Anti Anti Identity Politics

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Anti-Anti-Identity Politics: Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities of CitizenshipAuthor(s): Susan BickfordReviewed work(s):Source: Hypatia, Vol. 12, No. 4, Citizenship in Feminism: Identity, Action, and Locale(Autumn, 1997), pp. 111-131Published by: Blackwell Publishingon behalf of Hypatia, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810735.

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Anti-Anti-Identity olitics:Feminism,Democracy,ndtheComplexities fCitizenshipSUSAN BICKFORD

In thisessay, I arguethat recentleftistcriticisms f identity olitics do notaddressproblems f inequalityand interaction hat are central n thinking boutcontemporaryemocratic olitics.I turn nstead o a setof feminist hinkerswhosharethesecritics'visionof politics,but whocriticallymobilizedentity n a waythatprovidesa conceptionof democratic itizenshipor our inegalitarian nddiversepolity.

Radicaldemocraticpoliticalactionattempts o perform he paradoxicalaskof achieving egalitariangoals in egalitarianwaysin an inegalitariancontext.The danger s that bracketing ocial and economic inequality asthough wewere all equal risksreproducing nequity under the guise of neutrality;yettaking those inequalities into account in some systematic way risks re-entrenching them.1In this essay,I will arguethat this central challenge ofcontemporarydemocratictheoryandpractice requiresan expansiveconcep-tion of the languagesof citizenship. Specifically,I contend that the languageof identity need not be regarded s inimical to democraticpolitics,as it isbymany contemporarycritics of identity politics. My ungainly title, then, ismeant to invoke Clifford Geertz'sarticle Anti-Anti-Relativism, because Ihave much the samepurposewith respectto identitypoliticsthat he had withrespect to relativism.That is, my purpose s not to defend somethingcalledidentitypolitics -nor to dismissit. I aim insteadto contest the particularversions of identity politics that some critics construct and the consequentdangers hey envision.Identity tself is obviouslya termthick with meanings.It can indicatemysense of self,who I think I am;this is often boundupwith groupmembership,those people with whom I identify or am identified.There is, further,the

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linguistic or conceptual sense of identity as a categorythat designatestheself-sameentity, defined by unity, fixity, and the expulsion of difference(Young1990, 98-99). The diversemeaningsof identityarepursuedn a varietyof academicdiscourses,rom the most abstractphilosophicalinvestigationsofthe identitiesofpersons o the mostrichlyempiricaldevelopmentalpsycho-logicalwork on the formationof identity.There are also a variety of meanings of identitypolitics circulating,although it is strikingthat in most commentaries(includingsome of thosediscussedhere) the precisemeaningis left implicit.Among otheruses, iden-

titypolitics canrefer o articulatinga claim in the nameofaparticular roup;beingconcerned with culturalspecificity,particularlyn an ethnic-nationalistsense; acting as though group membershipnecessitates a certain politicalstance; focusing to an excessive degree on the psychological;and variouscombinationsof these.Thus identity politics has become, as Geertz said about relativism, theanti-herowith a thousandfaces (Geertz 1984, 273). Appropriately,hen, its

opponentsalso take a varietyof forms.Although much publicdiscoursehascentered on the disagreementsbetween those who take groupidentity seri-ouslyand their conservativecritics,recentlya chorus of voices fromthe lefthasstressed he dangersof identity politics. In thisessay,I address hese leftistarguments,which have been made from a varietyof theoreticalperspectives(feminist,communitarian,poststructuralist,emocratic,old New Left) andina varietyof venues (booksfrom academicas well as popularpresses, ournalsfrom Dissentand Tikkun o Harper'so PoliticalTheory).I use the designationleft broadlyto indicate that these criticismsstem from a concernwith theprospectsof democraticpolitics;these writers harewith those theycriticizeacommitmentto transfiguringn oppressiveand inegalitarian ocialorder.Letme also stress that these leftist writersdifferprofoundly romone another intermsof theiroverallintellectual andpoliticalprojects,aswell as in the termsof theircritiqueof identitypolitics.What is noteworthy,however,is that criticismsof identity politics play arole in so many differentcontemporary leftish enterprises.I discernthreeprimaryhemes in leftistcritiques, hree interrelateddangersallegedlyembed-ded in identity politics that hamperpolitical action orientedtowardradicalsocialchange.The firstdangerhas to do withsubjectivity,with the kind of selfthat identity politics produces.The secondhas to do with community,or thekind of collectivity that identity politics precludes.And finally, these con-structionsof self and community are regardedas dangerousbecause theyencourageandpreventcertainkindsof political action.It isprecisely he interactionof thesetwophenomena-self andcommunity,subjectivityand intersubjectivity-that is the focus of some feministrethink-ing of politicsand identity.As a counter to the leftistcritiquesI will discuss,Iwant to offer a readingof feminist theorists of inequalityand identitywhose

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work has been influential in feminist contexts both academicand nonaca-demic. These writers, will argue,help us thinkthrough he complexrelationsbetween identity and politics in an inegalitarianand diverse polity; theysuggesta differentunderstandingof the political and rhetoricalusesof iden-tity.2By examiningthe worksof these writers,I hope to counterthe politicaland theoretical moves made by leftist criticswho read dentityclaimsin aparticularway. But I also intend to address heir concerns by showing howfeminist writers have begun to construct a conception of citizenship andidentitythat is adequate o this social andpoliticalcontext and to the aimsofemancipation.My goal, again,is not to defend some activityor orientation called identitypolitics.Rather,my intent is to show that feminist work on reconceptualizingthe link between identityandpolitics is central to thinkingabout democraticcitizenship.Myconcern is that the value of thisworkgetsobscuredorblockedout in apublicdiscourse haracterized ythe increasingly ommon invocationof identity politics as an all-purposeanti-hero. That practiceof dismissalsetsup a frame in which linking identity with politics is automaticallysuspect,regardlessof how we characterize hat link. So my argument against thatphenomenon-against anti-identitypolitics-proceeds by analyzinghe polit-icallyandtheoreticallyvital waythat some feministwritershave conceptual-ized the connection.

