Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso, Aristotle's Right Reason, Apeiron 1995

8/13/2019 Gmez-Lobo, Alfonso, Aristotle's Right Reason, Apeiron 1995

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Aristotle s RightReasonAlfonsoGomez Lobo

Thepurpose of the present paper is to o f f e r aninterpretation of Aris-totle s conceptionof the role ofreason in moral virtue. The rightreason,I shall hold, is a particular practical proposition which identifies theintermediate to be chosen in the given circumstances.I shall argue for my interpretation in three steps. First, I brief lyexamine theNicomacheandefinition ofmoral virtue andsome interpre-tationso f f e r e d for the logoswithin that context.I then turn to the openingsectiono fBookVI o f the EN, apassage which r e f e r sbackto thedefinitionandpoints to the needtospecifythe role of(right) reasoninmoral choice.Finally,I try to show how the previously obtained results are buttressedbyAristotle s conception of prudence, good choice and liberality.

TheRevisedOxfordTranslation renders Aristotle s Nicomachean defi-nitionofmoral excellence asfollows:Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in ameanrelative tous,this being determinedby reason and in the way in whichthe man ofpractical wisdom would determine it.1

Barnes 1984)ROT ,1748.Barnesprints the Ross translationof the ENasrevisedbyJ.O.Urmsonandsubsequently revisedby himself. In correspondence Barnes hasindicated to me that he is responsible for the new wording o f 1106b36ff. Theunmodified Ross translation isreadily accessibleinMcKeon(1941 andnumerousreprints). In this pape r I do no t de alwith the def inition ofmoral excellencein therought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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16 Alfonso Gomez-Lobo

This rendering breaks at two points with a widely shared traditionbestrepresented by the translation f rom which it departs. (1) Ross, whofavorsthe term virtue for , had rendered as deter-mined by a rational principle thus suggesting that there is some kindof rule, plan o r principle involved. (2) Ross had accepted Bywater semendationof to in the OCT editionof1894,anemendation derivedf rom Aspasius. Ross accordingly translatedtherelative causeas and bythat principlebywhich . Accordingto this translation, thedefinitionstates thatthe logos orprinciple employedtodeterminethemeanis thesameas the one the prudent manwould use.The new ROT translationby substituting reason fo r logos leaves theinterpretationunderdetermined,and, by retaining the modal whichrepresentsthe consensus codicum, allowsfor a looser connection betweentheinstrument todetermine themeanand thereferenceto the man ofpracticalwisdom. Both decisions are, I believe, commendable.If we canma k esense of amanuscript readingas it stands, itshould certainlybepreferred, and a rendering o f logos which allows the reader to decideamongthedifferent senses o f this wordisoften preferable to atranslationwhich offers narrower options.Before turning to the interpretation o f logos within the definition aminoranomaly shouldbenoted. In thephrase this being determinedbyreason it isunclear what the pronoun this refersto . If we take the readingof the manuscripts ()it would be the state (hexis) that is thusdetermined. If , alternatively,we read the dative with the puta-tive manuscript o f W illiam o f Moerbecke and with the commentatorsAspasiusand Alexander,it israther themiddlestate (mesotes) thatisdelimited by reason. Both alternatives are unsatisfactory because Aris-totle s explanations in the remainder of the chapter show rather clearlythat the mesotes character of the hexis and, hence, the hexis itself, are aconsequenceof the habitual choiceof the meson. Excellence is a kind o fmean(mesotes), sincei t aims at what is intermediate(meson) . 2Aristotle s

Eudemian Ethics (1222allff.) although i t raises similar problems to the ones dis-cussed here. Unless otherwise noted, translationsare from the ROT I a m gratefulto my colleagues Henry Richardson and Nancy Scherm an for helpful criticism o fearlier drafts o f this paper. M y thanks ar e also due to Richard Bosley, Janet Sissonand Roger Shiner fo r their valuable objectionsand suggestions.2 EN II 6,1106b27-8 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Aristotle s Right Reason 17

settled view is doubtlessthat it is the latter item,i.e., theobject of our choiceorthe intermediate relative to us, that is determined by logos.Whatdoes the term logos stand fo r in this context? There is one replythatcan beeasily disposed of, the onenamely that holds that logos herereferstoreason, in the sense of the rational capacity of the human soul,as opposed, in particular, to the desiderative part of the soul. This viewwas put forward by J.Cook Wilson in a famous article published in 1913which generated alively controversy.3Hiscritics were quickto refutehim by producing a host of arguments, among them that in thepassageshe quotes the term logos cannot be taken to stand for reason as a part ofthe soul (Aristotle s expression for the human rational faculty is not logosbut , that which has logos ). Moreover, the dative has to beunderstood as instrumental and it is unlikely that a humanfaculty is theinstrument.41find it hard to believe that anyone would want to defendthis position today.

