An Analysis of Contacts between the Dalai Lama … Analysis of Contacts between the Dalai Lama Special Envoy Delegation and the Chinese Leadership 3 “Except for the independence

An Analysis of Contacts between the Dalai Lama Special Envoy Delegation and the Chinese Leadership 1

※ Brief Analysis of Important Issues ※

An Analysis of Contacts between the Dalai Lama Special Envoy Delegation and the Chinese Leadership

Yu-hsin Chen ( Counselor of the Commission)

Abstract

On September 9, 2002, after over two decades of hiatus, the

four-man special envoy delegation representing the Dalai Lama

arrived at China. The delegation, headed by Mr. Lodi Gyari (the

Dalai Lama’s representative in Washington), shattered the

no-direct-dialogue impasse between China and Tibet. Four formal

direct contacts between the Chinese and Tibetan leadership have

taken place since 2002, with the first three times in China and the

fourth time in the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland. The rest of the

world watched with their minds contemplating the details of the four

talks, including the operation, content, and potential impact for the

future. The paper introduces the background surrounding the Dalai

Lama’s primary contacts with the Chinese leadership, deciphering

the signs foreshadowing dispatch of the special envoy delegation

since 2002 and the maneuvering on the part of the Dalai Lama at

home and abroad, including creation of the Tibetan Peace Talk

Preparatory Committee and its organization, purposes, division of

responsibilities, and interactions with the international community.

Through the presentation of objective factors, the paper draws a

comparison of the situation before and after the delegation’s

contact with the Chinese leadership, meanwhile analyzing the

outcome of the contacts and predicting possible future

development.

Keywords: The Dalai Lama、Special Envoy Delegation、The

Task Force on Negotiation 、China、The United

States of America

Introduction

Since the Dalai Lama began his exile in India in 1959, exile Tibetans have

been pursuing the possibility of returning the Dalai Lama to Tibet. For his part,

the Dalai Lama has dispatched six delegations to Tibet since 1979. However,

interactions between China and exile Tibetans came to a halt shortly afterward.

Interactions between both sides, despite persistent, consisted of mostly indirect

statement of stance made in public or in private. Direct open dialogues did not

happen until September 9, 2002 when the Dalai Lama dispatched to China a

four-member delegation headed by Lodi Gyari, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy

to Washington. The delegation broke the deadlock between exile Tibetan and

China that had lasted for nearly 20 years with their face-to-face contact with

Chinese officials. Four official contacts have taken place since 2002, with the

first three taking place in China, and the fourth being conducted in the Chinese

embassy in Switzerland. The process of the negotiations, the issues involved,

and the potential impact on the future are being closely monitored by the world.

Ⅰ. Initial Contacts between the Dalai Lama and China

Following a successful comeback to PRC power center in 1978, Deng

Xiaoping began to take notice of the Dalai Lama, who was spending his time in

exile in India. In 1979, Deng had a meeting with Gyalo Thondup, the second

eldest brother of the Dalai Lama, and made clear China’s keynote in dealing

with the Dalai Lama and its conditions on the Dalai Lama’s return to China:


“Except for the independence of Tibet, all other questions can be negotiated.1”

In his letter to Deng Xioping on March 23, 1981, the Dalai Lama expressed his

wish to strive for improvement in the relationship between Tibet and China.2

On July 28, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Hu Yaobang,

on behalf of Deng, presented a letter containing China’s “five-point principles3”

to Gyalo Thondup. The Dalai Lama responded by sending six fact-finding

delegations to Tibet in 1979-80,4 but contrary to what the Chinese had expected,

these visits revealed impoverished conditions and strong feelings of Tibetan

nationalism.5 The Dalai Lama’s sending of the sixth delegation was blocked

because China would not issue visa to the delegation. Contacts in the venue of

1 The Department of Information and International Relations Central Tibetan Administration, "Dharamsala and Beijing:Initiatives and Correspondence 1981-1993," Letter to Deng Xiaoping from His Holiness the Dalai Lama, p.9, Dharamsala, 1994. 2 Ibid., Letter to Deng Xiaoping from His Holiness the Dalai Lama, p.9. 3 Xizang-zhiye, “The PRC’s ‘Five-Point Guidelines’ for the Dalai Lama”: 1. Our country has already entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic prosperity, and unity and mutual assistance among the nationalities. Since the Dalai Lama and his followers are smart, they should have confidence in this. If they doubt these changes, they can wait and see for a few more years. 2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere, and not beat around the bush. They should not bargain as if doing business. There should be no more quibbling about past history, namely the events of 1959. Let us disregard and forget this. 3. We sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers to return to settle. This is based on our hope that they will contribute to upholding China’s unity and promote solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities (and among all nationalities), while making a contribution to achieving the Four Modernizations. 4. The Dalai Lama would enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. The CCP will be able to recommend to the National People’s Congress (NPC) that he be reappointed as Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. Also, through consultation, he can hold the position of Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. But he should not return to Tibet. He should not concurrently hold positions in Tibet, because young Tibetans have already taken office and they are doing their jobs well! Of course, he can return to Tibet often to observe conditions. His followers need not worry about their work and living arrangements. These will only be better than before, because our country has developed. 5. When the Dalai Lama returns, he can issue a brief statement to the press. He can decide the contents of the statement himself. He should give us notice of the year, month, and date of his return. If he plans to arrive in Hong Kong and travel overland through Guangzhou, we will send a ministry-level cadre to the border to receive him and issue a press release. If he plans to arrive by air, we will organize a ceremony of proper scale to welcome him and issue a press release, http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/hhdl/zhonggong.html. 4 Xizang-zhiye, “His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Address to the European Parliament,” 2001/10/24,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/hhdl/OUzhou.html. According to the Dalai Lama, “Six fact-finding delegations visited Tibet in the 1980s.”

5 Melvyn C.Goldstein, “The Dalai Lama's Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs v77,n1(Jan-Feb,1998), http://www.asiamedia.ucle.edu/Deadline/MacKinnon/TibetQuestion/articles/Goldstein.htm.

http://www.asiamedia.ucle.edu/Deadline/MacKinnon/Tibet

fact-finding delegations came to a halt.6 Alarmed by China’s unfriendly move,

the Dalai Lama began to actively seek support from the international society

while refusing to compromise on his stance. It is unlikely that the Dalai Lama

would return to China without sufficient guarantee and careful planning.

The Dalai Lama began to seek support from the US and Europe to boost

his bargaining chip with China on his return to Tibet. China was convinced that

countries in the West would not have the slightest interest in the strategic

position and economy of Tibet, and has always regarded Tibet as an

inconsequential part of its internal affairs.7 However, China never failed to send

out strong-worded protests through its foreign embassies whenever it spotted a

meeting between the Dalai Lama and foreign political leaders, warning other

countries not to interfere with China’s “internal affairs” and preferring to define

the Tibet problem as one that concerns only the Dalai Lama’s personal future.

Much to China’s annoyance, the Dalai Lama responded by launching a series of

anti-China protests and demonstrations through his peripheral organizations,

including the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). The Dalai Lama introduced his

“Five-Point Peace Plan” in his address to the US Congress on September 21,

1987, and made similar comments outside the hall of the European Parliament

in Strasburg shortly afterward. The fifth point in the Five-Point Peace Plan

concerns commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet

and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples with a view to finding

a solution that is in the long-term interest of all.8 The Dalai Lama urged for

negotiations with China: “My proposal envisages that Tibet enjoy genuine

autonomy within the framework of the People's Republic of China. However,

not the autonomy on paper imposed on us 50 years ago in the 17-Point

6 The Department of Information and International Relations Central Tibetan Administration, “Dharamsala and Beijing: Initiatives and Correspondence 1981-1993,” ＜Separate Note Attached to His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Letter to Deng Xiaoping: March 23,1981＞, p.10. 7 Tsering Shakaya, “The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of modern Tibet since 1947,” Pimlico, London,1999, P.434. 8 See Note 4.


Agreement, but a true self-governing, genuinely autonomous Tibet, with

Tibetans fully responsible for their own domestic affairs, including the

education of their children, religious matters, cultural affairs, the care of their

delicate and precious environment, and the local economy. Beijing would

continue to be responsible for the conduct of foreign and defense affairs.9” In

1989, the Dalai Lama built on his international reputation and his image as a

moral religious leader with the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize. Former US

President George H.W. Bush became the first US President to meet the Dalai

Lama in private capacity on April 16, 1991. Political leaders of other countries

soon followed suit and had meetings with the Dalai Lama. Former US President

William Jefferson Clinton urged Chinese leaders to conduct dialogues with the

Dalai Lama or his representatives in his visit to China in 1998. Incumbent US

President George W. Bush made the same suggestions to Chinese leaders in his

visits to Shanghai in October 2001 and to Beijing in February 2002.10 In public

occasions, the Dalai Lama cited the comments of the international society and

spoke of the Tibet problem along with China’s human rights, religious freedom,

and environmental protection, making it difficult for China on the international

scene. In the face of pressure from the international society, China kept

reiterating its rule over Tibet and its efforts to develop Tibet, and arranged for

politicians and civilians of countries concerned to visit Tibet for propaganda

purposes. In an attempt to clear its name, China started to release the White

Paper on Human Rights in China in November 1991. The White Paper,

published three times per year, cited large amount of statistics on Tibet’s

development in human rights, culture, education, and economy, and provided a

comparison of the “dark,” “backward,” “cruel,” and “inhuman” Old Tibet under

9 Ibid. 10 Central News Agency, “US Officials Urge China to Resolve the Tibet Issue and Create Win-Win Situation,” 2002/3/8,http://news.yam.com/cna/international/news/200203/20020308080012.html.

the rule of the religious and political leader Dalai Lama with the Modern Tibet

developed by China. China sought to declare that Tibet under the legitimate rule

of China is advancing and prospering throughout the years, contrary to the

situation portrayed by the Dalai Lama. China intended to promote its political

stance and achievements and make the world believe that its actions in Tibet are

well-suited to the needs of most Tibetans in order to counter the Dalai Lama’s

international propaganda and dilute some of the international society’s support

for the Dalai Lama.

