Apeiron Volume 38 Issue 1 2005 [Doi 10.1515%2Fapeiron.2005.38.1.73] Mouracade, John -- Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws

Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's LawsJohn Mouracade

There is a dominant scholarly view that Plato believes hedonistic con-siderations to be incompatible with the virtuous life, such that anyonewho is virtuous must be motivated to do what is right independent ofthe resulting pleasure or pain.1 In the sequel, I argue, against this domi-nant view, that Plato accepts psychological hedonism (the view that allhumans are motivated by what we consider most pleasant) and itscompatibility with virtue in the Laws. The Athenian seems to plainlyendorse this view when he claims, 'So the account that does not separatethe pleasant from the just and fine and good, persuades someone, ifnothing else, to wish to live a pious and just life ( ', , ).'2 And evenmore decisively he states,

It is by nature that pleasures, pains, and desires are especially human( 5 );from these, it is necessary for every mortal nature simply ( ) to be suspended and to depend upon theweightiest and greatest of these ( ). It is necessaryto praise the noblest life ( ), not only because itcharacteristically has a better reputation, but further ... as superior inthat which we all seek ( ) more pleasure and less pain

1 Noteworthy examples include Morris (1934), Mabbott (1937), Annas (1981). Dissent-ing are Gosling and Taylor (1982) among others.

2 Laws 663a8-b2; translations are my own unless otherwise noted, based on the textof Bury (1928).

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74 John Mouracade

throughout the whole of life ( , ).3

The vast majority of scholars have resisted the implications of suchpassages.4 In Platonic Ethics Old and New, Julia Annas defends the stand-ard interpretation of Plato's moral psychology in the Laws. According toAnnas, Plato makes two central claims about virtue and pleasure. First,the virtuous life delivers more pleasure than any other. Second, in orderto achieve virtue, one cannot pursue pleasure, but must desire virtue foritself. Annas states, 'The greatest pleasure, for Plato, is to be found in thelife in which the person aims not at pleasure but at virtue, and indeedtrains his desires so thoroughly that he values only virtue, even whenaccompanied by all conventional evils.'5 And again, 'It is only when yougive up aiming at pleasure and aim at virtue instead, in the mostuncompromising way, that you get true pleasure ... .'6 Annas expressesthis necessary condition for virtue in various ways: that one must valuevirtue alone, that one must pursue virtue alone, and that one cannot aimat pleasure. In spite of compelling support for such a view and itspersistent popularity, there are good reasons for thinking otherwise.Annas acknowledges passages in the Laws and other dialogues whichcontradict the standard view and presents arguments for discountingthe force of those passages. I have not found those arguments persuasive.I find Plato's view of hedonistic motivation and virtue to be morecomplex than Annas allows.71 argue, pace Annas et al., that an adequateunderstanding of Plato's moral psychology must neither completelydisregard (as the standard line does) nor completely exalt (as a hedonis-tic interpretation of Plato does) the desire for pleasure. Rather, it must

3 Laws 732e4-733al

4 Exceptions include R.F. Stalley (1983), Carone (2002). Although these scholars donot follow the standard line, their project is not directly arguing against it, as thispaper does.

5 Annas (1999,146)6 Ibid., 149

7 I find it to be more complex in exactly this way. Plato does not simply precludehedonistic motivations, nor does he simply endorse them (as Socrates seems to inthe Protagoras). The complexity is found in Plato's inclusion of some, but not all,hedonistic considerations in the virtuous life.



Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws 75

be allowed that there are certain types of hedonistic motivations that areincompatible with virtue and some that are compatible with and evennecessary for virtue. In offering such an account I will show that theeducational program laid out in the Laws requires this understanding ofhedonistic motivations and virtue.