The second reply worth considering is the one adopted by mostopponents to Cook Wilson, and by their followers. According to thisview, logos should be translated by such terms as rational principle ,norm , rule andeven plan .5The philosophical substrate common tothese proposals is that there is a universally quantified propositionalcontent endowed with normative force which ought to be used todetermine the intermediate.

This view has toface insurmountable difficulties, the most importantof which is that bydeclaring that the intermediate is relative to the agent,and also to the time of the action, the objects involved, the peopleaffected, the motive adopted, the mode of the action, etc.6, Aristotle

3 Cook Wilson (1913), 113-174 Lord (1914), 1-5; Bumet (1914), 6-7; Stocks (1914), 9-125 In a sense, R.A. G authier and J.Y. Jolif (1970), 1,149 bring earlierstrands togetherwhen they write: Ce qu il faut retenir, c estque le logos qui sert de norme la vertu

n estpasseulement un planqui permet d atteindre la fin, mais qu il est en memetempsune intimation, un commandement;c est pourquoi nous traduisons par letermede rigle, qui rend ces deuxides: la regie est la fois ce quit permet deparvenirla fin souhaitee et ce que s impose avec autorit. Ross in his translation oscillatesbetween rational principle and (right) rule . For plan cf. Flashar (1983), 245,apparently following Dirlmeier.

6 ENn6,1106b21-2 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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seems to have ruled out a general principle ornorm in this domain. Ifnotonly the constitution of each single agent has to be taken into accountbut alsoa host ofd ifferentcircumstances in whichthe same agent mayfind himself, then therule would have to be amazingly complex, involv-ing multiple quantification over a largeset ofvariables. It would thusturnout to be pe rfectly useless fo raction.Itseems to be very much in the spiritofAristotle s ethics to say thatthere simply are no precise rules to determine the meson.Thereare,atmost, vague piecesofadvice suchas the following:

Butwe must consider the things towards which we ourselves also areeasily carried away;for some of ustend to one thing, some toanother;and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and pain we feel.Wemust drag ourselves awayto the contrary extreme; for we shallgetintothe intermediate state by drawing well away from error, aspeople doinstraightening sticks that are bent.7

This kind of adviceis in fact usefulbecause it takes into account ourinclination to steer awayfrom the meson but itthen follows that it canbe applied only f t e r the intermediate has been determined. Hence, itcannotbe taken as an exampleof the logosused for its determination.Atthis pointitwouldbetemptingtoconclude that sincetherelativityof the intermediate entails that there are no precise rules guiding itschoice,it thenfollowsthat Aristotle adopts some form ofmoral relativ-ism. Whatevertheindividual chooses wouldberightly chosen.

This,of course, will not do. Aristotle isquite firmly in the absolutistcamp since he holds that certain actions are always wrong. Adultery,theftand murder c an never be rightlychosen.8B utfrom the factthat the

7 ENII9 1109bl-78 EN II 6 1107a8-27. The unconditional rejec tion of adultery theft and murder

generatesaserious problem of interpretation because it doubtless commits Aristotletoexceptionless general moral rules forbiddingactions ofthese kinds. T he reasonwhy such actions cannotbe the objectofvirtuous choice in certain cases is that theyare institutionally defined. Marriageand property rightsdefine whatis tocount asadultery and theft respectively. Murder is also institutional since the killing ofsomeone who does nothave rights in a given polis presumably would not beconsidered murder.Actsof these sorts are therefore not relative to the agent theoccasion, the circumstances, etc. In order to account forthis factwithin the frame-rought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Aristotle s RightReason 19

appropriation ofsomeone else s money isalways wrong, itdoes notfollow that the use ofone s own money isalwaysright.9One s ownproperty does not define a range within which any choice counts as achoiceof the intermediate. Aristotle s views inthisdomain also commithim to a non-relativistic position, as we shallsee in section infra

Theupshot of this isthatin theabsenceof universal rulesfor thechoiceof theintermediate,it isunclearhowAristotle would arguefor anon-re-lativistic understanding of moral choice.In order to work towards a satisfactory resolution of theissue,I wouldlike to suggest an interpretation of logos along different lines than theones mentioned hitherto.

First,wewould dowellto notice that theoccurrenceoflogos in thedefinition of moral virtue has been preceded by referencesto logos inchapters 2 and 3 of the same Book and will be explicitly recalled in theopening section of Book VI.WhenAristotle first invites us to examine the nature of actions whichwillleadto theacquisition ofexcellence,hestarts off by saying:

Thatwemustactaccording to theright reason ( )iscommon ground andmustbeassumed.10

Inother words, it is takenasbeyond dispute thatanactioniscorrectifitconformsto the rightreason,but how far doestheacceptanceofthisview extend?

work of his doctrine,Aristotle holds that they are clear instances of excess ordeficiency, and that it is absurd to lookf or the intermediate within eacho f thoseextremes.Cf.1107a8-27.Rulesofthis nature, however,do notallowus todeterminetheintermediatein the caseof actions that are not sharply definedby an institution.The dividing line between liberal and illiberal giving cannot be settled in the sameway as thedividing line between theft andlegitimate appropriation can.