“Middle-way” and “non-violence” have become the key words in the Dalai

Lama’s stance toward the Tibet problem since the Strasburg address. Since then

his relation with the Chinese government has taken many twists and turns. A

lack of political will on the part of the Chinese leadership to address the issue of

Tibet in a serious manner has failed to produce any progress. The Dalai Lama’s

initiatives and overtures over the years to engage the Chinese leadership in a

dialogue remain unreciprocated. In September 2000, the Dalai Lama

communicated through the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi the wish to send a

delegation to Beijing to deliver a detailed memorandum outlining his thinking

on the issue of Tibet and to explain the discuss the points raised in the

memorandum. The Dalai Lama conveyed that through face-to-face meetings we

would succeed in clarifying misunderstandings and overcoming distrust. The

Dalai Lama reasoned with the Chinese leadership that through face-to-face

meetings they would succeed in clarifying misunderstandings and overcoming

distrust. So far the Chinese government is refusing to accept the Dalai Lama’s

delegation. This is a clear indication of a hardening attitude of Beijing and a

lack of political will to resolve the Tibetan problem.11 In the absence of any

positive response from the Chinese government to his overtures over the years,

the Dalai Lama was left with no alternative but to appeal to the members of the

international community. It was clear that only increased, concerted, and

11 Ibid.


consistent international efforts would persuade Beijing to change its policy on

Tibet.12 In his annual public statement on March 10, 2001, the Dalai Lama said:

“Because the situation inside Tibet still remains serious, as I stated before,

and also because the Chinese authorities are refusing to discuss the Tibetan

issue, there is growing criticism of my policy of “Middle-Way Approach”. I

have always welcomed the right to have different political views. There are

those who hold firmly to the goal of independence of Tibet. There is also

criticism that my position is causing division and confusion among our people. I

can understand the increasing criticism because China refuses to constructively

respond to my “Middle-Way Approach”. Moreover, the overwhelming majority

of the Tibetan people have no doubts in their hearts and minds that

independence is their historical and legitimate right.” 13

Meanwhile, China also made clear its stance toward the Dalai Lama’s

activities on the international scene, “The Dalai issue is not religious, but

political. The Dalai Lama is not merely a religious figure. Rather, he is a

political exile that has long been engaged in activities aimed at splitting China

and undermining national unity. The Chinese government firmly opposes the

Dalai Lama's political activities aimed at splitting China, in any country under

any name, and opposes the official figures of any country to receive the Dalai

Lama in any name of form.” 14 The Dalai Lama was awarded the “Nobel Peace

Prize” abroad, and some people call him “guardian of human rights” and

“advocator of non-violence.” China responded by saying, “The Dalai Lama is

not merely a religious figure. Rather, he is a political exile who has long been

engaged in activities aimed at splitting China and undermining national unity.

12 Ibid. 13 Xizang-zhiye, “His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Speech on the 42nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising on March 10,” 2001/3/10, http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/hhdl/3.10/42.html. 14 China Tibet Information Center, 100 Questions and Answers about Tibet, “At present, the Dalai Lama is received by certain foreign governments and officials. What is the attitude of the central government towards this?” http://www.tibetinfor.com.cn/tibetzt/question/6/099.htm.

He has organized armed forces, engaged in violent activities and instigated

disturbances. The Old Tibet under the rule of the 14th Dalai Lama had long been

a society of feudal serfdom under the despotic theocratic rule of lamas and

nobles; a society darker and crueler still than that of European serfdom in the

Middle Ages…The Dalai Lama fled abroad because he opposed reform of this

backward and inhuman feudal serfdom, whereby serfs might live as free human

beings rather than being regarded as mere chattel…Since fleeing abroad, the

Dalai Lama has established the "government-in-exile," organized armed forces

and engaged in terrorist activities, and in the 1980s he also instigated riots in

Tibet, causing enormous damage to and loss of local property. In recent years he

has also violated religious rituals and historical conventions, having sabotaged

the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama…The Chinese government firmly

opposes any foreigners that use the Dalai to interfere in China's internal affairs,

and opposes any action aimed at splitting China.” 15 The China government also

expressed view on the Dalai Lama’s “non-violence,” “Since the Dalai Lama

fled abroad in 1959, he has been engaged in activities that split the motherland

and sabotage national unity, despite claiming to advocate "non-violence." In

1959 the Dalai Clique staged an armed rebellion in Tibet. The rioters robbed

monasteries of jewelry, valuable Buddhist statuary and other treasures, killed

Tibetan cadres, and plundered property. After the failure of this rebellion, the

self-exiled Tibetan separatists organized armed forces, and began making raids

on Tibetan border areas, harassing, sabotaging, severely threatening and

harming the lives and property of local Tibetans, and disturbing public order.

During the disturbances instigated by a handful of separatists in Lhasa in

September 1987, rioters severely disrupted the daily life of the city's residents

with their destruction, sabotage, burning and killing. Their violence caused

enormous losses, both in terms of people's lives and their property. In the face

15 Ibid, “The Dalai Lama was awarded the “Nobel Peace Prize” abroad, and some people call him “guardian of human rights” and “advocator of non-violence” How would you comment on this?” http://www.tibetinfor.com.cn/tibetzt/question/6/095.htm.


of such violent terrorism, the Dalai Lama can hardly lay the blame on someone

else, and how can this be called "non-violence"?” 16

China issued an explanation of the limited progress in the negotiations

between the central government and the Dalai Lama, “Since 1979, the central

government has received the Dalai's private representatives on several

occasions. However, due to obstruction from the Dalai, contacts have been

intermittent. The Dalai has constantly changed his tactics: when he believes the

situation to be in his favor, he suspends contacts, and when he feels the reverse

to be true, he demands contact. Even when he is in contact with the central

government, he never gives up his separatist activities at home and abroad.

Facts indicate that the Dalai Lama is not sincere in his negotiations with the

central government, but tries to sway public opinion for "Tibet independence"

under the guise of negotiation. Therefore, the Dalai Lama should be held totally

responsible for the stagnation in negotiations.17” Former US President Clinton

spoke of the importance of resolution of the Tibet problem in his meeting with

Chinese leader Jiang Zemin in June 1998. China capitalized on the occasion to

reiterate its policy in dealing with the Dalai Lama: The policy of the Central

Government towards the Dalai Lama has been consistent and clear-cut, that is,

the Dalai Lama truly gives up his proposition for "Tibet independence," stops

all activities aimed at separating the motherland, and publicly recognizes that

Tibet is an inalienable part of China, Taiwan is a province of China, and the

government representing the whole of China.18 The five points have since been

China’s guiding principles with regard to the Dalai Lama’s return to China, and

also the bottom lines in China’s negotiations with the Dalai Lama.

16 Ibid, “What is the central government's view on the Dalai's "nonviolence"?”

http://www.tibetinfor.com.cn/tibetzt/question/6/096.htm. 17 Ibid, “Why have the negotiations between the central government and the Dalai Lama made so little progress?” http://www.tibetinfor.com.cn/tibetzt/question/6/098.htm. 18 Ibid. “What policies does the Chinese government have towards the Dalai Lama regarding contacts and negotiations?” http://www.tibetinfor.com.cn/tibetzt/question/6/097.htm.

Over the years, China remained untouched by the suggestions of the

Dalai Lama, however vivid they might be. With both sides refusing to give in

and trying to boost their bargaining chips at the same time, the situation soon

turned into mutual accusations over the lack of will for negotiations. In fact, the

basic difference lies in the fact that China insists that the Tibet problem

concerns only the Dalai Lama’s personal future, while exile Tibetans regard the

Dalai Lama as an integral part of the Tibet problem, hence the failure to reach

an agreement.

