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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

ANNUAL REPORT

TO CONGRESS

Military and Security Developments

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Preparation of this report cost the Department of

Defense a total of approximately $95,000 in Fiscal

Years 2015-2016. This includes $3,000 in

expenses and $92,000 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2016 April 26 RefID: 117FA69



Annual Report to Congress:

Military and Security Developments Involving

the People’s Republic of China 2016

A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2000

Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s

Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law

111-84, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202,

Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified

and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of

China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological

development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese

security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts

supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States-

China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report,

including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy

for such engagement and cooperation in the future.”


Executive Summary


i

The long-term, comprehensive modernization

of the armed forces of the People’s Republic

of China (PRC) entered a new phase in 2015

as China unveiled sweeping organizational

reforms to overhaul the entire military

structure. These reforms aim to strengthen

the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control

over the military, enhance the PLA’s ability to

conduct joint operations, and improve its

ability to fight short-duration, high-intensity

regional conflicts at greater distances from the

Chinese mainland. China’s leaders seek ways

to leverage China’s growing military,

diplomatic, and economic clout to advance its

ambitions to establish regional preeminence

and expand its international influence.

Chinese leaders have characterized

modernization of the People’s Liberation

Army (PLA) as essential to achieving great

power status and what Chinese President Xi

Jinping calls the “China Dream” of national

rejuvenation. They portray a strong military as

critical to advancing Chinese interests,

preventing other countries from taking steps

that would damage those interests, and

ensuring that China can defend itself and its

sovereignty claims.

Throughout 2015, China continued to assert

sovereignty claims over features in the East

and South China Seas. In the East China Sea,

China continued to use maritime law

enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near

the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in order to

challenge Japan’s claim. In the South China

Sea, China paused its land reclamation effort

in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding

more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven

features it occupies in the archipelago.

Although these artificial islands do not

provide China with any additional territorial

or maritime rights within the South China Sea,

China will be able to use them as persistent

civil-military bases to enhance its long-term

presence in the South China Sea significantly.

China demonstrated a willingness to tolerate

higher levels of tension in the pursuit of its

interests, especially in pursuit of its territorial

claims in the East and South China Sea;

however, China still seeks to avoid direct and

explicit conflict with the United States.

China’s leaders understand that instability or

conflict would jeopardize the peaceful

external environment that has enabled China’s

economic development, which is central to

the perpetuation of the CCP’s domestic

legitimacy. In the near-term, China is using

coercive tactics short of armed conflict, such

as the use of law enforcement vessels to

enforce maritime claims, to advance their

interests in ways that are calculated to fall

below the threshold of provoking conflict.

In the long term, Chinese leaders are focused

on developing the capabilities they deem

necessary to deter or defeat adversary power

projection and counter third-party—including

U.S.—intervention during a crisis or conflict.

China’s military modernization is producing

capabilities that have the potential to reduce

core U.S. military technological advantages.


ii

China’s officially-disclosed military budget

grew at an average of 9.8 percent per year in

inflation-adjusted terms from 2006 through

2015, and Chinese leaders seem committed to

sustaining defense spending growth for the

foreseeable future, even as China’s economic

growth decelerates.

The PRC continues to focus on preparing for

potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, but

additional missions, such as contingencies in

the East and South China Seas and on the

Korean peninsula, are increasingly important

to the PLA. Moreover, as China’s global

footprint and international interests grow, its

military modernization program has become

more focused on investments and

infrastructure to support a range of missions

beyond China’s periphery, including power

projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy,

peacekeeping, and humanitarian

assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). PLA

global operations in 2015 included

counterpiracy patrols, humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief, exercises, and sea lane

security operations. China’s November 2015

public confirmation of its intention to build

its first overseas military support facility in

Djibouti likely reflects this more global

outlook, as it will be utilized to sustain the

PLA Navy’s operations at greater distances

from China.

During 2015, the PLA continued to improve

key capabilities that would be used in theater

contingencies, including cruise missiles; short,

medium, and intermediate-range ballistic

missiles; high performance aircraft; integrated

air defense networks; information operations

capabilities; and amphibious and airborne

assault units. The PLA is developing and

testing new intermediate- and medium-range

conventional ballistic missiles as well as long-

range, land-attack, and anti-ship cruise

missiles, which once operational would extend

the military’s reach and push adversary forces

further from potential regional conflicts.

China is also focusing on counterspace,

offensive cyber operations, and electronic

warfare (EW) capabilities meant to deny

adversaries the advantages of modern,

information technology-driven warfare.

Despite the PLA’s gains over the last two

decades, its modernization program faces

challenges. The organizational reforms

unveiled by the leadership are part of a

broader effort by President Xi to address the

PLA’s deficiencies, such as corruption. Since

Xi took power in 2012, more than forty senior

officers have fallen in a wide-ranging anti-

corruption campaign that last year ensnared

the former top officer in the PLA. Moreover,

Xi’s slogan exhorting the PLA to prepare to

“fight and win” battles implies that the

leadership is concerned about how the PLA,

which has not fought a war in more than

thirty years, would fare in combat.

The Department of Defense (DoD) approach

to China is part of a broader U.S. strategy for

the Asia-Pacific region that is focused on


iii

ensuring and building upon a stable and

diversified security order, an open and

transparent economic order, and a liberal

political order. Combined, these factors have

contributed to the peace and prosperity of the

entire region since the end of the Second

World War, directly benefiting China and its

neighbors. U.S. policy toward China is based

on the premise that it is in both our countries’

interests to deepen practical cooperation in

areas where our countries’ interests overlap,

while constructively managing differences.

Sustaining positive momentum in the military-

to-military relationship supports U.S. policy

objectives to encourage China to uphold

international rules and norms and to

contribute positively to resolving regional and

global problems. DoD seeks to continue

building a military-to-military relationship

with China that is sustained and substantive.

DoD will continue to focus on enhancing risk

reduction measures that diminish the potential

for incidents or miscalculation, and encourage

China to contribute constructively to efforts

to maintain peace and stability with the

United States, our allies and partners, and the

greater international community.

While the United States builds a stronger

military-to-military relationship with China,

DoD will also continue to monitor and adapt

to China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine,

and force development, and encourage China

to be more transparent about its military

modernization program. The United States

will adapt its forces, posture, investments, and

operational concepts to ensure it retains the

ability to defend the homeland, deter

aggression, protect our allies, and preserve a

principled regional order founded in

international law and norms that benefit all

countries equally.


iv


Executive Summary i

Chapter 1: Annual Update 1

Chapter 2: Understanding China’s Strategy 40

Chapter 3: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 56

Chapter 4: Resources for Force Modernization 76

Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency 86

Chapter 6: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts 94

Special Topic: Political Work in the People’s Liberation Army 102

Appendix I: Military-to-Military Exchanges 103

Appendix II: China and Taiwan Forces Data 107

Appendix III: Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of

Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of

the People's Republic of China Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air

and Maritime Encounters

110

Appendix IV: Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of

America Department of Defense and the People's Republic of China Ministry of

National Defense on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building

Measures Mechanism

133

1 ANNUAL UPDATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

1

This chapter summarizes significant

developments in China’s military and security

activities over the past year with an emphasis

on developments highlighted in section 1246

of the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84).

DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY

STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE, AND

TRAINING

In 2015, China’s top leadership announced

plans to initiate the most significant reforms

of the PLA in at least three decades.

Additionally, the People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) updated high-level strategies, plans, and

policies that reflect its intent to transform

itself into a more flexible and advanced force

capable of more advanced joint operations

and fighting and winning “informationized

local wars”—regional conflicts defined by

real-time data-networked command.

Structural Reform. The widening gap

between the demands of winning

informationized local wars and the PLA’s

legacy command, organizational, and

administrative structure has fueled several

proposals for reform since the 1990s. The

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central

Committee endorsed the need for reform at

the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress

in November 2013 and the Central Military

Commission (CMC) established the Leading

Group for Deepening Defense and Military

Reforms in the months that followed.

President Xi Jinping chairs the group, and

CMC Vice Chairmen Fan Changlong and Xu

Qiliang serve as its deputies.

In late November 2015, President Xi

introduced the major elements of structural

reform intended to be carried out by 2020 at a

special three-day reform group session.

Further announcements followed in

December. The Ministry of National Defense

(MND) spokesman stated that, overall, the

reforms sought to improve “leadership

administration and command of joint

operations” so that the PLA would have a

force structure able to fight and to win

modern conflicts. These reforms include:

> Theaters. The PLA is transitioning from its

seven legacy military regions (MR) to five

“theaters of operations,” or joint

commands, in a move the MND

spokesman tied to enhancing combat

effectiveness.

> Army Headquarters. In late 2015, the PLA

began to establish a headquarters for its

ground forces, creating a separate PLA

Army (PLAA) service. Previously,

leadership of ground units was integrated

into the PLA’s four general departments,

which were each represented on the CMC.

> Rocket Force. On December 31, 2015,

China’s military leadership re-designated

the PLA Second Artillery Force

(PLASAF) as the PLA Rocket Force

(PLARF) and elevated it from an

independent branch to a full service.



2



3

> Strategic Support Force. Also on the last day

of the year, the PLA created a new force

under the CMC, reportedly to oversee its

space and cyber capabilities.

> Roles and missions. The reform plan aims to

establish two clear lines of authority under

the CMC. It gives the services authority

over “force management” issues while the

theater headquarters command

operations—a distinction that was

ambiguous in the past.

> Staff Departments. The leadership is also

adjusting the PLA’s senior staff bodies, in

part by replacing the four general

departments with six joint departments,

three commissions, and five offices under

the CMC.

> Internal Discipline. The CMC is tightening

military discipline with reforms to its

Discipline and Inspection Commission, its

Auditing Office, the PLA judicial system,

and a new Politics and Law Commission.

In September 2015, President Xi also

announced that the PLA would reduce its

force by 300,000 personnel by the end of

2017, a move widely expected to result in

fewer non-combat personnel, such as those

specialized in arts and culture, administrative

duties, or academic work. China’s official

media also report the cuts will help to

rebalance the proportion of forces among the

services in ways that will raise the relative

importance the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA

Air Force (PLAAF).

At the operational level, the PLA may intend

to continue to convert some divisions into

brigades in order to increase its overall

combat capabilities and enhance mobility.

Although the majority of these conversions

appear to have been accomplished prior to

2015, additional actions may have been

paused in 2015 due to the wider PLA

reorganization. This is part of an overall

modernization effort to streamline the force

and to reduce non-combat positions such as

entertainment units or headquarters staffs.

The PLA is also placing non-commissioned

officers in positions traditionally held by

officers or assigning civilians to take over

some duties.

The continued development of army aviation

units, special operations forces (SOF), and air-

land mobility is an attempt to increase the

agility of the force and build an expeditionary

capability. These changes in how the PLA

trains for combat and how it would fight

during a conflict has required fundamental

changes to PLA doctrine. Dissemination of

this revised doctrine will probably take some

time but will support the PLA’s

modernization goals for 2020.

Defense White Paper. In May 2015,

China released a new defense white paper

(DWP), the latest in a series of reports

outlining military developments that have

been issued every two years since 1998. The

report, labeled a “military strategy,” moved

away from the detailed service-centered



4

profiles of earlier editions and toward a more

conceptual presentation.

The paper affirmed many existing elements of

China’s military strategy, particularly the

concept of active defense, a decades-old PLA

commitment not to attack until attacked, but

to counterattack strongly once struck. It also

reiterated without change China’s no-first-use

nuclear weapons policy, which had been

absent from the previous white paper.

The DWP’s changes were modest and in line

with the direction of recent PLA activity. The

paper elevated the maritime domain within

the PLA’s formal strategic guidance and

shifted the focus of its modernization from

“winning local wars under conditions of

informationization” to “winning

informationized local wars, highlighting

maritime military struggle. The DWP also

gave more attention to emerging domains like

cyber and space than earlier versions and

presented a vision of a more joint, flexible,

and active force overall.

Anticorruption Campaign. The CCP’s

anticorruption efforts in the military targeted

more than 40 senior officers in 2015,

including former Central Committee

Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman

Guo Boxiong, who served as the PLA’s top

general before he retired in 2012. Guo, who

was accused in July 2015 of accepting bribes

and abusing his authority over promotions, is

the second retired member of the high

command to come under scrutiny for graft.

Former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou,

Guo’s colleague, died this year while awaiting

prosecution for corruption. Anticorruption

investigations in the PLA parallel a larger

Party-wide effort that President Xi initiated

shortly after taking office to safeguard the

legitimacy of the CCP, root out corruption

and powerful rival networks, improve

governance, and strengthen central control.

Military discipline inspectors have targeted

individual power networks and sectors

historically prone to corruption, and the PLA

is also revising its regulations to prevent abuse

more effectively.

Anniversary Parade. In September 2015,

China held a high-profile military parade in

Beijing to mark the 70th anniversary of the

end of World War II. Chinese officials

emphasized the parade’s focus on peace, but

regional analysts noted the unveiling of new

ballistic missiles and China’s growing military

might. President Xi used the occasion to

announce military personnel cuts as the first

round of last year’s reform push.

Military Exercises. The PLA focused last

year’s training on developing the capability to

execute large-scale, complex joint operations.

This included greater realism during exercises,

improved core service capabilities,

strengthened strategic campaign training, and

execution of long-distance maneuvers and

mobility operations. Major exercises included

new iterations of the exercise series STRIDE,

JOINT ACTION, and FIREPOWER.



5

> STRIDE 2015 was both larger in scale

and had more rounds of force-on-force

events than last year’s iteration. Ten

brigades from all seven MRs deployed to a

training center for three rounds of force-

on-force drills. STRIDE 2015 also

included intensified operational command

training for PLA officers, the integration

of PLAAF and PLAA aviation units in

coordinated air-to-ground strikes, and

increased nighttime combat training.

> JOINT ACTION 2015 consisted of five

separate exercises held in locations across

China in which military units from all

services and civilian support assets

conducted complex, large scale joint

operations. Exercises in western China

focused on high altitude operations, with

special emphasis on using space-based

reconnaissance. Exercise activity in the

Nanjing MR rehearsed second-echelon

logistics, over-the-shore activity, and

follow-on force combat operations in

support of an island landing campaign.

> FIREPOWER 2015 included two large-

scale evolutions: The first phase included

a PLAAF “Blue Force”—or enemy

force—flying more than 200 sorties with

multiple types of aircraft and unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAV) attacking the PLA

“Red Force” air defense units in a

complex electromagnetic environment.

The second phase consisted of “Blue

Force” Army units using artillery, anti-

tank weapons, and motorized forces to

attack a “Red Force” that was focused on

both offensive and defensive operations.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY

SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Preparing for a contingency to prevent formal

Taiwan independence remains a top PLA

mission. Last year’s DWP noted both

improvements in cross-Strait relations and

potential challenges. It praised “a sound

momentum of peaceful development” in

cross-Strait relations, but echoed the previous

DWP in warning against “the Taiwan

independence separatist forces.” Should

conditions deteriorate, the PLA could be

called upon to compel Taiwan to abandon

possible moves toward independence or to re-

unify Taiwan with the mainland by force

while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or

denying any third-party intervention on

Taiwan’s behalf.

In 2015, China and Taiwan continued to

explore ways to make progress on contentious

issues and to hold government-to-government

consultations that began in 2014. In

November 2015, President Xi Jinping met

with President Ma Ying-jeou, the first such

meeting since 1946, and reiterated the

importance of maintaining the status quo.



6

CHINA’S EVOLVING OVERSEAS ACCESS

China is expanding its access to foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to regularize

and sustain deployments in the “far seas,” waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and

Atlantic Ocean. In late November, China publicly confirmed its intention to build military supporting

facilities in Djibouti “to help the navy and army further participate in United Nations peacekeeping

operations (PKO), carry out escort missions in the waters near Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, and provide

humanitarian assistance.” This Chinese initiative both reflects and amplifies China’s growing geopolitical

clout, extending the reach of its influence and armed forces.

China’s expanding international economic interests are increasing demands for the PLAN to operate

in more distant seas to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and critical sea lines of communication

(SLOC).

China most likely will seek to establish additional naval logistics hubs in countries with which it has a

longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan, and a precedent for

hosting foreign militaries. China’s overseas naval logistics aspiration may be constrained by the

willingness of countries to support a PLAN presence in one of their ports.

So far, China has not constructed U.S.-style overseas military bases in the Indian Ocean. China’s leaders

may judge instead that a mixture of preferred access to overseas commercial ports and a limited number of

exclusive PLAN logistic facilities—probably collocated with commercial ports—most closely aligns with

China’s future overseas logistics needs to support its evolving naval requirements.

Preferred access would give the PLAN favored status in using a commercial port for resupply,

replenishment, and maintenance purposes. A logistics facility would represent an arrangement in

which China leases out portions of a commercial port solely for PLAN logistics operations.

Such a logistics presence may support both civilian and military operations. China’s current naval

logistics foortprint in the Indian Ocean is unable to support major combat operations in South Asia.

A greater overseas naval logistics footprint would better position the PLAN to expand its participation in

non-war military missions, such as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), search-and-rescue

(SAR), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and sea lines of communication (SLOC) security.

To some extent, a more robust overseas logistics presence may also enable China to expand its support to

PKO, force protection missions, and counterterrorism initiatives.

For example, in 2015, the PLAN’s naval escort task forces performing counterpiracy escort duties in the

Gulf of Aden were able to utilize Djibouti and Oman for basic resupply and replenishment.

BillGertz

Highlight



7

Following Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential

and legislative elections, China has stressed

that denying the “1992 Consensus”—which

acknowledges China and Taiwan are part of

“one China” but allows for different

interpretations—would make peace and

development impossible. President-elect Tsai

Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party

has pledged to maintain the status quo in

cross-Strait relations, but has not endorsed

Beijing’s interpretation of the 1992

Consensus. Her position differs with the

approach of the outgoing Kuomintang Party.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

While China has resolved several land and

maritime border disputes in the past, several

persist—particularly the ongoing territorial

and maritime disputes in the East China Sea,

South China Sea, and along the China-India

border. For the United States, some of these

disputes involve U.S. allies with whom there

exist long-standing cooperation and security

treaty commitments. China’s actions in the

South China Sea in 2015, particularly its land

reclamation on features in the Spratly Islands,

enhanced the appearance of China’s ability to

exercise control over disputed areas in the

South China Sea, raised tensions in the South

China Sea, and caused concern over China’s

long-term intentions.

South China Sea. China depicts its South

China Sea claims by using a “nine-dash line”

that encompasses most of the area. China

remains ambiguous about the precise

coordinates, meaning, or legal basis of the

nine-dash line. Brunei, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Vietnam

all contest portions of China’s territorial and

maritime claims in the South China Sea.

In 2015, China accelerated land reclamation

and infrastructure construction at its outposts

in the Spratly Islands. When complete, these

outposts will include harbors,

communications and surveillance systems,

logistics facilities, and three airfields. Although

artificial islands do not provide China with

any additional territorial or maritime rights

within the South China Sea, China will be able

to use its reclaimed features as persistent civil-

military bases to enhance its presence in the

South China Sea significantly and enhance

China’s ability to control the features and

nearby maritime space.

Throughout 2015, Chinese Coast Guard

(CCG) ships maintained a presence at

Scarborough Reef, continuing operations that

began in 2012. Chinese officials asserted in

2015 that the patrols were normal and

justifiable, claiming that China has

indisputable sovereignty over the various

features in the South China Sea and adjacent

waters. Both China and the Philippines

continue to claim sovereignty over

Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas Shoal.

China maintains a continuous CCG presence

at both locations while the Philippines

stations military personnel aboard a tank

landing ship that has been grounded on

Second Thomas Shoal since 1999.

BillGertz

Highlight



8



9



10



11

In October 2015, an arbitral tribunal

constituted at the request of the Philippines

and pursuant to Chapter XV of the Law of

the Sea Convention ruled that it has

jurisdiction to decide certain disputed issues

between the Philippines and China, such as

whether a particular feature is an “island”

entitled to a territorial sea, an exclusive

economic zone, and continental shelf; a

“rock,” a subset of islands that are entitled

only to a territorial sea; or a feature that is

submerged at high tide and thus not entitled

to any maritime zone of its own. The arbitral

tribunal will not rule on sovereignty claims to

land features. The tribunal is expected to issue

a ruling on the merits of the case in 2016.

China continues to reiterate that it does not

accept the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal

and will not abide by its decision.

Other disputed areas include the Luconia

Shoals, Reed Bank, and the Paracel Islands.