9 EN IV 1 passim Cf.especially1121al-2 onspendingone s money contrarytowhatis right andnoble .10 EN 2,1103b31-2.1 think Barnesis right in reading in the ROT.Thesecond infinitive could have easily disappearedby haplography and itseems to be

needed becausethe clause surelyhas to have normativeforce. I translatecommonground with Thomson (1978),93insteadof theROT s commonprinciple .Thereis nowordfor principle in theGreek. Ihave also supplied thearticlebefore rightreason tomatchthearticlein theoriginal. Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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20 Alfonso Gomez Lobo

Commentators usually state thatitrepresentsaconsensus withintheAcademyand theLyceum.11Butthiscanhardlyberight.Orthoslogosnotonly appears inHerodotus12andThucydides.13Thereisalsoanoccur-renceofthisexpressioninPlato's Apologywhichconfirms,becauseof itscontext,thatits use was notlimitedtophilosophical circles. Socrateshassaid thatthose 'corrupted'by him might have reason to help him

...but theuncomipted,already oldermen,...what otherlogosdotheyhavetohelpme but the right andjust one, that they know thatM eletusislyingand that I am telling the truth?

Socrates here relies on thefactthat the jurors will accept the argumentthat an agent has done the proper thingifhe has the right reason, i.e., thecorrect justification, on his side. This doubtless constitutes an appeal toeveryday Athenian usage of the expression and is thus commonground.The addition of , 'andjust',on the other hand, may well beattributedto thePlatonic Socrates givenhisinterestinjusticein theearlydialogues and what is at stake in the trialitself.

Thepassage fromtheApologynotonly pointstowidespreaduse of theappealtothe rightreason,italsogivesusaninstanceofanorthoslogos:'thatMeletusislyingandthatI amtellingthetruth'.Heretheright reasonorjustificationis not ageneral ruleornorm,butratheraconjunctionof twoparticularpropositions. It is notdifficult tosee,ofcourse, thatinordertohavea full-blown validjustificationone wouldhaveto assume a principleoftheform:'inall cases in which the accuser is lyingandthe accused tellingthetruth,oneoughttohelptheaccused',butitisinterestingtoobserve thatin thecontextof theApologywhathasbeen saidisenough. Socrates adds ,Tsethatas itmay',andmoveson tosomething else.

11 For alistofauthoritiescf. Brthlein 1964), 130 n.3 .1am grateful toProf.ErnstA.Schmidt, T bingen, for an offprint of this article from the estateof Prof.FranzDirlmeier.

12 Cf.Herodotusxvii1;VIliii2; VIIxviii1.13 Cf.ThucydidesIxi 2,where Pericles tells theAthenians thathis logoswill not

appearright tothem becauseof theweaknessoftheir resolution.I t isassumed thattheaverage Athenian will understand Pericles'reproach.14 Apol 34b. Cf. Bumet 1924) ad loc : ... logos in this phrase means account or

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InAristotle the primary function of the right reason is somewhatdifferent.Rather thanjustifying anindependently described action, it isinvolvedin the id entification of the appropriate action itself. And becauseofthis it can then play a justificatory role. The best candidate for a logos thatis to discharge such functions, I submit, is a particular proposition.

ConsiderAristotle s example aboutthe intake of food:if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two toolittle,it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for thisalsois perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little too little fo r Milo [the huge wrestler from Sicily], too much for thebeginner in athletic exercises.15

Whatwill the trainer prescribe, say, for thebeginner? Surely not arange of choices, fo r the example is precisely designed to illustrate theideathat thereisonlyone correct amount orm eson fo r agiven individualin the particular contextof choice.16

The trainer will say to the young athlete something like this: Tourpounds [e.g.] is the appropriate amountfor you given the circumstances,yourphysical constitution, etc. Thisis the right logos that justifies theyoung man s eatingfour pounds offood that day, notmore, and not less.The logos has determined a boundary ( ) above which he wouldbeeating too much and below which he would be earing too little. Lateron weshall reap some fruits from this observation about horos.

Letus now turn to the opening section of Book VI of the EN, a passagewhichofficially supplements thedefinition ofmoral excellence but, as Ishall argue, tends to be misunderstood because the wrong metaphor iscommonlyassumed when tryingtomake senseof it. It isalso illuminat-ing inthatitshows beyond reasonable doubt that wehavetounderstanddetermined by logos in thedefinition asshorthand for determined bythe right logos .