Ⅱ. Historical Context for the Dalai Lama’s Dispatch of Delegation

In the wake of the terrorism attack on September 11, 2001, the US

immediately launched the global anti-terrorism war. Anti-terrorism became the

mainstream value around the world. The change of circumstances forced exile

Tibetans and China to switch from radical to peaceful in their demonstrations

and protests to avoid raising eyebrows. In 2002, a new generation of Chinese

leaders took over as the older generation took a bow. Jiang Zemin stepped down

as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China following the party’s

16th National Congress on November 8 of the year. Jiang also stepped down as

PRC President following the National People’s Congress of the National

Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March

2003. With Hu Jintao gradually took over as the new PRC President, China

appeared to be heading for a new direction. In the course of political power

turnover, China finally broke the deadlock between itself and the Dalai Lama in

September 2002 when it received the Dalai Lama’s delegation for the first time,

breaking the impasse which lasted for nearly 20 years. Despite adopting a more

realistic and open-minded approach, China made it clear that it was not

prepared to compromise Jiang’s five-point principle in dealing with exile

Tibetans. Both sides made interactions through individuals, the press, and other


public and private channels. While both sides made clear their bottom lines, it

was still a monumental task to dilute suspicions and doubts in the face of the

hostility and lack of trust accumulated over many years of not-so-friendly

interactions. The Tibetan delegations dispatched by the Dalai Lama to China

after September 2002 were a test of mutual confidence, and served as a good

parameter indicating the stance of both sides, the decision-making process, and

possible future development of this newfound relationship. Of course, the

Tibetan delegation representing exile Tibetans had their own formula in dealing

with China. Yet information disclosed to the public was so limited that those

who cared about the Tibet problem were left with no clue as to the details of

Sino-Tibet negotiations. A vague picture of the process can still be formed by

looking at the results.

In addition to the lobbying or pressure from the international society,

especially from the US, another important factor in Sino-Tibet negotiations is

the will for both sides to sit down at the negotiation table. In his annual public

statement on March 10, 2002, the Dalai Lama said:

“It is my sincere hope that the Chinese leadership will find the courage,

wisdom and vision to solve the Tibetan issue through negotiations. Not only

would it be helpful in creating a political atmosphere conducive to the smooth

transition of China into a new era but also China's image throughout the world

would be greatly enhanced. It would have a strong, positive impact on the

people in Taiwan and will also do much to improve Sino-Indian relations by

inspiring genuine trust and confidence…I truly believe that one day, there will

be the chance at dialogue and peace because there is no other choice for China

or for us…On my part, I remain committed to the process of dialogue. As soon

as there is a positive signal from Beijing, my designated representatives stand

ready to meet with officials of the Chinese government anywhere, anytime…I

am not seeking independence. As I have said many times before, what I am

seeking is for the Tibetan people to be given the opportunity to have genuine

self-rule in order to preserve their civilisation and for the unique Tibetan culture,

religion, language and way of life to grow and thrive. For this, it is essential that

the Tibetans be able to handle all their domestic affairs and to freely determine

their social, economic and cultural development…The growing international

support for Tibet reflects the inherent human empathy for and solidarity with

human suffering and a universal appreciation for truth and justice. I appeal to

governments, parliaments and to our friends to continue their support and

efforts with a renewed sense of dedication and vigour.” 19

The emphasis of the statement: the Dalai Lama truly believes that one day,

there will be the chance at dialogue and peace. The Dalai Lama’s designated

representatives stand ready to meet with officials of the Chinese government

anywhere, anytime, and the Dalai Lama appeals to governments, parliaments

and to friends to continue their support and efforts with a renewed sense of

dedication and vigour.

Talking to Radio Australia's Tricia Fitzgerald on May 22 during his 8-day

visit to the country, the Dalai Lama said the following:

“Actually since 1993, (there's been) no sort of formal contact, but some

informal channels…I think, some Chinese government leaders have the feeling

the better to have talk with Dalai Lama…I think in 1998, we eventually

developed contact with some semi-officials, but that somehow stopped…And

very recently (we entered a) new phase…Some Chinese businessmen, some

intellectuals are now showing some movement.” 20

The Dalai Lama also called for the establishment of “mutually acceptable

resolutions” to the Tibet problem with China in his address to the National Press

Club of Australia, and noted that he would be willing to conduct negotiations

19 Xizang-zhiye, “His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Speech on the 43rd Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising on March 10,” 2002/3/10,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/hhdl/3.10/43.html. 20 Xizang-zhiye, “Dalai Lama Willing to Talk to China Anytime,” 2002/5/27,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0205/index.html#020527.1.


with China anytime. At this stage, the Dalai Lama declared that

communications between Tibet and China had moved on to a new phase. Both

sides would conduct negotiations anytime. The Dalai Lama has made his stance

clear: all Tibetan people, not just those living in the Tibetan Autonomous

Region, but also those living in the Tibetan regions in Qinghai, Yunnan, Sichuan,

and Gansu should live under a true self-governing, genuinely autonomous

regime.21 The Dalai Lama also made clear Tibet’s bottom line in dialogues with

China:

“I am dedicated to the Middle-Way approach I have been pushing forward.

I do not seek to split Tibet from China...now what I want to see is genuine

autonomy for Tibet, because this I believe is the only way for Tibet to preserve

its local culture and environment.” 22

Following repeated hints on positive development in contacts with China

given by the exile Tibetan government and the Dalai Lama, on July 3, 2002,

two months before the first Tibetan delegation headed for China, sources

revealed that Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, would leave

Hong Kong for three months of travel and his first return visit to Tibet in 50

years. He would travel to Mainland China, Tibet, and finally to Xinjiang

Province, according to sources. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu

Jianchao told a news conference in Beijing that mainland authorities have

approved a private trip by Gyalo Thondup.23

However, Liu refused to confirm whether Gyalo Thondup would meet the

top officials of the Chinese government and the Tibetan Autonomous Region,

and would not comment on whether Gyalo Thondup’s visit represents Beijing’s

21 Xizang-zhiye, “Dalai Lama: Sino-Tibet Contact Entered New Phase,” 2002/5/23,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0205/index.html#020527.1. 22 Ibid. 23 US Department of State, June 23, 2004, " Report on Tibet Negotiations,"

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/34266.htm.

acquiescence of the Dalai Lama’s visit to China. Fearing the side effects of

non-official activities and premature actions, the exile Tibetan government also

maintained a cautious tone with regard to Gyalo Thondup’s visit, sticking to the

same old line that Gyalo Thondup is not an official representative of Tibet, and

is not dispatched by the exile Tibetan government. Just like what the Kalon

Khripa (Prime Minister, Head of the Cabinet) Samdhong Rinpoche said:

“I am not aware of Gyalo Thondup’s visit to Tibet.” 24

Of course, this was not Gyalo Thondup’s first visit to China. Gyalo

Thondup has paid several visits to China in the past, meeting with China's late

paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. He has also acted as an envoy between

Beijing and the Dalai Lama in the past. Newspapers confirmed that Gyalo

Thondup’s latest visit to China was in October 2000.25 Gyalo Thondup’s

frequent visits to China suggest his close relationship with the country. For

some reason, this particular visit was noted by the press, and attracted so much

attention that even the Chinese MFA spokesperson had to make an official

statement. This visit covered not just the inland cities of Beijing but also Tibet

and Qinghai where many Tibetan people live. Unlike his previous visits, this

time Gyalo Thondup stayed for more than a month in China. In a stark contrast

to the past, the visit was not deliberately kept confidential and low-key. It was

confirmed in front of the press by top officials of the Tibetan Government in

Exile, the Chinese MFA spokesperson, and the Dalai Lama himself. Upon his

return to India, Gyalo Thondup spoke of "great changes inside Tibet, including

many good roads and significant development in the cities" since his last time in

Tibet in 1952. He also expressed optimism over the "great changes in the

outlook of the Chinese Government" and urged face-to-face talks between

24 Xizang-zhiye, “Gyalo Thondup Returned to Tibet for the First Time,” 2002/7/2,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0207/index.html#020711.1. 25 Xizang-zhiye, “Chinese MFA Responded to Gyalo Thondup’s Visit to Tibet,” 2002/7/3,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0207/index.html#020711.1.


Tibetan and Chinese leaders.26 Soon after, there were whispers on September 9,

2002 that the Tibetan Government in Exile was about to dispatch its delegation

for the first time to China.

There were also subtle signs prior to the fourth meeting between the Dalai

Lama’s delegation and China. On May 6, 2005, Lodi Gyari, who had led the

Dalai Lama’s delegation to China for three times, spoke of “the delegation’s

fourth visit to China in the near future to conduct negotiations on the resolutions

of the Tibet problem.” 27 The Dalai Lama also hinted the fourth round of

negotiation and his wish to return to Tibet in an interview with the press in

Europe on June 18.28 It seems clear that the Dalai Lama usually gave hints on

the activities of his delegation.

Ⅲ. The Dalai Lama’s Delegations

A major breakthrough in contact between the Tibetan Government in Exile

and China appeared in 2002. On September 9, a four-member delegation

comprising of Lodi Gyari, Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama to Washington,

Kalsang Gyaltsen, the Dalai Lama’s envoy in Europe, Bhuchung Tsering,

Director of the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT)29 in Washington D.C.,

and Sonam Norbu Dagpo, Additional Secretary of Department of Information

26 US Department of State, June 23, 2004, "Report on Tibet Negotiations,"

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/34266.htm. Gyalo Thondup’s visit to China and his comments after returning to India, despite not covered in newspapers, were written into annual report by US officials in great details. This suggests a close relationship between Gyalo Thondup and US intelligence and Gyalo Thondup’s importance as one of the key Tibetan figures.