The Luconia Shoals are disputed by China

and Malaysia and may contain extensive oil

and natural gas reserves, as well as productive

fishing grounds. Reed Bank is claimed by

both China and the Philippines, and in August

2014, China sent hydrographic research

vessels to survey the area. In disputed waters

near the Paracel Islands, tensions between

China and Vietnam spiked in 2014 when

China deployed and commenced operation of

a state-owned exploratory hydrocarbon rig in

waters also claimed by Vietnam.

East China Sea. China claims sovereignty

over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands

in the East China Sea; this territory is also

claimed by Taiwan. Since 2012, China has

used maritime law enforcement ships and

aircraft to patrol near the islands in order to

challenge Japan’s administration. Chinese

officials continue to claim the islands are part

of China’s territory and that China will

resolutely respond to any perceived external

provocation.

Last year, China balanced this concern with

efforts to improve relations with Japan

gradually. The two countries resumed official

senior-level exchanges in 2015 following

President Xi’s first bilateral meeting with

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in

November 2014, where both sides announced

a four-point agreement to improve bilateral

ties.

China-India Border. Tensions remain

along disputed portions of the Sino-Indian

border, where both sides patrol with armed

forces. After a five-day military standoff in

September 2015 at Burtse in Northern

Ladakh, China and India held a senior-level

flag-officer meeting, agreed to maintain peace,

and retreated to positions mutually acceptable

to both sides.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S

FOREIGN MILITARY

ENGAGEMENTS

China seeks to leverage engagement with

foreign militaries to enhance its presence and

influence abroad, bolster China’s international



12

and regional image, and assuage other

countries’ concerns about China’s rise. PLA

engagement activities also assist its

modernization by facilitating the acquisition

of advanced weapon systems and

technologies, increasing its operational

experience throughout and beyond Asia, and

giving it access to foreign military practices,

operational doctrine, and training methods.

Combined Exercises. PLA participation

in bilateral and multilateral exercises continues

to increase in scope and complexity. In 2015,

the PLA conducted at least nine bilateral and

multilateral exercises with foreign militaries.

The PLA conducted its first field exercise

with Malaysia, first naval exercise with

Singapore, and first air force exercise with

Thailand. China also conducted bilateral

exercises with Russia, Pakistan, India, and

Mongolia. China participated in the Mongolia-

hosted multinational peacekeeping exercise,

KHAAN QUEST and a counterterrorism

exercise with Tajikistan under the auspices of

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO). Many of these exercises focused on

counterterrorism, border security,

peacekeeping operations (PKO), and disaster

relief; however, some also included

conventional air, maritime, and ground

warfare training.

China and Russia also conducted NAVAL

COOPERATION 2015, which consisted of

two phases; the first in the Mediterranean Sea

and the second in the Sea of Japan. This was

the fourth NAVAL COOPERATION

exercise since 2012 between China and Russia

and was intended to strengthen bilateral

military ties and increase mutual trust between

both militaries. Phase one in the

Mediterranean focused on protecting sea lines

of communications (SLOCs) and combating

terrorism and phase two in the Sea of Japan

featured simultaneous amphibious landings,

joint air defense drills, and anti-surface ship

drills.



13

CHINA’S USE OF LOW-INTENSITY COERCION IN MARITIME DISPUTES

China has used low-intensity coercion to enhance its presence and control in disputed areas of the East and

South China Sea. During periods of tension, official statements and state media seek to frame China as

reacting to threats to its national sovereignty or to provocations by outside actors. China often uses a

progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed areas and avoid

escalation to military conflict. China has also used punitive trade policies as instruments of coercion during

past tensions and could do so in future disputes. In 2015, China continued to employ Chinese Coast Guard

and PLA Navy ships to implement its claims by maintaining a near-continuous presence in disputed areas in

order to demonstrate continuous and effective administration. Recent land reclamation activity has little

legal effect, but will support China’s ability to sustain longer patrols in the South China Sea. In 2012, China

restricted Philippine fruit imports during the height of Scarborough Reef tensions. In 2010, China used its

dominance in the rare earth industry as a diplomatic tool by restricting exports of rare earth minerals to

Japan amid tensions over a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese patrol ship.

RECLAMATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

China paused its two-year land reclamation effort in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding over 3,200

acres of land to the seven features it occupies; other claimants reclaimed approximately 50 acres of land over

the same period. As part of this effort, China excavated deep channels to improve access to its outposts,

created artificial harbors, dredged natural harbors, and constructed new berthing areas to allow access for

larger ships. Development of the initial four features—all of which were reclaimed in 2014—has progressed

to the final stages of primary infrastructure construction, and includes communication and surveillance

systems, as well as logistical support facilities.

At the three features where the largest outposts are located, China completed major land reclamation efforts

in early October 2015 and began transitioning to infrastructure development, with each feature having an

airfield—each with approximately 9,800 foot-long runways—and large ports in various stages of

construction. Additional substantial infrastructure, including communications and surveillance systems, is

expected to be built on these features in the coming year.

China’s Government has stated these projects are mainly for improving the living and working conditions of

those stationed on the outposts, safety of navigation, and research. However, most analysts outside China

believe that China is attempting to bolster its de facto control by improving its military and civilian

infrastructure in the South China Sea. The airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities will allow China to

maintain a more flexible and persistent coast guard and military presence in the area. This would improve

China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties, widen the range of

capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.

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A PLAN task force conducted a cruise around

the world from August 2015 to February

2016, during which it conducted bilateral

training with Denmark. Ships from the 20th

Naval Escort Task Force in the Gulf of Aden

stopped in 13 countries, including Poland,

Cuba, Sweden, the United States, Denmark,

and Australia. This is the first PLAN

operation to circumnavigate the globe since

2002, building on more recent naval visits to

Africa and Europe.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

China’s participation in United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)

supports various objectives—including

improving China’s international image,

obtaining operational experience for the PLA,

and providing opportunities to gather

intelligence. These operations also reflect the

PLA’s expanding role beyond China’s

borders. China provides civilian police,

military observers, engineers, logistical

support, and medical personnel to UN PKO

missions.

China contributes the largest number of

forces among the permanent members of the

UN Security Council. China maintains

approximately 3,079 personnel in ten UN

PKOs, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and the

Middle East. This number increased from

2,200 in 2014. China is also the sixth largest

financial contributor to the UN PKO

budget—fourth among UN Security Council

members—pledging 6.66 percent of the total

$8.27 billion budget for the period from July

2015 to June 2016.

In early 2015, China deployed approximately

700 PLA personnel to the UN Mission in

South Sudan, the first time China sent a

battalion of combat troops to a UN PKO

mission. The battalion is protecting a refugee

camp in Juba. China probably will increase its

participation in future PKO deployments.

During the 2015 UN General Assembly,

President Xi pledged to establish a permanent

peacekeeping force of 8,000 personnel, train

2,000 peacekeepers from other countries,

conduct 10 mine clearance programs, and

provide $100 million in military aid to fund

the African Union. Xi also noted that a PLA

helicopter unit will join the UN PKO in

Sudan.

China’s Arms Sales. From 2010 to 2014,

China’s arms sales totaled approximately $15

billion. As of this report’s publication, data for

2015 arms sales was not yet available. China

primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction

with economic aid and development

assistance to support broader foreign policy

goals such as securing access to natural

resources and export markets, promoting its

political influence among host-country elites,

and building support in international forums.

To a lesser extent, arms sales also reflect the

profit-seeking activities of individual arms

trading companies in China and efforts to

offset China’s defense-related research and

development costs.



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From the perspective of China’s arms

customers, most of which are developing

countries, Chinese arms are less expensive

than those offered by the top international

arms suppliers, although they are also

generally considered to be of lower quality

and reliability. Chinese arms also come with

fewer political strings attached, which is

attractive to those customers who may not

have access to other sources of arms for

political or economic reasons.

Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2015, China

maintained its support to counterpiracy

efforts in the Gulf of Aden, a commitment

that began in December 2008. The PLAN’s

19th Naval Escort Task Force, deployed on a

counterpiracy mission, also supported non-

combatant evacuation operations from

Yemen and participated in a Sino-Russian

naval drill in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2015,

China continued the trend of conducting

submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean,

ostensibly in support of its counterpiracy

patrols. A HAN-class nuclear-powered attack

submarine (SSN) operated in the Indian

Ocean in the winter of 2014-15 and a YUAN-

class air-independent powered attack

submarine (SSP) conducted a lengthy patrol in

the Indian Ocean starting in March 2015. The

YUAN also conducted the first foreign port

call by a PLAN submarine to Karachi,

Pakistan. China’s Ministry of National

Defense assured regional nations that the

submarines deployed to the Indian Ocean

were in support of China’s counterpiracy

patrols; however, the submarines were

probably also conducting area familiarization,

and demonstrating an emerging capability

both to protect China’s SLOCs and to

increase China’s power projection into the

Indian Ocean.

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The Rocket

Force, renamed from the PLASAF late last

year, operates China’s land-based nuclear and

conventional missiles. It is developing and

testing several new classes and variants of

offensive missiles, including a hypersonic

glide vehicle; forming additional missile units;

upgrading older missile systems; and

developing methods to counter ballistic

missile defenses.

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The force possesses approximately 1,200

short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) in its

inventory. China is increasing the lethality of

its conventional missile force by fielding the

CSS-11 (DF-16) ballistic missile with a range

of 800-1,000 km. The CSS-11, coupled with

the already deployed conventional land-attack

and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-

21C/D) medium-range ballistic missile

(MRBM), will improve China’s ability to strike

not only Taiwan, but other regional targets.

These ballistic missile systems are

complimented by the CJ-10 ground-launched

cruise missile (GLCM). The CJ-10 has a

range in excess of 1500 km and offers flight

profiles different from ballistic missiles that

can enhance targeting options.

China is fielding a growing number of

conventionally armed MRBMs, including the

CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic

missile (ASBM). The CSS-5 Mod 5, with a

range of 1,500 km and maneuverable

warhead, gives the PLA the capability to

attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the

western Pacific Ocean.

China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-range

ballistic missile (IRBM) during the September

2015 parade in Beijing. When fielded, the DF-

26 will be capable of conducting precision

strikes against ground targets and contribute

to strategic deterrence in the Asia-Pacific

region. The official parade announcer also

referenced a nuclear version of the DF-26,

which, if it shares the same guidance

capabilities, would give China its first nuclear

precision strike capability against theater

targets.

The PLARF continued to modernize its

nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and

adding more survivable, mobile delivery

systems. China’s ICBM arsenal to date

consists of approximately 75-100 ICBMs,

including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5)

and multiple independently-targetable reentry

vehicle (MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5B); the

solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and

2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the shorter range

CSS-3 (DF-4). The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a

range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most

locations within the continental United States.

China also is developing a new road-mobile

ICBM, the CSS-X-20 (DF-41) capable of

carrying MIRVs.

PLA Navy (PLAN). Over the past 15 years,

China’s ambitious naval modernization

program has produced a more technologically

advanced and flexible force. The PLAN now

possesses the largest number of vessels in

Asia, with more than 300 surface ships,

submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol

craft. China is rapidly retiring legacy

combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission

ships equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-

air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.

China continues its gradual shift from “near

sea” defense to “far seas” protection as

espoused in its most recent DWP, with the

PLAN conducting operational tasks outside

the so-called “first island chain” with multi-

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mission, long-range, sustainable naval

platforms that have robust self-defense

capabilities.

The PLAN places a high priority on the

modernization of its submarine force and

currently possesses five SSNs, four nuclear-

powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN),

and 53 diesel-powered attack submarines

(SS/SSP). By 2020, this force will likely grow

to between 69 and 78 submarines. In addition

to the 12 KILO-class SS units acquired from

Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, China has built

13 SONG-class SS (Type 039) and 13 YUAN-

class SSP (Type 039A) with a total of 20

YUANs planned for production. China

continues to improve its SSN force, and four

additional SHANG-class SSN (Type 093) will

eventually join the two already in service. The

SHANG SSN will replace the aging HAN-

class SSN (Type 091). These improved

SHANG SSNs feature a vertical launch

system (VLS) and may be able to fire the YJ-

18 advanced anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).

Over the next decade, China may construct a

new Type 095 nuclear-powered, guided-

missile attack submarine (SSGN), which not

only would improve the PLAN’s anti-surface

warfare capability but might also provide it

with a more clandestine land-attack option.

Finally, China continues to produce the JIN-

class SSBN (Type 094) with associated CSS-

N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBM) that has an estimated range

of 7,200 km. This platform represents China’s

first credible, sea-based nuclear deterrent.

China will probably conduct its first SSBN

nuclear deterrence patrol sometime in 2016.

Four JIN SSBNs are operational, and up to

five may enter service before China begins

developing and fielding its next-generation

SSBN, the Type 096, over the coming decade.

The Type 096 will reportedly be armed with a

successor to the JL-2, the JL-3 SLBM.

Since 2008, the PLAN has continued a robust

surface combatant construction program of

various classes of ships, including guided-

missile destroyers (DDG) and guided-missile

frigates (FFG). During 2015, the final

LUYANG II-class DDG (Type 052C) entered

service, bringing the total number of ships of

this class to six. Additionally, a second

LUYANG III-class DDG (Type 052D)

entered service in 2015. It has a multipurpose

VLS capable of launching ASCMs, land-attack

cruise missiles (LACM), surface-to-air missiles

(SAM), and antisubmarine missiles. China has

also probably begun construction of a larger

Type 055 “destroyer,” a vessel better

characterized as a guided-missile cruiser (CG)

than a DDG. China has continued to produce

the JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A),

with 20 ships currently in the fleet and five in

various stages of construction. These new

DDGs and FFGs provide a significant

upgrade to the PLAN’s air defense capability,

which will be critical as it expands operations

into distant seas beyond the range of shore-

based air defense systems.

Augmenting the PLAN’s littoral warfare

capabilities, especially in the South China Sea

and East China Sea, is a new class of small



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combatant. Twenty-five JIANGDAO-class

corvettes (FFL) (Type 056) are in service and

the latest ships have been upgraded to anti-

submarine warfare (ASW) variants with a

towed array sonar. China may build more than

60 of this class, ultimately replacing older

PLAN destroyers and frigates. China also has

60 HOUBEI-class wave-piercing catamaran

guided-missile patrol boats (PTG) (Type 022)

built for operations in China’s “near seas.”

The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-

surface warfare (ASUW) as its primary focus,

including modernizing its advanced ASCMs

and associated over-the-horizon targeting

systems. Older surface combatants carry

variants of the YJ-83 ASCM (65 nm, 120 km),

while newer surface combatants such as the

LUYANG II are fitted with the YJ-62 (120

nm, 222 km). The LUYANG III and Type

055 CG will be fitted with a variant of China’s

newest ASCM, the YJ-18 (290 nm, 537 km),

which is a significant step forward in China’s

surface ASUW capability. Eight of China’s 12

KILOs are equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM

(120 nm, 222 km), a system China acquired

from Russia. China’s newest indigenous

submarine-launched ASCM, the YJ-18 and its

variants, represents an improvement over the

SS-N-27, and will be fielded on SONG,

YUAN, and SHANG submarines. China’s

previously produced submarine-launched

ASCM, the YJ-82, is a version of the C-801,

which has a much shorter range. The PLAN

recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a

robust, over-the-horizon targeting capability

to realize their full potential, and China is

investing in reconnaissance, surveillance,

command, control, and communications

systems at the strategic, operational, and

tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting

information to surface and subsurface launch

platforms.

China’s investments in its amphibious ship

force signal China’s intent to develop an

expeditionary and over-the-horizon

amphibious assault capability as well as

HA/DR and counterpiracy capabilities. Since

2005, China has built three large YUZHAO-

class (Type 071) amphibious transport docks

(LPD) with a fourth soon to enter service,

providing considerably greater and more

flexible capability for “far seas” operations

than the older landing ships. The YUZHAO

can carry up to four of the new YUYI-class

air-cushion medium landing craft (LCMA)

and four or more helicopters, as well as

armored vehicles and marines for long-

distance deployments. Additional YUZHAO

construction is expected in the near-term, as is

a follow-on amphibious assault ship that is

not only larger, but incorporates a full flight

deck for helicopters. Two YUTING II-class

tank landing ships (LST) are currently being

built to replace older LST units that are

reaching the end of their service lives, and to

support logistics operations, particularly in the

South China Sea.

In 2015, the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier,

LIAONING, certified its first cohort of

domestically trained J-15 operational pilots.

The air wing is expected to deploy on the



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carrier in 2016. China also began construction

of its first domestic aircraft carrier and could

build multiple aircraft carriers over the next

15 years. Even when fully operational,

LIAONING will not enable long-range

power projection similar to U.S. NIMITZ-

class carriers. LIAONING’s smaller size

limits the number of aircraft it can embark,

while the ski-jump configuration limits aircraft

fuel and ordnance loads. LIAONING will

possibly be used for fleet air defense missions,

extending air cover over a fleet operating far

from land-based coverage. Although it

possesses a full suite of weapons and combat

systems, LIAONING will probably continue

to play a significant role in training China’s

carrier pilots, deck crews, and developing

tactics that will be used with later, more

capable carriers.



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PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy

Aviation. The PLAAF is the largest air force

in Asia and the third largest in the world, with

more than 2,800 total aircraft (not including

UAVs) and 2,100 combat aircraft (including

fighters, bombers, fighter-attack and attack

aircraft). The PLAAF is rapidly closing the

gap with western air forces across a broad

spectrum of capabilities from aircraft and

command-and-control (C2) to jammers,

electronic warfare (EW), and datalinks. The

PLAAF continues to field additional fourth-

generation aircraft (now about 600). Although

it still operates a large number of older

second- and third-generation fighters, it will

probably become a majority fourth-generation

force within the next several years.

The PLAAF and PLAN may become more

prominent within the PLA if China proceeds

with the personnel reductions announced in

September 2015. Last year, the personnel

levels of the PLAAF and PLAN were just

398,000 and 235,000 respectively, accounting

for 27.5 percent of the PLA overall. The

PLA’s planned personnel reductions may

increase the relative size of the PLAAF and

PLAN; Chinese analysts speculate the

absolute size of the two services may even

increase.

China has developed the J-10B follow-on to

its first indigenously designed fourth-

generation fighter and it is expected to enter

service in the near-term. The PLA is also

likely to acquire the Su-35 Flanker aircraft

from Russia along with its advanced radar

system. If China does procure the Su-35, the

aircraft could enter service by 2018. In

November 2015, talks to purchase 24 Su-35

fighters reportedly concluded successfully.

China has been pursuing fifth-generation

fighter capabilities since at least 2009 and is

the only country other than the United States

to have two concurrent stealth fighter

programs. China seeks to develop these

advanced aircraft to improve its regional

power projection capabilities and to

strengthen its ability to strike regional airbases

and facilities. The PLAAF has observed

foreign military employment of stealth aircraft

and views this technology as a core capability

in its transformation from a predominantly

territorial air force to one capable of

conducting both offensive and defensive

operations. PLAAF leaders believe stealth

aircraft provide an offensive operational

advantage that denies an adversary the time to

mobilize and to conduct defensive operations.

In 2015, China began flight testing its fifth

and sixth J-20 stealth fighter prototypes.

Within two years of the J-20’s first flight in

January 2011, China tested a second next-

generation fighter prototype. The prototype,

referred to as the FC-31 (and unofficially as

the J-31), is similar in size to a U.S. F-35

fighter and appears to incorporate design

characteristics similar to the J-20. The FC-31

conducted its first flight on October 31, 2012,

and debuted at China’s 10th China

International Aviation & Aerospace

Exhibition in Zhuhai in November 2014. The

Aviation Industry Corporation of China



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(AVIC) is actively marketing the FC-31 as an

export fifth-generation multirole fighter to

compete with the F-35 for foreign sales.

AVIC is reportedly in negotiations with the

PLAAF to sell the FC-31 for domestic use. In

addition to manned fighter aircraft, the

PLAAF also views stealth technology as

integral to unmanned aircraft, specifically

those with an air-to-ground role, as this

technology would improve that system’s

ability to penetrate heavily protected targets.

China is also producing bomber-class aircraft.

China continues to upgrade its H-6 bomber

fleet (originally adapted from the late-1950s

Soviet Tu-16 design) to increase operational

effectiveness and lethality by integrating new

standoff weapons. The PLAAF operates three

different H-6 bomber variants. The H-6H and

the more capable H-6M have been in service

since the last decade. The PLAAF also

employs the new, fully redesigned H-6K

variant with new turbofan engines for

extended range and the capability to carry six

LACMs. Converting the H-6 into a cruise

missile carrier gives the PLA a long-range

standoff offensive air capability with

precision-guided munitions capable of striking

Guam. In 2015, China flew H-6Ks into the

western Pacific Ocean in a demonstration of

the airframe’s long-range capability. PLA

Navy Aviation utilizes a nearly identical

version of the earlier H-6, known as the H-6G

equipped with systems and four weapons

pylons for ASCMs to support maritime

missions. All of China’s H-6 variants maintain

their traditional bomb bay for gravity bombs,

precision guided bombs, and naval mines.

