Balfour Declaration

Not to be confused with Balfour Declaration of 1926.

The Balfour Declaration was a letter dated 2 Novem-ber 1917 from the United Kingdom’s Foreign SecretaryArthur James Balfour to Walter Rothschild, 2nd BaronRothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, fortransmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britainand Ireland. It read:

His Majesty’s government view with favourthe establishment in Palestine of a nationalhome for the Jewish people, and will use theirbest endeavours to facilitate the achievementof this object, it being clearly understood thatnothing shall be done which may prejudice thecivil and religious rights of existing non-Jewishcommunities in Palestine, or the rights andpolitical status enjoyed by Jews in any othercountry.[1][2]

The text of the letter was published in the press one weeklater, on 9 November 1917.[3] The “Balfour Declaration”was later incorporated into both the Sèvres peace treatywith the Ottoman Empire, and the Mandate for Pales-tine. The original document is kept at the British Library.The declaration was in contrast to the McMahon-Husseincorrespondence, which promised the Arab independencemovement control of the Middle East territories “in thelimits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca”in exchange for revolting against the Ottoman Empireduring World War I.The issuance of the Declaration had many long lastingconsequences, and was a key moment in the lead-up tothe Arab–Israeli conflict, often referred to as the world’s“most intractable conflict”.[4][5][6]

1 Background

The background of British support under Balfour for aJewish homeland in Palestine, though idealistically em-bedded in 19th-century evangelical expectations[7] andChristian feelings that England was to play a role in theAdvent of the Millennium and Christ’s Second Coming,was primarily linked to geopolitical calculations. Thesewere originally precipitated by the Eastern Crisis afterMuhammad Ali occupied Syria and Palestine.[8]With thegeopolitical shakeup occasioned by the outbreak ofWWI,

the earlier calculations, that had lapsed for some time—Theodor Herzl's own attempts earlier to obtain interna-tional support for his project had failed—led to a renewalof strategic assessments and political bargaining regard-ing the Middle and Far East.[8]

1.1 Early Zionism

Further information: Zionism and Christian Zionism

Zionism arose in the late 19th century in reactionto anti-Semitic and exclusionary nationalist movementsin Europe.[9][10] Romantic nationalism in 19th centuryCentral and Eastern Europe had helped to set off theHaskalah or “Jewish Enlightenment”, creating a split inthe Jewish community between those who saw Judaismas their religion, and those who saw it as their ethnic-ity or nation.[9] The 1881-84 Anti-Jewish pogroms in theRussian Empire encouraged the growth of the latter iden-tity, resulting in the formation of the Hovevei Zion pio-neer organizations and the publication of Leon Pinsker'sAutoemancipation.[9]

In 1896, Theodor Herzl, a Jewish journalist living inAustria-Hungary, published Der Judenstaat (“The Jews’State” or “The State of the Jews”), in which he assertedthat the only solution to the "Jewish Question" in Europe,including growing antisemitism, was through the estab-lishment of a state for the Jews. This marked the emer-gence of political Zionism.[11] Ayear later, Herzl foundedthe Zionist Organization (ZO), which at its first congress,“called for the establishment of a home for the Jewishpeople in Palestine secured under public law”. Proposedmeasures to attain that goal included the promotion ofJewish settlement there, the organisation of Jews in thediaspora, the strengthening of Jewish feeling and con-sciousness, and preparatory steps to attain those neces-sary governmental grants.[12] Herzl died in 1904 withoutthe political standing that was required to carry out hisagenda of a Jewish home in Palestine.[13]

Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, later President of theWorld Zionist Organisation, began living in the UKin 1904 and met Balfour during his 1905-06 electioncampaign[14] in a session arranged by Charles Dreyfus,his Jewish constituency representative.[15]

During the first meeting between Weizmann and Bal-four in 1906, Balfour asked what Weizmann’s objec-tions were to the 1903 Uganda Scheme. The scheme,which had been proposed to Herzl by Colonial Secretary

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

Joseph Chamberlain following his trip to East Africa ear-lier in the year,[16] had been subsequently voted down fol-lowing Herzl’s death by the Seventh Zionist Congress in1905,[17] after two years of heated debate in the ZionistOrganization.[18] According to Weizmann’s memoir, theconversation went as follows:

“Mr. Balfour, supposing I was to offer youParis instead of London, would you take it?"He sat up, looked at me, and answered: “ButDr. Weizmann, we have London.” “That istrue,” I said, “but we had Jerusalem when Lon-don was a marsh.” He ... said two things whichI remember vividly. The first was: “Are theremany Jews who think like you?" I answered:“I believe I speak the mind of millions of Jewswhom you will never see and who cannot speakfor themselves.” ... To this he said: “If that isso you will one day be a force.”[19]

1.2 World War I

Further information: Timeline of World War I

In 1914, war broke out in Europe between the TripleEntente (Britain, France and the Russian Empire) andthe Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and laterthat year, the Ottoman Empire).Following Britain’s declaration of war on the OttomanEmpire in November 1914, Weizmann’s efforts pickedup speed.[20] On 10Dec 1914, he met with Zionist Britishcabinet member Herbert Samuel,[20] who believed Weiz-mann’s demands were too modest.[21] Two days later,Weizmann met Balfour again, for the first time since1906.[22] A month later, Herbert Samuel circulated amemorandum entitled The Future of Palestine to his cab-inet colleagues. The memorandum stated that “I am as-sured that the solution of the problem of Palestine whichwould be much the most welcome to the leaders and sup-porters of the Zionist movement throughout the worldwould be the annexation of the country to the BritishEmpire”.[23] Many further discussions followed, includ-ing a meeting between Lloyd-George and Weizmann in1916, of which Lloyd-George described in hisWarMem-oirs that Weizmann: "... explained his aspirations as tothe repatriation of the Jews to the sacred land they hadmade famous. That was the fount and origin of the fa-mous declaration about the National Home for the Jews inPalestine... As soon as I became Prime Minister I talkedthewholematter over withMrBalfour, whowas then For-eign Secretary.”[24]

1.3 The McMahon–Hussein Correspon-dence

Main article: McMahon–Hussein Correspondence

In 1915 the British High Commissioner to Egypt, HenryMcMahon, had exchanged letters with Hussein bin Ali,Sharif of Mecca, in which he had promised Hussein con-trol of Arab lands with the exception of “portions of Syria"lying to the west of “the districts of Damascus, Homs,Hama and Aleppo".[25][26] Palestine lay to the south-west of the Vilayet of Damascus and wasn't explicitlymentioned.[25] After the war the extent of the coastal ex-clusion was hotly disputed.[27]

On the basis of McMahon’s assurances, the Arab Revoltbegan on 5 June 1916. However, the British and Frenchalso secretly concluded the Sykes–Picot Agreement on16 May 1916.[28] This agreement divided many Arab ter-ritories into British- and French-administered areas andallowed for the internationalisation of Palestine.[28] Hus-sein learned of the agreement when it was leaked by thenew Soviet government in December 1917, but was sat-isfied by two disingenuous telegrams from Sir ReginaldWingate, High Commissioner of Egypt, assuring him thatthe British government’s commitments to the Arabs werestill valid and that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was not aformal treaty.[28]

Following the publication of the Declaration the Britishhad dispatched Commander David George Hogarth tosee Hussein in January 1918 bearing the message thatthe “political and economic freedom” of the Palestinianpopulation was not in question.[28] Hogarth reported thatHussein “would not accept an independent Jewish Statein Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such astate was contemplated by Great Britain”.[29] ContinuingArab disquiet over Allied intentions also led during 1918to the British Declaration to the Seven and the Anglo-French Declaration, the latter promising “the completeand final liberation of the peoples who have for so longbeen oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of na-tional governments and administrations deriving their au-thority from the free exercise of the initiative and choiceof the indigenous populations.”[28][30]