27 Xizang-zhiye, “Dalai Lama’s Delegation to Visit China Again,” 2005/05/06, http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0505/index.html#050506.1.

28 Xizang-zhiye, “Dalai Lama Optimistic on Return to Tibet,” 2005/06/15, http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0506/index.html#050615.3.

29 The incumbent ICT Chairman is actor Richard Gere, with Bhuchung Tsering being ICT Director in Washington D.C., and Lodi Gyari being ICT Executive Chairman.

and International Relations, arrived at China for a second time for a 17-day visit

to Tibet and Beijing.30 Two more visits followed in late May 2003 and late

September 2004. The three visits consist of mostly tours and talks organized by

the Chinese United Front Work Department. The fourth visit, which took place

on June 30 and July 1, 2005, was different in nature in that both parties skipped

the tours and proceeded directly to the negotiation. There was no change in the

delegation dispatched by China and Tibet in the four rounds of negotiations, a

healthy sign that mutual trust was building and that no deliberate actions were

needed to warm up the atmosphere. Both sides had named the negotiation squad

and were ready to begin.

After returning from China to Dharamsala, the delegation normally

reported to the Dalai Lama and the Kalon Khripa. A couple of days later,

Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, as head of the delegation, would present a report on

the negotiation in a press conference. The only exception was the third time,

when the delegation returned to Dharamsala on October 1 and had to wait for

the Dalai Lama to return from a visit to North America to deliver their report.

The press conference was delayed until October 13 after the delegation met

with the Dalai Lama and members of the Assembly of Tibetan People’s

Deputies and the Kashag. Appendix Table 1 provides a summary of the

information released in press conference, offering a basic picture of the

negotiations between China and Tibet.

Another direct contact materialized during September 9 – 25, 2002. While

the Tibetan Government in Exile claimed at first that the “Tibetan Government

in Exile’s delegation” would be visiting China in order to define the contact as

between two governments, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs opted for a low-key tone, saying that “a group of Tibetan expatriates”

would visit “in a private capacity.” MFA spokesperson Kong Quan stated that

30 Xizang-zhiye, “Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy,” 2002/9/30,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0209/index.html.


the Chinese Government had agreed to the visit of a "group of Tibetan

expatriates" who would visit "in a private capacity" in order to tour and see

relatives, and would also have a chance to exchange views with people at all

levels. By the time the Tibetan delegation visited China for the second round of

negotiation, its official title had already been changed to “the Dalai Lama’s

delegation” as requested by China. It was after seeing the change that Chinese

Deputy FM Shen Guofang stated in public that negotiations were useful and

beneficial. "China welcomes their return and views the visit as an opportunity

for the group to observe the development of Tibet and other Tibetan regions.

China will meet Tibetan expatriates of all levels,” 31 continued Quan. Changing

the title was a compromise on Tibet’s part to smooth the way for negotiations

with China.

The Dalai Lama’s delegation was hosted by the Chinese United Front

Work Department during their first three visits. The hospitable hosts listened

closely to the words of the Tibetan delegation and had extensive, serious, and

candid discussions. The Tibetan delegation was able to interact with the

provincial, prefectural and local officials who introduced the development in

Tibet. In addition to tours and interactions with Chinese officials, the most

important part was the negotiation with Chinese central officials. Upon their

return to Dharamsala, the delegation said the following:

“Throughout the trip we were guided by this objective. Consequently, we

focused our effort towards building confidence by dispelling distrust and

misconception. We have made every effort to create the basis for opening a new

chapter in our relationship. We are fully aware that this task cannot be

completed during a single visit. It will also need continued persistent effort and

31 US Department of State, April 23, 2005, "China's Invitation to Dalai Lama's Representatives Encouraging-- State Department releases annual report on Tibet negotiation,"

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Apr/22-206846.html.

support from many sides.” 32

The delegation acknowledged major differences between both sides

following the third round of negotiation, but emphasized optimism for future

contacts and concluded that the visit was a successful one that paved the way

for substantive negotiations.33 Likewise, the Dalai Lama is particularly pleased

that the Chinese leadership has a positive assessment of the recent direct contact.

He is encouraged by the development and reiterated the importance for his

delegation to continue to make vigorous efforts to advance this process further.

The mission of the delegation is to lead this process to an earnest negotiation to

find a mutually acceptable solution for the Tibetan people.34

The Dalai Lama did not give further details as to the issues discussed in the

three rounds of negotiation save those revealed in the press conferences. Dawa

Tsering, exile Tibetan Government spokesperson and a member of Tibet’s Task

Force on Negotiations, provided an explanation on behalf of the Dalai Lama:

“Tibet’s delegation, or to be precise the Dalai Lama’s delegation, said upon

their return that it was their third visit to China after contact came to a halt in

1993. On their first and second visits, they were led to visiting different places

by Chinese officials rather than following their own plans. They did discussed

substantive issues on the third visit. I don’t know how far the negotiation went,

but it did take place. This shows that contacts are starting to become substantive.

I think this is what the Dalai Lama was talking about, a more substantive

contact.” 35 Dawa Tsering added:

32 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Sheja, “Visits of Dalai Lama’s Delegation to Beijing and Tibet Turned World Event,” (Chinese translation), September 2002, http://www.tibet.net/sheja/vol14/world/2/index.html. 33 Xizang-zhiye, “Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy: Major Differences between Tibet and China,” 2004/10/13,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0410/index.html#041013.1. 34 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Sheja, “The Dalai Lama’s Delegation’s Third Visit to China and Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s Instructions,” (Chinese Translation), October 2004

http://www.tibet.net/sheja/vol39/world/page1.html. Also see Xizang-zhiye, “Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy,” 2003/06/12, http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0306/index.html#030612.

35 Xizang-zhiye, “Dalai Lama’s Delegation to Visit China Again,” 2005/05/06, http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0505/index.html#050506.1.


“The Dalai Lama also spoke of his wish to return to his homeland Tibet

some day, and he is optimistic about the idea. He has been dreaming of this for

many years. As for how to return, he believes there are many possible ways.

One of them is through a negotiated settlement. It is his wish to return to Tibet,

to his motherland, but more importantly is the resolution of the Tibet problem.

Sometimes China makes the Tibet problem look like nothing but the Dalai

Lama’s return to Tibet. The Dalai Lama has said that he would not force a

return if China had a problem with it, but the Tibet problem must not remain

unresolved. If he is to return to Tibet at all, it will be after the Tibet problem is

resolved, possibly through negotiations. He might go on a pilgrimage trip to

some of the Buddhist sites in China to smooth the way for future negotiations.”

36

Meanwhile, in a customary press conference in Beijing in early May 2005,

Chinese MFA Spokesperson Liu Jianchao was asked by reporters to comment

on the Dalai Lama’s remark about “positive progress in negotiations between

China and his delegation.” Liu reiterated:

“The door to dialogue is open, but the Dalai Lama must truly give up his

proposition for "Tibet independence," stop all activities aimed at separating the

motherland, and publicly recognizes that Taiwan is an inalienable part of

China.” 37

Liu’s words are in conformity to the five-point principles China kept

emphasizing in its contact with the Dalai Lama, “If the Dalai Lama ceased

splittist activities, recognized Tibet and Taiwan as part of China, and admitted

that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legitimate

government representing all of China, then China would be willing to have

36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.

direct consultations with him on his personal future.” 38

The Dalai Lama met with the delegation on June 23, 2005, several days

before the delegation departed for the fourth round of negotiation in China.

There, in front of Kalon Khripa Samdhong Rinpoche, the Tibetan leader spoke

of the importance of proceeding to substantive negotiations. The fourth round of

negotiation on June 30 and July 1 is an extension of the third round in late

September 2004.39 The negotiation was conducted behind closed doors at the

Chinese embassy in Berne, Switzerland. This time there were no tours around

China for the Tibetan delegation. The five-member Tibetan delegation

comprised of Lodi Gyari, Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama, Kalsang Gyaltsen,

Envoy of the Dalai Lama, Sonam Norbu Dagpo, the Secretary-General of the

Department of Information and International Relations of the Tibetan

Government-in-Exile, Tsegyam Ngaba, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile’s

Representative in Taiwan, and Bhuchung K. Tsering. Representing the Chinese

side was Zhu Weiqun, the Vice-Minister of the United Front, Sithar and other

four officials of the department.40 In a stark contrast to previous rounds, the

fourth round was conducted outside China, and the Tibetan delegation was

exempted from visits and tours in China and was able to proceed directly to the

negotiation. The Tibetan delegation for the fourth round is marked by the

addition of rNgapa Tsegyam, de facto ambassador of Tibet's

government-in-exile to Taiwan. Lodi Gyari summed up the fourth round of

negotiation:

“The discussions were concrete and substantive…Obviously, major

differences on a number of issues, including on some fundamental ones,

38 US Department of State, April 23, 2005, “China's Invitation to Dalai Lama's Representatives Encouraging-- State Department releases annual report on Tibet negotiation,”

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Apr/22-206846.html. 39 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration,

http://www.tibet.net/flash/2005/0705/010705.html. 40 Canada Tibet Committee, World Tibet Network News, “Two Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama conclude fourth round of talks in Berne, Switzerland,” Saturday, July 1, 2005,

http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/7/1_1.html.


continue to remain. But the Berne round gave both sides yet another

opportunity to extensively share with each other their views and perspectives on

core issues. We put forward some concrete proposals that will…move the

ongoing process to a new level of engagement.” 41

In the fourth round, pleasantries and rapport-building tours made way for

substantive discussions. Taiwan was mentioned as one of the key issues

between China and the Dalai Lama’s delegation. Both sides were pleased that

their direct contact had now become stable and an "established practice.” 42

How the situation will unfold in the future remains to be seen.

