The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers

INCORPORATED 1912

FOR THE

Advancement of the Science ofRailway Signalling

Proceedings 2004/2005

(Copyright Reserved)

PRICE TO NON-MEMBERS £50.00

Printed by Fericon Press Ltd (Tel: 0118 945 6100)

Cover Picture: The IRSE Convention Special train at Wicklow on Tuesday afternoon, 1st June 2004. The specialtrain is snugly in the loop (with its rear in the headshunt!) to allow the service train from Rosslare to Dublin to

pass. Behind the locomotives is the generator car, and behind that the RPSI’s ex-Great Southern and WesternRailway Co “Irish State Coach” No. 351 of 1903. Note Iarnród Éireann’s high-visibility semaphore signals.

Photo Copyright: Robert Gray

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ContentsPage

Contents ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3

Portrait of J D Corrie ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4

History of President …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4

The Council of the Institution 2004/2005 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6

Addresses of Officers ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………8

Institution Announcements ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9

Institution Sales ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………11

Institution Awards …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………14

Obituaries…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………15

Sixth Members’ Luncheon ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………18

Presidential Address………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………20

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Wednesday 13th October 2004 “Railway Control Philosophy” ……………………27

by Daniel Woodland with a summary of the Discussion …………………………………………………………………………………………42

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Wednesday 10th November 2004 “Railway Signalling Philosophy, ……………45

Principles and Practice” by Francis How with a summary of the Discussion ……………………………………………………56

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Tuesday 8th December 2004 “Points and Point Machines” …………………………58

by Antony S Kornas with a summary of the Discussion …………………………………………………………………………………………70

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Wednesday 12th January 2005 “Block Working, Route Holding and …………72

Train Detection” by J D Francis with a summary of the Discussion ……………………………………………………………………83

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Wednesday 16th February 2005 “Interlocking Developments” ……………………85

by Ian Shannon and Roger Short with a summary of the Discussion …………………………………………………………………99

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Wednesday 10th March 2004 “The Evolution of Signalling on the High-…102

Speed Lines in France” by Christian Sevestre and Michel Laurin with a summary of the Discussion…………118

Technical Meeting of the Institution, Midland & North-Western Section, Wednesday 8th September 2004

“LED Cluster Technology in Railway Signalling Applications” by Hugh Barton ………………………………………………120

Technical Meeting, York Section, Thursday 9th December 2004 “Kowloon – Canton Railway Corporation

“Signal Engineering to Corporate Planning”” by Syd Barley ………………………………………………………………………………124

Ninety-Second Annual Report …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………129

Ninety-Second Annual General Meeting …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………144

41st Annual Dinner ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………146

IRSE Convention 2004: Dublin, Ireland ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………147

The Early History of the IRSE – The Formation of the Institution by Ken Burrage …………………………………………………154

The Honorary Fellows by Ken Burrage ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………157

2004 Examination Results …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………159

Technical Visit to the Øresund Link 26th-27th November 2004 …………………………………………………………………………………160

Australasian Section ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………164

Midland & North-Western Section ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………173

North American Section………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………174

Plymouth Section …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………175

Scottish Section……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………176

Southern African Section ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………177

Western Section……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………180

York Section …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………185

Younger Members’ Section ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………188

Advertisers ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………190

4

Photo: Claire Porter

Having left school a few months after theBeeching Report was published, John followedcareers advice away from railways. However, aswith all our Presidents, he has been a life longdevotee of rail transport.

There is a tenuous railway ancestry through a near

relative who was Station Master with the LMS atEdinburgh’s Princes Street station. There was alsothe proximity of one of Britain’s busiest railways tohis childhood home. John was born and brought upin Ilford and the constant procession of steam-hauled main line trains and electric suburban

J D Corrie DMS CEng FIEE FIRSE FCILT FPWI MCMI MSaRS MIRO

President 2004-05

J D CORRIE 5

services on the Great Eastern main line soonattracted his attention. Trains in all directionsrunning in perfect safety at different speeds. Howwas it done?

He did not waste any time in finding out as, by theage of 13, he had joined the Bluebell Railway, wastrained as a fireman, signalman and guard, andsometimes helped the S&T department where hespent time with Charlie Hudson. What better startcould anyone wish for?

John was educated at Beal Grammar School inIlford leaving there in 1963 to start his apprentice-ship with Marconi at Basildon. He reckons that hischoice was partly influenced by his father’s interestin radio, which had its origins in war service inBurma as a Radio Officer. Five years apprenticeshipwas followed by two years working on mappingdisplay systems for helicopters. He completed hisHNC in electrical and electronic engineering andJohn will tell you that his professional status is aTelecommunications Engineer having obtained hisChartered Engineer status through the thenInstitution of Electronics and Radio Engineers.

