~·c JOURNAL ~

PHILIPPINE PLANNING! ~·c • JOURNAL~ <;J~"zen~ SCHOOL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING • VOL. XVIII, No.1, October 1986 •

PHILIPPINE PLANNING JOURNALVOL. XVIII, No.1, October 1986

Board of EditorsDolores A. EndrigaTito C. FirmalinoJaime U. Nierras

Managing EditorCarmelita R. E. U. Liwag

Circulation Manager

Emily M. Mateo

Production ManagerDelia R. Alcalde

The Philippine Planning Journal is published in October and April by the School of Urbanand Regional Planning, University of the Philippines. Views and opinions expressed in signedarticles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the School of Urban andRegional Planning. All communications should be addressed to the Business Manager, PhilippinePlanning Journal, School of Urban & Regional Planning, University of the Philippines, Diliman,Quezon City, Philippines 1101.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Evaluation of the PhilippineEnvironmentallmpaet StatementSystem: 1977-1985

- Ramon Abracosa and Leonardo Ortolano

30 A Corporate PlanningStrategy for aBetter Implementation of thePhilippine Environmentallmpaet(EIS) System

- Precioso F. David

39 Rural-rurallnteraetion Model:A Model for Regional Planning inDualistic Economies in Crisi~

- Cesar B. Umeli, Jr.

IT II

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NATURALENVIRONMENT

EVALUATION OF THE PHILIPPINEENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM:

1977-1985

by Ramon Abracosa and Leonard Ortolano

Like many other countries, the Philippines has adopted an environmental qualitymanagement strategy based on the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).This strategy relies on the preparation and review of environmental impact statements (EISs)for proposed projects that might have a significant effect on environmental quality. Incontrast to other countries, the developmentand implementation of the EIS-based management approach occurred under conditions ofmartial law.

Although EIS systems have been implemented in many developing countries, theireffectiveness has not been widely studied. Thispaper analyzes the Philippine EIS system from1977, the time of its inception, through 1985,near the end of the presidency of FerdinandMarcos. Emphasis throughout is on politicaland organizational issues. The paper investigatesboth how the EIS system was developed andhow the Philippine agencies responded to it.Two issues permeate the analysis: Did thePhilippine agencies comply with· regulationsimplementing the EIS system? If not, why not?

The paper contains three main sections, thefirst of which is a historical analysis of Philippine environmental policy from 1977 to 1985.This section details events and personalities influencing the Philippine National Environmental Policy and its keystone instrument: theEIS system. The second main section considersorganizational aspects of the National Environ-

1

mental Protection Council (NEPCl. the multiagency body which played a central role inenvironmental impact assessment (EIA) policydevelopment. The third major section examinesNEPC's strategies for EIA policy implementation and appraises agency compliance with theEIS system. The paper closes with explanationsfor the observed compliance record and a"postscript" indicating some changes thatfollowed the fall of the Marcos government inFebruary, 1986.

EVOLUTION OF THE PHILIPPINEEIS SYSTEM

The Martial Law Government (1972-81)

The most significant Philippine environmental laws and policies were promulgated as presidential decrees under a martial law government that began on September 21, 1972. Theprocess of law and policy-making under this administration was fundamentally different fromthat of the preceding period, and it influencedsignificantly how Philippine environmental reforms were instituted.

Despite its parliamentary facade, the Philippine government from 1972 to 1981 was essentially presidential, organized as a unitarystructure. The revised constitution of 1973 empowered the incumbent President, Ferdinand

PHILIPPINE PLANNING JOURNAL

Marcos, to rule by decree indefinitely. Thesedecrees were to have the effect of law and wereto be binding even after martial law was lifted"unless expressly or explicitly modified by theregular National Assembly." The constitutionalamendments of 1976 and 1981 furtherstrengthened the President's powers andallowed him to rule by decree even after martiallaw ended in 1981. 1

Before the declaration of martial law in1972, laws were developed jointly by an executive branch under the President and a bicameral legislative body composed of the Senateand the House of Representatives. The courtsprovided judicial review of constitutional andstatutory matters. The policy-making processwas characterized as being precedent-bound,based on these laws.2 In theory, the legislativebranch acted as the principal lawmaker. In practice, however, it was often the executive branchrather than Congress that initiated governmentpolicies. 3 Cabinet secretaries and agency administrators, together with their aides, draftedproposals and presented them to congressmenwho acted as sponsors of bills. Thus the civilservice bureaucracy, whose main role had beento implement policies and programs, graduallytook on the function of initiating policies.

Under the martial law constitution, thegovernment was still divided into the judicial,executive,and legislative branches (with Congress being replaced by an interim national legislative assembly). This separation of powersbased on the principle of checks and balanceswas superficial since the executive branchwas the dominant force. The interim legislativeassembly served mainly as a "rubberstarnp" forthe authoritarian chief-executive. The preeminence of the executive branch was reflectedin the bureaucracy, where policy-makingfunctions were enhanced enormously.

I See Frederica M. Bunge, ed., Philippines: A

Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: The AmericanUniversity, Foreign Area Studies, 1983), pp. 175-227.

2Raul de Guzman, A. Carbonell and V. Mariano,"Citizen Participation and Decision Making UnderMartial Law Administration: A Search for a ViablePolitical System," Occasional Paper No. 1 (QuezonCity, Philippines: College of Public Administration,University of the Philippines, March 19761. p, 14.

3Ceasar Alzona, "Legislation by PresidentialDecree: Philippine Experience," (M.S. Thesis, NationalDef~.mse College of the Philippines, 1976), p. 53.

2

The bureaucracy's emergence as a majorpolicy-making entity was accompanied by anincrease in both the number and influence ofprofessional administrators, or "technocrats."Their role was analyzed by Ocampo (1975),who assessed the technocrat's view of government machinery before martial law as a "cumbersome and sticky structure that militated notonly against the implementation of a plan, buteven against formulating a meaningful plan."?Trained as managers and administrators, thetechnocrats had been recruited into almost allgovernment agencies, especially those involvedin economic development and resourcesmanagement. They applied their acquirednorms of "efficiency" and expeditious policymaking within these agencies. Their approach,however, minimized citizen participation inpolicy-making, which had been a feature of thecongressional process abolished during martiallaw. Because they were appointed directly bythe President and accountable primarily to him,the technocrats did not feel obliged to consultthe people on policy matters. The institutionalmechanism for maintaining public accountability-the ballot-had been dismantled by martiallaw. Executive preeminence and the lack ofpublic accountability gave the technocrats enhanced discretion in formulating and implementing policies.

Policy Review Process under Martial Law

In the absence of Congress-and until theregular National Assembly was convened in1984-a mechanism within the Cabinet provided a venue for policy deliberation and forarriving at unified positions on proposals to bepresented to the Prestdent.f In place of defunctcongressional committees, a cabinet standingcommittee (assisted by ad hoc technical com-

4 Romeo Ocampo, "Technocrats and Planning:Sketch and Exploration," Phitipplne Journal of PublicAdministration, Vol. IV, No.1 (January 1971) pp. 3164; see also R. B. Stauffer, The Philippine Congress:Causesof Structural Change, SAGE Research Papers inthe Social Sciences Series, Vol. 3, No. 90-024 (BeverlyHills: SAGE Publications, 1975).

SSantiago Simpas and V. Mariano, "Policy MakingUnder Martial Law," Philippine Journal of PublicAdministration, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3-4 (July-October,1978), pp. 233-253.

6Ib id., pp. 239-241.

mittees) provided the principal means for reviewing proposed policies. These committeesforged the compromises needed to formulatepolicies amidst conflicts in agency jurisdiction,but this cabinet-level review was not always expeditious. A study by Simpas and Mariano(1978) concluded that the policy review process introduced during the mid-seventies reverted to the same pre-martial law proceduresthat had been rejected earlier for being cumbersome and time consurnlnq.?

Agencies Influencing Initial EnvironmentalPolicies

Interest in environmental policy reform inthe Philippines took place during the mid-seventies when the bureaucracy was itself undergoing reorganization. That period witnessedthe emergence of two new agencies that wouldplay significant, but competing, roles in environmental policy development.

On May 17, 1974 the Department of NaturalResources was established by PresidentialDecree No. 461. (Prior to this, natural resourcesmanagement functions had been conducted bythe Department of Agriculture.) The newlycreated agency was instrumental in formulating the Philippine "National EnvironmentalPolicy" and establishing the environmental impact statement system as the cornerstone ofthat policy.

Another Presidential Decree (No. 933, datedMay 13, 1976J created the Human SettlementsCommission, the other infiuential body inPhilippine environmental policy reform. TheCommission evolved from a "task force"created in 1973 to assess human settlementsprojects and to specify guidelines for developing sectoral policies that would yield an integrated human settlements program.8 Environmental protection was among the issues thatcaught the Commission's attention. Indeed, theconcept of "eco-development," defined as theprocess of adapting development approachesto environmental constraints, became the hallmark of what was called the "human settle-

7 lb id ., p. 233.

BT he term "human settlements" refers to thehabitat or built environment of human beings encompassing both urban and rural areas.

3


ments approach" in the Philiopines." During1976, the Human Settlements Commissionsponsored two major international conferenceson environmental issues, each of which provided a platform for announcing the Commission's environmental mandate. 10 At the sametitne, the Department of Natural Resources wasalso fashioning a wide-ranging program forenvironmental policy reform.

The two agencies did not differ greatly inthe way they looked at environmental management. Each recognized the value of improvedcoordination arr.onq agencies with environmental responsibilities, the need for a nationalenvironmental protection policy, and the usefulness of environmental impact statements inregulating development. Despite the similarityof their positions, the two agencies pursuedtheir environmental interests along completelydifferent tracks. This occurred because environmental protection was only one of many concerns in each of their organizations. Anotherfactor is that the two agencies derived politicalsupport from different sources.

At the time of its creation in 1976, theHuman Settlements Commission scored aninitial victory in establish!ng its claim as theprimary environmental management agency bybeing assigned to coordinate activities of theNational Pollution Control Commission(NPCC). At that time, the NPCC was the onlyagency with a mandate for pollution controland environmental quality manaqernent.l '

The Human Settlements Commission, thenunder the Office of the President, establisheditself as a prominent force in the nationalbureaucracy. The Commission's influence expanded through an advantageous link with thepowerful central planning agency, the NationalEconomic and Development Authority. More

9The "human settlements approach" refers to thephysical planning, improvement and management ofhuman settlements, and includes consideration ofshelter and related facilities which affect habitabilityand efficiency from the standpoint of quality of lifeand economic and social opportunity.

lOThese conferences were: "The First Internatlonal Conference on Human Settlements" (Manila,1976) and the "International Conference on the Survival of Humankind" (Manila. September 6-10,19761.

llThis commission, reorqanized in 1976, originated from the National Water and Air Pollution ControlCommission created under Republic Act 3931 in1964.


irnpor.ant, however, was the political supportof the President's wife, Imelda Marcos. She wasclimbing the rungs of power and viewed theHuman Settlements Commission as the organizational base for establishing her own politicalpower in the bureaucracy. In 1978, the HumanSettlements Commission was elevated to therank of Ministry, and the President's wife wasdesignated as its head.

The pol itical actors and historical circurnstances under which Philippine environmentalpolicies emerged have greatly influenced theformulation and implementation of those policies. A time line of events that marked theimplementation of the Philippines EIS systemprovides a reference for the discussion below(see Table 1).

Formulation of the Philippine NationalEnvironmental Policy

The year 1976 was a watershed for environmental advocates in the bureaucracy. OnJuly 6, the Secretary of Natural Resources(called Minister after June 1978) secured apresidential Letter of Instruction (LOI No.422) which set up the Interagency Committeefor Environmental Protection (IACEP). TheCommittee, which consisted of representativesfrom 18 agencies,12 focused its attention oncoordinating independent efforts of agencieswhose missions touched upon the environment.

The IACEP asked the United Nations Regional Office in Bangkok to send an advisorymission to the Philippines to help the Committee identify gaps in existing environmental protection efforts and to recommend appropriatelegislative and administrative measures. JackBeale, former Minister of Environment for NewSouth Wales in Australia, headed the UN advisory mission which arrived in Manila duringthe latter part of 1976.

1. Conditions Existing in 1976

The meetings between IACEP and its advisers generated questions regarding the institutional context for environmental qualitymanagement in the Philippines. One issue con-

12Minerva N. Medida, "Philippine EnvironmentalPolicy: Evolution and Evaluation," (Master's thesis indevelopment studies, Institute of Social Studies, TheHague. Netherlands. 1980).

4

cerned the large number of agencies (22 wereidentified) whose activities directly affectedthe environment, or whose missions otherwiseinvolved some form of environmental management. The key problem was not consideredto be the proliferation of environmentally related agencies. but the lack of coordinationamong them. The meetings resulted in the consensus that integration of environmental programs was urgently needed. Because environmental management involved activities of manyagencies, it was considered impractical to createa single, cabinet-level "superagency." Moreover,such a move would have violated a timehonored tradition among Filipino agencies:"non-interference among equals.',13 The workof IACEP also revealed significant gaps in environmental legislation, including the absenceof requirements for environmental assessmentof development projects.

The collaboration between IACEP and theUN mission pointed to the need for a mandateannouncing the government's resolve to protectthe environment, and for an interagency environmental council chaired by the Presidenthimself. Cabinet ministers and heads of majoragencies were to be members of this council.

In January 1977, Beale presented thefindings outlined above to the President andoffered recommendations for legal and administrative measures needed to launch an integrated environmental management program. 14

Beale's recommendations included: (1) promulgation of a national environmental policysupported by legislation, (2) specification of anenvironmental code with principles and standards on which to anchor the environmentalpolicy, and (3) institution of a clear-cut procedure for integrating environmental considerations into the work of development agencies. These recommendations were immediatelyaccepted in principle by the President, therebyforestalling potentially extended debates in theCabinet over the proposed landmark policy.

13Veronica R. Villavicencio. "IntergovernmentalRelations in Philippine Environmental Management inthe Seventies," speech delivered during the NationalConference on Environmental Management (June 607,1977),

14Jack Beale, "Environmental Management in thePhilippines. Phase I: Legal and Administrative Initiatives" (Bangkok: United Nations Regional Office forAsia and the Pacific. 1977).


Table 1

Events that marked the Implementation of the PhilippineEIS System

July 6, 1976

April 18, 1977

June 6,1977

June 2,1978

June 6, 1978

June 11, 1978

November 23, 1979

December 23, 1979

December 14, 1981

June 21, 1982

November 7, 1983

Creation of the Inter-Agency Committee for Environmental Protection (IACEP).

Creation of the National Environmental ProtectionCouncil (NEPC).

Issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1151 (Philippine National Environmental Policy) and Presidential Decree No.1152 (Philippine Environmental Code).

Creation of the Ministry of Human Settlements; NEPCwas incorporated into the Ministry.

NEPC issued guidelines for implementing a decentralizedEIS system.

Datemark on Presidential Decree No. 1586 revising theoriginal EIS system by centralizing its administration.

NEPC's governing board adopted rules and regulationsfor the centralized EIS system.

NEPC established an "interim" EIS system pending issuance of a presidential proclamation which was neededto implement the centralized EIS system.

Presidential Proclamation No. 2146 was issued definingthe scope of the centralized EIS system. PresidentialLetter of Instruction No. 1179 was issued on the samedate requiring agencies to set up environmental units.

Rules and regulations of the centralized EIS system werepublished in the Philippine Official Gazette.

NEPC issued technical definitions of projects and areascovered by the EIS s-ystem.

5


The first step in implementing Beale's recommendations was to establish a NationalEnvironmental Protection Council made up of apolicy-making board and a secretariat. TheNEPC's primary functions were to provideenvironmental policy guidance and to coordinate environmental activities of all agencies.Its immediate task, however, involved draftinga national environmental policy and an associated "environmental code." The latter was tospecify detailed principles and standards uponwhich the environmental policy would bebased.

On April 18, 1977, the President created, bydecree, the National Environmental ProtectionCouncil and designated the Minister of NaturalResources as its executive officer. 15 A technocrat who influenced the Natural ResourcesMinister's views on environmental management,became executive director of the NEPC Secretariat. Although nominally under the Officeof the President, the political clout of the newCouncil was provided by the Natural ResourcesMinister.

Indeed, the Minister of Natural Resourceshad been very effective in expanding his ministry's environmental mandate in 1976 and 1977,a period during which the rival Human Settlements Commission was still a fledgling body.During October 1976, a Natural ResourcesManagement Center was set up under the Ministry of Natural Resources to develop and inventory the country's natural resources and environmental conditions. On September 19,1977, the Natural Resources Minister was empowered to promulgate rules and regulationsfor implementing an important environmentallaw (P.O. No. 1198) requiring all entitiesengaged in natural resources exploitation, including infrastructure development, "to restoreor rehabilitate areas (affected by these activities) to their original condition.,,16

2. The Role of the EIS System

On June 6, 1977, the President issueddecrees establishing the Philippine NationalEnvironmental Policy (P.O. 1151) and thePhilippine Environmental Code (P.O. 1152).Both had been drafted by NEPC. The formulators of the policy drew inspiration mainly from

l$Section 2, P.O. 1121.16Section 1, P.O. 1198.

6

the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of1969. The general goals of NEPA were echoedin similar pronouncements by the PhilippineNational Environmental Policy: 17

It is hereby declared a continuing policy ofthe state to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyableharmony with each other; to fulfill thesocial, economic and other requirements ofpresent and future generations of Filipinos,and to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life ofdignity and well-being.

The core of the policy is set forth in Section4 of the Presidential Decree. It ordered theestablishment of an environmental impactstatement system to cover all agencies andinstrumentalities of the national government,including public and private corporations andentities. These organizational units were required to prepare and submit, along with theirproposals for action, an environmental impactstatement describing: 18

1. the environmental impacts of the proposed action, project or undertaking;

2. any adverse environmental effect whichcannot be avoided should the proposal beimplemented ;

3. alternatives to the propose action;4. determination that the short-term uses of

the environmental resources are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and

5. whenever the proposal involves the use ofdepletable or non-renewable resources, afinding must be made that such use andcommitment are warranted.

The policy also inaugurated a process for interagency review and comment on environmentalimpact statements.

The EIS system had been widely promotedas a sound planning tool during the environmental conferences and consultations held inManila during 1976. Moreover, Beale's recommendation for a clear-cut procedure for incorporating environmental considerations into

17Section 1, P.O. 1151. For a comparable statement of goals, see Section 101 of the U.S. NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969.

18Section 4, P.O. 1151. The language here is similar to Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.

development planning was anchored on the concept of environmental impact assessment. TheNEPC's executive director, who had been atthe forefront of the environmental campaign,described the EIS process as "an instrument ofpublic will to safeguard and preserve the qualityof (the) environment.',19

The EIS system, which was regarded as acentral component of the National Environmental Policy, had unmistakeable actionforcing provisions. However, it only requiredthe entities concerned to submit EIS documents along with their project proposals. Theobjective of sytematically integrating environmental considerations into an organizaton'swork was implied, but there was no indicationof what changes in organizational structuresand procedures were required. Rather, P.O.1151 instructed the 18 agencies representedin the Interagency Committee for Environmental Protection to submit to NEPC, within60 days, their respective guidelines, rules andregulations to implement the EIS system. TheNEPC was to provide only general guidanceand review of agency procedures. The questionof how to integrate environmental considerations into an agency's work, beyond preparing EISs, was left to the agencies.