It appears that the four rounds of contact between the Dalai Lama and

China followed a fixed pattern:

Giving hints that contact was forthcoming→official announcement→

delegation departed for negotiations→delegation returned and reported to the

Dalai Lama and the Kashag→press conference. Behind-the-scene maneuvering

before the delegation’s departure and after its return to India usually went

unnoticed.

Ⅳ. Tibet’s Task Force on Negotiations

Interactions between the Dalai Lama and China comprised of both formal

and informal. Informal contacts took the shape of Gyalo Thondup’s personal

visit to China. Formal interactions derived from a series of internal and external

operations, with the latter generally perceived as suitable for public disclosure.

Arrangements and strategies of internal operations varied, depending on the

41 Xizang-zhiye, “Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy,” 2005/07/11,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0507/index.html#050711.2. 42 Ibid.

purpose of negotiations, the parties involved, and the issues brought up in the

negotiations.

The Task Force on Negotiations43 was founded by the Dalai Lama as early

as October 10, 1998 to be responsible for interactions with China. As a task

force on “negotiations,” its primary function is to deal with issues related to

Tibet’s interactions with China. Manifestation of Task Force operations lies in

the visits of the Dalai Lama’s delegation to China. The Task Force convened the

first meeting in October 1998, shortly after its foundation. The Task Force had

convened a total of four meetings, three of which were conducted before the

Tibetan delegation departed for China in mid September 2002, late May 2003,

and late September 2004. In other words, the Task Force would call for a

meeting before the departure and after the return of the Tibetan delegation. The

Task Force convened its fifth meeting on November 17, 2004, after the Dalai

Lama’s third delegation returned from China in late September 2004. The panel

for the fifth meeting consists of five new members. The sixth Task Force

meeting was convened on December 28 of the same year,44 followed by the

seventh meeting on April 13, 2005 and the eighth meeting which lasted for three

days since June 20.45 This proves that the third Tibetan delegation returned

home with substantive issues and suggestions worth serious pondering and

discussions. Appendix Table 2 shows the relationship between the timing of

43 Task Force on Negotiations is directly translated into “Task Force on Peace Talks with China” in Chinese. 44 Contrary to the Chinese version of Xizang-zhiye, 2005/01/03,

http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/xzxinwen/0501/index.html#050103.3,

which cited, “According to the Tibet Times on December 31, 2004, Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) Samdhong Rinpoche, Kalons (Ministers), representatives of the Dalai Lama’s foreign offices, the envoys of the Dalai Lama, and experts on Tibet issues had a meeting near Dharamsala in Northern India on December 28. Details of the meeting have not been disclosed to the public.” Details of the sixth Task Force meeting disclosed in the Tibetan-language political communiqué are dictated by the exile Tibetan government.

45 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration，Sheja, “Task Force on Negotiations Conduct Eighth Meeting,” (Chinese translation), June 2005, http://www.tibet.net/sheja/2005/vol38no6/tibet/page6.html. The article says that the seventh Task Force meeting was held for two days starting April 6, as opposed to April 13 reported by the Bod mii rang dbyang (Tibetan Freedom), June 22, 2005, http://www.tibet.net/tibfreedom/2005/vol45no23/data/page2.html. Sheja made an error on the date.


Task Force meetings and the Tibetan delegation’s trips to China. As suggested

by the table, the third Tibetan delegation brought home core issues which were

extensively discussed in several Task Force meetings. The Task Force rarely

called for meetings unless there were serious issues in the Tibetan delegation’s

negotiations with China.

The Task Force on Negotiations used to be run completely by the Kashag

and its Department of International Relations. The Dalai Lama’s private office

took over the helm following the fifth and sixth Task Force meetings on

November 17 and December 28, 2004 respectively, when decisions were made

to establish the Task Force as an independent body. The Kashag would be

responsible for Task Force operations and coordination for tasks of varying

importance.46 The reshuffling of Task Force, and in particular the switch of

control from the Department of International Relations to the Dalai Lama’s

private office, carries special meanings in that Tibetan delegations from then on

would represent the Dalai Lama instead of the Tibetan Government in Exile, a

change that matched China’s repeated claim that the Tibetan delegations were

the Dalai Lama’s private representatives. The Kashag would no longer have

complete control over the Task Force; its role would be limited to carrying out

decisions only. The Dalai Lama’s private office would be responsible for task

delegation, coordination, and general supervision. More parties would be

involved in Task Force operations, and the Task Force would be able to exercise

greater influence. The magnitude and scope of Tibetan delegation operations

were expanded, with the focus being shifted to the Dalai Lama. The Kashag

was sidelined and played a secondary role in Tibet’s interactions with China.

The size of the Task Force was limited until after its sixth meeting. There

46 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Chapsidridak Archive, “Important Political Announcements of the Tibetan Government in Exile,” Minutes of the Sixth Task Force Meeting (Chinese translation), 2004/12, December, 2004, http://www.tibet.net/chapsidridak/vol31/.

was some small-scale addition in the fifth meeting, but real expansion did not

occur until the sixth meeting. The record shows that the meeting was attended

by 14 members of the Task Force, including Kalon Khripa Samdong Rinpoche,

Kalon for Finance bLobsang Nyandrags, Secretary-General of the Dalai Lama’s

Office bKasthong Tenzin dGebyed, Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama Lodi

Gyari (also former Kalon and the Tibetan Government in Exile’s Envoy to the

US), and Envoy of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile’s

Envoy to Europe Kalsang Gyaltsen, and other current members of the Task

Force, including Thubten Samphal, Spokesperson and Secretary of the

Department of Information and International Relations, Dwagpo Sonam Norbu,

Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Information and International

Relations, rNgaba Tsegyam, de facto representative of Tibet's

government-in-exile and chairman of the Dalai Lama Foundation to Taiwan,

Tsedbang Phuntsog, Liaison Officer of Latin America Office of Tibet, and

Bhuchung . Tsering, President of the International Campaign for Tibet. New

members appointed on November 17, 2004, including Tashi dBangdus, the

representative of the Dalai Lama in New Delhi and former Kalon, Tempa

Tsering, former Kalon for Home Affairs, Gonpo, former chief of Kham of

Do-Kam Association, Dawa Tsering, former Secretary for International

Relations, and Kunchok Tsungrus, Chief Planning Officer of the Planning

Commission, were also present in the meeting.47

The sixth, seventh, and eighth Task Force meetings were presided over by

Kalon Khripa Samdhong Rinpoche as usual. The number of participants for the

three meetings and their positions were slightly different. bLobsang

Nyandrags , 48 for example, had become the Kalon for Information and

International Relations by the time he took part in the seventh meeting. Seven

47 Ibid. 48 Lobsang Nyandak was the Kalon for Finance at the time of the sixth Task Force meeting on December 28, 2004. By the time of the seventh Task Force meeting on April 13, 2005, he had become the Kalon for Information and International Relations.


out of the ten Task Force members were present in the seventh Task Force

meeting, including Lobsang Jinpa, Secretary-General of the Dalai Lama’s

private office, and Tenzin Taklha, Secretary of the Dalai Lama’s private office.49

Present in the eighth Task Force meeting were 10 Task Force members

including Kalon for Information and International Relations bLobsang

Nyandrags , Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama Lodi Gyari (also former Kalon

and the Tibetan Government in Exile’s Envoy to the US), Envoy of the Dalai

Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile’s Envoy to Europe Kalsang