He might have remained in aircraft instrumen-tation but for an advertisement he chanced upon.Westinghouse needed engineers for developmentwork on the first computer-based train describers.John’s long held desire to be part of the railwaycommunity was immediately realised when DavidNorton, who was the boss of Westinghouse’s R&Ddepartment, employed him to work with the teamwho were developing the display systems for theWCML train describers. From there, he assistedTerry George’s group who were tasked withproducing an enhanced AWS for the SouthernRegion of BR.

Within no time at all, John found that an unwrittencondition of Westinghouse employment was IRSEmembership and Tony Howker soon had Johnstudying, successfully, for the examination. The SRAWS work was succeeded by ATO development forthe Madrid Metro contract.

Life seemed set to remain with Westinghouse butlove intervened. He married Nicola, a professionalmusician, and left Westinghouse to live in Newburyworking for Nuclear Enterprises at Beenham Grangenear Aldermaston [GWR’s wartime headquarters].

Four years of working with computer interfaceequipment for nuclear applications was enough. Lifeaway from railways was not particularly attractive and he began to realise thatWestinghouse had given him the opportunity toinfluence events rather than just to respond to theideas of others.

In 1979, he returned to Chippenham. The HongKong MTRC contract was underway and he wassoon involved in the ATO and ATP systems.Westinghouse’s very own processor-based interlocking was his next project resulting in theNeasden CBI for London Underground in 1985.Neasden was to be the solitary UK application asBR remained faithful to the SSI and LondonUnderground subsequently adopted Westrace.

John has strongly held views on the design ofinterlockings about which he will happily give youchapter and verse.

In 1986, in conjunction with the S&T engineers onBR’s Western Region, he produced a design andspecification for a radio based signalling system forthe lines in Cornwall. Despite the success of theRadio Electronic Token Block elsewhere on BR, theconcept was never pursued. A pity as it might wellhave placed the UK railway industry in the lead forthe development of ERTMS.

Work on the Westrace computer based inter-locking and the FS series of microprocessor-basedtrack circuits preceded his departure in 1988 toMott, Hay and Anderson. “Motts”, now MottMacDonald, required experienced signal engineersfor the growing market in systems engineering inrailway applications and John’s first involvementwas with Manchester Metrolink.

The range of work that he has undertaken sincewould fill an entire issue of IRSE News. Inevitably, itis the bizarre events that come to mind first such aspersuading Cyril Smith MP, a man of substantialrotundity, that the ticket gates proposed for the LULstations had been designed with him specifically inmind.

John’s greatest technical passion is cab signallingand automatic protection systems. His railwaywould be one with no lineside signals and with radiotransmission of data for cab signalling and trainposition detection. His experience of ATP systemshas involved him in assessment work of the ChilternLines and Paddington to Bristol systems. He was anindependent safety assessor for Railtrack’s WestCoast main line train control system and also theTrain Protection Warning System. Whilst he is fullysupportive of measures that will reduce andeventually eliminate train safety being dependent onvisual interpretation of lineside signals by drivers, hehas serious misgivings on some of the engineeringfeatures of this protection system.

He is Technical Director in Mott MacDonald’sRailways Division and has an impressive array ofletters after his name – seven institutions at the lastcount – covering railway operations, engineering,management and safety. Our Institution in particularhas cause to be grateful for the time that he hasdevoted to a range of activities. He was on theExamination Committee for 12 years and made asignificant contribution to the development of thetraining modules. In between times, he has giventalks to study groups, IEE schools and marked theannual exam papers.

His sons are displaying similar talents. David ispursuing a career in IT, currently specialising in thedesign of display systems for medical records.Stuart is with Mott MacDonald as a permanent wayengineer on West Coast main line.

So what does John do in his spare time,assuming that there is any? Organs are a sharedinterest with Nicola. She plays them and hemaintains them. Just like a well managed railway,operations and engineering in harmony.

The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers

INCORPORATED 1912

SESSION 2004/2005

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

PRESIDENT

J D CORRIE …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Croydon

VICE-PRESIDENTS

J PORÉ ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Paris

J FRANCIS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Chippenham

COUNCIL

CO-OPTED PAST PRESIDENTS

C H PORTER …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

P STANLEY ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

R E B BARNARD……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Manchester

FELLOWS

W J COENRAAD ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Utrecht

A J FISHER …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Plymouth

F HEIJNEN ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Chippenham

F HOW ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

J IRWIN …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

P JENKINS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

I MITCHELL ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Derby

A SIMMONS …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

D N WEEDON ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

F WILSON ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

MEMBERS

Mrs C PORTER………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

A S KORNAS ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………York

G SIMPSON……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

K L WALTER …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

D WOODLAND ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

N WRIGHT ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Swindon

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

J HAILE……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………London

C LAKE …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Swindon

6

IRSE Council & Officers outside IEE, Savoy Place, London

Front Row (left to right):