Responsibility for setting up EIS Rules andRegulations

Presidential Decree No. 1151 announcingthe Philippine National Env.ironmental Policywas not sufficient to put the EIS system towork. Rules and regulations were needed tospecify details of the system by answering suchquestions as: How will the EIS system be administered? What types of projects are to becovered? What must the agencies do to be incompliance with the system? These rules themselves required approval, which presumablywould be given by the President.

Although P.O. 1151 ordered agencies tosubmit their EIS procedures to the NationalEnvironmental Protection Council, it was unclear whether final rules were to be prepared byeach agency separately, or if the NEPC was toformulate final rules based on proposals sub-

19Celso R. Roque, "Ecological Humanism," keynote address: National Seminar·Workshop on Environmental Considerations for the Mining Industry,Baguio, Philippines (February 22-24, 1979).

7


mitted by agencies. A careful reading of P.D,1151 indicates that each agency was responsiblefor preparing its own rUles:2o

Different agencies charged with environmental protection as enumerated in Presidential Letter of Instruction 422 shall, within 60 days from effectivity of this decree,submit to NEPC their respective guidelines,rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of Section 4 on EIA.

A presidential letter of instruction (LOI No.549) to NEPC following the issuance of PD.1151 instructed the National EnvironmentalProtection Council to set up an administrativemechanism for the EIS system. However, thismechanism was intended only for the "evaluation" of EISs, not for the system's entireimplementation.

Another ambiguity concerned the deadlinefor submitting EIS rules and regulations. It mayhave appeared specific-"60 days from effectivity of (the) decree "-however, the term"effectivity" did not refer to the date of thedecree's issuance. Strictly speaking, a presidential decree becomes effective only when itsaccompanying rules and regulations are published in the Philippine Official Gazette.

To add to the confusion, P.O. 1151 did notspecifically order NEPC to issue preliminaryguidance for the agencies. The outcome wasthat none of the agencies complied with the order to submit their EIS rules and regulations toNEPC, and no effort was made to compel themto do so.

Confusion over rules and regulations plaguedthe EIS system for many years. This confusionpersisted not only because of the enablingdecree's inherent vagueness, but also because ofpolitical developments that reshaped the roleand status of NEPC.

NEPC's Shift into the Ministry of HumanSettlement

During the year following the landmark environmental laws of 1977, the National Environmental Protection Councll began to establish itself within the Ministry of Natural Resources, where it enjoyed the support of theMinister. The work atmosphere was characterized by optimism and vigor, inspired by the

20Sectlon 5, P.O. 1151.


novelty of the EIS concept and the perceivedsignificance of the Council's mission.r ' One ofNEPC's major activities was to prepare guidelines for the EIS system, a noteworthy effortgiven the confusion over who was supposed tomake the first move toward implementing thesystem.

The NEPC set out to develop guidelines for adecentralized EIS system, which was the implementation approach implied in P.D. 1151. Leadagencies (designated by NEPC) would supervise and process EIS documents, coordinateinteragency review, and issue "certificates ofcompliance" to project proponents. 22 Underthis set up, The Council would only provide"final review" of draft EIS documents andwould arbitrate if disagreements arose betweena project proponent and a lead agency. Th isdecentralized system was intended to free theNEPC from the details of EIS administrationand allow it to concentrate on formulatingpolicy and designing environmental management strategies. These policy-making task appeared more in keeping with the Council'slimited organizational resources.

Certain events in 1978 had a dramatic effecton NEPC and its role in the EIS system. OnJune 2, the President created (through P.D.1396) the Ministry of Human Settlements(MHS) headed by his wife, Imelda Marcos, whowas concurrently Governor of MetropolitanManila. The newly established Ministry, formedfrom what was previously the Human Settlements Commission, became, by order of thedecree, the primary agency responsible for overseeing the government's environmental management program. This responsibility was in addition to the Ministry's principal function ofhuman settlements development. PresidentialDecree 1396 instructed MHS to promulgate"national standards and guidelines for environmental management... and develop an environmental impact statement system for the operationalization of said standards and guidelines.::23 The new Ministry was directed to incorporate the National Environmental Pro-

21personal interview with Amador Remigio, Head

of the EIS Section, NEPC, Manila, Philippines (November 6, 1984).

22See NEPC, "Guidelines for the Implementationof the Environmental I mpact Statement System"(Manila: June 1978), p. 6.

23Section 4b, P.O. 1396.

8

tection Council within its organizational structure, and this removed the Council from its political support base within the Ministry of Natural Resources. For purposes of policy andprogram coordination, the Ministry of HumanSettlements directed the Council and couldtherefore determine the course of the EISsvstern.f" The Human Settlements Ministerbecame chairperson of NEPC, a position previously held by the President. To many observers, the shift to MHS lowered the Council '5

status because it no longer reported directly tothe President.

The Ministry of Human Settlements emergedas a strong political force. It might have beenpropitious for NEPC to consolidate its influence within the Ministry. However, the MHSlacked the resolve to strengthen the Counciland fully incorporate it. One compelling reason for this is that the Council and MHS haddivergent roles. The Ministry was primarilyengaged in the development of human settlements. In contrast, much of NEPC's rurallybased work (e.q., soil conservation and aquaticresources management) concerned natural resources and related only indirectly to humansettlements. Also, many projects subject toenvironmental impact assessment are resourceuse activities, such as mining, logging, andwater resources development, and these areperipheral to the MHS's main functions.

The transfer of NEPC to the Ministry ofHuman Settlements severed the Council's political connection with the Ministry of NaturalResources. Although the Natural ResourcesMinister retained his post as executive officerof NEPC, his influence (and interest) in itdwindled.

Revision of the Decentralized EISImplementation Strategy

On June 6, 1978, the Council, then underthe purview of MHS, issued its guidelines forimplementating the EIS system. The HumanSettlements Minister, as chairperson of NEPC,issued an accompanying administrative orderto begin implementing the system using thedecentralized approach which NEPC had devised during 1977 and which was embodied inthe June 6 guidelines.

24Section 14, P.O. 1396.

It turned out, however, that MHS policymakers had an altogether different approachto irnplernerrtinq the EIS system. They adoptedthe view that the EIS system should apply onlyto projects and areas proven to be "environmentally critical." More significantly, they feltthat administration of the system should becentralized within the Council. The MHSpolicy-makers were intent on reversing thedecentralized implementation strategy previously adopted by the NEPC.

Near the end of 1978, a presidential decree(P.O. 1586), drafted by policy-makers withinthe Human Settlements Ministry, establisheda revised EIS system that centalized withinNEPC the administrative functions originallyassigned to the lead agencies. These functionsincluded evaluation and approval of EIS documents prepared by project proponents. Thedecree also limited coverage of the EIS system to projects and areas that would be declared as environmentally critical by a separate presidential proclamation. The role of leadagencies was reduced to that of assisting projectproponents in preparing environmental impactstatements.

Presidential Decree 1586 had a soberingimpact on NEPC, both for its content and itsunexpectedness. The decree thwarted attemptsto expedite EIS implementation and halteddevelopment of the decentralized system beforeit could even be tested. The date of the decreewas itself baffling: it had been marked June 11,1978, even though it was issued five monthslater. A literal reading of the posted datesindicates that, officially, the NEPC guidelinesof June 6, 1978 specifiying a.decentralized EISsystem were being modified just five days laterby a decree establishing a centralized system.To many agencies still formulating their impressions of NEPC, this was an inauspicious beginning. It signaled that either NEPC couldn'tmake up its mind or, for observers perceptiveenough to sort out the facts and dates, thatNEPC was not dictating its own polices. Thiscontributed to, and some would say it precipitated, a decline in the Council's credibility.

The new concept of the EIS system-centralized administration and limited EIS coveragehad the apparent aim of streamlining thesystem and making it more manageable. However, revision of the EIS system proved to be

25N EPC Administrative Order NO.1 (June 1978).

9


complex and time consuming. It createdopportunities to challenge the system on bothtechnical and legal grounds. In fact, it tookuntil 1982 for legal requirements of the centralized EIS system to be refined, and even thenthe legal framework remained precarious. Furthermore, the new centralized system providedchances for selective compliance and exemption,thereby creating a crack in the EIS systemwhich led eventually to major erosion in itsimpo rtance .

The Interim EIS System

Upon issuance of P.O. 1586,theNEPClegalstaff was directed to draft rules and regulationsto implement the new system. At the sametime, the technical staff of NEPC was instructed to delineate the environmentc:lly criticalprojects and areas subject to the EIS system.This required a new set of legal instruments,since the declaration of project; and areascovered by the EIS system required separatepresidential approval.

The environmental decrees of 1977 had notbeen debated rigorously in the Cabinet, but thesituation was vastly different in 1979 forseveral reasons. By then, the Council no longerhad the political support of the Natural Resources Minister, whose access to the President hadbeen crucial in expediting the envi ron mentalpol icies of 1977. In contrast, the HumanSettlements Minister displayed no interest inassuming the role of environmental policy advocate. In addition, the list of projects andareas determined by NEPC as environmentallycritical had to wind its way through the Cabinet, past the eyes of wary Ministers who hadbecome very uneasy about how the centralized EIS system which affect their agencies. Ittook nearly two years to gain approval for thedraft presidential proclamation of environmentally critical projects and areas, and the resulting list was 15% to 20% shorter than whatNEPC had originally proposed. 27

26A central ized EIS system does not mean thatNEPC would prepare the EISs. It means that all EISsprepared by project proponents would be centrallyevaluated and approved by the NEPC.

27personal interview with Amador Remigio, Head

of the EIA Section, NEPC, Manila, Philippines(November 14, 1984).


On November 23, 1979, during the firstmeeting of the National Environmental Protection Council attended by cabinet ministers,the rules and regulations of the revised EISsystems were approved. A major differencefrom the June 6, 1978 guidelines, in additionto the aforementioned centralized administrationand reduced coverage, was a provision forexemption: the ability to excuse projects andareas listed as environmentally critical from theEIS process. The matter of exemption wasneither mentioned nor implied in P.O. No.1586, the decree establishing the centralizedEIS system. The exemption provision wasincorporated into the rules and regulations atthe initiative of NEPC's legal staff, which reogarded the provision as being "natural underthe circumstances."28 Since exemptions reoquired presidential approval, NEPC lawyers didnot expect the provision to be used frequently.Moreover, even if a proposed project receivedan exemption, it did not preclude the Councilfrom requiring the project proponent to institute environmental protection measures.29

Before the approved EIS rules and regulations could take effect, the presidential proclamation identifying environmentally criticalprojects and areas had to be secured. Thatrequired cabinet approval which, during 1979,took much more time than expected. Sensingthat the process of getting presidential approvalfor the coverage of the revised EIS systemmight be extended, the Council decided toimplement an "interim" system. Under thisinterim approach, the EIS guidelines of June1978 (featuring a comprehensive coverage ofprojects and areas) would be followed, but theprocessing of EIS documents would be centralized at NEPC in accordance with the intent ofthe revised EIS system.

On December 23, 1979, NEPC secured amemorandum from the Minister of HumanSettlements directing all concerned agencies toadopt NEPC's interim EIS system, which wasto remain in effect for three years. To manyagencies, however, the MHS memorandum wasnot particularly compelling, and they quest-

28personaJ interview with Amado TolentinoNEPC Legal consultant and head of inter-agency legaicommittee, Manila, Philippines (November 15, 1984).

29Article II, Section 2, Philippine EIS System:Rules and Regulations.

10

ioned the validity of the interim system. Sincelaws must be published in the Philippine Official Gazette to signal their effectivity, and sincethe interim EIS system (being temporary) hadnot been so published, the system did not havethe status of law.

Scope of the Centralized EIS System

On December 14, 1981, about two yearsafter the policy-making board of NEPC approved the rules and regulations for implementingthe centralized EIS system based on P.O. 1586,the long awaited Presidential Proclamation (No.2146) defining the system's scope was finallyissued. The proclamation listed three types ofprojects automatically covered by the revisedsystem: heavy industries, infrastructure, andresource extractive activities. In addition to theproject-based coverage of the EIS system,twelve types of areas were identified as beingenvironmentally critical. All projects to belocated in these areas were subject to EIS requirements.

A short time later, the definition of the EISsystem's coverage, especially coverage based onthe list of critical areas, posed another difficulty for NEPC. This time, the problem was notone of legality, but one involving technicaldefinitions of projects covered by the EIS system. It proved difficult to formulate unambigous, workable definitions.

A.long with the presidential proclamationdefining the scope of the centralized EIS system, a presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI1179) was issued requiring each agency listedin P.O. No. 1586 to form an environmental unitfrom its existing personnel. These units wereexpected to provide technical assistance in processing and evaluating environmental impactstatements within their agencies.

Another notable aspect of LOI 1179 concerned the exemptions in the 1979 EIS rulesand regulations issued by NEPC. Under thelatter, the President could grant EIS exemptions for reasons of "national interest" or whencompliance with an international commitmentrequired an exemption. LOI 1179 modified thisprocedure by giving NEPC the authority togrant exemptions based on the recommend-

30As described below, agencies demanded detaileddefinitions of the projects and areas covered by theEIS system.

ation of the Minister having authority over theproject in question. Although this provisionappeared to buttress NEPC's decision-makingprerogatives, it remained uncertain whetherNEPC had the final authority to accept or denya minister's recommendation for exernption.fIt could be surmised that since the Council retained the ultimate decision on the issuance ofcertificates of compliance with the EIS system,it also had the final say on matters of exemptions. There was concern about how much discretion would be allowed within the EIS system, and some agencies chose to go straight ·tothe President to get exemptions for thei r projects.

The Period from 1982 to 1985

Following the December 1981 presidentialproclamation of environmentally critical projects and areas, it was finally possible for the1979 EIS rules and regulations to take effect.This took place on June 21, 1982, when therules and regulations were published in the Philippine Official Gazette. Between 1979 and1981, the interim EIS system theoreticallycovered all kinds of projects in all areas, andthe NEPC evaluated and approved EISs.Although encumbered by both lack of firmlegal basis and an all-encompassing coveragethat taxed NEPC's limited resources, the interim system have been relatively simple to interpret: comprehensive coverage of projecttypes under a centralized EIS evaluation andapproval system.

Although the new (June, 1982) EIS ruleswere intended to streamline the EIS system,they produced confusion and criticism overtechnical definitions of environmental criticalprojects and areas. The use of these area typesto identify projects covered by the EIS systemwas particularly bothersome, since agencieswanted to know their location and if all projects within environmentally critical areas werecovered, regardless of their significance. Theagencies demanded that the definitions of environmentally critical projects and areas beclarified as a precondition for compliance withthe EIS system. On November 7, 1983, appro-

31Michael Anderson, "Exemption to the EIS sys

tem: A Means to Clarify and Streamline the EIS Pro

cess," Issue Paper, No.2, (Manila: National Environ

mental Protection Council, May 1982).

11


ximately 16 months after the June 1982effectivity date of the centralized EIS system,NEPC finally issued unambiguous definitions ofenvironmentally critical projects and areas, including maps to fully define critical areas.

Early in 1983 the NEPC legal staff begandeliberating over ways to revise the EIS rulesand regulations to deal with agency complaintscentering on how projects in environmentallycritical areas were handled. During 1984, newrules and regulations were prepared for adoption by NEPC's policy-makers. The proposedrevisions required full EISs for all enrivonmentally criticial projects, thereby eliminating initial"project descriptions" which had formerly beenused by the Council to make an initial assessment of likely impacts. However, initial projectdescriptions would be required for projects inenvironmentally critical areas, and thesedescriptions would be used by NEPC to decidewhether full environmental impact statementswere needed. In May 1985, the NEPC formallyadopted these revision to the EIS rules andregulations.

Analysis of Political Events Influencing the EISSystem

The relocation of the NEPC into the Ministry of Human Settlements was one of severalevents that worked to seriously limit the Council's ability to implement the EIS system. Asoriginally conceived in 1977, the NEPC was tobe a collective inter-agency policy making bodyreporting directly to the President, who alsoserved as the Council's chair. At that time, theNEPC enjoyed the strong political support ofthe Minister of Natural Resources, who wasinstrumental in forming the Council and servedas its executive officer.

Shifting the NEPC into the Ministry ofHuman Settlements was perceived as diminishing the Council's status since it no longer reported directly to the President, but rather, tothe Minister of Human Settlements, whoserved as the Council's chair. The move wasaccompanied by the loss of political supportfrom the Minister of Natural Resources, and itWCjS perceived as a blow to the natural resources ministry whose rival in environmentalmanagement was the MHS.

Many agencies viewed the concentration ofenvironmental regulatory power in the newMinistry of Human Settlements as upsetting thepolitical balance which had formed the multi-


agency basis of NEPC. 32 For many years,bureaucratic relations within the Philippineswere characterized by "equal standing" and"non-interference" among agencies. Becauseenvironmental management activities were performed by numerous agencies, the formationof an environmental superagency had been previously rejected. 33 Reluctance to concentratepower in one agency is what led to the cooperative multi-agency approach reflected inthe formation of the National EnvironmentalProtection Council and the reliance on leadagencies to administer a decentralized EfSsystem.

The concentration of environmentalauthority under the MHS spawned resentmentfrom other agencies, but the agencies generallykept their opposition to themselves. At thetime of its formation, the Ministry of HumanSettlements was already a potent unit in thebureacracy, mainly because it was headed bythe powerful wife of the President.f" It wouldhave been politically indiscreet for any agencyto challenge the new ministry's sweeping environmental mandate.

The Ministry of Human Settlements further

aggravated the resentment of the agencies byconverting the EIS system into a centralizedregulatory process administered by NEPC. 35

This occurred because many agencies were

32Upo n its creation in 1978, the Ministry ofHuman Settlements embraced all special agencies concerned with environmental protection, such as theNEPC and the National Pollution Control Commission.

33 See discussion above on the formulation ofPNEP.

34Until February, 1986, the President's wife,Imelda Marcos, was concurrently Governor of Metropolitan Manila.

3S The original concept of a decentralized EIS

system originated in the Inter-Agency Committee forEnvironmental Protection formed in 1976 to studyadministrative and legal measures for environmentalmanagement in the Philippines. This concept was

adopted in NEPC's "EIS Guidelines" in 1978. Thedecentralized approach was patterned after the EISsystem used in the United States. In the U.S., federalagencies are indivlduallv responsible for the conductand administration of the EIS process, the proceduraland substantive aspects of which can be challenged inthe courts. However, under the U.S. EIS system, noagency holds a regulatory function involving issuanceof permits for projects based on the evaluation andapproval of EISs.

12

themselves proponents of projects requiringenvironmental impact statements. Centralization of the EIS system under NEPC, and byextension under the M:-lS, invited suspicionsthat the Ministry of Human Settlements wasout to regulate other aqencies through theEIS svstern,

The decree that created the Ministry ofHuman Settlements (P.D. No. 1396) had in factonly directed that NEPC be "attached" to thenewly-formed ministry; it did not stipulate thatNEPC become a line agency of the MHS. 36

Formally, the Council was to remain independent. However, because the Ministry of HumanSettlements controlled NEPC's budget, suchformal independence was difficult to exercise.It was hard for outside agencies to take theclaim of independence seriously and the Council came to be viewed as an arm of the MHS.

The initiative for policy-making at NEPCshifted to the human settlements ministry, eventhough, on the surface, that task remained acollective responsibilities of the agencies represented in the Council. The MHS policymakers transformed the EIS implementationscheme into a centralized process that gaveNEPC the originally unintended role of a regulatory agency. This was more than a change inEIA implementation strategy since it placed theNEPC in an adversarial position vis-a-vis theagencies. The NEPC was not given additionalbudgetary and political support, and withoutadded support, it was difficult for NEPC todeal with agency challenges to the rules andregulations for the centralized EIS system andagency efforts to obtain exemptions fromthem.