First,however,we need to sortthroughthe significanceof the claims thatleftist critics aremaking againstsomething they call identity politics.THE FAILINGSOF IDENTITYOLITICS :

RESSENTIMENT,ALKANIZATION,NDREGULATIONIdentitypolitics,somecriticsargue,createsandperpetuatesan understand-ingof public identitycomposed n termsof the suffering elf:the oppressedareinnocent selves defined by the wrongs done them. The concept ofressentiment s often usedin makingthis argument, o indicatea corrosiveresentfulnesson the partof those political actorsmotivatedby or engaging nidentitypolitics. 3Ressentimentpromptsa focus on victimhood andpower-

lessness,andanobsessivedemand orrecognition(Brown1995,Elshtain1995,Tapper1993;see also Patai and Koertge1994, Patai 1992, Gitlin 1993). Thepolitical pursuitsof this suffering elf aredirected towardsecuringrightsfroma strongState protector Brown1995;Wolin 1993).Consideran examplefrom the workofWendyBrown,who hasprovided hefullest and most complexversionof these argumentsby analyzing he histori-cal, cultural,andpolitical-economicconditions in which contemporaryden-tity politicshas emerged.Browncites as indicativeof identity politicsa SantaCruz, California city ordinance forbiddingdiscriminationon a variety ofgroundsrangingfrom race to weight to personalappearance.She argues hat

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attemptsto establish such a wide varietyof componentsas relevant to publicidentityend up reinforcing he disciplinary,normalizingpowerof the regula-tory apparatus f the state.When suchdefinitions of identitybecome partofliberaladministrativediscourse, t ensures hat personsdescribableaccord-ing to them will now become regulated hroughthem (1995, 65-66).

Why wouldpolitical actorspursuesocial change in such a counterproduc-tive, self-destructive or self-disciplinary)way?Brown locates the answerinthecomplexlogicsofressentiment -ressentimentnherentin liberalculture,but amplifiedconsiderablyby contemporarypolitical,economic, and culturalconditions(1995, 66-69). These conditionsproduceor provokeidentity poli-tics-or, in her words, politicized dentity -which is rooted in an acquisi-tion of recognitionthrough ts historyof subjection(a recognition predicatedon injury,now righteouslyrevalued). The coherence of the groupidentityitself,according o Brown,rests on its marginalization.n other words,politi-cized identityhas an ontological investment in its own subjection-its veryexistence is constitutedby its oppression-thus it mustcontinuallyconcen-trate on its own woundsof marginalization, xclusion, subjugation(Brown1995, 70-74;see also Pataiand Koertge1994, chap. 3). The logic of ressenti-ment (the moralizingrevenge of the powerless )is such that politicizedidentityhas to maintain and reiterate ts sufferingpublicly, n orderto main-tain its existence.

Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims foritself,only by entrenching,restating,dramatizing, nd inscrib-ing its pain in politics;it can hold out no future-for itself orothers-that triumphsover this pain. (Brown1995, 74)The very gesturesmadeto combat this pain compulsivelyreopen or reinfectthe wound(Brown1995, 73). Brown'sanalysisalmostirresistibly onjuresupan imageof identitypolitics as a kind of obsessivescratchingat scabs; politi-cizedidentity spoliticallyneurotic.Other politicalprojectshave been identified asneuroticin this way,and ashaving the same sort of political results.MarionTapperarguesthat somefeminist-inspiredpracticesin academic institutionsemploy, perhapsunwit-tingly,modem formsof disciplinarypower.She cites, forexample,the estab-lishmentof policies that coursecontent and teachingmaterialsbe nonsexist,that womenbe includedin candidatepoolsandon selectioncommittees,thatresearchactivitiesincorporategender ssues(Tapper1993, 136-38).To addressinjustices in academic institutions in this way, Tapperargues,is to end upcreatingwithin universities docile ubjectsamenableto a varietyof formsofsurveillanceof their teachingand research.The impulsetoward intellectualauthoritarianism hat underlies these politics springsfrom ressentiment,which is botha backward-lookingpirit-it needs to keep on rememberingpast injustices-and an expansive spirit-it needs to find new injustices