Lord Grey had been the Foreign Secretary during theMcMahon-Hussein negotiations. Speaking in the Houseof Lords on 27 March 1923, he made it clear that he en-tertained serious doubts as to the validity of the Britishgovernment’s interpretation of the pledges which he, asforeign secretary, had caused to be given to Hussein in1915. He called for all of the secret engagements regard-ing Palestine to be made public.[31] Many of the relevantdocuments in the National Archives were later declassi-fied and published.[32] Among them were the minutes ofa Cabinet Eastern Committee meeting, chaired by LordCurzon, which was held on 5 December 1918. Balfourwas in attendance. The minutes revealed that in laying

2.1 Academic interpretations 3

out the government’s position Curzon had explained that:

Palestine was included in the areas asto which Great Britain pledged itself thatthey should be Arab and independent in thefuture.[33]

1.4 Sykes–Picot Agreement

Further information: Sykes–Picot Agreement

In May 1916 the governments of the United Kingdom,France and Russia signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement,which defined their proposed spheres of influence andcontrol inWesternAsia should the Triple Entente succeedin defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War I.[34]The agreement effectively divided the Arab provinces ofthe Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian peninsula intoareas of future British and French control or influence.[34]

The agreement proposed that an “international adminis-tration” would be established in an area shaded brownon the agreement’s map, which was later to becomePalestine, and that the form of the administration wouldbe confirmed after consultation with both Russia andHussein.[34] Three months prior to the agreement of thememorandum, Sykes has been approached with a planby Herbert Samuel in the form of a memorandum whichSykes thought prudent to commit to memory.[35] Sykescommented to Samuel on the boundaries marked on amap attached to the memorandum, noting that the exclu-sion of Hebron and the “East of the Jordan” there wouldbe less to discuss with the Muslim community.[36]

2 Motivation for the Declaration

2.1 Academic interpretations

The war on the Western Front developed into a stalemateby 1917. The immediate effect of Balfour’s declaration,initially a mere declaration of intent, had little effect onthe military sphere,[37] but there were larger geopoliticalcalculations, some visible in Lloyd George’s list of ninefactors motivating his decision as Prime Minister to re-lease the declaration,[38] not least of which the view thata Jewish presence in Palestine would strengthen Britain’sposition on the Suez Canal and reinforce the route toGreat Britain’s imperial dominion in India.[38][39] Weiz-mann had argued that one consequence of such a pub-lic commitment by Great Britain, making the establish-ment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, one of the Allies’war aims, was that it would have three effects: it wouldswing Russia to maintain pressure on Germany’s EasternFront, since Jews had been prominent in the March Rev-olution of 1917. It would rally the large Jewish commu-nity in the United States to press for greater funding for

Ahead of the American entry into World War I, it became clearthat WoodrowWilson and his advisors were in favor of Zionism.Six months before the Declaration, this front page article fromtheCharlotte Observer notes the announcement that Balfour andWilson had “informally discussed” the project.

the American war effort, underway since April of thatyear; and, lastly, that it would undermine German Jew-ish support for Kaiser Wilhelm II.[40] Some historiansargue that British government’s decision reflected whatJames Gelvin calls 'patrician anti-Semitism' in the over-estimation of Jewish power in both the United States andRussia.[38]

Gelvin cites at least three reasons for why the British gov-ernment chose to support Zionist aspirations. Issuing theBalfour Declaration would appeal to two of WoodrowWilson's closest advisors, who were avid Zionists.

4 2 MOTIVATION FOR THE DECLARATION

The British did not know quite what tomake of President Woodrow Wilson and hisconviction (before America’s entrance into thewar) that the way to end hostilities was for bothsides to accept “peace without victory.” Two ofWilson’s closest advisors, Louis Brandeis andFelix Frankfurter, were avid Zionists. Howbetter to shore up an uncertain ally than by en-dorsing Zionist aims? The British adopted sim-ilar thinking when it came to the Russians, whowere in themidst of their revolution. Several ofthe most prominent revolutionaries, includingLeon Trotsky, were of Jewish descent. Whynot see if they could be persuaded to keep Rus-sia in the war by appealing to their latent Jew-ishness and giving them another reason to con-tinue the fight? ... These include not only thosealready mentioned but also Britain’s desire toattract Jewish financial resources.[41]

Jonathan Schneer writes:

Thus the view from Whitehall early in1916: If defeat was not imminent, neither wasvictory; and the outcome of the war of attritionon the Western Front could not be predicted.The colossal forces in a death-grip across Eu-rope and in Eurasia appeared to have canceledeach other out. Only the addition of signifi-cant new forces on one side or the other seemedlikely to tip the scale. Britain’s willingness,beginning early in 1916, to explore seriouslysome kind of arrangement with “world Jewry”or “Great Jewry” must be understood in thiscontext.[42]

At aWar Cabinet meeting, held on 31 October 1917, Bal-four suggested that a declaration favourable to Zionist as-pirations would allowGreat Britain “to carry on extremelyuseful propaganda both in Russia and America.”[43] Thecabinet believed that expressing support would appeal toJews inGermany andAmerica, and help the war effort;[44]they also hoped to encourage support from the large Jew-ish population in Russia.[43]

According to James Renton, Senior Lecturer at Edge HillUniversity, and author of The Zionist Masquerade: theBirth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance: 1914–1918, PrimeMinister David Lloyd George of the United Kingdomsupported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestinebecause “it would help secure post-war British control ofPalestine, which was strategically important as a buffer toEgypt and the Suez Canal.”[45]

American Zionism was still in its relative infancy; in 1914the Zionist Federation had a small budget of c.$5,000 andonly 12,000 members, despite an American Jewish pop-ulation of three million.[46] However, the Zionist organi-zations had recently succeeded in a show of force within

the American Jewish community in arranging a Jewishcongress to debate the Jewish problem as a whole.[47] Thisimpacted British and French government estimates of thebalance of power within the American Jewish public.[47]

In addition, the British intended to preempt the expectedFrench pressure for an international administration.[48][49]

2.2 Prime Minister Lloyd-George’s expla-nations

David Lloyd George, who was PrimeMinister at the timeof the Balfour Declaration, told the Palestine Royal Com-mission in 1937 that the Declaration was made “due topropagandist reasons.”[50] Citing the position of the Al-lied and Associated Powers in the ongoing war, LloydGeorge said, in the Report’s words:

In this critical situation it was believed thatJewish sympathy or the reverse would makea substantial difference one way or the otherto the Allied cause. In particular Jewish sym-pathy would confirm the support of Ameri-can Jewry, and would make it more difficultfor Germany to reduce her military commit-ments and improve her economic position onthe eastern front... The Zionist leaders gave usa definite promise that, if the Allies committedthemselves to giving facilities for the establish-ment of a national home for the Jews in Pales-tine, they would do their best to rally Jewishsentiment and support throughout the world tothe Allied cause. They kept their word.[50]

In his Memoirs, published in 1939, Lloyd George furtherelucidated his position:

The Balfour Declaration represented theconvinced policy of all parties in our countryand also in America, but the launching of it in1917 was due, as I have said, to propagandistreasons.... The Zionist Movement was excep-tionally strong in Russia and America.... It wasbelieved, also, that such a declaration wouldhave a potent influence upon world Jewry out-side Russia, and secure for the Entente the aidof Jewish financial interests. In America, theiraid in this respect would have a special valuewhen the Allies had almost exhausted the goldand marketable securities available for Amer-ican purchases. Such were the chief consid-erations which, in 1917, impelled the BritishGovernment towards making a contract withJewry.[24]