Overall, the shift to MHS proved disadvantageous for NEPC. Its former status as thetopmost environmental protection agency became subordinate to the sweeping environmental mandate of the MHS. Although thisarrangement had "potential advantages forNEPC, considering the political influenceenjoyed by the MHS, the advantages nevermaterialized because the NEPC's status within the human settlements ministry remainedlow.

36T he relevant directive, P.O. No. 1396 dated 2June, 1978, specifies that N EPC be placed under theadministrative supervision of MHS "for the purpose ofpolicy and program coordination."

Under the Ministry of Human Settlements,the image of NEPC sunk to being one of itsattached agencies [but} not actually withinthe mainstream of MHS's priorities and program. . . . What eventually happened wasthat NEPC was legally attached to the MHS,but its programs were not integrated and coordinated with MHS, thereby in effect operating without support and institutionalbacking of its mother ministry.

THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION COUNCIL

This section focuses on the role and organizational structure of the National Environmental Protection Council. It also examines theresources available to NEPC in carrying out itsEIA policy implementation activities.

Changes in the Role of the NEPC

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1121creating the NEPC gave it the followingmission:

To rationalize the functions of governmentagencies charged with environmental protectionand with the enforcement of environmentallyrelated laws to the end that effective, coordinated and integrated systems of environmentalprotection, research and implementation shallbe achieved.

The NEPC was to provide a unifying rolebased on interagency coordination and policymaking. It was not expected to have regulatoryfunctions, such as issuing environmental permits or prosecuting violations of environmentallaws and regulations. Even though the originalmandate of NEPC included other tasks, such asundertaking environmental research programsand conducting public information campaigns,38 none of these included a regulatoryfunction. The primary role of NEPC was to actas a venue for collective policy-making by itsmember agencies. The NEPC's research program was to guide the formulation of environmental policies, which were to serve as a basisfor regulation, a task left to individual agencies.

37David, P. F., "A Corporate Planning Strategy for

a Better Implementation of the Philippines EIS System:' M.S. Thesis, School of Urban and RegionalPlanning, University of the Philippines, Diliman,

1985.38Section 3, P.O. No. 1121, 12 April 1977.

13


The NEPC member agencies retained environmental functions exercised prior to theCouncil's creation, but they were required touse NEPC to coordinate their activities. Severalagencies represented or. the Council had regulatory procedures of their own, none of whichwere modified as a result of creating theNEPC. 39 Indeed it would have been difficultfor a new entity, such as NEPC, to regulateactivities in several sectors OVer which existingagencies held jurisdiction.

It is worth emphasizing that NEPC's originalcharge was policy-making, not regulation, andthat it had neither the resources nor the authority needed to regulate effectively. Unlike theNational Pollution Control Commission (NPCC),4C1 the NEPC could not administer regulatory sanctions in the form of economic penalties, injunctions, and so forth. The NationalPollution Control Commission had quasi-judicial powers that enabled it to issue cease anddesist orders and try violations of its orders."!The authority to levy sanctions is vital to aregulatory body, and its absence in NEPC'soriginal mandate is evidence of deliberate intentto exclude regulation from the Council'smission.

Although the EIS system was to be a regulatory process, the original conception of thesystem envisioned a decentralized approach inwhich regulation and much administration wasleft to lead agencies.42 NEPC was to provideguidelines for evaluating EIS documents andmake comments and recommendations on draft

39There were at least 15 agencies in the Philippinesresponsible for regulating activities that affect the environment. These activities include forestry, fishing,mining, land use development, air and water pollution,etc. See NEPC, Environmental Impact Assessment:Handbook, November 1983.

40The National Pollution Control Commission wasfirst created by Republic Act No. 3931 in 1964. It wasreorganized, with its powers and functions expanded,in 1976. With the creation of the Ministry of HumanSettlements, the NPCC was removed from the Officeof the President and put under the supervision of

MHS.41 Fernandez, P. V., "National Policy Trends in

Environmental Protection and Pollution Control in thePhilippines:' in Kato, et el., (eds.l, EnvironmentalLaw and Policy in the Pacific Basin Area University ofT0t<,r0 Press, 1981, pp. 37-45.

2NEPC, "Guidelines for the Implementation of

EIS System:' 1978.


environmental impact statements. The leadagencies were to circulate draft EISs for comment by other agencies and the public, andthey were to issue "environmental compliancecertificates" (ECCs) to project proponents tosignify compliance with the EIS system.43

In 1978, when the NEPC became part of theMinistry of Human Settlements, a centralizedEIS system was imposed and the Council tookover regulatory functions formerly assigned tolead agencies. 44 This significantly expandedNEPC's role from policy-making to both policymaking and administration of the EIS system.The following discussion examines the organizational aspects of this change in NEPC's roleand consequent influences on NEPC's effectiveness.

Organizational Structure of NEPC in 1985

As of 1985, the NEPC was organized in atiered fashion with four levels as shown inFigure 1. At the head was the policy-makingCouncil consisting of 14 members.45 The Minister of Human Settlements was the Council'schairman and the Minister of Natural Resourcesacted as executive-officer. Decision-makingauthority rested with these 14 members.

In spite of the Council's broad membership,it excluded several important agencies havingenvironmental management functions, suchas, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry ofEducation, and the Ministry of Information.The central planning agency, the National Economic Development Authority, which had apivotal role in development planning, was notpart of the Council.

The large number of cabinet rank officersin the Council made it difficult to convenemeetings regularly. Between 1976 (when theNEPC was created) and 1985, only two meetings of the 14-member Council had taken placeone in 1979 and the other in 1985.46 The lackof authority behind many of NEPC's orders was

43 Ibid., p. t.

44 The centralized EIS system were mandated byP.D.1586.

45 NEPC, Environmental Impact Assessment HandboOk

6Manila, Nov. 1983.

4 The 1979 meeting adopted the rules and regulations of the centralized EIS system. The 1985 meetingadopted revisions to the rules and regulation.

14

due largely to the difficulty of securing resolutions that emanated directly from the Council.

To alleviate this problem, a ManagementExecutive Committee was created in 1979.47 Itconsisted of agency officials (mostly bureauchiefs) designated by ministers as their representatives to the Council. The ManagementExecutive Committee was empowered to reviewpolicies, programs and proposed legislation, butthe Council retained final decision makingauthority. The Committee was supposed toabsorb the backlog in the Council's regularduties. However, as reported by David (1985),the Committee did not accomplish this effectively.48

Below the Council and the Executive Man·agement Committee was the NEPC Secretariatheaded by an executive-director. The Secretariat performed the routine duties of NEPC,such as undertaking research, conductinginformation campaigns, coordinating interagency projects, and drafting proposed policiesand legislation. Although the Secretariat wasthe administrative arm of the Council, in theeyes of many agencies, the Secretariat was theNEPC. It is a feeble image though-a result ofthe failure of the 14-member Council and theExecutive Management Committee to providestrong leadership for NEPC.

Strictly speaking, the Secretariat had nodecision-making authority. However on severaloccasions, the Secretariat had to issue presumably binding documents to the agencies,such as the definitions of environmentallycritical projects and areas issued in 1983.49 Bythemselves, Secretariat orders remained open tochallenge because they were not backed byspecific resolutions or the formal approval ofthe 14-member Council.

47The Executive Management Committee wascreated under NEPC Council Order No. 1 (Series of1979), 14 December 1979.

48David, P. F.,op. cit., p. 11949NEPC Office Circular signed by the Executive

Director, 7 November 1983.50 ln 1984, the NEPC Secretariat consisted of 42

technical specialists and 40 administrative and supportstaff. Of the technical specialists, 15 were in thehumanities and social sciences, 19 were in the biological and physical sciences, four were categorized ashaving interdisciplinary fields, and four others servedas in-house consultants.


COUNCIL(14 Members, with the Minister of HumanSettlements as Chairman and the Ministerof Natural Resources as Executive Officer)

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE(Representatives of Ministers of Agenciesin the Council headed by the Exectuve

Director of NEPC's Secretariat)

SECRETARIAT(Administrative and Technical Staff,

which includes the EIA Group)

INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEES(Environmental Officers Committee,

Legal Officers Committee, Task Forces)

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of .the National EnvironmentalProtection Council (1985)

15


Personnel and Budget of the NEPCSecretariat

The size of the NEPC Secretariat contractedfrom a high of 125 in 1978 to a low of 82 in1984. Beginning in 1978, the NEPC annualbudqet increased until it reached its peak ofP9.341M (million pesos) in 1983. The budgetwas reduced to P7.90M in 1984. Table 2 detailschanges in the NEPC's annual budget and staffsize.51

The NEPC budget derived from allocationsmade by the Ministry of Human Settlements.The absolute size of the Council's budget doesnot reveal much about the level of prioritygiven to NEPC by the ministry. It is more informative to compare NEPC's budget withthose of two other environmental regulatoryagencies attached to the MHS: the NationalPollution Control Commission and the HumanSettlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC).In 1983, for example, the NEPC receivedP9.34M, while NPCC and HSRC got P10.20Mand P27.08M, respectively.52 The disparitiesare significant considering that both NPCC andHSRC were primarily regulatory agencies,whereas NEPC performed policy-making, research, and regulation, the latter in connectionwith the centralized EIS system.

It is instructive to speculate on why theCouncil remained a poorly supported branch ofthe Ministry of Human Settlements. As notedabove in part F of Section I, the're was a mismatch in the roles of NEPC and MHS. Thescope of the human settlements ministry'senvironmental mandate was sweeping, but itsprimary mission was a specialized: the development of human habitat. The environmentalinterests of the MHS, which were largely concentrated in urban areas, seemed to be adequately served by NPCC and HSRC. The National Pollution Control Commission wasresponsible for promulgating and enforcing airand water quality standards and for controllingnoise pollution, while the Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission was responsible for

51NEPC's 1978-84 Accomplishment Report; M.N.,"Philippine Environmental Policy: Evolution andEvaluation," M.S. Thesis, Institute of Social Studies,The Hague, Netherlands, 1980, pp. 23-25. See alsoDavid, P.F., op. cit., p. 103.

52David, P F. op. cit., pp. 126-127.

16

regulating land use.53 Clearly, the environmental regulatory work of NPCC and HSRCwere directly relevant to the work of the Ministry of Human Settlements. That missionseemed less directly in accord with the naturalresource oriented portion of NEPC's environmental management functions (e.g., soil conservation).

Structure of the NEPC Secretariat

In 1985, the NEPC Secretariat was composed of two divisions and a support staffdivided into five groups.54 The EnvironemntalResearch and Community Projects (ERCP)Division undertook policy research and formulated programs for nature conservation andenvironmental management. It also implemented environmental rehabilitation projectsand conducted training programs on use ofalternative technologies in environmental protection. The Environmental Planning, Management and Enhancement (EPME) Division wasresponsible for inter-agency coordination andestablishing guidelines for implementing theEIS system. The Division also prepared environmental quality status reports and formulated alternative environmental managementstrategies, such as economic incentive schemesfor controlling pollution.

The Environmental Impact Assessment Group

The Environmental Impact AssessmentGroup was organized under the EnvironmentalPlanning, Management and Enhancement Division. 55 In 1985, it had six core staff memberswho were divided into two sections: (1) the

53The National Pollution Control Commission wasattached to the MHS in 1978, whereas the HumanSettlements Regulatory Commission developed as anorganizational unit within the human settlementsministry. The HSRC approves town plans and zoningordinances, and issues locational clearances for alienable lands of the State.

54NEPC Council Special Order No.1, dated 15January 1980.

5SThrough NEPC Office Order No.1, dated January 1984, the EIA Group was incorporated into theEnvironmental Planning, Management and Enhancement Division. Prior to this date, the EIA Group hadbeen a separate technical staff under the Office of theExecut ive-D irector.


Table 2

Personnel and Budget of NEPC1978-1984

Year

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

Total budget(million pesos)

2.700a

6.525

7.001

7.878.8.680

9.341

7.900

Number ofPersonnel

125b

84

117

115

117

104

82

Source: NEPC Files and Records. Cited in Media, M. N., "Philippine Environmental Policy:Evolution and Evaluation," M. S. Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands,1980; and David, P. F., "A Corporate Planning Strategy for a Better Implementation of thePhilippine EIS System," M. S. Thesis, School of Urban and Regional Planning, University of thePhilippines, Diliman, 1985.

aThe bulk of these annual budgets go to the development of environmental protection policies.In 1978, the allocation for this activity was only 2.7 million pesos. That rose to 6.525 millionpesos in 1979 and subsequently remained above that level. In 1978, NEPC was receiving financial support from the Ministry of Natural Resources.

bSixty-five of these personnel were categorized as "casual."

EIA Review and Assessment Section, and (2)the Research and Monitoring Section. The EIAGroup concentrated its efforts on processingand evaluating environmental impact statements and related documents.

Much of the work involved in appraisingenvironmental impact documents was done byan EIS Review Committee S6 made up of abouta dozen consultants. The Committee receivedsupport from the EIA group in conducting onsite inspections to verify field conditions andmonitoring projects in the field. It is the EISReview Committee that recommended approvalof environmental impact documents and

56 T he EIS Review Committee was created under

N EPC Council Special Order No.1, dated 15 January1980.

17

issuance of environmental compliance certificates. Several members of the EnvironmentalPlanning, Management, and Enhancement Division were sometimes called upon to helpevaluate envi ronmental documents.

The budget of the EIA Group was relativelysmall; between 1978 and 1984 it was between6 and 8 percent of NEPC's total budget. 57 Thelimited financial resources, combined with thesmall EIA group permanent staff size, hinderedefforts to implement the centralized EIS system and reflected a lack of strong support forthe system within the MHS.

S7 The 6 to 8 percent figure is from Media, M. N.,op. cit., and Philippine General Appropriations Act,1982-84.


The Role of Interagency Committees

Presidential Letter of Instruction No. 549(issued following the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1151 in 1977) directed theNEPC to organize interagency committees andtask forces to study major environmental problems and devise solutions. These interagencygroups, originally intended for research andpolicy review functions, became the principallink between the NEPC and the individualagencies (see also Figure 1). The coordinationrole assumed by these interagency groups was aresponse to the difficulty of providing systematic and effective coordination at the level of the14 member Council and the Executive Management Committee.

The Environmental Officers Committee,which included representatives of 33 agencies,was formed in 1980 and given the followingrather general charge: 58

1. Comment on proposed policies, programs and projects concerning the EISsystem;

2. Serve as the central working committeefor implementation of the EIS system;and

3. Provide technical assistance in mattersconcerning the Council and its memberagencies.

Although the Committee was effective in exposing weaknesses in rules governing the EISsystem, it had limited success in enforcingagency compliance with the system. There aretwo reasons for this. First, the Committee wascomposed mainly of section chiefs and seniortechnical officers who could not commit theirrespective agencies to agreements reached in theCommittee. Second, the Committee could onlymake recommendations to the Council, whichretained final decision making authority butrarely met.

58The Environmental Officers Committee wascreated under NEPC Council Special Order No.2,dated 15 January 1980. The members of the Committee were designated in March 26, 1980. The head ofthe EIA Group coordinated the Committee's work.The Committee's statement of functions was vague,e.g., it did not specify the form of technical assistanceexpected from its members.

18

Another inter-agency committee, the LegalOfficers Committee,59 was composed oflawyers from different agencies and was instrumental in developing the EIS system's rules andregulations. However, the Committee couldonly draft proposals and submit them for theCouncil's approval. Because of the difficultyof convening the Council, the promulgation ofrules and regulations was slow.

The interagency task forces and committees6 0 formed to remedy environmental problems succeeded mainly in identifying important issues, such as the need to control ofhazardous substances. Although the interagency groups drew up comprehensive programs requiring the collective effort of different agencies, implementation of programs wasfrustrated by the absence of authority on thepart of committee members. Interagency projects, such as the National Environmental Enhancement Program6 1, could only be implemented when there was voluntary participation by agencies asked to provide personneland resources. The NEPC Secretariat hadneither the authority nor the stature to orderagencies to provide assistance.

Summary Assessment of the NEPC

The decision of the Ministry of HumanSettlements to convert the EIS system into acentralized, regulatory process under theNEPC-and by extension, under the MHScreated agency resistance to both the EIS system and the NEPC. Having been thrown into anadversarial position vis-a-vis the agencies to beregulated via the EIS system, the NEPC neededmore political clout, expanded powers, and increased resources to fulfill its tasks. None ofthese was forthcoming. The MHS failed to provide political muscle for the NEPC, despite theministry's influential standing in the bureaucracy. The Council was given a regulatory role

59T he Legal Officers Committee was created underNEPC Council Special Order No.3, issued during1980. The Committee conducted research on iegalmatters affectfng environmental policies and was responsible for initiating and reviewing policies and fordrafting Council orders.

60presidential Letter of Instruction No. 549, 6January 1977.

61 N EPC, National Environmental EnhancementProgram, February 1983.

without having the powers needed to becredible as a regulator. Lack of resources alsolimited the- NEPC's ability to carry out itsnumerous tasks, especially implementation ofthe centralized EIS system.

The NEPC was severely constrained by itsorganizational set-up. The difficulty of convening meetings of the Council as a result of itscabinet-level membership forced the delegationof functions to the Executive ManagementCommittee and the Secretariat, neither ofwhich could make decisions for the Council.Excessive reliance on the Secretariat to perform the tasks of NEPC reduced NEPC to anorganization largely embodied by its secretariat. The NEPC Secretariat, on its own, wasunable to muster crucial high-level support forits environmental programs among the agencies,and representatives to NEPC's committeescould not generally make commitments fortheir agencies.

THE PHILIPPINE EIS SYSTEM:AN ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION

This section analyzes the operation of theEIS system under the three implementationschemes used by NEPC: decentralized, interim,and centralized. It also evaluates the record ofcompliance with the system by analyzing statistics for the number of environmental impactassessment documents generated and the rate ofNEPC approval for these documents.v' Theevaluation of the Philippine EIS system emphasizes procedural compliance, i.e., the extentto which agencies and firms prepared environmental assessment documents in accordancewith EIS system requirements. Although thisdoes not provide a complete framework forappraising the performance of the EIS system,there is little point in applying a more completeset of evaluative criteria if the rate of procedural compliance is low. As shown below, compliance with the Philippine EIS system wasquite low.

62 T he term "environmental impact document" isused here to refer to various types of reports requiredunder the Philippine EIS System: the initial environmental examination, the project description, and theenvironmental impact statement.

19


Implementation Schemes for the PhilippineEIS System

In each of the three phases of EIS systemimplementation, the policy objectives remainedas set forth in Presidential Decree No. 1151which established the EIS system. In all phases,the regulatory procedure involved the issuanceof permits, called environmental compliancecertificates, based on an appraisal of environmental impact documents. The three implementation schemes differed in terms of whowas responsible for evaluating environmentaldocuments and issuing ECCs and what types ofprojects were covered.

The Decentralized EIS System

The EIS system implemented in 1978 wasunprecedented'F and this caused difficulties.Environmental issues in project planning constituted a new influence for many agencies andnearly all firms. The lead agencies, for theirpart, had neither the experience nor the expertise to carry out their prescribed roles:setting up rules, ensuring coordination, monitoring compliance, and evaluating environmental assessment docurnents.P" Agencies wereto prepare environmental documents when theywere themselves project proponents. Many leadagencies did not have environmental specialistsand were not provided with resources to hirenew personnel.