China also uses a modified version of the H-6,

known as the H-6U to conduct aerial

refueling operations for some of its

indigenous fighter aircraft, increasing their

operational ranges. China is also receiving

receive Il-78s from Ukraine, which are

outfitted as air-refueling tankers. China-

Ukraine negotiations for additional tankers

will likely continue. Although China can refuel

fighter aircraft, to date no H-6 variants are

capable of being refueled while airborne.

China is improving its airfields in the South

China Sea with the availability of Woody

Island Airfield in the Paracel Islands and

construction of up to three new airfields in

the Spratly Islands. All of these airfields could

have runways long enough to support any

aircraft in China’s inventory. During late-

October 2015 the PLAN deployed four of its

most capable air superiority fighters, the J-11B,

to Woody Island.

The PLAAF possesses one of the largest

forces of advanced long-range SAM systems

in the world, consisting of a combination of

Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300PMU1/2)

battalions and domestically produced CSA-9

(HQ-9) battalions. In an effort to improve its

strategic air defense systems even further,

China plans to import Russia’s S-400/Triumf

SAM system, as a follow-on to the SA-20, and

may simultaneously develop its indigenous

CSA-X-19 (HQ-19) to provide the basis for a

ballistic missile defense capability.

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China’s aviation industry continues to test its

Y-20 large transport aircraft for introduction

into the PLA’s operational inventory to

supplement and eventually replace China’s

small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which

currently consist of a limited number of

Russian-made IL-76 aircraft.

The Y-20 made its maiden flight during

January 2013 and is reported to use the same

Russian engines as the IL-76. The large

transports are intended to support airborne

C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and

strategic reconnaissance operations, as well as

HA/DR missions.



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PLA Army (PLAA). In November 2015, the

PLA established a separate Army

headquarters for its ground forces. The CMC

creation in late 2015 of a separate Army

headquarters set the conditions for joint

operations by leveling the status of the

services. This change has required an

alteration in the organization of theater

commands, which for the first time are

establishing separate subordinate theater army

headquarters to lead their ground

components.

Other aspects of PLAA modernization

continued in 2015. The PLA also continued to

modernize and to restructure its ground force

to create a fully modern army capable of

fighting and winning multiple simultaneous

regional land wars as the core element of a

national joint force. In 2015, the PLAA

emphasized mobility exercises across MRs,

the mechanization of combat brigades, the

creation of high-mobility infantry and

combined-arms battalions, and the delivery of

advanced command, control, communication,

computers, and intelligence (C4I) equipment

that provides real-time data-sharing at the

division and brigade level. Modernization also

involves improved rotary-wing army aviation

with precision-guided munitions (including

dedicated air-to-air missiles for helicopter-to-

helicopter aerial combat). The PLAA

continued to field tracked and wheeled

artillery systems, wheeled anti-tank guns, anti-

tank guided missiles, wheeled and tracked

armored vehicles, and air defense systems

which incorporate advanced target-acquisition

capabilities. Advanced long-range artillery

systems—conventional and rocket—as well as

supporting target-acquisition systems

continued to enter the force, providing PLAA

tactical- and operational-level units with

world-class, long-range strike capabilities.

Two increasingly influential PLAA ground

force exercise series are the STRIDE and

FIREPOWER. In a STRIDE exercise, the

PLAA assesses a maneuver brigade as it

deploy across MR boundaries to a training

center, where it then goes into carefully

observed force-on-force combat against a

non-cooperative dedicated opposition force

(OPFOR). Battlefield success is determined

primarily through extensive laser engagement

systems keyed to each weapon system, much

as U.S. Army units train at the National

Training Center. The FIREPOWER exercise

series is for artillery brigades and air defense

brigades, which deploy across MR boundaries

and conduct extensive live-fire practice

carefully observed and evaluated by dedicated

observer-controllers. Last year, the PLAA

placed even more emphasis on increasing its

ability to deploy operational campaign-level

forces across long distances quickly, entering

immediately thereafter into force-on-force

combined-arms combat. In 2015, 15 combat

maneuver brigades undertook a STRIDE

exercise iteration, more than double the seven

maneuver brigades that conducted a STRIDE

exercise in 2014.



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In 2014, the FIREPOWER exercise series

trained 10 brigades across a number of

training areas. In contrast, the 2015

FIREPOWER series trained 14 brigades at

two dedicated live-fire training areas in the

Lanzhou MR. Seven artillery brigades

deployed to the Qingtongxia training area and

seven air defense brigades deployed to the

Shandan training area.

In 2015, PLAA academies conducted

command-post exercises (CPX) with units

conducting STRIDE and acting as the

dedicated OPFOR for FIREPOWER

exercises. Rather than having commanders

and staffs travel to the academies, the PLAA's

command software system was used to

support training units at their training centers,

with the pertinent academy personnel

remaining at their academies. Distributed

training at this level of sophistication

represents a considerable advance for the

PLAA, especially since the first academy cadre

OPFOR-unit training only was conducted in

2012.

PLAA exercises in 2015 continued the trend

of improving rotary-wing army aviation

operational capabilities and overall air-ground

and C2 capabilities with improved networks

providing real-time data sharing within and

between units. The production and fielding of

improved PLAA wheeled and tracked

armored vehicles, advanced air defense

systems, and EW capabilities continues, as

does the spread of advanced long-range

artillery systems along with their supporting

target-acquisition systems, including SOF

trained for deep-strike reconnaissance. All

elements of the PLAA were major players in

the extensive JOINT ACTION-2015 series of

exercises which included a focus on SOF

integration with long-range fire strike assets.

The growth of additional regional training

centers with full-time non-cooperative

OPFORs, along with dedicated observer-

controller personnel to conduct unit training

evaluations and training support elements, as

seen in the expansion of the STRIDE exercise

series noted above, continues to drive realistic

training across major portions of the PLAA.

The primary limiting factor at this time seems

to be the simple availability of training time at

the current centers, in comparison with the

size of the world's largest ground force.

Extensive media coverage of Army exercises

in 2015 again underscored a growing national

confidence in the PLAA’s ability to conduct

modern air-land battle.



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36

Space and Counterspace Capabilities.

Using its on-orbit and ground-based assets to

support its national civil, economic, political,

and military goals and objectives, China’s

space program continues to mature. China has

invested significantly in improving its space

capabilities, with particular emphasis on

satellite communications (SATCOM);

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR); satellite navigation (SATNAV);

meteorology; as well as manned, unmanned,

and interplanetary space exploration. In

addition to its on-orbit assets, China’s space

program has built a vast ground infrastructure

supporting spacecraft and space launch

vehicle (SLV) manufacturing, launch, C2, and

data downlink. In parallel with its space

program, China continues to develop a variety

of counterspace capabilities designed to limit

or to prevent the use of space-based assets by

the PLA’s adversaries during a crisis or

conflict.

China’s most recent DWP affirmed the PLA’s

focus on new, emerging security domains

such as outer space. The report called space

the “commanding height in international

strategic competition.” Although China

continues to advocate the peaceful use of

outer space, the report also noted China

would “secure its space assets to serve its

national economic and social development,

and maintain outer space security.”

As of December 2015, China launched 19

SLVs carrying 45 spacecraft, including

navigation, ISR, and test/engineering

satellites. Noteworthy 2015 accomplishments

for China’s space program include:

> Two New Launch Vehicles: September

2015 saw the successful debut of both the

Long March (LM)-6 and the LM-11 “next

generation” SLVs. The LM-6 is a small

liquid-fueled SLV designed to carry up to

1000 kg into low Earth orbit (LEO), and

the LM-11is described as a “quick

response” SLV designed to launch a small

payload into LEO on short notice in the

event of an emergency.

> China’s Largest Multi-Payload Launch and

Smallest Satellites: The 19 September

2015 inaugural launch of the LM-6 SLV

carried the largest number of satellites (20)

China has ever launched on a single SLV.

Most of the satellites carried onto orbit by

the LM-6 were technology-demonstration

satellites smaller than 100 kg.

Furthermore, the four Xingchen

femtosatellites launched aboard the LM-6

are the smallest Chinese spacecraft to

date, weighing just 100 g each.

> Launches Begin for Beidou Global

Network: China’s Beidou SATNAV

constellation began the next step of its

construction in 2015 with the launch of

the Beidou I1-S, an inclined

geosynchronous orbit (IGSO) satellite, on

March 30. In 2015, China launched two

more medium Earth orbit satellites and

two more IGSO satellite. This phase of

the project plans to extend the Beidou

network beyond its current regional focus

to provide global coverage by 2020.

BillGertz

Highlight



37

The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies

to improve China’s counterspace capabilities.

In addition to the development of directed

energy weapons and satellite jammers, China

is also developing anti-satellite capabilities and

has probably made progress on the

antisatellite missile system it tested in July

2014. China is employing more sophisticated

satellite operations and is probably testing

dual-use technologies in space that could be

applied to counterspace missions.

In the summer of 2014, China conducted a

space launch that had a similar profile to the

January 2007 test. In 2013, China launched an

object into space on a ballistic trajectory with

a peak altitude above 30,000 km, which could

have been a test of technologies with a

counterspace mission in geosyncronous orbit.

Although Chinese defense academics often

publish on counterspace threat technologies,

no additional antisatellite programs have been

publicly acknowledged. PLA writings

emphasize the necessity of “destroying,

damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s

reconnaissance...and communications

satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as

well as navigation and early warning satellites,

could be among the targets of attacks

designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”

China’s Engagement on International

Cyber Issues. China is engaged in cyber

related diplomatic and advocacy efforts in

multilateral and international forums such as

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO), and among Brazil,

Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS).

China promotes international cooperation on

combatting terrorists’ use of the internet and

countering cyber-related criminal activity and

advocates for cyber norms that include

principles of sovereignty, non-interference

and states’ rights to control online content.

China, along with several other countries

contributed to the UN Group of

Governmental Experts on Development July

2015 report that addresses cyber related issues

and state behavior in cyberspace.

U.S.-China Cyber Engagement. DoD

engages China to bring greater transparency

of each nation’s military doctrine, policy roles

and missions in cyberspace as part of the

U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks, the

Strategic Security Dialogue, and related

dialogues. DoD participates in the U.S.-China

Senior Experts Group on International

Security Issues in Cyberspace, which was one

of the outcomes of the cyber commitments

between President Obama and President Xi in

September 2015



38

DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

China continues to modernize its nuclear forces across the PLA. In 2015, China maintained

nuclear-capable delivery systems in its missile forces and navy, giving it a dispersed and more-

survivable capability.

> The PLA Rocket Force’s (PLARF) arsenal contains 75-100 ICBMs. The PLARF is modernizing

these airframes, including through the development of a new road-mobile ICBM capable of

carrying multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China has also tested a hypersonic

glide vehicle, although official statements make no reference to its intended mission or potential

capability to carry a nuclear warhead.

> The PLAN continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN, with four commissioned and at least one

under construction. The JIN class and its SLBMs will give China its first reliable long-range,

sea-based nuclear capability.

In 2015, China also continued to develop long-range bombers, including some Chinese military

analysts have described as “capable of performing strategic deterrence”—a mission reportedly

assigned to the PLA Air Force in 2012. There have also been Chinese publications indicating

China intends to build a long-range “strategic” stealth bomber. These media reports and Chinse

writings suggest China might eventually develop a nuclear bomber capability. If it does, China

would develop a “triad” of nuclear delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air—a posture

considered since the Cold War to improve survivability and strategic deterrence.



39



40

2 UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S

STRATEGY



41

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Since 2002, China’s leaders—including

President Xi Jinping—have characterized the

initial two decades of the 21st century as a

“period of strategic opportunity.” They assess

that during this time international conditions

will facilitate domestic development and the

expansion of China’s “comprehensive

national power,” which outside observers

believe will serve what they assess to be the

Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) overriding

strategic objectives:

> perpetuate CCP rule;

> maintain domestic stability;

> sustain economic growth and

development;

> defend national sovereignty and territorial

integrity;

> secure China’s status as a great power and,

ultimately, reacquiring regional

preeminence;

> and safeguard China’s interests abroad.

The CCP has distilled these objectives into

President Xi’s “China Dream” of national

rejuvenation. The concept, first articulated by

Xi shortly after the 2012 leadership transition,

encapsulates a long-standing national

aspiration of establishing a powerful and

prosperous China. President Xi and other

leaders also link the China Dream to two

high-profile centenary goals: achieving a

“moderately prosperous society” by the 100th

anniversary of the CCP in 2012, and building

a “modern socialist country that is prosperous,

strong, democratic, culturally advanced and

harmonious” by the 100th anniversary of the

establishment of the PRC in 2049.

The China Dream also includes a

commitment to developing military power

commensurate with China’s resurgent status

as a great power. China’s leaders are

increasingly seeking ways to leverage its

growing military, diplomatic, and economic

clout to establish regional preeminence and

expand its international influence. China’s

strategy is to secure these objectives without

jeopardizing the regional peace that has been

conducive to its military modernization and

the economic development that has helped

the CCP maintain its monopoly on power.



42

MILITARY STRATEGY

China’s ambitious, two-decade long

modernization entered a new phase in 2015 as

President Xi unveiled the most sweeping

reforms in at least thirty years. Official

Chinese press has touted the reforms as the

most sweeping in the history of the PLA. The

reforms are designed in part to make the PLA

a leaner, more lethal force that is more

capable of conducting the type of joint

operations the U.S. military pioneered. The

reforms establish new joint theater commands

and a new Joint Staff Department, while

CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Since 2014, China has taken several steps to modernize CCP, military, and state institutions and ensure greater

coherence in the conduct of China’s national security policy. These efforts address long-standing concerns that

China’s Cold War-era system of stove-piped organizations is ill-equipped to meet the growing range of

challenges that China faces as its interests and capabilities expand.

> In January, the CCP Politburo adopted China’s first national security strategy outline. Official media noted

that it is intended to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership’s guidance.

> In July, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed an expansive national security law, replacing an

earlier law that dealt primarily with counterespionage. The law sets a wide definition of national security

and gives central authorities—possibly the new National Security Commission—leadership of strategy,

coordination, and crisis management.

> The content of the two documents echoes a broad national security vision first stated by President Xi in

2014 at the inaugural meeting of China’s National Security Commission. At that session, Xi described 11

areas that are components of national security, ranging from political security—i.e., ensuring CCP rule—to

military security, as well as a variety of other issues.

The NSC’s mission, sprawling definition of national security, and powerful leaders suggests that the NSC may

claim broad authority over time. At the NSC’s first meeting, President Xi called on it to “establish a centralized

and unified, highly authoritative state security system.” The Commission’s purview appears to encompass

domestic and foreign affairs, endowing it with a much wider mandate than the U.S. National Security Council.

Xi, Premier Li Keqiang, and National People’s Congress Chairman Zhang Dejiang lead the Commission, but

China has not publicly named other members. Beijing-owned press outlets note that the head of its general

office is Politburo member and CCP General Office Director Li Zhanshu, who appears close to Xi and

probably had little experience with international affairs during his decades-long career in the provinces.



43

replacing the four general departments that

have run the PLA since the establishment of

the People’s Republic of China in 1949 with

new organizations. Xi and the Central Military

Commission (CMC) have mandated that the

PLA make “major breakthroughs” in

overhauling its structure by 2020.

National Military Strategic Guidelines. In

2015, the leadership directed the PLA to be

capable of fighting and winning

“informationized local wars” with an

emphasis on “maritime military struggle,”

adjusting its guidance on the type of war the

PLA should be prepared to fight. China

promulgated this revision through its “military

strategic guidelines,” the top-level directives

that define concepts, assess threats, and set

priorities for planning, force posture, and

modernization. The guidelines identify the

type of war for which China must prepare,

and regional analysts widely interpreted this

update as an indication that China expects

significant elements of a modern conflict

would occur at sea.

> China’s leadership has adjusted its national

military strategic guidelines twice since the

fall of the Soviet Union. In 1993, Jiang

Zemin directed the PLA to prepare for

conflict under modern, high-tech

conditions after observing U.S. military

operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, Hu

Jintao ordered the military to focus on

“local war under infomationized

conditions.”

> Taiwan remains the PLA’s main “strategic

direction,” one of the geographic areas the

leadership identifies as endowed with

strategic importance. Other focus areas

include the East China Sea, the South

China Sea, and China’s borders with India

and North Korea. This year’s structural

reforms appear to have oriented each new

theater command toward a specific

direction.

> In 2015, China outlined eight “strategic

tasks,” or types of missions the PLA must

be ready to execute: safeguard the

sovereignty of China’s territory; safeguard

national unification; safeguard China’s

interests in new domains such as space

and cyberspace; safeguard China’s

overseas interests; maintain strategic

deterrence; participate in international

security cooperation; maintain China’s

political security and social stability; and

conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief,

and “rights and interest protection”

missions.

> China’s military leaders also want to

achieve mechanization and to make

“major progress” toward

informationization by 2020. The concept

of “informationization” figures

prominently in PLA writings and is

roughly analogous to the U.S. military’s

concept of “net-centric” capability: it is a

force’s ability to use advanced information

technology and communications systems

to gain operational advantage over an

adversary. PLA writings highlight the



44

benefit of near real-time shared awareness

of the battlefield in enabling quick, unified

effort to seize opportunities.

Coercive Approach. In tandem with the

modernization and reorganization of the PLA,

Chinese leaders are increasingly leveraging

tactics short of armed conflict to advance

China’s interests. Their approach seeks to

enhance China’s reach and power through

activities calculated to fall below the threshold

of provoking the United States, its allies and

partners, or others in the Asia-Pacific region

into open conflict. This is particularly evident

in China’s pursuit of its territorial and

maritime sovereignty claims in the South and

East China Seas. For instance, China is using

its maritime law-enforcement vessels to limit

access to Scarborough Reef and pressure the

Philippine presence at Second Thomas Shoal.

China’s expansion of disputed features and

construction in the Spratly Islands, using

large-scale land reclamation demonstrate

China’s capacity—and a newfound willingness

to exercise that capacity—to strengthen

China’s control over disputed areas, enhance

China’s presence, and challenge other

claimants.

Growing Global Presence. China’s

maritime emphasis and attention to missions

guarding its overseas interests has increasingly

drawn the PLA beyond China’s borders and

its immediate periphery. The PLA Navy’s

evolving focus—from “offshore waters

defense” to a mix of “offshore waters

defense” and “open seas protection”—

reflects the high command’s expanding

interest in a wider operational reach. In late

November 2015, China acknowledged its

intent to build military support facilities in

Djibouti. If completed, this facility would be

China’s first overseas logistics station.

Active Defense. China characterizes its

military strategy as one of “active defense,” a

concept it describes as strategically defensive

but operationally proactive in orientation. It is

rooted in a commitment not to attack, but to

respond aggressively once an adversary

decides to attack—a defense that

counterattacks in order to disrupt an

adversary’s preparations or offensive rather

than a defense that reacts passively. The PLA

interprets active defense to include mandates

for both de-escalation and seizing the

initiative. Active defense is set in China’s

National Security Law (2015) and is included

in the PLA’s major strategy documents.

FOREIGN POLICY

China continues to regard stable relations with

the United States and China’s neighbors as

key to its development. China sees the United

States as the dominant regional and global

actor with the greatest potential both to

support and to disrupt China’s rise. China is

conscious that if its neighbors come to view it

primarily as a threat, they will balance against

China.



45

In October, in part to allay these fears, China

hosted back-to-back meetings of ASEAN

defense chiefs and national and military

leaders who attended China’s Xiangshan

Forum, a semi-official dialogue on regional

security. During the forum, CMC Vice

Chairman Fan Changlong defended China’s

construction of islands in South China Sea,

advocated for handling differences through

peaceful bilateral negotiations, and stated that

China will never “recklessly” use force to

resolve disputes. Fan’s comments

underscored the challenges in China’s regional

policy. In addition, China used its 2014-2015

chairmanship of the Conference on

Interaction and Confidence Building

Measures in Asia (CICA) and the inaugural

ASEAN-China Defense Ministers’ Informal

Meeting in October 2015 to push forward

new mechanisms for regional security

cooperation.