Gary Simpson, Frans Heijnen, Ken Burrage (Chief Executive), John Corrie (President),Jacques Poré (Senior Vice-President), John Francis (Junior Vice-President)

2nd Row (left to right):

Colin Porter, Tony Kornas, Wim Coenraad, Keith Walter, Martin Govas (Treasurer)

3rd Row (left to right):

Daniel Woodland, Derek Edney, Mark Watson-Walker, Nick Wright, David Weedon

4th Row (left to right):

Jim Irwin, Bob Barnard, John Haile

Back Row (left to right):

Fraser Wilson, Peter Stanley, Ian Mitchell, Chris Lake, Francis How

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL 7

Photo: Colin Porter

8

Addresses of Officers

Chief ExecutiveK W BURRAGE

3rd Floor, Savoy Hill House, Savoy Hill, London WC2R 0BSTelephone: +44 (0)20 7240 3290 Facsimile: +44 (0)20 7240 3281 Email: hq@irse.org

TreasurerM GOVAS

2 The Droveway, Haywards Heath, West Sussex RH16 1LL

Proceedings EditorA PARKER

Network Rail, Floor 9, 1 Eversholt Street, London NW1 2DNTelephone: 020 7904 7411 Facsimile: 020 7240 3281 Email: andrea.parker@networkrail.co.uk

Australasian SectionChairman: C PAGE Vice-Chairman: T MOORE

Secretary: G WILLMOTT Treasurer: G WILLMOTT

Hong Kong SectionChairman: P GAFFNEY Vice-Chairmen: F FABBIAN & K W PANG

Secretary: F HUI Treasurer: F HUI

Midland & North Western SectionChairman: I ALLISON Vice-Chairman: I JOHNSON

Secretary: B REDFERN Treasurer: C WILLIAMS

North American SectionChairman: D THURSTON Vice-Chairman: K BISSET

Secretary: G YOUNG Treasurer: G YOUNG

Plymouth SectionChairman: A WILSON

Secretary: D CAME Treasurer: D CAME

Scottish SectionChairman: A KING

Secretary: I HILL Treasurer: A McWHIRTER

Southern African SectionChairman: R GOULD Vice-Chairman: R KOHLER

Hon Secretary: V BOWLES Treasurer: J C VAN DE POL

Western SectionChairmen: P DUGGAN Vice-Chairman: C NAPPERSecretary: D GILLANDERS Treasurer: M BROOKES

York SectionChairman: R PRICE Vice-Chairman: K YEWS

Secretary: J MAW Treasurer: R PRICE

Younger Members’ SectionChairman: J HAILE

Secretary: K GOODHAND Treasurer: C OYEKANMI

9

Institution Announcements

(The price and subscription rates and other information given in these announcements are current at the date of publication – August 2005)

CHANGE OF ADDRESSConsiderable inconvenience is created by

members failing to notify changes of address. Willmembers please inform the Institution office immediately of any such alteration and so ensureprompt delivery to themselves of notices, etc.

TRANSFER TO HIGHER CLASSOF MEMBERSHIP

Members sometimes remain in one class of membership when their professional standing hasbecome such as to entitle them to transfer to a higher one. The Council invites any such person tomake application for transfer, for which purpose aform can be obtained from the Institution office, andso take a position in the Institution consonant withhis attainments and responsibilities.

TECHNICAL PAPERSThe Council invites members of all classes to

submit papers for presentation at technical meetingsin London or at local meetings in the UnitedKingdom or overseas.

Papers should consist of between four thousandand six thousand words and while no limit is placedon the number of illustrations an author uses duringhis reading of the paper, the number printed as partof the advance copy and published in the Journal ofProceedings must not exceed twelve.

The Institution office will be pleased to provide fullparticulars upon application.

COPIES OFTECHNICAL PAPERS

Copies of the technical papers read in London willbe published in IRSE News and circulated to allmembers. The cost of this service is included in theAnnual Subscription.

SUBSCRIPTIONS AND REMITTANCESMembers are reminded that in accordance with

the Articles of Association subscriptions are payableon election or by the 1st July each year. The subscription rates applicable for 2005/2006 havebeen determined by Council. Members have been circulated with details.

Members are reminded that prompt payment ofsubscriptions is required. The Institution is gratefulto the vast majority of members who keep admini-stration costs down by paying at the time requested.The Treasurer is obliged to send out notices ofarrears to members who have not paid by that date.

Subscriptions should be sent to the Institutionoffice in London, unless you belong to either theSouthern African or Australasian Section. Local

arrangements apply to members of these Sections.

