Are new political cleavagesopening up between globalization’s (perceived) ‘winners’ and ‘losers’?

Edgar Grande

University of MunichChair in Comparative Politics

Presentation at the joint Policy Network/ FES symposium on „The future of European social democracy“,

London, February 7-8.

Key Questions:

• How does globalization affect national politics in Western Europe?

• Does it lead to a re-configuration of political cleavage structures and mobilization patterns?

• And if so, what does this mean for established parties and party systems?

The argument in brief

• Globalization is transforming the very basis of politics in Western Europe.

• Globalization has been generating a new political cleavage (‚demarcation-integration‘ cleavage) and this new cleavage and this new cleavage has far-reaching repercussions for the structure of political spaces in West European countries.

• Thus far, the new political potentials created by globalization have most successfully been exploited by (new) right-wing populist parties (‘politics of identity’).

Background of the Presentation

• Research project on „Political Change in a Globalizing World“ jointly directed by Edgar Grande (University of Munich) and Hanspeter Kriesi (University of Zurich).

• Project covers six West European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK);

• Period from the mid-1970s until the 2002-2005;• Data set includes post-election polls (demand side)

and quantitative content analysis of election campaigns (supply side).

Figure 3.1: The rise of globalization 1970-2003

Source: KOF Globalization index 2006 (ETH Zurich); see www.globalization-index.org. This index averages the scores of 23 economic, social, and political indicators of globalization in 123 countries. Economic indicators include, for example, trade flows, foreign investments and import barriers, social indicators include tourism, outgoing telephone calls or Internet usage, political globalization, finally, is operationalized with membership in international organizations and diplomatic relations with foreign countries.

How does globalization affect national politics?

Globalization gives rise to new disparities and new political conflicts. Basically, we can identify three mechanism, which contribute to the formation of new groups of ‚winners‘ and ‚losers‘ of competition:

- economic competition (open vs. protected economic sectors),

- cultural diversity (indigenous vs. migrant populations),

- and political integration (nationalist vs. cosmopolitan orientations).

These new oppositions constitute new political potentials which offer a ‘window of opportunity’ for processes of political de- and re-alignment, the formation of new political parties and the restructuring of national party systems.

Table 10.4. Impact of social-structural characteristics on voters’ attitudes towards a restrictive immigration policy. Coefficients and robust standard errors estimated with OLS regressions

France Austria Switzerland Netherlands Britain Germany 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1990s 1990s

Education level -0.75*** -0.17 -0.68*** -0.30** -0.49*** -0.37*** -0.88*** -0.53*** -0.75*** (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Farmer -0.09* 0.18* 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.46*** -0.17 0.10 0.11 (0.04) (0.09) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.18) (0.22) (0.15) Self-employed 0.02 0.33 -0.06 -0.15 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.17* (0.03) (0.19) (0.17) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) Routine non-manual worker -0.09** -0.03 -0.20* 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14* -0.12** -0.15** (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Manager -0.10** 0.06 -0.19* -0.18* -0.10* 0.07 -0.20* -0.22*** -0.23*** (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) Technical specialist -0.15* -0.15 -0.39*** -0.22* -0.29*** -0.17* -0.14 -0.16 (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) Social-cultural specialist -0.30*** -0.30** -0.52*** -0.28* -0.44*** -0.10 -0.35** -0.48*** (0.04) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) Technical/social-cultural -0.44*** (0.10) Lower service class -0.34*** -0.02 (0.04) (0.07) Upper service class -0.32*** 0.02 (0.05) (0.11) Non labour force part. -0.20*** -0.34*** -0.30** -0.06 -0.07 0.24** -0.05 -0.10 -0.19*** (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) Catholic 0.37*** 0.17 0.27*** 0.15 0.24*** 0.13** 0.28*** 0.06 0.03 (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Catholic, high att. -0.07 -0.01 0.07 (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) Protestant 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.02 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Constant 0.18*** -0.19 0.33*** 0.01 0.19** 0.00 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.37*** (0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.16) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) R2 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.10 N 10685 1504 1554 1204 3911 2755 2624 4857 4785 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 10.5. Impact of social-structural characteristics on voters’ attitudes towards European integration. Coefficients and robust standard errors estimated with OLS regressions.