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everywhere. As both Tapper and Brown note, this spirit is particularlyinvestednot justin its ownpain,but in itspurityandpowerlessness.Ressenti-ment involves the need to see the other as powerfuland responsible ormypowerlessness,and then the transformation f this thought into the thoughtthat my powerlessnesss a proofof mygoodnessand the other'sevil (Tapper1993, 134-35;see also Brown1995, chap. 2).The implicationsof ressentiment orpolitics,then, are twofold. It is not justthat bureaucratic, egulatorypracticesare enhanced and expandedthroughthe pursuitof this kind of strikingly nemancipatory olitical project Brown1995, 66).4 The furtherproblemis that the assumptionof morallypureandpowerlessvictims eliminates the possibilitiesfor democratic disagreement.Rather than articulatingpolitical claims in contestable ways,victims wieldmoralreproach againstpower.The myth of moral truth serves as a weaponin the complaintagainststrength ;ts ownpowerrestsin itsbeingdifferenti-atedfrompower(Brown 1995, 42-46). As Browndescribes his view, Truthsalwayson the side of the damnedor the excluded;hence Truth s alwayscleanof power,but thereforealwayspositionedto reproachpower 1995, 46). Theproblemthen is that these bifurcations-into good-evil, powerless-powerful,true-oppressive-evade the necessity for political argumentaboutuncertainthings,obscurethe realitythat all areimplicated n power,and truncateboththe capacityforpolitical judgmentand the practiceof publicdebate (Brown1995, chap. 2;Elshtain1995, xvi-xvii, 44-45, 58-59).Other leftist critics claim that identity politics visits anotherkindof harmon democraticpolitics.Theirconcern is not so much the logicof ressentimentand the kinds of selves it necessitates, but rather the assertionof groupdifference and the kind of communitysuch assertionspreclude.The criticismhere is one of balkanization.For example, Todd Gitlin arguesthat radicalpolitics, in academic and otherforms,is no longer grounded n an interestinuniversalhuman emancipation. 5The left no longer relies on (indeed, itabjures)the potentiallyinclusive language at the heart of two hundredyearsof revolutionary radition,whether liberalor radical 1993, 174). Theresulting identity politics (particularly n its academic manifestations)is apolitics of dispersion ndseparateness, f distinct andembattledgroupings.Identitypolitics is simply old-stylepluralism n revolutionaryguise,a politicsthatpreventsus from magining acommonenterprise. 6 he academiceft,Gitlin concludes, haslost interest in the commonalities that undergird tsobsession with difference (1993, 177). This is not just a problem in theacademy,of course. A similarpoint is made in Wolin'sgrimassessmentof ourcurrent political conditions, to which the politics of difference and theideologyof multiculturalismhave contributedby renderingsuspectthe lan-guageand possibilitiesof collectivity, common action, and sharedpurposes(Wolin 1993,481; see alsoHitchens 1993). As JeanBethke Elshtainputsit:

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To the extent that citizensbegin to retribalize nto ethnic orother fixed-identity roups,democracy alters.Any possibil-ity for human dialogue, for democratic communication andcommonality,vanishes.... Differencebecomesmore and moreexclusivist.... Miredin the cement of ourown identities,weneed never dealwith one another.(1995, 74)

This kind of identity politics entrenches boundariesbetween groupsat theexpense of commonality;our attachment to the respublicas attenuated,andthe identitythat suffers s that of citizen (Wolin 1993, 477-81).Ironically,Wolin notes, the focus on difference instead of commonalityprovokesan attachmentto sameness, o the illusion of internalunitywithineach difference 1993, 477). The notion of identity as exclusive, seamless,stable, and not open to critiquehas been challenged by othersas well, in adifferent heoreticalvein. To makeidentitythe sourceof ourcommonalitynotonly precludesa broaderkind of public togetherness,it prevents a radicalinquiry nto the politicalconstructionandregulationof identityitself (Butler1990, ix). Some feminist theoristsquestion the idea that feministsneed astable notion of genderidentity,of the category women. They argueagainstthe idea thatidentity-as both aparticularense of subjectivityand a concom-itantsenseof collectivity-can be a foundation orpolitics.Identificationwitha collectivity is itself an achievement of power; this is to say that we areconstructedthrough the workingsof power to be certain kinds of subjects,membersof certaingroups.Claims that this membershipcan be a sourceforcollective political action distractus frominvestigating he ways membership(identity) is produced,and obscurethe workingsof powerthat produce t. AsButlercontends, the identity of the feminist subject ought not to be thefoundation of feminist politics, if the formationof the subject takes placewithin a field of power regularly buried through the assertion of thatfoundation 1990, 6).

The regulatory racticeof identity (Butler 1990, 32) implantsa desirefora stableoneness,anunproblematic I or we. The pursuitof unityinevitablygenerates exclusions, because who we are can be defined only by thepresenceof the not-we, the abnormal. dentitypolitics is chargedwith ignor-ing how normsof identity alwaysproduceexclusion (Brown1995), how theeffort to secure identity preventsus from contesting its production(Butler1990, 1992), and how that productionis temporallyspecificand politicallyvariable,not fixed (Riley 1988).

In sum,these diverseleftist criticsprovideoverlapping,althoughnot iden-tical, indictments of identity politics. Some criticize the production of aresentfulselffocusedon redressof its (incurable) njuriesand desirousof unity,stability,andthe (unachievable)exclusionof difference.Othersare criticalofthe constructionof political collectivities that nurture n irreducible oreof

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exclusivity (Wolin 1993,479) and thus thwartthe commitmentto common-alityand sharedpurposes.And they allquestionthe kinds of politicsthat suchgroupspursue an enhancement of the regulatory tate,orseparatist nclaves)and the kind that they preclude(communicativedemocratic nteraction).

THE FAILINGSOF ANTI-IDENTITYOLITICSLeftistcriticsof identitypoliticsarenot unaware hat the very argumentsorthe politicalrelevanceof identityaroseas a response o certainconceptionsof

the politicalself andthe politicalcommunity.Feministshave long argued hatmen are the implicitnorm of universal onceptionsof the individualorthecitizen (Okin 1979, 1989; Lloyd 1984; Young 1990; Pateman 1988). Andfeminism as a radicalpolitical movement arose in partfrom women'sexperi-ence ofoppressionn the radical politicalcommunity Evans 1980).As sometheorists have concluded, appeals to the sharedpurposes or commoninterests of a communityare not neutral; heyoften serve to falselyuniversal-ize the perspectivesof the powerful,while the concernsof those not partof thedominant culturearemarkedout asparticular, artial,and selfish(perhapsalsowhiny, backward-looking,elf-absorbed?). he languageof commonality tselfcan perpetuate nequality,particularlywhen invokedby those who commandpolitical, communicative,or economic resources(Mansbridge1983; Young1990;Fraser1992).One centralproblem,then, with some leftistcritiquesof identity politics isthat they do not address he insightsof the last few decadesof radical(partic-ularly eminist)politicalthought. Simplyto re-invoke shared urposes eemsto me to ignorewhat we have learned about how the languageof common-ality can actively exclude. Simply to reassert citizenship as a publicidentity that transcends or integrates other commitments is to evade thequestion of what conception of citizenship would not automaticallyprivi-lege certain commitments. And to see identity claims as obsessed withsuffering is to overlook the fact that it is the perspectiveof the dominantculture that marks hem out that way.7Thuspartof whatmakes dentityrelevant to politicsisprecisely he contextof inequalityin which even radicaldemocraticpolitical (inter)action takesplace.8In such a context, the central democraticpoint cannot be simplythatgroupidentities get in the way of strongcommitment to the respublica, hebroaderpolitical community (as I think Gitlin and even Wolin wouldhaveit). Rather, the question is more like: in a context of inequality andoppression,how are multiple we's o be democraticallypart of the samepublic thing? What can make possible democratic communication withdifferentiallyplacedothers?