15 ENn6,1106a36-b416 The application of this example to moral choice rules out any interpre tation holdingthat by to meson Aristotle means a range of actions. Excellence both finds and

chooses that which is intermediate (1107a5-6), i.e.,a particular action.rought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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IntheRevisedOxfordTranslationthepassageinquestion readsasfollows:Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which isintermediate [],not the excess nor the defect, and that theintermediate[] isdetermined by thedictatesofreason, let usdiscuss this.In all thestates [] w ehave mentioned, as in a llothermatters, thereisamark []towhichthe man whopossessesreasonlooks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is astandard []which determines themean states[ ]which wesayareintermediate between excessanddefect, being inaccordancewithright reason. But such a statement, though true, is by nomeansilluminating;forin allotherpursuitswhichareobjectsofknowledgeit isindeedtrueto saythatwemustnotexert ourselvesnorrelaxour effortstoomuch nor too little, buttoanintermediateextent[]and as rightreason dictates;butifamanhadonly this knowledgehewouldbenonethe wisere.g., weshouldnotknow what sortofmedicinestoapplytoourbodyifsome weretosay allthose whichthemedicalartprescribes,andwhich agree withthepracticeofone whopossessestheart .Henceitisnecessary with regardto thestatesof thesoulalsonotonly that thistrue statement shouldbemade,butalso thatitshouldbe determinedwhatright reason is and what is the standard that fixesit 17

This translation isunsatisfactoryatseveral points. Itomits 'right'before 'reason'in theopening sentence,butgiven that further along'rightreason'is therendering for orthos logos we maytakethisto be amisprint. Moreimportantly,noeffortis made to indicate that in theGreekorthoslogos(andtheunqualified logosonline22) isalways pre-ceded by thedefinite articleand therefore suggests something quitespecific. Theman whopossessesreason'translatesaGreek expressionwhichismeanttosingleout not areasonable person ingeneral,butrathersomeonewho has the logoscorrespondingto aparticularcraftortechrie.Furthermore, thereisnothing inGreek for 'activity',i.e.,thatwhich is supposed to be heightened or relaxed, assuming that thesewords represent adequate translations.Finally,thereare twogenitiveswhose renderingisoverdetermined:for'a standard which determines

17 ENVI1,1138bl8-34 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Aristotle sRightReason 23

themeanstates thetext simplyhas the /zeros of the meanstates and forwhat is the standard that fixes it (sc. the right reason) it really has andofthis [sc. the right reason] what is the floras .Thepassage explicitly refers backto thedefinition o f moral excellenceand promises to discuss its conceptual core, i.e., the view that theintermediate to be chosen is as the right reason says it is. The need toraisethisquestion is first justified by showing within thecontext of ahighly metaphorical description o f the moral excellences that it is insuf-ficient tomake ageneral reference to the right reason.The text thenshows that exactly the same shortcoming obtains in the case of such artsor technaiasgymnasticsandmedicine.It is theinitial metaphor whichhasprovento berather elusive, hencewe are well advised tostart with the less controversial instances. Inphysical training (represented in the text by the verbs and) to saythatone should exert oneselfand relax the intermedi-ates or to an intermediate extent, i.e., as the rightlogosindicates, is true,buthardly helpful untiltheparticularrightreasonforeach individualandeachtype o f exerciseisidentified. Thesame holds fo r medicine. Herethequestioniswhat kind () ofmedicinesor foo d tooffer thepatient.

Toreply all those () which medicine prescribes, i.e., as he who hasit indicates isagaintrue,butunhelpful.Justas in the Athenian agora publicofficials placed a boundary stoneor horos beyond which those banned f rom the marketplace could notenter,likewise here the right reason uttered in theparticular caseby thetrainer orthephysicianestablishesa limit beyond which exercise andfood would be excessive. The same limit viewed f rom the oppositedirection indicates also when the amount of exertion and nutritionwould beinsufficient. The right logos the particular practical propositionconceived by the trainer or the doctor, thus determines the horosorboundary markfor aproper choice.18

18 Ihave seen a modem substitute for the older stone with the inscription ,am aboundary ma rk of the marketplace ,at thesouth-west comerof the Athenian agora. For a clear and uncontroversial use of horosin the sense o flimit within the EN, cf. I 7,1097bll. At VII5,1148a34f.there is an occurrence o ftheplural withinaphrase that the ROT rightlyrendersbybeyond thelimits . I hadreached m y viewso n this matter before reading Peterson (1988). Much of what Iholdhere is consistent with Peterson s positionand I am indebted to herpaper fo rclarificationon several points. Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Is this interpretation correct?Itcertainly contradicts venerable opin-ion.Ross tookthe howsto be thestandard that fixes right reason andGrantwent so far as to speak of the standard of the law. 19 Further afieldstand Gauthier and Jolif with their conviction that thestandard is therule leadingtocontemplation, whichin turn leads to theabsurd v iewthat, say,a choiceinbattle exhibiting courage instead ofrashness orcowardice isdeterminedby aconsiderationof aplan that would leadtothatultimate goal. For the sakeofcontemplation cowardicemay be abetterpiece of advice than riskingone s life. 20 Irwin s rendering of horosby definition isalso puzzling because thepoint at stakeissurelynotthegeneral characterization of the rightreason,butratherthediscoveryofwhat countsineach singularcase as the right logos.