France Austria Switzerland Netherlands Britain Germany 1990s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s

Education level 0.64*** 0.17 0.34** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.38** 0.48*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.07) Farmer 0.06 0.04 -0.19 -0.44*** 0.01 0.14 1.21*** 0.26 -0.62** -0.13 (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.22) (0.18) Self-employed 0.13** 0.25 0.10 -0.06 0.04 0.14 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.25* (0.04) (0.15) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10) Routine non-manual worker 0.05 0.38*** -0.06 0.16* 0.15* 0.06 0.21*** 0.02 0.01 -0.01 (0.04) (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) Manager 0.31*** 0.23** 0.07 0.29*** 0.07 0.22* 0.81*** 0.16*** 0.13 0.22*** (0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) Technical specialist 0.26*** 0.26* 0.22* 0.28*** 0.04 0.09 0.68*** 0.31*** (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) Social-cultural specialist 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.25 0.48*** 0.05 0.12 0.45*** 0.15** (0.04) (0.09) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) Technical/social-cultural -0.43* 0.17 (0.19) (0.14) Lower service class 0.13 (0.08) Upper service class 0.33** (0.11) Non labour force part. 0.28*** 0.24* -0.11 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.40*** 0.03 -0.20 0.23* (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.17) (0.11) Catholic -0.14*** -0.08 -0.20 0.02 0.16** -0.04 -0.03 -0.17 0.23*** (0.03) (0.06) (0.21) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) Catholic, high att. 0.09* 0.12 (0.04) (0.08) Protestant -0.09 -0.24 -0.06 0.11* -0.10 -0.22*** -0.02 0.17** (0.13) (0.21) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) Constant -0.39*** -0.28*** 0.02 -0.34*** -0.27** -0.20** -0.39*** -0.15*** -0.07 -0.34*** (0.03) (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.05) R2 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.06 N 7454 1906 921 3893 2232 2275 1778 7583 1487 2950 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 10.4. Average location of education levels on the economic and cultural dimensions

Figure 10.5. Average location of social classes on the economic and cultural dimensions

Figure 11.2 Positions of party families in the political space

a) 1970s

b) 1990s-2000s

Figure 13.1 Typology of Ideological Profiles of Political Parties

socio-economic dimension cultural dimension demarcation (pro-state)

integration (pro-market)

integration (strong libertarianism)

social democratic and left-green profiles

radical liberalism

demarcation (strong authoritarianism)

extreme right and fascist positions

‘winning formula’ of right-wing populist parties in the 1990s

Table 13.3 Party Systems and Party System Change in Western Europe

Country Type of System and Direction of Change

UK two-party system with a strong trend towards moderate pluralism

Germany moderate pluralism with a trend towards fragmented pluralism

Austria moderate pluralism with a trend toward fragmented pluralism

Switzerland moderate pluralism with a trend towards polarized pluralism

Netherlands fragmented pluralism with a trend towards extreme pluralism

France polarized pluralism

Conclusions I:

• First, the ‘cultural’ dimension of the political spaces has been transformed and in most countries its importance has been increasing.

• Second, the ‚space of competition‘ among the major parties has been shifting significantly towards the right pole of the ideological spectrum.

• Third, the polarization and fragmentation within party systems has clearly been increasing in most countries since the 1970s.

Conclusions II:

• Fourth, as a result of these trends a tripolar structure of political competition has been emerging: social-democratic and green parties on the left pole, Christian-democratic and conservative-liberal parties at the moderate right pole, right-wing populist parties forming a new radical right wing pole.

• Fifth, the transformative potential of globalization has not yet been fully exploited by political parties. There seems to be potential for new left-wing populist parties who successfully respond to various types of security problems created by globalization (‘politics of security’).

Appendix I

• Transformation of national political spaces in six West European countries:

• Germany• UK• France• Austria• Switzerland• Netherlands

Appendix II:

• Background information on the six countries:

• Social and economic indicators,

Table 2.2 Social and economic indicators

Popula-tion size (in Mio) (2000)

Human develop-ment index (2003)1)

GNP/ capita, PPP, US$ (2003) 2)

Import+ export as % of GDP (2002/3) 3)

Globaliza-tion Index, rank (2005) 4)

Unem-ployment rate (2005) 5)

Social ex-penditures as % of GDP (1995) 6)