3.2 Jewish national home vs. Jewish state 5

Lord Balfour’s desk, in the Museum of the Jewish Diaspora, inTel Aviv

3 Drafting

3.1 Authors and evolution of the draft

Under the new Conservative government which tookpower in October 1922, attempts were made to identifythe background to the drafting.[51] In December 1922,Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh of the new Middle East de-partment of the Foreign Office discovered that the cor-respondence prior to the declaration was not available inthe Colonial Office, 'although Foreign Office papers wereunderstood to have been lengthy and to have covered aconsiderable period'.[51] A Foreign Office note in a Cab-inet Paper from January 1923 stated that:

little is known of how the policy repre-sented by the Declaration was first given form.Four, or perhaps five men were chiefly con-cerned in the labour – the Earl of Balfour,the late Sir Mark Sykes, and Messrs. Weiz-mann and Sokolow, with perhaps Lord Roth-schild as a figure in the background. Nego-tiations seem to have been mainly oral andby means of private notes and memoranda ofwhich only the scantiest records seem to beavailable.[lower-alpha 1]

Declassification of Government archives have allowedmodern scholarship to piece together the choreographyof the drafting of the declaration. In his widely cited1961 book, Leonard Stein published four previous draftsof the declaration.[53] Stein illustrated the evolution of thedrafting from the original proposal by the Zionist Orga-nization, followed by various iterations. Subsequent au-thors have debated as to who the “primary author” re-ally was. In his posthumously published 1981 book TheAnglo-American Establishment, Georgetown Universityhistory professor Carroll Quigley explained his view thatthe primary author of the declaration was Alfred, LordMilner,[54] and more recently, William D. Rubinstein,

Professor of Modern History at Aberystwyth Univer-sity, Wales, wrote that Conservative politician and pro-Zionist Leo Amery, as Assistant Secretary to the Britishwar cabinet in 1917, was the main author of the BalfourDeclaration.[55]

3.2 Jewish national home vs. Jewish state

Further information: Homeland for the Jewish people

“This is a very carefully worded document and but for thesomewhat vague phrase “A National Home for the Jew-ish People” might be considered sufficiently unalarming...But the vagueness of the phrase cited has been a causeof trouble from the commencement. Various persons inhigh positions have used language of the loosest kind cal-culated to convey a very different impression to the moremoderate interpretation which can be put upon the words.President Wilson brushed away all doubts as to what wasintended from his point of view when, in March 1919,he said to the Jewish leaders in America, “I am more-over persuaded that the allied nations, with the fullest con-currence of our own Government and people are agreedthat in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a JewishCommonwealth.” The late President Roosevelt declaredthat one of the Allies peace conditions should be that“Palestine must be made a Jewish State.” Mr. WinstonChurchill has spoken of a “Jewish State” and Mr. BonarLaw has talked in Parliament of “restoring Palestine tothe Jews”."Report of the Palin Commission, August 1920[57]

The term “national home” in the Declaration was inten-tionally ambiguous.[58] For example, the phrase 'nationalhomeland' had no legal value or precedent in internationallaw,[59] so its meaning was thus unclear when comparedto other terms such as 'state'.[59] The choice of statingsuch a homeland would be found 'in Palestine' rather than'of Palestine' was also no accident.[59] Explication of thewording has been sought in the correspondence leading tothe final version of the declaration. The phrase “nationalhome” was intentionally used instead of “state” becauseof opposition to the Zionist program within the BritishCabinet.[59] Following discussion of the initial draft theCabinet Secretary, Mark Sykes, met with the Zionist ne-gotiators to clarify their aims. His official report backto the Cabinet categorically stated that the Zionists didnot want “to set up a Jewish Republic or any other formof state in Palestine immediately”[60] but rather preferredsome form of protectorate as provided in the PalestineMandate. In approving the Balfour Declaration, LeopoldAmery, one of the Secretaries to the British War Cabinetof 1917–18, testified under oath to the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry in January 1946 from his personalknowledge that:

“The phrase 'the establishment in Pales-

6 4 REACTION TO THE DECLARATION

tine of a National Home for the Jewish people'was intended and understood by all concernedto mean at the time of the Balfour Declara-tion that Palestine would ultimately become a'Jewish Commonwealth' or a 'Jewish State', ifonly Jews came and settled there in sufficientnumbers.”[61]

David Lloyd George, who was PrimeMinister at the timeof the Balfour Declaration, told the Palestine Royal Com-mission in 1937 that it was intended that Palestine maybecome a Jewish Commonwealth if and when Jews “hadbecome a definite majority of the inhabitants":

The idea was, and this was the interpre-tation put upon it at the time, that a JewishState was not to be set up immediately by thePeace Treaty without reference to the wishesof the majority of the inhabitants. On theother hand, it was contemplated that when thetime arrived for according representative in-stitutions to Palestine, if the Jews had mean-while responded to the opportunity affordedthem by the idea of a national home and hadbecome a definite majority of the inhabitants,then Palestine would thus become a JewishCommonwealth.[50]

Both the Zionist Organization and the British govern-ment devoted efforts to denying that a state was the in-tention over the following decades, including in WinstonChurchill's 1922 White Paper.[lower-alpha 2] However, inprivate, many British officials agreed with the interpre-tation of the Zionists that a state would be establishedwhen a Jewish majority was achieved;[62] in particular,at a private meeting on 22 July 1922 at Balfour’s home,both Balfour and Lloyd-George admitted that an eventualJewish state had always been their intention.[63][64]

The initial draft of the declaration, contained in a let-ter sent by Rothschild to Balfour, referred to the princi-ple “that Palestine should be reconstituted as the NationalHome of the Jewish people.” [65] In the final text, the wordthat was replaced with in to avoid committing the en-tirety of Palestine to this purpose. Similarly, the origi-nal drafts of Rothschild, Balfour and Milner did not in-clude the commitment that nothing should be done whichmight prejudice the rights of the non-Jewish communi-ties. These changes came about partly as the result of theurgings of Edwin Samuel Montagu, an influential anti-Zionist Jew and Secretary of State for India. Montagu,the only Jewish member of the British cabinet, voiced hisopposition by declaring:

'The policy of HisMajesty’s Government isanti-Semitic in result and will prove a rallyingground for anti-Semites in every country of theworld.'[66]

The draft was circulated and during October the govern-ment received replies from various representatives of theJewish community. Lord Rothschild took exception tothe new proviso on the basis that it presupposed the pos-sibility of a danger to non-Zionists, which he denied.[67]At San Remo, as shown in the transcript of the San Remomeeting on the evening of 24 April, the French proposedadding to the savings clause so that it would save for non-Jewish communities their “political rights” as well as theircivil and religious rights. The French proposal was re-jected.

4 Reaction to the Declaration

4.1 Arab opposition

The most popular Palestinian Arab newspaper, Filastin (LaPalestine), published a four-page editorial addressed to LordBalfour in March 1925.