Annas' reasoning unfolds in two stages. The first explicates a passagefrom the Laws (644d7-5cl). Based on this passage, Annas claims that therelationship between rational motivations and non-rational motivationsis asymmetrical. The asymmetry is to be found in reason's ability topursue its goals with no concern for pleasure and pain, whereas suchconsiderations are all that matter to non-rational motivations. In thesecond stage of her argument, she contends that the pursuit of virtue isfundamentally different from the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance ofpain. In fact, these pursuits differ so greatly that a motivational transfor-mation must occur before one can pursue virtue instead of pleasure.8

Annas quotes the passage from the Laws at length.9

Let's think about it in the following way. Let's think of each of us livingthings as a puppet of the gods, either as one of their toys or asconstructed for some serious purpose, for that we don't know. But thiswe do know, that these emotions [pathe] in us are like cords or stringswhich drag us along. Being opposed to each other, they pull us indifferent directions to opposite kinds of action, and this is where thedivision between virtue and vice lies. Reason says that we should allfollow along always with one of these pulling forces and in no wayleave go of it, pulling against the other strings. This is the directing ofreasoning, and is golden and holy, and is called the common law of thestate. The others are hard and like iron, but it is soft, being golden, whilethe others are like forms of all sorts. We must always co-operate withthe directing of the law, which is finest; for since reasoning is fine, butgentle and not violent, its directing needs helpers so that the goldenkind in us will win over the other kinds. In this way our story of virtue,which is about us as though we were puppets, would be a success, andthe idea of being "self-master" or "giving in to oneself" would become

8 Ibid., 145

9 I will use Annas' translation of this passage which she admits to be controversial insome respects. See Annas (1999,142 n 15).



76 John Mouracade

somewhat clearer, as would the point that an individual must graspthe true reasoning within himself about these pulling forces, and livefollowing it, and a state must grasp the reasoning (whether from a godor from a human with knowledge), establish it as law, and live by itboth internally and with other states. In this way both vice and virtuewould be more clearly articulated for us.10

Annas identifies two special features of the cord of reason.

First, it is soft whereas they are hard and inflexible ... But the softnessof the gold cord makes the point that reason can deal with pleasure andpain in ways that they cannot deal with it. They simply yank and pull,whereas it can manage and manipulate them; its greater flexibility givesit greater power over them than they have over it. Second, the personcan be encouraged to cooperate with and follow the golden cord; itneeds help, but the person can follow it and thus be able to withstandthe pullings of pleasure and pain, inflexible though these are."

Annas correctly observes that the gold cord differs from the others inso far as it is soft and they are hard. However, there is ample room fordisagreement about what this means. Annas takes this to signify reason'sdistinct ability to operate on non-rational strings of pleasure and painthrough management and manipulation. Reason's flexibility in dealingwith non-rational strings endows it with 'greater power over them thanthey have over it'. Thus, Annas explicates the softness of the gold cordas indicating complex and varied options for dealing with the appetites(which simply pull).

It should be noted that the nature of the cords represents how theydeal with us, not with each other. The cords, according to the imagery,are connected to the puppet and act directly on the puppet and onlyindirectly on one another. Reason is one of the cords and as such doesnot free us from our dominant desire although it does free us from thedemands of the lower part(s) of the soul.12 Thus, the life drawn along by

10 laws 644d7-645cl

11 Annas (1999,143)12 This point is also made by Scolnicov (2003,123) and Gerson (2003,150), Christopher

Bobonich makes an elaborate case for a dissenting opinion in Bobonich (2002,260-81).




the golden cord is of the same sort as the life dominated by the othercords insofar as there is no freedom from the strongest desire. Thedifference is that the life dominated by the gold cord is freer in the sensethat the rational life is lived in subjection to benevolent and persuasivereason and directed by considerations of truth, goodness, and appropri-ateness as opposed to the tyrannical rule of appetite which is entirelycoercive.