The ressentimentrgument suggeststhat pursuingthis question throughregulatory means is likely to be self-subversive.Certainly, any effective

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identity politics. By critically theorizingpolitical identity and interaction,these feministsoffera conceptionof democraticcitizenship or ourinegalitar-ian and diversepolity.REFUSING HESPLIT:MATERIALIZINGEMINIST EMOCRATICITIZENSHIP

One womanwrote, Becauseyou are Black and Lesbian,youseem to speakwith the moralauthorityof suffering. Yes,Iam Black andLesbian,and whatyouhearin myvoice is fury,not suffering.Anger,not moralauthority.There is adifference.(AudreLorde1984, 132).In workssuch as ThisBridgeCalledMy Back,Borderlands/Larontera,SisterOutsider, ndMakingFace,MakingSoul/Haciendo aras, he politicalcharacterof identity is analyzedin terms of its multidimensionality.I use the wordmultidimensional o indicatemore than that identityis multiple,althoughmultiplicityispartof it. The furtherpoint is that identity playsdifferentkinds

of political roles, is related to power in differentways. Identity hus hasmultidimensionaleffects in the world. And the primary phenomena thatidentity(the assumption,assignment,andexperienceof identity)bringsaboutare relations andseparations. put the point this wayin order o distinguish tfromthe claim that identityasa concept meanscategoricalsameness,andthusinevitably produces ts Other as the differencethat makes the categorypossi-ble. That logic of identityis certainlyone of the forcesshapingcontemporarysocialorders.But identityalsoproducesotherkinds of effects,ones that (I willargue)enable democraticpoliticalaction.Mobilizinga group dentityas politicallyrelevant is an attemptto respondto powerin itsconstrainingandoppressive orm.Prevailingrelationsofpowerallow institutions and individuals to define less powerfulgroups-throughculturalimages,bureaucraticpractices,economic arrangements-in ordertocontrol, constrain,condemn,or isolate them (see esp. Moragaand Anzaldua1983, Anzalduia1990d, Collins 1991). To say that a group of people isoppresseds to saythat they are markedout asmembersof particular roups nwaysthatpreventthem fromexercising(in IrisYoung'serms)self-determina-tion and self-development.In such a political context, it is hard to imaginehow one could articulatea politicalclaim againstoppressionwithoutnaminggroup dentities.But,paceBrown,the existence of the groupdoesnot dependsolelyon the publicreiterationof its injuries.For dentityhasanotherrelation-ship to politics, one that manifests a differentkind of power:power as anenabling,empowering orceor capacity.Farfrombeing constitutedsolely bytheir oppressionand exclusion,group dentitiesmaybe cherishedas a sourceof strengthandpurpose.Ourrace,ethnic heritage,gender dentity,orreligioncan be a vital motivationin ourpolitical lives, one that sustainsus in struggle

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and makes political action possible (Morales 1983a,b; Quintales 1983;Moschkovich 1983; Moraga 1983; also Anzald6a 1987). Reclaiming theseidentities asexpresslypolitical identities often involves insistingon the recog-nition of oppression,but it also means reclaiming(in bell hooks'swords)alegacyof defiance,of will, of courage hooks 1989, 9).This reclamation,however, is complicatedby identity's multiple worldlymanifestations and effects, which are often discrepant-some rooted inimposeddefinitions,in how others see us, some in how we see ourselves.Theidentitiesthat areimposedon usdo not necessarilyneatlymeshwith whatwewantto reclaim;otherindividualsor institutionsmaydefineusdifferently hanwe woulddefineourselves,or take as definingcharacteristics nes that we donot. Controlling definitions of group identity that are imposed from theoutsideestablishparticularines of sameness(of those within the group)anddifference(fromthosenot in the group).This premiseof homogeneitywithingroupsis often repeatedand enforcedby the groupsthemselves (Anzaldua1990b;Zook 1990;Lorde1990, 1988).The premiseof homogeneityand boundedness s questionedin two relatedwaysby the theoristsI amciting:first,by insistingon the multiplicityof groupmemberships,and second, by highlightingthe necessityof actively interpre-ting what an identity means.Adrienne Rich'sconceptuallanguageis usefulhere.Near the beginningof the long poem Sources,Rich asks:

Withwhomdoyoubelieve our otis cast?Fromwheredoesyourstrengthome?I thinksomehow,somewhereeverypoem of mine mustrepeatthose questionswhich arenot the same. (1986, 6)

Our strengthmaycome from those aroundwhom we grewup, those whotaughtus our racialheritage, incited ourreligious passions,constituted ourethnic or economic or sexed milieu. As we live on, ourstrength may comefromothers discoveredor created as an us, those with whom we come tosharean ethics, a politics, a set of practices-a movement of feminists, say,or of radicalartists.At the same time, we mayreject, sustain,or revise themeanings of our earlier identifications, and we may confront conflictsbetween those identifications.