21Inordertoassess theadvantagesof thepresent interpretation,let us

turn backtoAristotle s metaphorical summary of the waymoral excel-lenceworks. He first says that thereis amarkortarget skopos) towardswhich the man who has the logos looks. Takeninconjunction withafamous remarkin Book Iaboutthe usefulness ofknowingthehumangood( Shallwenot, like archerswhohaveatarget [skopos] atwhichtoaim,be more likely tohitupon what we should? 22), ourpassage suggestsprima facie the image of the bowman.23The tex t thenadds something that does notquitefitintothepicture:he tightens and relaxes . No object for these actions is mentioned.Commentators whohave assumed thearcher metaphor haveto saythatwhat you relax ortightenis thestring at themomentofshooting.24Butthisis not theactual practicein thedomain ofarchery. Inaiming at a

19 Grant (1885), U 14620 Gauthier et Jolif (1970), 1,14921 Irwin (1985), 148. For a similar case in which the questiondoes not request adefinition but a specification of what counts as a such and such, c f. An Po 2,90a6and the detailed treatment of the point in Gomez-Lobo (1980).22 ENI2,1094a23-l (my trans.)23 Thelistofauthoritieswhohold this view wouldbelong indeed. Cf., e.g., Hardie(1980),214. Even such an attentive critic as S. Peterson (see note 26, above) is misledon this point,as theconjecturehisbow in hertranslationof VI1 . indicates.24 Gauthier et Jolif (1970), 2, 436: U y a en effet un but en regard duquel celui qui

possedelaregie tend oudefend lacordede sonarc.rought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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targetthebowmanpullsbackthestring asfa raspossible whetherthetargetlies closeathandor at acertain distance. What thearchermodifiesaccordingly is theinclinationof thearrow,not thetensionof thestring.25A weak shot isworthless. Themarkdoesnotprovideany criteriontotightenorrelax anything.Isubmit that if westartour interpretationby consideringtheverbsinvolvedandmove backwardstoaccommodatethereferenceto atargetwe can obtain a surprisingly coherent picture.Justas theinfinitivesponeinand rathymeinpointtophysical training,the forms and,asGrantsawlong ago,aretaken fromthepracticeofmusic.26Intuningalyreamusicianhas atarget:totuneagiven string, say, at the octave. This implies finding the point or limit inthetensionof the string above whichthesoundwouldbe toohighandbelowwhichitwouldbe toolow.27This limitis inaccordance withtherightreasonif it matchestheaccount givenby theexpert whenhesays: Thisis the propertension. Themarknowprovidesacriterionforchoice:the rightreason determines the horosatwhichthechoice oughttoaim.In fact , to aim at the target is to aim at the limit, as a glanceat thecorresponding passageof theE udemian Ethicsshows. Therethewordingis very similarto the passagewe arediscussing,except that theobjectofapoblepein prosti, tolook towardssomething is,bysubstitution, horosinstead of sfcopos.28Moreover, the limit is strictly particular. It is the one that correspondsto this particularstring ofthisparticularinstrument.A longerorthickerstring,or astring madeof adifferent material,may requirea different

25 I owethis observationto Mr. St. John Colon,aformerstudentofminewho iswellversed inarchery both ancientandmodem. R.Sorabji apparently perceivedthedifficulty andappendedto apaperonthese topicsafootnoteasking,Are thearchershereand at1094a23 tryingtoshootacertaindistance,aidedby amarkerthatmarksthatdistance, rather than shooting at amarker? Sorabji (1980), 219,n. 5. In theabsenceof any indicationthat this unusual setting isassumed, Ithink Sorabji'ssuggestion isquite implausible.26 Grant (1885),147with referencestoLysis209band Phaedo98c.27 Plato Laws 785b)uses theexpression todesignatetheproper timetomarry.Before thatitwouldbe tooearly;after that,to olate.28 EE5,1222b7-9.Cf.also3,(or 15), 1249a22-b3 wherethep hysicianissaidto proceedby reference to ahoros.If hedoes lessormore, health willnolongerbetheoutcomeof thetreatment. Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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degreeoftension. This explainswhy itis true,but not clear torequirethatthestring betuned at thelimit:to saythatweshould look for thehoros(that will giveus theoctave)is ageneral standard, but the horositselfis not astandard.It is thecorrect tensionforthis particular case.Now thatthe keymetaphorhasbeen clarified oneminor difficultyremains in that Aristotle uses here the term mesotes the term usedofficially for the mean states. Given the clear parallelism with theintermediates in theexampleof thetrainerand theamountoffood (ormedicinesin theexampleof thedoctor),weshould nothesitatetotakethepluralofmesotesaspointingnot to thesubjectivestates, butrather tothe objective amounts to be chosen.29If the foregoing is correct, the delimitation of the intermediate isperformed bymeansof aparticular practical proposition without the aidofa general ruleorplanofwhichitwouldbe adirect application. Theredoesn tseem to be a standard tofixthe right account. How, then, do weidentify the right reason and its limit?

