changes the temporal fluidity of the hydraulic model into an industrial mechanism, a "memento of repetition."

James's behavioral approach stands in contrast to John Dewey's phenomenology. Habit, Dewey believes, constitutes the very grounds of the individual's perceptual and

cognitive functioning; it represents the social basis of sensation, perception, and

thought, binding us to the environment and each other, shaping our view of the world and molding our social identity (Human Nature 31). Dewey attacks the idea of the mind as a blank slate: "There is no immaculate conception of meanings or purposes. Reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction" (30-31), and those who would disagree with him "usually identify experience with sensations impressed upon an empty mind." Habit is not simply an accumulation of repeated instances reduced and stored in memory. Knowledge is constantly restructured by new information. Furthermore, the medium of habit filters all material that reaches our perception and thought. This "filter is not, however, chemically pure." Dewey describes it as a "reagent which adds new qualities and rearranges what is received" (32). The meta- phor of the chemical reagent is a fitting one since the reagent changes the structure and thus the nature of a substance. As the environment is not a fixed entity, "adapta- tion to that environment is always dynamic," and habit, directing and channeling human impulse, enables flexible adaptation (Lectures 41-42). Thus James Ostrow, in his analysis of the phenomenology of Dewey and French philosopher Merleau-Ponty, writes that "[h]abit... is properly understood only in terms of the experiential dialec- tic between lived body and the world" (31).

Although the hydraulic model is not overtly present, it remains implicit in the idea of habit as a "projective, outgoing force of some natural impulse" that has been harnessed and organized (Lectures 313). If one could find the natural stimulus, then habit would be driven by a powerful emotional force. Dewey's educational philoso- phy centers on finding this motivating impulse to learning. Finally, Dewey maintains that both society and culture are constituted by collective habit. In contrast to much recent sociological critique of culture as a deterministic loop constantly reproducing its ideological structure, Dewey believes in a liberating dialectic: "The more complex

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a culture is, the more certain it is to include habits formed on differing, even con- flicting patterns." It is the "internal frictions" resulting from these conflicts that give rise to the liberating impulses responsible for personal, institutional, and societal change (Human Nature 128). Thus change is predicated on diversity. Nonetheless, if, as William Andrew Paringer points out, Dewey's optimism about the democratic possibilities of cultural dialectic avoids the notion that "particular instincts are devel- oped into habits for ideological reasons which preserve those hierarchies," then indeed memory holds us in thrall (90).

Charles Camic notes that given the rich history of habit it is unfortunate that recent sociological critique has centered on the most reductionist and deterministic conceptualization (1068). For it is precisely in the mechanistic behavioral reflex arc of stimulus/response that the possibilities of the hydraulic model of memory finally dry up (Rose 147). However, Dewey's notion of habit as "reagent" directs us to yet another model of memory, one that suggests a transformative, or as Daniel Bender puts it, alchemical, action (117). Habit, which from its classical origins has repre- sented notions of natural as opposed to artificial memory, poses a model that does not purport to be scientific but relies on what could be called folk explanation. Here the already embodied memory is conceptualized as a synecdochical body whose struc- ture and function is sustained by eating and digesting. Everyday metaphors give cre- dence to the concept: One bites off more than one can chew; swallows one's pride; eats or minces one's words; lies through one's teeth; chews, digests, or absorbs ideas; assimilates knowledge. Argument is fleshed out and thus becomes meaty. In the car- nivorous vein, we may tear into and devour text. Conversely, words get stuck in one's throat; one gets mental indigestion; one vomits, spews, or regurgitates information. Without flesh argument becomes weak, puny, loses its teeth, and incontinently can- not hold water.