A delegation of the Muslim-Christian Association,headed by Musa al-Husayni, expressed public disap-proval on 3 November 1918, one day after the ZionistCommission parade marking the first anniversary of theBalfour Declaration.[68] They handed a petition signed bymore than 100 notables to Ronald Storrs, the OETA mil-itary governor:

We have noticed yesterday a large crowd

4.3 Response by Central Powers 7

of Jews carrying banners and over-running thestreets shouting words which hurt the feelingand wound the soul. They pretend with openvoice that Palestine, which is the Holy Land ofour fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors,which has been inhabited by the Arabs for longages, who loved it and died in defending it, isnow a national home for them... We Arabs,Muslim and Christian, have always sympa-thized profoundly with the persecuted Jews andtheir misfortunes in other countries... but thereis wide difference between such sympathy andthe acceptance of such a nation...ruling over usand disposing of our affairs.[69][70]

The group also protested the carrying of new “whiteand blue banners with two inverted triangles in themiddle”,[71] drawing the attention of the British author-ities to the serious consequences of any political implica-tions in raising the banners.[71]

Balfour’s stance was seen as a betrayal of British under-standings with Arabs.[40] Later that month, on the firstanniversary of the occupation of Jaffa by the British, theMuslim-Christian Association sent a lengthy memoran-dum and petition to the military governor protesting oncemore any formation of a Jewish state.[72]

4.2 Zionist reaction

Balfour Declaration as published in The Times, 9 November1917

The publication of the intent galvanized Zionism, whichfinally had obtained an official charter. In the ongoingSinai and Palestine Campaign, both Gaza and Jaffa fellwithin several days. Once under British military occupa-tion, large transfers of funds were possible, and a ma-jor effort began to drain the marshy land of the Val-ley of Jezreel, whose redemption as the breadbasket ofPalestine became the priority of the Third Aliyah settlers,mainly from Eastern Europe.[37]

Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, the principalZionist leaders based in London, had asked for the recon-stitution of Palestine as “the” Jewish national home. Assuch, the declaration fell short of Zionist expectations.[73]

The declaration spurred an extraordinary increase in ad-herents of American Zionism; in 1914 the 200 Ameri-can Zionist societies comprised a total of 7,500members,which grew to 30,000 members in 600 societies in 1918and 149,000 members in 1919.[47]

4.3 Response by Central Powers

Immediately following the publication of the declara-tion Germany entered negotiations with Turkey to putforward counter proposals. A German-Jewish Soci-ety was formed: Vereinigung jüdischer OrganisationenDeutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte der Juden des Os-tens (V.J.O.D.) and in January 1918 the Turkish GrandVizier, Talaat, issued a statement which promised legis-lation by which “all justifiable wishes of the Jews in Pales-tine would be able to find their fulfilment”.[74]

4.4 Evolution of British opinion

“It is said that the effect of the Balfour Declaration wasto leave the Moslems and Christians dumbfounded... It isimpossible to minimise the bitterness of the awakening.They considered that they were to be handed over to anoppression which they hated far more than the Turk’s andwere aghast at the thought of this domination... Promi-nent people openly talk of betrayal and that England hassold the country and received the price... Towards theAdministration [the Zionists] adopted the attitude of “Wewant the Jewish State and we won't wait”, and they did nothesitate to avail themselves of every means open to themin this country and abroad to force the hand of an Admin-istration bound to respect the “Status Quo” and to com-mit it, and thereby future Administrations, to a policy notcontemplated in the Balfour Declaration... What morenatural than that [the Moslems and Christians] should failto realise the immense difficulties the Administration wasand is labouring under and come to the conclusion that theopenly published demands of the Jews were to be grantedand the guarantees in the Declaration were to become buta dead letter?"Report of the Palin Commission, August 1920[57]

8 8 CITATIONS

In October 1919, Lord Curzon succeeded Balfour asForeign Secretary. Curzon had opposed the Declarationprior to its publication and therefore determined to pur-sue a policy in line with its “narrower and more prudentrather than the wider interpretation”.[75] Following BonarLaw's appointment as Prime Minister in late 1922, Cur-zonwrote to Bonar Law that he regarded the Balfour Dec-laration as “the worst” of Britain’s Middle East commit-ments and “a striking contradiction of our publicly de-clared principles.”[76]

In August 1920, the report of the Palin Commission, thefirst in a long line of Commissions of Inquiry on the ques-tion of Palestine during theMandate period,[77] noted that“The Balfour Declaration... is undoubtedly the startingpoint of the whole trouble”. The conclusion of the re-port mentioned the Balfour Declaration three times, stat-ing that “the causes of the alienation and exasperation ofthe feelings of the population of Palestine” included:

• Inability to reconcile the Allies’ declared policyof self-determination with the Balfour Declaration,giving rise to a sense of betrayal and intense anxietyfor their future;

• Misapprehension of the true meaning of the BalfourDeclaration and forgetfulness of the guarantees de-termined therein, due to the loose rhetoric of politi-cians and the exaggerated statements and writings ofinterested persons, chiefly Zionists; and

• Zionist indiscretion and aggression, since the Bal-four Declaration aggravating such fears.[78]

British public and government opinion became increas-ingly less favourable to the commitment that had beenmade to Zionist policy. In February 1922, WinstonChurchill telegraphed Herbert Samuel asking for cuts inexpenditure and noting:

In bothHouses of Parliament there is grow-ing movement of hostility, against Zionist pol-icy in Palestine, which will be stimulated by re-cent Northcliffe articles.[79] I do not attach un-due importance to this movement, but it is in-creasingly difficult to meet the argument thatit is unfair to ask the British taxpayer, alreadyoverwhelmed with taxation, to bear the cost ofimposing on Palestine an unpopular policy.[80]

5 Longer term impact

The declaration had two indirect consequences, the emer-gence of a Jewish state and a chronic state of conflictbetween Arabs and Jews throughout the Middle East.[40]Starting in 1920, the Intercommunal conflict in Manda-tory Palestine broke out, which widened into the regional

Arab–Israeli conflict, primarily from 1948-73 but extend-ing in more limited manner to 2006, and finally becamethe Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the ongoing local conflictwhich began also began in 1948 and whose primary phasebegan following the 1964 foundation of the PLO.Jonathan Schneer’s 2010 study concluded that becausethe buildup to the declaration was characterized by “con-tradictions, deceptions, misinterpretations, and wishfulthinking”, the declaration sowed dragon’s teeth and “pro-duced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvestingeven today.”[81][82] The foundational stone for modern Is-rael had been laid, but the prediction that this would laythe groundwork for harmonious Arab-Jewish cooperationproved to be wishful thinking.[83]

The implementation of the declaration fed a disenchant-ment among the Arabs that alienated them from theBritish Mandatory Authorities.[40] Palestinian historianRashid Khalidi has argued that following the BalfourDeclaration there ensued “what amounts to a hundredyears of war against the Palestinian people.”[84]

6 See also

• Proposals for a Jewish state

• British Mandate for Palestine (legal instrument)

7 Notes[1] Full text of note included CO 733/58, Secret Cabinet Pa-

per CP 60 (23), 'Palestine and the Balfour Declaration,January 1923. FO unofficial note added 'little referring tothe Balfour Declaration among such papers as have beenpreserved'. Shuckburgh’s memo asserts that 'as the offi-cial records are silent, it can only be assumed that suchdiscussions as had taken place were of an informal andprivate character'.[52]

[2] See the report of the United Nations Special Committeeon Palestine, UN Document A/364, 3 September 1947

8 Citations[1] “The Balfour Declaration”. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs. 2013.

[2] Yapp, M.E. (1 September 1987). The Making of the Mod-ern Near East 1792–1923. Harlow, England: Longman.p. 290. ISBN 978-0-582-49380-3.

[3] Schneer 2010, p. 342.

[4] Chris Rice, quoted in Munayer Salim J, Loden Lisa,Through My Enemy’s Eyes: Envisioning Reconciliationin Israel-Palestine, quote: “The Palestinian-Israeli dividemay be the most intractable conflict of our time.”

9

[5] Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-fireAgreementsand the Durability of Peace, page 67, “Britain’s contra-dictory promises to Arabs and Jews during World WarI sowed the seeds of what would become the interna-tional community’s most intractable conflict later in thecentury.”