Politicallyspeaking,Rich'spoemremindsus,thereis afurtherquestion:withwhomdoyoubelieve our ot s cast? f this isnot the samequestionasfromwheredoesyour trengthome?t mustbe becauseourlot is castbeyondthe groups hatgive us strength,beyond those with whom we share an intense history orpassionatecommitment.Indeed,the feminist writersI am discussingconsis-tently emphasize that the achievement of freedom for oppressedgroupsdependson freedom orall.Theiranalyses nvokeandexploregroup pecificity

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at thesametimethat they insist that freedomrequires ombatingall systemsofoppression;they argue that we cannot ignore groupdifference, despite itsconstructednature,nor can we ignorehow the fates of differentgroupsareintertwined.10

The difficultyof making hispoliticalanalyticpointstems,on the one hand,from the culturallegacyof liberalhumanism,which assumes hat individualfreedomcan be achievedby ignoringgroupdifference.On the otherhand, itsdifficulty temsfromthisparticular oliticalcontext, in whichcastingone's otwidelywith others can be seen asdisloyaltyto a particulargroup.

Your llegiance s to LaRaza, he Chicanomovement, aythemembersof my race. Your llegianceis to the ThirdWorld,say my Black and Asian friends. Yourallegiance is to yourgender, to women, say the feminists. Then there'smy alle-gianceto the Gaymovement, to the socialistrevolution,to theNew Age, to magicand the occult.... They wouldchopme upinto little fragmentsandtageachpiece with a label. (Anzaldua1983a, 205)

Such calls to singularallegianceoverlook the possibilities nherent in theexperienceof identityas noncategorical,as multiple.Anzalduia'sesponsetothis fragmentingcompetitionis not to acceptthe impliedcontradictions,butrather to assert the connections: onlyyour labels split me. Refusing hesplit is another recurring heme in these works, as an alternative to theproliferationof ever more narrowlydefined social locations or hyphenatedidentities.11These writers insist that political identity cannot be capturedsimplyby a would-becomprehensive istingof ourgroupaffiliations,andtheymaintainthat ourgroup dentities arecentral to ourpolitical identity.The languageof refusinghe split mayseem to indicate the kindof desireforwholenessthat ourpostmoderneyes are trained to treatsuspiciously.Butthis desire to bring together partsof the self is a responseto a politicallandscapethat triesto imposea singlepiece as the whole. This response,thisdesire, involves not the achievement of solidity,but allowing power fromparticular ources of my living to flow back and forth freely throughall mydifferent selves, without the restriction of externally imposed definition(Lorde1984, 121;see alsoMoraga1983,xvii-xix, and 1993, 146-47). Refusingthe split does not involve achieving a neatly unified sense of self. It meansrefusing he closure of fragmentation,andrecognizing he specificbut relatedsourcesof living that can be brought to bear on political action. Thisinsistence on the multiplicity and the incompletenessof identity,with itsconcomitant refusalof fragmentation,providesan importantalternative forthinkingaboutthe self-as-citizen.This conceptionchallengesneat categoriesof marginality Anzaldua1990c) and thussuggestsa new modelforpoliticaltogethernessaswell.12

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contradictory-our embeddedness n the socially constructedgivens of ourexistence, and ourcapacityto presentourselvesself-consciously n awaythatengagesbut doesnot simplyreflectthose givens.The stress on intersubjectivity nvolved in the metaphorof makingfacespoints towardthe implicationsof this creativeunderstanding orgroups andnot simply ndividuals).Groupsbasedon identityhave in recent decadesbeenbuilding a place in the worldby creatingbookstores,presses,coffee houses,record abels,culturalcenters,shelters,newspapers, ndcooperativebusinessesand residences. These places, and the political groupsrooted in them, canprovidea communitycontext where somepeoplefeel theycan appearasmostthemselves; these groupsare a political home, to use Berice JohnsonReagon's terminology.Thus these autonomous institutions have importantempowering oles.However,asReagonpointsout in her much-cited articleoncoalition politics, the hominess of suchgroupsoften turs out to be based onexclusion,or a false sense of sameness.Ourmultiplicityanddistinctivenessasindividualsmakes ordifferences ven withingroups hat areseen (fromwithinorwithout) ashomogeneous (Reagon 1983, 357-60; Anzaldia 1990a,b).

This recognitionof multiplicitywithin groupsas well as within individualshaspointedfeminists to the need fora second model of political togetherness,beyond the model of home. The understandinghere is that establishedorenforced socialgroupsdo not exhaust the possibilitiesof humantogetherness;it isnot simply ndividual dentities that arerecreated ather hanunyieldinglygiven, but those of political groupsas well. Our politics need not be con-strainedand delimitedby lines that we had no hand in drawing.Moragasays,Iwouldgrowdespairingf I believed... we wereunilaterallydefinedbycolorand class Moraga1983,xiv). Anzalduia grees:we cannot let colorclass andgenderseparateus fromthosewho wouldbe kindredspirits Anzaldua1983a,205-6; see also Perez1993, 65; Morales1983b). Politicalcollectivities can becreated, and created in ways that do not necessarilyaccord with alreadyexisting groups or with fully shared experiences. This insight has led tocriticismsof sisterhood sa model forfeministsolidarityand to an increasingemphasis, n feministtheoryandpractice,on alliancesand coalitions.15Thesespecificallypolitical groupsare createdthrougha conscious decision to allywith others,perhapsbecausewe sharepoliticalcommitmentsor interests,butalso simplybecause by workingtogether we can change the meaningsandmerits of this commonmaterialworld in which we coexist.