All cheques and money orders, especially thosefrom overseas, should be crossed.

The attention of members is directed to the clauses in the Articles of Association under whichneither notices nor copies of Proceedings may besent to those who are in arrears with their subscrip-tions beyond a certain time.

Income Tax – the annual subscription to theInstitution of Railway Signal Engineers is treated asan allowance expense under Section 16 of theFinance Act 1958 and should be included in your TaxReturn in the section headed “Expenses inEmployment – Fees or subscriptions to professionalbodies”.

Members of the Institution who have retired andhave paid full subscriptions for at least ten years areentitled to continue membership of the Institution athalf the full rate applicable to their class of member-ship. Similar arrangements are available to others inspecial need on application to the Treasurer.Members of 50 years standing are not required topay subscriptions.

LIBRARYThe Institution Library is incorporated with the

Library of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, bykindness of the Council of the latter body. It is situated at the Institution of Electrical Engineers’building at Savoy Place, Victoria Embankment,WC2. Members of the Institution of Railway SignalEngineers have been granted the same privilegeswith respect to it as those enjoyed by members ofthe Institution of Electrical Engineers, and the entirecollection is open to them on equal terms.

The Reference Library, which contains a ReadingRoom in which a great number of technical periodicals are always available, as well as a largegeneral collection, is open as follows:

Monday to Friday 9.00 am to 5.00 pm

Any member of the Institution of Railway SignalEngineers entering the Library must sign his name inthe book provided for that purpose.

The use of the Lending Library, which is open during the same hours as the Reference Library andwhich contains the principal works relating to electrical engineering, its applications and alliedsubjects including, of course, railway signalling, isgoverned by the following rules, which must bestrictly adhered to:

When applying for a book by post a member of theInstitution of Railway Signal Engineers must statetheir class of membership. All communicationsshould be addressed to the Secretary, Institution ofElectrical Engineers, at the address already given.

Anyone desirous of making a presentation to thecollection should forward it to the same address,when its receipt will be suitably acknowledged.

SIGNAL AND TELEGRAPHTECHNICAL SOCIETIES

The following S&T Technical Societies are affiliated to the Institution:

The Signal & Electrical Engineers’ Society –General Secretary: M B SimmondsTube Lines Ltd, 4th Floor (4/091), 15 WestferryCircus, Canary Wharf, London E14 4HDEmail: mathew.simmonds@tubelines.comTel: 020 7088 5517

IRSE PROFESSIONAL EXAMINATIONREQUIREMENTS FOR CORPORATE

MEMBERSHIPThe aim of the examination is to establish the

professional competence of educationally qualifiedelectrical, electronic and communications engineersin railway signalling and communication engineer-ing.

It is intended to test the main concepts of the subject material without bias to any one railwaypractice and is designed to demonstrate that thestudent has reached the necessary professionaleducational standard required by a signalling ortelecommunications engineer for CorporateMembership of the Institution.

This standard is typified by the exercising ofjudgement in the preparation, assessment, amendment or application of specifications and procedures, and is applicable to personnel engagedin the following activities:

• Signalling/telecommunications principles, prac-tices, rules and regulations for the safe operation of railway traffic.

• Design and development of signalling/tele-communications equipment and systems.

• Preparation and understanding of equipmentdrawings and specifications and/or design.

• Planning, site installation and testing of signalling/telecommunications equipment andsystems.

• Practices related to assembly, wiring and testingof signalling/telecommunications equipmentand systems.

• Maintenance and servicing of signalling/telecommunications equipment and systems.

In order to meet the examination requirements forcorporate membership, candidates must, within aperiod of five years, obtain a pass in Module 1, plusthree of the remaining six optional modules.

It is possible to obtain exemptions from individualmodules where you can demonstrate that you havepassed an examination by a recognised body, whichhas substantially covered the syllabus of a particularIRSE examination module. Due to the specialisednature of the IRSE Examination, the scope forexemption is fairly limited.

Claims for exemption must be made within fiveyears of obtaining the particular qualification forwhich recognition is being claimed. The reason forthis condition is that the exemption is based oninformation that may not be available where a qualification has been discontinued or changed.

MODULE 1Safety of Railway Signalling and Communications

– No exemptions will be given.

MODULE 2Signalling the Layout – Please apply, no exemp-

tions currently agreed.

MODULE 3Signalling Principles – Please apply, no exemp-

tions currently agreed.

