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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity,
and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,
JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN
TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of
Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines,Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING
CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO
LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197392
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the
National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three
(3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular
national and local elections. The law as well granted the
President the power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the
Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor,
and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who
shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office."
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No.
10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House
Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in
petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after
RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to
enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely
carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was
held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article
X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting
provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An
Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
as Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law
provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first
defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 91401 -
on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections
originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.
It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later
than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14,
2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join
ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No.
6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on
June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as
House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the
ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22,
2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with
one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011.
Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June
7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate
amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA
No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came
through a petition filed with this Court – G.R. No. 1962713 -
assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No.
2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for
non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed
another petition4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave
rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its
constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition5 filed by Rep. Edcel
Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary)
and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition6 filed by Atty.
Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and
Preliminary Injunction7 filed by Louis "Barok" Biraogo against
the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus8 filed by Jacinto Paras
as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as
G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding
Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with
candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for
August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus9 against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights
Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement
filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for
Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011.
On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the
petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No.
2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,
2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153
and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these cases not be
decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have
to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of
suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere
to the "elective and representative" character of the executive
and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to
appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular
elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue
that the power of appointment also gave the President the power
of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were
recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of
August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections
constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No.
9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and
Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the
ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is
constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented
above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that
the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of
this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined
by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election
of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of
all Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year
and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,10 which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.11
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections –
whether national or local – to once every three years.12 This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations.13
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the
synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission on
Elections,14 we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and
the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same
hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously
as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should
be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
"local" election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.1avvphil
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used
should be understood in the sense that they have in common use
and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms
are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails.15 As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,16 "[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, its language should be understood in the sense that it
may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed."
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political
subdivision.17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions
of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives obviously fall within this classification, since
they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the
limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions
are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government."
Autonomous regions are established and discussed under
Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a
form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X
of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.
Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization
mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious. We shall refer to
synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this
concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed
in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete
resolution.
II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of
RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution18 which provides that before
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws,
they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the
bill’s immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,19 explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement
not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with
the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed
on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on
the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by
the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from
having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to
our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section
18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art.
VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with
procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of
their legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the
President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.
Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify
our intrusion under our power of judicial review.21
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial
department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of
the President's certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers
and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the
judicial hand.22
In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold
purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable
our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators
of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that
a measure is in progress through the enactment process.23
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law,
that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure
had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light,
no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to
RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These
provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution,
this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress
of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act
shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the
vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153
amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will
show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first
ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the
date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by
enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously,
these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 –
cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did
not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by
providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that
rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA
No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent
elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM
elections,24 leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,25 RA No. 8176,26 RA No.
8746,27 RA No. 8753,28 and RA No. 901229 were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these
laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No.
6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.
Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any
plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law
on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be
held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 914030to reset the date of the ARMM
elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.
9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA
No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite
held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9333,31 which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed
RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
905432 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
"majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of
the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these
bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a
vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately,
in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3
voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution
requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws
it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v.
GSIS33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when
so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the
acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal
may be exercised at the same session at which the original act
was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot
declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures
or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it
is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action
and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively
enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an
unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that
Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point
of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite
is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be
included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is
that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,35 questions
on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may
unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the
Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a
plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these wordings
as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions
– i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution
which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the
Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the
regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e., the
special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative
powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.36
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that
the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are
valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local
elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide
for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.
On this point, an existing law in fact already exists – RA No.
7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections
with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA
No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with
the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections
where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is
technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law,
given that regional elections are in reality local elections by
express constitutional recognition.37
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMM’s regular elections (which
should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333)
with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed
by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three
options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These
options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1),
Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;38 (2) to hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to
Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in
choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs,
chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a
completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying
material premises must be fully understood. The first is the
extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the
constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and
the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.39 The legislative body possesses plenary power
for all purposes of civil government.40 Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.41 Except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects
and extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.42
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either
express or implied. The express limitations are generally
provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights
(Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative
and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the
autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express
limitations. The implied limitations are found "in the evident
purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as
a part of organic law."43
The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically,
Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution – constitute
express limitations on legislative power as they define
autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate
on the governance of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the
limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of
government – i.e., that the government must have an executive
department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be
elective and representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative
powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as
expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and
functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government."
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve
as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with
legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions.
The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the
Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-government,
in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under
these provisions are the permeating principles of national
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as
expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.44 In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence,
as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio45 in
the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized
and established constitutional mandates, with one being as
compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,
the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on
and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy – as the
term suggests – directly carries a narrower regional effect
although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and
limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To
succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then,
its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the
national, congressional and all other local elections (save for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the
intervening period between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-
one (21) months away – of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this
period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its
established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due
to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not
a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The
Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the
new46and for the introduction of new concepts.47 As previously
mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections
towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look
far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that
synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus,
the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances
when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon
del Sur48 and Dinagat Islands,49 the creating statutes authorized
the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these
positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive
officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall
have been elected and qualified.50 A similar authority to appoint
is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-
province to a province.51
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by
necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were
adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in
sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution
and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall
serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the
options available to Congress to address the problems brought
about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly
understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide.