This explanation of the asymmetry between the rational and non-ra-tional cords is preferable to Annas' for several reasons.13 There is bettertextual support for my reading within the Laws and within the Plato'sthought as a whole. In the Laws, one of the most important points madeby the Athenian is that persuasion is preferable to compulsion.14 Thisnecessitates preambles for the laws which attempt to persuade citizensto comply rather than merely ensuring obedience through coercion. Thepreference for persuasion over compulsion can be used to explain thesoftness of the golden cord of reason. It is golden and soft because it isrational and persuasive as opposed to the non-rational iron cords whoseonly tool is force. In addition to textual support, there is better thematicfit with the Laws. The Laws addresses the issues of education, persuasion,and avoidance of force. My reading of the story of the strings resonateswith those themes whereas Annas' reading relies heavily, if not entirely,on the passage quoted at length above. Such a difficult and metaphoricalpassage should not bear such a heavy interpretive burden. After all, theparable is introduced to explain temperance and we should be reticentto draw conclusions about topics other than temperance without sup-porting texts elsewhere.

Thus far, it may not be clear that there is a significant differencebetween my reading and Annas'. Perhaps the complex and variedoptions available to reason on Annas' account include various modes ofpersuasion. Granting that persuasion is among the ways reason canmanage the appetites (and perhaps exhausts the options, but we need

13 Another minor reason that may appeal to some is the following. It is a moreconservative reading of the text which is supported by other passages in the Lawsand in the Republic. Given the metaphorical nature of the passage in the Laws quotedabove, we should not put undue interpretive burden upon it.

14 Laws 719e6-722c4. For a very good discussion of this topic, see Bobonich (1991) andthe corresponding discussion in Bobonich (2002,97-106).



78 John Moumcade

not go that far), this would be merely incidental to Annas' account as sheexplains the difference between reason and appetite completely in termsof the fact that appetite has only one way to deal with reason and reasonhas many ways to deal with appetite. She emphasizes the complexityand number of ways of managing the appetites, whereas I emphasizethe way reason does the managing. Though this difference may not itselfseem significant, it underlies the two fundamentally different ways ofviewing reason's relation to the desire for pleasure considered in thispaper (the standard view and my view). The significance resides in therole of persuasion. If reason must persuade the appetites (as I hold) topursue a virtuous life, then hedonistic considerations must be compat-ible with the pursuit of virtue since desires can only respond to hedon-istic considerations.15

Annas' second claim about the golden cord begins with an innocuousassertion. She points out that a person can follow the guidance of reasonwhen it conflicts with the demands of the non-rational desires. But thenAnnas makes an interesting substitution. Whereas Plato claims that weought to follow the golden cord of reason and pull against all the othercords which are identified as emotions (pathe), Annas' second point isthat we should follow reason and withstand the 'pullings of pleasureand pain.'

Understood one way, she is correct to make this substitution, butunderstood differently she is not. We can see the two ways of under-standing this point if we bring before us the context of the passagequoted above while keeping in mind that Plato has recognized differenttypes of pleasure elsewhere (Republic IX, Symposium, Philebus, Gorgias).Plato's other discussions of pleasure and self-control are worth consid-ering in this regard, especially Republic 389d9-e2 where self-control isdescribed as being a ruler of the pleasures of food, sex and drink( ). Prior to thepassage quoted above, the Athenian reminds his interlocutors, 'Weagreed a long time ago that those who are capable of ruling themselvesare good, and those who cannot are bad.'16 This point is agreed upon and

15 Bobonich has a prolonged argument for the absence of belief and judgment fromdesires in Plato's psychological theory of the Laws. See Bobonich (2001,295-334).

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the Athenian offers to clarify the point by offering a story. This serves asan introduction to the divine puppet story. So, the point of this story isto explain temperance, as the Athenian reminds his interlocutors againat the end of the story. And surely the temperate person obeys reasonand does not give in to the all desires for physical pleasure and allrepulsions from physical pain. This is one way in which reason mustwithstand pleasure and pain by withstanding a subset of pleasuresand pains. The second way to understand Annas' point is to take thepulling of reason as not merely conflicting with the desires for physicalpleasure, but as conflicting with the unqualified pursuit of pleasure andavoidance of pain.17 Since Annas claims that the virtuous person, 'valuesonly virtue' and gives up 'aiming at pleasure and aims at virtue instead',she seems committed to the latter understanding wherein reason resiststhe pull of all pains and pleasures.