Switzerland 7.3 0.947 32'700 81.1 3 3.6 25.5

Austria 8.1 0.936 30'800 102.0 9 5.2 27.1

Netherlands 15.9 0.943 30'400 119.7 5 6.6 28.0

France 58.9 0.938 28'300 50.4 18 9.9 30.1

United Kingdom 59.5 0.939 30'100 53.2 12 4.7 22.8

Germany 82.8 0.930 27'600 67.8 21 11.7 29.6

overall average

0.892 (OECD)

23'300 (OECD-Europe)

42.2 (OECD-

18)

31 (Poland)

8.6 (Euro Area)

24.7 (OECD-18)

maximum 0.963

(NO) 18'800

(PT) 161.8 (BE)

1 Singapore

3.6 (CH)

15.7 (AUS)

minimum 0.904

(PT) 54'000 (LUX)

23.4 (USA)

29 (GR)

13.5 (BE)

33.4 (S)

1) Source: http://hdr.undp.org 2) Source: OECD 3) Import+export of goods and services as % of GDP. Source: World Bank. 4) Source: http://www.atkearney.com, this index incorporates measures such as trade and investment

flows, movement of people across borders, volumes of international telephone traffic, internet usage and participation in internation organizations

5) Source: The Economist, October 29th, 2005: Economic and financial indicators. 6) Source: Scharpf and Schmidt (2000: 365, Table A.27a). (including private mandatory benefits)

Table 13.2 Effective number of parties (based on votes at national parliamentary elections)1

Period/

Country

1974-79 1980-1985

1986-1989

1990-1995

1996-1999

2000-2003

Austria 2.4 (1975)

2.4 2.71 3.9 (1994)

3.8 (1999)

3.0

France2

5.0

(1973) 4.1 4.6

(1988) 7.2 7.3 5.3

Germany 2.4 2.6 (1983)

2.9 3.1 (1994)

3.3 3.3

Netherlands 6.9 (1972)

4.3 (1982)

3.8 (1986)

5.8 5.2 6.1 (2002)

Switzerland 5.8 (1975)

6.0 6.9 7.4 6.8 (1995)

5.5

UK 3.1 (Feb.1974)

3.5 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.3

1 Based on Laakso & Taagepera (1979). 2 Based on Taagepera &Shugart (1989), calculated from vote shares of all candidates at national parliamentary elections.

Figure 10.1. The strength of traditional and new divides among social groups.

Figure 11.3 Positions of parties in the political space

a) 1970s

b) 1990s-2000s

Table 13.1 Political and institutional opportunity structures for radical right parties Country

Electoral system

Party organization

Party strategy towards new competitor

Austria

medium high barrier

favorable opportunity structure: - medium-high adaptive capacity of established parties; - strong organizational capacities of new right-wing populist party

co-optation

France

very high barrier

favorable opportunity structure: - low adaptive capacity of established parties; - strong organizational capacities of new extreme right party

stigmatization

Germany

medium high barrier

unfavorable opportunity structure - high adaptive capacity of established parties; - weak organizational capacities of new parties

stigmatization

Great Britain

very high barrier

unfavorable opportunity structure: - high adaptive capacity of established parties; - weak organizational capacities of new parties

dismissal

Netherlands

low barrier

unfavorable opportunity structure: - high adaptive capacity of established parties; - weak organizational capacities of new right-wing populist party

co-optation

Switzerland

medium to high barrier

favorable opportunity structure: - medium high adaptive capacity of established parties; - strong organizational capacities of right-wing populist party

co-optation

Figure 13.2 Typology of Pluralist Party Systems

weak polarization

strong polarization

weak fragmentation

moderate pluralism

polarized pluralism

strong fragmentation

fragmented pluralism

extreme pluralism

Appendix III:

• Additional data on Germany and the UK:

Table 9.1: Election results and party system features

Election ø1949-69 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 PDS1 - - - - - - 2.4 4.4 5.1 4.0 8.7 Greens - - - 1.5 5.6 8.3 5.0 7.3 6.7 8.6 8.1 SPD 34.7 45.8 42.6 42.9 38.2 37.0 33.5 36.4 40.9 38.5 34.2 FDP 9.5 8.4 7.9 10.6 7.0 9.1 11.0 6.9 6.2 7.4 9.8 Union 44.3 44.9 48.6 44.5 48.8 44.3 43.8 41.5 35.1 38.5 35.2