MODULE 4Communications Principles – This is the most

commonly sought after exemption. Many of theapplicants for exemption claim that telecommuni-cations has been part of their Degree course andthat, on this basis, exemption should be granted.Unfortunately it has been clear that the content ofthe telecommunications element within a typical university Engineering Degree is, at best, a basicoverview. Occasionally, students study a tele-communications topic for their final year project, butthese tend to be about a research topic narrowly specialising in a particular field and theCouncil is not convinced that such study justifiesmodule exemption. As a basic guideline, therefore,please do not ask for exemption to this moduleunless: your university study has predominantlybeen in telecommunications; or your university studyhas included telecommunications and your presentcareer is railway telecommunications engineering.

Module 5Signalling & Control Equipment, Applications

Engineering – Please apply, no exemptions currentlyagreed.

Module 6Communications Equipment, Applications

Engineering – Please apply, no exemptions currentlyagreed.

Module 7Systems, Management & Engineering – Please

apply, no exemptions currently agreed.

The examination is generally held in October ofeach year and the regulations are available from theHead Office. The following support materials arealso available to students:

• Information for Students• Examination Syllabus• Reading List• Past Papers• Model Answers• Examiners Reports• Updates of Examination Material (fee applies)

THE THORROWGOODSCHOLARSHIP AWARD

The Thorrowgood Scholarship is awarded annually to a student member excelling in the

INSTITUTION ANNOUNCEMENTS10

Institution’s Professional Examination. The awardconsists of the Institution’s Thorrowgood Scholar-ship Medallion, and a cheque in the region of£1,000, that is presented at the Annual GeneralMeeting of the Institution in the April following theexamination.

The terms of the Thorrowgood bequest requirethat it should be utilised to assist the development ofyoung engineers employed in the railway signalling

and telecommunications field. A requirement of theaward is that it is used to finance a study tour of railway and/or signalling installations or manufactur-ing facilities, usually in a foreign administration, andthat the award holder presents a report about thestudy tour to the Younger Members’ Section.

To be eligible for the award students are usuallyexpected to have sat the required four modules inthe same year, and achieved outstanding results.

INSTITUTION ANNOUNCEMENTS 11

INSTITUTION TIEAn Institution tie bearing a single motif of the

Institution crest in light blue on a navy background isavailable, price £10.00.

Institution SalesAll items are available from the Institution office andpostage and packing is not included.

12

Non-Members Members

TEXT BOOKSBritish Railway Signalling Practice – AWS, Level Crossings & Remote Control

Systems (Green Books 24, 25, 26) (New title) NOW AVAILABLE £10.00 £20.00British Railway Signalling Practice – Electrical (Green Books 7, 9, 11) £8.00 £8.95British Railway Signalling Practice – Interlocking Principles & Systems

(Green Books 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29) (New title) NOW AVAILABLE £10.00 £20.00British Railway Signalling Practice – Mechanical (Green Books 1, 2, 3, 10) £9.00 £9.95British Railway Signalling Practice – Multiple Aspect Signalling

(Green Books 14, 15, 16, 27) (New title) NOW AVAILABLE £10.00 £20.00British Railway Signalling Practice – Signalling Instruments (Green Books 4, 12, 13) £7.00 £7.95British Railway Signalling Practice – Signalling Relays & Circuits

(Green Books 5, 6, 8, 17) (New title) NOW AVAILABLE £10.00 £20.00European Railway Signalling £50.00 £65.00Fifty Years of Railway Signalling – O S Nock (reprint) £10.00 £11.95Introduction to Signalling £25.00 £60.00Metro Railway Signalling £35.00 £60.00Railway Control Systems £35.00 £60.00Railway Signalling £35.00 £60.00Railway Telecommunications £35.00 £60.00Signalling Atlas & Signal Box Directory – Great Britain & Ireland £9.00 £9.95

TECHNICAL REPORTSNo. 1 Safety System Validation – Cross Acceptance of Signalling Systems £12.00 £30.00No. 2 The Operational Availability of Railway Control Systems £12.00 £30.00No. 3 The Influence of Human Factors on the Performance of Railway Systems £12.00 £30.00No. 4 The Implications of Applying Transmission Based Signalling £12.00 £30.00No. 5 The Contribution of Signalling to the Future of Road Traffic Management £12.00 £30.00No. 6 Proposed Cross Acceptance Processes for Railway Signalling Systems

& Equipment (includes CD-ROM) £20.00 £50.00No. 7 Quality of Services in Railway Traffic Management Systems £12.00 £30.00Signalling Philosophy Review (April 2001) £12.00 £50.00Testing and Commissioning £12.00 £30.00

CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PAPERSBringing Innovation to the UK Railway (February 2002 London) CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00Competence Assurance in the S&T Business (May 2000 London) £10.00 £20.00Developments in Interlocking and their Support Tools (Seminar 26th February 2004)

CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00ERTMS and its Application (November 2000 London) £10.00 £20.00Future Trends in Signalling and Train Control (January 2001 Birmingham) £10.00 £20.00Improvements in the Delivery of Signalling Projects and Products (March 1998 Glasgow) £10.00 £20.00Justifying Investment in Train Control Systems (Seminar 19th February 2003)

CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00Keep It Safe, Keep It Legal (December 1999 London) £10.00 £20.00Life Long Learning (February 1999 London) £10.00 £20.00Mathematically Formal Techniques in Signalling (April 1996 London) £10.00 £20.00New Technology for Interlocking & Train Control (November 2001 London) CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00New Techniques to Demonstrate Electromagnetic Compatibility between

Rolling Stock and the Signalling Infrastructure (February 1998 London) £10.00 £20.00Proposed Cross-Acceptance Processes for Railway Signalling Systems &

Equipment (Seminar 21st November 2002 London) CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00Railway Interfaces (Seminar 18th November 2004 London) CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00Resignalling Metro Lines (Seminar 27th November 2003 London) CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00The Lifecycle of a Major Railway Project (Younger Members June 1998 London) £10.00 £20.00The Pitfalls of Commercial Contracting in the S&T Business (January 2000 Birmingham) £10.00 £20.00The Railway as a System (Younger Members July 2000 Birmingham) £10.00 £20.00The Skill of the Tester (November 1998 London) £10.00 £20.00Traction/Signalling Compatibility (April 1997 London) £10.00 £20.00Train Detection (October 2001 Paris) CD-ROM format only £12.00 £24.00

ASPECT CONFERENCE PAPERS AND ANNUAL PROCEEDINGSAspect Conference 2003 £20.00 £50.00Annual Proceedings of IRSE 1990/91 to date (inclusive) (please state year(s) required) each £20.00 £50.00

IRSE PROFESSIONAL EXAMINATION – SUPPORT MATERIALSExamination Past Papers 1994 (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 1995 (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 1996 (per set) £10.00 N/A

PUBLICATIONS

13PUBLICATIONS

Examination Past Papers 1997 (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 1998 (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 1999 & Examination Review (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 2000 & Examination Review (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 2001 & Examination Review (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 2002 & Examination Review (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 2003 & Examination Review (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Past Papers 2004 & Examination Review (per set) £10.00 N/AExamination Syllabus Free N/AIndividual Papers from Reading List (please specify title, year and publication) each £3.00 N/AInformation for Students (Version 2) Free N/AModel Answers 1997 onwards £5.00 N/AModule 1 Student Resource Pack (contains past papers, examiners’ critiques and text-based

questions) CD-ROM format only £25.00 N/AModule 5 Student Resource Pack (contains past papers, examiners’ critiques and text-based

questions) CD-ROM format only £25.00 N/AModule 7 Student Resource Pack (contains past papers, examiners’ critiques and text-based

questions) CD-ROM format only (New title) NOW AVAILABLE £25.00 N/AQualifications & Examination Regulations Free N/AReading List Free N/ARelevant Model Answers 1970-1996 (NB: Syllabus changed in 1994) £10.00 N/AStudent Reading Pack (contains over 90 IRSE Technical Papers on Reading List) CD-ROM format only £75.00 N/A

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14

Institution Awards

DELL AWARDThe Dell award is made annually under a bequest

of the late Robert Dell OBE (Past President). It isawarded to a member of the Institution employed byLondon Underground Ltd (or its successor bodies)for achievement of a high standard of skill in the sci-ence and application of railway signalling. The awardtakes the form of a plaque with a uniquely designedshield being added each year with the recipient'sname engraved on it and a cheque for £300 tospend as the recipient wishes.

The winner of this year's Dell award is JohnJoyce, of Tube Lines, and the President Mr Corriepresented Mr Joyce with the Dell Award at the AGMin April amidst applause.

John Corrie presents John Joyce of Tube Lines with theDell Award Photo: Colin Porter

THORROWGOOD SCHOLARSHIPThe Thorrowgood Scholarship is awarded

annually under a bequest of the late W JThorrowgood (Past President) to assist the develop-ment of a young engineer employed in the signallingand telecommunications field of engineering, andtakes the form of an engraved medallion and acheque to be used to finance a study tour of railwaysignalling installations or signalling manufacturingfacilities. The award is made, subject to satisfactoryinterview, to the Institution young member attaining

at least a pass with credit in four modules in theInstitution's examination.

The Thorrowgood Scholar for 2004 is PeterChung, of MTRC in Hong Kong.

Mr Corrie explained to the AGM that the incomingPresident, Mr Poré, would present Mr Chung withthe Thorrowgood Scholarship Award during theforthcoming Presidential visit to Hong Kong Sectionlater in the year.