In general, the food and digestion metaphors relate to the process by which the textual becomes part of the memorial body. Marshall Gregory, for example, believes that many of the humane attitudes that define maturity "are influenced by the stories we imaginatively ingest" (57). In her study of memory in medieval culture, Mary Car- ruthers writes, "[m]etaphors which use digestive activities are so powerful and tena- cious that 'digestion' should be considered another basic functional model for the complementary activities of reading and composition, collection and recollection" (165-66). However, the digestive idea entails four articles of faith. First, it calls for belief in the nourishing quality of food/text and the efficacy of particular food/texts. Second, the idea demands a pedagogy that mirrors the digestive process in the prac- tice of textual breakdown, reconstruction, and construction. Third, the model calls for a curriculum that, like the process of digestion, stretches across time, accommo- dating the memorial need for practice, connection, and context. And fourth, and per- haps most important, the digestive model entails trust in the unconscious processes

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necessary to transform a body of knowledge into the memorial body. The dynamic nature of this change involves a dialectic between the textual (social, cultural, and per- sonal knowledge[s]) and a highly individual neurological system, including a unique set of emotions.

At the very foundation of classical rhetoric, the Greek pedagogue Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) and later the Roman teacher and lawyer Quintilian (c.35-c.95 A.D.) both understood that it was the long process of memorial transformation, rather than the "hard-and-fast" rules of handbooks, that lent itself to the contingent nature of rhetoric, particularly to judicial oratory, in which lightning-fast adaptation to cir- cumstance was crucial. Both also comprehended that the ethical dimension of rhetoric must be embodied in the same memorial process. Aristotle reminds us that ethike is formed by a slight variation of the word ethos, habit ("Nichomachean" 1103 a. 17-18). In keeping with its etymology, ethos cannot be regarded simply as a function of the rhetor's public persona but, as Isocrates argues, must be inherent in the inner conversation of thought and deliberation ("Antidosis" 257). Quintilian's "good man" is developed by the same memorial process as that which produces the man who "speaks well." As Johnson argues, the "moral imagination" is nurtured "through the fictional narratives we imaginatively inhabit" (Moral 197); it is through narrative that we learn the metaphoric vocabulary "constitutive of our modes of reasoning, evalua- tion, and moral exploration" (52). Furthermore, as a measure of the seamless inte-

gration of rhetorical elements in the orator's discourse, Isocrates declared rhetoric to be a counterpart of gymnastics (185). Neither art can be taught simply by precept; only demonstration and rigorous practice produce the requisite facility and grace. Likewise, Quintilian's frequent comparison of rhetorical facility with musical or gymnastic fluency indicates the degree to which skills have become so integral a part of the bodily repertoire that they do not have to be deliberated on to be performed. Indeed, self-consciousness is inimical to fluency. According to Howard Margolis, the manifest nature of physical habit can shed light on the implicit nature of habits of mind (13-20). Since Margolis sees all levels of cognition, including the deliberative, as ultimately grounded in habitual patterns of thought, he understands scientific par- adigms as essentially shared habits of mind, believing, like Dewey, that the clash of certain anomalous habits may be the key to revolutionary change.

Quintilian not only connects body with mind but, in his theme of memorial nourishment, also figuratively places the body within the mind as the agent of cogni- tive, emotional, and ethical growth and transformation. In a striking departure from the deference normally given to Cicero, Quintilian rejects the master's endorsement of memory systems and their progenitors (xi.ii.26). Quintilian's memory is a "quanta divinitas" that method only impedes from its remarkable function. The interlocking exercises of the Roman progymnasmata provide a variety of ways to inhabit the liter- ary text through increasingly complex and demanding imitation of models (Murphy

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xxvii-xxxiv). Yet the end of the rhetorical education in no way resembles the tempo- ral and structural imperatives of the classical curriculum. "The crown of all our study" emerges as the power of fluent improvisation (x.vi.i). For, writes Quintilian, even "extempore eloquence . . . depends on no mental activity so much as memory" (xl.ii.3). The simultaneity of so many rhetorical functions, which improvisation demands, puts superhuman demands on the memory:

[I]t is scarcely possible either for natural gifts or for methodic art to enable the mind to grapple simultaneously with such manifold duties, and to be equal at one and the same time to the tasks of invention, arrangement, and style, together with what we are uttering at the moment, what we have got to say next and what we have to look to still further on, not to mention the fact that it is necessary all the time to give close atten- tion to voice, delivery and gesture. For our mental activities must range far ahead and pursue the ideas which are still in front, and in proportion as the speaker pays out what he has in hand, he must make advances to himself from his reserve funds, in order that, until we reach our conclusion, our mind's eye may urge its gaze forward, keeping time with our advance: otherwise we shall halt and stumble, and pour forth short and bro- ken phrases, like persons who can only gasp out what they have to say. (x.vii.9-10)