[6] Avner Falk, Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoana-lytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Chapter 1, page8, “Most experts agree that the Arab-Israeli conflict isthe most intractable conflict in our world, yet very fewscholars have produced any psychological explanation—let alone a satisfactory one—of this conflict’s intractabil-ity”

[7] Lewis, Donald (2 January 2014). The Origins of ChristianZionism: Lord Shaftesbury And Evangelical Support ForA Jewish Homeland. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. p. 380. ISBN 9781107631960.

[8] Freddy Liebreich (2004). Britain’s Naval and Political Re-action to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine, 1945-1949. Routledge. pp. 8-9.

[9] LeVine, Mark; Mossberg, Mathias (2014). One Land,Two States: Israel and Palestine as Parallel States. Uni-versity of California Press. p. 211. ISBN 978-0-520-95840-1. The parents of Zionism were not Judaism andtradition, but anti-Semitism and nationalism. The idealsof the French Revolution spread slowly across Europe, fi-nally reaching the Pale of Settlement in the Russian Em-pire and helping to set off the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlight-enment. This engendered a permanent split in the Jewishworld, between those who held to a halachic or religious-centric vision of their identity and those who adopted inpart the racial rhetoric of the time and made the Jewishpeople into a nation. This was helped along by the waveof pogroms in Eastern Europe that set two million Jews toflight; most wound up in America, but some chose Pales-tine. A driving force behind this was the Hovevei Zionmovement, which worked from 1882 to develop a Hebrewidentity that was distinct from Judaism as a religion.

[10] Gelvin, James L. (13 January 2014). The Israel-PalestineConflict: One Hundred Years of War. Cambridge Univer-sity Press. p. 93. ISBN 978-1-107-47077-4. The fact thatPalestinian nationalism developed later than Zionism andindeed in response to it does not in any way diminish thelegitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it less validthan Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition to some“other”. Why else would there be the need to specify whoyou are? And all nationalisms are defined by what theyoppose. As we have seen, Zionism itself arose in reactionto anti-Semitic and exclusionary nationalist movements inEurope. It would be perverse to judge Zionism as some-how less valid than European anti-Semitism or those na-tionalisms. Furthermore, Zionism itself was also definedby its opposition to the indigenous Palestinian inhabitantsof the region. Both the “conquest of land” and the “con-quest of labor” slogans that became central to the domi-nant strain of Zionism in the Yishuv originated as a resultof the Zionist confrontation with the Palestinian “other”.

[11] Friedman, Isaiah. “Herzl, Theodor.” Encyclopaedia Ju-daica. Ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. 2nd

ed. Vol. 9. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007.54–66. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 15 April2010.

[12] Avish, Shimon. “Herzl, Theodor [1860–1904].” Encyclo-pedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa. Ed.Philip Mattar. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. New York: MacmillanReference USA, 2004. 1021–1022. Gale Virtual Refer-ence Library. Web. 15 April 2010.

[13] Bunt, Martin; Cleveland, William L. (2010). A Historyof the Modern Middle East. p. 456. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0.

[14] Weizmann, Current Biography 1942, pp.877–80.

[15] Harry Defries (4 February 2014). Conservative Party At-titudes to Jews 1900-1950. Routledge. p. 51. ISBN 978-1-135-28462-6. Balfour had, at the least, acquiesced inChamberlain’s earlier efforts to assist the Jews in findinga territory to establish a Jewish settlement. According tohis biographer he was interested enough in Zionism at theend of 1905 to allow his Jewish constituency party chair-man, Charles Dreyfus, to organise a meeting with Weiz-mann. It is possible that he was intrigued by the rejectionby the Zionist Congress of the 'Uganda' offer. It is unlikelythat Balfour was 'converted' to Zionism by this encounterdespite this view being propounded by Weizmann and en-dorsed by Balfour’s biographer. Balfour had just resignedas prime minister when he met Weizmann. Despite hissubsequent dramatic defeat at the polls by the Liberals andhis ultimate resignation as Party leader in 1911, he was tostage a renaissance politically. His advice was sought bythe Liberal administration on matters of defence and withthe outbreak of the First World War his opinion was ineven greater demand. In December 1914 Weizmann metBalfour again.

[16] Rovner 2014, p. 51-52: “In the spring of 1903 the fastid-iously dressed sixty-six-year-old secretary was fresh froma trip to British possessions in Africa... Whatever the gen-esis of the idea, Chamberlain received Herzl in his officejust weeks after the Kishinev pogroms. He fixed Herzlin his monocle and offered his help. “I have seen a landfor you on my travels,” Chamberlain told him, “and that’sUganda. It’s not on the coast, but farther inland the climatebecomes excellent even for Europeans… [a]nd I thoughtto myself that would he a land for Dr. Herzl.” "

[17] Rovner 2014, p. 81: “On the afternoon of the fourth dayof the Congress a weary Nordau brought three resolutionsbefore the delegates: (1) that the Zionist Organization di-rect all future settlement efforts solely to Palestine; (2) thatthe Zionist Organization thank the British government forits other of an autonomous territory in East Africa; and(3) that only those Jews who declare their allegiance to theBasel Program may become members of the Zionist Or-ganization.” Zangwill objected… When Nordau insistedon the Congress’s right to pass the resolutions regardless,Zangwill was outraged. “You will be charged before thebar of history,” he challenged Nordau… From approx-imately 1:30 p.m. on Sunday, July 30, 1905, a Zionistwould henceforth he defined as someone who adhered tothe Basel Program and the only “authentic interpretation”of that program restricted settlement activity exclusively

10 8 CITATIONS

to Palestine. Zangwill and his supporters could not acceptNordau’s “authentic interpretation” which they believedwould lead to an abandonment of the Jewishmasses and ofHerzl’s vision. One territorialist claimed that Ussishkin’svoting bloc had in fact “buried political Zionism”.”

[18] Rovner 2014, p. 51-81.

[19] Weizmann, Trial and Error, p.111, as quoted in W. Lac-quer, The History of Zionism, 2003, ISBN 978-1-86064-932-5. p.188

[20] Weizmann 1983, p. 122: “The entry of Turkey into thefray and the remarks made by the Premier in his Guildhallspeech were an additional impulse towards proceedingwith the reconnoitring work at a higher speed... An oppor-tunity offered itself to discuss the Jewish problems withMr. C.P. Scott (Editor of the Manchester Guardian)…Mr. Scott, who has, I believe, given the whole problem avery careful and sympathetic attention, was good enoughto promise that he would talk to Mr. Lloyd George on thesubject… As it happened, Mr. Lloyd George, having sev-eral engagements for the week suggested that I should seeMr. Herbert Samuel, and an interview took place at hisoffice. [Footnote: 10 Dec. 1914]"

[21] Weizmann 1983, p. 122b: “He believed that my demandswere too modest, that big things would have to be done inPalestine; he himself would move and would expect Jewryto move immediately the military situation was clearedup… The Jews would have to bring sacrifices and he wasprepared to do so. At this point I ventured to ask in whichway the plans of Mr. Samuel were more ambitious thanmine. Mr. Samuel preferred not to enter into a discussionof his plans, as he would like to keep them ‘liquid’, but hesuggested that the Jews would have to build railways, har-bours, a university, a network of schools, etc… He alsothinks that perhaps the Temple may be rebuilt, as a sym-bol of Jewish unity, of course, in a modernised form.”