Despite its broad coverage, administration ofthe EIS system seemed feasible because responsibility for implementation was decentralized. The National Environmental ProtectionCouncil was to designate lead agencies, formulate guidelines, provide comments on draftEISs, and settle disputes arising from leadagency decisions. Lead agencies were to beresponsible for coordinating and evaluating allenvironmental documents.

A project proponent (either an agency or aprivate entity) was required to prepare an Initial Environmental Examination (lEE) andsubmit it to the lead agency assigned for thetype of project proposed. Based on the preli-

63Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1151,6 June

1977.

64 T he procedure for evaluating and approving en

vironmental assessment documents is described below.


minary assessment of expected impacts in thelEE, the proponent was to recommend to thelead agency whether an environmental impactstatement was needed.

After reviewing the lEE and the project proponent's recommendation, the lead agencydecided if an environmental impact statementwas required. If an EIS was not needed, anenvironmental compliance certificate was issuedto the proponent, who could then implementthe project. If the lead agency required an EIS,the proponent was to prepare an EIS at its ownexpense and submit it in draft form forapproval.

The lead agency was responsible for circulating the draft EIS and determining which agencies should be asked to comment.65 Upon. receipt of comments, the lead agency decidedwhether the proponent needed to respond.Comments were used primarily by the leadagency for evaluating the EIS.

After considering the comments and its ownpreliminary evaluation of the draft EIS, thelead agency decided if a public hearing wasnecessary. It had full discretion over the extentof public involvement in the EIS review process.6 6

Comments on the draft EIS, along withresults of the public hearing (if any), were submitted to NEPC. The Council provided its owncomments and recommendations to the leadagency, which, in turn, might require the project proponent to revise the draft EIS andsubmit a final version.

Upon receipt of the final EIS, the leadagency undertook another evaluation. If thefinal EIS was disapproved, the proponent wasgiven a chance to revise the document. Theoretically, the revision process could go on for aslong as the lead agency found the EIS unacceptable. If the proponent (or an outsideparty) contested the lead agency's decision,the NEPC could be called upon to determinethe EIS's acceptability.

The decentralized EIS system disrupted traditional relations among agencies since leadagencies were often proponents of projectscovered by the EIS system. In such instances,

65 N EPC, "Guidelines for Implementation of En-vironmental Impact Statement System," (Manila,June 1978), pp. 5-6.

66/b id., p. 6.

20

the NEPC assigned another agency to assumethe "lead" role. This situation, which was therule rather than the exception, involvedagencies in regulating each other through theEIS system, an unprecedented and untenablearrangement within the traditionally factionalPhilippine bureaucracy.

The Interim EIS System

In June, 1978, the Ministry of HumanSettlements revised the EIS system by havingNEPC oversee the system and decide on theacceptability of environmental documents submitted by proponents. 6 7 This centralizationwas to be accompanied by a reduction in scope:only a limited set of projects defined accordingto project type and location were to becovered.

This change in policy transformed the Council into overall "watchdog" for the EIS system,a task originally assigned to lead agencies, collectively. The lead agencies shifted from beingpart-time regulators to being the full-time regUlated parties. As previously described, implementation of the centralized EIS system waspostponed because of requ irements for add itional statutes to legitimize the new system.

Because of delays in obtaining the requisitestatutes, the NEPC adopted an interim system,a compromise between the original decentralized approach and the proposed centralized EISsystem with reduced coverage. The interim EISsystem differed from the decentralized schemeby placing responsibility for evaluating environmental assessment documents under the solejurisdiction of NEPC. However, the types ofprojects covered and the steps to be followedin securing environmental compliance certificates were the same as in the original implementation. The interim system was thus characterized by a comprehensive coverage of projectsand a centralized review and approval processadministered by NEPC.

The interim EIS system had an importantlimitation. Although the system's rules' andregulations had been approved by NEPC, theyhad not been published in the National Official

67Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1586,issued on 11 June 1978.

Gazette and, thus they did not have the forceof law. Consequently, the Council could notenforce EJS requirements effectively. Thegenerally unreceptive attitude of the regulatedagencies toward the EIS system only madematters worse. Furthermore, although the in-terim system nominally covered all projects,the expectation that a presidential proclamation limiting the EIS system's scope would beforthcoming weakened NEPC's insistence oncomprehensive coverage.

While the interim system was in place (1980to 19821. the Council was unable to penatizeagencies that refused to comply with its interimrequirements.P'' Many project proponents disregarded EIS requirements without penalty,and this diminished the perceived significanceof the EIS system.

The Centralized EIS System

In June 1982, the long delayed rules andregulations for the centralized EIS system (withreduced project coverage) were published in thePhilippine Official Gazette, but it was not untilJanuary 1983 that NEPC formally adopted thesystem.69 Coverage extended to all actions thatfell within the definition of an "environmentally critical project" (ECP), or that would belocated in an "envionmentally critical area"(ECA). These project types and areas are listedin Tables 3 and 4. Projects covered by thissystem had to secure environmental compliancecertificates from NEPC before they could beimplemented.70

68 The penalty for violation of the EIS system,according to Section 9 of Presidential Decree No.1586 (issued on June 11, 1978), was as follows: "Anyperson, corporation or partnership found violatingSection 4, of this Decree, or the terms and conditionsin the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the standards, rules and regulationsissued by the National Environmental ProtectionCouncil pursuant to this Decree shall be punished bythe suspension or cancellation of his/its certificateand/or a fine in an amount not to exceed fifty thousand pesos (P50,OOO) for every violation thereof, atthe discretion of the National Environmental Protection Council."

69See "The Philippine EIS System", Supplementto Official Gazette, Volume 78, No. 25 (Manila, 21June 1982).

70T he list of ECPs and ECAs were enumerated inPresidential Proclamation No. 2146 issued on 14December 1981.

21


If a proponent determined that a proposedproject fell within the definition of an ECP orECA, the proponent was to prepare a projectdescription. 72 If the proposed project waslocated withih an enviromentally critical area,but was determined by the Committee to havenegligible impacts, an environmental compliancecertificate would be issued immediately. If theEIS Review Committee felt an EIS was required, however, j)e proponent would be askedto prepare a draft EIS (following an outlineprescribed by the Committee) and submit it tothe NEPCSecretariat. 73

The draft EIS was reviewed in stages. First,the Committee evaluated the draft for cornpleteness of information and conformity withthe prescribed EIS outline. If the draft EIS waseither incomplete or out of conformity, itwould be returned to the proponent for revision. Once the Committee was satisfied thatprocedures being followed were adquate,74 theNEPC published a brief description of the projeceS and distributed review copies of the draftto agencies and interested parties.76 Although

71T he initial environmental examination used in

the decentralized scheme was replaced by a so-called

"project description" (PO), a simplified version of thelEE. The PO, which served the same purpose as thelEE, was used by NEPC to determine whether an EISwas required. Unlike the lEE, however, the PO in thecentralized system contained only a detailed description of the proposed project. It did not describe eitherproject alternatives or potential impacts. Despite itslimited scope, the PO was expected to provide a basisfor determining the need for an EIS.

72Section 1, Article III, Rules and Regulations ofthe Philippine EIS System, NEPC, 23 November 1979.

73Article III of the 1979 EIS Rules and Regulations provided that the draft EIS shall first be reviewed by the lead agency which would then call forthe preparation of the final EIS for submission to

NEPC. Apparently this step had been bypassed.74procedural adequacy in this sense mainly refers

to conformity with the EIS outline prescribed by theEIS Review Committee for the project description andthe environmental impact statement.

7SThe publication of descriptions of proposed pro

jects was not done on a regular basis.76

R.. . .

eVlewmg agencies were given 30 days to submittheir comments on the draft EIS. NEPC decided onthe agencies were. given 30 days to submit their comments on the draft EIS. NEPC decided on the agencies

asked to provide comments. Private parties had to fileformal requests to examine and comment on draft

EISs.


Table 3

List of Environmentally Critical Projects

A. Heavy Industries1. Non-ferrous Metal Industries2. Iron and Steel Mills3. Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries4. Smelting Plants

B. Resource Extractive Industries1. Major Mining and Quarrying Projects2. Forestry Projects3. Dikes for/and Fishpond Development Projects

C. Infrastructure Projects1. Major Dams2. Major Power Plants3. Major Reclamation Projects4. Major Roads and Bridges

Source: Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, 14 December 1981.

Table 4

List of Environmentally Critical Areas

1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves, andsanctuaries;

2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;3. Areas which constitue the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of indigenous

Philippine wildlife (flora and fauna);4. Areas of unique historic, archeological, or scientific interests;5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities and tribes;6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods,

typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.):7. Areas with critical slopes;8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;9. Recharge areas of aquifers;

10. Waterbodies;11. Mangrove areas; and12. Coral reefs.

Source: Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, 14 December 1981.

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NEPC might ask the proponent to respond toreviewers' comments, the comments weremainly for the EIS Review Committee's consideration.

If, after evaluating the draft EIS and comments, the Committee determined that projectimpacts would not be significant, it might issuean environmental compliance certificate. (Issuance of an ECC could be based on eitherdraft or final EISs, a practice used to avoidreproducing EISs when changes between draftand final EISs would be minimal. Alternatively,based upon comments on the draft EIS, andresults of a public hearing (if any), 77 the proponent might be asked to submit a final EIS.After evaluating the final EIS, the Committeechose one of three actions: (1) issue an environmental compliance certificate, (2) requirethe proponent to modify the project and submit a revised EIS, or (3) stop the project bywithholding an environmental compliancecerti ficate.

The role of lead agencies in the centralizedEIS system, was minimal. Their functions weremainly: to assist proponents in deciding if proposed projects were covered by the EIS svstem/8 to recommend EIA methodolooles.I"and to provide information on relevant environ-

77 l f an ECC was not issued during the draft stageof the EIS, the NEPC might conduct a public hearingon the proposed project. The decision to conduct apublic hearing was made by NEPC "if the expectedenvironmental impact of the project is of substantialmagnitude in terms of the number of people affected,the area impacted, (and) the cost involved." Section1d, Article III, Rules and Regulations of the PhilippineEIS System, NEPC, 23 November 1979. According toArticle IV of the same rules and regulations: "Whenever a public hearing is to be conducted... noticethereof shall be published once a week for two weeksin any newspaper of general circu lation at least 20calendar days prior to the public hearing. Notice shalllikewise be posted in a conspicuous place in the municipality or barangay where the project is to be located.All expenses of the notices shall be for the account ofthe flroject proponent."

8This applied only if the project proponent decidedto consult the lead agency.

79 Lead agencies were not obligated to providemanpower in data COllection or to prepare an EIS forthe project proponent.

23


mental parameters.P" If a potential lead agencywas itself the project proponent, the NEPCacted as lead agency.

The centralized EIS system was intended tobe more efficient than the interim system.Using the lists of ECPs and ECAs, project proponents determined for themselves if theiractivities were covered by the system, whichrelieved NEPC from screening projects. Alimitation of this approach was that projectproponents had little incentive to faithfullyreport all activities to NEPC, especially smalland intermediate sized projects which did notfit squarely with the definitions of ECPs andECAs. The only systematic way NEPC couldlearn about proposed projects was when (andif) proponents submitted project descriptions.If a proponent decided not to file a projectdescription, NEPC had little chance to verifythat the proposal was not an ECP or was notlocated within an ECA. 81 The Council did nothave the resources to track all developmentactivities in the country. The EIS system hadno procedures for NEPC to check on projectproponents who decided not to issue projectdescriptions.

The centralized EIS system required carefuldefinition of ECPs and ECAs. However, theinitial definitions were ambiguous, and thisgave proponents a basis for resisting compliancewith EIS requirements by demanding additional details as a means of rendering the definitions workable. For instance, "major dams,major power plants, major reclamation projects, major roads and bridges" were subjectto the EIS system, but the exact meaning of"major" for each case was not initiallydefined. 82

80A site inspection, termed an "ocular inspection"by NEPC, was supposed to be done by NEPC according to the rules. and regulations, but this happenedonly after a project proponent had submitted a projectdescription.

8! Ten ministries and 17 other agencies had beendesignated as lead agencies for various types of projects.

82Detailed definitions of the ECPs and ECAsfinally came out on November 7, 1983.


Table 5

aSummary Report on the EIS System

1981 1982 1983 1984 19855-yearTotal

Projects Granted 330 170 321 339 170 1330ECC (30.9) (14.3) (34.2) (58.0) (43.5)

Projects Denied 2 1 12 19 2 36ECC (0.2) (0.1) (1.3) (3.3) (0.5)

Projects Pending 644 930 375 69 59 2077at NEPC (60.2) (78.2) (39.9) (11.8) (15.1 )

Projects Pending 93 84 211 146 150 684with Proponents (8.7) (7.1) (22.5) (25.0) (38.4)

Othersb 0 5 20 11 10 46(0.0) (0.4) (2.2) (1.9) (2.5)

Total 1069 1190 939 584 391 4173---------------------------------------------------------Source: NEPC, "Statistical Report on EIA Projects," (unpublished report),

Manila, 23 July 1986.

aFigures in parenthesis are percentages.

bThese include applications for renewal of ECC and environmental impact documents for projectsnot within the scope of the EIS system.

Implementation Record for the PhilippineEIS System

From 1981 to 1985, a total of 4173 environmental assessment documents (consisting ofinitial environmental examinations, projectdescriptions, and environmental impact statements) were evaluated by NEPC.83 Duringthe same period, 1330 projects receivedenvironmental compliance certificates (Table5). .

Based on these figure, a yearly average ofabout 835 environmental impact documentswere generated form 1981 to 1985, a seemingly

. 83No records are available at NEPC for the number of environmental impact documents processed andevaluated by lead agencies during the first phase of theEIS system.

24

impressive compliance record. What appearseven more impressive is the reported numberof projects approved (1330), which is far belowthe number of documents reviewed. This makesit seems as if the system was effective inscreening out projects with unacceptable environmental impacts.

A cursory interpretation of the figures aboveis that the total number of environmental documents rejected is 2843, the difference betweenthe number of documents received (4173) andthe number of environmental compliance certificates issued (1330). There are, however,several aspects of the compliance record thatdiminish the apparent effectiveness of the EISsystem. Consider, for example, that from 1981to 1985, only 36 projects were denied environmental compliance certificates, a strikingly lowfigure compared to the previously noted 2843(the difference between the number of environ-


Table 6

Distribution of Environmental Impact Assessment Documents''According to Project Type

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985--------------------------------------------

Mining 307 242 218 158 108(28.70 (20.3) (23.2) (27.1) (27.6)

Sand and Gravel 741 926 687 387 232Quarrying (69.3) 117.8) (73.2) (66.3) (59.3)

Other Projectb 21 17 14 28 41Types (2.0) (1.4) (1.5) (4.8) (10.8)

Total 1069 1190 939 584 391-------------------------------------------

Source: NEPC, "Statistical Summary Report on EIS Projects," (unpublished report). Manila, 23July 1986.

aFigures in parenthesis are percentages.

bThese include other resource-extractive projects, infrastructure, and heavy industry.

mental assessment documents reviewed and thenumber of ECCs issued). After accounting forthe 36 projects denied ECCs, there are 2807environmental assessment documents that wereneither approved nor disapproved. NEPCreports this difference (2807) as the approximate number of projects for which environmental assessment documents were eitherawaiting action by NEPC or returned to projectproponents for rnooitication.P" Part of thedifference is also accounted for by the doublesubmission of lEEs (or PDs) and EISs for someprojects. Although the Council's. tallying procedures on this point are not explicit, the actualnumber of projects reviewed is lower than thenumber of environmental documents evaluated.In view of possible inaccuracies in NEPC'saccounting of environmental assessment documents, the fjgures here should be regarded asindicative, not exact.

The figures above can be disaggregated toclarify the state of compliance and answer the

84See also: NEPC, "Accomplishment Report: En

vironmental Impact Statement System (1981-1984)",Office Report (Manila, nd.l.

25

following questions: What is the distributionof environmental assessment documents intolEEs, PDs, and EISs? How many lEEs (andPDs) were followed by EISs? What is the distribution of documents by project types? Whichprojects were major and which were minor?And of the 36 proposed projects denied ECGs,how many were major?

Table 6 gives the distribution of environmental assessment documents (lEEs andEISs)from 1980 to 1985.85 Table 7 shows thenumber of EISs submitted from 1980 to 1982,the time of the interim system. The dispositionof these documents is broken down into thosein which ECCs were issued or denied, and those

85No complete data were available for 1980,which marked the start of the interim EIS system.Partial records show that there were 254 environmental impact documents submitted for mining projects in 1980. Six environmental impact documentswere submitted for industrial projects, and another 4for infrastructure projects. No data are available forthe number of sand and gravel quarrying projectsduring this year. Source: Unpublished records provided by NEPC, May 1984.


returned to proponents for additional work.Notab.v, only 23 EISs were submitted during1980-82, a small fraction of the total numberof documents submitted in that period.

Table 6 reveals the predominance of miningactivities among projects for which environmental assessment documents were prepared.The prevalence of mining is even more strikingif sand and gravel quarrying projects are placedin the mining sector, a reasonable inclusionsince they are regulated by the Bureau of Minesand Geosciences (BMGS). Including ~and

and gravel projects, the mining sector accountsfor about 96% of all environmental assessmentdocuments submitted from 1981 to 1985.

Now consider the number of full-fledgedEISs. Nine were submitted to NEPC in 1981,and two more were reported in 1982. TheCouncil's records do not indicate if any of theseEISs were re-submitted draft statements fromprevious years. Even without correcting forpossible double counting, it is evident that onlya small percentage of environmental assessmentdocuments submitted to NEPC during 1980-82were EISs.

The use of ECPs and ECAs to limit coverageof the EIS system took effect in 1983. Asshown in Table 6, the number of environmentalassessment documents decreased under thiscentralized EIS system with limited coverage.Mining and sand ang gravel projects continuedto dominate. Collectively, they accounted for93.5% of the 1914 documents submitted during1983-85; sand and gravel projects alone accounted for 68.2%.

Table 7

Total Number and Disposition of EISsduring the Interim Phase of the EIS System

1980 1981 1982--------------

Issued ECCs 7

Denied ECCs 0 0 0

Proponents requested 5 8to provide moreinformation

Total 12 9 2

Source: Unpublished NEPC Records, May1985.

26

Even allowing for possible discrepancies inthe records, it is clear that min ing and quarrying projects account for a disproportionateshare of all environmental assessment documents submitted to NEPC between 1981 and1985, and that IEEs and PDs are a large fraction of the total number of documents.

Evidence of the EIS System's Ineffectiveness

Despite the seemingly large number of environment assessment documents produced, theEIS system in the Philippines has not succeededin regulating most development proejcts, withthe notable exception of the mining sector. In1982, out of the sixty major development projects approved by the National Economic Development Authority, only four had compliedwith the EIS system. The five-year nationaldevelopment plan for 1983-87 included 92"major" infrastructure projects. 86 However,the total number of environmental assessmentdocuments for infrastructure projects between1981-82 (during which time environmentaldocuments for the 92 projects should have beenapproved) was only 8-a mere 8.7% of the totalnumber of approved infrastructure projects.87

The rate of rejection of projects on environmental grounds provides no evidence of the EISsystem's effectiveness. From 1981 to 1985,only 36 proposed projects were denied ECCs,and none were in the category of major development projects. However, the denial of ECCsmay not, by ,itself, provide a complete pictureof NEPC's ability to stop environmentallydamaging projects from being implemented. Itcan be argued that the mere act of returningdocuments to a proponent for additional information about the project's environmentalimpacts might influence the proponent's decision to proceed with the project. Indeed, thenumber of environmental assessment documents returned to proponents for "additionalinformation" was quite large. 88 Although there

86N EDA, Selected Major Development Projects

(Manila, June 1983).870 f the eight environmental impact documents

for infrastructure projects between 1981-82, five wereEISs.