Gyaltsen, and 10 other administrative staffs.50 Task Force members can be

classified into several categories: 1. Negotiation panel, namely the Dalai Lama’s

delegation, 2. General administration, including Kashag departments,

international relation and public relation bodies, responsible for organizing and

hosting meetings, compiling meeting minutes and new release, conducting press

conferences, and other administrative work, 3. the Dalai Lama’s team, i.e., the

staffs of the Dalai Lama’s private office, 4. International relation: One of the

key agenda in the global deployment of the exile Tibetan government is to

secure support from the international community, especially from the US and

the EU, through its negotiations with China. While the Tibetan Government in

Exile has representative offices in many countries around the world, the Tibetan

delegation only include de facto ambassadors to the US, the EU, and Taiwan, a

fact which shows that Taiwan was of the issues in negotiations between the

Tibetan delegation and China, and 5. Communication and coordination, i.e., the

Planning Commission of the exile Tibetan government and major groups

49 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Bod mii rang dbyang (Tibetan Freedom), April 13, 2005, http://www.tibet.net/tibfreedom/2005/vol45no13/data/page4.html. Tenzin Geyche Tethong was the Secretary-General of the Dalai Lama’s Private Office at the time of the sixth Task Force meeting on December 28, 2004. By the time of the seventh Task Force meeting on April 13, 2005, the position was held by Lobsang Jinpa. 50 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Bod mii rang dbyang (Tibetan Freedom), 22nd, June, 2005, http://www.tibet.net/tibfreedom/2005/vol45no23/data/page2.html. Sheja, 2005, June, http://www.tibet.net/sheja/2005/vol38no6/tibet/page6.html.

representing the people, responsible for the organization reform for the exile

Tibetan government and the coordination of internal opinions. The classification

shows that the Dalai Lama’s delegation has been trying to come up with a

response to China’s conditions following its negotiations with China. The

conditions are what the Chinese side kept reiterating, “If the Dalai Lama ceased

splittist activities, recognized Tibet and Taiwan as part of China, and admitted

that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legitimate

government representing all of China, then China would be willing to have

direct consultations with him on his personal future.51” Lodi Gyari issued a

statement after the visit to China in late September 2004 noting that "both sides

acknowledged the need for more substantive discussions in order to narrow

down the gaps and reach a common ground,” and “We stressed the need for

both sides to demonstrate flexibility, far-sightedness and vision to bridge the

differences.” 52

In the sixth Task Force meeting on December 28, 2004, Kalon Khripa

Samdhong Rinpoche provided an analysis of Lodi Gyari’s visits to China and

Tibet, and in particular the third visit to China and details of negotiation with

Chinese officials, the difficulties on the Chinese side, and the operations of the

Task Force since its foundation, including organizational reform, missions for

the future, and the areas of responsibilities for Task Force members. The Kalon

Khripa also spoke of Tibet’s direct contact with China back in 2002 and give

details of the third Sino-Tibet contact. Samdong Rinpoche summed up in the

end:

“Both sides have a high level of confidence with regard to the future. Tibet

is trying to fulfill the instructions of the Dalai Lama, the collective wish of the

Tibetan people, and the Middle-Way approach as confirmed by the Assembly of

51 Ibid. 52 US Department of State, April 23, 2005, " China's Invitation to Dalai Lama's Representatives Encouraging-- State Department releases annual report on Tibet negotiation,"

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Apr/22-206846.html.


Tibetan People’s Deputies. Initiatives beneficial to both sides should begin as

soon as possible. Both sides should strive for more profound cooperation in the

areas of medicine, introduce fundamental changes, and lay the foundation for

the mutual development of traditional medical theories. The Tibetan

delegation’s three visits to China have cleared all obstacles for direct contact,

something that was not possible in the past. Yet uncertainties, differences, and

lack of mutual confidence still cast a dark shadow over the future of the

relationship and the foundation for direct meetings and mutual development.

Small gestures may conjure up significant meanings. Now both sides have

displayed willingness to make improvement. Now that China has extended

goodwill, we should not resort to anti-China demonstrations and protests like

we did in the past. We should stand firmly on our stance and find ways to

implement the Middle-Way Approach. This is the kind of mutual trust both

sides are trying to build.” 53

The sixth Task Force meeting approved the addition of new Task Force

members, some of whom former Kalons who spoke of the Five-Point Peace

Plan, the Strasburg Statement, and other issues including mutual development

of medicine from political, historical, and their personal perspectives in the

meeting.54 The former Kalons spoke highly of the political situation and reform

taking place in Tibet and China, and offered constructive comments on the

language, rhetoric, and the legal issues involved in interactions with China, in

particular their personal insights on the steps, planning, and strategies involved

in the development of relationship between Tibet and China. The seventh Task

53 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Bod mii rang dbyang (Tibetan Freedom), April 13, 2005, http://www.tibet.net/tibfreedom/2005/vol45no13/data/page4.html. 54 In addition, the sixth Task Force meeting also decided to launch cooperation with China in the area of medicine. Professor Yash Ghal of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who was responsible for coordination between the Chinese government and the British government with regard to Hong Kong, and Dr. Nicholas Haysom, who has experience in handling racial issues in South Africa, will lead the medical cooperation between Tibet and China.

Force meeting on April 6, 2005 was about finding ways to carry out the

decisions in the sixth meeting, especially the directions outlined in the Dalai

Lama’s Statement on the 46th Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising and

the Dalai Lama’s Guidelines on Sino-Tibet Relations.55 Both sides had moved

on to technical problems at this stage, with Tibet having to enlarge the size of

the Task Force to meet the demand of the task.

Ⅴ. Support from International Society

Because the United States does not recognize Tibet as an independent state,

it does not conduct official diplomatic relations with the Tibetan

"government-in-exile" in Dharamsala. However, it maintains contact with

representatives of a wide variety of political and other groups inside and outside

of China, including with Tibetans in the United States, China, and around the

world.56 Former U.S. President George H.W. Bush became the first U.S.

president to meet the Dalai Lama when he received the Tibetan leader in White

House on April 16, 1991. Former British Prime Minister John Major received

the Dalai Lama on December 1 of the same year. Former U.S. Vice President Al

Gore received the Dalai Lama in his private capacity in April 1993. Former U.S.

President Bill Clinton dropped in on the White House meeting between Al Gore

and the Dalai Lama. Since then, it has almost become an annual routine for the

U.S. President to receive the Dalai Lama.57 On September 10, 2003, President

Bush met with the Dalai Lama at the White House. In that meeting, the

President expressed his strong support for the Dalai Lama's commitment to

55 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Bod mii rang dbyang (Tibetan Freedom), April 13, 2005, http://www.tibet.net/tibfreedom/2005/vol45no13/data/page4.html. 56 US Department of State, April 23, 2005, “China's Invitation to Dalai Lama's Representatives Encouraging-- State Department releases annual report on Tibet negotiation,"

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Apr/22-206846.html. 57 Xu Mingxu, Intrigues and Devoutness: The Origin and Development of the Tibet Riots, Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1999, p.364.


dialogue with the Chinese Government. The meeting was the first of many

subsequent meetings between the Dalai Lama and political leaders around the

world. Tibet became one of the common issues in the international society

thanks to increasing worldwide media coverage of meetings between the Dalai

Lama and political heavyweights. Soon after, the US Congress created the new

position of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. On May 17, 2001,

Secretary of State Colin Powell designated Paula Dobriansky as Special

Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, in addition to her continuing role as Under

Secretary of State for Global Affairs.58 Tibetan affairs came into the spotlight on

the international scene following the European Parliament’s appointment of the

EU Special Representative for Tibetan Affairs.59 President George W. Bush,

Vice President Richard Cheney, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, and

incumbent Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice raised the importance of

progress on dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives and concerns

about threats to the unique cultural heritage of Tibetans with senior Chinese

officials on different occasions. President Bush met Chinese President Hu

Jintao at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum held in

Santiago Chile, in November 2004. There, he raised the importance of progress

on dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. Vice President Cheney

raised the importance of supporting the dialogue with the Dalai Lama's

representatives with Chinese Premier Wen and Vice President Zeng Qinghong

during his trip to China in April 2004. During her first trip to China as Secretary

of State in March 2005, Dr. Condoleezza Rice raised the importance of the

dialogue on Tibet with senior Chinese officials.

The Tibetan Government in Exile is mostly in touch with the US, the EU,

58 US Department of State, May 17, 2001, “China -- Special Coordinator For Tibetan Issues,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/2933.htm. 59 Melvyn C.Goldstein, " The Dalai Lama's Dilemma", Foreign Affairs v77,n1(Jan-Feb,1998),

http://www.asiamedia.ucle.edu/Deadline/MacKinnon/TibetQuestion/articles/Goldstein.htm.

and the press. The delegation of Dalai Lama serves the double roles of

representing Tibet in dialogues with China and representing the Dalai Lama in

communications with the international society. Contacts between head of

delegation Lodi Gyari and the US and the role of the US in pushing for

negotiations between China and Tibet are recorded in details in the Report on

Tibet Negotiations. The Report on Tibet Negotiations submitted by Dr.

Condoleezza Rice to the US Congress on April 12, 2005 as required by the

Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, gave details of the United States’ continued efforts

in urging for discussions between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama.

According to the report, the United States continues to raise with Chinese

counterparts the importance of the Tibet issue and to urge that China enter into

discussions with the Dalai Lama or his representatives as soon as possible. The

United States is encouraged that the People's Republic of China resumed

contact with the Dalai Lama's envoys in recent years, and urged that these

contacts continue, and that substantive dialogue between the Chinese

Government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives lead quickly to a

negotiated settlement on questions related to Tibet. During his trip to China in

late January 2004, former Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage raised Tibet on

several occasions.