However, as China’s foreign interests increase

and its power have grown, former paramount

leader Deng Xiaoping’s oft-repeated policy

dictum that China should “hide capabilities

and bide time” has come under strain as some

members of China’s elite question its

continued relevance. China is seeking

progressively higher-profile leadership roles in

existing regional and global institution while

seizing the initiative to establish multilateral

mechanisms such as the proposed “New

Asian Security Concept,” an all-inclusive

security framework that promotes Asian

solutions to Asian problems and provides an

alternative to U.S. alliances in Asia. In late

November 2014, President Xi at a rare CCP

Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference—

only the fourth since the establishment of the

PRC—called on Beijing to take on regional

and global leadership and officially endorsed

the main thrust of China’s foreign policy. Xi

remarked on the “protracted nature of the

struggle over the international order” and

highlighted China’s intention to play a larger

role. He stressed that China would be firm in

defending its interests, especially its territorial

sovereignty and maritime rights.

China’s increasingly assertive efforts to

advance its national sovereignty and territorial

claims, its forceful rhetoric, and lack of

transparency about its growing military

capabilities and strategic decision-making

continue to raise tensions and have caused

countries in the region to enhance their ties to

the United States. These concerns are likely to

intensify as the PLA continues to modernize,

especially in the absence of greater

transparency.



46



47

CHINA’S ENERGY STRATEGY

China’s engagement, investment, and foreign construction related to energy continued to grow. In 2015 China has

constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries. This ambitious investment in energy assets is

driven primarily by China’s desire to ensure reliable, diverse energy sources to support economic growth. The

Chinese companies involved are also interested in increasing profitability, as well as access to advanced

technologies.

China hopes to diversify both producers and transport options. Although energy independence is no longer realistic

for China, given population growth and increasing per capita energy consumption, China still seeks to maintain a

supply chain that is less susceptible to external disruption.

In 2015, China imported approximately 60 percent of its oil supply, and this figure is projected to grow to 80

percent by 2035, according to International Energy Agency data. China continues to look primarily to the Persian

Gulf, Africa, and Russia/Central Asia to satisfy its growing demand.

A second goal of China’s foreign energy strategy is to alleviate China’s heavy dependence on sea lines of

communication (SLOCs), particularly the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. In 2015, approximately 83 percent

of China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. Separate crude oil pipelines from Russia

and Kazakhstan to China illustrate efforts to increase overland supply. In 2015, the Russia–China crude oil pipeline

started expanding to double its capacity from 300,000 to 600,000 barrels per day (b/d) by 2016. In 2015,

construction was finished on the 440,000-b/d Burma–China oil pipeline. This pipeline bypasses the Strait of

Malacca by transporting crude oil from Kyuakpya, Burma to Kunming, China. The crude oil for this pipeline will

be supplied by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and African countries.

Given China’s growing energy demand, new pipelines will alleviate only slightly China’s maritime dependency on

either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz. Despite China’s efforts, the sheer volume of oil and liquefied

natural gas that is imported to China from the Middle East and Africa will make strategic SLOCs increasingly

important to China.

In 2015, China imported approximately 27.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, 45 percent of all of its

natural gas imports, from Turkmenistan by pipeline via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This pipeline is designed to

carry 40 bcm per year with plans to expand it to 60 bcm per year. Another natural gas pipeline designed to deliver

12 bcm per year of Burmese-produced gas commenced operations in September 2013 and shipped 3 bcm of gas in

2014. This pipeline parallels the crude oil pipeline across Burma. There was no progress in 2015 on the natural gas

project that China and Russia agreed to in 2014. The pipeline is expected to deliver up to 38 bcm of gas by 2035;

initial flows are to start by 2018.



48

China's Top Crude Suppliers 2014

Country Volume (1,000 barrels/day) Percentage of Imported Crude Oil

Saudi Arabia 1,012 15

Russia 850 13

Angola 775 12

Iraq 643 10

Oman 642 10

Iran 533 8

Venezuela 320 5

Kuwait 289 4

Brazil 278 4

UAE 251 4

Others 1,123 17

Total 6,716 102

Numbers may not equal 100 as figures have been rounded.

FACTORS SHAPING CHINA’S

LEADERSHIP PERCEPTIONS

Authoritative official documents indicate that

China’s leaders over the past several years

have viewed the country’s security

environment as becoming more complex.

Even with “a generally favorable external

environment,” last year’s Defense White

Paper (DWP) assessed that “the national

security issues facing China encompass far

more subjects, extend over a greater range,

and cover a longer time span than at any time

in the country’s history. Internally and

externally, the factors at play are more

complex than ever before.” Some of these

evolving factors include:

Domestic Stability. China’s leaders are

watchful for signs of unrest and vigilant about

controlling dissent. In 2015, the leadership’s

anxieties about social stability spurred the

CCP to tighten social controls and crackdown

on dissent. The protests in Hong Kong in late

2014 inflamed Chinese officials’ perceptions

that the West seeks to intensify domestic

instability that would overthrow the CCP.

China’s new National Security Commission

has a mandate to protect the CCP from both

internal and external threats, a reflection of

the regime’s enduring fear of foreign

subversion. This fear of unrest probably also

has contributed to the leadership’s focus on

tightening CCP control of the PLA. In his

first speech as commander-in-chief, Xi cited

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s



49

lack of control of its armed forces as a key

cause of the Soviet Union’s demise.

Decelerating Economic Growth.

China’s continued economic growth has been

a chief enabler of the PLA’s rapid

modernization. Chinese leaders, however,

were concerned about the past year’s slowing

growth and stock market volatility. China’s

economy faces a range of risks, including a

slowdown in the property market, ballooning

debt that continues to outpace economic

growth, high off-balance sheet borrowing by

provincial and local governments, domestic

resource constraints, and rising wages. China’s

leaders recognize that the economy needs to

embark on a disruptive transition from an

export- and investment-driven economy to a

more consumer-driven economy, but they

worry that the necessary reforms in the short

term could undermine the steady economic

growth, low unemployment, and contained

inflation that the leadership judges to be the

bedrock of social stability. Over the longer

term, China’s economy also faces

environmental challenges and the dual threat

of a rapidly aging population and a declining

birth rate that now falls below replacement

level, changes that will strain China’s

resources and its economic growth model.

The CCP Central Committee last year decided

to lift its longtime “one-child policy” in part

to address this challenge, but the high cost of

living still discourages many couples from

having a second child.

Regional Challenges to China’s

Interests. There are numerous, complex

maritime and territorial disputes across the

Asia-Pacific. China’s behavior in these

disputes have increased regional concerns

about its intentions in the region,

undercutting its professed desire to maintain a

friendly periphery, and driving its neighbors

to align more closely with each other and the

United States.

Nationalism. CCP and PLA leaders have

adopted a more nationalistic foreign policy

posture. Stirring nationalist sentiment may

bolster the legitimacy of the CCP, but also

risks limiting Chinese leaders’ flexibility in

dialogues with foreign interlocutors, including

during a crisis, by limiting options and

opening the leadership up to criticism that it

has insufficiently defended China’s national

interests.

FOREIGN MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The PLA engages with foreign militaries to

demonstrate its growing capabilities and to

improve its tactics, techniques and

procedures. Bilateral and multilateral exercises

provide a political benefit to China and

opportunities for the PLA to improve

capabilities in areas such as counterterrorism,

mobility operations, and logistics.

Military Diplomacy. In January 2015, the

PLA held an All-Army Foreign Affairs Work

Conference to outline how China’s military

diplomacy would support the vision set by the



50

CCP’s earlier Central Foreign Affairs Work

Conference. At this PLA event, senior

officials conveyed the goals and strategic

outlook for military diplomacy for the next

decade, addressing themes of President Xi’s

speech to Party leaders, including “big power

diplomacy,” coordination, and policy

implementation.

Senior-level visits and exchanges provide

China with opportunities to increase military

officers’ international exposure, to

communicate China’s positions to foreign

audiences, to understand alternative world

views, and to advance foreign relations

through interpersonal contacts and military

assistance programs. Expanded PLA travel

abroad enables PLA officers to observe and

study foreign military command structures,

unit formations, and operational training.

Military Cooperation. As China’s regional

and international interests grow more

complex, the PLA’s international engagement

will expand, especially in the areas of PKO,

counterpiracy, HA/DR, counterterrorism, and

joint exercises. For example, virtually every

Latin American and Caribbean country that

diplomatically recognizes China sends officers

to the strategic-level College of Defense

Studies at the National Defense University;

some of these countries also send officers to

the PLAA and PLAN command schools. In

addition to furthering PLA modernization,

the focus of these engagements will probably

remain on building China’s political ties,

assuaging fears about China’s rise, and

building China’s international influence,

particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Military Attaché Presence. China

advances its day-to-day overseas military

diplomacy work using PLA officers assigned

as military attachés in at least 110 offices

worldwide. China’s military attaches serve as

military advisors to the ambassador, support

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign

policy objectives, and perform a variety of

duties tied to PLA military and security

cooperation, including counterpart exchanges

with host-nation and third-country personnel.

Military attachés also collect intelligence on

their countries or areas of assignment.

Although the general function of an attaché

office is the same worldwide, some attaché

offices probably prioritize specific missions or

diplomatic priorities due to close bilateral

relations or other factors. In recent years,

China’s military attaché presence has grown

around the world as the PLA continues to

professionalize.

China’s military attaché offices vary in size,

generally ranging from two to 10 PLA

officers. Most offices consist of just a few

accredited officers; however, offices in

countries considered important to China’s

strategic interests are often considerably

larger, potentially including multiple assistant

attachés, dedicated naval or air force attachés,

and support staff.



51

CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN CONTEXT

The People’s Republic of China’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely throughout its history.

Some disputes led to war, such as China’s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contested

border with the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In more recent cases,

China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has

settled 11 land-based territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. In recent years, China has adopted a coercive

approach that eschews military conflict in order to deal with several disputes continue over exclusive economic

zones (EEZ) and ownership of potentially rich, offshore oil and gas deposits.

The East China Sea contains natural gas and oil, though hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. China

and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelves and the EEZs extending from their respective

mainlands. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while

China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. Since early 2009,

Japan has repeatedly accused China of violating a June 2008 agreement establishing an equidistant demarcation

line from each country for resource development and an area to the north spanning the line for joint exploration

of oil and natural gas fields, and claimed that China unilaterally drilled beneath the demarcation line, extracting

reserves from the Japanese side. China continues to contest Japan’s administration of the nearby Senkaku

Islands.

The South China Sea plays an important role in security considerations across the East Asia because Northeast

Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including more

than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly

and Paracel Island groups and other land areas within its “nine-dash line” claim—claims disputed in whole or

part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies the Itu Aba Island in the Spratly

Islands, makes the same claims as the PRC. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelf submissions in

the South China Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam; in its protest to the UN Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf, China included its ambiguous “nine-dash line” map, while stating in a note verbale that it has

“indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign

rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.”

Tensions remain with India along their shared 4,057 km border over Arunachal Pradesh (which China asserts

is part of Tibet and therefore of China), and over the Askai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan

Plateau, despite increases in China-India political and economic relations. In October 2013, Chinese and Indian

officials signed the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement, which supplements existing procedures managing

the interaction of forces along the Line of Actual Control. China and India continue to accuse each other of

frequent incursions and military build-ups along the disputed territories, with the most recent incident occurring

in September 2015 along the Line of Actual Control at Burtse in Northern Ladakh. After a five-day standoff,

China and India held a senior-level flag meeting and agreed to maintain peace and retreat to positions mutually

acceptable to both sides.



52

CHINA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The PLA is the armed instrument of the CCP and organizationally is part of the Party apparatus. Career military

officers are CCP members, and units at the company level and above have political officers responsible for

personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP

committees, which are led by the political officers and military commanders.

China’s military leaders are influential in defense and foreign policy due to the Central Military Commission’s

special bureaucratic status and the PLA’s near-monopoly on military expertise. The military’s highest decision-

making body, the CMC, is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed almost

exclusively by military officers. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the General

Secretary of the CCP and President of China. Prior to the reorganization of the PLA high command announced

in January 2016, the ex officio membership of the CMC included several vice chairmen, the minister of national

defense—a position functionally unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense—the three service commanders, and the

directors of the four general headquarters departments. The officers who held those positions prior to the

January 2016 announcement still serve on the CMC, but the CMC’s composition may change as a result of the

PLA’s ongoing structural reforms.

MEMBERS OF THE CCP CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION

Chairman Xi Jinping’s appointment as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012, and his selection

as President in the spring of 2013, was the first simultaneous transfer of all three of China’s top positions to an

incoming leader in recent decades. Prior to becoming CMC Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice

Chairman. Xi’s father was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo

member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as secretary to a defense minister early in his career and would have

had opportunities to interact with the PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S. officials, Xi has

emphasized improving military-to-military relations between China and the United States.

Vice Chairman Fan Changlong in 2012 became China’s top uniformed officer in an unusually steep

“helicopter promotion” in 2012. He formerly commanded the Jinan Military MR, a test bed for new operational

concepts and technology that has been at the forefront of the PLA’s joint training efforts in recent years. Fan was

the longest serving of China’s seven MR commanders at the time of his appointment, but unlike previous CMC

vice chairmen, Fan had never previously served on the CMC. He also spent 35 years in the Shenyang MR,

adjacent to North Korea and Russia.



53

Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang—the first career air force officer promoted to CMC Vice Chairman—

previously served on the CMC as PLAAF commander where he oversaw rapid force modernization and

expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He vocally advocated for increasing the PLAAF’s role within

the larger PLA, including arguing in 2009 that the PLAAF should lead the development of offensive space

capabilities. Xu may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping earlier in their careers when both men served in

Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLAAF officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department

(GSD) since the Cultural Revolution period, and—at 54 years of age—the youngest in PLA history.

Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan was appointed at the National People’s Congress in

March 2013. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA’s third most senior officer and manages its

relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Chang previously oversaw the PLA’s weapons

development and space portfolio as head of the General Armament Department. He played a role in China’s

border skirmishes with Vietnam and has held top posts across three military regions.

Joint Staff Department Chief Fang Fenghui oversees PLA operations, training, and intelligence,

responsibilities that are similar to those of his role as head of the former General Staff Department (GSD).

In his previous position as Beijing Military Region commander, he was “commander-in-chief” of China’s

60th anniversary military parade in 2009 and oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Fang is

the first former Beijing MR commander to move directly to Chief of the GSD. He was the PLA’s youngest

military region commander when he was promoted to lead the Beijing MR in 2007.

Political Work Department Director Zhang Yang oversees the PLA’s political work including

propaganda, discipline, and education—missions inherited from the former General Political Department.

Unusually for a CMC member, Zhang spent his entire career in a single MR, the Guangzhou MR bordering

Vietnam and the South China Sea, where he ultimately became the MR’s Political Commissar at a relatively

young age after. Zhang also participated in China’s border conflict with Vietnam and supported disaster

relief efforts following a January 2008 snowstorm in southern China.

Logistics Support Department Director Zhao Keshi, previously as head of the former General Logistics

Department between 2012 and 2015, was responsible for overseeing PLA support functions including

supply, transportation, military finances, facilities management, and infrastructure construction. Before his

appointment to the CMC in 2012, Zhao spent his entire career in Nanjing MR—responsible for a Taiwan

contingency—and most recently served as its commander. He was also reportedly an exercise commander in

the large military drills that induced the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhao has written on defense mobilization

and reserve unit construction.

Equipment Development Department Director Zhang Youxia’s previous position as Director of the

former General Armaments Department gave him oversight of the military’s weapons development and

space programs. He gained rare experience as a combat commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam

in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the Shenyang MR, which shares a border with North Korea and

Russia. Zhang is one of China’s military “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China,



54

PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli has served as head of the PLAN since 2006 and on the CMC since

2007. Under Wu, the PLAN has increased its out-of-area exercises, multinational patrols, and foreign

naval exchanges, and initiated its first deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The first career PLAN officer to

serve as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Wu also held leadership positions in two of the PLAN’s

three fleets, spending most of his career in the East Sea Fleet.

PLA Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian previously oversaw the PLA’s foreign military engagement

activities as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Ma led the PLA side in key military-to-military exchanges

with the United States, including the Defense Consultative Talks and the Strategic Security Dialogue

component of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Ma has significant experience as a pilot

and as a staff officer in multiple military regions.

PLA Rocket Force Commander Wei Fenghe oversees the former PLASAF. Wei served in multiple

missile bases across different military regions and held top posts in the PLASAF headquarters before

being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of the General Staff—the first officer from the PLASAF to

do so. In that role, Wei met frequently with foreign delegations, including senior U.S. officials, affording

him greater international exposure than previous PLASAF commanders.



55



56

3 FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS

AND TRENDS



57

China is investing in military programs and

weapons designed to improve extended-range

power projection, anti-access/area denial

(A2/AD), and operations in emerging

domains such as cyberspace, space, and the

electromagnetic spectrum. Current trends in

China’s weapons production not only enhance

China’s capabilities to cope with contingencies

along its periphery, such as a Taiwan crisis,

but will also enable the PLA to conduct a

range of military operations in Asia beyond

China’s traditional territorial claims. Key

systems that either have been deployed or are

in development include ballistic missiles

(including anti-ship variants), anti-ship and

land-attack cruise missiles, nuclear submarines,

modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier.

The need to secure trade routes, particularly

oil supplies from the Middle East, has

prompted China’s Navy to conduct

counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Disputes with Japan over maritime claims in

the East China Sea and with several Southeast

Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly

and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea

have led to heightened tensions in these areas.

Instability on the Korean Peninsula could also

produce a regional crisis involving the PLA.

The desire to protect energy investments in

Central Asia, along with potential security

implications from cross-border support to

ethnic separatists, could also provide an

incentive for military investment or

intervention in this region if instability

surfaces.

China’s leaders have also charged the PLA

with developing capabilities for missions such

as UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO),

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

(HA/DR), and counterterrorism operations.

These capabilities will increase China’s

options for military influence to press its

diplomatic agenda, advance regional and

international interests, and resolve disputes in

its favor.

For example, China’s ANWEI-class military

hospital ship, the PEACE ARK, has deployed

throughout East Asia and to the Caribbean.

China conducts joint military exercises with

SCO members, the most prominent being the

PEACE MISSION series, with China and

Russia as the main participants. China also

continues its Gulf of Aden counterpiracy

deployment that began in December 2008.

PLA CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT

Nuclear Weapons. China’s nuclear

weapons policy prioritizes maintaining a

nuclear force able to survive an attack and to

respond with sufficient strength to inflict

unacceptable damage on an enemy. China

insists the new generation of mobile missiles,

with warheads consisting of multiple

independently targeted reentry vehicles

(MIRVs) and penetration aids, are intended to

ensure the viability of China’s strategic

deterrent in the face of continued advances in

U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic

ISR, precision strike, and missile defense

capabilities. Similarly, India’s nuclear force is



58

an additional driver behind China’s nuclear

force modernization. The PLA has deployed

new command, control, and communications

capabilities to its nuclear forces to improve

control of multiple units in the field. Through

the use of improved communications links,

ICBM units now have better access to

battlefield information and uninterrupted

communications connecting all command

echelons. Unit commanders are able to issue

orders to multiple subordinates at once,

instead of serially, via voice commands.

China has long maintained a “no first use”

(NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear

forces only in response to a nuclear strike

against China. China’s NFU pledge consists of

two stated commitments: China will never use

nuclear weapons first and China will never use

or threaten to use nuclear weapons against

any non-nuclear-weapon state or in nuclear-

weapon-free zones. There is some ambiguity

over the conditions under which China’s

NFU policy would apply. Some PLA officers

have written publicly of the need to spell out

conditions under which China might need to

use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an

enemy’s conventional attack threatened the

survival of China’s nuclear force or of the

regime itself. However, there has been no

indication that national leaders are willing to

attach such nuances and caveats to China’s

NFU doctrine.

China will probably continue to invest

considerable resources to maintain a limited,

but survivable, nuclear force to ensure that

the PLA can deliver a damaging responsive

nuclear strike. Recent press accounts suggest

China may be enhancing peacetime readiness

levels for these nuclear forces to ensure

responsiveness.

Land-Based Platforms: China’s nuclear arsenal

currently consists of approximately 75-100

ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2

(DF-5A) and Mod 3(DF-5B); the solid-fueled,

road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and Mod 2 (DF-

31 and DF-31A); and the more-limited-range

CSS-3 (DF-4). This force is complemented by

road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 Mod 6 (DF-

21) MRBM for regional deterrence missions.

Sea-based Platforms: China continues to produce

the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile

submarine (SSBN), with four commissioned

and another under construction. The JIN will

eventually carry the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) SLBM

with an estimated range of 7,200 km.

Together these will give the PLAN its first

credible long-range sea-based nuclear

capability. JIN SSBNs based at Hainan Island

in the South China Sea would then be able to

conduct nuclear deterrence patrols.

