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MERALCO, Deyto, Sapitula vs. Rosario Lim
Doctrine: The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Facts:
Rosario Lim (Cherry) is an admin clerk of MERALCO. On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Admin Bldg. where Cherry was assigned, as well as in lockers, with imputations against her.
The content of said letter are as follows:
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.”
Cherry immediately reported this to the PNP the following day. A month after (July 4), HR Staffing head Deyto issued a Memorandum transferring Cherry to Alabang sector due to said reports with threats and accusations as it may compromise her safety.
On July 10, 2008, Cherry wrote to Sapitula, VP & HR admin head appealing her transfer and asking that she be allowed to voice her concerns, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She further claimed that the grueling travel from her Pampanga residence to Alabang amounted to a threat on her job security which violated their CBA.
Her reply contained the ff:
“I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a sitting duck so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management
supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.”
She requested that it be deferred but after receiving no response from MERALCO, she filed a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data in the RTC of Bulacan. She alleged that their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. She prayed for a TRO on her transfer and a WRIT commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
TRO was granted and both parties were ordered to file their verified written return.
Petitioners alleged lack of jurisdiction of the RTC and for the dismissal of petition for writ and recall of the TRO. But RTC ruled in favor of Lim by declaring that a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Petition for review to the SC was filed.
Issues:
1. WON RTC had jurisdiction? NO! Its within the jurisdiction of the NLRC and LA. 2. WON issuance of the writ was outside the parameters of a writ of Habeas Data?
YES!
Held:
Petition is GRANTED and the Special Proceeding is DISMISSED. RTC decision in favor of Lim is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Ratio:
RTC has no jurisdiction since it is clearly a labor dispute, ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data. Transfer is a management prerogative. Further, OCA- Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
Cherry’s plea from exemption of the transfer under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, is not covered by a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data: Remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds are vague or doubtful. Employment is a property right under due process clause. It is evident that MERALCO’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer are what prompted her to petition for habeas data. Jurisdiction should have been with the NLRC and LA.
There is no showing on the part of MERALCO, et al, committed any unlawful violation of Cherry’s right to privacy vis-‐à-‐ vis the right to life, liberty or security. Cherry’s claims are speculative. Cherry in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her July 10, 2008 letter. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work is a punitive move by the management. Her own words caught her because it clearly shows the issue to be labor-‐related.
Gamboa v. Chan, 385 SCRA 677 DOCTRINES: The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of the person; (b) the actions and recourses such person took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-‐Arroyo issued AO no. 275 “Creating an Independent Commission to Address Existence of Private Armies in the Country” which will be called the Zeñarosa Commission. Its goal is to eliminate private armies before May 10, 2010 elections. The said commission submitted to the president a report regarding private army groups (PAG), naming also the officials associated with them. Gamboa, one of those named in the report and a mayor of Dingras Ilocos Norte, then alleged that the PNP – Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operations against her and her aides and classified her as someone who keeps PAG without the benefit of data-‐verification. The said information was then submitted by PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the report containing a list of persons with private armies. Then on July 6 and 7, 2010, ABS CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa also averred that her association with PAG also appeared in print media and that she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG of an unverified information that the PNP Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the commission. She said that because of the said report and its disclosure, she is subjected to possible harassment and police surveillance operations. Gamboa then filed a writ for habeas data, alleging that her right to privacy was violated. In the Return on the Writ filed by PNP, it was alleged that it acted within the bounds of the mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. The information in their database also pertained to several criminal cases, more specifically, murder and assault that was charged against Gamboa.
The PNP likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. They also contend that the Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. The RTC dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Habeas Data should issue. RULING: No. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. But wait, there’s more. Drum roll please. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. In a case decided in the European Court of Human Rights, it was held that the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the applicants right to respect private life. In a similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. In this case, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. In this case the respondents admitted the confidential nature and Gamboa also failed to prove that the information leaked to the media was due to the fault of the respondent. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper. She also failed to prove that she will be subject to harassment and unnecessary police surveillance because of the report because the investigations against her was for the other crimes she was accused of. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied. You start the spark in my bonfire heart.