Unquestionably, Quintilian does make reference to the conventional storehouse of rhetorical elements (Bender 121), yet it is equally clear that in the practice of impro- visation the elements of discourse are thoroughly transformed and integrated into the memorial body. The performative aspect of rhetoric, the ability to play with so many elements at once, cannot be considered a "knack" or an inspiration of the gods. "Writing, assiduous reading and long years of study" provide a foundation for pre- cept, while "habit and exercise" are essential for facility (x.vii.-9). The ability to turn a critical eye on one's own knowledge and assumptions, to engage discourse at many different levels, undoubtedly involves a memorial complexity similarly produced by years of inhabiting the text. But the link between time and memorial complexity is not always apparent. When sixteenth-century French methodist Peter Ramus criti- cizes Quintilian's Institutio, it is the length of the orator's education that frequently provokes his scorn:

Nor should we keep coming back to this point, that an orator cannot exist without this boyhood education, for this cause is too remote from its effect. Perhaps a doctor can- not be perfect without the same training, yet I do not hear the doctor giving instruc- tions in medicine that derive from that boyhood elementary schooling. (94)

Method as shortcut offers a way to circumvent the temporal imperative of habit and for that purpose proposes a requisitely logical and tidy model of memory. In recent years, the Critical Thinking movement has proffered just such a remedial techne.

In connecting memory, habit, and expertise, Quintilian draws on food meta- phors to express the kind of nurturance necessary to produce the firma facilitas. He speaks of nurturing the mind as birds feed their young; "finally, when they have

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proved their strength, they are given the freedom of the open sky and left to trust in themselves" (II.vi.7). In contrast to Plato's view of the teacher as midwife, Quintilian sees the teacher in loco parentis. Nurturing is predicated upon emotional ties that bind us to both our subject and object. Deborah Lupton writes that "[e]motions, like food and eating, are commonly regarded as the preserve of the embodied self rather than the disembodied, philosophising mind" (31). Recent research has shown that the tying together of emotion, memory, and the viscera may not be entirely the product of folk mythology but in fact may be groundedin the neurological mediation between the brain and other organs, including the stomach. According to Kevin Clark et al., the mediating nerve (the vagus) is the target of arousal hormones that trigger the memorial retention of emotional events. Unquestionably, from an evolutionary stand- point strong emotional memories have survival value. Indeed, Endel Tulving remarks that "a biological memory system differs from a mere physical information-storage device by virtue of the system's inherent capability of using the information in the ser- vice of its own survival.. ." (95). In all aspects of the student's education, Quintilian links the power of emotion to that of cognition, from his advocacy of early education (learning as play), to his rationale for public education (audience), to his choice of texts (literature over histories), to his endorsement of performative exercises such as the prosopopeia or impersonation (in which the student attempts to inhabit a dramatic character in a particular action), to his appeal for declamatory exercises that involve "true conflicts" rather than stale themes. Psychologist Stanley Greenspan calls such pairing the "dual coding" of emotion and cognition in memory (18), and, like Quin- tilian, Greenspan believes the engagement of both elements essential to the child's intellectual, emotional, and moral development. Finally, the crucial role of "feeling and force of imagination" as impetus to performance (x.vii.15-16) demonstrates the futility of attempts to abstract the elements of expertise from their human embodi- ment. (See, for example, Bereiter and Scardamalia's attribution of expertise to a career rather than to a person since people sometimes lose their edge [18].) True expertise involves habit driven by passion.