Future Efforts: China is working on a range of

technologies to attempt to counter U.S. and

other countries’ ballistic missile defense

systems, including maneuverable reentry

vehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff,

jamming, and thermal shielding. China has

acknowledged that it tested launched a

hypersonic glide vehicle in 2014. China’s

official media also cited numerous PLASAF



59

training exercises featuring maneuver,

camouflage, and launch operations under

simulated combat conditions, which are

intended to increase survivability. Together

with the increased mobility and survivability

of the new generation of missiles, these

technologies and training enhancements

strengthen China’s nuclear force and bolster

its strategic strike capabilities. Further

increases in the number of mobile ICBMs and

the beginning of SSBN deterrence patrols will

force the PLA to implement more

sophisticated C2 systems and processes that

safeguard the integrity of nuclear release

authority for a larger, more dispersed force.

Anti-Access/Area Denial. As China

modernizes the PLA and prepares for various

contingencies, it continues to develop

capabilities that serve to dissuade, deter, or if

ordered, defeat possible third-party

intervention during a large-scale, theater

campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. U.S.

defense planners often refer to these

collective PLA capabilities as A2/AD, though

China does not use this term. China’s military

modernization plan includes the development

of capabilities to attack, at long ranges,

adversary forces that might deploy or operate

within the western Pacific Ocean in the air,

maritime, space, electromagnetic, and

information domains. As the PLA Academy

of Military Science 2013 Science of Strategy states,

“we cannot count on luck and must keep a

foothold at the foundation of having ample

war preparations and powerful military

capabilities of our own, rather than hold the

assessment that the enemy will not come,

intervene, or strike.”

Information Operations. An essential element, if

not a fundamental prerequisite, of China’s

ability to counter third-party intervention is

the requirement to control the information

spectrum in all dimensions of the modern

battlespace. PLA authors often cite the need

in modern warfare to control information—

sometimes termed “information blockade” or

“information dominance”—and to seize the

initiative early in a campaign so as to set the

conditions needed to achieve air and sea

superiority. China is improving information

and operational security to protect its own

information structures, and is also developing

EW and other information warfare

capabilities, including denial and deception.

China’s “information blockade” likely

envisions the employment of military and

non-military instruments of state power

across the battlespace, including in cyberspace

and space. China’s investments in advanced

EW systems, counterspace weapons, and

cyberspace operations—combined with more

traditional forms of control such as

propaganda and denial through opacity—

reflect the emphasis and priority China’s

leaders place on building capability for

information advantage.

Cyber Operations. China believes its cyberspace

capabilities and personnel lag behind the rest

of the world. To deal with these perceived

deficiencies, China is improving training and



60

domestic innovation to achieve its cyberspace

capability development goals. PLA researchers

advocate seizing “cyberspace superiority” by

deterring or to stopping an adversary by

developing and employing offensive

cyberspace capabilities. Chinese offensive

cyberspace operations could support A2/AD

by targeting critical nodes to disrupt adversary

networks throughout the region.

Long-Range Precision Strike. The development of

China’s conventionally armed missile

capability has been extraordinarily rapid. As

recently as 10 years ago, several hundred

short-range ballistic missiles could reach

targets in Taiwan, but China had only a

rudimentary capability to strike many other

locations within or beyond the first island

chain, such as U.S. bases in Okinawa or

Guam. Today, however, China is fielding an

array of conventionally armed short-range

ballistic missiles (SRBMs), as well as ground-

and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles

(LACMs), special operations forces (SOF),

and cyber warfare capabilities to hold targets

at risk throughout the region. U.S. bases in

Japan are in range of a growing number of

Chinese MRBMs as well as a variety of

LACMs. Guam could also possibly be

targeted by air-launched LACMs, as

demonstrated by H-6K bomber flights into

the Western Pacific for the first time in 2015.

At the September 2015 parade, China

unveiled the DF-26. This system is capable of

conducting intermediate precision strikes

against ground targets, which could include

U.S. bases on Guam.

China’s LACM and ballistic missiles have also

become far more accurate and are now more

capable against adversary air bases, logistic

facilities, communications, and other ground-

based infrastructure. PLA analysts have

concluded that logistics and power projection

are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare,

given the requirements for precision in

coordinating transportation, communications,

and logistics networks.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). China has made

efforts to go beyond defense from aircraft and

cruise missiles to gain a BMD capability in

order to provide further protection of China’s

mainland and strategic assets. China’s existing

long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM)

inventory offers limited capability against

ballistic missiles. New indigenous radars, the

JL-1A and JY-27A, are designed to address

the ballistic missile threat, with the JL-1A

advertised as capable of the precision tracking

of multiple ballistic missiles. China’s SA-20

PMU2 SAMs, one of the most advanced SAM

systems Russia offers for export, has the

advertised capability to engage ballistic

missiles with ranges of 1,000 km and speeds

of 2,800 meters per second. China’s domestic

CSA-9 long-range SAM system is expected to

have a limited capability to provide point

defense against tactical ballistic missiles with

ranges up to 500 km. China is proceeding

with the research and development of a

missile defense umbrella consisting of kinetic-



61

energy intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes

(greater than 80 km), as well as intercepts of

ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles

within the upper atmosphere. In January 2010,

and again in January 2013, China successfully

intercepted a ballistic missile at mid-course,

using a ground-based missile. The announced

acquisition by China of the S-400 SAM system

from Russia could provide China with a

counter-MRBM capability depending on

which interceptor variants are delivered to

China.

Surface and Undersea Operations. China continues

to build a variety of offensive and defensive

capabilities that could permit the PLA to

achieve sea control within what the PLAN

calls the “near seas,” as well as to project

limited combat power into the “far seas.” Of

these, China’s coastal defense cruise missiles

(CDCM), air- / surface- / sub-surface-

launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs),

submarine-launched torpedoes, and naval

mines provide the PLAN with an ability to

counter an adversary fleet’s intervention with

multi-axis, high-intensity attacks that increase

in lethality as adversary naval combatants

approach China’s coast. Additionally, China

has fielded CSS-5 anti-ship ballistic missiles

(ASBMs) specifically designed to hold

adversary aircraft carriers at risk 1,500 km off

China’s coast. China is making gradual

progress in the undersea domain as well, but

continues to lack either a robust coastal or

deep-water anti-submarine warfare capability.

It is also unclear whether China has the

capability to collect accurate targeting

information and to pass it to launch platforms

in time for successful strikes in sea areas

beyond the first island chain.

Space and Counterspace. The PLA continues to

strengthen its military space capabilities,

which include advancements with the Beidou

navigation satellite system, and its space

surveillance capabilities that can monitor

objects across the globe and in space. China is

seeking to utilize space systems to establish a

real-time and accurate surveillance,

reconnaissance and warning system, and to

enhance C2 in joint operations. Publicly,

however, China stands against the

militarization of space. In 2009, the then-

commander of the PLAAF Xu Qiliang

retracted his earlier assertion that the

militarization of space was a “historic

inevitability” after former President Hu Jintao

swiftly contradicted him.

PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-

based systems—and to deny them to

adversaries—as central to enabling modern

informationized warfare. Although PLA

doctrine does not appear to address space

operations as a unique operational “campaign,”

space operations will probably form an

integral component of other PLA campaigns

and would serve a key role in enabling actions

that counter third-party intervention.

Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Within

300 nm (556 km) of its coast, China has a

credible IADS that relies on robust early



62

warning, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM

systems as well as point defense primarily

designed to counter adversary long-range

airborne strike platforms. China continues to

develop and to market a wide array of IADSs

designed to counter U.S. technology, tailoring

the threats to attempts to deny “high-tech”

operations across a wide range of capabilities.

In addition to improving China’s ability to

counter traditional IADS targets such as

fixed-wing aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, and

cruise missiles, China’s airshow displays claim

that new Chinese radar developments can

detect stealth aircraft. China’s trade materials

also emphasize the systems’ ability to counter

long-range targets, such as long-range

airborne strike and combat support aircraft.

Long-range air surveillance radars and

airborne early-warning aircraft, such as

China’s indigenous KJ-2000 and KJ-500, are

said to extend China’s detection range well

beyond its borders.

China has increasing numbers of advanced

long-range SAMs, including its indigenous

CSA-9 (HQ-9), Russian SA-10 (S-300PMU),

and SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2), all of which

have the advertised capability to protect

against both aircraft and low-flying cruise

missiles. In fall 2014, China signed a contract

for delivery of Russia’s extremely long-range

SA-X-21b (S-400) SAM system (400 km), and

is also expected to continue research and

development to extend the range of the

domestic CSA-9 SAM to beyond 200 km.

Air Operations. The planned development of

China’s fifth-generation fighter force will

bolster China’s air-to-air capability. These

fighters feature high-maneuverability, low

observability, and an internal weapons bay,

based on the J-20 or FC-31/J-31 prototypes.

Other key features of these aircraft are

modern avionics and sensors that offer more

timely situational awareness for operations in

network-centric combat environments, radars

with advanced tracking and targeting

capabilities, protection against enemy

electronic countermeasures, and integrated

EW systems. These fifth-generation aircraft,

which could enter service as early as 2018, will

significantly improve China’s existing fleet of

fourth-generation aircraft (Russian-built Su-

27/Su-30 and J-11A, and indigenous J-10 and

J-11B fighters) to support regional air

superiority and strike operations. China’s

continuing upgrades to its bomber fleet will

give them the capability to carry new, longer-

range cruise missiles. In conjunction with

procuring more capable military equipment,

China is increasing the complexity and realism

of air and air-defense training.

Similarly, the acquisition and development of

longer-range UAVs will increase China’s

ability to conduct long-range ISR and strike

operations. China is advancing its

development and employment of UAVs. In

2015, Chinese media reported the

development of the Shendiao (Sacred Eagle or

Divine Eagle) as the PLA’s newest high-

altitude, long-endurance UAV for a variety of

missions such as early warning, targeting, EW,

and satellite communications. Last year, the

PLAAF also reported on its use of a UAV to

assist in HA/DR in the aftermath of an



63

earthquake in China’s west—the first public

acknowledgment of PLAAF UAV operations.

Photos of the UAV showed it was the Yilong

(also known as the Wing Loong or

Pterodactyl).

Building an Informationized Military. The PLA conducts military exercises

simulating operations in complex

electromagnetic environments, and likely

views conventional and cyber operations as

means of achieving information dominance.

The PLA would likely use EW, cyberspace

operations (CO), and deception to augment

counterspace and other kinetic operations

during a wartime scenario to deny an

adversary’s attainment and use of information.

Chinese military writings describe

informationized warfare as an asymmetric way

to weaken an adversary’s ability to acquire,

transmit, process, and use information during

war and to force an adversary to capitulate

before the onset of conflict. “Simultaneous

and parallel” operations would involve strikes

against U.S. warships, aircraft, and associated

supply craft and the use of information

attacks to affect tactical and operational

communications and computer networks.

These operations could have a significant

effect on an adversary’s navigational and

targeting radars.

Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

Modernization. China continues to prioritize

C4I modernization as a response to trends in

modern warfare that emphasize the

importance of rapid information sharing,

processing, and decision-making. The PLA

seeks to modernize itself both technologically

and organizationally to command complex,

joint operations in near and distant battlefields

with increasingly sophisticated weapons.

The PLA views technological improvements

to C4I systems as essential to improve the

speed and effectiveness of decision-making

while providing secure and reliable

communications to fixed and mobile

command posts. The PLA is fielding

advanced automated command systems like

the Integrated Command Platform (ICP) to

units at lower echelons across the force. The

adoption of the ICP enables multi-service

communications necessary for joint

operations. These C4I advancements are

expected to shorten the command process.

The new technologies introduced into the

PLA enable information-sharing—intelligence,

battlefield information, logistical information,

and weather reports—on robust and

redundant communications networks, to

improve commanders’ situational awareness.

In particular, the transmission of ISR data in

near real-time to commanders in the field

could facilitate the commanders’ decision-

making processes and make operations more

efficient.

These technical improvements have greatly

enhanced the PLA’s flexibility and

responsiveness. “Informationized” operations

no longer require in-person meetings for

command decision-making or labor-intensive

processes for execution. Commanders can

issue orders to multiple units at the same time

while on the move, and units can rapidly

adjust their actions through the use of digital



64

databases and command automation tools.

The PLA also seeks to improve its C4I

capabilities by reforming its joint command

institutions at the national and regional levels.

Cyberwarfare. Cyberwarfare capabilities

could serve PLA operations in three key areas.

First and foremost, they allow the PLA to

collect data for intelligence and potential

offensive cyberoperations (OCO) purposes.

Second, they can be employed to constrain an

adversary’s actions or to slow response time

by targeting network-based logistics,

communications, and commercial activities.

Third, they can serve as a force-multiplier

when coupled with kinetic attacks during

times of crisis or conflict.

The development of cyber capabilities for

warfare is consistent with authoritative PLA

military writings, which identify information

operations (IO) as integral to achieving

information superiority and as an effective

means for countering a stronger foe. China’s

most recent Defense White Paper (DWP) for

the first time noted cyberspace as a new

domain of national security and area of

strategic competition. The DWP also declared

China’s intent to expedite the development of

a cyber force in response to a perceived

increase in cyber threats.

PLA military writings detail the effectiveness

of IO and OCO in conflicts and advocate

targeting an adversary’s C2 and logistics

networks to affect its ability to operate during

the early stages of conflict. They portray an

enemy’s C2 system as “the heart of

information collection, control, and

application on the battlefield. It is also the

nerve center of the entire battlefield.”

In the PLA, IO command organizations exist

at the strategic, campaign, and tactical levels,

according to China’s Academy of Military

Sciences. The campaign-level IO department

contains several groups dedicated to

coordinating IO. The structural reforms

announced in 2015, however, may change

how the PLA organizes and commands IO.

Cyber Activities Directed Against the

Department of Defense. In 2015,

numerous computer systems around the

world, including those owned by the U.S.

Government, continued to be targeted for

intrusions, some of which appear to be

attributable directly to the China’s

Government and military. These and past

intrusions were focused on accessing

networks and exfiltrating information. China

is using its cyber capabilities to support

intelligence collection against the U.S.

diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial

base sectors that support U.S. national

defense programs. The information targeted

could potentially be used to benefit China’s

defense industry, high-technology industries,

and provide the CCP insights into U.S.

leadership perspectives on key China issues.

Additionally, targeted information could

inform Chinese military planners’ work to

build a picture of U.S. defense networks,

logistics, and related military capabilities that

could be exploited during a crisis. The

accesses and skills required for these

intrusions are similar to those necessary to

conduct cyberattacks.



65

Role of Electronic Warfare in a Future Conflict

The PLA identifies electronic warfare (EW) as a way to reduce or eliminate U.S. technological

advantages, and considers it an integral component of warfare. The PLA’s EW doctrine

emphasizes using electromagnetic spectrum weapons to suppress or to deceive enemy

electronic equipment. The PLA’s strategy focuses on radio, radar, optical, infrared, and

microwave frequencies, in addition to adversarial computer and information systems.

China’s strategy stresses that EW is a vital fourth dimension to combat, and should be

considered equal to traditional ground, sea, and air forces. Effective EW is seen as a decisive

aid during military operations and consequently the key to determining the outcome of war.

The PLA sees EW as an important force multiplier, and would likely employ it in support of all

combat arms and services during a conflict.

The PLA’s EW units have conducted jamming and anti-jamming operations, testing the

military’s understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and performance. This helped improve

the military’s confidence in conducting force-on-force, real-equipment confrontation

operations in simulated EW environments. Advances in research and deployment of EW

weapons are being tested in these exercises and have proven effective. These EW weapons

include jamming equipment against multiple communication and radar systems and GPS

satellite systems. EW systems are also being deployed with other sea- and air-based platforms

intended for both offensive and defensive operations.



66

PLA Power Projection Expanding Outward

PLA modernization and development trends over the last decade reflect an expansion in the PLA’s

capabilities to address regional and global security objectives. PLA ground, air, naval, and missile forces

are increasingly able to project power during peacetime and to contest U.S. military superiority in the

event of a regional conflict. The PLA’s growing ability to project power also augments China’s globally-

oriented objectives to be viewed as a stakeholder in ensuring stability and a regional power.

The PLA will maintain a primary emphasis on developing capabilities for a potential Taiwan

contingency but is steadily expanding the force’s operational flexibility to be able to meet regionally and

globally focused missions. The PLA’s missile and air forces remain a critical component in extending

China’s defensive perimeter. This frees up and enables other military assets to focus on conducting

offensive missions, such as blockades, sovereignty enforcement, and/or A2/AD, farther from China’s

shores. China also is focused on enhancing the PLA’s ISR capabilities, which will enable improved

targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate region will facilitate non-war uses of

military force and provide China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific

and Indian Ocean regions. Improving “blue water” capabilities will extend China’s maritime security

buffer to protect China’s near and far seas interests more effectively.

China’s modern naval platforms include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will

strengthen the force’s core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond

the reaches of land-based defenses. Moreover, China’s current aircraft carrier and planned follow-on

carriers will extend air defense umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task

group operations in “far seas.” Sea-based land attack probably is an emerging requirement for the

PLAN. Chinese military experts argue that in order to pursue a defensive strategy in far seas, the Navy

must improve its ability to control land from the sea through long-range LACM development.



67

Systems and Capabilities Enabling

Power Projection. China has prioritized

land-based ballistic and cruise missile

programs to extend its strike warfare

capabilities further from its borders. It is

developing and testing several new classes and

variants of offensive missiles, forming

additional missile units, upgrading older

missile systems, and developing methods to

counter ballistic missile defenses. In addition

to the SRBMs, the PLA Rocket Force—

formerly the PLASAF—has deployed to

locations across from Taiwan, the force is also

fielding cruise missiles, including the ground-

launched CJ-10 LACM. China continues to

field an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-

5 (DF-21) MRBM that it began deploying in

2010. The CSS-5 Mod 5 has a range of 1,500

km and is armed with a MaRV. China also

deploys the land-attack CSS-5 Mod 4, holding

at risk targets on Okinawa and the main

Japanese islands, and the DF-26 will be

capable of conducting precision strikes against

ground targets, potentially placing U.S. forces

on Guam at risk.

The PLAN continues to develop and to field

ship-, submarine-, and aircraft-deployed

ASCMs of both Russian and Chinese

manufacture to extend its strike range.

Additionally, China may develop the capability

to arm the new LUYANG III-class DDG

with LACMs, giving the PLAN its first land-

attack capability. Furthermore, the continued

deployments of the ASCM-equipped

submarines in support of counterpiracy

patrols underscore China’s interest in

protecting SLOCs beyond the South China

Sea. These submarine deployments support an

apparent Chinese requirement to project

power into the Indian Ocean.

The PLAAF is continuing to improve its

capability to conduct offensive and defensive

offshore operations such as strike; air and

missile defense; strategic mobility; and early

warning and reconnaissance missions. In 2015,

a PLA report identified a military requirement

to extend surveillance into the Western Pacific

Ocean. In addition to emphasizing the

requirement for a new type of strategic

bomber and ground-based interceptor, the

report identified several additional capabilities:

a high-speed land-attack cruise missile, a large

transport plane, an airship that moves in the

upper atmosphere, a next-generation fighter,

an unmanned attack aircraft, air force satellites,

and precision-guided bombs. China continues

to develop stealth aircraft technology. The

PLAAF already employs the H-6K bomber

with the capability to carry six LACMs, a

platform that will give the PLA a standoff

offensive air capability with precision-guided

munitions. The acquisition of three IL-78

MIDAS aerial refueling tankers will increase

the PLAAF’s ability to extend the range of

fighter aircraft operating over the East China

Sea and South China Sea. In an effort to

address its strategic airlift deficiency, China is

also testing a new heavy lift transport aircraft,

identified as the Y-20. This aircraft began

flight testing in January 2013. In addition to



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being China’s first indigenous heavy lift jet

transport, the Y-20 could also acquire

additional missions such as an airborne

warning and control system (AWACS) and as

an aerial refueling tanker. PLAAF and PLAN

Aviation continue to make incremental

improvements in their air power projection

capabilities. Last year, PLAAF aircraft trained

in the “far seas” closer to the western Pacific

Ocean. Also in 2015, PLAN and PLAAF

aircraft participated in a number of inter-

service exercises and real-world operations

that suggest that China is seeking to integrate

future air operations. Integrating air power

could allow China to enhance flexibility of

strike and support aircraft in East China Sea,

South China Sea, or Taiwan contingencies.

Operating its first carrier LIAONING has

provided the PLAN valuable lessons, serving

in what officials describe as an “experimental”

capacity, that the PLA states will be applied to

a future multi-carrier force. In 2015, China

began construction of its first domestically

produced aircraft carrier. China’s next

generation of carriers will probably be capable

of improved endurance and of launching

more varied types of aircraft, including EW,

early warning, and anti-surface warfare (ASW),

thus increasing the potential striking power of

a PLAN “carrier battle group” in safeguarding

China’s interests in areas beyond its

immediate periphery. The carriers would most

likely perform such missions as patrolling

economically important sea lanes, conducting

naval diplomacy, regional deterrence, and

HA/DR.