Theseed of areply iscontained in the last,epexegeticclauseof thedefinition ofmoral excellence:the delimitation of the intermediatebyreasonproceedsinthe way inwhichthe man ofpractical wisdom woulddetermine it .

Aswe noted earlier, if wedropAspasius conjecture and return tothe of the manuscripts (as we should on strictly paleographicalgrounds), the referenceto theprudent manbecomes vaguer.Onthisreading,it is not thecase that there is aspec ific logosfordelimiting themean, exactlythe logosthattheprudentmanknowsandwould himselfuse.Thedefinition says instead thatindetermining themeanoneshouldproceedasthemano fpractical wisdom would, i.e., that prudence simplyprovidesamodelfor therequired operation.A brief treatmentofsome well-known (though notundisputed) fea-tures o f prudence should provide partial confirmation of the viewdefended thus far.

29 On thispointcf.Peterson(1988),235n6. Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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hronesis(practical wisdom, prudence) is theexcellenceofthecalculativepartof therational soul.It isoperative whenweperform wellawidevarietyofinterconnected intellectual operations which aim at attainingtruth in thedomainofaction.It isoriginally introducedas a capacity todeliberate well.

Now it isthought to be a m ark of the m an ofpractical wisdom to beable todeliberate well about whatisgoodand expedientforhimself,not in some particular respect, e.g., about whatsortsof thing conducetohealth or strength, but about whatsortsof thing conduce to the goodlife in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men withpractical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculatedwellwith aviewtosome goodendwhich is one of those that are notthe object of any art. Thus in general the man who is capable ofdeliberatinghaspractical wisdom.30

Sincemoral excellenceisconduciveto the good life ingeneralit istempting to follow Gauthierand Jolif and apply these remarks to thequestionofpracticalwisdom scontribution tomoral virtue. If thegoodlifeconsists in contemplation, then the prudent man would be expectedtodetermine the intermediate by deliberating about what is conducivetothis privileged activity.31As I have already suggested,thisis highlyimplausiblebecause in many instances the action according to a vice,e.g., cowardice or illiberality, may be the most conducive to futurecontemplation.

There is a recent (and much more sophisticated) variant of this posi-tion which assumesaninclusive rather thanadominant interpretationofAristotelian happiness.32It isbest represented by R.Sorabjiwhenhewrites:

Whateverother roles practical wisdom may or may not play, I suggestthatoneroleisthis. Itenablesaman,in thelightof hisconceptionof

30 ENV I5 1140a25-3131 Gauthierand Jolif(1970),1,149. Cf. note20.32 For the use ofthis terminology cf. theseminal articleby Hardie(1965), 277-95.rought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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thegood lifein general, to perceive what generosity requiresofhim, ormore generally what virtueand tokalonrequireofhim, in theparticularcase, and itinstructs him to actaccordingly. Apicture of thegood lifewill save himfromgiving away too much, or too little, or to the wrongcauses, in particular instances.33

Ithink this isexcessively optimistic. A comprehensive picture of thegood life apicture that regards liberality as an important ingredientwithin it,will simply tell an individual that he has to be generous, andthatvirtue andnobility require that he be so, but it will hardly indicateto him the right amount to give in a particular case. Two individuals mayhave the same picture of the good life but if there is considerabledifference inpersonal wealth between them, therequirements ofliber-alitywill also differwidely. It is not amatter, ofcourse, ofsaving moneyfor a life ofleisure, but ofattaining excellence here andnow,

...f or liberality resides not in themultitudeof thegiftsbut in thestateof the giver, and this is relative to the giver s substance. There isthereforenothing to prevent the man who gives less from being themore liberal man,if he has less togive.34

The ultimate reason to be moral does not coincide with the reason tochoose to give aspecificamount of money. Likewise, there is no directinference from thenotion that thebest state forthe lyre is to have all ofitsstrings in tune to the conclusion that this is the proper tension for thisparticular string.Idoubt, then, that keepingbeforeoureyes a picture ofhappiness isthe major contribution prudence makes to the determination of theintermediate.That deliberation enters into moral choice cannot be doubted. Aliberal individual certainly has to deliberate about how to spend hismoney, but his deliberation, as we have seen,f lowswithin the channelsof preset limitations because he aims at spending according to hissubstance and on the right objects .35 How much spending will be

33 Sorabji (1980), 20634 EN IV1,1120b7-ll35 EN IV 1,1120b23^1 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Aristotle sRight Reason 29

compatible withhiswealthhas to be determined by adifferent opera-tion, onethat precedesthedeliberation abouthow tospendit, but is notequivalentto hisgraspof thegood life.

Whatfeature ofprudence,then,allowsit tomakethedecisive contri-butionto thedelimitation of theintermediate?Since foreach action the limit isparticular, it canonlybe grasped

correctly by anintellectual excellence whose task is todeal also withparticulars. Aristotelian science,ofcourse, cannotdo the jobbecauseitis anapprehensionofuniversalandnecessarybeings .36Moreover, whatisrequiredis apractical grasp, i.e.,notsimplyagraspofwhatis thecase,but ofwhatisgoodorbest withinthecircumstances.