Saez v. Macapagal-‐Arroyo Facts: Saez filed a petition to be granted the privilege of the wirts of amparo and habeas data, with a TRO and an inspection and production of documents. He alleged that the military was conducting surveillance on him and monitoring his activities. In particular, he said that on April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed by “Joel” who used to be his colleague at Bayan Muna. Joel pretended to be a pan de sal vendor and loitered around Saez’s store. Joel had asked him if he was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. Three days later, Saez was apprehended by the military and taken to Naujan, Mindoro. He brought with him two bodyguards and his uncle. He was eventually released at 5pm of the same day, but did not return to his home in Calapan, Mindoro, because he was afraid of a certain Pvt. Osio, who he claimed was always at the pier. Saez also alleged in his petition that his name appeared in military documents such as an order of battle and other governmental records which connected him to the Communist Party of the Philippines. He prayed to have his name excluded from such documents. He claimed that the military had offered to take out his name from the list and clear him from other records if he would cooperate and become a military asset, and he assented under duress. The SC issued the writ of Amparo and ordered the respondents to make a return. They then referred the case to the CA. The return of the respondents stated that the names and descriptions used in the petition were not sufficent to properly identify some of the persons sought to be included as respondents. Some other respondents however, submitted their affidavits. The CA dismissed the case on the following grounds
1. There was no substantial evidence to show how Pvt. Zaldy Osio violated or threatened to violate his right to life, liberty, and security, since he did not even go home to Calapan, where he claimed Osio was.
2. Aside from this he failed to even allege how the supposed violation or threates of violation were committed.
3. The petition does not conform with the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, particularly, Saez did not include any allegation as to how his right to privacy was violated, what recourse he availed of to obtain the documents, what specific documents he was talking about, and from whom he wished to obtain them.
Aside from this, the CA also dropped President GMA as respondent because of immunity from suit. It also dismissed the petition for lacking proper verification. Issues: Whether
1. The petition and its allegations conformed with the requirements of the Rules on Amparo and Habeas Data.
2. Saez was able to prove with substantial evidence his right to the Writs prayed for. 3. Whether the President was rightfully dropped as a respondent.
Held/Ratio:
1. The petition and its allegations conformed with the requirements – The Court found that Saez was able to make specific allegations as to his and respondent’s personal circumstances. He was also able to indicate particular acts which were violative of his rights (sorry guys, di sinabi kung ano yung allegations niya aside from what I already put in the facts). The Court also found that as to the remedies he had to exhaust before availing of the writs, he was able to show that he did not expect help from the military because they were the oppressors, and already went to a human rights organization before going to court. The Court also found that as to the documents, he was able to name them specifically (order of battle, those linking him to the CPP, those he signed under duress), and that it did not matter that he did not allege from whom the documents were to be asked because the requirement of specificity only arises if the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known.
2. Saez was not able to prove his right to the Writs with substantial evidence – Aside from the one question Joel asked Saez about ANAKPAWIS, there was no other contact made between the two, despite Saez’s claims that Joel continued to loiter around his store. No reasonable threat of violation can be inferred from this. Also, after his apprehension, he claims that he was interrogated and forced by the military to stay in certain places, however, the military claim that it was he who voluntarily went to places and offered them his services as a military asset, which they rejected. There being conflicting claims, Saez failed to provide substantial evidence to prove his case. Also, he claims that during his apprehension and interrogation, he was allowed to bring his uncle, the Baranggay Captain, and bodyguards, yet none were brought before the court to testify. Further, respondents deny the existence of the order of battle with Saez’s name on it, and even the people Saez accuse to have been involved in his apprehension were not actually connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division, which he claims was responsible for the violations to his right. Finally, there was no restraint on his liberty, and the mere allegation that “Osio was always at the Pier” cannot be used to reasonably infer any violation to his rights or threats to violate those rights.