Capabilities to Realize a “Blue Water”

Navy. The PLAN remains at the forefront

of the military’s efforts to extend its

operational reach beyond East Asia and into

what China calls the “far seas.” Missions in

these areas include protecting important sea

lanes from terrorism, piracy, and foreign

interdiction; providing HA/DR; conducting

naval diplomacy and regional deterrence; and

training to prevent a third party, such as the

United States, from interfering with

operations off China’s coast in a Taiwan

contingency or conflict in the East or South

China Sea. The PLAN’s ability to perform

these missions is modest but growing as it

gains more experience operating in distant

waters and acquires larger and more advanced

platforms.

The PLAN’s goal over the coming decades is

to become a stronger regional force able to

project power across the greater Asia-Pacific

region for high-intensity operations over a

period of several months. However, logistics

and intelligence support remain key obstacles,

particularly in the Indian Ocean and in other

areas outside the greater Asia-Pacific region.

As a result, China desires expansion of its

access to logistics in the Indian Ocean and

will probably establish several access points in

this area in the next decade.



69

In the last several years, the PLAN’s “far seas”

experience has been derived primarily from its

ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of

Aden and long-distance task group

deployments beyond the first island chain in

the western Pacific Ocean. China continues to

sustain a three-ship presence in the Gulf of

Aden to protect Chinese merchant shipping

from maritime piracy. This operation is

China’s first enduring naval operation beyond

the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2015, the PLAN continued to conduct “far

seas” deployments. The PLAN continued

submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean,

demonstrating its increasing familiarity with

operating in that region. Following a China-

Russia naval exercise in 2015, three PLAN

ships transited the Bering Sea and U.S.

territorial waters near Alaska’s Aleutian

Islands. In 2015, a three-ship counterpiracy

task group followed their three month

deployment to the Indian Ocean with a

round-the-world cruise visiting numerous

ports in Europe, Central America, and the

United States.

The PLAN’s force structure continues to

evolve, incorporating more platforms with the

versatility for both offshore and long-distance

power projection. China is engaged in series

production of the LUYANG III-class DDG,

the JIANGKAI II-class FFG, and the

JIANGDAO-class FFL. China also began

construction of the much larger Type 055 CG

in early 2015, with expected commissioning in

2017 or 2018.

Maritime Law Enforcement. China

prefers to use its government-controlled,

civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in

maritime disputes, and uses the PLAN in an

overwatch capacity in case of escalation. The

enlargement and modernization of the China

Coast Guard (CCG) forces will improve

China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims.

The CCG is increasing its total force level at a

rapid pace. Over the last five years, China has

added more than 100 ocean-going patrol ships

to the CCG to increase its capacity to conduct

extended offshore operations and to replace

old units. In the next decade, a new force of

civilian law enforcement ships will afford

China the capability to patrol more robustly

its claims in the East China Sea and the South

China Sea. Overall, the CCG’s total force level

is expected to increase by 25 percent. Some of

these ships will have the capability to embark

helicopters, a capability that only a few CCG

ships currently have.

In 2013, China consolidated four of its

maritime law enforcement agencies into the

CCG and subordinated its operations to the

Ministry of Public Security. The CCG is

responsible for a wide range of missions,

including enforcing China’s sovereignty claims,

anti-smuggling, protecting fisheries resources,

and general law enforcement.

Military Operations Other Than War.

The PLA continues to prepare for military

operations other than war (MOOTW)

including emergency response,

counterterrorism, international rescue,



70

HA/DR, PKO, and various other security

tasks. China’s 2015 DWP noted the PLA will

continue to incorporate MOOTW into its

readiness preparations and vision of

modernization. In practice, the military shares

many of these missions with the People’s

Armed Police (PAP), a domestically-oriented

paramilitary force.

In 2015, the PLA sent more than 1,000

personnel to contribute to HA/DR in Nepal

following a powerful earthquake there in April.

The PLA characterized the operation as

China’s largest-ever deployment of armed

forces personnel abroad for humanitarian aid.

Last year, the PLA also supported 10 UN

PKO and continued to participate in several

bilateral and multilateral military exercises

focused on MOOTW.



71

China’s Internal Security Forces

China’s national internal security forces consist primarily of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the

Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the PLA. China’s

leaders rely on these forces to address challenges ranging from protests over political, social,

environmental, or economic problems to suspected terrorist attacks. In recent years, China has

focused increasingly on protests perceived as linked to foreign influences and, separately, the East

Turkestan Independence Movement, which China’s leaders believe is a terrorist group connected to

ethnic Uighur nationalists in the Xinjiang autonomous region. China blames Uighur “separatists”

for terrorist attacks in China, which have increased markedly since early 2014, and has imposed

strict security in Xinjiang to curb potential attacks.

PLA. As the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PLA is the ultimate guarantor

of the CCP’s authority, giving it a role in domestic security in addition to its national defense

mission. For example, the PLA may provide transportation, logistics, and intelligence to assist local

public security forces with internal security and is authorized under the 1997 National Defense Law

to “assist in maintaining public order” directly when CCP leaders consider it necessary.

PAP. The PAP is a paramilitary component of China’s armed forces whose primary mission is

internal security and domestic stability. It falls under the dual authority of the CMC and the State

Council. Although the PAP has units for a variety of functions, such as border security and

firefighting, the most numerous are for internal security. PAP units are organized into “contingents”

in each province, autonomous region, and centrally administered city, as well as a smaller number of

“mobile divisions” available to deploy anywhere in the country in response to escalating internal

crises.

MPS. The MPS leads China’s national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order.

The key mission of the MPS is domestic law enforcement and the “maintenance of social security

and order” with duties including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism. There are about 1.9 million MPS

police officers spread throughout local public security bureaus across the country.

MSS. The MSS is China’s main civilian secret intelligence/counterintelligence service. The missions

of the MSS are: to protect China’s national security; to secure political and social stability; to

implement the recently updated State Security Law and related laws and regulations; to protect state

secrets; to conduct counterintelligence; and to investigate organizations or people inside China who

carry out or direct, support, or aid other people in harming China’s national security.



72

Precision Strike

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) (less than 1,000 km). The PLA Rocket Force, formerly called

the PLASAF, had approximately 1,200 SRBMs at the end of 2015. The force fields advanced variants with

improved ranges and accuracy in addition to more sophisticated payloads, while gradually replacing earlier

generations that do not possess true precision strike capability.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is fielding conventional

MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships

operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain.

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) (3,000-5,500 km). The PLA is developing a nuclear

and conventional road-mobile IRBM, which increases its capability for near-precision strike out to the

“second island chain.” The PLAN also is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with

sky wave and surface wave over the horizon (OTH) radars, which can be used in conjunction with

reconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from China , (hereby supporting long-range

precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs.

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). The PLA continues to field air- and ground-launched LACMs

for standoff precision strikes. Air-launched cruise missiles include the YJ-63, KD-88, and the CJ-20 (the

air-launched version of the CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile still fielded in the PLASAF). China

recently adapted the KD-88 LACM, with an advertised range of more than 100 km, and may be testing a

longer-range version. China also is developing the CM-802AKG LACM, an export system that can strike

both land and ship targets from fighters or bombers.

Ground Attack Munitions. The PLAAF has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles (ASM) as

well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and

laser-guided bombs. China is developing smaller-sized ASMs such as the AR-1, HJ-10 anti-tank, Blue

Arrow 7 laser-guided, and KD-2 missiles in conjunction with its increasing development of UAVs.

Additionally, China is also adapting to UAVs GPS-guided munitions such as the FT-5 and LS-6 that are

similar to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). The PLAN is deploying a wide range of advanced ASCMs. The

most capable include the domestically produced ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM and the Russian SS-N-

22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquired from

Russia. China’s submarine force is also increasing its ASCM capability, with the long-range YJ-18 ASCM

replacing the older YJ-82 on the SONG, YUAN, and SHANG classes. The YJ-18 is similar to the Russian

SS-N-27B/SIZZLER ASCM, which is capable of supersonic terminal sprint and is fielded on eight of

China’s 12 Russian-built KILO SS. In addition, PLAN Aviation employs the 200 km range YJ-83K ASCM

on its JH-7 and H-6G aircraft. China has also developed the YJ-12 ASCM for the PLAN. The new missile

provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to its long range and supersonic speeds. It is capable of

being launched from H-6 bombers.

Anti-Radiation Weapons. China is starting to integrate an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P

(AS-17), known as the YJ-91, into its fighter-bomber force. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY

UAVs and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s.

Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is developing and deploying artillery systems

with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait, including the PHL-03 300 mm

multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (greater than 100 km range) and the longer-range AR-3 dual-caliber MRL

(out to 220 km range).

PLA Underground Facilities

The PLA continues to maintain a robust and technologically advanced underground facility (UGF)

program protecting all aspects of its forces, including C2, logistics, and missile and naval forces. Given its

NFU nuclear policy, China has assumed it might have to absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuring

leadership and strategic assets survive.

China determined it needed to update and to expand its military UGF program in the mid- to late-1980s.

This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S. and coalition

air operations during the 1991 Gulf War and their use in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. The

following emphasis on “winning high tech battles” precipitated research into advanced tunneling and

construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable,

deeply buried facilities, resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort we have detected throughout

China for the last decade.



74

Denial and Deception

In historical and contemporary PLA texts, Chinese military theorists routinely emphasize the

importance of secrecy and deception for both the protection of personnel and infrastructure and

the concealment of sensitive military activities. In 2015, the Chinese press featured the PLA

using a variety of denial and deception (D&D) methods, including camouflage, decoys, and

satellite avoidance activities during training events to protect PRC forces from enemy

surveillance and targeting. Key D&D principles identified in official PLA monographs include:

> conforming to what the enemy expects and creating false images that correspond to the

target’s psychological tendencies and expectations;

> detailed pre-planning, centralized control, and operational integration to ensure strategic

coherence at the political, diplomatic, and economic levels;

> extensive, current, and sophisticated understanding of enemy psychology, predisposition,

capabilities (particularly C4ISR), intentions, and location; and

> operational flexibility, rapid response, and the ability and willingness to employ new D&D

techniques and devices.

Contemporary PLA writings also indicate the Chinese view D&D as a critical enabler of

psychological shock and force multiplication effects during a surprise attack, allowing the PLA to

offset the advantages of a technologically superior enemy and to reinforce its military superiority

against weaker opponents.



75

4 RESOURCES FOR FORCE

MODERNIZATION



77

China has the fiscal strength and political will

to sustain increased defense spending,

supporting the continued modernization of

the PLA into a more professional and capable

force. The PLA continues to decrease its

reliance on foreign weapon acquisitions as

China’s defense-industrial and research bases

mature. However, the PLA still looks to

foreign assistance to fill some critical, near-

term capability gaps. China continues to

leverage foreign investments, commercial

joint ventures, academic exchanges, the

experience of Chinese students and

researchers, and state-sponsored industrial

and technical espionage to increase the level

of technologies and expertise available to

support military research, development, and

acquisition. China’s long-term goal is to create

a wholly indigenous defense-industrial sector,

augmented by a strong commercial sector, to

meet the needs of PLA modernization and to

compete as a top-tier supplier in the global

arms market. China draws from diverse

sources to support PLA modernization,

including: domestic defense investments,

indigenous defense industrial development, a

growing research and development (R&D) /

science and technology (S&T) base, dual-use

technologies, and foreign technology

acquisition.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES TRENDS

In March 2015, China announced a 9.2

percent inflation-adjusted increase in its

annual military budget to $144 billion,

continuing more than two decades of annual

defense spending increases and sustaining its

position as the second-biggest military

spender in the world after the United States.

Analysis of data from 2006 through 2015

indicates China’s officially-disclosed military

budget grew at an average of 9.8 percent per

year in inflation-adjusted terms over that

period. China has the ability to support

defense spending growth at comparable levels

for the foreseeable future.

Estimating China’s Actual Military

Expenditures. Using 2015 prices and

exchange rates, the DoD estimates that

China’s total military-related spending for

2015 exceeded $180 billion U.S. dollars (USD).

However, it is difficult to estimate actual

military expenses due to China’s poor

accounting transparency and incomplete

transition to a market economy. China’s

published military budget omits several major

categories of expenditure, such as R&D and

the procurement of foreign weapons and

equipment.

FIVE YEAR DEFENSE BUDGET GROWTH TREND

IHS Jane’s Defense Budgets expects China’s defense budget to increase by an annual average

of 7 percent, growing to $260 billion by 2020. As of March 2015, the DoD Comptroller

forecasted the US defense budget will reach $598 billion in current dollars over the same

period.



78

2015 Defense Budget Comparison (Adjusted for Inflation)

Billion (USD)

China (Official Budget) $144

Russia (National Defense Budget) $54.4

Japan $40.8

India $39.0

Republic of Korea $33.43

Taiwan $9.9

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN

CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Defense Sector Reform. Having

undergone dramatic transformations in the

late-1990s and again in 2008, China’s defense-

industrial sector continues to adapt and to

reorganize in an effort to improve weapon

system research, development, and

production capabilities. To this end, China is

attempting to improve business practices,

streamline its bureaucracy, institute policies,

shorten developmental timelines, incorporate

and refine modern manufacturing processes,

improve quality control, and promote civil-

military collaboration in defense system

development from concept to delivery in

order to compensate for an estimated lag of

one-to-two generations behind its main

competitors in the global arms industry. China

places particular emphasis on civil-military

integration to maximize the utility of its

expanding science, technology, engineering,

and industrial bases. In line with that objective,

China established a new, high-level advisory

group in 2015, the Strategic Committee of

Science, Technology, and Industry

Development for National Defense. The

committee is tasked to help facilitate efficient

and effective civil-military integration and the

reform and expansion of the country’s

burgeoning defense industry.

China’s military service armament

departments and 10 state-owned defense-

industrial corporations, working through their

associated armament academies and research

academies respectively, are supported by a

wide range of research institutes (RI) and

academic institutions (AI), with an increasing

number of the latter capable of granting

advanced degrees. The RIs and AIs serve to

focus basic and applied research on cutting-

edge technologies conducive to military

applications and to groom the next generation

of scientists and engineers to lead China’s

defense initiatives. They also provide a



79

conduit to international resources and

exposure to foreign scientific research

networks, as Chinese affiliates regularly attend

conferences, present research findings, and

publish scholarly articles.

The National Natural Science Foundation of

China (NSFC) , the China Academy of

Science (CAS), and the Ministry of Science

and Technology (MOST) fund and promote

basic and applied research, scientific

innovation, and high-tech integration

throughout China’s scientific, engineering,

and civil-military industrial complex. The CAS,

working closely with the NSFC, is the highest

academic institution for comprehensive R&D

in the natural and applied sciences in China

and reports directly to the State Council in an

advisory capacity, with much of its work

ultimately funding disciplines and contributing

to products for military use. In 2015, the PLA

General Armaments Department (GAD) and

the State Administration for Science

Technology and Industry for National

Defense (SASTIND) worked together to

monitor and to guide the military and state

sides of China’s defense-industrial apparatus,

respectively. The GAD and subordinate

service armament departments connected to

China’s 10 state-owned defense industrial

corporations through a network of military

representative bureaus and offices charged

with supervising and monitoring quality

control and defense contract compliance. The

PLA’s new Equipment Development

Department, the GAD’s successor following

structural changes, appears intended to

assume this role.

China’s dual-use areas of focus in the R&D

realm is indicative of the path it is taking

include applied physics, material science, high-

performance computing, innovative

electronics/software development, electro-

optics, aerospace technology,

automation/robotics, high-energy physics,

and nanoscience, just to name a few. For

example, China’s new super-large JF12

hypersonic wind tunnel, reportedly the largest

in the world, is capable of replicating

aerodynamic conditions from Mach 5 to

Mach 9, and is instrumental for China to meet

its hypersonic aspirations. This facility and

other similar CAS-sponsored facilities,

support research and development efforts in

both China’s civilian and military aerospace

sectors.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT

MODERNIZATION TRENDS

China’s defense industry favors missile and

space systems, followed by maritime assets

and aircraft, and lastly, ground-forces materiel.

China is developing and producing

increasingly advanced systems, augmented

through selected investments into foreign

designs and reverse engineering. However,

China’s defense industries are increasing the

quality of output in all of these areas as well as

increasing overall production capacity. Over

the past decade, China has made dramatic

improvements in all defense industrial



80

production sectors and is comparable to other

major weapon-system producers like Russia

and the European Union in some areas.

Missile and Space Industry. China’s

production of a range of ballistic, cruise, air-

to-air, and surface-to-air missiles for the PLA

and for export has probably been enhanced

by upgrades to primary assembly and rocket

motor production facilities over the past few

years. China’s space-launch vehicle (SLV)

industry is expanding to support commercial

and rapid satellite launch services and the

manned space program. The majority of

China’s missile programs, including its ballistic

and cruise missile systems, are comparable to

other international top-tier producers,

although its surface-to-air missile (SAM)

systems lag behind global leaders.

Naval/Shipbuilding Industry. Shipyard

expansion and modernization has increased

China’s shipbuilding capacity and capability

for all types of military projects, including

submarines, surface combatants, naval

aviation, and sealift assets. China’s two largest

state-owned shipbuilders—the China State

Shipbuilding Corporation and the China

Shipbuilding Industry Corporation—

collaborate in shared ship designs and

construction information to increase

shipbuilding efficiency. China continues to

invest in foreign suppliers for some

propulsion units, but is becoming increasingly

self-sufficient. China is the top ship-producing

nation in the world and is pursuing a domestic

aircraft carrier program. China is outfitting its

latest classes of surface combatants with

increasingly sophisticated anti-surface, anti-air,

and anti-subsurface defensive and offensive

capabilities. China is improving in most areas

of the maritime sector. For instance, it is using

more sophisticated ship design and

construction program management

techniques and software.

Armaments Industry. China’s production

capacity continues to advance in almost every

area of PLA Army systems, including new

tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense

artillery systems, and artillery pieces. China is

capable of producing ground weapon systems

at or near world-class standards; however,

quality deficiencies persist with some export

equipment.

Aviation Industry. China’s commercial and

military aviation industries have advanced to

produce a developmental large transport

aircraft; modern fourth- to fifth-generation

fighters incorporating low-observable

technologies; modern reconnaissance and

attack UAVs; and attack helicopters. China’s

commercial aircraft industry has invested in

high-precision and technologically advanced

machine tooling and production processes,

avionics, and other components applicable to

the production of military aircraft. However,

China’s aircraft industry remains reliant on

foreign sourcing for dependable, proven,

high-performance aircraft engines. China’s

infrastructure and experience in the

production of large-body commercial and

military aircraft are improving as a result of



81

China’s ongoing C919 commercial airliner and

Y-20 large transport programs.

Foreign Technology Acquisition. China

continues to supplement indigenous military

modernization efforts through the acquisition

of targeted foreign technologies, including

engines for aircraft, tanks, and naval vessels;

solid state electronics and microprocessors,

guidance and control systems; enabling

technologies such as cutting-edge precision

machine tools; advanced diagnostic and

forensic equipment; and computer-assisted

design, manufacturing, and engineering. China

often pursues these foreign technologies for

the purpose of reverse engineering or to

supplement indigenous military

modernization efforts.

China seeks some high-tech components and

major end items from abroad that it has

difficulty producing domestically—particularly

from Russia and Ukraine. China has

purchased advanced Russian defense

equipment such as the SA-X-21b (S-400)

SAM system, and is pursuing the Su-35 fighter

aircraft as well as a new joint-design and

production program for a heavy-lift helicopter

and diesel-electric submarines based on the

Russian PETERSBURG/LADA-class. China

purchased ten used IL-76 transport aircraft

from Russia, three IL-78 aircraft refitted for

aerial refueling from Ukraine, an additional 52

Mi-171 multi-role medium-lift helicopters,

and at least 130 AL-31F turbo-fan jet engines.

China is partnering with Russia to purchase

electronic components as well as creating joint

production facilities located within Russia.

China also has signed significant purchase

contracts with Ukraine in recent years,

including contracts for assault hovercraft and

aircraft engines.

Science and Technology Development

Goals through 2020. China’s National

Medium- and Long-Term Program for

Science and Technology Development (2006-

2020), issued by the State Council in February

2006, seeks to transform China into an

“innovation-oriented society” by 2020. The

plan defines China’s S&T focus in terms of

basic research, leading-edge technologies, key

fields and priority subjects, and “major special

items,” all of which have military applications

China continues to implement the Ministry of

Science and Technology and the Ministry of

Finance the October 2014 joint statement

announcing reforms of China’s science

spending. The objective of the reforms is to

combat widely reported corruption and the

waste of government funds intended for S&T

research. The reforms would consolidate

research funding from a system in which 40

agencies administered more than 100 S&T

programs and funds into five new channels:

the NSFC (small-scale competitive grants);

national S&T major projects; key national

R&D programs; special funds to guide

technological innovation; and special projects

for developing human resources and

infrastructure.