[22] Weizmann 1983, p. 126: “On the suggestion of BaronJames, I went to see Sir Philip Magnus with whom I hada lengthy conversation, and he expressed his willingnessto cooperate, provided that great discretion was used… Iasked Sir Philip his opinion of the advisability of seeingMr. Balfour, and he thought that an interview with Mr.Balfour would be of very great interest and value… Atone of my visits to London I wrote to Mr. Balfour and gotan appointment with him on Saturday the same week at 12o’clock in his house.[Footnote: 12 Dec. 1914] I spoke tohim practically in the same strain as I did to Mr. Samuel,but the whole turn of our conversation was more academicthan practical.”

[23] Kamel 2015, p. 106.

[24] David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference,Volume II, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939;chapter XXIII, pp. 724-734

[25] Huneidi 2001, p. 65.

[26] See the original letter here, and the article McMahon–Hussein Correspondence for further details.

[27] Huneidi 2001, p. 65-70.

[28] Khouri, Fred John (1985). The Arab-Israeli Dilemma.Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-8156-2340-3, pp.8–10.

[29] Huneidi 2001, p. 66.

[30] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex A, para-graph 19.

[31] Report of a Committee Set Up To Consider CertainCorrespondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and TheSharif of Mecca Archived January 30, 2009, at theWayback Machine.

[32] Primarily following the Public Records Act 1958

[33] Ingrams 2009, p. 48: “Ingrams cites the UK Archive filesPRO CAB 27/24”

[34] Schneer 2010, p. 75-86.

[35] Kamel 2015, p. 109: “In reference to a 27 February 1916letter, Kamel quotes: "'I read the memorandum', clarifiedSykes to Samuel shortly before departing for Russia, 'andhave committed it to memory'"

[36] Sanders, Ronald (January 1984). The high walls ofJerusalem: a history of the Balfour Declaration and thebirth of the British mandate for Palestine. Holt, Rine-hart and Winston. p. 347. ISBN 978-0-03-053971-8.Sanders quotes Sykes’s letter as follows: “By excludingHebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to discusswith the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomesthe only matter of vital importance to discuss with themand further does away with any contact with the bedouins,who never cross the river except on business. I imaginethat the principal object of Zionism is the realization ofthe ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather thanboundaries or extent of territory. The moment I return Iwill let you know how things stand at Pd.”

[37] Rafael N. Rosenzweig, The Economic Consequences ofZionism, BRILL, 1989 pp.25-28.

[38] Gelvin 2014, p. 82ff.

[39] Gresh, Alain; Vidal, Dominique (2004). The New A-Z ofthe Middle East (2 ed.). I.B.Tauris. p. 42.

[40] Tim Watts, 'The Balfour Declaration,' in Spencer C.Tucker, Priscilla Roberts (eds.), Encyclopedia of theArab-Israeli Conflict, The: A Political, Social, and Mil-itary History: A Political, Social, and Military History,ABC-CLIO, 2008 p.190.

[41] Gelvin 2014, p. 82-83.

[42] Schneer 2010, p. 152.

[43] Ingrams 2009, p. 16.

[44] Wall Street Journal review of Jonathan Shneer, BalfourDeclaration “As Mr. Schneer documents, the declarationwas, amongmuch else, part of a campaign to foster world-wide Jewish support for the Allied war effort, not least inthe U.S.”

11

[45] James Renton, The Balfour Declaration: its origins andconsequences, Jewish Quarterly, Spring 2008, Number209

[46] Shareen Blair Brysac; Karl E. Meyer (12 October 2009).Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East.W. W. Norton. p. 115. ISBN 978-0-393-34243-7.As the lawyer and historian David Fromkin has shrewdlynoted, out of an estimated three million Jews living in theUnited States in 1914, a mere twelve thousand belongedto an amateurishly led Zionist Federation, which claimedbut five hundred members in New York. Its annual bud-get prior to 1914 never exceeded $5,200, and the largestsingle gift it received totalled $200.

[47] Reinharz, Jehuda (1988). “Zionism in the USA on theEve of the Balfour Declaration”. Studies in Zionism 9 (2):131–145. doi:10.1080/13531048808575933. “At theZionist Emergency Conference in August 1914, Poalei-Zion demanded the convening of a Jewish congress whichwould debate the Jewish problem as a whole... During ayear of fruitless discussions, the AJC would only agreeonly to a limited convention of specific organizations,rather than a congress based on democratic elections. InMarch 1916, therefore, the Zionists invited a number ofother organizations to set up a congress. The internal strifeamong American Jewry, which had been so widely feared,broke out in full force... The elections were held in June,two months after the United States had entered the war;325,000 voted, 75,000 of whom were from the Zionistworkers’ camp. This was an impressive demonstrationof the ability of the immigrant Zionists to rally massivesupport. Immediately after came President Wilson’s sug-gestion to Wise not to hold the congress while the warwas on, and the opening session was thus postponed fromSeptember 2, 1917, until “peace negotiations will be inprospect”. The PZCs acceptance of the deferment againaroused the ire of supporters of the congress, who de-scribed it as a degrading surrender. However, in the eyesof other observers of that generation, the matter took ona different form. British and French estimates of the bal-ance of power in the American Jewish public were greatlyaffected by this success in the struggle for a congress. Itwas a victory for Zionists under the leadership of closeadvisers to the Wilson Administration, such as Brandeisand Frankfurter, against the desires of the bankers fromWall Street, the AJC, and the National Workers’ Commit-tee. It spurred an impressive growth in organized mem-bership: from 7,500 in 200 Zionist societies in 1914 to30,000 in 600 societies in 1918. One year later, the num-ber of members reached 149,000. In addition, the FAZand the PZC collected millions of dollars during the waryears. This demonstration of support for Zionism amongthe masses of American Jews played a vital role in theBritish considerations which led to the Balfour Declara-tion. The American Government (or, at least, the StateDepartment), which did not particularly want to supportthe Declaration, did so almost in spite of itself – appar-ently because of the growing strength of Zionists in theUnited States.”

[48] Grainger, John D. (2006). The Battle for Palestine, 1917.Woodbridge: Boydell Press. ISBN 978-1-84383-263-8.It was later lauded as a great humanitarian gesture and

condemned as a wicked plot, but the preceding Cabinetdiscussions about it show that it was the product of hard-headed political calculation… It was argued that such adeclaration would encourage support for the Allies in theUnited States and in Russia, the two countries in the worldwhich had very large Jewish populations. But behind it allwas the knowledge that, if Britain promoted such a policy,it would necessarily be up to her to implement it, and thiswould in turn mean that she would have to exercise polit-ical control over Palestine. One aim of the Balfour Dec-laration was thus to freeze out France (and anyone else)from any post-war presence in Palestine. p. 178

[49] Barr 2011, p. 60: “To ward off the inevitable French pres-sure for an international administration once Palestine hadbeen conquered, the British government nowmade its sup-port for Zionism public.”

[50] Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd 5479, 1937,pp23–24.

[51] Huneidi 2001, p. 61-64.

[52] Huneidi 2001, p. 256: “The 'most comprehensive expla-nation' of the origin of the Balfour Declaration the For-eign Office was able to provide was contained in a small'unofficial' note of Jan 1923 affirming that...”

[53] Stein 1961, p. 664: “Appendix: Successive drafts andfinal text of the Balfour Declaration”

[54] Quigley, Carroll (June 1981). The Anglo-American Estab-lishment. New York: Books in Focus. p. 169. ISBN 978-0-945001-01-0. This declaration, which is always knownas the Balfour Declaration, should rather be called “theMilner Declaration,” since Milner was the actual drafts-man and was, apparently, its chief supporter in the WarCabinet. This fact was not made public until 21 July 1937.At that time Ormsby-Gore, speaking for the governmentin Commons, said, “The draft as originally put up by LordBalfour was not the final draft approved by the War Cab-inet. The particular draft assented to by the War Cabi-net and afterwards by the Allied Governments and by theUnited States...and finally embodied in the Mandate, hap-pens to have been drafted by LordMilner. The actual finaldraft had to be issued in the name of the Foreign Secre-tary, but the actual draftsman was Lord Milner.