88 Sut NEPC does not keep track of which, and

how many, of the environmental impact documentsreturned to project proponents are resubmitted. Nordoes it track projects that are voluntarilv abandonedby the proponent.

is probably some form of deterrence introducedin asking proponents to elaborate on projectimpacts, it is not possible to characterize thispotential deterrence because other factors (e.g.,lack of financing) may influence a proponent'sdecision to abandon a project.

Absence of Public and Interagency Review

There is little evidence that the public wassystematically involved in appraising environmental assessment documents. Between 1981and 1985, only five public hearings were conducted by NEPC in conjunction with the EISsystem. A public hearing could only be called ifa full-fledged EIS was involved. Since few EISswere produced, the opportunity for publicinvolvement was minimal.

Resource constaints prevented the Councilfrom regularly disseminating environmentalassessment documents for review by publicinterest groups.89 These groups had to fileformal requests and to bear the cost of reproducing EISs if they wanted to review draftEISs. This costly practice discouraged environmental groups from reviewing EISs.

There is no evidence that outside agencieswere actively engaged in EIS review and comment procedures. The Council determinedwhich agencies would be asked to comment onan EIS. There are no records to show that thisopportunity to obtain comments was usedsystematically, a situation that is partially explainable by the limited number of EISs produced.

Exemptions from and Non-Compliance withthe EIS System

As noted above, only a small percentage ofmajor development projects approved byNEDA complied with the EIS system. Onemight suppose that projects without requiredenvironmental assessment documents had beenexempted. The EIS rules and regulations allowNEPC to issue exemptions for certain projectsupon recommendation of the minister responsible for the proposed project. However, from

89Personal correspondence with Delfin Ganapin

(22 August 1985). Ganapin was organizer and pastPresident of the Philippine Federation for Environmental Concern.

27


the time EIS review functions were centralizedat NEPC to 1985, only two major developmentprojects were given exernptlons.P'' This suggeststhat other proponents failing to comply withEIS requirements had either ignored the EISsystem without penalty or found valid excusesfor non-compliance.

The most forceful excuse offered for noncompliance with EIS requirements is thatfeasibility studies for a proposed project wereunderway before the EIS system was in place.(Other projects might have been authorizedeven earlier and had implementation deferredto a time when EIS system rules applied.) Therepercussions of this justification were seriousin the context of another controversial question: the legal effectivity date for the EIS system. If the publication date of the EIS regulations in the Philippine Official Gazette is takenas the starting date, then formal effectivity forthe EIS system occu rred in 1982,91 instead of1978 as NEPC would have it. In fact, thequestion of when the centralized E IS systemofficially took effect has not been conclusivelyresolved.

The principal legislation on the EIS system(P.O. 1151 and P.O. 1586) did not indicatewhether projects whose feasibility studieswere underway before the effectivity date ofthe EIS system were required to comply withEIS procedures. In any case, it is difficult todisprove an agency assertion that planning fora certain project dates back before the earliestcontended effectivity date of the EIS system(1978). Preparatory studies for major projectsoften start years before detailed feasibility studies are carried out. Notwithstanding thisdifficulty, who, other than NEPC, would havechallenged an agency if it tried to justify noncompliance on the above grounds? NEPC'slimited political clout prevented it from assuming potentially adversarial positions vis-a-vis theagencies.

What happened with those agencies whoopenly disregarded the EIS system? From 1977to 1985, there was no case in which an agency

90These exemptions were actually made by executive directive from the President in the form of aLetter of Instruction.

91T h is year is cited because it is when the Revised

Rules and Regulations for the EIS System appearedin the Official Gazette.


suffered serious consequences from non-compliance. The NEPC did not choose to either seta precedent or assert its regulatory mandate bypenal izing non-complying agencies.

Overall, the compliance data through 1985shows that the EIS system did not institutionalize the regular submission of environmentalassessment documents, with the notable exception of the mining sector.

The Unique Response of the Mining Sector

The motivation that sustained support forthe EIS system in the mining sector appeared tostem from special interests served within theBureau of Mines and Geosciences. Private proponents of mining projects directly employedBureau personnel to prepare envi ron mentalassessment documents for submission to NEPC.

The BMGS required applicants for miningand quarrying rights to secure an environmentalcompliance certificate from NEPC. This forcedall applicants to produce environmental assessment documents. The BMGS enforced this procedure in earnest, thereby affecting operationsfrom large-scale mining to small-scale sand andgravel quarrying.

Though self-serving, there seemed to be nothing illegal about the BMGS's practice. IfBMGS personnel were required to evaluate thedocuments, they would be appraising their ownwork. However, since NEPC reviewed the documents, the involvement of BMGS personnel inpreparing them did not influence the objectivity of the evaluation. However, NEPC could notrely on the Bureau to provide comments onenvironmental assessment documents formining and quarrying projects knowing, asNEPC did, that most such documents were prepared by BMGS personnel.

This unusual practice of the Bureau of Mineswas not adopted by other agencies. The uniquesituation at the BMGS was abetted by the particular character of the mining sector. Practicallyall mining operations were undertaken by private firms and entities, with the BMGS coordinating and regulating their activities. 9Z Since

92To some extent, the situation was similar in the

industrial sector, which was regulated by the Board ofInvestments (BOI). However, the Board felt reluctantto impose EIS requirements, especially for mediumsized industries, because industries were already regulated heavily, e.q., by the National Pollution Control

28

the Bu reau dfd not undertake developmentprojects, it was never in the position of a project proponent in the EIS process.

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EIS SYSTEM'SINEFFECTIVENESS

Absence of Effective Controls

Analyzing why the Philippine EIS systemwas ineffective can assist in the design of otherEIS systems. In seeking explanations, it isuseful to borrow the concept of "control" fromorganization theory. 93

In the context of EIS systems, controlmechanisms consist of organizational structuresand processes that encourage project proponents to account for environmental factors inplanning and decision making. Three suchmechanisms are relevant to the EIS system inthe Philippines: judicial, procedural, and evaluative control.

Judicial control uses of a superordinate body(e.g., a court) to resolve disputes, evaluate complaints, and interpret laws. The U.S. experiencewith citizen litigation over implementation ofthe National Environmental Policy Act of 1969demonstrates how the judicial control mechanism, combined with public activism, can yielda high rate of procedural compliance with EISrequirements.f" However, in the Philippines,there are no environmental groups with theresources needed to bring environmental lawsuits against agencies. Moreover, there is noprecedent for agencies being brought to courtthrough third party litigation, something re-

Commission. The logging industry was also in thehands of the private sector. The Bureau of ForestDevelopment (BFD) regulated activities in this sectorand it did not undertake development projects. Unlike the BMGS, however, the BFD did not requirethose applying for licences to conduct logging activities to obtain environmental compliance certificates.The BFD adoptee! its own regulatory procedure inwhich private developers who wished to conduct Jog

ging operations had to submit lEEs for evaluation byBFD's Environmental Division. See David, P. F., op.ctt., JJ. 237.

930rtolano, L., B. Jenkins, and R. Abracosa,"Viewpoint: When and Why is EIA effective," EtAReview (December, 1987), in press.

94 Li roff, R. A., A National Policy for the Environment: NEPA and Its Aftermath, I ndiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, 1976.

qui red with EIS lawsuits. Also, the lack of abroadened concept of "standing" in the Philipine judicial system makes it difficult for environmental groups to use the courts to challengeagency decisions.

A second control mechanism useful inanalyzing EIS system involves proceduralcontrol, whereby a central administrative unitpromulgates rules and regulations describingtasks to be performed in carrying out environmental assessments. Systematic use of the EISrequirements promulgated by NEPC wouldmake it difficult for agencies to ignore environmental issues in their planning and decisionmaking. However, procedural control is onlyeffective if agencies accept EIA regulations asvalid. As shown herein, the Philippine agencieswere motivated to resist the EIS system andvigorously challenge its validitv.

Evaluative control includes EIS system procedural rules, but it goes further by includingcriteria for judging EIS compliance andsanctions for non-compliance. Evaluativecontrol mechanism requires a centralized body,an environmental "watchdog", to formallyappraise environmental assessments. An effective watchdog organization must have theresources and expertise to credibly review thepremises and implications of agency plans andactions. Effectiveness also depends on theenvironmental watchdog unit's ability influenceagency decisions and stop projects that fail tocomply with EIS procedures.

In the Philippines, evaluative control of theEIS system was vested in the National Envrionmental Protection Council. In principle, projects that failed to receive environmental compliance certificates could have been stopped.The problem was that control was not exercisedby the NEPC.

Absence of Political Power

Since the reasons for NEPC's failure toexercise its authorities have been treated atlength, only the main points will be reviewed.In 1918, the fledgling NEPC was especially hardhit when it lost its political support base withinthe Ministry of Natural Resources by being

29


placed under the Ministry of Human Settlements. Within the MHS, the Council becamethe victim of interagency tensions, fueled byfears that President Marcos' wife would use theMHS to bolster her own powers within thePhilippine bureaucracy. What made mattersworse was that MHS officials did not viewNEPC's work as worthy of their politicalsupport.

The abrupt shift form a decentralized to acentralized implementation strategy only increased agency resistance to NEPC. Althoughthe Council was given regulatory authoritiesunder the centralized EIS system, it did notreceive the political backing or budgetary support needed to use those authorities. Agenciesto be regulated objected to NEPC's role,because it broke with the tradition of equalityand non-interference among Philippine agencies. The agencies seized opportunities to avoidcomplying with the EIS system, especiallythose created by shortcomings in the legalinstruments used to implement the system.NEPC's failureto penalize agencies that did notcomply with EIS regulations only encouragedfurther resistance to the system.

POSTSCRIPT

The analysis herein covers the 1911-1985period. In February 1986, the government ofFerdinand Marcos was toppled in a militarycivilian uprising. The new government, underthe leadership of President Corazon Aquino,chose to repeal the 1973 (martial law) constitution.

Following a constitutional convention, thepopulace ratified a new Philippine Constitution which contains several sections that concern the environment. Of special note is ArticleII, "Declaration of Principles and State Policies," which includes:

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of people to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythmand harmony of nature.Since February 1986, the fate of both the

NEPC and the EIS system have been unsettled.

A CORPORATE PLANNING STRATEGY FOR ABETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHILIPPINE

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (EIS) SYSTEM

bVPrecioso Fe David

INTRODUCTION

Background

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) inthe Philippines was born out of a State policyto balance growth and development with environmental protection. It was established as amajor environmental management strategy anda major State policy in a series of PresidentialDecrees. In its inception in 1977, EIA served asa del iberate and systematic attempt to enabledecision-makers to understand how their development activities affect the environment andhow their concern for the environment shouldaffect their activities. Patterned heavi Iy afterthe U.S. EIA process, the Philippine EISSystem has labored to adapt itself into the localsetting for the past six years. As with otherborrowed concepts, its local application has notbeen a painless experience. A review of its implementation will show that in fact, it has notbeen easy meeting the goals of the System.

The problems and difficulties encountered inEIA application in the Philippine experiencehave been documented by Tolentino (1983)and Cordero (1983). Although the authors differed in their perceptions of the measure of thelevel of its performance, both have nevertheless agreed that the EIS System is plagued by aset of institutional/administrative/legal problems which seriously undermine its implementation. In his paper, Tolentino took a veryencouraging posture on the EIA experiencewhile recognizing its various imperfections.He postulated that the Philippines had adoptedthe EIA process, perhaps unconsciously,through a process of learning by experience.

30

Proof of this may be found in the modificationsand innovations that have been introducedsince the System's inception in 1977, in aneffort to make the EJA process simpler andmore operational.

In brief, Tolentino sums up the EIA experience in the Philippines as follows:

1. The initial scope of the EIA Systemwhich included practically all types ofdevelopment projects was not realistic interms of actual institutional and technicalcapabilities. The more selective declaration of environmentallY-critical areas andprojects was seen as a step in the rightdirection.

2. A major problem in the implementationof the EIS System is the lack of effectivecommunication and coordinationamong the identified lead agencies andthe National Environmental ProtectionCouncil (NEPC). A related issue is thelead agencies natural predilection towardpromoting projects under their jurisdiction with little concern for regulatingtheir environmental aspects the centalization of the processing system at theNEPC as well as the creation of Environmental Units in these agencies were seenas feasible solutions in overcoming theseproblems.

3. Another major constraint was the web ofrequired permits and licenses of leadagencies which presented administrativedifficulties vis-a-vis the EIS requirement.Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding among the agencies concerned tostreamline the procedure were seen to eliminate these difficulties.

4. There is the obvious lack of guidelines forEIA, locally tested methodologies, and ingeneral, adequate local experience informand familiarize project proponents withthe objectives and processes of EIA.

5. The few highly trained, experienced andqualified professionals who are most qualified to be members of the EIS ReviewCommittee have been alarmingly luredaway from the government service or theacademe to join professional consultingfirms.

6. The impact on the EIA decision-rnakinqof the limited experience with publicparticipation in the EIA process couldnot be specifically determined.

The other significant study on EIA experience in the Philippines is contributed byCordero (1983). Cordero deviates sharply fromTolentino's "learning process" observation ashe concludes that the actual implementationof the EIS System has not come to pass. Cordero argues that the main problem affectingfurther developments in and full implementation of the EIS System is the lack of a realcommitment from the part of most government agencies in complying with the EISrequirement. In fact, out of the 60 or somajor development projects approved byNEDA for 1982-83 which fall under thescope of the EIS System, only four have sofar submitted an EIS. Furthermore, he addsthat NEPC, while mandated to enforce thisrequirement, lacks the required political andadministrative power to do so.

In conclusion, Cordero recommends thatlead agencies issuing permits and licenses shouldbe made legally responsible for the EIA of private projects for which they issue permits andlicenses. Serious attention must be given to thedevelopment of specific project guidelines andthe gathering and processing of environmentalinformation. Lastly, he notes that since lendingand assistance institutions are committed tominimizing the negative environmental effectsof projects receiving financial assistance, effortsshould be made to integrate EIAs in projectproposals, along with the financial and technical reports.

Objectives of the Study

This study is an attempt to provide a coherent, integrative and realistic managementframework in confronting the EIS System's

31


problems and difficulties. In so doing, it takesa critical approach to the experience of environmental management in the country in relationto the implementation of the EIS System.

It reviews the components of the EIS System and assesses its strengths and weaknesses.Such critical evaluation is necessary because thesuccess of any policy recommendation dependson the accuracy of its problem identificationand interpretation. The Study looks for satisfactory answers to the following questions:

1. What is the level of performance of theEIS System in relation to environmentalmanagement in the country?

2. What objectives should it pursue to makeitself relevant and useful to the local planning and decision-making processes?

3. How is it going to achieve these objectives?

Within this context, the study consisted ofthe following:

1. Undertaking of an objective documentation and critical evaluation of the EIA experience in the Philippines as well as thatof environmental management;

2. Formulation of a corporate planning strategy analysis in order to identify the problems and opportunities of environmentalmanagement as well as the strengths andweaknesses of the EIS System; and

3. Generating policy recommendations tostrategically respond to these problemsand constraints.

Methodological Approach

Framework

The study was undertaken within the broadframework of a strategic management processin pursuing a policy study of the EIS System.In brief, strategic management refers to theaspects of the management process that areconcerned with ensuring the mobility of an organization and the adaptation of its resourcesto its environment in a way that would permitefficient achievement of the organization'sgoals. A corporate planning strategy representsboth the "end" and the "guide" of the strategicmanagement process.

The following have been the target outputsand their corresponding methodologies.


Target Output

1. Documentation, review and assessmentof the performance of environmentalmanagement in the Philippines

2. Identification of the Prospects andProblems of Environmental Management in the country

3. Documentation, Review and Assessment of the Implementation of thePhilippine EIS System

4. Identification of the strengths andweaknesses of the EIS System

5. Generation of a strategic managementframework

One of the main tasks of this study is torationalize the scope of the EIS System and inthe process, include more urban projects underits scope. There are several environmental concerns associated with urban growth, namelyloss or degradation of resources, threat tohealth or social well-being, reduction or loss ofopportunity for resource use, and cumulativeeffects of resources utilization. These concernswill have to be addressed when deciding on projects, such as drainage and sewerage facilities,reclamation, shoreline developments, conversion of prime agricultural lands, etc. in addition to major roads and bridges and other industries which are now under the scope of theEIS System.

32

Methodology

gathering of secondary data from existingrecords, publications and available studies

primary interviews with key respondentsfrom the various groups involved in theEIS system as well as in planning and decision-making

infusion of personal experience

critical analysis of the secondary data andthe responses from the primary interviewsand insights from personal experience

analytical integration of the results of thereview and assessment of environmentalmanagement in the Philippines

gathering of secondary dataprimary interviewsinfusion of personal experiencecritical analysis of the secondary data, primary interviews and personal experience

analytical integration of the results of thereview and assessment of the implementation of the EIS system

analytical matching of the strengths andweaknesses of the EIS system with theprospects and problems of environmentalmanagement in the country,

Limitations of the Study

The study suffered from the following limitations:

1. The policy analysis was limited by theauthor's subjectivity and "participant" roleand experience in the implementation ofboth policies because there are very fewavailable policy studies on the experience ofenvironmental management and EIA in thecountry.

2. In some instances, some materials could notbe found. Hence, discussion of their relevance was limited to respondent's perceptiions and opinions. For example, the training

materials on a series of EIA training seminarsin 1979 conducted at the National ScienceResearch Council (NSRC) were not availableeither at the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC) and NSRC.

3. Although the study focused on the problemsand issues in implementation where the public sector plays a significant role, limitedrepresentation of the private sector (29% inthe primary survey) has likewise contributedto the study's limitations.

4. The primary survey was also limited by thefive substitutions made (respondents ofequal credentials and/or lower position/rankbut nonetheless of senior official level) andthe failure to conduct the interviews withthe last two respondents from the privatesector.

5. The survey was also limited by NGO's representing the affected communities instead ofthe latter being directly interviewed.

6. The study was also confined to the eventsthat took place from 1977 to June 1984.

Appraisal of the EIS System Implementation

Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses

1. The EIA experience in the Philippines hasbeen governed by an ambitious regulatorysystem which did not have the necessaryinstitutional and political support. Therehave actually been three EIS Systems, butfor the most part, all three systems havebeen far from being success stories. NEPCdoes not have the financiai and manpowerresources as well as the political clout toeffectively integrate EIA into the local setting. In contrast with the US model afterwhich the System was adopted, EIA in thecountry developed not as an offshoot of thecitizen's desire for a better environment butof the Government's perception that it wasnecessary. Proponents of EIA in the Philippines should have taken into serious consideration the local institutional, legal andfinancial administrative conditions beforeembarking on the program of such a grandscale. The neglect of these pre-conditions hasmanifested itself in the form of various problems in implementation.