82

Basic Research. As part of a broad effort

to expand basic research capabilities, China

identified five areas that have military

applications as major strategic needs or

science research plans requiring active

government involvement and funding:

material design and preparation;

manufacturing in extreme environmental

conditions; aeronautic and astronautic

mechanics; information technology

development; and nanotechnology research.

In nanotechnology, China has progressed

from virtually no research or funding in 2002

to being a close second to the United States in

total government investment.

Leading-edge Technologies. China is

focusing on the following technologies for

rapid development:

> Information Technology. Priorities include

intelligent perception technologies, ad hoc

networks, and virtual reality technologies.

> New Materials. Priorities include smart

materials and structures, high-temperature

superconducting technologies, and highly

efficient energy materials technologies.

> Advanced Manufacturing. Priorities include

extreme manufacturing technologies and

intelligent service advanced machine tools.

> Advanced Energy Technologies. Priorities

include hydrogen energy and fuel-cell

technologies, alternative fuels, and

advanced vehicle technologies.

> Marine Technologies. Priorities include three-

dimensional maritime environmental

monitoring technologies; fast, multi-

parameter ocean floor survey

technologies; and deep-sea operations

technologies.

> Laser and Aerospace Technologies. Priorities

include the development of chemical and

solid state laser technologies to field a

weapon-grade system ultimately for

ground-based and airborne platforms.

Key Fields and Priority Subjects. China

has identified certain industries and

technology groups with the potential to

provide technological breakthroughs, to

remove technical obstacles across industries,

and to improve international competitiveness.

Specifically, China’s defense industries are

pursuing advanced manufacturing,

information technology, and defense

technologies. Examples include radar;

counterspace capabilities; secure C4ISR; smart

materials; and low-observable technologies.

Major Special Items. China has also

identified 16 “major special items” for which

it plans to develop or expand indigenous

capabilities. These include core electronic

components, high-end universal chips and

operating system software, very large-scale

integrated circuit manufacturing, next-

generation broadband wireless mobile

communications, high-grade numerically

controlled machine tools, large aircraft, high-

resolution satellites, and lunar exploration.



83

Espionage Activities Supporting

China’s Military Modernization. China

uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign

military and dual-use technologies, including

cyber activity and exploitation of the access of

Chinese nationals—such as students or

researchers—acting as procurement agents or

intermediaries. China very likely uses its

intelligence services and employs other illicit

approaches that violate U.S. laws and export

controls to obtain key national security and

export-restricted technologies, controlled

equipment, and other materials unobtainable

through other means.

> In November 2014, U.S. authorities

arrested a named Chinese national

employed by a U.S. defense contractor en

route to China with sensitive proprietary

documents containing equations and test

results used in the development of

technologically advanced titanium for U.S.

military aircraft. Earlier, after the

individual returned from a trip to China in

August 2014, U.S. Customs and Border

Protection officers found the individual in

possession of undeclared cash, Chinese

corporation-establishment documents,

and a mostly-completed application for a

Chinese state-controlled aviation and

aerospace research center. The application

claimed work on the engines for the U.S.

F-22 and F-35 fighter aircraft.

> In May 2015, U.S. authorities arrested

Chinese national Zhang Hao based on a

32 count indictment charging Zhang and

five other named Chinese defendants with

economic espionage and the theft of trade

secrets. The indictment alleged Zhang and

the other co-conspirators stole source

codes, specifications, design layouts, and

other documents related to thin-film bulk

acoustic resonator (FBAR) dual-use

technology from U.S. companies. The

stolen material supported the creation of a

Chinese FBAR fabrication facility and

joint venture providing FBARs to

commercial and military entities.

In addition, multiple U.S. criminal indictments

and investigations since 2009 involve non-

ethnic-Chinese U.S. citizens and naturalized

Chinese U.S. citizens or permanent resident

aliens procuring and exporting controlled

items to China. These activities included

efforts to acquire and to transfer sensitive or

military-grade equipment such as radiation-

hardened programmable semiconductors and

computer circuits, restricted microwave

amplifiers, high-grade carbon fiber, export-

restricted technical data, and thermal imaging

systems.



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CHINA’S ARMS EXPORTS

China’s defense firms are marketing and selling arms throughout the world with the bulk of their

sales to the Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan African regions. In 2015, China’s arms exports

probably increased modestly as China’s domestic defense industry improved. From 2010 to 2014,

China signed about $15 billion in arms export agreements for conventional arms worldwide,

ranging from general purpose materiel to major weapons systems.

> Pakistan remains China’s primary customer for conventional weapons. China engages in both

arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with Pakistan, including LY-80 surface-to-air

missile systems, F-22P frigates with helicopters, main battle tank production, air-to-air

missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. In June 2014, Pakistan started co-producing the first

two of 50 Block 2 JF-17s, which is an upgraded version of the Block I JF-17.

China is the largest supplier of arms to the Sub-Saharan Africa region, which was China’s second

highest sales region between 2010 and 2014, with about $4 billion in sales. Sub-Saharan African

countries view China as a provider of low-cost weapons with generally fewer end-use monitoring

conditions relative to other arms suppliers. China tends to provide favorable payment

arrangements. China’s top customers in this region are South Sudan, Sudan, and Ethiopia.



85

86

5 FORCE MODERNIZATION

FOR A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY



87

China’s overall strategy continues to

incorporate elements of both persuasion and

coercion to hinder the development of

political attitudes in Taiwan favoring

independence. In 2015, China’s strategy

toward Taiwan was influenced by what it saw

as positive developments in Taiwan’s political

situation and approach to engagement with

China. China and Taiwan have made progress

in expanding cross-Strait trade, economic

links, and people-to-people contacts.

Despite positive developments last year—

such as the cross-Strait meeting between

China’s President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s

President Ma Ying-jeou in November, the

first such meeting since 1946—there have

been no signs that China’s military posture

opposite Taiwan has changed significantly.

The PLA continues to develop and deploy

military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan

or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These

improvements pose major challenges to

Taiwan’s security, which has been based

historically upon the PLA’s inability to project

power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the

natural geographic advantages of island

defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological

superiority, and the possibility of U.S.

intervention.

CHINA’S STRATEGY IN THE

TAIWAN STRAIT

China appears prepared to defer the use of

force as long as it believes that unification



88

over the long term remains possible and that

the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits.

China argues that the credible threat to use

force is essential to maintain the conditions

for political progress and to prevent Taiwan

from making moves toward de jure

independence. China has refused for decades

to renounce the use of force to resolve the

Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously

professing its desire for peaceful unification

under the principle of “one country, two

systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland

has historically warned it would use force

have evolved over time in response to the

island’s declarations of its political status,

changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view

of Taiwan’s relations with other countries.

These circumstances have included:

> formal declaration of Taiwan

independence;

> undefined moves toward Taiwan

independence;

> internal unrest on Taiwan;

> Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

> indefinite delays in the resumption of

cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

> foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal

affairs;

> and foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of the March 2005 Anti-Secession

Law states that China may use “non-peaceful

means” if “secessionist forces… cause the

fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if

“major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession”

occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful

reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of

these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

CHINA’S COURSES OF ACTION

AGAINST TAIWAN

The PLA is capable of increasingly

sophisticated military actions against Taiwan.

It is possible China would first pursue a

measured approach characterized by signaling

its readiness to use force, followed by a

deliberate buildup of force to optimize the

speed of engagement rather than strategic

deception. Another option is that China

would sacrifice overt, large-scale preparations

in favor of surprise to force a rapid military or

political resolution before other countries

could respond. If a quick resolution is not

possible, China would seek to:

> deter potential U.S. intervention;

> failing that, delay intervention and seek

victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick

war;

> or fight to a standstill and pursue a

political settlement after a protracted

conflict.

Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. In

addition to direct military engagement, PLA

writings describe potential alternative



89

solutions—air blockades, missile attacks, and

mining to force capitulation. China could

declare that ships en route to Taiwan must

stop in mainland ports for inspection and/or

transshipment prior to transiting to Taiwan

ports. China could also attempt the equivalent

of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile

closure areas in approaches to ports, in effect

closing port access and diverting merchant

traffic. The PLA employed this method

during the 1995-96 missile firings and live-fire

exercises. There is a risk, however, that any

attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from

Taiwan would trigger countervailing

international pressure and military escalation.

Limited Force or Coercive Options.

China might use a variety of disruptive,

punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited

campaign against Taiwan, probably in

conjunction with overt and clandestine

economic and political activities. Such a

campaign could include computer network or

limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s

political, military, and economic infrastructure

to induce fear in Taiwan and to degrade the

populace’s confidence in Taiwan’s leaders.

Similarly, PLA special operations forces could

infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against

infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. China could

use missile attacks and precision strikes

against air defense systems, including air bases,

radar sites, missiles, space assets, and

communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s

defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or

break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available

Chinese writings describe different

operational concepts for amphibious invasion.

The most prominent of these, the Joint Island

Landing Campaign, envisions a complex

operation relying on coordinated, interlocking

campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support,

and EW. The objective would be to break

through or circumvent shore defenses,

establish and build a beachhead, transport

personnel and materiel to designated landing

sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s

western coastline, and launch attacks to seize

and to occupy key targets or the entire island.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the

most complicated and difficult military

operations. Success depends upon air and sea

superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment

of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted

support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would

strain China’s armed forces and invite

international intervention. These stresses,

combined with China’s combat force attrition

and the complexity of urban warfare and

counterinsurgency (assuming a successful

landing and breakout), make an amphibious

invasion of Taiwan a significant political and

military risk. Taiwan’s investments to harden

infrastructure and strengthen defensive

capabilities could also decrease China’s ability

to achieve its objectives.

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various

amphibious operations short of a full-scale



90

invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military

preparations beyond routine training, China

could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held

islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas

or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-

sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or

Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an

invasion would demonstrate military capability

and political resolve while achieving tangible

territorial gain and simultaneously showing

some measure of restraint. However, this kind

of operation includes significant, and possibly

prohibitive, political risk because it could

galvanize pro-independence sentiment on

Taiwan and generate international opposition.

THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE

FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT

Preparation for a Taiwan conflict with the

possibility of U.S. intervention continues to

play a prominent role in China’s military

modernization program.

Missile Forces. The PLA Rocket Force,

formerly the PLASAF, is prepared to conduct

missile attacks and precision strikes against

Taiwan’s air defense systems, air bases, radar

sites, missiles, space assets, and C2 and

communications facilities in an attempt to

degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize

Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will

to fight.

Air Forces. The PLAAF has maintained a

force posture that provides it with a variety of

capabilities to leverage against Taiwan in a

contingency. First, it has stationed a large

number of advanced aircraft within an

unrefueled range of Taiwan, providing it with

a significant capability to conduct air-

superiority and ground-attack operations

against Taiwan. Second, a number of long-

range air defense systems provide a strong

layer of defense of China’s mainland against

counterattack. Third, China’s development of

support aircraft provides the PLAAF with

improved ISR capability to support PLA

operations in a contingency.

Navy Forces. The PLAN is improving anti-

air and anti-surface warfare capabilities,

developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent,

and introducing new platforms that are

positioned to strike Taiwan in a cross-Strait

conflict. The additional attack submarines,

multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth-

generation naval aircraft entering the force are

designed to achieve sea superiority within the

first island chain as well as to deter and

counter any potential third party intervention

in a Taiwan conflict.

Ground Forces. Increasingly armed with

more modern systems such as attack

helicopters, the PLAA is conducting joint

training exercises that will prepare it for a

Taiwan invasion scenario. The PLAA often

conducts training, including amphibious

landing training, under realistic conditions,

including all-weather and at night. Improved

networks provide real-time data transmissions

within and between units, enabling better C2

during operations. Additionally, the PLAA’s

ongoing fielding of advanced air defense

equipment is significantly enhancing the self-

defense of key C2 elements and other critical

assets believed to be tasked for potential use



91

against Taiwan. As the number of these new

systems grows in the PLAA, the ability of an

amphibious invasion force to defend cross-

Strait amphibious lodgments successfully

against counterattacks by both legacy and

advanced weaponry will inevitably increase.

TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVE

CAPABILITIES

China’s multi-decade military modernization

effort has eroded or negated many of

Taiwan’s historical advantages in deterring

PLA aggression, such as the PLA’s inability to

project sufficient power across the Taiwan

Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological

superiority, and the inherent geographic

advantages of island defense.

Taiwan is taking important steps to build its

war reserve stocks, grow its defense-industrial

base, improve joint operations and crisis

response capabilities, and strengthen its

officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

These improvements partially address

Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages.

Taiwan is following through with its transition

to a volunteer military and reducing its active

military end-strength from 300,000 to

approximately 175,000 personnel to create a

“small but smart and strong force.” Under

this plan, which is slated for full

implementation in 2019, the cost savings from

a smaller force will free up resources to

increase volunteer salaries and benefits,

although these savings will not be sufficient to

cover the costs of volunteers. The transition

has led to additional personnel costs needed

to attract and retain personnel under the

volunteer system, diverting funds from

foreign and indigenous acquisition programs,

as well as near-term training and readiness.

In addition, Taiwan’s military spending has

dropped to approximately 2 percent of its

gross domestic product. Meanwhile, China’s

official defense budget has grown to roughly

14 times that of Taiwan’s. Recognizing

China’s continued growth in military spending,

Taiwan is working to integrate innovative and

asymmetric measures into its defense planning

in order to counterbalance China’s growing

capabilities.

The United States maintains a One-China

Policy that is based on the three Joint

Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act

(TRA). The United States opposes any

unilateral change to the status quo in the

Taiwan Strait by either side and does not

support Taiwan indepenedence. The United

States continues to support the peaceful

resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner,

scope, and pace acceptable to the people on

both sides.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States

has contributed to peace, security, and

stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by

providing defense articles and services to

enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-

defense capability. To this end, the United

States has announced more than $14 billion in

arms sales to Taiwan since 2009.



92

CHINA’S AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES

China continues to improve its ability to conduct and sustain amphibious operations through its fleet

modernization and joint exercise programs. In 2015, the PLA staged three joint landing exercises that tested

its capabilities, marking an increase in the complexity of its amphibious training.

> In July, the PLA used a POMORNIK-class LCUA for the first time in an actual ground-forces landing

mode during a South Sea Fleet joint landing exercise. The PLA also used YUYI-class LCMAs for the

first time in an unfamiliar landing area—the naval equivalent of traveling to, and conducting landing

operations within, an out-of-region training area. Although the exercise was not large (just more than 20

vessels of 10 types participated), it was unique in that it reportedly was the PLA's first uncooperative,

opposition force (OPFOR)-enabled joint amphibious operation.

> In the East Sea Fleet area, exercise JOINT ACTION-2015B focused on mobilization, uploading, multi-

modal transport, offloading, and follow-on second-echelon assaults inshore. The primary participants

were subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region (MR), including elements of the 12th Group Army, MR

reserve forces, and PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF units. Participants were supported by civilian aircraft,

vessels, facilities, and equipment. The exercise’s focus on operations following a landing suggests the PLA

is confident in its ability to seize and to expand significant beachheads during an amphibious operation.

> In exercise JOINT MARITIME-2015, Chinese and Russian surface combatants, amphibious forces, and

rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft conducted combined amphibious and air landing operations on the

Russian coastline northeast of North Korea. The number of participants was relatively small, however,

and China probably did not gain much tactical insight.

In recent years, China has built four new YUZHAO-class amphibious transport docks (LPD). Each of these

is capable of carrying up to four YUYI-class LCMAs as well as four helicopters, more than 50 armored

vehicles, and a large number of forces. It has also built several additional YUTING II-class tank landing

ships, acquired two POMORNIK-class air-cushion utility landing craft (LCUA) from Ukraine, and is

finishing construction of two additional LCUAs in China.

Additionally, as part of a push for greater civil-military integration, several exercises in 2015 featured the use

of civilian ferries or roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels. The use of these civilian ferries and RO/RO vessels

may increase PLA mobility but would be limited to non-combat support operations due to the need for port

infrastructure.



93



94

6 U.S.-CHINA

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS



95

STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT

The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy

emphasizes that the United States seeks to

develop a constructive relationship with China

that sustains and promotes security and

prosperity in Asia and around the world. At

the same time, the strategy acknowledges

there will be areas of competition and

underscores that the United States will

manage this competition with China from a

position of strength while seeking ways to

reduce the risk of misunderstanding or

miscalculation. The Department of Defense

(DoD) strategy for military engagement with

the PRC’s defense establishment is part of this

broader approach.

U.S.-China defense contacts and exchanges

provide opportunities to explore and expand

cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to

manage competition constructively. In 2016,

DoD’s plan for military-to-military contacts

with the PRC focuses on three interconnected

lines of effort: (1) building sustained and

substantive dialogue through policy dialogues

and senior leader engagements; (2) building

concrete, practical cooperation in areas of

mutual interest; and (3) enhancing risk

management efforts that diminish the

potential for misunderstanding or

miscalculation.

The pace and scope of China’s military

modernization provide opportunities as well

as challenges for military-to-military

engagement. The PLA’s growing military

capabilities can facilitate deeper practical

cooperation in areas ranging from

humanitarian assistance to counterpiracy.

However, as China’s military develops and

expands its reach, the risk of an accident or

miscalculation also increases, which puts a

premium on risk reduction efforts.

Pursuit of a constructive and productive

relationship with China is an important part

of the U.S. strategy to Rebalance to the Asia-

Pacific region. DoD seeks to strengthen the

U.S.-China military-to-military relationship in

ways that best serve the interests of the

United States and our allies and partners.

Sustaining the positive momentum in the

military-to-military relationship supports U.S.

objectives of ensuring China acts in a manner

consistent with international rules and norms

and that China serves as a source of stability

and shared prosperity in Asia.

As the United States builds a stronger

foundation for a military-to-military

relationship with China, it will continue to

monitor China’s evolving military strategy,

doctrine, and force development, and

encourage China to be more transparent

about its military modernization program. The

United States also will continue adapting its

forces, posture, and operational concepts to

deter aggression, defend our allies, and ensure

we continue to engage China from a position

of strength. The United States will continue

to build the capacity of our allies and partners,

enhance regional cooperation, and deepen



96

partnerships to maintain a stable and secure

Asia-Pacific security environment.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY

ENGAGEMENT IN 2015 –

HIGHLIGHTS

DoD conducts all contacts with China in a

manner consistent with the provisions of the

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

for Fiscal Year 2000.

In 2015, the U.S. and China military-to-

military relationship focused on areas of

cooperation with real world application. The

two militaries advanced confidence building

measures designed to reduce risk and improve

transparency through signing new annexes to

the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and

Maritime Encounters Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) and the Notification

of Major Military Activities MOU, one on air-

to-air encounters, and the second on crisis

communication. DoD also continued to make

progress with the PLA in developing the

capacity to cooperate in the delivery of

international public goods, including

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

(HA/DR), counterpiracy, peacekeeping

operations (PKO), search and rescue (SAR),

and military medicine.

Selected visits, exchanges, exercises, and

arrangements are highlighted below. A

complete list of 2015 engagements is provided

in Appendix I.

Confidence Building Measures. DoD

and the PLA expanded upon the historical

understandings reached in 2014, when then-

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and PRC

Minister of National Defense Chang

Wanquan signed two confidence building

measures: (1) the Rules of Behavior for Safety

of Air and Maritime Encounters MOU, and (2)

the Notification of Major Military Activities

MOU. In 2015, both sides expanded upon

the MOUs with an air-to-air annex and a crisis

communication annex, which enhanced

efforts to reduce risk and misunderstanding.

The crisis communication annex regularized

the process of using the Defense Telephone

Link, as part of the Notification of Major

Military Activities MOU. It reaffirmed each

side’s commitment to improve and normalize

mutual notification of military crisis

information. The annex established

procedures to ensure that secure

communications between the U.S. and

Chinese militaries occur at the appropriate

level in a timely fashion. For instance, the

PLA utilized the Defense Telephone Link to

request a call with the Chief of Naval

Operations Admiral John Richardson

following U.S. operations in the South China

Sea. Admiral Richardson and PLAN

Commander Admiral Wu Shengli discussed

ongoing engagements between the two navies,

including port visits and senior leader

engagements, and recent operations in the

South China Sea.