At the invitation of the European Parliament, Under Secretary Dobriansky

visited Brussels in January 2004 to discuss with Parliament members and

European Commissioners her role as Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues in

the context of the U.S.-China relationship. She met with the Dalai Lama in

April and September of 2004, to discuss the status of the dialogue with the

Chinese, the plans for the third visit of the envoys, and the strategy for

continuing and strengthening the dialogue in the future. Under Secretary

Dobriansky also met with Lodi Gyari eight or more times in 2004 to discuss the

dialogue, including preparations for his trip and his views on the outcome. In

addition, Under Secretary Dobrianksy and Lodi Gyari have discussed the

long-term strategy for the dialogue and the potential for future visits. Former


Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly

also encouraged continuation of the dialogue during 2004. He met with Lodi

Gyari several times, both before and after the delegation's September trip.

Assistant Secretary Kelly, during several meetings with the Chinese

Ambassador and with other senior Chinese officials, urged the Chinese

Government to hold substantive talks with the Dalai Lama or his representatives,

without preconditions, to resolve outstanding differences. 60 All of these

demonstrate the extent of US intervention in the bilateral dialogues.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Human Rights has been paying

close attention to human rights issues in China and Tibet, and in particular the

religious and cultural rights of Tibetans.61 An EP delegation embarked on a visit

to China and Tibet in July 2002 to observe the situation and exchanged views

with the Chinese leadership. 62 The European Parliament calls on the

Government of the People’s Republic of China to step up the ongoing dialogue

with the representatives of the Dalai Lama with the aim of reaching a mutually

acceptable solution to the issue of Tibet without further delay. The Parliament

reiterates, in this respect, its call to the European Council to appoint an EU

Special Representative for Tibetan Affairs so as to contribute effectively to the

peaceful resolution of this issue.63 At the invitation of the European Parliament,

Under Secretary Dobriansky visited Brussels in January 2004 to discuss with

60 US Department of State, April 23, 2005,” China's Invitation to Dalai Lama's Representatives Encouraging-- State Department releases annual report on Tibet negotiation,"

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Apr/22-206846.html. 61 International Federation of Human Rights and the Human Rights in China (HRIC) note to the EU, 12.11.2002 62 European Parliament, 16 July 2003，A5-0274/2003, " Report on the 19th EP-China Interparliamentary meeting", PE 320.362,

http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2003-0274+0+DOC+WORD+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y

63 European Parliament, http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+TW-20041115-S+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S#SECTION15.

Parliament members and European Commissioners her role as Special

Coordinator for Tibetan Issues in the context of the U.S.-China relationship.64

Kalsang Gyaltsen, a member of the Dalai Lama’s delegation, was educated in

Switzerland in his early years and later became one of the key secretaries in

Dalai Lama’s private office. During his capacity as secretary, he was mainly

responsible for communications and arrangements for Dalai Lama’s visits. His

promotion to the new position as the Envoy of the Tibetan Government in Exile

to the European Union a few years back has made him the main channel of

communications with the EU. It is clear that western countries led by the US are

supportive for negotiations between China and Tibet, and have established

channels through which they can indirectly take part in any progress that would

lead to a negotiated settlement.

From the end of World War Two all the way to the Cold War in the early

1990s, India had been focusing its agenda on domestic politics and economy, its

problems with neighbors Pakistan (in 1948, 1965, and 1971), and its clash with

China (in 1962). In an atmosphere characterized by the face-off between

superpowers US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, India led the

Non-Aligned Movement while it remained isolated by the international society.

It was a time when the US was calling the shots in Asia Pacific as it

consolidated its grip on the region by providing security support for post-war

Japan, and forming a strategic alliance with China in order to carry out its

containment policy. Relationship between India and the US was confined to a

certain extent. The situation took a turn in the post Cold War era when India

forsook unilateralism and began to Look East in a bid to develop substantive

interactions with the US, Japan, the Association of South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN), China, and Taiwan. India played a key role in the establishment of

anti-terrorism cooperation and the fight against international crime projects in

the ninth ministerial meeting in the 2002 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

64 Ibid.


Dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the political context and diluted

China’s importance as a supporting strategic ally of the US, a development

which led to greater importance and improvement in US-India ties. India

welcomed the change of wind which brought opportunities of cooperation with

the US in the areas of national defense, trade, and business. There were bilateral

issues such as border clash and warfare between India and China, and the two

became economic rivals after they were gloriously dubbed the rising BRICs

along with Brazil and Russia in recent years. Yet there were evident signs of

healthy improvement in Sino-India relationship, as proved by the mutual visits

of senior officials, and the joint search and rescue naval exercise at the coast of

the East Sea, near Shanghai in 2003. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to

India in April 2005 was a real breakthrough in Sino-India relationship. Wen

signed the Joint Statement between China and India with Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh, in which the two leaders agreed to establish a strategic and

cooperative partnership to further deepen diplomatic relations and economic

and trade cooperation. The two countries also signed the Guiding Principles for

the Settlement of the China-India Boundary Question in the hope of resolving

border disputes that had been dragging on for more than 30 years.

Any contact between the Dalai Lama and China would have to take India’s

feelings into consideration. One of the most important parameters of Sino-India

relationship is the intensity of resentment harbored by Tibetans in India against

China. Improvement in Sino-India relationship limited the actions of Tibetans in

India. The Department of Security under the Tibetan Government in Exile had

been in touch with the Intelligence Bureau in India for quite a long time, and the

Dalai Lama also set up the India Tibet Coordination Office (ITCO) in New

Delhi, a division of his personal office, to be responsible for communication

and coordination between India-based Tibetan people and the India government.

Samdhong Rinpoche, the first directly elected Kalon Khripa, has concurrently

served as the Kalon for Security since 2001. The new Kalon Khripa cited plans

to introduce innovative changes to strengthen the Department of Security in his

report to the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies in that year. 65

Communications between the Tibetan Government in Exile and India were

made easier thanks to Samdong Rinpoche’s solid relations with Indian officials.

Indian Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs Mr. Ashok Kant

arrived at Dharamsala in northern India, the home to the Tibetan Government in

Exile, on May 26, 2005 for a visit. Mr. Kant discussed Tibetans issues with the

Dalai Lama and Kalon Khripa Samdhong Rinpoche.66 The Tibetan Government

in Exile and the Indian Government has shared a long-standing close

cooperative relationship in Tibetan affairs. It is a universally acknowledged fact.

India naturally would want to know the latest progress in negotiations between

the Dalai Lama and China, and the Tibetan Government in Exile would be

disinclined to withhold any information from India.

Conclusion

Formal contacts between exile Tibetans and senior Chinese representatives

came to a halt in 1984. The Dalai Lama’s delegation sat down at the negotiation

table in 2002, breaking the impasse after a 17-year hiatus. The delegation was

welcomed by their host and successfully concluded their first three visits to

China. While differences from both sides might have hindered a negotiated

settlement, the dialogues were indeed moving toward building mutual trust and

65 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Chapsidridak Archive, “Important Political Announcements of the Tibetan Government in Exile,” Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rinpoche’s Report to the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies (Chinese translation), 2001/09/05,

http://www.tibet.net/chapsidridak/vol2/. According to the report, the Department of Security should aim to 1. Strengthen existing mechanism to look after the security of the Dalai Lama, and establish an agency to be responsible for security affairs and another agency to be responsible for reception, and 2. Expand the organization and function of the Department of Security to facilitate professional multitasking.

66 The official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Bod mii rang dbyang (Tibetan Freedom), June 1, 2005, http://www.tibet.net/tibfreedom/2005/vol45no20/index.html.


creating a friendly atmosphere for future negotiations. For its part, the Tibetan

Government in Exile tried to defuse some of China’s hostility and suspicions by

adjusting the title of the delegation and asking its peripheral organizations to

keep anti-China demonstrations to a minimum. The Dalai Lama repeatedly

reiterated in public that he would never seek Tibet independence, and that he

recognized Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China, giving humble

assurances that Tibetans are not seeking to split Tibet from China, and Tibet is

willing to remain a part of the People’s Republic of China so long as China

shows enough respect for the Tibetan culture. These actions were meant to build

trust and create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. The fourth round of

negotiation was conducted in the Chinese embassy in Switzerland, an answer to

Tibet’s request that negotiations be held in a third country. The four rounds of

negotiations were marked by a gradual decline in mutual hostility. The Tibetan

delegation was able to proceed directly to the negotiation without having to go

through tours and visits. This is a sign that both sides had become familiar with

each other and were able to focus their agenda on substantive issues.

