Asia's Cauldron (Part 1)

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    SIA'S CAULDRON

    bert Kaplan

    one sentence, this reading tells us that the conflict in South China Sea is nothing but a power play.

    plan makes this point by illustrating the difference

    tween the land-related wars of the past, and the water-ated conflict at present: where the issues that gave rise

    land-conflict beforewere humanist issues like slavery

    d a general desire of countries to protect their rights,w, the water-war is a bigger deal, and is all about

    untries particularly China! wanting to e"ercise

    hatever power they#ve got in an attempt to advance theirn economic prowess.

    e conflict is thus framed as a portrait of %ealism. $o

    t it in perspective, realism, as an artistic&literaryovement, is e"actly what it sounds like, in that it

    flects human conflict and e"perience e"actly as it is at

    e value, without the abstract embellishments of moral

    uggles and fighting for rights.

    applied to this water-war, Kaplan is implying thatre is really nothing more to the conflict right now than

    e desire of the countries to outdo each other by using

    hatever military and economic prowess they have toost their status as international 'powers# ( by means of

    rightful claim# to the South China Sea.

    HE HUMANIST DILEMMA

    a nutshell, the 'humanist dilemma# is e"actly what wet said ( that there is nothing grounding the desire ofuntries to fight over the water e"cept a thirst for power.

    umanists wouldn#t like that because such a fight is

    rposeless, and does nothing to advance humanity or itsnse of morality.

    plan e"pounds on this point by telling a few stories:

    rst, he talks about why anyone would care so much

    ou waer, to the point that they fight over it the way

    y do:

    the wars of the past mostly happened in urope, over

    dry land. $he conflict now, however, is happening in

    st sia, over its waters.

    hy fight over water/ +or the following reasons:

    it has the power to protect territory

    it is a 0barrier to aggression1

    it 2creates clearly defined borders1

    it 2has the potential to reduce conflict0

    warships potential threats! are slower in wat

    it presents a 0stopping power0 to conflict

    it is an 0impediment to invasion0 because

    with a naval force, it is difficult to occupy 0h

    shore0 water that is not its own!

    An example is the Taiwan Strait:

    It is a hundred miles wide, but still four times wider

    the English Channel (aross whih the Allied in!ame"#

    So e!en if China engages Taiwan in a war, it woudiffiult to oup$ the ountr$ beause of the

    hundred miles of water between it and the mainland

    &ther examples are the maritime distanes be

    'apan and Korea, South Korea and China, 'apans R

    Islands and China, China*s +ainan Island and ietn

    $hen, he talks abouthe !neres !n he Souh Ch!n!n "ar!cular#

    So imagine daw South ast sia as a cluster of cou

    that want to 0advance their perceived territorial

    beyond their own shores0, particularly, at0geographical meeting place of all these states1, wh

    the South China Sea.

    China, has also decided to come in as the bully counthat it is trying to claim the area by pushing its nav

    that way the +ist Island Chain in the estern 3acifi

    So why all the fuss over it/ $he South China

    credentials:

    it is the 2mass of connective economic

    where the global sea routes coalesce1

    it is the 2heart of urasia4s navigable rimland

    more than half the world4s annual merchan

    tonnage passes through there, as well as a th

    all maritime traffic worldwide

    the oil that is transported through it is tripamount that passes through the Sue5 Cana

    fifteen times the amount that transits the 3aCanal

    6&7 of South Korea4s energy supplies, 89

    ;apan and $aiwan4s energy supplies, and 99 trillion cubic feet of natural gas

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    en, he talks about wha !s $uell!n% ha !neres#

    it is, the South China Sea is claimed by ?runei,

    alaysia, the 3hilippines, Aietnam, $aiwan, and China.

    ina is being the biggest dick about it though, saying

    at its historic maps give it a better right than all these

    her countries that are trying to lay claim to it with 4help4m the Bnited States.

    plan says that the interest here is globali5ation, trade,d a general sense of competition.

    points out how this wasn4t the problem during the days

    the ?ritish mpire because the 0Crown0 reignedpreme, and there was a great 0emphasis on free trade

    d freedom of navigation0 ( but that is no longer the

    se now, what with the countries constantly pitting theirrships against each other in freuent 2close

    counters1 in the South China Sea.

    w going back to what we said about China being ak, one guy ( this official from one of the other nations

    e littoral states! ( pointed out that China has no

    tification for its claims, and are sticking to a 0@iddlengdom mentality0, effectively 0denying Ethe littoral

    tesF their rights to their own continental shelf0. China

    merely riding on its growing military and economicwer to dominate the other countries. $he official said

    at dealing with China reuires BS Daval presence,

    cause as it is, China has built and placed all kinds oflitary contraptions on reefs and shoals within the South

    ina Sea.

    plan also points out how China4s behavior with regard

    the South China Sea is a lot like how merica was with

    e Caribbean Sea in the nineteenth century. ?ack then,

    BS recogni5ed the uropean claim over theribbean, but tried to dominate it anyway. $he BS

    ally became a world power after the Spanish-merican

    ar of G