These requirementsaresatisfiedbyprudence.It is notconcerned withuniversalsonly:itmust also recognize particulars.37And it is an excel-lenceof practical, not of theoretical knowledge, i.e.,of knowledge whichis for thesakeofsomething ,viz.,action.38

How then does practical wisdom operatein moral excellence?It iswell known that in his discussion of prudence in Book VI of the ENAristotledoes notgiveus asingle exampleofmoral reasoning.Allof hisexamples are taken from thenon-moral realm and for the most partaddress the question of deliberation towards an end.If myprevious thoughts are correct,thedirect roleofprudence inmoral excellence is to identify the immediate end of an action.Byimmediate end I mean something like this: my remote end is to flourishand ofthis prudence gives me a general picture within which I seeliberalityas aningredient.Liberality then becomesfor me anintermedi-ate end. I aim to be liberal because that will make a contribution to mybeinga good quality human being,aflourishing human being.But I canonly becomealiberal person, prudence also tellsme,if Iengagein rightgiving .39Right givingonthis occasion then becomesmyimmediate end.

What constitutes right giving? According to the general standardprovidedby thedefinitionofliberality,itconsistsindoingit for thesakeof the noble , i.e., not for any subordinate advantage formyself but

36 ENVI 1140b31-2 my trans.)37 ENVI7 1141bl5.Cf.alsoVI8,1142al4;VI9,1143a32-438 ENVI1,1139a32-3and 1139bl 9 EN IV1,1120a24-6 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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becauseof its beauty and intrinsic worth.40M y grasp of the definition ofthe intermediate end isimportant because it sketches before my mindcertain general conditions that right giving ought to satisfy but myaiming at the kalon however,may not be enough. I can make a mess ofitif Ifail to satisfy fu rthe rconditions. Rightgiving implies giving to therightpeople, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the otherqualifications thataccompany right giving .Atthis point, Iwould suggest,the aspect of practical wisdom directedto particulars stepsin. A good intellectual grasp is required to knowif itis right to give, say, to this or that person or institution, to know whatwouldconstitute the right amount given mysubstance, to know if thisis the right moment because giving too early may be bribing instead ofexpressing gratitude. Aristotle adds th e equivalent o fe tcetera and therest ,indicating that the list of variables to consider may be, as we knowfrom our own lives, quite long.Each ofthese variables would have to be substituted by a reference toa specificperson orgroup ofpersons, to aspecificamount, to a momentin time, etc. Thus, we are back at the notion of a highly complexprepositional content constituting the right reason that specifies theintermediate by fixing the horos or limit. Although each item can bepartial ly justified byexplainingwhy thisis the right person, the rightamount, etc., no overarching, fixedstandard seems to be in sight.Imay now return to a difficulty suggested earlier concerning thisinterpretation:does it not imply that, since there is no general standardof which a particular right reason is a deductive application, our moraldecisions turnout to be relativistic and thus arbitrary?I think not. Although morally right choice has been shown to berelativeto the agent, the circumstances, his condition, the recipients, etc.,this does notimp lyrelativism because it does notfollow that what seemsrightto the agent is right for the agent. Rightness and wrongness is nota function of the agent s perception or persuasion. He may well bewrong.There are cases ofgood practical grasps and of bad, i.e., mistaken,ones.The accounts of the latter would be wrong, notright, logoi.In fact Aristotle s understanding of the commonly accepted appealto theright reason seemsto bethatit notonlyhas to beadequateand toth e point,but that, first and foremost, it has to be true.

40 Ibid. Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Justaslackof art )is astate concerned with production butinvolvingafalse logos likewiseafailureinprudence amountstoengag-inginaction undertheguidanceof afalseprepositionalcontent.Indeed,when specifying what constitutes an excellent choice , Aristotle enumerates three conditions that have to be met:

1)Thelogosmustbetrue,2) thedesire mustbe right, and3) thedesire must pursue whatthe logossays.41

These conditions appear in a highly controversial passage whichperhaps the foregoing developments will help to clarify.42 Appealingonce more to the example of liberality, let us assume that acertainPleistarchos, a moderately wealthy but otherwise unknown Athenian,decidestocontributeto theembellishmentof asmall Ionic templeon thebanksof theIlissos.Let usassume furtherthat, givenhissubstance,hishaving adebtofgratitudeto thegod,hiscitynotbeingatwar, etc.twominaeis the rightamountandthat thiscan bejustifiedbyreferencetohiswealth, his devotion to this divinity and therestofhis circumstances.Ifit istruethatthisis theproper amount,andifhedesirestocontributejust that, the logosand the desire point in the same direction and hisdecision willbeexcellent.IfPleistarchos recognizesthat two minae is the proper amount andyetfeelsstrongly inclined tocontribute four,perhapsout ofvanity,hisdesire will not be right. It does not pursue what thelogosestablishes asthe limit. If he contributes two after all,he will be engaging in theequivalent ofself-controlorenkrateia.If heinstead contributesfour, weshallimputeto himweaknessof thewillorakrasia.Neitherofthese two,ofcourse, constitutes excellent choosing.