[55] William D. Rubinstein (2000). “The Secret ofLeopold Amery”. Historical Research (Institute ofHistorical Research) 73 (181, June 2000): 175–196.doi:10.1111/1468-2281.00102.

[56] Halpern, Ben (1987). A Clash of Heroes : Brandeis,Weizmann, and American Zionism: Brandeis, Weizmann,and American Zionism. Oxford University Press, USA. p.163. ISBN 978-0-19-536489-7.

[57] Wikisource:Palin Report

[58] Makovsky, Michael (2007). Churchill’s Promised Land:Zionism and Statecraft. Yale University Press. p. 76.ISBN 0-300-11609-8. The definition of “national home”was left intentionally ambiguous.

12 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY

[59] Gelvin 2014, p. 82ff: “The words of the Balfour Decla-ration were carefully chosen. It was no accident that thedeclaration contains the phrase “in Palestine” rather than“of Palestine”, nor was it an accident that the foreign officewould use the words “national home” rather than the moreprecise “state” - in spite of the fact that “national home”has no precedent or standing in international law. Andwhat exactly do “view with favour” and “use their best en-deavours” mean? The seeming ambiguities of the declara-tion reflect debates not only within the British governmentbut within the British Zionist and jewish communities aswell.”

[60] Strawson, John (2010). Partitioning Palestine: Legal Fun-damentalism in the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict. London:Penguin Books. p. 33. ISBN 9780745323244.

[61] The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1984.Martinus Nijhoff. 1997. p. 48. ISBN 9789041103383.

[62] Mansfield, Peter (1992). The Arabs. London: PenguinBooks. pp. 176–77.

[63] Gilmour, David (1996). “The Unregarded Prophet: LordCurzon and the Palestine Question”. Journal of PalestineStudies 25 (3): 64. JSTOR 2538259.

[64] Meinertzhagen, Richard (1959). Middle East Diary,1917-1956. Cresset Press. p. 104. L.G. and A.J.B bothsaid that by the Declaration they always meant an eventualJewish State

[65] Stein 1961, p. 470.

[66] Saree Makdisi, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occu-pation,W. W. Norton & Company, 2010 p.239.

[67] Ingrams 2009, p. 13.

[68] Wasserstein 1991, p. 31.

[69] Wasserstein 1991, p. 32.

[70] Storrs to OETA headquarters, 4 Nov. 1918 (ISA2/140/4A)

[71] Huneidi 2001, p. 32

[72] Huneidi 2001, p. 32a, Huneidi cites: 'Petition from theMoslem-Christian Association in Jaffa, to the MilitaryGovernor, on the occasion of the First Anniversary ofBritish Entry into Jaffa', 16 November 1918, Zu'aytir pa-pers pp. 7–8

[73] Balfour Declaration. (2007). In Encyclopædia Britannica.Retrieved 12 August 2007, from Encyclopædia BritannicaOnline.

[74] MacMunn, Lieut.-General Sir George (1928) MilitaryOperations. Egypt and Palestine. From the outbreak ofwar with Germany to June 1917. HMSO. Pages 219,220.

[75] Curzon to Allenby, 16 July 1920, CP 112/799, as quotedin Gilmour, page 66

[76] Curzon to Bonar Law, 14 December 1922, Bonar LawPapers, 111/12/46, as quoted in Gilmour, page 67

[77] Huneidi, 2001, p.35

[78] Kattan, Victor (June 2009). From coexistence to conquest:international law and the origins of the Arab-Israeli con-flict, 1891-1949. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-2579-8.

[79] Defries, Harry (2001). Conservative Party Attitudes toJews, 1900-1950. Psychology Press. p. 103. ISBN9780714652214. Retrieved 2014-07-12.

[80] Huneidi 2001, p. 57, Huneidi cites: CO 733/18, Churchillto Samuel, Telegram, Private and Personal, 25 February1922

[81] Schneer 2010, p. 370: “Because it was unpredictable andcharacterized by contradictions, deceptions, misinterpre-tations, and wishful thinking, the lead-up to the BalfourDeclaration sowed dragon’s teeth. It produced a murder-ous harvest, and we go on harvesting even today”

[82] Review: ‘The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of theArab-Israeli Conflict’, JimMiles, April 4, 2012, “The con-clusion reached by Schneer, stated twice, “Because it wasunpredictable and characterized by contradictions, decep-tions, misinterpretations, and wishful thinking, the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration sowed dragon’s teeth…. Itproduced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvestingeven today.""

[83] Schneer 2010, p. 361.

[84] Ian Black,'Middle East still rocking from first world warpacts made 100 years ago ,' The Guardian 30 December2015.

9 Bibliography• Barr, James (2011). A Line in the Sand: Britain,France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East.Simon & Schuster. p. 60. ISBN 978-1-84983-903-7.

• Gelvin, James (2014) [2002]. The Israel-PalestineConflict: One Hundred Years of War (3 ed.).Cambridge University Press.

• Huneidi, Sahar (2001). A Broken Trust: Sir HerbertSamuel, Zionism and the Palestinians. I.B.Tauris. p.84. ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5.

• Ingrams, Doreen (2009). Palestine papers: 1917-1922: seeds of conflict. Eland. ISBN 978-1-906011-38-3.

• Kamel, Lorenzo (2015). Imperial Perceptions ofPalestine: British Influence and Power in Late Ot-toman Times. British Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-78453-129-4.

• Rovner, Adam (2014). In the Shadow of Zion:Promised Lands Before Israel. NYU Press. ISBN978-1-4798-1748-1.

• Schneer, Jonathan (2010). The Balfour Declaration:The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. RandomHouse. ISBN 978-1-4000-6532-5.

13

• Smith, Charles (2007). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s.

• Stein, Leonard (1961). The Balfour Declaration.New York: Simon & Schuster.

• Wasserstein, Bernard (1991). The British in Pales-tine: The Mandatory Government and Arab-JewishConflict, 1917-1929. B. Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-17574-2.

• Weizmann, Chaim (1983). The Letters and Pa-pers of Chaim Weizmann: August 1898-July 1931.Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-0-87855-279-5.

10 External links• Balfour Declaration lexicon entry Knesset website(English)

• Happy Birthday Balfour Declaration- 91 YearsLater- Jerusalem Post

• Donald Macintyre, The Independent, 26 May 2005,“The birth of modern Israel: A scrap of paper thatchanged history”

• Avi Shlaim. “The Balfour Declaration and Its Con-sequences”. Retrieved 21 June 2007.

• Balfour: 117 words that changed the face of theMiddle East

• From the Balfour Declaration to Partition… to TwoStates?