In order to evaluate Annas' claim that reason pulls against all moti-vations of pleasure and pain, we must proceed to the second stage ofAnnas' argument. Here, she claims that the pursuit of virtue differsfundamentally from the pursuit of pleasure. While Annas does not addmuch in the way of arguing for this position, she clarifies her view. It isimportant to discuss her view in light of these clarifications. Annasmaintains that the virtuous life is the most pleasant on Plato's scheme,but she also claims that the virtuous life cannot be lived while pursuingpleasure, not even while pursuing the pleasure that derives from avirtuous life. She states, 'Pleasure thus comes, we may say, only whennot directly sought, and it comes as a result of what is sought, namelyvirtue.'18 In a similar vein she claims, "The desire for pleasure is the mostbasic motivation that we have, but rational reflection can so educate andtrain the person that they aim in an appropriately uncompromising wayat being virtuous. The person who succeeds in becoming virtuous, andwho does not aim directly at pleasure, in fact gets pleasure as a result ofhis virtue.'19 She makes this point even more succinctly by later claiming,

17 For a detailed discussion of Plato's use of pleasure to sometimes pick out physicalpleasures and to sometimes refer to all pleasures, see Grube (1980, Chapter 2,especially p. 66).

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80 John Mouracade

The best pleasure comes only to those who don't seek it.'20 She alsoclaims that the virtuous person will 'acquire a radically different atti-tude' to pleasure.21

Is Annas right about this? Does Plato require us to abandon our searchfor pleasure in favor of pursuing virtue in order to become virtuous?Does the golden cord of reason pull against all pleasure and pain? Thereare good reasons for thinking this is not so. To begin with, Annas' claimis a strong assertion and the only textual support she musters on behalfof her view is the story about the puppets. Even if she had the correctunderstanding of Plato's theory of human motivation and virtue, weshould not be convinced solely by an appeal to such a difficult piece oftext. There should be corroboration and Annas offers none.22 Besides alack of corroborating evidence, there is textual support in the Laws andelsewhere for the opposite of Annas' suggestion. In Laws , whilediscussing the relation between justice and pleasure and the Athenianargues that the just life is the pleasantest.23 He then insists that a distinc-tion between the just and the pleasant is harmful and should be prohib-ited because 'no one willingly consents to be persuaded to do somethingunless more pleasure and less pain comes from it.'24 More decisively inBook V the Athenian asserts, 'It is by nature that pleasures, pains, anddesires are especially human; from these, it is necessary for every mortalnature simply to be suspended and to depend upon the weightiest andgreatest of these. It is necessary to praise the noblest life, not only becauseit characteristically has a better reputation, but further ... as superior inthat which we all seek more pleasure and less pain throughout the whole

20 Ibid., 147

21 Ibid., 148

22 Annas does not offer additional evidence for this view, but she argues that it issimilar in various ways to Plato's other discussions of pleasure in the Republic,Gorgias, and Philebus. While these other dialogues offer support for different aspectsof her view, none of them are offered as evidence that Plato requires a motivationalshift.