2. After about eight years, it appears that EIAand the EIS System have remained government functions or activities within the strictpurview of the agencies and committees in

33


charge of implementing it. Even the leadagencies which are supposed to be an integral part of the administrative network arequite unfamiliar with EIA and the EIS System and how it actually works. Even if thereis a strong acknowledgment of the need toassess the impacts of projects on the environment, such belief may not find concretetranslation by the lack of a more than cursory knowledge of EIA and the EIS System.There has been no serious and deliberatecampaign to disseminate information on theEIS System.

3. Such ambiguity and inadequacy of knowledge is compounded by a lack of management will to directly confront the legalquestions on the enforceability of the EISrequirement. Although it would seem thatlegal impediments have resulted in noncompliance, their questionable bases shouldcompel NEPC to test these legal questions.This legal vagueness could have been avoided had NEPC marshalled its resources toconfront them. Ultimately, the question isnot the ambiguous and general one ofwhether EIS System is already in effect ornot, but the more pragmatic question ofhow to implement it.

4. There are also inherent flaws in the EIS System which make implementation unsuccessful and highly problematic. Primarily, itsscope is too ambitious even after Proclamation 2146 has tried to limit it. Equally problematic for implementation are the lackand/or absence of a long list of technical andlegal support mechanisms. Aside from theEIA handbook, there is no locally developedproject-specific guidelines and locally testedmethodologies to assist in EIA preparationand evaluation. Technical data base and researches in support of EIA evaluation areinadequate. The system also lacks thesubstantive and procedural pre-requisites formonitoring. Administratively, there is nostrong body for appeals and adjudication.Lead agencies which are tasked to promoteand implement EIA using their own internalsystems and procedures have generally notbeen able to integrate EIA into their agencyresponsibilities. Generally, the Environmental Units mandated by law do not exist.

5. In a system plagued with all these inadequacies and imperfections, what is called for isfor the management/administration of the


System to creatively adopt implementationto its strategic options. If indeed the EIA isthe cornerstone of Philippine EnvironmentalPolicy, EIA should be the agency's focus ofconcern and the subject of strategic planningand management. Also, EIA administrationmust receive more substantial portion of theNEPC budget.

6. The consequences of such flaws and defectsin the EIS System and its implementationare seen in the low degree of compliance aswell as the limited degree of usefulness ofEIA as a planning and decision-making tool.

7. The foregoing review of the EIS System'simplementation as well as the perceptions ofthe key respondents have underscored thecomplex and overwhelming weaknesses ofthe ErS System and its implementation. Thisis not to say, however, that EIA in thePhiJippines can not be effectively implemented nor integrated in the local development process. The EIS System enjoys severalresources or capabilities that can be usedeffectively.

8. For all the weaknesses of the System, EIAremains to be the cornerstone of PhilippineEnvironmental Policy. As a potentiallypotent tool for planning and decisionmaking, the benefits associated with it urges

Table 1

one to promote it. If the perception of thekey respondents is good indication there is across-sectional acceptance of EIA as a planning and decision-making tool for the protection of the environment (Refer to toTable 1). Further, if the experience with theRizal rock aggregate case can be a good measure of the citizen's ability to organizethemselves, publ ic participation can be galvanized into mass action and consequentlyexpand the usefulness of EIA. The usefulness of EIA has brighter prospects in thefuture since some degree of re-orientation ofproject proponents towards environmentalconsiderations has already been achieved.Finally, the existence of a formal law and asystem of procedure on EIA and the EISSystem provides the process more solid legaland institutional grounds from where strategic initiatives couJd spin off. Such a Jawis absent and in fact being adapted by otherdeveloping countries.

Table 2 summarizes the existing situation andpolicy recommendation as formulated by theauthor.

*Public hearings were conducted involving the expropriation of land and evaluation of the rockcrushing plant in Antipolo.

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON ENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENT

Question

Concept/Understanding ofEnvironmentalManagement

2 EnvironmentalManagement: RunsCounter toDevelopment?

3 Have Objectionsin following

EnvironmentalRegulations

ResponseDescription/Cal:~ories No. %

sustainable development/tied-up with decision-making/towards a decent,healthful, clean and

safe environment 37 95did not answer 2 5

Total 39 100

Yes 3 8No 36 92

Total 39 100

Yes 1 3No 38 97

Total 39 100

34


Question

4 Impressions/Opinions onRelevance andEffectiveness of

4.1 Environmental

ManagementLaws

4.2 EnvironentalManagementInstitutions

5 Problem &Prospects(Identification)

ResponseDescription/Categories

Adequate But

Implementation

isWeakNot familiar withlaws

Total

No EffectiveInstitutionalMechanism forEnv. Mgmt.

Not familiar withinstitutions andtheir activities

Total

Bleak Futu re/No Catastroph icEnvironmental Problem ButTrend Not Too Encouraging

Lack of Public Support/Pressure/Need for IntensivePublic Information

Need for Catastrophic

Env. Event

Inability to enforce laws/lack of manpower andservices/political inter

ference will continue

35

No.

3722

39

36

3

39

32

23

23

25

%

9555

100

92

8

100

(of 39)

(of 39)

(of 39)

(of 39)


TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF EXISTING SITUATION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Areas of ConcernExisting Situation!

ProblemsShort Term Policy

RecommendationsLong Term Policy

Recommendations

I. Mode ofImplementation

II. Institutional

1.1 comprehensive

2.1 weak institutionalpersonality

1.1

2.1

selective imple- 1.1mentation; prioritization of ECPs

linkage with NEDA 2.1

Regulation ofECPs; prioritization and identification of significant ecps; exel usion of ECAs

re-alignment withMNR (PD 112 setup)

2.2 lack of institutional 2.2control overprojects and agencies

promote institutional 2.2credibility by ad-vancing 'art' or'science' of EIA

linkage withNEDA for projectcontrol; with office ofBudget and Management for bud-get release withforeign bankinginstitutions forloan approval;with research institutions for dataand training

2.3 Council met onlyonce

2.4 Lack of credibility

2.5 Lack of support

2.6 Vague instituionallinkage (MHS/MNR)

2.3 NEPC to stand upon issues

2.4 Restructure Council (Deputy Minister Levell'

2.5 Should assumemore active role ofExecutive Officer

2.6 Deputization ofCouncil, Chairmanand ExecutiveOfficer powers toExecutive Director

III. Legal Impediments 3.1 Vague legal stature; 3.1EIS system is saidnot to be lmplementable withoutsuch legal person-ality of technicaldefinition of ECPsand ECAs.

Test case in court;adduce to broadmandate of NEPC

3.1 NEPC Secretariatto acquire strongermandates to actindependently(unlike with II2.6)

3.2 Set up a strong 3.2legal body todefinitely acton these legal aspects

36

Use of NGOs formonitoring

Areas of Concern

Existing Situation/

Problems

Short Term Policy

Recommendations


Long Term Policy

Recommendat ions

IV. Functions 4.1 Procedures: no

moruto rmq nor

provisions for

appeals

4.1.1 Selective monitoring 4.1.1

as test cases

Buil t-ir, with EIS

procedures

4.1.2 Use of NGOs fo'

monitoring

4.1.2 Use of NGOs for

monitoring

4.2 EIA preparation

review and

evaluation:

lack of project

specific guidelines

4.2 Advance the 4.2

'science' or 'art'

of EIA progressively

and selectively

Advance the

'science' or 'art'

of EIA

4.3 Lack of adequate

manpower and

financial resources

4.4

4.5

Public participation

not advanced/promoted

Information campaign/

training not consistently

promoted

4.4 Procedures must

mandatorily re

quire public

hearings, and

community sur

veys in EIS

documents

4.5.1 Bi-annual seminars

and training

programs for lead

agencies and pro

ject proponents

for project type

4.5.2 News releases or

information dis

semination on the

developments of

EIA in the

country

4.5.3 Development of

college curricula

for co liege stu

dents

V. Manaqernent 5.1

5.2

No administrative

control

Directionless

51

5.2

Restructurmg of 5.1

the composition of

Environmental Officers

and Legal Officers

committees

System of feedback 5.2

Instituted

ditto

ditto

53 EfA group is under

manned and

under financed

5.3.1 EOs role defined

as technical into.

data provider and

additional force

to coerce compliance

5.31 ditto


Areas of ConcernExisting Situation/

Problems

Short Term PolicyRecommendations

Long Term PolicyRecommendations

5.3.2 L.a. role defined 5.3.2 dittoas enforcement ofEIS law and provi-sion of legal opinions

5.3.3 Provision of 5.3.3 dittospecific terms ofreference for ReviewCommittee (RevCom);

Use of RevCom for gene·rating EIA studies

5.4.1 EIAnotanagencypriority

5.3.4 Direct and aqresssive communicationwith lead agenciesand project

proponents

5.4.1 Top managementcommitment tostrengthen andprovide dynamicand creativemanager

5.4.2 Reorganization tomake EIA groupa full division

5.4.3 Strengthening ofLegal Division

5.3.4 Imposition oflegal sanctionsagainst erring

lead agencies

5.4.1 ditto

5.4.2 Reorganization tomake EIAs aprimary concernfor NEPC

5.4.3 Legal and Policy

Division to becreated andmaintained tocomplement EIAinitiatives

VI. Usefulness of EIA 6.1 Merely a requirement 6.1 Ensure timing at

latter part of orafter feasib i Iitvstudy

6.1 Ensure propertiming of EIApreparation

6.2 Undertaken during

construction phase6.2 Submission of

final blue printsof plans to NEPCbefore projectimplementation

6.3 No substantialevidence to linkEIA with anychanges in projectplans

-------------------------------------------------------------------

38

RURAL-RURAL INTERACTION MODEL: A MODELFOR REGIONAL PLANNING IN DUALISTIC

ECONOMIES IN CRISIS*

by

Cesar B. Umali, Jr.

Underdevelopment in Asian countries is, to an extent, due to the fact that these countries have too heavily relied on external development models and have shown too little creativity in evolving new models or appropriately relating the foreign models to meet local conditions. r r (lnayatullah, 1975)

THE CRISIS ECONOMIES: A NEWCOUNTRY GROUPING

Indeed, conditions in many Less DevelopedCountries (LDCs) beckon Third World planners to seriously reflect on what Inayatullahhad said many years ago. Certainly, all LDCssuffer from some form of chronic growth pain.What sets apart a particular group, however,is the fact that over the past decade, theirsocio-economic situation has continually beenproblematic if not deteriorating. Thus, we seethe emergence of what may be called the "dualistic crisis economies of the 1980s:.1

The Philippines, sad to say, is a prominent(but hopefully not permanent) member of thisnew subset of LDCs. Its colleagues includeBrazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela.j Thecrisis economies are plagued by huge foreigndebts, disturbing rates of inflation, high levelsof unemployment ana underemployment, andinvariably, worrisome political instability. Forthis group of financially-strapped and debt-

*This article is based on the author's master'sthesis, bearing the same title, which he submitted tothe School of Urban and Regional Planning, U.P. Diliman (Copyright 1987 by Cesar B. Umali, Jr ,J.

lin this paper, distinction is made between "dual"and "dualistic" societies. In a dual society, the traditional and modern secots are dichotonous, i.e., theyexist independently of each other. In contrast, a dualistic society has the two sectors co-ex isting, interacting, and interlocked with each other.

2See, for example, Dan B. Canlas, et.el., "AnAnalysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis (A Workshop Report) ," June 1984.

39

ridden LDCs, less and less resources are becoming available to finance development programs. The challenge then to contemporaryplanners is how to maximize use of whatevermeager resources become available to addressnagging growth and equity problems. More ofthe same capital-intensive programs and projects are no longer affordable. The Rural-RuralInteraction Model (RRIM) is an unconventionalresponse to this present-day challenge - and toInayatullah's admonition. Although the modelwas borne out of the Philippines' own experience, it may as well be adaptable to othercrisis economies in the Third World.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Evolution of Development Models: TowardsThe Third Generation

Since the end of the Second World War,development planners have been formulatingtheories and models responsive to the specialneeds of the times. Initially, they were concerned with the speedy reconstruction of thewar-ravaged nations. Thus prevailed first generation growth models from the early 1950s upto the late 19605. Examples are the dual economy models of Lewis (1954), Jorgenson(1961), and Fei and Ranis (1964).3, While

3See, for example, Shirley W. Y. Kua, GustavRanis, and John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan SuccessStory:Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952-1978, Westview Press, lnc.,Colorado, 1981.


growth was incipient, however, income andwealth distribution remained uneven if notworsened. Thus, second generation growthwith equity models such as those in Taiwanand in the Philippines became popular duringthe 19705.4 These models sought to reduceinequity without hindering overall growth. Thegrowth model's macro (national) focus gaveway to the growth with equity models' submacro (regional) focus. Up to now, however,equity - and growth - problems in manyLOGs like the Philippines remain intractable.Inter-regional and inter-sectoral disparities haveeven widened. The situation turned for theworse (as if things were not bad enough) asgrowth rates plunged and many LOGs assumeda "crisis state" early in the present decade.i'Evidently, neither the growth nor the growthwith equity models can alleviate the woes ofthe crisis economies. In fact, these models which invariably prescribe rural-urban interaction and inteqration - may themselves haveabetted the crisis in these LOGs.

The RRIM will fall under an entirely new orthird generation of development models, whichwill be called equity with growth models in thispaper. Such models recognize that the LOGs'comparative advantage lies in people, becausepeople are their most abundant, crucial, andpromising development resource. Therefore,this third generation contends that growthprocesses in the crisis economies can be initiated only through massive social participation. Improved equity is an .absolute prerequisite to sustainable growth .. In contrast togrowth with equity models, equity with growthmodels seek to reduce socio-economic disparities even if overall growth temporarily declines. Essentially, the basic question whichequity with growth models address is: "Howcan growth processes finally be initiated andsubsequently sustained in the case of persistently poor groups, sectors, and areas withinLOGs?" The growth with equity models' regional focus is further narrowed down to theequity with growth models' sub-regional focus.

4William M. Bateson, "Some Theoretical Underpinnings for Arila Development Approaches," Regional Planning and Area Development Project, Madi

son~Wisconsin,1980,P.11.

See, for example, Economic Commission of LatinAmerica, "Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy 1985," Dec. 31, 1985.

40

Rural-Urban Interaction Models

Belonging to the family of second generationgrowth with equity models are rural-urban interaction models under which fall very popularplanning approaches including integrated areadevelopment (lAO). The fundamental assumption on which these models rest is that marketforces operate and serve to widely distributethe fruits of development. This is not surprisingbecause such models grew out of the uniquelypleasant experience to Western planner withrespect to markets. The premise behind ruralurban interaction is that rural areas are poorbecause these are not adequately linked to progressive urban centers. Thus, an infrastructurebased, outward-looking rural developmentstrategy is prescribed. The Philippines had invested heavily on roads, bridges, and ports sothat the multiplier effects of urban economicactivities could trickle down to and stimulatethe rural periphery.

Theoretically, there can be a healthy, symbiotic relationship between rural and urbanareas as assumed in rural-urban interactionmodels. Bert F. Hoselitz refers to a "generativecity" as one where " ... impact on economicgrowth is favorable, i.e., (if) its formation andcontinued existence and growth is one of thefactors accountable for the economic development of the region or country... rr (c.f. "parasitic cities").6 This generative city can beviewed in the context of Walter Ghristaller's"ergansungsgebiet" or "complementary region.',7 Within such region, rural and urbanareas exist in harmony and as shown in Oiagram1, effectively exchange economic resourcesthrough dynamic market mechanisms.

In reality, however, things are strikingly different, particularly in the Case of crisis economies like the Philippines where we observe thefollowing:[a] Serious Market Imperfections - Oliqopolistic/oligopsonistic as well as monopolistic/monopsonistic forces discussed in economicstextbooks are historically and persistently pre-

6Bert F. Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities"(essay written originally as a summary of the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Developmentheld in Chicago in May 1954).

7Walter Christaller, Central Places in SouthernGermany, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1966 (translatedby Carlisle W. Baskin).


Theoretical Rural-Urban Interaction Model

SURPLUS LABOR, PRIMARY GOODS

IRURAL I AREAS

I

OPERATIONAL MARKETMECHANISMS

Diagram 1

AREAS

valent, especially in rural areas outside primatecity(ies). Among these market imperfections,it is particularly important to cite the absence,lack, or centralized control of market information - one of the weakest pillars of the market economy concept as far as LDCs like thePhilippines are concerned. Consumers havelittle if any access to information about products and markets. Scant information aboutmarket opportunities and production technology is available to producers. Factors of production are therefore severely restricted in theirability to move in response to market information, and prices and interest rates do notreflect relative scarcities and opportunity costs.

In addition, there are market imperfectionswhich are inadvertently created by government.In programs to stabilize the prices of agricultural commodities, for example, governmentdeliberately intervenes in the market. Such interventions can aggravate the already uneventerms-of-trade between the rural/agriculturalareas and the urban/industrial centers.[b] Near Non-Market Economies - All of thevarious imperfections distorting the market inthe Philippines and in other LOCs can be regarded as "structural problems". Beyond thesestructural problems, however, there exists aneven more serious "essential problem," i.e., onewhich puts in question the basic idea behindthe "market". The essential problem renderssome lagging, rural areas virtual "non-marketeconomies". In these areas, a significant portionof the population is at or below subsistence andtherefore, would have very little, if any, to buyor sell in the market. Therefore, a market economy, by definition, is non-existent because ofthe absence of a quid pro quo, i.e., people re-

41

gularly offering to buy and sell at a moneyprice various amounts of a particular commodity. According to Sixto K. Roxas, " ... for 70percent of the Philippines... households primarily produce for their own consumption andcan primarily consume only their own production:,8

Of course, one cannot expect to come acrossperfectly closed local (rural) economies in thePhilippines at this day and age. (However, certain countries in Africa, for example, may havepeople in this type of economy.) Thus, thispaper refers to a "near non-market economy"instead of a "non-market economy:' The maindistinction is that in the former, majority ofhouseholds produce primarily for their ownconsumption. Simultaneously, there are limited, intermittent, incidental, and exploitativetrading activities.[c] Chronic Unemployment and Underemployment - Urban/industrial centers have not beenable to absorb the increasing surplus labor inagriculture. The Marxist "reserve army of unemployed labor" is just too great, resulting in ahigh level of unemployment and underemployment in rural areas, and extremely depressedwages for those few who find work in the cities.

In light of the foregoing observations, theactual relationship between rural and urbanareas is more accurately depicted in DiagramThe uneven rural-urban relationship can be

8Sixto K. Roxas, "Community-Based Organizationand Management Technology" in Alternative Futures,Vol. II, No.1, The Philippine Institute of AlternativeFutures, Manila, 1985, p. 4.


Real World Rural-Urban Interaction Model

CHEAP LABOR, UNDERPRICED PRIMARY GOODS1------------>------------------------>---------1~ V

RURAL AREAS IMPERFECT MARKET URBAN AREASI MECHANISMS I

A V

-------------<-----------------------<-----------LOW WAGES, INADEQUATE SOCIAL SERVICES,COSTLY FARM rNPUTS & PROCESSED GOODS

Diagram 2

better appreciated when viewed from the perspective of a "dualistic society". Indeed, therelationship between the traditional andmodern sectors in LDGs has assumed a "pattern of dependency". It is interesting to notethat aI/ the major features of the dependencytheory formulated by Latin American economists in the late 1960s and in the early 1970sare transmutable to the scale of rural-urbanrelations in contemporary Philippine society.The features are: tal displacement, but notdisappearance, of the indigenous (rural) political-economic structure; [b] emergence of anurban-dominated political structure; and [c]stagnation of the traditional eeonornv." Ruralurban interaction in a dualistic economy feedstwo types of vicious cycles: [i] the viciouscycle of poverty in the rural areas, and iii] thevicious cycle of wealth in the urban areas vis-avis the rural areas. (Underscoring is supplied inorder to account for the fact that pockets ofpoverty db exist within the urban areas themselves.)