• Theodore Herzl and Rev. William Hechler and theZionist Beginnings

• Brandeis, Wilson and the Reverend who changedhistory, Jerry Klinger

• The 1937 Peel Commission on the Balfour Declara-tion

14 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

11.1 Text• Balfour Declaration Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration?oldid=715514716 Contributors: AxelBoldt,Dreamyshade, Uriyan, Bryan Derksen, Taw, DanKeshet, Andre Engels, Danny, Aaron, Blue~enwiki, Ericd, Stevertigo, Rbrwr,IZAK, Islandboy99, Ahoerstemeier, Kingturtle, Ijon, Efghij, John K, Uriber, Boson, Morwen, Zero0000, Wetman, Proteus, Jamesday,Jni, Robbot, Stewartadcock, Der Eberswalder, Humus sapiens, Mervyn, SoLando, Donald j axel, Graeme Bartlett, DocWatson42, Cokoli,Meursault2004, Mpntod, Jason Quinn, SWAdair, Bobblewik, Zachbe, Quadell, DRE, The Prince Manifest, Arminius, Mike Rosoft, Ta bushi da yu, Jayjg, Bornintheguz, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, Wk muriithi, Ericamick, Pavel Vozenilek, Bender235, Kaiser-shatner, Jnestorius, Doron, Sfahey, JoeHenzi, Smalljim, L.Willms, MPerel, Leifern, Alansohn, Rd232, Justinbb, Snowolf, Sir Joseph,Velella, Politician~enwiki, Crosbiesmith, Mwalcoff, Woohookitty, ScottDavis, Guy M, Lapsed Pacifist, Royan, Graham87, BD2412, Dpr,Wikix, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Jmcc150, SMC, Nneonneo, Noon, Ian Pitchford, John Z, Jeremygbyrne, Chobot, YurikBot, Cyferx, RussBot,Stephenb, Nicke L, Wikimachine, Rshumway, Wiki alf, Jgrantduff, Rjensen, Taco325i, Sjttaylor, Vancouveriensis, Formeruser-82, Tony1,Norvo, Alarob, Bayerischermann, Bangpound, Tsiaojian lee, Curpsbot-unicodify, Huldra, DVD R W, Marquez~enwiki, SmackBot, Zeq,David Kernow, InverseHypercube, Unyoyega, Big Adamsky, Jab843, Nethency, Mike McGregor (Can), IstvanWolf, Gilliam, Hibernian,Oatmeal batman, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Krsont, Eatatjohns, Khoikhoi, Jiddisch~enwiki, RolandR, Bart v M, StN, Ohconfucius,ZScarpia, Kimholder, Gloriamarie, Loodog, JohnI, Dybeck, Yms, Gb drbob, Samhook, Iridescent, OttomanReference, Dp462090, Harlanwilkerson, Tawkerbot2, Fdssdf, Emote, W guice, Cydebot, Tiphareth, Treybien, Tawkerbot4, DBaba, ErrantX, Nishidani, Thijs!bot,Wikid77, Faigl.ladislav, Marek69, James086, Rshah2009, Tellyaddict, E. Ripley, Michael A. White, Tiamut, Mewnews, Mentifisto,AntiVandalBot, Marokwitz, Jbaranao, Rselcov, Fcgier, Caper13, JAnDbot, DuncanHill, Dimension31, Dsp13, Amoruso, Andonic,Prometheus 85, Magioladitis, VoABot II, Yakusha fx, Yakushima, Ling.Nut, Nikevich, Chesdovi, Wierzba, 4m33s, Ahecht, Sesesq,DerHexer, Baristarim, MartinBot, R'n'B, AlexiusHoratius, Leyo, Anders12, J.delanoy, PalestineRemembered, Derwig, TrickyH, Mets-Fan76, STBotD, DorganBot, RJASE1, Idioma-bot, Funandtrvl, Hugo999, Sam Blacketer, VolkovBot, TreasuryTag, Jeff G., Epson291,Asabbagh, Littlealien182, Rich Janis, Natg 19, RiverStyx23, Lbmarshall, Wardeagle999, BotMultichill, Hertz1888, Vexorg, MatthewYeager, SE7, Yintan, 0xFFFF, The Doctor666, Nummer29, Perspicacite, CriticalMass34, Lightmouse, Onopearls, StaticGull, Telaviv1,Tanvir Ahmmed, ClueBot, The Thing That Should Not Be, Jrryjude, Enthusiast01, CasualObserver'48, Inagatt, Piledhigheranddeeper,Hermanoid, Lbertolotti, Excirial, Kopitarian, Ziko, Estirabot, Sightlines, Frederico1234, John Bahrain, IngerAlHaosului, Eichman,MystBot, Good Olfactory, Addbot, SelfEvidentTruths, Fieldday-sunday, Download, LaaknorBot, Bassbonerocks, AndersBot, Favonian,Tide rolls, Vasiľ, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Fraggle81, Backslash Forwardslash, AnomieBOT, 1exec1, YeshuaDavid, Killiondude,Ulric1313, Materialscientist, ImperatorExercitus, GrammerGranny, Citation bot, ArthurBot, Cliftonian, LilHelpa, Xqbot, Addihockey10,Capricorn42, SMWriter, Davshul, Padres Hana, MerlLinkBot, Colt .55, SixBlueFish, Plot Spoiler, Recognizance, Sudopeople, Izzedine,Cpsoper, Moonraker, RedBot, Sandy stone, Serols, Oil Cash, Petra Oil, Tim1357, TobeBot, DixonDBot, Dinamik-bot, Mr SerjeantBuzfuz, Minimac, Klett, EmausBot, John of Reading, Ykantor, WikitanvirBot, Faceless Enemy, Bettymnz4, Winner 42, AsceticRose,ZéroBot, Dolovis, Oncenawhile, Lorenzo Rabello, Robertoh11, Greyshark09, RoslynSKP, Δ, ChuispastonBot, Nicepepper, Brigade Piron,Socialservice, ClueBot NG, Pillywarker, O.Koslowski, Widr, Cognate247, Helpful Pixie Bot, Andrew Gwilliam, Guest2625, לעומר ,חודרBG19bot, U109, Krenair, PaintedCarpet, Arminden, Historyfeelings, BattyBot, Justincheng12345-bot, Dlv999, Triggerhippie4, CyberbotII, ChrisGualtieri, JYBot, RupJana, Frosty, SFK2, Jamesx12345, Jdoles, Lekoren, Aus Pilots, Globnarp, Hammadrs, Chris troutman, El-Hef, Distilled Truth, Monochrome Monitor, LahmacunKebab, Eb575555, My-2-bits, Mabailey48, Wlglunight93, Bettykishek, Pgov10m,That guy with, Herningenser, Capistranese, Daddyismad, Reesie4321, KasparBot, T-Bends, JJMC89, LoveFerguson, Kerlwhatthefuckkerland Anonymous: 370

11.2 Images• File:2011-08_Desk_Balfour.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/2011-08_Desk_Balfour.JPG License:CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ziko

• File:Balfour_Declaration_in_the_Times_9_November_1917.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/Balfour_Declaration_in_the_Times_9_November_1917.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: The Times of London Original artist:The Times of London

• File:Charlotte_Sunday_Observer_front_page_May_27_1917,_Twenty-Century_Dream_of_Israel_May_Be_Realized_by_America’{}s_Entry_into_War.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/Charlotte_Sunday_Observer_front_page_May_27_1917%2C_Twenty-Century_Dream_of_Israel_May_Be_Realized_by_America%27s_Entry_into_War.jpg License:Public domain Contributors: w:The Charlotte Observer Original artist: w:The Charlotte Observer

• File:Filastin_(La_Palestine)_March_25th_1925_editorial_addressed_to_Lord_Balfour.pdf Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Filastin_%28La_Palestine%29_March_25th_1925_editorial_addressed_to_Lord_Balfour.pdf License: Publicdomain Contributors: Filastin newspaper 1925 Original artist: Filastin newspaper 1925

• File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/ae/Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Li-cense: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:Kotel_Israel.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Kotel_Israel.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contrib-utors: This panoramic image was created with PhotoStitch(Stitched images may differ from reality.) Original artist: SuperJew

• File:Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/33/Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Design data from FOTW and the existing WPimage (PNG by AnonMoos, now deleted). Created from scratch using PD resources. Original artist: User:Greentubing, User:AnonMoos

11.3 Content license• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0