WING AWARD FOR SAFETYThe Wing Award for Safety was introduced in 1994

to commemorate the life and work of the late PeterWing, a Fellow of the Institution and employee of

British Rail, who during his career made a majorcontribution to the cause of line side safety. Theaward takes the form of a certificate and an amountof £500 to be devoted to personal development andis made to an individual who it is considered hasmade an outstanding contribution to railway track-side safety by, for example, coming forward with anovel idea for improving safety, is a long term champion of improving trackside safety standards orhas made a significant contribution to the awarenessof trackside safety in his business.The Wing Award for Safety this year had been madeto Phil Broad, Maintenance Delivery Unit Manager,Ashford, Kent, nominated by Network Rail for hiswork in improving trackside safety in Kent. ThePresident presented Mr Broad with the Wing Awardamidst applause.

John Corrie presents Phil Broad with the Wing Award forSafety Photo: Colin Porter

15

Obituaries

ALBERT POWELL MIRSE

Last year a remarkable celebration took place tomark 50 active full-time years of service to railwaysignalling, most of which were served in the employof BR Western Region. More remarkable becausethose 50 years had been achieved despite diagnosisof bowel cancer some 18 months previously. After aseemingly successful operation and return to work,the GW Society at Didcot was the venue where aselect group of friends wined and dined him centrestage in the limelight he usually shunned.

A year later and secondaries have unfortunatelytaken his life after six months further care. Hepassed away peacefully on Wednesday 2nd March,at the Sue Ryder care home in Nettlebed, north ofReading, with his wife Margaret by his side. Heleaves four sons and their families, his mother andsister, as well as so many friends and acquaintancesin the wider rail industry. Services were held inReading and his home town in Shropshire.

Albert began simply, in his own words, as a ganglad in Oswestry progressing to the maintenance oflocal lines so many of which never made it past theBeeching cuts. He often said of those times that hewanted to be with the technicians who 'looked after'their districts, he never wanted to be idle and itmade the day pass along with a rhythm.

It was hopefully his capabilities and not any irrita-tion which got him sent to Reading as a youngster,before he achieved his Higher National, to join themodernisation S&T department in 1960. He wasn'tyet 20. His best recollections of those times are fromthe Cheapside offices, the characters and the banter, but mostly the projects, the rush design ofthe forgotten-about engine shed interface on theFriday afternoon when Old Oak Common PSB wasbrought in. He made the London end of the WesternRegion his own alongside Marion Baldin, VicDoswell, Joe Eagles and Charlie Pilborough. Hisfavourite box became Oxford (with Reading closebehind) where the scheme was built for next to nothing and designed in very short time.

He worked on schemes that he later forgot, on theGloucester golden shunt and into Wales, then in the1980s worked on the West of England until A&Oorganisations added Gloucester to his responsi-bilities and he became a project engineer. As theproject groups became less regional he led theNorth London line resignalling to Woolwich and moretraditionally designed at Marylebone when it cameback to his favourite Western. By then he was withwhat had become the Interlogic Company, and afterPaddington resignalling replaced his Old OakCommon psb, he became head of design. His second resignalling of the London end of WR wastrying, as it didn't seem right that the second timewas so much more difficult to achieve in the privatising railway. He saw worse later.

Private ownership offered him opportunitieswhich at first didn't work out, and he went intoconsulting without a clear idea of what that would

lead to. At Michael Hamlyn Associates he began anew close working relationship with Railtrack,Brian Baralos's team, developing life extensionprojects for the GW installations that he loved andones that he then grew to know. Frustrationremained as so few of the possible schemes cameto pass, but he played a big role in many that did.From special auditor of others’ design to blazingglory in his own delivery of the new south-westside of Reading station for Virgin's OperationPrincess. Along the way were extensions atPlymouth and big alterations at Gloucester,Swindon, Cardiff and more.

He had participated in creating a new designhouse in what was now Lloyd's Register MHA,merely because the new Reading had to be commissioned within a 52-hour blockade and thefirst-attempt design hadn't even got close!Everyone at Lloyd's will miss his technical leader-ship and the advice he offered so freely. There aremany in the wider industry who came across himlater in his career as he contributed to the UK circuits committee and who appreciated his caringand enthusiasm, and his patience for detail.Signalling design was his job and a huge part of hislife, and he challenged himself and his colleaguesto achieve with minimum additional frippery. Heparticipated in a number of well meaning attemptsto get design back to basics but he never saw thatit had been achieved. He felt that talent and knowledge had been replaced with 'process'.

Having spent more than 40 years living andworking in Reading, more than 200 people attended his funeral there before his ashes wereinterred at the parish church of St Martin’sOswestry. There is hope yet that some long lastingrail memorial might be possible, but this is only inits early planning.