Rural-Rural Interaction Model

The uneven relationship between rural andurban areas serves as the take off point for theRural-Rural Interaction Model. The main contention of the RR1M is that contrary to conventional thinking, the growth of certain lagging, rural areas in dualistic crisis economieswill not result by vertically integrating these

9James Weaver and Kenneth Jameson, EconomicDevelopment, University Press of America, Maryland,1981. p. 87.

42

areas with higher-order urban areas in thespatial hierarchy. These rural areas need to relyupon and interact among themselves in order toachieve strategic first-order self-sufficiency objectives and therefore, finally break out of thevicious cycle of poverty. Only thereafter shouldefforts be made to reintegrate them with urbancenters in pursuit of higher-order growth objectives. In crisis economies, rural areas arebetter off being temporarily disassociated fromtheir urban "core" which is usually moreseverely affected by the economic malaise.Diagram 3 provides the essence of the RIIM.

The RRIM, above represented by the trapezoid formed by broken lines, involves a dynamic and multi-faceted interaction amongvarious groups within the target rural area. TheRRIM will "prime" the area by way of basicsocial goods and services. Once this is completed, the area will be in a better position tocompete in exploitative markets and -to participate in conventional growth - and marketoriented programs and projects. It is thenready to be re-integrated and to interact withurban areas, as shown by the bigger rectangleformed by solid lines in Diagram 3.

Conceptualization of the RRIM is anchoredon the fol/owing observations concerning theoperationalization in the Philippines of ruralurban interaction models, particularly in thecase of the popular lAD approach;

First, there' has been a neglect of the fragmented socio-economic structure typical ofdualistic economies. For instance, the "Master Plan of the Bohol Integrated Area Development Project" states that ".... Bohol's economy is more or less a homogenous agricultural society in which no significant differen-


Rural-Rural Interaction Model

II

URBANAREAS

III\IIII

I(SOCIAL & OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)

III

RURAL AREAS

PRIMARY & PROCESSED GOODS, LABOR\---------> - -- - - - --------- -- --- ----)0---------------I II SPECIFIC TYPES OF GOODS & SERVICES I

I -------->---------->-------- IA / II /I /

(SOCIAL & OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS)

I /I /

YES /\ I' NO

\ /PRIMED?

// I I

/-1---------<-------<- ------<-----COMPLEMENTARY GOODS & SERVICES

J JI I----- ----- -----<--- - - - -- - - - ----<- ----------

HIGHER ORDER GOODS & SERVICES

Diagram 3

ces exist in its socio-economic fabric. . ,,10

With such an undiscriminating perspective,coupled with a predominantly uneven ruralurban economic relationship, the rural, agricultural, and subsistence sectors stand to gainlittle economic benefits (if any) from lADprojects. Road projects, for example, areusually located in urbanizing areas, thereby primarily benefitting the already better off surplus producers.

Second, a Western-inspired free marketorientation has been inappropriately transplanted to the Philippines where, as earlierpointed out, serious market imperfectionsexist and certain situations approach a nonmarket economy. Thus, projects prematurely aim for growth objectives, e.g. helpingsubsistence farmers produce for supposedly

viable markets. At best, local markets areexploitative.

Third, lAD programs and projects, from themanagement and financial point of view, havebeen grossly over-extended sector ally and geographically. Since activities cover practically theentire spectrum of development concerns, implementation has been difficult and has required huge financial outlays. Close to P8.5billion, about half from foreign sources, havebeen allocated to seven lAD projects in thePhilippines.

Fourth, sufficient authority has not beendecentralized to project management units,thereby making it even more difficult [if notimpossible] for them to coordinate/integratethe wide range of local activities. l !

10Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),

"Master Plan Study of the Bohol Inteqrated AreaDevelopment Project (BIADP)," February 1980.

11Francisco G. Balitaan, "The Planning and Implementation of Integrated Area Development Projects in the Philippines," USAID, Manila, April 1983,p.43.

43


Fifth, institutional and structural obstaclesprevent trickle down effects even in the longrun. This is because trickle down mechanismswill not work where market forces are weak.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE RURAL·RURALINTERACTION MODEL

Ideological Framework

Filipino planners have a tendency to glossover the ideological aspects of their profession.Since most of the models, theories, approaches,and strategies they work with are imported,there is the real danger of promoting a foreignideology based on moral values which differfrom, if not contradict, our very own. In theparticular case of the RRIM, the following setof assumptions serves as backdrop:

1. Economic growth per se is unimportantwhere income and wealth distribution is alarmingly and increasingly inequitable.

2. Land is the Filipino's most cherished physical and psychological possession. Highest priority should be given by government to transferringland ownership to the landless.

3. The household is the foundation of Philippine society. Next comes the neighborhood,and then the larger community. Developmentprograms should take cognizance of this socialhierarchy.

4. Households always behave rationally. Subsistence households may seem irrational because " .... the main rnotlvatlnq force in thepeasant's life (is) the maximization not of income but rather of his family's chances of survival. .... 12

5. Community spirit is important because itfoments the emergence of a "plural society,,13where weil-informed and politically active citizens' groups predominate. It has been shownthat Filipinos can intricately blend introvertedfamily life with extroverted community life.

6. In light of Points 3 and 4, households cannot be imbued with the abstract "community

12Michael P. TOdaro, Economics for a DevelopingWorld, Longman Group Limited, London, 1977, p.243.

13John Friedman, "The Active Community: Towards a Political-Territorial Framework for RuralDevelopment in Asia" in R.P. Misra (ed.l, RuralDevelopment: National Policies and Experience (Vol.IV), UNCRD, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 231-257.

44

spirit" while they are at or below the subsistence level of existence.

7. Based on the principles of "self-determination" and "self-governance", rural development planning and management must be decentralized and participatory. Decentralizationis also a practical necessity in view of the increasing inability of central government to actas "provider".

8. The system of education should be redesigned to impart not only appropriate skillsand technology but also the indigenous "ideological" or "moral" motivation to stir thecitizenry towards productive, concerted endeavor.

9. The planner's role is advocacy, not simplythat of a bureaucrat or technician because"... appropriate planning action cannot beprescribed from a position of value neutrality,for prescriptions are based on desired objectives.. ,'r14

Distinctive Features

To provide a framework for discussing theRRIM in more concrete terms, what may be regarded as the "classical lAD approach" of ruralurban interaction models will be used as reference. This classical lAD approach will becompared with what will be labelled the "neoclassical lAD approach" of the RRIM. Twelvepoints of comparisons will be discussed.

[a] Primary Objective. That growth is theprimary objective of the classical lAD approachstems from the goal which second generationmodels seek: to reduce socio-economic disparities without hindering overall growth. Growthis seen as catalyst or prerequisite for improvedequity. Market and urban biases are notable.

On the other hand, the primary objective ofthe Neo-c1assical approach is derived from thegoal of third generation models: to reducesocio-economic disparities even of overallgrowth temporarily declines. In the case of lagging, rural areas in the crisis economies, growthcan be initiated and sustained only throughimproved equity resulting from massive socialparticipation which, in turn, is unrealizablewithout self-sufficiency in basic needs. Households at or below the level of subsistence cen-

14 pau1 Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning" in Journal of the Amerlcen Institute ofPlanners,Vol. 31, November 1965.


Subsistence Threshold for Participation

HH "8"S RU E8 QS UI IS RT EE MN EC NE T

S

a S

Diagram 4

MTSR

HH "A"

MPNR

TIME

not and will not meaningfully participate in andbenefit from conventional market/growthoriented programs and projects. Diagram 4 willbe used to expound on this particular argument. The diagram is a modification of MarvinP. Miracle's risk attitude analysis.I S

"MPNR" is the minimum physiologic nutritional requirement set by Mother Nature."MTSR" is the minimum total subsistence requirement fixed by society and which includessocial norms for food, clothing, shelter, education, and health care. The curve is slightlysloping upwards to reflect society's rising expectations over time. At Time S, Household Ais not interested in social participation as it isengrossed in efforts to live up to social normsfor a dignified human existence. It is physically,intellectually, and emotionally handicapped.Therefore, the neo-c1assical approach will initially concentrate resources to raise the Household beyond what may be called the "threshold for participation", i.e., to the level ofHousehold 8.

[b] Sectoral Basis. Given the market and urbanbiases in the classical lAD approach, an "infrastructure-induced rural development strategy"

ISMarvin P. Miracle, "Subsistence Agriculture:Analytical Problems and Alternative Concepts" inAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, May1968, pp. 292-310.

45

is pursued. Infrastructure accounts for close to80 percent of the cost pf Philippine lAD projects.

In contrast, the neo-c1assical approach promotes a "social services-based rural development strategy," following the contention thatfor lagging, rural areas in crisis economies,growth processes can be initiated and sustainedonly through massive social participationfounded on the satisfaction of basic needs.

De-emphasis on infrastructure results notonly from questioning the validity of the viewthat rural areas are poor because they are notadequately linked to progressive urban centers.There is also a pragmatic basis: crisis economiescannot continue to afford the same high magnitude of public investments.

[e] Factor Emphasis. The infrastructure strategy of the classical lAD approach requiresmassive capital inputs, a substantial portion ofwhich come from foreign sources. On the otherhand, the social services strategy of the neoclassical approach puts emphasis on indigenoushuman and natural resources. People, ratherthan sectors or industries, will serve as the"engine of growth". Delivery of primary healthcare services, for example, will involve community members trained as "barefoot doctors"knowledgeable in the production and use ofherbal medicine. If small-scale rural infrastructure projects are absolutely necessary, construct-ion will be by labor-intensive methods ern-


ploying locally available materials to the fullestextent possible.ldl Spatial. Strategy. The rural-urban integration strategy of the classical lAD approach isquite distinctive. Cities are viewed as generativerather than parasitic.

As already pointed out, however, projectswhich seek to enhance rural-urban linkages onlyexacerbate the plight of the poorest groups,sectors, and areas. Thus, the neo-c1assical approach advocates the unconventional spatialstrategy of "strategic rural isolation" to primelagging, rural areas for eventual re-integrationwith exploitative urban centers. Of course, thisdoes not mean total isolation. All it implies isthat government development resources willnot be devoted to enhancing rural-urban linkages.

[e] Growth Source. It is quite evident from theforegoing that the classical lAD approach follows an "externally-induced rural growth strategy." Rural growth is expected to be ignitedby the external urban economy from which thefruits of public investments will trickle. Insteadof benefiting the rural areas, however, this "dependency relationship" only serves to keep saidareas in low-level bucolic equilibrium.

Therefore, the neo-classical approach prescribes an "inward looking rural growth strategy" requiring strategic rural isolation. Ruralareas should maximize use of indigenous resources to finally start their economy rolling.

[f] Scope. The term "maxi-sectoral" perhapsbest describes the scope of the classical lAD approach as it attempts to cover the entire spectrum of possible development interventions.lAD projects cover areas ranging from four tofifteen thousand square kilometers, with apopulation in 1980 of 400,000 to 1.2 million.

Owing to managerial and financial constraints, only key or propulsive sectors will becovered by the neo-c1assical approach. Initially,the locus of concentration will be on socialservices. The target area will be limited in termsof size and population. Specific parameters willbe discussed below.[g] Changes Desired. The classical lAD approach is mainly concerned with the enhancement of the functional roles of sectors andareas within the existing socio-economic structure. It usually aims for increases in sectoralproductivity.

The neo-classical approach is more interestedin basic structural and institutional changes in

46

the following areas: [1] agrarian structure, [2]rural-urban economic relationships, [3] socialrelations, and [4] the political structure. (Itmight be noted that the neo-classical approachtakes exploitative markets as given.) Therefore,unequivocal political will is required. The na-ture of these structural and institutionalchanges will be discussed below.

[h] Resource Allocation. Because of the assumption that the market works, the classicallAD approach concentrates resources in growthcenters. On the other hand, the neo-classical approach will initially be non-market oriented. Itwill allocate development resources based onneed instead of market demand. It recognizes,for example, that a poor community's demandfor primary health care services would be lowand therefore, the market by itself will not adequately provide these services.[i] Social Focus. The classical lAD approach isprimarily concerned with overall growth sotherefore, does not discriminate among socialgroups. In contrast, the neo-c1assical approachinvolves a "targeting" of the poorest and mostdisadvantaged rural groups who may have neverbeen in the mainstream of development. Targeting will require setting-up social service delivery centers in areas where priority groups aremost concentrated.

[j] Outlook. Under the classical lAD approach,popular participation is effectively negated bycountervailing pressures exerted by paternalism."Popular participation" is herein defined as thesubstantial involvement of local institutions inthe planning, implementation and evaluation ofdevelopment activities. "Paternalism" is definedin terms of the relationship between centralgovernment and these local institutons.

The neo-classical approach adopts popularparticipation based on the following convictions: [1] nobody can understand local constraints and opportunities better than the localresidents themselves; [2] nobody is more interested in understanding and managing localaffairs than the local community whose survival and well-being are on the line; and [3]people are the lagging, rural areas' most valuable development resource which should be harnessed and developed.

[k] Management Style. With paternalistic instincts reigning over participatory aspirations,the management style in the classical lAD approach is naturally centralized. Adoption ofpopular participation in the neo-c1assical ap-

preach, on the other hand, requires nothing lessthan decentralized management.[I] Role of Government. In light of paternalismand centralization, the government, particularlyat the central level, serves as "provider" underthe classical lAD approach. In crisis economies,the central government obviously can not keepup with this role. It should encourage the use oflocal resources and the participation of the private sector in rural development. Thus, its roleshifts to that of "facilitator of change, growth,and development processes" under the neoclassical approach. This means that the centralgovernment will primarily serve to enhancelinkages and interaction among groups, sectors,and areas.

The Planning Area

In spatial terms, the Rural-Rural InteractionModel translates into the Rural Town District(RTDl. District boundaries will be defined by a"commuting radius" of not more than thirtyminutes by reliable motorized public transportation. If a tricycle can travel from twenty fiveto thirty kilometers per hour on existing ruralroads, this commuting radius will be twelveand-a-half to fifteen kilometers. Therefore, theRTD will have a total area of 500 to 700 squarekilometers.

In terms of resource endowment, all that isrequired is that the planning area is populatedby more or less 200 persons per square kilometer. 16 The presence of people in itself meansthat an area has strong potential under theRRIM. With said population density, the planning area will have a population of 100,000 to140,000 persons.

In real terms, the RTD will consist of twoto three contiguous Philippine municipalities.It can be a grouping of any of the 163 minorurban centers identified by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)or the 1,276 satellite municipalities under theMinistry of Human Settlements (MHS) Plan. 17

16Friedmann,op. cit.

17See National Economic and DevelopmentAuthority, Five Year Philippine Development Plan1978-1982, Manila, September 1977 and Ministry ofHuman Settlements, National Multi- Year HumanSettlements Plan: A Physical Development Framework, Makati, 1978.

47


Using the MHS figure, there are 500 to 700 probable RTDs nationwide. Client "lagging ruralareas" will include existing lAD areas; hugetracts planted to export crops like coconut andsugar which are no longer profitable; vast upland areas which are subjected to destructiveswidden agriculture; sequestered, foreclosed,and foreclosurable idle lands; tenanted or leasedlands; and island economies like Catanduanesand Masbate in the Bicol Region.

Just how will an RTD look like? To answerthis question, 'It would be useful to portray the"before" and "after" situations. The "before"situation will consist of the area's initial economic, social, and political conditions which willserve as benchmarks for monitoring and assessing change. Ironically, these so-called "initialconditions" have for ages persisted in many arural town in the Philippines. On the otherhand, the "after" situation will consist of thearea's "normative" conditions, i.e., how thearea should look like.

Economic Conditions. Initially, the targetarea is strikingly pastoral in contrast to the urban centers in the province or region where itis situated. Even the supposedly urban "pobIaclones" within the RTD, when compared tourban areas outside the district, are essentiallyrural with nothing more than small-scale andintermittent trading activities taking place. Asizeable majority of the population is at, if notbelow, subsistence. The economy is near nonmarket since production is primarily consumption-oriented and affords households with nomore than marginal and unstable income. Withaccess to productive resources being monopolized by elite groups, income and wealth distribution is statistically skewed.

If the RRIM is successfully applied surplusproduction and income will increasingly begenerated, thus stimulating both factor and product markets. A stable cash income flow willslowly generate household savings and thereafter, domestic capital formation. Regular brisktrading is expected. The area's comparative advantages will be developed and it will be in abetter position to compete in exploitativeurban markets as the residents get organizedand gain increasing access to crucial market information. Access to productive resources especially land will be diffused. The RRIM willstrongly complement an agrarian reform program under a sincere government. What it willdo is to prepare non-traditional clients (e.g."sacadas") for land ownership.


Social Conditions. Corresponding to theinitial depressed economic conditions in thetarget area, .certain social conditions follow:[1] basic needs are being inadequately met;[2] most residents are egocentric as they concentrate on the survival and well-being ofhousehold members, particularly children; and[3] social relations are semi-feudal, i.e., apatron-client relationship binds landownerswith tenants/lessees/landless workers.

A social transformation of the area willresult from a successful application of theRR1M. Satisfaction of basic needs, coupledwith increases in income, will enable the population to break-out of mundane survival prerequisites and finally appreciate the virtues ofcommunity life. Beneficiary organizationshould set the stage for active and meaningfulsocial participation and the gradual erosion ofsemi-feudal social relations.

Political Conditions. Initially, politics withinthe area is "elitist". The socio-economic elitesare the very same people who dominate politics. The vast majority, being engrossed in dayto-day survival, is apathetic. There are no political organizations except those established bythe paternalistic central government to influence if not direct local level politics. Politicaldissent is discouraged if not outlawed.

Successful application of the RRIM willresult in a broad-based "popular democracy"replacing the narrow-based "elitist democracy".A pluralistic society will take the place of theoligarchical society. The treditional socio-economic-political elites will continue to exist;however they will now be only one of the political forces in the communi·ty. The governmentwill cease to behave in a paternalistic manner.

MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The Style of Planning

Complementing the RRIM is a planning stylewhich is transactive, iterative, and targeted.Each of these three characteristics is briefly discussed below.

Transactive. John Friedmann describes transactive planning as a planning style based on an"unbroken sequence of interpersonal relations".18 It involves continuing dialogue to

18John Friedmann, Retracking America: A Theoryof Transactive Planning, Anchor Press/Doubleday,New York, 1973.

48

synthesize the planner's processed knowledge"and his client's "experiential knowledge". Thissynthesis will take time to achieve because processed knowledge is abstract and expressedthrough formal language, while experientialknowledge is concrete and expressed th roughinformal language. Transactive planning takesplace through a "mutual learning process": theplanner learns from his client's actual experiences, and the client from the planner's technical expertise.

Iterative. With transactive planning goes aninterative style. Indeed, the major steps in theplanning process can be identified, as done inthe next section. However, the steps will notalways come about in linear sequence. Backtracking will occur as the need to re-examine orre-formulate decisions arise as a result of incremental learning and experience. Mistakes willbe viewed positively rather than as a sign offailure or weakness. A transactive and iterativestyle is naturally more tedious than the blueprint style. However, it is necessary where littleinformation is available and where maximumparticipation of clients is desired.