The proper understanding of the options as interim measures
assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the
passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be
faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the
Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections
necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could
have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered
and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
As this Court put in Osmeña v. COMELEC:52
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of
officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has
in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when
the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act
postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is
limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent
beyond the period as limited by the Constitution." [Emphasis
ours.]
Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where
the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its
mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should
be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional
process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches
of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate
except only as the Constitution itself may allow.53 If at all,
Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it
by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is
appropriate and called for.54
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been
fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself
and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively
another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term
– is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,
then all laws would be illusory.55 Congress cannot also create a
new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President.56 Hence,
holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where
the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,57 Adap v.
Comelec,58 and Montesclaros v. Comelec,59 where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in
a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other
hand, refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the
ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year
term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot
legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were
originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible,
and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,60 we have to remember
that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.61
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within
the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is
for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct
special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following
provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when
so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a
body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.63
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the
Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,
cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not
without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion.64 But our power rests on very narrow
ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it
is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282
urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional
power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress
to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing
and administering all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a
specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5
and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone
elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and
can only be exercised within, the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious
cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition
by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close
to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to
address instances where elections have already been scheduled
to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence,
(b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of
such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous
causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected
events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These
"analogous causes" are further defined by the phrase "of such
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible."
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations
where elections have already been scheduled but do not take
place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence,
(c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspendedbefore the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses
instances where the elections do not occur or had to be
suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is
by law – i.e., by congressional policy – and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be
given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal
causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure,
cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended
by the lawmakers.66 Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of
BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has
absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold
special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective
officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to
compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis
likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials
shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the
synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the
terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power
to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be
exercised only in the case of barangay officials,67 is specifically
given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such
power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of
twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,68 and extended the
terms of the President and the Vice-President69 in order to
synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same
power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution
cannot be changed by mere statute.70 More particularly, not
even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or
more, than the constitutionally mandated three years71 as this
tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will
happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express
provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those
officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on
their term (where the "term" means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the "tenure" represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office).72 As with the fixing of the
elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis
to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would
commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their
discretion if they do so.
E. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim
measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President
of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only
measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however,
should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of
this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;
other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in
this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.74
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from
RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the
authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the
assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be "elective and
representative of the constituent political units." This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged
constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office." This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the
supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is
that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153,
in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the
interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.75 Aside from
its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim
measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given
the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought
with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above
considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing
for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the
elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to
appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure,
and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
– an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend
beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to
foster a government that is not "democratic and republican." For
then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of
fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would
frontally breach the "elective and representative" governance
requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period
is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance – both
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054
– will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat
what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern
unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with
the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary
measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will
temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community,
the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but
this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an
interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been
adopted and used in the creation of local government
units76 and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of
provinces.77 These measures, too, are used in light of the wider
national demand for the synchronization of elections
(considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). The
adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from
the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the
State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of
the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen
leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment
process; only the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete
terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 –
viewed in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of the
Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one
that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the
oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President
the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus
allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the
President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers
of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even
Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it
was for a very specific and limited purpose – the
synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a
lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are
likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied
to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other
localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections
can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated
by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot
continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of
their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to
conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the
dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not
be forgotten that a period of 21 months – or close to 2 years –
intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective
officials’ terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective
officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our
Mindanao history – past and current – teach us, many
developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire
in the country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the way
they transpired in the past.78 Thus, it would be reckless to
assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an
acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional
Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily.
To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint
OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative.
We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v.
Petilla, etc., et al.:79
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two
laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as
provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through
their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,
etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent,
may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay
in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the
Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.80 (Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that
may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President
in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment
power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable
measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the
ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there
exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional
mandates – synchronization and regional autonomy – such that
it is necessary to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic
principle in constitutional construction – ut magis valeat quam
pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over
the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear.82 We refer to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angco v.
Castillo, et al.,83 thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in
isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions
should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give
to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this
Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that
Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to
transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected.
Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or
modify its governing features, except in a very temporary
manner and only as necessitated by the attendant
circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections
should not be synchronized with the national and local elections
in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its
own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of
nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous
regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the
Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The
ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination. As reflected during the
constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous
regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation
from the central government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region and the central
government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a
separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within
the larger political framework of the nation.84[Emphasis
supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the
above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by
the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that
autonomy shall be "within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines."
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed
to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary
in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous
regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon
further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision
in order to "make it clear, once and for all, that these are the
limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not
enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national
government[.]"85 Of note is the Court’s pronouncement in
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre86 which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally
must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the
synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a
national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy
granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from
having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by
no less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a
constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national and
local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court
cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.87 As judges, we can
only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about
its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.88
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which
Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge
laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.89 The petitioners, in asking
this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite
its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture
into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one
of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government – the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress
acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.90
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly
within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it
acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to
perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the
petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we
can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is
presumed valid.91 Congress, thus, has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of
rebutting this presumption.92 Any reasonable doubt about the
validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.93 As this Court declared inGarcia v. Executive
Secretary:94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the
joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law
has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for
lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our
Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.