A host of complicated factors forced China and Tibet to sit down at the

negotiation table. Neither side would want to repeat the unpleasant history in

which talks suddenly came to a halt after the fifth round. Fortunately, the

situation is different on the domestic and international scenes. New Chinese

leadership led by Hu Jintao displayed a real show of confidence by trumpeting

the slogan “Rise in Peace.” The Chinese leaders broke the deadlock in its

contacts with the Dalai Lama and created possibilities for negotiations without

compromising the five points raised by Jiang Zemin, creating hope for a

negotiated settlement for the Tibet problem in the near future. A real

breakthrough may appear in 2006 and 2008, when China begins operation of

the newly built Qinghai-Tibet Railway and hosts the Olympic Games. Tibet

experienced democratic elections of central and local representatives, and the

first Kashag formed by the Kalon Khripa elected by exile Tibetans was born in

2001, building a solid foundation of legitimacy for the Tibetan Government in

Exile. For exile Tibetans, the Tibet problem consists of two issues: the Dalai

Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile. But China insists that the problem

concerns only the Dalai Lama’s personal future and all will be well if the Dalai

Lama returns to China. The change of title which indicates that the delegation

represents not the Tibetan Government in Exile but the Dalai Lama, and the

switch of command from the Tibetan Government in Exile to the Dalai Lama’s

private office all indicate that exile Tibetans have given in and now believe that

the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet is more important than the Tibetan Government

in Exile. Negotiation is supposed to be a means to an acceptable end for all

parties involved. China and Tibet should focus their agenda on the following:

how the Dalai Lama provides satisfactory answers to Jiang Zemin’s five points,

and under what circumstances should the Dalai Lama return to China, including

when to return, in what capacity, who to bring, who to meet, what to do in

China, and whether the return is temporary or permanent.

Most members of the delegation are second-generation Tibetan elite either

educated or have spent a long time in the West, who are familiar with

contemporary politics and negotiation strategies and are able to negotiate in an

extremely sophisticated way that sets a good example for others. However, it

would be unrealistic for Tibet to adopt western-style values and strategies to

haggle with a China that refuses to compromise Jiang’s five points. After all,

China and Tibet are geographically inseparable and are destined to live together

side by side. Constructive understanding and implementation of the Dalai

Lama’s eastern-style middle-way approach and non-violence would be crucial

in creating a negotiated settlement for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan

Government in Exile and passing down healthier Tibetan ethnic, religious, and

cultural heritage to future generations of Tibetans and the world. China has

written down “recognition of Taiwan as an inalienable part of China” as a

condition for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet in its negotiation with the Tibetan


delegation. It seems natural for the Dalai Lama to take care of his own interests

and the Tibet problem first, since Taiwan is hardly a touchier and more

complicated issue than the Tibetan Government in Exile in the eyes of the

Tibetan leader. But in fact it is sheer nonsense for China to throw a completely

irrelevant Taiwan into the package. China was merely trying to make an issue

of the Dalai Lama’s two visits to Taiwan since 1997 and Tibet’s relationship

with Taiwan. As a show of appeasement, the Dalai Lama stated in public that

he would carry on with negotiations with China and suspend all visits to Taiwan.

It would be interesting to see whether the Dalai Lama would succumb to

pressure from China and decide to sever his relationship with Taiwan and

whether Taiwan would be able to understand the Dalai Lama’s reasons for

doing so and come up with a proper response.

(This paper was presented in the 524th MTAC commissioner meeting and the

1077th administrative meeting on August 8, 2005. Revision was completed on

September 19, 2005.)

Appendix Table 1: Negotiations between the Tibetan Delegation and China

First Second Third Fourth Duration 2002/9/9~25 2003/05/25~6/10 2004/9/12~29 2005/06/30~7/1 Location/Places Visited

Beijing, Lhasa (Jokhang Monastery, Norbulinka, and Ganden Monastery), Shigatse (Zhaxilhunbu Monastery), Gyantse (Bakuo Buddhist Tower), Chamdo, and Buddhist sites in Chengdu and Shanghai

Shanghai, Jiangsu,Mount Putuo (Riwo Potala) in Zhejiang, Mount Jizu (Riwo Jakang) in Yunnan, and the Gaden Sumtsenling Monastery (founded by the Great Fifth Dalai Lama) in present-day Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan

Darzêdo (Kangding),Nyarong (Xinlong), Ganzi, and Tawu (Daofu) of Kham Region in Tibet, Guangdong, and Hubei

The Chinese embassy in Berne, Switzerland

Hosts The United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party

The United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party

The United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese embassy in Berne, Switzerland

Tibetan delegation

1.Lodi Gyari, the Tibetan Government in Exile’s Special Envoy to the U.S. 2.Kalsang Gyaltsen, the Tibetan Government in Exile’s Envoy to Europe 3.Sonam N Dagpo, Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Information and International Relations of the Tibetan Government in Exile 4.Bhuchung K. Tsering, President of the International Campaign for Tibet

1.Lodi Gyari 2.Kalsang Gyaltsen 3.Sonam N Dagpo 4.Bhuchung K. Tsering

1.Lodi Gyari 2.Kalsang Gyaltsen 3.Sonam N Dagpo 4.Bhuchung K. Tsering

1.Lodi Gyari 2.Kalsang Gyaltsen 3.Sonam N Dagpo 4.Bhuchung K. Tsering 5.Tsegyam Ngaba, de facto ambassador of Tibet's government-in-exile to Taiwan

Chinese representatives

Wang Zhaoguo, Vice-Chair of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and head of the CPC's United Front Work Department, Li De Zhu, Minister for Nationalities Affairs and Deputy Head of the United Front Work Department, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Vice-Chair of the CPPCC, Ragdi, the Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress and Deputy Party Secretary, Legchok, Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region

Tibetan cadres working at prefectural and provincial levels in Yunnan, and officials working at provincial, prefectural, municipal, and county levels in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Yunnan

Liu Yandong, Vice-Chair of the CPPCC and head of the CPC's United Front Work Department; Zhu Weiqun, deputy head; Chang Rongjung(Ms.), the Secretary-General, and the head of the PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission and officials working at the provincial and prefectural level

Zhu Weiqun, deputy head of the CPC's United Front Work Department, Sithar, head of the Second Bureau in the United Front, and 4 other members


Government and Deputy Party Secretary, Samdup, Head of the Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, and Atrin, Vice Chair of the Sichuan Province Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

Missions The purpose of the visit was two-fold: One, to re-establish direct contact with the leadership in Beijing and to create a conducive atmosphere enabling direct face-to-face meetings on a regular basis in future; Two, to explain His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach towards resolving the issue of Tibet.

The mission is to lead this process to an earnest negotiation to find a mutually acceptable solution for the Tibetan people. In addition to the main objective of continuing the process begun in September 2002 to meet Chinese leaders responsible for Tibetan affairs, there are three specific aims for this visit; i) to broaden theoverall understanding of the situation in China through visits to different areas and meeting with officials; ii) to meet Chinese Buddhist leaders and to visit Buddhist holy sites; and, iii) above all, to visit Tibetan areas and meet Tibetan officials.

Head of the delegation emphasized optimism over future contacts.

The negotiation was conducted outside China in conformity to the agreement reached in September 2004 (the third round of negotiation), and involved concrete and substantive issues.

Results The Dalai Lama expressed happiness over the re-establishment of direct contact with the Chinese leadership and said, "I had instructed my envoys to make every effort to pursue a course of dialogue with the leadership in Beijing and to seize every opportunity to dispel existing misunderstandings and misconceptions in Beijing about our views and positions.

Both sides agreed thatthe past relationship had many twists and turns and that many areas of disagreement still exist. Both sides agreed that there was a need for more efforts to overcome the existing problems and bring about mutual understanding and trust.

There were major differences, with each side expressing different stance. The visit was successful for the most part and laid a solid foundation for substantive negotiations between Tibet and China. Both sides discussed the increase in the number of meetings and to consider periodic meetings at any convenient place, including outside of China, and the inclusion of Mr. Ngapa Tsegyam as a member of Tibetan delegation.

Both sides had a positive assessment of the ongoing process. Despite the existing areas of disagreement, Vice Minister Zhu was pleased that the direct contact had now become stable and an "established practice". The Tibetan side put forward some concrete proposals that will help build trust and confidence and move the ongoing process to a new level of engagement aimed at bringing about substantive negotiations to achieve

a mutually acceptable solution to the Tibetan issue.

Appendix Table 2: The Relationship between the Timing of Task Force Meetings and

Sino-Tibet Negotiations

Meeting First Secon

d Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Sevent

h Eighth

Date 1998/10/10 ？ 2002/9/9

~9/25 ？ 2003/05/25~6/10 ？ 2004/9/1

2~9/30 2004/11/17

2004/12/28

2005/4/13

2005/6/20

2005/06/30~7/1

Negotiations First Second Third Fourth

Appendix Table 2.2: The Relationship between the Timing of Task Force Meetings

and Sino-Tibet Negotiations Foundation and First Meeting

Second Meeting

Third Meeting

Fourth Meeting

Fifth Meeting Sixth Meeting

Seventh Meeting

Eighth Meeting

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12

First Round of

NegotiationSecond

Round of Negotiation

Third Round of Negotiation

Fourth Round of Negotiation

Documents

An Analysis of Contacts between the Dalai Lama … Analysis of Contacts between the Dalai Lama Special Envoy Delegation and the Chinese Leadership 3 “Except for the independence