3. The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent – The President can be held liable under the doctrine of Command Responsibility, which has three elements:
a. The existence of a superior-‐subordinate relationship b. Superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed c. Superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent criminal
acts or punish perpetrators thereof. Since the President is the Commander in Chief of the military, she necessarily possesses control over them which qualifies her as a superior. Circumstantial evidence can also be used to infer knowledge. However, the petitioner failed to present substantial evidence to show her involvement in his ordeal or her knowledge thereof. Also, there was no request or demand for investigation brought before the President’s office. The Petitioner failed to establish accountability.
Other notes: On the non-‐verification of the petition, compliance with technical rules of procedure cannot be accorded primacy in these kinds of cases, especially when the petitioner himself testifies in court to prove the veracity of his allegations. The defect was deemed cured.
In the matter of the petition for the writ of amparo and the writ of habeas data in favor of Melissa C. Roxas. Roxas v. Macapagal-‐Arroyo Winger’s digest facts: Roxas, an American citizen with Filipino descent, joined an immersion trip to Tarlac. She brought with her money, electronics, etc. After doing work on May 19 2009, she rested, along with her companions, in the house of a certain Mr. Paolo. Around 1:30pm, Roxas and her companions were abducted. The companions were released, but Roxas wasn’t. Roxas was subjected to harsh conditions and torture while being detained. She was allegedly detained for being a member of the CPP-‐NPA. She was released on May 25 2009 and was given only a cellphone with a sim card, where one of the abductors continued to contact her. She filed Amparo and Habeas Data (“HD”). She impleaded the top government employees, from PGMA, to the Chief PNP and Chief of AFP (CSAFP) etc. SC grants the Amparo and HD (but is stricken down later on). but after it is referred to CA, absolves the respondents because Roxas cannot prove the liabilities of the officials. Court cannot also order the respondents to return Roxas’ stuff because it would amount to imputing liability on the respondents. But the respondents can still be impleaded if the petitioner can prove that they can be held still under “responsibility”. Basically the case was referred to the CA and CHR for further investigation and monitoring. (Decision, refer to the bottom part of this case.) Facts: Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-‐United States of America (BAYAN-‐USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-‐Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.
The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name. Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and knees. Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. Petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-‐New People’s Army (CPP-‐NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to “the fold.” The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in
blindfolds even in her sleep. Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named “Rose” who bathed her. There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the
names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as “Dex,” “James” and “RC.” “RC” even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group,” and that she was abducted because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s
house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIMcard, a slip of paper containing an e-‐mail address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit “Rose,” “Dex” and “RC”. Issues:
1. Validity and other circumstances of the Writ of Amparo? 2. Validity and other circumstances of the Writ of Habeas Data? 3. W/N Roxas is entitled to the return of her belongings?
Held: Writ of Amparo -‐She invokes command responsibility. But… It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-‐respondent in an amparo petition. Rubrico v. Arroyo said:
“The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-‐day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)”
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-‐blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. Razon v. Tagitis said:
“x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. “
There is no evidence to impute to the respondents some responsibility. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. Basically she said that her travel time was the basis to know that she was detained in Fort Mags, and that she heard gunfire, construction, and airplanes. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. Return of the Personal Belongings In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and
exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. Inspection of Fort Magsaysay area It would be equivalent to sanctioning a “fishing expedition,” which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. Habeas Data CA said: Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-‐army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-‐list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-‐list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-‐NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. Disposition
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the
persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner,
as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or
his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to
extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time
of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to
furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or
continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its
own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of
Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its
tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We
hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her
personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice,
however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this
decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency
tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human
Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or
continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not
limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National
Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals,
and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to
provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the
following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public
respondents; and on the basis of this determination—
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the
report and recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights—its
own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who
were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for
the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED
BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or
accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may
have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-‐G.R. SP No. 00036-‐WRA that are not contrary to this decision areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