Thus groupidentities are politically relevant not only by virtue of theirimpositionand reclamation,but throughthe possibilityof creation as well.The creationof these alliancescontests the lines of differenceand samenessthat would sortus only in establishedways.This conception of action allowsusboth to claimand to transfigureiven identities-to challengethe termsonwhich identity is given by creatingnew political confederations.Coalitionsenact a particularkind of political togetherness,one that is not restrictedby

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establishedgroup dentitybut not dismissiveof it either.Coalitions, then, arean exampleof a specificallydemocraticintersubjectivity;hat is, of politicalrelationsbetweenpartiallyconstituted andpartiallyconstituting subjects n acontext of variegatedpower.This notion of coalition mightnot satisfyGitlin, for it doesnot require hepresupposition f deep oruniversalcommonalitiesunderlyingourdifferences.But this conception of identities andpolitics seems to me to offer an extraor-dinaryamountof promise.Such a conception underscores he point that theachievementof democraticpolitics does not rest on placingcommitmentto

commonpurposes bove commitmentto one'sgroup(s),butratheron actingtogetherin waysthat could createa democraticcommons-one that is plural,egalitarian,and communicative.The furtherpoint is that this move againstclosurein intersubjectiverela-tions is promptedby,and utilizesthe materialof, subjective dentity.Theoriz-ing the lived experienceof noncategorical dentityhere informsa politics offreedom, gives shape to a genuinely democratic public. Brown contrastsarguing romidentitywith arguing rom a desire fora collective good (Brown1995, 51); yet there is no reasonwhyan argumentabout whatI wantfor usis incompatiblewith articulating who I am. Indeed, the works of thesetheoristsshow that gettingmy opinionsabout whatI want forus heardmayrequirea prioror ongoing argumentabout whoI am -who I am to you, tous,to the sheerpossibilityde un 'nosotras 'Lugones1990,50). This thinkingabout identity does not reallyfit Butler'svision of identities that are alter-nately institutedand relinquishedaccordingto the purposesat hand (1990,16). But it chimes in some wayswith her analysisof the centralityof perfor-mance to identity,and it endsupat a vision of democraticpolitics that is notunlike Brown's:active, argumentative,and oriented towardchange (Butler1990, 1993;Brown1995,esp.47-51, 74-76).This understanding f identityandpolitics starts rom the recognitionthatgroup identity is implicated in power in multiple ways-ways that bothperpetuate nequalityand providemeansto resist-and thereforethat groupidentityispoliticallyrelevantto who we are ascitizens.But that identitydoesnot fix us and segregateus; identity is a personaland political force open toactive re-creationthroughour wordsand actions. Such re-creation s not anexerciseclean of power,nor is it an exerciseof sovereignty; t obviouslyhasuncertaineffects,locatedas it is in the context of the bureaucratictate,globalcapitalism,andother formsof dominatingandproductivepower.Yetpoliticiz-ing identityin thiswayopensthe possibilityof collective interventionin thoseother formsof power,throughparticipation n an alternativeperformanceofdemocratic dentity.In this forgingof identity,we connect with others andengagein collectivework.I contend that this is an understanding f what democraticcitizenshipis, and needs to be, in an inegalitarianor egalitariancontext. These kindsof

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actors-conditioned andcreative, situatedbut not static-are citizens.Andthese activities shouldbe understoodnot simplyas feministwork or coali-tion politics but as the practice,the performance, f citizenship.It is throughsuchpractices hat we mightcreatea common worldthatwants,amongotherthings, an end to suffering Rich 1986, 25).

THEPASSIONSOFCITIZENSHIPIn conclusion,however, et me stress hat this understanding f identityand

politics is not one that concentratesprimarilyon sufferingor on the moralpurityof powerlessness.This wayof politicizing identityand intersubjectivityforegrounds ertain sensibilitiesand capacitiesthat enable democraticpoliti-cal action.The authorsdiscussedaboveargue or a politicalethic that focusesnot on suffering,nnocence, orcompassion-but on anger,responsibility, ndcourage.

Anger,as Lorde heorizes t, isverydifferent romNietzscheanressentiment.Anger is indeedreactive; t isaresponse o injustices, ike racism. t is aspecifickind of reaction, though;Lordedistinguishesanger fromhatred, the latterbeing markedby a cravingfor the destructionand elimination of others. Bycontrast, anger s agriefof distortionsbetweenpeers,and itsobjectischange(1984, 129). Unlike ressentiment,then, anger'sreactivecharacterdoes notreiterate impotence or constrain the ability to act.16Anger is energydirected toward another in an attempt to create a relationship betweensubjects that is not distorted (made unjust) by hierarchies of power andthe way subjectsworkwithin those hierarchies. If those hierarchies are tobe changed through political interaction, then recreatingthe relationshipbetween subjects is a central step. To recognizeangeras a possible force inthat reconstruction is to recognize the specificity of the creatures whoengage with one another; it neither requires us to deny ourselves norprevents our connecting with others.But materializing he possibilityof relation and change that angercarrieswith it dependsboth on our own actions and on the responsesof others. Theuses of angerrequirecreativity,as Lorde makes clear in characterizinghesymphonyof anger : And I saysymphonyatherthan cacophony ecausewehave had to lear to orchestrate hose furiesso that they do not tear us apart.We have had to lear to move throughthem and use them forstrengthandforceand insightwithin ourdailylives (1984, 129). But we also have to learhow to hearanger,how not to treatit asdestructive,offputting,guilt-inducing.As Lordepointsout, it is not the angerof Blackwomen that is corroding heworldwe live in (1984, 133).