97

The Rules of Behavior MOU affirms the large

body of existing international law, standards,

and guidance that relate to safe operations,

such as the Law of the Sea, the Code for

Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), the

Chicago Convention, and the International

Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea

(COLREGS). The air-to-air annex established

operational and best practices for professional

airmanship in order to emphasize the

importance of operational safety in the air,

consistent with existing international norms

and practices, as part of the Rules of Behavior

for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters

Memorandum of Understanding. The new air-

to-air annex draws upon international norms

and provides DoD and PLA the framework

for a comprehensive regime that will increase

operational safety and reduce risk. With the

air-to-air annex complete, future discussions

about operational safety will take place as part

of the existing Military Maritime Consultative

Agreement (MMCA) talks.

The completion of the two annexes reflected

a shared objective of the two militaries to

improve relations, manage risk, and expand

cooperation in areas of mutual interest while

managing differences. The confidence-

building mechanisms manage risk and

improve reciprocal transparency, while

invigorating existing multilateral and bilateral

engagement mechanisms, such as the Military

Maritime Consultative Agreement and the

Defense Policy Coordination Talks.

High-Level Visits and Engagements.

High-level contacts are an important means to

exchange views on the international security

environment, to identify areas of common

interest, to manage differences, and to

facilitate common approaches to shared

challenges. Discussions focused on areas of

military cooperation and candidly addressed

differences.

In May 2015, U.S. Pacific Command

(USPACOM) Deputy Commander,

Lieutenant General Anthony Crutchfield,

hosted the Commander of the Chengdu

Military Region, Lieutenant General Li

Zuocheng, at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Lieutenant

General Li met with U.S. Army Pacific

Command Commander, General Vincent K.

Brooks, at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and traveled

to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington,

for meetings with the Washington National

Guard where the two sides discussed HA/DR.

Later in June, the Commander, Pacific Air

Forces, General Lori Robinson, visited Beijing,

Nanjing, and Guangzhou. General Robinson

met with the People’s Liberation Army Air

Force Commander, Lieutenant General

Huang Guoxian, as well as senior leadership

from the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military

Regions.

In June 2015, the Defense Department hosted

Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military

Commission, General Fan Changlong, for a

visit to the United States. General Fan visited

San Diego where he met with the U.S. Third



98

Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Kenneth

Floyd, received a tour of an aircraft carrier,

the USS RONALD REAGAN, and toured a

U.S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot. General

Fan then travelled to Fort Hood, Texas, met

with U.S. Army Forces Command

Commander, Lieutenant General Sean

MacFarland, and observed a live fire exercise

and demonstration. The U.S. visit continued

with a visit to Washington, D.C., where he

met with the Secretary of Defense and other

senior U.S. officials including then-Chief of

Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno.

The trip concluded with the signing of the

Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism

framework by Major General William C. Hix,

Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy,

Headquarters, Department of the Army and

Major General Tang Ning, Deputy Director

of the Army Building Bureau within the

General Staff Department’s Military Training

Department.

In November 2015, USPACOM Commander,

Admiral Harry Harris, traveled to China,

where he met with senior military officials in

Beijing and Nanjing, holding meetings with

the Chief of General Staff, General Fang

Fenghui, the Vice Chairman of the Central

Military Commission, General Fan Changlong,

and the Nanjing Military Region Commander,

General Cai Yingting.

In November, Secretary of Defense Ash

Carter met with Chinese Minister of National

Defense, General Chang Wanquan, in Kuala

Lumpur, Malaysia, on the sidelines of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-

Plus).

Recurrent Exchanges. Recurring

institutionalized events form the backbone of

U.S.-China defense discussions each year.

They serve as a regularized mechanism for

dialogue at the strategic and policy levels.

In February 2015, then-Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense David Helvey hosted

Deputy Director Rear Admiral Li Ji, Minister

of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office

(MND-FAO), for the Defense Policy

Coordination Talks (DPCTs) in Washington,

D.C. The U.S. side included USPACOM J-5

Mobilization Assistant Brigadier General

Joseph Whitlock and Deputy Director for

Asia of the Joint Staff, Brigadier General

David Stilwell. The dialogue covered issues

ranging from military-to-military engagements,

confidence building measures, and practical

areas of cooperation.

In March 2015, Assistant Secretary of

Defense David Shear hosted the inaugural

Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD) and

hosted Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, Director

of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign

Affairs Office (MND-FAO). The dialogue

discussed security interests of mutual concern.

In June 2015, Deputy Secretary of State

Antony Blinken and Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth hosted

the fifth Strategic Security Dialogue in



99

Washington and met with Executive Vice

Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui and Deputy

Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Sun

Jianguo. USPACOM Commander, Admiral

Harry Harris and Joint Staff J5, Vice Admiral

Frank Pandolfe also participated. The

Dialogue covered issues ranging from North

Korea to the South China Sea. Admiral Sun

also had an office call with Deputy Secretary

of Defense Robert Work.

In November 2015, a delegation from the

Headquarters Department of the Army

inaugurated the U.S.-China Army-to-Army

Dialogue Mechanism (AADM) in Beijing,

China. The AADM establishes a sustained

and substantive dialogue between U.S. and

PLA Land Forces that is nested within

broader U.S.-China security dialogues and

fora. The AADM is focused on deepening

military cooperation in HA/DR,

peacekeeping, Corps of Engineer exchanges,

educational exchanges at all levels, and

military medical exchanges.

Functional and Academic Exchanges.

Reciprocal exchanges—including between

functional officers, rising leaders, and

institutions of professional military

education—help to identify and explore new

areas of cooperation, discuss differences, and

serve to develop a generation of leaders on

both sides who are knowledgeable and adept

at handling this increasingly complex and vital

relationship. Increasing contact between mid-

level officers is an important objective for

both militaries as they seek to build familiarity

and mutual understanding between future

leaders.

In January 2015, a USPACOM senior

military-medicine delegation travelled to

China for an exchange with their PRC

counterparts. The same month, a delegation

from the U.S. Army, Pacific executed the

Disaster Management Exchange in China.

These exchanges advanced practical areas of

cooperation.

In February 2015, a PLA Navy Prospective

Commanding Officer delegation visited the

United States. The delegation met with the

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan

Greenert, in the Pentagon, toured the US

Naval Academy, and traveled to Newport,

Rhode Island, to participate in discussions

with USN counterparts attending the Surface

Warfare Officers School.

In March 2015, a delegation from the U.S. Air

War College traveled to China, followed by a

reciprocal visit from the PLA Air Force

Command College visit to the U.S. Air War

College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,

in April 2015.

In May 2015, an Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD)-Army delegation met with

Ministry of National Defense (MND)

Peacekeeping Affairs Office and MND

Peacekeeping Center in the first military-to-

military, only, peacekeeping experts working

session. The session resulted in the

establishment of an annual working group.

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability



100

Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, hosted a subsequent session in

October 2015, and China will host in 2016.

Also in November 2015, OSD-Policy

participated in a State Department-led

interagency delegation to Beijing to conduct a

peacekeeping technical experts meeting where

China indicated its interest to cooperate on

peacekeeping capacity building for countries

in the Africa and Asia-Pacific regions.

In August 2015, National Defense University

CAPSTONE fellows traveled to China,

offering an opportunity for newly selected U.S.

general and flag offices to increase

understanding of China and the Pacific. The

same month, the Joint Staff hosted a PLA

mid-to-senior level officer exchange in

Washington, D.C.

In October 2015, a U.S. Navy Prospective

Commanding Officer delegation visited China.

The delegation toured China’s aircraft carrier,

the LIAONING, and participated in

discussions with officers and crew. The

delegation visited the PLAN Submarine

Academy, the PLAN Naval Command

Academy, and traveled to Beijing to meet

PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli.

In November 2015, a delegation from the

Headquarters Department of the Army

inaugurated the U.S.-China Army-to-Army

Dialogue Mechanism (AADM) in Beijing,

China. The AADM establishes a sustained

and substantive dialogue between U.S. and

PLA Land Forces that is nested within

broader U.S.-China security dialogues and

fora. The AADM is focused on deepening

military cooperation in HA/DR,

peacekeeping, Corps of Engineers exchanges,

educational exchanges at all levels, and

military medical exchanges.

Ship Visits and Exercises: Ship visits and

exercises promote trust between the two sides

and build joint capacity to provide

international public goods in areas of mutual

interest, such as SAR, HA/DR, and

counterpiracy. Port calls are also used to

enhance operational safety and exercise

communications and navigation protocols.

In April 2015, the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship,

the USS BLUE RIDGE conducted a port

visit to Zhanjiang, home of the PLAN South

Sea Fleet. In July 2015, the USS STETHEM

visited Qingdao and conducted a search and

rescue table top exercise.

In October 2015, the PLAN midshipman

training ship, the ZHENG HE, visited Joint

Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

In November and December 2015, the

PLAN’s Counterpiracy Task Group’s three

ships visited Naval Station Mayport, Florida

and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii,

respectively, during an around-the-world

transit home.

The PLAN hospital ship, the PEACE ARK,

visited San Diego, California in November to

conduct a port visit and medical subject

matter expert exchange with staff of the

Military Sealift Command hospital ship the

USNS MERCY and Balboa Naval Hospital.



101

Also in November, the USS STETHEM

visited Shanghai for a port visit. The

Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet,

Admiral Scott H. Swift, participated in the

port visit and met with Admiral Wu and Vice

Admiral Su Zhiqian, the PLAN East Sea Fleet

Commander. Admiral Su Zhiqian, the PLAN

East Sea Fleet Commander.

PLANNING FOR MILITARY-TO-

MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS IN

2016

A list of planned engagements for 2016 is

provided in Appendix I.



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SPECIAL TOPIC: POLITICAL WORK IN THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

Although most Western militaries are considered apolitical, professional forces that first and

foremost serve the state, the PLA has been a politicized “party army” since its inception and exists

to guarantee the CCP regime’s survival above all else. In fact, official media regularly excoriates the

idea of an apolitical military, in part because the leadership judges that the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union’s lack of control over its military was a key factor in the demise of the Soviet Union.

Maintaining the “party army” identity even as the PLA embarks on major structural reforms is the

top priority for China’s leadership, including President Xi Jinping. The PLA reforms include the

establishment of the Political Work Department, which appears to have assumed many of the

responsibilities of the former General Political Department. The PLA’s political work system is the

primary means through which the CCP “controls the gun” in accordance with Mao Zedong’s

famous dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Most PLA officers are Party

members, and in recent decades PLA officers typically have comprised approximately 20 percent of

the CCP’s Central Committee. Moreover, since 1997 the two uniformed vice chairmen of the

Central Military Commission have served concurrently on the Politburo.

The tiers of political work in the PLA are interlocking and reinforcing systems that allow the Party

to penetrate the military from top to bottom. These tiers consist of the political commissar system,

the Party committee system, and the Party discipline inspection system.

> Political commissars are responsible for personnel, education, security, discipline, and morale.

Prior to this year’s reorganization of the high command, the General Political Department

(GPD), the director of which served on the CMC, managed the PLA’s political commissars and

was the locus of political work in the military. It is unclear how the ongoing reorganization of

the PLA will affect this system.

> The Party committee system is replicated in some fashion at each level of command. Party

committees are directly subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and are intended to ensure

loyalty at all levels. They propagate the Party line, policies, and directives throughout the force.

> The Party discipline inspection bodies monitor the performance of Party members in the

military and ensure upright behavior. The PLA Central Discipline Inspection Commission is

subordinate to the CMC and has been particularly active in recent years as it oversees

investigations to weed out graft and uproot politically powerful networks in the ranks as part of

China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign. In November 2015, Xi also announced the creation

of a new PLA Politics and Law Commission, mirroring a similar party organization that oversees

legal and judicial issues in the state bureaucracy.



103

APPENDIX I: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES

U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS FOR 2015

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA Month (2015)

U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander to China May

U.S. Pacific Command Commander to China November

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATES

PRC Chengdu Military Region Commander to the United States May

PRC Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to the United States June

HIGH-LEVEL MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENTS

Western Pacific Naval Symposium in China April

Shangri-La Dialogue

U.S. Pacific Command Chiefs of Defense Conference in Hawaii

June

December

Pacific Armies Chief’s Conference in Indonesia September

RECURRENT EXCHANGES

Defense Policy Coordination Talks in the United States February

Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue in the United States March

Strategic Security Dialogue in the United States July

Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Groups and Plenary in China

and the United States

June/

November

Strategic Security Dialogue July

Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism November

ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

U.S. Air War College Delegation to China March

PLA Air Force Command College Delegation to the United States March

FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES

U.S. Air War College Delegation to China March

PLA Air Force Command College Delegation to the United States March

Pacific Armies Management Seminar in Indonesia September

U.S. Navy Prospective Commanding Officer Delegation to China October

U.S Pacific Command Mid –Level Officers visit to China October

U.S Army War College Delegation to China October



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Disaster Management Exchange in the United States November

Peacekeeping Workshop in the United States October

JOINT AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES

Kowari in Australia October

COBRA GOLD in Thailand February

KHAAN QUEST in Mongolia June

U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES PLANNED FOR 2016

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA

Secretary of Defense (TBD)

Chief of Staff of the Army (2/3 QTR)

Chief of Naval Operations (3/4 QTR)

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATES

PRC Senior Defense or Military Leader (TBD)

Theater Command Delegation (TBD)

INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCHANGES

Defense Policy Coordination Talks (4 QTR)

Joint Staff Strategy Talks (September)

MMCA Plenary and Working Groups (3/4 QTR)

Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism (September)

Disaster Management Exchange (/November)

Military Medicine Exchange (August)

Defense Consultative Talks (June)

Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (3 QTR)

ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

PRC Academy delegation to the United States (TBD)

U.S. National Defense University or Academy delegation to China (May)

U.S. Air War College (February)

National War College Student Delegation (April)

Marine War College (May)

U.S. Naval War College-PLA Navy Student Exchange (2/3 QTR)

U.S. Army Cadet Command (TBD)

PLA Nanjing Army Command College (TBD)

PLA National Defense University Student Delegation (July)

National Defense University Strategic Discussion (October/November)

PLA National Defense University “Dragons” Class (TBD)

PLA Air Force Command College Student Delegation (April)

PLA Navy Command College (TBD)



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FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES

PLA Navy Ship Visits to the United States (TBD)

U.S. Navy Ship Visits to China (TBD)

U.S. Navy-PLA Navy Prospective Commanding Officer Exchange in the United States or China (TBD)

Gulf of Aden Counterpiracy Exercise (TBD)

Peacekeeping Exchange in the United States or China (3/4 QTR)

Prospective Commanding Officer Exchange (3/4 QTR)

Mid-level Officer Exchange (TBD)

Military Archive Delegation (TBD)

BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES INVOLVING THE PLA 2012-2015

Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises Since 2012

Year Exercise Name Type of Exercise Participants

2012

NAVAL COOPERATION 2012 Maritime Russia

Unnamed Counterpiracy France

BLUE ASSAULT 2012 Maritime (Amphibious Assault) Thailand

PEACE MISSION 2012 Counterterrorism Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

SHARP KNIFE 2012 Counterterrorism Indonesia

Unnamed Maritime (Search and

Rescue) Vietnam

Unnamed Counterpiracy United States

COOPERATIONA SPIRIT 2012 HA/DR Australia, New Zealand

2013

Unnamed Counterterrorism; Pakistan

ADMM+ Exercise Maritime (Search and

Rescue); HA/DR ASEAN

PEACE MISSION 2013 Counterterrorism Russia

FRONTIER DEFENSE JOINT

DETERMINATION 2013 Counterterrorism Kyrgyzstan

SHARP KNIFE AIRBORNE 2013 Counterterrorism Indonesia

HAND IN HAND 2013 Counterterrorism India

STRIKE 2013 Counterterrorism Thailand



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2014

COBRA GOLD 2014 Counterterrorism United States, Thailand

KOMODO 2014 Naval Diplomacy Hosted by Indonesia

MARITIME COOPERATION 2014 Counterterrorism

Bangladesh, Malaysia,

Singapore, Brunei, Pakistan,

India, Indonesia

MARITIME COOPERATION 2014 Maritime Russia

KOMODO 2014 Naval Diplomacy Hosted by Indonesia

MARITIME COOPERATION 2014 Maritime Russia

GROUP SAIL 2014

Maritime (Search and

Rescue); Communications;

Counterpiracy

United States, Singapore,

Brunei

RIMPAC 2014 Multilateral Naval Exercises Hosted by the United States

(22 countries participated)

Unnamed Counterpiracy United States

Unnamed Maritime (Search and

Rescue) & Communications United States

PEACE MISSION 2014 Counterterrorism Russia

BORDER DEFENSE

COOPERATION 2014 Counterterrorism Russia

Unnamed Communications United States

SHARP KNIFE AIRBORNE 2014 Counterterrorism Indonesia

COOPERATION 2014 Infantry Exercise Singapore

2015

JOINT SEA 2015 Maritime Russia

CHINA-SINGAPORE

COOPERATION 2015 Maritime Singapore

KHAAN QUEST 2015 Peacekeeping Hosted by Mongolia

SHAHEEN-IV Air Pakistan

Unnamed Maritime Denmark

PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP 2015 Maritime Malaysia

HAND IN HAND 2015 Counterterrorism India

FALCON 2015 Counterterrorism Mongolia

FALCON STRIKE 2015 Air Thailand



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APPENDIX II: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA IN 2015

Taiwan Strait Military Balance in 2015, Ground Forces

China Taiwan

Total Taiwan Strait Area Total

Personnel (Active) 1.25 million 400,000 130,000

Group Armies/Army Corps 18 8 3

Infantry Divisions 12 4 0

Infantry Brigades 23 7 5

Mechanized Infantry Divisions 7 4 0

Amphibious Mechanized

Infantry Divisions 2 2 0

Mechanized Infantry Brigades 25 8 3

Armor Divisions 1 0 0

Armor Brigades 17 7 4

Amphibious Armor Brigades 1 1 0

Army Aviation Brigades and

Regiments 11 6 3

Artillery Brigades 22 9 5

Airborne Divisions 3 3 0

Marine Brigades 2 2 2

Tanks 7,000 2,800 1,100

Artillery Pieces 8,000 3,900 1,600

Note: In 2015, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) active ground forces were organized into group

armies and independent airborne and marine units deployed through seven military regions.

(MRs). A significant portion of these assets were deployed in the Taiwan Strait area (the former

Nanjing, Guangzhou and Jinan MRs), including coastal defense, border defense, headquarters,

and administrative units reflected in the personnel total but not tabulated in detail. Taiwan has

three army corps and four principle defense commands. Each army corps contains an artillery

command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus. The numbers of specific systems are

approximate.



108

Taiwan Strait Military Balance in 2015, Naval Forces

China Taiwan

Total East and South Sea

Fleets Total

Aircraft Carriers 1 0 0

Destroyers 23 16 4

Frigates 52 40 22

Corvettes 23 14 1

Tank Landing Ships/

Amphibious Transport Dock 30 28 14

Medium Landing Ships 22 16 0

Diesel Attack Submarines 57 38 4

Nuclear Attack Submarines 5 2 0

Ballistic Missile Submarines 4 4 0

Coastal Patrol (Missile) 86 68 45

Note: In 2015, the PLA Navy had the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and

amphibious warfare ships in Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea

Fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea

Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but could

provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets.



109

Taiwan Strait Military Balance in 2015, Air Forces

China Taiwan

Total Within range of

Taiwan Total

Fighters 1,700 130 384

Bombers/Attack 400 200 0

Transport 475 150 19

Special Mission Aircraft 115 75 25

Note: In 2015, the PLA Air Force and Navy had approximately 2,100 operational combat

aircraft. These consisted of air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-

bombers, and bombers. An additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers, and trainers were

employed for training and research and development. The PLA also possess approximately 475

transports and more than 100 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with intelligence,

surface search, and airborne early warning capabilities. We expect the PLA Air Force would

supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario. The majority of PLA

Air Force and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern half of the country, and approximately

330 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling. However, this

number could be significantly increased through any combination of aircraft forward

deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profiles. Taiwan Air Force figures do

not indicate a significant change; they reflect a change in the categorization of some aircraft.

China’s Missile Forces

System Missiles Launchers Estimated Range*

ICBM 75-100 50-75 5,400-13,000+ km

MRBM 200-300 100-125 1,500+ km

SRBM 1,000-1,200 250-300 300-1000 km

GLCM 200-300 40-55 1,500+ km

Note: Estimates reflect the PLA’s ongoing modernization of its missile forces and in some cases may have increased.



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APPENDIX III: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA REGARDING THE RULES OF BEHAVIOR FOR SAFETY OF AIR AND

MARITIME ENCOUNTERS



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Appendix IV: Memorandum of Understanding Between the United

States of America Department of Defense and the People's Republic

of China Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major Military

Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism



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