23 Laws 662b and ff.

24 Laws 663b2-5. .




of life.'25 To this the Athenian later adds, 'But if we eve speak of ourselvesas desiring an object other than those aforesaid [the preponderance ofpleasure over pain], the statement is due to ignorance and defectiveexperience of actual lives.'26

Annas is correct to note that there must be a motivational transforma-tion. The above texts show that she is incorrect to assert (as she doesmany times and as the standard interpretation requires) that the trans-formation is from one that is hedonistically based to one that is entirelydevoid of hedonistic considerations and focuses only on virtue. Theeducational program of the Laws indicates that the motivational trans-formation is not away from desiring pleasure, but away from desiringsome pleasures to desiring others. Regarding education in Magnesia,R.F. Stalley correctly observes: 'Since virtue consists in having our de-sires adjusted to whatever reason judges to be right, the citizen's educa-tion will involve so training a child's feelings of pleasure and pain that,even before his reason can grasp the nature of virtue, he loves what oughtto be loved and hates what ought to be hated (653a-c).'27 Again Stalleynotes, "The main theme of Book [of the Laws] is that the young mustbe educated to take pleasure in the right things.'28 Christopher Bobonichalso observes that the legislators must 'pay close attention to pleasure,since enjoying the right pleasures is not simply a constituent of the happylife and a concomitant of achieved virtue, but is essential to the develop-ment of virtue itself.'29 In connection with these points (with which Iwholeheartedly agree), Laws 636d7-e3 offers profound support, 'Pleas-ure and pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature. If a mandraws the right amount from the right one at the right time, he is happy;but if he draws unintelligently at the wrong time, his life will be quitethe opposite. State and individual and every living being are on the samefooting here.'30 It is in light of this view of the importance of pleasure that

25 Larvs 732a4-el

26 Lflms733d3-6

27 Stalley (1983,124)28 Ibid., 62

29 Bobonich (2001,351)30 Trans. Saunders (1997) with modifications.



82 John Mouracade

the educational program focuses on training children to take pleasure inthe right sort of things. To this end the Athenian states, 'We should tryto use the children's games to channel their pleasures and desires to-wards the activities in which they will have to engage when they areadult.'31 The Athenian makes it quite clear that this description appliesto education in virtue their topic of discussion (643e).32 The Athenianlater asserts:

I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy arepleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice firstenter the soul ... I call "education" the initial acquisition of virtue bythe child, when pleasure and affection, pain and hatred are channeledin the right courses before he can understand the reason why ... Butthere is one element you could isolate in any account you give, and thisis the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, whichmakes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love whatwe ought to love. Call this "education", and I, especially, think youwould be giving it its correct name.33

Plato continues to develop this view, claiming that 'the correct orderingof pleasures and pains is education.'34 These feelings are so important,that Plato ordains Dionysian festivals to revive the sense of pleasure inthe aged. And again, 'pleasure is indeed a proper criterion in the arts,but not the pleasure experienced by anybody and everybody.'35 Rather,it is the people of high moral character and advanced education whomust be pleased by good art (658e). We are then told that children mustbe educated to feel pleasure according to the law and 'find pleasure andpain in the same things as the old.'36 The Athenian continues the discus-

31 Laws 643c7-9, trans. Saunders (1997)32 It is also noteworthy that these comments about pleasure almost immediately

precede the puppet story, which begins less than one Stephanas page later.

33 Laws 653a5-c4, trans. Saunders (1997) with modifications.34 Lflu>s653c8

35 Luo*658e7-9

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sion advocating a constraint on poets; they would be compelled to neversay that 'there are men who live a pleasant life in spite of being wicked.'37

It is in light of the educational program established by the Athenianthat we must consider Plato's view of human motivation and the rela-tionship between pursuing pleasure and acquiring virtue. The Athenianspeaks univocally on this matter. Children are educated in virtue bylearning to take pleasure in the right sort of things. It is this view whichleads the Athenian to proclaim that the educator/legislator must notallow the virtuous life to be conceptually separated from the mostpleasant life in order to provide a compelling argument for living justly.38On the standard view, one must pursue virtue for itself and not beprompted by hedonistic considerations. This would make it impossiblefor an argument like the one cited directly above to persuade someoneto live a virtuous life because it is impossible to acquire virtue whilebeing motivated by such considerations. Additionally at 732e5-6 theAthenian claims, 'pleasures, pains, and desires are by nature especiallyhuman.' He continues that the virtuous life should be praised because'it is superior in that which we all seek more pleasure and less painthroughout the whole of life.'39 He concludes with a compelling indict-ment of the standard view: 'We must think of all of our human lives asnaturally bound up in these two feelings [pleasure and pain], and wemust also determine what kind of life we naturally desire. But if we saywe wish for something besides these, we are talking out of ignorance andconfusion about life as it is really is.'40