It is not the angerof other women that will destroyus but ourrefusals o stand still, to listen to its rhythms,to learn within

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it.... The angersbetween women will not kill us if we canarticulatethem with precision, if we listen to the content ofwhat is said with at least as much intensity as we defendourselvesagainstthe mannerof saying.(1984, 130-31)

The political uses of angerrequirecreative action on both sides:articulatingwith precision, listeningwith intensity.We areresponsible, hen, for how wespeakand how we hear each other.Lorde's nalysisof angerprovidesapossiblewayof rethinking resentment.But it is important o recognizethat the public passionof angeris not alwaysor automaticallyused in the service of democratic or progressiveaims. Theangerand hatredbehind ethniccleansing or militant militiasreveals in themost disturbingwayhow this all-too-humanemotion can lead to the deepestinhumanity.Angercan indeed tearcitizensapart,andleadthem to tearothersapart.There is no one meaninginherent in the political expressionof feeling,whether angeror suffering.The question would seem to be not how to ridpoliticsofanger,butwhether and howwe can createconditionsin whichangeris put to the serviceof a justworld.This is relevant to the contemporaryleftist abhorrence of claims ofvictimhood and suffering.As long as some people are oppressed,claimsaboutsufferingarerelevantin publicdiscourse.Let me suggestan alternativeway of hearingthese claims. A claim of victimhood is not automaticallyanassertionofpowerlessness r innocence;it is an assertionaboutthe exerciseofunjustpower.It is a protestagainstcertain relationsof powerandan assertionof alternativeones, forto speakagainstthe exercise of unjustpower-to speakagainstbeing victimized-is to say that I am a peer,a rightfulparticipant nthe argumentaboutthe justand the unjust, n the collective exerciseofpower.Claims about suffering,as well as claims made in anger,can be attemptstoenact democraticpolitical relationships.Both are part of the languagesofcitizenship. What I am suggesting is that this conception of democraticcitizenship requires,as part of its conditions for realization,a practice ofpolitical listening.Such listening is best understoodnot as an attempt to getat an authentic meaning,but as participation n the constructionof mean-ing. And I think we democratictheoristsneed to begin to imagine suppleinstitutionalspacesthatmight support uch interactionandfosterandsustaincoalition politics.17

Enactingthese relationships,speakingand listening to these languagesofcitizenship,is not particularly asy.If angeris loadedwith informationandenergy (Lorde 1984, 127), we may justifiablyfear its intensity and theintensityofour ownresponse.Hence thenecessityforcourage,which hasbeenconnected to citizenshipfor centuriesof politicalthought,althoughusually nways that emphasizedvirility and battle strength.I have arguedelsewhere(Bickford1996) that Anzalduta, orde,andotherspoint to the necessityfora

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feministreworkingof courageand give us the resources o beginthat transfig-uration.18 earlessness, s Lordesays, s a luxurywe do not have, and need notwait for.

We can learnto workandspeakwhenwe are afraid n the samewaywe have learnedto workandspeakwhen we are tired. Forwe have been socialized to respect fear more than our ownneedsforlanguageanddefinition,and while we wait in silencefor the finalluxuryoffearlessness,he weightof that silencewillchoke us. (1984, 44)An ethic of courageis thus an ethic oriented towardpolitical action, notpsychologicalpain. Yet it takes seriouslythe psychologicalstate, for that iswhat necessitates the exercise of courage.Implicit in this understandingofcourage s the recognitionthat we cansitdown andweep,and still becountedas warriors Rich 1986, 25); the articulationof sufferings not incompatiblewith the daringexercise of citizenship.Such courage-the courageto act, totake responsibility or the world and ourselves,despite risk-is a necessary

qualityfor radicaldemocraticpoliticsandtheoryin a context of differenceandinequality.19As citizens, we need to foster the couragenecessaryto take the risksofpolitical action. But we also need to lear to recognizeits exercise. Thisinvolves reconceptualizing olitical identityasactive, andthusreinterpretingidentity claims. Sufferingand citizenshiparenot antithetical;they are onlymade so in a context in which others hear claims of oppression solely asassertionsof powerlessness.A conceptionof citizenshipadequate o the worldin which we live mustrecognizeboth the infuriating ealityof oppression,andthe continual exerciseof couragewith which citizensmeet that oppression. tmustrecognize,in other words,that claims of inequalityand oppressionarearticulatedby political actors.As Lordesays-and I end, in tribute,with herwords- I amnot only a casualty, amalso a warrior 1984, 41).

NOTESFor heirkindandcritical ttention o earlier ersionsf thisessay, amgratefuloKimberleyurtis,LisaDisch,MichaelLienesch,Gregory .McAvoy,ohnMcGowan,SiobhanMoroney,tephenG.Salkever,ndHolloway parks.1.MarthaMinow 1987)calls his thedilemma fdifference. nexampleftheargumentgainst racketingsFraser1992).2. The primaryextsI willdraw romareSisterOutsiderLorde1984);Border-lands/LaronteraAnzaldua987);TheLastGenerationMoraga993);and heeditedcollectionsThisBridge alledMyBack MoragandAnzaldua 983),Making ace,

MakingouUHaciendoarasAnzalduia990d),andFrontlineeminismKahn1995).Specific ssaysneditedvolumeswillbecitedbytheindividualuthor'same.