Election results (votes)

Others 11.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.4 1.3 4.3 3.5 6.0 3.0 4.0 TPV2 84.5 91.7 92.1 89.3 87.8 82.3 84.3 81.3 81.2 82.8 72.9 Asymmetry3 9.6 -0.9 6.0 1.6 10.6 7.3 10.3 5.1 -5.8 0.0 1.0 Volatility4 7.6 3.4 3.6 3.5 8.9 5.5 8.6 9.4 8.0 8.0 10.6

Party system features

ENP5 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.4 Abbreviations: PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), FDP (Free Democratic Party), Union (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union). Notes: 1 2005: Die Linke (The Left) 2 Two-Party Vote: SPD+Union 3 Asymmetry: Difference Union-SPD 4 Net volatility (Pedersen 1979) based on seat percentages of all parties represented in the parliament. 5 Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) based on seat percentages of all parties represented

Figure 9.3: The supply-side of party competition in Germany. Elections of 1976, 1994, 1998, and 2002

Table 8.1: Election results House of Commons: shares of votes and number of seats

ø 1945- 1959

1964 1966 1970 1974 (Feb)

1974 (Okt)

1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005

Election results (% of the valid votes, seats in parenthesis)

Conservatives 46.1 43.4 41.9 46.4 37.9 35.8 43.9 42.4 42.3 41.9 31.5 31.7 32.4

(304) (253) (330) (297) (277) (339) (397) (375) (336) (165) (166) (197)

Labour 46.6 44.1 47.9 43 37.1 39.2 36.9 27.6 30.8 34.4 43.3 40.7 35.3

(317) (363) (287) (301) (319) (269) (209) (229) (271) (418) (412) (355)

Liberals/Liberal Democratic Party

5.8 11.2 8.5 7.5 19.3 18.3 13.8 25.4 22.6 17.8 17 18.3 22.1

(9) (12) (6) (14) (13) (11) (23) (22) (20) (46) (52) (62)

others 1.4 1.3 1.7 3.1 5.7 6.7 5.4 4.6 4.3 5.8 8.2 9.3 10.2

(0) (2) (7) (23) (26) (16) (21) (24) (24) (30) (29) (19)

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

(630) (630) (630) (635) (635) (635) (650) (650) (651) (659) (659) (643)

Figure 8.2 : Demand side of party competition, elections 1974, 1992, 1997, 2001

Figure 8.4: Supply-side of party competition, elections 1974, 1992, 1997, 2001

Appendix IV:

• Basic information on the project:• Elections covered,• Definition of issue categories

Table 3.1: Elections Point of reference

in the 1970s Elections in the 1990s/2000s

France* 1978 1988 1995 2002 Austria** 1975 1994 1999 2002 Switzerland 1975 1991 1995 1999 The Netherlands 1973 1994 1998 2002+2003 Britain 1974 (Feb.) 1992 1997 2001 Germany 1976 1994 1998 2002 * 1978 election to the parliament; 1988, 1995, and 2002 presidential elections (as explained in the text). ** We do not analyse the snap election of 1995 because this campaign was extraordinarily dominated by the major parties.

Table 3.2: Issue-categories category abbreviation

in the figures

description

welfare welfare support for an expansion of the welfare state; defence against welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; calls for employment and health care programs

budget budget support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit; cuts on expenditures; reduction of taxes without direct effects on redistribution

economic liberalism

ecolib support for deregulation, more competition, and privatisation; opposition to market regulation; opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy

cultural liberalism cultlib support for the goals of new social movements, with the exception of the environment movement; support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (excluding the European Union and Nato); support for the United Nations; opposition to racism; support for the right to abortion and euthanasia; opposition to patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and to traditional moral values; support for a liberal drug policy

Europe europe support for European Integration, including enlargement; support for EU-membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria

culture culture support for education, culture, and scientific research immigration immigration support for a tough immigration and integration policy army army support for the armed forces (including Nato), for a strong national

defence, and for nuclear weapons security security support for more law-and-order, the fight against crime, and

denouncing political corruption environment environ support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy institutional reform

iref support for various institutional reforms such as the extension of direct democracy, modifications in the structure of the political system, federalism and decentralization; calls for the efficiency of government and public administration, and new public management

infrastructure infra calls for the improvement of the country’s roads, railways, etc.