There is another feature of the puppet account that merits discussion.The cord which pulls against the emotions () is calculation (-). The logismos is the calculating and prudential faculty of the mindwhereas nous is the theoretical and understanding part. If Plato hadclaimed that nous pulled against the emotions, the standard interpreta-tion would have better textual grounds. As it is, Plato claims thatcalculation pulls against the emotions, leaving open the interpretationthat the judgment which is based on a calculation of long term pleasures

37 Lau*662b4-cl

38 Laws 663a8-b2

39 Laws733a2

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84 John Mouracade

and pains pulls against the pathe whose focus is on the immediate orshort run pleasures and pains.41 And this interpretation is not merely leftopen by the text as calculation is described as that which determineswhich pleasures and pains are better and which are worse (644c5-d3). Itis this calculation which 'when it becomes a public decree is named thelaw of the state.'42 This identification of calculation with law recurswithin the puppet imagery as we are told that there is one cord we oughtto hold on to which is 'the leading of calculation which is golden andholy and is called the public law of the state ( ' , ).'43Since the golden cord is calculation and it determines which pleasuresare better and which are worse, it cannot be that following the goldencord means ignoring considerations of pleasure and pain.

Department of PhilosophyOklahoma Baptist University

500 W. UniversityShawnee OK, 74804

[email protected]

References

Annas, Julia. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.. Platonic Ethics Old and New. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Bobonich, Christopher. 1991. 'Persuasion, Compulsion, and Freedom in Plato's Laws'.Classical Quarterly. Ns 41.365-88.

. 2001. 'Akrasia and Agency in Plato's Laws'. In Wagner (2001), 203-29.

. 2002. Plato's Utopia Recast. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Bury, R.G. 1926. Laws. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Carone, Gabriela. 2002. 'Pleasure, Virtue, Externals, and Happiness in Plato's Laws'. History

of Philosophy Quarterly 19: 327-44.

41 Scolnicov (2003,124) contains an interesting discussion of this point.42 Lui)s644d443 Laws(A5al-2




Cooper, John, ed. 1997. Plato's Complete Worte. Indianapolis: Hackett.Gereon, Lloyd P. 2003. 'Akrasia and the Divided Soul in Plato's Laws'. In Scolnicov and

Brisson (2003), 149-54.Gosling, J.C.B. and Taylor, C.C.W. 1984. The Greeks on Pleasure. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Grube, G.M.A. 1980. Plato's Thought. Indianapolis: HackettHeinaman, Robert, ed. 2003. Plato and Aristotle's Ethics. Aldershot: Ashgate.Mabbott, J.D. 1937. 'Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?'. Mind 46: 468-74.Morris, C.R. 1934 'Plato's Theory of the Good Man's Motive'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 34: 129-42.Saunders, Trevor J. 1997. Laws. In Cooper (1997).Scolnicov, Samuel. 2003. 'Pleasure and Responsibility in Plato's Laws'. In Scolnicov and

Brisson (2003), 122-27.Scolnicov, Samuel and Brisson, Luc, eds. 2003. Plato's Laws: From Theory into Practice. St.

Augustin: Academia Verlag.Stalley, R.F. 1983. An Introduction to Plato's Laws. Indianapolis: Hackett.Wagner, Ellen, ed. 2001. Essays on Plato's Psychology. Lanham: Lexington Books.



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Apeiron Volume 38 Issue 1 2005 [Doi 10.1515%2Fapeiron.2005.38.1.73] Mouracade, John -- Virtue and Pleasure in Plato's Laws