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3. Accountshat ocusontheresentmentfthosewithofficially rivilegedroupidentitiesanbefoundnConnolly1987,1991).4. Whatis sometimes ttachedo the argumenthatidentitypoliticsenhancesbureaucratictatepowers thecriticismfrights sanemancipatoryehicle.I do notaddresshis ssuehere,butsee Brown1995,chap.4);Elshtain1995)andthe sourcescitedtherein.5. Gitlin does join forceswith the ressentimentolks in claiming hat thehardening fgroup oundariesndthe thickening f identity olitics esultsn agrimandhermetic ravadoelebratingictimizationndstylizedmarginality1993,172-73).6.SeealsoPatai ndKoertge'sritiquef women'studies rograms,n which heyrefero identitypoliticsas theuglyspawn fold-fashionedpecial-interestockeyingandethnicpolitics 1994,51,72-77).7.Brown lmostmakeshispointwithherbrief uggestionhatwelear to readidentity laimsdifferently1995,75).8. As the analysisn the next sectionshouldmakeclear, agreewith Fraser'sargumenthateveninanegalitarianetting,multiple roupdentitieswould e centraltopublicdentityFraser 992,esp.125-28).9. The works discussn the next sectiondo not forthe mostpartaddresshisquestion bout elationshipsith hestate, ince heyareprimarilyocusedn relationsbetween itizens. omerecent eminist iscussionsf thestate in additiono Brown,1995) ncludeCooper1995)andPringle ndWatson1992).SeeWolin 1981,1989,1992)forparticularlynsightful nalyses f the impact f thecontemporarytateondemocraticitizenship.10. ExamplesncludeCollins(1991,37-39);hooks(1989,esp.chap.4); Lorde(1984,133);MoragandAnzaldua1983,esp. he section itled ElMundoZurdo/TheVision ); harr1995);Segrest1994,esp.Part3) andSmith 1995).11. Seeesp.Anzaldua1983a,205);Moraga1983,34);Lugones1990,47);alsoLorde1984);Morales1983a,b);Moraga1993).Alarc6n,n heranalysisfThisBridgeCalledMyBack,notesasa common heme thisrecognitionhatthe subjectivityfwomenof color sa multiple-voicedne,itsverymultiplicitylivedn resistanceocompeting otions orone'sallegiancer self-identificationAlarcon1990,365-66;see alsoSandoval 991).12.Thispoint,andthenextseveral aragraphs,rawdirectlyrommyanalysisnBickford1996).13. ThusMoraga's1993) imagining f QueerAztlan; hus Anzalduia's1987)persistentheorizationfcreativemestiza onsciousness.14.UnlessI undergo lastic urgery,f course.Foraninterestinget ofreflectionson theconnectionbetween dentity ndfacefrom heperspectivef oneundergoingreconstructiveurgery,eeGrealy1993).Forafascinating,rovocativeccountroma feminist nalyzingosmeticurgery,ee Davis 1993).15.For hecritiquef sisterhood,eeDill(1983,131-50); ooks 1984,chap.4);Ackelsberg1983). On coalition/alliances,ee Reagon(1983) and the followingcollections:AlbrechtandBrewer1990);Moraga ndAnzalduia1983);Anzalduia(1990d).16.Theanalysisf ressentiments mpotenteaction,s a ubstituteoraction,orpower s in Brown1995,69-73).

17.Althoughuch nstitutionshouldnotonlybe electoral nes,anexamplehatcomesimmediatelyo mindis LaniGuinier'sworkon alternative otingschemes

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(1994).SeealsoLisaDisch's rgument1997)thatballot eformor hirdpartiesouldencouragemeaningfulalthoughtillparty-based)oalitionbuilding.18. For a moredetailedaccountof courage, nd of the socialand institutionalconditionswhichsupportt,seeHolloway parks'sssayn thisvolume. nterestingly,asSparks ointsout,WendyBrown asalsourged reclamationfcourage;eeBrown(1988,206-7).19. On responsibility,eeespecially orde1995);Anzalduia1983b)andSegrest(1994).

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Okin, Susan Moller. 1979. Women n westernpolitical hought.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress..1989. Justice,gender, nd the amily.New York:BasicBooks.Patai, Daphne. 1992. The searchfor feministpuritythreatensthe goalsof feminism.EducationDigest57(9): 27-31.Patai,Daphne,and NorettaKoertge.1994. Professingeminism:Cautionaryales rom hestrangeworldofwomen's tudies.New York:BasicBooks.Pateman,Carole. 1988. The sexualcontract. tanford:StanfordUniversityPress.Perez,Emma.1993.Sexualityand discourse:Notes fromaChicanasurvivor. nChicanacriticalssues,ed. NormaAlarc6net al. Berkeley:Third WomanPress.

Pharr,Suzanne. 1995. Rural organizing:Building community across difference. InFrontlineeminism,1975-1995: EssaysromSojourner'sirsttwentyyears.See Kahn1995.Pringle,Rosemary, nd Sophie Watson. 1992. Women'snterests and the post-struc-turaliststate. InDestabilizingheory, d. Michele Barrettand Anne Phillips.Stan-ford:StanfordUniversityPress.Quintales,Mirtha. 1983. I paidveryhard for my immigrant gnorance.In Thisbridgecalledmyback.See MoragaandAnzaldula 983.Reagon,BerniceJohnson.1983. Coalitionpolitics:Turning he century. n Homegirls:A Black eminist nthology,d. Barbara mith. New York:Kitchen Table:Womenof Color Press.Rich, Adrienne. 1986. Yournative and,your ife.New York:W. W.Norton.Riley,Denise. 1988. AmI thatname? Feminism nd thecategory f women nhistory.Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press.Sandoval,Chela. 1991. U.S. thirdworld feminism:The theoryandmethod of opposi-tional consciousness n the postmoder world.Genders10: 1-24.Segrest,Mab. 1994. Memoir fa racetraitor.Boston: South End Press.Smith, Barbara. 995. Blackfeminism:A movement of our own. In Frontlineeminism,1975-1995: Essays romSojourer's irsttwentyyears.See Kahn 1995.Tapper,Marion. 1993. Ressentiment nd power. In Nietzsche,feminism,and politicaltheory, d. Paul Patton. New York:Routledge.Wolin, Sheldon. 1981. The people's wo bodies.democracy :9-24.. 1989. Thepresence f thepast:Essayson the stateandconstitution.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsPress..1992. What revolutionaryaction meanstoday.In Dimensions fradical emoc-racy,ed. Chantal Mouffe.London:Verso..1993. Democracy,difference,andre-cognition.PoliticalTheory21(3): 464-83.Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justiceand the politicsof difference.Princeton: Princeton

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