While the care and feeding aspect of the nurturing role seems self-evident, the letting go, the giving "the freedom of the open sky," is an aspect rarely discussed. Nonetheless, in her complex notion of "abjection," Julia Kristeva does emphasize the difficult separation from the maternal figure as essential to the integrity of the child's identity (70). Quintilian understands this separation as the telos of teaching: "For what else is our object in teaching, save that our pupils should not always require to be taught?" (II.v. 13). Other roles-that of the lover, for example-hardly provide for this goal of self-sufficiency and eventual independence. In the case of the lover, the leaving is usually regarded as betrayal. Not surprisingly, however, the question of the teacher's role has nowhere seen more debate than in feminist circles. Both Jane Gallop and Susan Miller ("In Loco Parentis") question the traditional emphasis on nurturance.

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Gallop focuses on the reproductive aspects of the teacher/student, and especially the teacher/student-teacher, relationships. Here she bases her theme of "impersonation" on Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron's contention that "education involves, not only the specific case of the student as reproduction of the teacher, but the more general case of student as impersonation of an educated person, taking on and repro- ducing the style and tastes of a class" (4).

Bourdieu and Passeron do indeed offer a view of habit very different from that of memorial nourishment. But first these theorists reject as simplistic any notion of "forced feeding" (3.2.2.1.3). The pervasiveness of this metaphor is such, however, that it merits a brief excursion. The images of forced feeding and regurgitation conflate the digestive and container models of memory wherein pieces of decontextualized knowl- edge are stockpiled. These useless fragments then lie inert in the student's memory, later to reappear verbatim on command. In a letter to Harper's, Daniel Ryan uses the regurgitation trope to criticize the notion of the "learning disabled child": "we make them sit still and anxiously expect them to swallow and regurgitate hunks of predi- gested skills and subject matter" (4). This "rote memory" argument is often used against proponents of the traditional literary canon. John Schilb, for example, re- sponding to Richard Rorty's endorsement of E. D. Hirsch's idea of cultural literacy, believes that Rorty "supports merely the latest version of the idea that human minds develop by ingesting chunks of data" (147). Susan McLeod believes that E. D. Hirsch has become "by virtue of his work.. a sort of twentieth-century Mr. Gradgrind" (272). The enormous attention given to the culture and cultivation of memory by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century pedagogues has indeed become epitomized by the oft-invoked utilitarian, Thomas Gradgrind, and the sadistic school master, Mr. M'Choakumchild, of Charles Dickens's 1854 novel Hard Times. The pair's penchant for the memorization and regurgitation of facts and definitions, the commodification of knowledge, echoes the ugliest aspects of industrial capitalism. Further, the brutal suppression of the unfortunate pupils' imaginative impulses emphasizes a rupture between memory and imagination, knowledge and creativity, reason and emotion- Romantic dualisms that still serve to limit the scope of memory.

In Bourdieu and Passeron's critique, knowledge does not lie inert in the mem- ory, but like the "leperous distillment" poured into Hamlet's father's ear, insidiously spreads until it infects the body politic, thence to perpetual circulation. Yes, Den- mark is indeed a prison-but, according to Bourdieu and Passeron, so are all soci- eties. While accepting Aristotle's idea of habit as "second nature," unquestionably the authors reject the idea that habit originates from choice ("Nichomachean" 1152a. 29-32). The term habitus refers to the patterning of dispositions and tastes, "equivalent, in the cultural order, of the transmission of genetic capital in the biolog- ical order." And, as a corollary, education is analogous to reproduction (3.0). Tradi- tionally, the dominant and privileged classes begin their schooling much earlier and

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thus lay down the grounds of subsequent knowledge. It is they who later claim the most prestigious jobs and thus devalue the jobs of the underclass. Further, the self- reproductive tendency is most fully realized when the terms of the pedagogical expe- rience remain implicit, unexamined (3.3.2.1). In this sense, apprenticeship is one of the most effective means of the transmission of habitus.

Although we might consider taste to be a matter of individual preference, Bour- dieu sees it as a conscious manifestation of habitus. Shilling writes, "Bourdieu has defined taste as a 'class culture turned into nature, that is embodied.... It is an incor- porated principle of classification which governs all forms of incorporation, choosing and modifying everything that the body ingests and digests and assimilates, physio- logically and psychologically"' (129). However, since the transmission of a "class- based social grammar of taste, knowledge, and behavior inscribed permanently in the 'body schema and the schemes of thought"' is largely undertaken at the level of the unconscious and is irreversible, agency is all but dead (Giroux 89). Because habitus operates unconsciously, it is difficult to understand how it is possible to escape the

"corporeal trajectories" assigned to people (Shilling 146). The unprecedented self- consciousness of the postmodern temper, the turn to criticism at the expense of liter- ature, is surely an attempt to remain an omniscient commentator on this cultural servitude. For if memorial food is a medium of determination, not eating may pre- serve the integrity of the self or selves.