Targeted. While other planning models focuson sectors and areas, the RRIM focuses on thepoorest and most disadvantaged groups in therural areas. David Korten and George Carnerexplain that targeted planning views the creative initiative of people as the primary development resource and their material and spiritualwell-being as the end that the development process serves. Conventional approaches havelumped the poor together as a faceless, placeless aggregate. 19 Hence, we see yet anotheraspect of the evolutionary process throughwhich planning models have gone. Growth models had a sectoral (agricultural-industrialfocus); growth with equity models assumeda spatial (especially regional) focus; and finally,equity with growth models shifted to a povertygroup focus.

The Planning Process

[a] Selection of the Planning Area. TheRRIM was designed for application in lagging,

19David C. Korten and George Carner, "Planning

Frameworks for People-Centered Development," inDavid C. Korten and Rudi Klauss Ieds.), PeopleCentered Development: Contributions Toward Theoryand Planning Frameworks, Kumarian Press, Connecticut, 1984, PP. 201-209.

rural areas where the economic, social, and political conditions earlier discussed exist. For purposes of identifying specific target areas (RuralTown Districts) esoteric and expensive techniques are unnecessary. All that is needed is a"threshold decision" (i.e., go or no-go; basedon some rough indicator like overall householdincome. If the income figure falls below thepoverty threshold, then the area is suitable because a significant portion of the populationwould be at or below subsistence.r''

This first step in the planning process will beundertaken exclusively by pianners from thelAD project office or where there is no lADproject in the area, by planners working withthe provincial government. It would be usefulfor the central planning body (NEDA) to beinvolved from the start so that it can effectivelyserve as advocate of successful innovative planning approaches.

[b] Review of Secondary Data. Having identified the RTD, the next step is to review municipal and provincial socio-economic profiles tovalidate the threshold decision in Step [a] andto establish baseline information. Given theRRIM's first order objective of self-sufficiencyand its social services-based strategy, basicneeds parameters are important. These willinclude food, shelter, education, and healthcare (including availability of safe drinkingwater). In addition, we should cover indicatorsreflecting the RR1M's institutional concernswhich were enumerated earlier.

At this early stage in the planning process,local participation should come in. The planners concerned should ensure the active involvement of municipal government officialsand staff who can serve as resource persons andmanagement trainees at the same time.

[c] Poverty Study. Using the secondary datain Step [b] to the maximum extent possible,supplemented by necessary primary data, astudy will be jointly undertaken by the planners and their municipal counterparts to:

[i] determine the predominant povertygroups and their spatial distribution;

(ii] understand their constraints and opportunities; and

20 Fo r poverty thresholds, see Emmy Huan,

"Estimation of Regional Poverty Incidence," Philip

pine Institute for Development Studies, April 1985.

49


[iii] gain an insight into their survival strategies.

The study is limited to poverty groups because: [j] it is the well-being of these groupswhich is our primary concern; and [2] there isusually scant if any information available tosystematically address the unique problems ofeach group. It should be pointed out, however,that poverty groups cannot be studied in totalisolation from the socio-economic milieu withinwhich they exist. It should be pointed out further that the poverty study is not intended simply to determine who the poorest people arebecause practically everyone in a crisis economy may be regarded as "poorest".

The poverty study should neither be complicated nor comprehensive because it is neverin "final". It is continually updated, refined,and/or expanded as new information becomesavailable. We do not want to be victims of"paralysis by analysis".

[d] Framework Plan Formulation. Based onthe study conducted in Step lcl , a multi-year(probably three-year) Framework Plan will becollaboratively formulated by the lAD project/provincial planners, their municipal counterparts, and representatives from the targetgroups. The Plan will translate the abstractRRIM into operational terms. It will describespecific strategic objectives, major activities tobe introduced, and detailed approaches to befollowed. Like the poverty study, it shouldneither aim to be complicated nor attempt tobe comprehensive. It should be readily understandable not only by professional planners butmore so by municipal officials and staff as wellas by the target beneficiaries.

[e] Implementation. This will be based onthe Framework Plan and phased as necessary.The RRIM's operational phases are discussedimmediately below. There will be annual workplans to spell-out specific activities. The organizational structure of the RTD will be discussedin the last section of this paper. Involvement ofthe larger community will begin at this pointin the planning process.

[1'] Evaluation and Re-design. Unlike conventional projects which require time-boundevaluation exercises, activities under the RRIMwill involve continuous self-evaluation with theplanners and their clients engaged in transactiverelationship, constantly converting mistakesinto lessons and knowledge into action.


RRIM Operational Phases

Humanization. This first phase of operationalizing the Rural-Rural Interaction Model is animmediate, initial response to the pressing problem of pushing subsistence households beyondthe threshold for participation, i.e., upliftingpersistently poverty-stricken households to asocially acceptable level of human existence.Thus, the term "humanization" is apt. This willbe done by helping them meet their most basicneeds. This is a period of strategic rural isolation during which development activities will bein the subsistence food production and socialservices sectors. The strategic first-order objectives are: [a) to enable each neighborhood unit(five to ten households) to produce enoughfood to meet nutritional requirements, and [b)to establish and sustain low-cost generation anddelivery systems and mechanisms for housing,education, and health care for which the localcommunity will assume eventual responsibility.Given political will, these mutually reinforcingobjectives should be attainable in one to twoyears.

The first objective will entail the provisionof technological, commodity, and nutritionalassistance to households. A good example are"food gardens". In contrast to conventionaldevelopment activities, we are at this point notinterested in marketing our produce. Of course,we cannot and should not prevent the production of a marketable surplus if certain households have the resources and capability to doso.

With respect to the second objective, distribution of social goods and services will initiallybe based on need rather than on the almostperfectly imperfect market. The bottom line,though, is that generation and delivery systemsare sustainable. This can only be possible ifdelivery systems, goods, and services are of thelow-cost "Third World Type" rather than thesophisticated "Western type". Examples areprimary health care systems and very low-costhousing projects.

The Humanization Phase will be highlylabor-intensive as community development(CD) workers from the lAD project office, provincial government, or municipal governmentshave to work at the household level in order toestablish a transactive relationship with theirclients. The participation of CD workers fromthe Department of Local Government might besought. With the delivery of basic services or-

50

ganized on the basis of neighborhood requirements, the concept of "commonality" is introduced, something which will pave the way forthe introduction of the abstract communityspirit during the next phase. Satisfaction ofbasic needs standards will signal the completionof the Humanization Phase.

Consolidation. The Consolidation Phase isconcerned with helping poor households maintain normative levels of human existence.Unlike Phase 1, however, it centers on morefundamental and longer-terms structural andinstitutional changes in pursuit of the strategicsecond-order objective of complementing andsolidifying socio-economic improvements incipient during the previous phase. Thus, thisphase is called "consolidation".

The structural and institutional concerns ofthe RRIM were discussed earlier. At this point,management concerns will shift to structuralparameters. Basic needs indicators will continueto be monitored for routinarv reporting purposes only. Again given political will, this phaseshould be completed in one to two years.

The second phase is the period during which"conscientization" and community organizingefforts will set in. Having attained self-sufficiency objectives during the first phase, the community is ready for social participation. Theabstract community spirit can now be introduced. The social focus will transcend the introverted confines of the household and expandinto the immediate community.

Assistance on food production will shift toimproving production technology to preparehouseholds for external trade during the nextphase. It should be noted however that thisphase is still a transition period during whichimportant structural and institutional adjustments are still being made. Thus, the RTD remains isolated from its urban core. The secondphase will be over as soon as the desired structural adjustments are in place.

Maturity. This is the th ird and final phase ofoperationalizing the R11M and can be concluded in one to two years. At his point, the RTD isprimed for re-integration with urban centersand for participation in exploitative markets.The target groups are ready to participate inconventional growth-oriented programs andprojects. Thus, this third phase marks the endof strategic rural isolation and represents thenexus between the RRIM and conventionalplanning approaches.

The spatial focus now transcends the RTD.The sphere of rural-urban interaction willcover the entire province or region. Development interventions will be in terms of identifying new markets, promoting trade throughfairs and exhibits, expediting the registrationof firms, and facilitating exchange transactions.Here, we see that the role of government haschange from "provider" to "facilitator". Thelocal community would have assumed fullmanagement responsiblitv at the end of theMaturity Phase.

Once the Maturity Phase is reached, theRTD can maintain its socio-economic wellbeing regardless of intimate interaction withexploitative markets and urban centers. Theprobability that the RTD will be contaminatedby sick urban centers no longer exists. TheRTD has been immunized, so to speak. Fromthe equity with growth model's standpoint,crucial interests are now being articulatedand protected and massive social participationshould engender economic multiplier effects.Rural-urban interaction will continually resultin net economic benefits to rural areas becauseof self-adjustment mechanisms built into theRTD's management structure which will be thefinal topic of this paper.

District Organizational Structure

The convention is to discuss organizationalstructure beginning from the apex. In line withbottom-up planning espoused by the RRIM,the RTD's structure will be described startingfrom the bottom.


To establish the foundation of the RTD,"sectoral assemblies" (SAs) will be formalizedduring the Consolidation Phase. Each SA willconsist of households engaged in a particularoccupation and therefore share a commonresource base. For example, members of theupland farmers' assembly all depend on thevast upland areas for their sustenance. Wecannot expect everyone to be neatly classifiedinto a particular group because subsistencehouseholds engage in a wide range of economicundertakings to supplement income from aprimary source and to spread risk. The uplandfarmer can be a part-time fisherman. What isimportant is that in the aggregate, the economic interests of the poorest groups are protected. The upland farmer-fisherman can jointhe upland farmers' assembly and rest assuredthat his interests as a fisherman are being protected by the fishermen's assembly.

Each SA shall elect a small "sectoral committee" (SC) to manage its day-to-day affairs.The SC will be headed by a Chairman. It willbe responsible for translating the SA's desiresand aspirations into program actions. It willensure that members receive adequate goods andservices, that production (and later marketing)programs are coordinated, that local human andnatural resources are fully utilized, and thatinternal conflicts are settled amicably. Onceoperational, the SC will serve as counterpartof planners from the lAD project office, provincial government, and municipal governments.

The Chairman of the respective SCs will sitin the Rural Town District Governing Council(RTDGCI which will include the mayors of the

Rural Town District Structure

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

II

RTDGC

I

I I ISA, SA. .• ., SA

ISA,

IRTDGC

I

ISA ... r

Diagram 5

51

ISA

ISA,

IRTDGC

I

I ISA.... , SA


municipalities within the district. It will serveas the policy-making body of the RTD and willhave authority to decide on all local issues orproblems. The RTDGC will also have fullauthority to secure and disburse public fundsas well as to generate and manage its own resources. It will be headed by an overall chairman who will represent the district at the provincial level. The district's organizational structure is show in Diagram 5.

52

Two points may be noted with respect tothe diagram. First, the number of organizational levels is at a minimum to balance organizational effectiveness and the potential for directparticipation of households. Second, the organization runs up to the provincial level onlybecause the RRIM has local level applicationand is intended to converge with more conventional planning models at the provinciallevel.


About the Contributors

RAMON ABRACOSA is Assistant Professor at the College of Engineeringand Agro-Industrial Technology of the University of the Philippines atLos Banos. He obtained his M.S. and M. Eng'g degrees from the University of the Philippines in 1981 and 1980 respectively.

LEONARD ORTOLANO is UPS Foundation Professor of Civil Engineer

ing at the Stanford University. He obtained his Ph.D. and M.S. degreesfrom Harvard University in 1969 and 1966 respectively.

CESAR B. UMALI, JR. is Senior Program Specialist in the Office of Ruraland Agricultural Development for the Local Resource Management Project of USAID/Philippines. He is at present enrolled at the graduateprogram of SURP. He obtained his B.S. in Economics from the University of the Philippines in 1977.

PRECIOSO F. DAVID, JR. is Executive Assistant for Planning and Technical Publications, National Environmental Protection Council, Ministry

of Human Settlements. He obtained his A.B. Disciplinary Studies atAteneo de Manila and Master of Urban and Regional Planning at U.P.in 1979 and 1985 respectively.

63


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(double issue)*Regional Planning in the Philippines* Delivery of Municipal Services*Development Planning*The 'Metrorail System* Land Evaluation

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The Managing EditorPhilippine Planning JournalSchool of Urban and Regional PlanningUniversity of the PhilippinesDiliman, Quezon CityPhilippines 1101

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Philippine Planning JournalSchool of Urban and Regional PlanningUniversity of the PhilippinesDiliman, Quezon CityPhilippines 1101

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The old schoolbuilding now being used as mere classrooms.

The SURP today as it stands witness to its growth and expansion.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES ~\1/

School of Urban and Regional Planning ~~

CAREERS INURBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING

- E~tate Planning- Public Works Planning

DEGREE PROGRAMS• Master 01Arts (M.A.) in Urban and Regional Planning with special·

ization in:- Urban Planning- Regional Planning

• Doctor 01Philosophy (Ph.D.)

The Programs tocus on urban and regional planning as a strategy lornalional development. They are designed particularly to producecapable prolessional urban and regional planners whose training andoutlook respond to the needs 01 developing countries like thePhilippines. Both the Masters' and Doctorate Proqrams may be takenon a lull·time or part-time basis. The full-time Masters' Programrequires only two years to complete.

The Programs are designed for those who plan to work with public andprivate planning and development agencies; those who expect to beengaged mainly in research and teaching; and those who intendto pursue individual careers as private planning practitioners.

Graduates of universities, colleges and schools of recognizedstanding, are eligible for admission. Preference is given to applicantswho had their undergraduate degree in planning, architecture,economics, business administration, engineering, geography, law,and public administration.

• For application lorms andlor more inlormalion, please contactlwrite:

The ChairmanAdmissions CommitteeSchool 01 Urban and Regional PlanningUniversity 01 the PhilippinesDiliman, Quezon City 3004

NON-DEGREE PROGRAMS• Special Course in· Urban and Regional Planning (SCURP) with

focus on:

~ Urban Development Planning- Regional Development Planning- Rural Settlements Development Planning

• Short·term specialized COurses on Land Use Pfanning, ZoningOrdinances and other Land Use Controls, The Management 01UrbanSettlements, and others ollered occasionally.

The Special Course in Urban and Regional Planning (SCURP) is afour-month non-degree workshop program, conducted annually duringthe months of August, September, October and November. For thisyear, 1984, the focus will be on Urban Development Planning; RuralSettlements Development Planning will be ollered in 1985; andRegional Development Planning will be the focus in 1986.

This workshop program is designed in response to the pressing needfor more trained personnel to carry out the national policy of comprehensive development planning in all municipalities, cities, provincesand regions in the country.

The Training Program is open to anyone who has a college degree,diploma or certificate in fields related to planning and development,Preference is given to those Who are now involved in various aspectsof development planning. Candidates from government agencies,including government-owned corperations may seek nominationsfrom their Heads of Office to enable themto attend on ollicial time,and to be entitled to SCholarship priVileges as per MemorandumCircular 156, 1968, Ollice of the President.

• For application lorms and/or more inlormation, please contacllwrite:

The Training DireclorSChool 01Urban and Regional PlanningUniversity 01the PhilippinesDiliman, Quezon City 3004

Advisory Council

Chairman: EDGARDO J. ANGARA

Members

RAMON B. CARDENASRUBEN A. GARCIAGABRIEL U. IGLESIAS

SIXTO K. ROXASANTONIO VARIAS

Adminirtration

ROQUE A. MAGNO, B.S. (G.E.l,M.T.C.P" Associate Professor

ZENAIDA A. MANALO, A.B. (Econ.l,M.A. (Econ.}, Spl. Program In Urbanand Regional Studies (SPURS), M.A.(U.R.P.l, Assistant Professor

MARl LYN G. MARQUEZ, B.S.B.E.,M.U.R.P., M.A.U.P., Assistant Professor

JAIME U. NIERRAS, B.S. (Arch.l,M.S. (Urban Planning), M.S. (Transportation Planning), Assistant Professor

ASTEYA M. SANTIAGO, Ll.B. (CumLaude), M.T.C.P., Certificate in Government Management, Professor

ERNESTO M. SEROTE, A.B., (English),Dip. in Integrated Surveys, M.U.R.P.,Assistant Professor

FEDERICO B. 51LAO, A.B. (Pol. se.i.M.P.A .. Professor

CYNTHIA D. TURIi\iGAN, B.A. (PA),Dip. in Comprehensive Regonal Planning, Associate Professor

JOSE R. VALDECAi\iAS, B.S. (C.E.),M.T.C.P., Associate Professor"

L1TA S. VELMONTE, B.S. (SocialWork), Dip. in Urban Studies, Associate Professor

DELIA R. ALCALDE, A.B. (Sociology),Researcher

NATALIA M. DELA VEGA, B.S.E.Research Assistant

ASTEYA M. SANTIAGO, Ll.B. (Cum Laude), M.T.C.P., Certificate inGovernment Management, Dean

DOLORES A. ENDRIGA, A.B. (Psvch.l, M.A. (socto.). M.R.P.,

School Secretary

GERARDO S. CALABIA, B.S. (Agriculturel, M.A. (Community andRegional Planning), Director of Graduate Studies

JAIME U. NIERRAS, B.S. (Arch.). M.S. (Urban Planning), M.S. (Trans

portation Planning), Director of Research and Publication

ALEX Q. CABANILLA, A.B. (Pol. se.i. Dip in Integrated Surveys,M.U.R.P., Director of Training

NICOLAS R. CUEVO, B.S. (Commerce), Ll.B., Administrative Officer

Faculty

LLENA P. BUENVENIDA, B.S.E.,M.E.P., Certificate in ComprehensiveRegional Development, Assistant Professor

ALEX Q. CABANILLA, A.B. (Pol. Sc.I,Dip. In Integrated Surveys, M.U.R.P.,Assistant Professor

PRIMITIVO C. CAL, B.S.C.E., M. Eng.(Transportation Engineering), Ph.D.(Transportation Planning), AssociateProfessor

GERARDO S. CALABIA, B.S. (Agriculture), M.A. (Community and Regional Planning), Professor

BENJAMIN V. CARIi\iO, B.A. (PA),M.A. (Pol. se.i. Ph.D. (Pol. se.i.Professor

DONATO C. ENDENCIA, 8.S.C.D.,M.C.D., Assistant Professor

DOLORES A. ENDRIGA, A.B. (Psvch.l.M.A. (Soclo.) , M.R.P., AssociateProfessor

VICTORIA A. EUGENIO, B.S. (Arch.l,M.S. (Arch.l. Instructor

TITO C. FIRMALlNO, B.S.E., M.P.A.,M.A. (Community and RegionalPlanning), Professor

ROSARIO D. JIMENEZ, A.B. (History),Dip. in Comprehensive RegionalPlanning, Assistant Professor

LEANDRO A. VI LORIA, A.B. (Pol.[Sc.I, M.P.A., M.A. (Community andRegional Planning), D.P.A., Professor

Researcfl Staff

CARMELITA R.E.U. L1WAG, A.B. (Pol.

sc.). MA(URP), Research AssistantEMILY M_ MATEO, B.S. (Foreign

Service), Research Associate

REMEDIOS R. SOR IANO, A.B. (Econ.l,Research Assistant

Training Staff

ATHENA F. AZARCON, B.S. (Business Administration), M.U.R.P.,Training Associate

Lecturer

WILFRIDO C. PALARCA, A.B. (Sociology-Anthropology), M.E.P.

" on special detail