Still worse would be his choice if his vanity leads him to wronglybelieve thatfourminae is the proper amount, and he infactcontributesfour.Theobjectofdesire and thesubjectof the logoscoincide it did notintheprevioustwocases ,but now thelogosisfalseand thedesire wrong.

41 ENVI2,1139a23-642 Icannot provide hereadetaileddefenseof myinterpretation,but I canindicatethatIowemuchof it toLoening 1903). Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Pleistarchoshasbeen intemperate in his giving. He has fallen prey to theviceof prodigality.In this last case the logos has failed to delimit the intermediate.

Pleistarchoshas not determined it in the way the prudent manwould,i.e.,taking into considerationall of the relevant, particular factors.Aristotle s explanationof such failure does not consist in complainingabout lack of standards, as we would. He introduces instead a very

important doctrine in moral epistemology, the doctrine namely thatconsistent moralfailure, i.e., vice, has a negative impact on the pruden-tialgrasp for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived aboutthestarting-points ofaction. 43Theinveterate drunkard believes that onemoredrink will be alright.IfPleistarchos hasbeen hitherto virtuous, hisexcellence, asAristotlesomewhat cryptically puts it, willmake his goal right ,44i.e., will providethe conditions for a correct grasp of the fact that, on this occasion, givingtwominae is the proper thing for him to do. It will also allow him to see,of course, that thereby he will be doing the liberal thing, and thatliberalitywill make an important contribution to his flourishing as ahuman being.

In our fictitious example two minae is the limit determined by logos.This is the right account. It is the account that accords with practicalwisdom,45 or, to use Aristotle s pregnant formulation, it is practicalwisdom in thisdomain.46One final misunderstanding of Aristotle s definition of moral excel-lence cannowbedisposed of, the one namely that derives from equatingtheprudent man with thegood or excellent man(the spouda ios)wholateron issaid to be as it were the norm kanori) an d measure metrori) ofthem ,47sc. of the noble kola) and the pleasant hedea). It is tempting toinferfrom this that Aristotle has in mind some privileged individual who

43 EN VI12,1144a34-6. Cf. further the paragraph that etymologically explains temper-ance() as that which preservesprudence ( ),sc.VI5,1140bll-20.

44 EN VI12,1144a7-845 ENVH3,1144b23-446 EN VI13,1144b27-847 ENni4,1113a33 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Aristotle s Right Reason 33

would actively determine the intermediate and thus the noble thing tochoose.He would be the person weshould look to and imitate because,in so f a ras he is the preeminently prudent person, whatever he doeswouldbe the prudent thing to do. That wewould have to rely on theevidence of prudent choices to identify theprudent ma n generates, ofcourse,a well-known circularity problem.M uch of what appears in part of this article ismeant toresolve thatproblem.What defines the spoudaios is not that whateverhedoes isnobleand good, but rather that he judges each case rightly and in each thetruthappears to him .48Should the truth not appear to him, i.e., shouldhemake a mistake in a particular case, then his choice, as we saw, ceasesto be spoudaia and he himself ca n hardly count a s spoudaios on thisoccasion.There is no individual whose practical graspof the intermedi-ate can always be guaranteed to be correct. A morally upright andpracticallywise person is as itwere anorm and a measure inmoralmatters.Infa ct thenorm and the measure is the right reason, that is, thetrue particular practical proposition relevant in the circumstances.At the outset of this paper Irejected the view that in hisdefinition ofm o r a lvirtue Aristotle means by logos either thehuman capacity wecallreason or ageneral rule, norm or principle. I then attempted toshowt h a t logos in thedefinition stands for the expression the right logos , a nexpressioncommonly used in thejustifica tionof anaction. With the aidof Aristotelianexamples, I claimed that the right reason is aparticularpractical proposition which specifies a horos or limit, thus rejectingearlierinterpretations which held, conversely, that the horos was a stand-ard for the logos. Finally, a fictitious case of liberality provided a nadequate illustration of how the present interpretation would work intheabsence of ageneral rule specifying amounts for right giving: theremoteend of the agent is to be happy, the intermediate end is to beliberaland the immediate end is to give the right amount. A prudentialgraspof the particulars of the case issues in atrue practical propositionwhichspecifies the m eso n orcorrect amount. Tochoose this amount,therefore is to act inaccordance with Aristotle s right reason.

48 EN ID 4,1113a29-31 Brought to you by | Columbia UniversityAuthenticated | 93 180 53 211Download Date | 11/22/13 7:35 PM


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Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso, Aristotle's Right Reason, Apeiron 1995