However, such a radical turn from the idea of food as nourishment inevitably leads us to confront its mirror image: food as pathogen. And where better to study the phenomenon than in the burgeoning literature of anorexia. Rudolph Bell writes that "anorexia, from the Greek an (privation, lack of) and orexis (appetite), is a gen- eral term used to refer to any diminution of appetite or aversion to food" (1). The parallels between what Bordo calls the metaphysics of anorexia ("Anorexia" 34) and the terms of the postmodern aversion to memory are remarkably similar. When "eat- ing" is deemed contaminating, sustaining the memorial body and, perforce, the body politic amounts to a betrayal of integrity. Even playing with one's food risks the

object becoming the subject. ThusJacques Derrida dwells in space: "Each time, writ- ing appears as disappearance, recoil, erasure, retreat, curling-up, consumption" (339). Further, in this climate the composition classroom functions as a sort of memorial boot camp where students are asked to seek out and purge past educational experience of "hidden curricula": Purveyors of a body of memorial knowledge are routinely denounced while vendors of popular culture (who use every figure, trope, and scheme-oral and visual-to shape the young consumer's memory) rarely evoke the same order of critique.

Unquestionably, anorexia is an illness that devastates both the sufferer and the family. However, as Susan Sontag demonstrated two decades ago in Illness as Meta-

phor, the body's breakdown and recovery can be conceived in symbolic, even mythic,

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terms. Persephone's fear of insemination attendant on her abduction and descent into Hades might very well illuminate the hyperconscious vigilance surrounding the deliberate avoidance of all food. The transgression of this resolve results in a duality of seasonal opposites, a separation of unconscious and conscious climates. The avoid- ance of cultural contamination poses similar constraints and manifestations. For, as Susan Miller reminds us, in the patriarchal history of teaching, "emission and trans- mission rhyme." Further, the idea of the colonizing of the teacher/student body is surely inherent in Miller's description of a tradition in which Quintilian's "good man" wears a "cultural servant's face" ("Death" 43). Remaining on the margins by sustaining a sense of oppression is a stance necessary to postmodernist critique. While it is true that those afflicted with anorexia are predominantly women, it is this sense of disempowerment that is crucial to the attempt to redefine both the biologi- cal and socially constructed body. Lupton comments that food, eating, and the emo- tions "are traditionally linked with the feminine, with the disempowered and marginalized" (31). Bell's hagiographic study of three medieval holy women, "holy anorexics," suggests first a quest to throw off all the fleshly reminders of sex and gen- der, to become pure spirit, but also represents "the contest for freedom from the patriarchy that attempts to impose itself between the holy anorexic and her God" (116). Samuel Richardson's Clarissa poses a literary paradigm of such struggle and apotheosis when, in her latter days, Clarissa Harlowe, sustained only by scripture, offers, in her refusal to eat, her last and most powerful argument against worldly greed and netherworldly lust. It is an argument without possibility of refutation. The impediment of flesh to the would-be transcendent spirit is explored by Steven Shapin, who sees the ascetic impulse as a "trope of great antiquity and pervasiveness" (24). However, implicit in the ascetic tradition lies the conception of the superiority and sufficiency of memorial or spiritual food, or logos. In a reversal of the idea of the liberatory denial of the flesh, postmodernism conceives of memorial food as binding one to a material present, to cultural and institutional constraint.

Cutting oneself off from the material (memorial or cultural) body necessitates a duality since "the body is the locus of all that threatens our attempts at control" (Bordo, "Anorexia" 33). Ridding oneself of the flesh by gradual starvation or self-induced vomiting has its own rewards when the body carries with it ambivalent cultural mes- sages. And as Vandereycken and van Deth comment, anorexia is a "culture bound syn- drome" occurring rarely in non-Westernized countries, whereas in "Western cultures it occurs almost epidemically" (5). In her autobiographical account of her illness, Marya Hombacher writes that "[o]ne's worth is exponentially increased with one's incremental disappearance" (4). Obsessive critique dominates the anorexic's life. Mir- rors figure heavily in the constant watchfulness of the sufferer; the world becomes fraught with reflections without an ultimate reference point. Food is dissected into tiny pieces but never consumed. Indeed, food becomes an invader, a foreign object

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within that is not the self. Ironically, the theme of containment is ever-present. Thus Hornbacher writes, "if I could only contain my body, if I could keep it from spilling out so far into space, then I could, by extension, contain myself" (25). But the author also notes the terrible contradictions inherent in the compulsion to starve oneself: "desire for power that strips you of all power. A gesture of strength that divests you of all strength. A wish to prove that you need nothing, that you have no human hungers, which turns on itself and becomes a searing need for the hunger itself" (6). WVhat be- comes clear from journals such as Hornbacher's is that anorexia is a self-perpetuating illness whose end point is the dissolution of the body. The image of memory as a wasted body is not easy to contemplate. Yet, as we move toward the end of the millennium, our

discipline seems marked by a failure of nerve to attempt any reconstitution. Bordo takes issue with postmodernism's flight from the body's weight and locat-

edness in space and time. Wilson attacks "the expulsion of the flesh.. that is repeated again and again in computational cognitive theory" (77). A model of mem- ory that embodies an infinitely complex neurological network, activated, constituted, and reconstituted by interaction with the environment, offers a nexus between bio-

logical and cultural, between presence and process. Habit conceived as a dynamic between memory and knowledge describes a process in which both are reciprocally transformed, rendered more complex and flexible. However, the idea of habit as

presence raises a significant problem-a question surely at the heart of its circum- vention in modem composition theory and practice: what in one of the most diverse and complex cultures in the world at the brink of a new century might constitute a truly representative body of knowledge? Fortunately, strong competing voices guar- antee a diversity in choice of texts and curricular composition. Agreement is more elu- sive. Only when fear of cultural enslavement and the concomitant politics of bodily disintegration give way to concern for students' intellectual, emotional, and ethical strength and independence will agreement across educational and even disciplinary levels be possible. Paradoxically, only when students develop habits of mind does cul- tural critique take on intrinsic importance in higher education.

All rhetorics manifest a particular conception of memory, whether the idea forms the epistemological foundation or haunts the rhetorical superstructure. But memory in some form or another is always present. The tarring of neuroscience and psychology with the brush of determinism has effectively maintained a paradigm that has served postmodernist cultural critique. However, as I've attempted to show, the model bears no relationship to a faculty that the brain sciences now conceive as a dynamic maker of meaning defined by temporality and transformation rather than fixed spatial location. The memory neither contains discrete pieces of knowledge that lie inert and useless nor involves an insidious process whereby the student becomes the corporeal manifestation of that knowledge. But like the living body of which it is a part, memory is always in a state of becoming. Likewise, the memorial body of knowledge is neither a library nor a database; it defies homogeneity in the

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constant categorizing and recategorizing of cognitive and emotional, individual, and social elements. Such a reconception of memory brings time back into focus, prompt- ing a longer view of the educational process, defying discrete systems and disciplines. Temporality suggests global and interactive rather than purely local and provincial stances. Free of methodical restraint, the flux and change of time calls into service those unfashionable virtues of authenticity, responsibility, and commitment-values that lend consistency and gravity to the enterprise of teaching. Despite the prevailing concern with the being and nothingness of the spatial, it is in the acts of reading and writing that space and time find their embodiment. Inhabiting the text involves a qual- ity of engagement that draws us into personal, if not visceral, identification with suf- fering and injustice, with joy, love, and sorrow. But that impersonation does not preclude a larger perspective. Literature permits us to live both inside and outside the individual and cultural body. Memorial complexity allows the simultaneous vision necessary for humane critique of our own condition.

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