OBITUARIES16

WILLIE MURRAY1904 – 2004

Willie Murray died 100 hours short of his hundredth birthday. He was born and brought up inGlasgow where he joined the Caledonian Railway in1919 as a telegraph boy in the Buchanan StreetHeadquarters. The nomadic existence of telegraphlads as they roamed from office to office carryingmessages was ideal for identifying career oppor-tunities. Willie was not long in finding that the Caley,as the company was affectionately known, had anelectrical engineering department and he reckonedthat there might be a future here. This proved to bea sound decision. The Caley had decided to build ahotel with a world-class golf course at Gleneaglesand electrical lighting would be provided, eventhough the nearest source of power was at Bridge ofAllan some 15 miles away. Willie worked with thegang that installed the power line. In 1923, the Caleybecame part of the London, Midland & ScottishRailway creating further career opportunities for him.He moved to Aviemore to be the Telegraph Linemanfor one of the wildest stretches of track in Britain.Just try to imagine attending to a pole route fault atDalwhinnie on a January evening. There he met hiswife Jess to whom he was married for 60 years. Herfather had been an engine driver with the HighlandRailway at Keith.

Arthur Bound, who was Chief S&T Engineer of theLMS, introduced a policy of power signalling controlled by electrically interlocked miniature lever frames. St Enoch was the first and was commissioned in May 1933. A Westinghouse-style L-frame was installed in the new signal box to control the station area and approach lines.Electrical interlocking was a new concept and brightyoung men would be required for maintenance andfaulting. Willie was an obvious choice and he movedsouth to assist with the commissioning in order togain experience of this advanced technology. Hewas electrical lineman at St Enoch for many years.

In 1948, the LMS and LNER Scottish areas werecombined as the Scottish Region of British Railwaysand a programme of resignalling using the latesttechniques was soon under way.

Willie's experience of electrical signalling was to

prove invaluable for the power signal boxes com-missioned in association with the 25kV electrificationof the Glasgow suburban lines. Promotion continuedto come his way as he worked his way through thehierarchy of inspector grades culminating in hisappointment as Engineering Manager.

Willie was never a member of the IRSE but he wasdedicated to training and development. New startersallocated to Willie Murray's domain were fortunatemen indeed. He always found the time to counseland assist them. Many of these trainees rosethrough the system to become senior engineers and,in one case, to be President of the IRSE. All recall thehelp that Willie gave them with gratitude.

In 1982, the IRSE Scottish Section was formedfrom the local S&T Technical Society. For manyyears, Willie had been an enthusiastic and hardworking committee member for the Society. Herecognised the development potential of a pro-gramme of technical lectures and visits on a widerange of topics. He became less enthusiastic when"London rule" arrived. We could never convince himthat it was a change of title only and that we had nointentions of being told what to do by that lot.

On retirement in 1969, Willie and Jess pursued anactive life from their home in Tantallon Road inCathcart. Although housebound for the last years ofhis life he remained a welcoming and generous hostto all who visited him. Railway talk assisted with ahint of whisky was inevitable in such gatherings ashis daughters Wilma and Sheila ruefully came toaccept but they did recognise that it was a combi-nation that did wonders for him as can be seen bythe photograph taken as recently as October.

Arguably, Willie was the last S&T survivor of thepre-grouping [1923] railway companies but we havenot totally lost him. He volunteered to be interviewedfor the National Railway Museum's Archive of OralHistory and the full tale of his career, related by himself, is available for the asking. R Nelson

ANDREW ST JOHNSTONCEng FIEE FBCS FIRSE

1922 – 2005Andrew St Johnston was born on 28th August

1922 and completed a boyhood passion for electronics by taking an honours degree in ElectricalEngineering (Communications) at the City & GuildsCollege (part of Imperial College). He then took partin the last years of the war as a radar officer in theNavy, completing his service at the Admiralty SignalEstablishment, working on analogue computingtechniques. He entered the digital field when joiningElliott Brothers, later Elliott Automation, in 1949, andtook part in the early development of computersthere, later taking over the management of theComputing Division. With Elliotts, he played a part inintroducing computers and computing techniquesinto many application areas, including process control, defence, road traffic control, display systems and train describers, as well as scientificand business applications, the latter in conjunctionwith NCR.

Andrew joined Vaughan Programming Services in1966. The company had been started by his wifeDina in 1959 and by then was a flourishing softwarehouse operating in the electronic data processing,scientific and on-line real time fields. It was his timewith Vaughan, later Vaughan Systems, that broughtAndrew into more contact with the railway signallingand telecommunications fraternity and the IRSE.

Apart from general management activities of thecompany of which he was the Managing Director,Andrew's major role had always been the prepar-ation of Software Functional Specifications for on-line real-time dedicated computer systems. Hedeveloped a framework for these specificationswhich proved very successful and in their way werethe forerunner of documentation produced as standard today. He provided the glue between thecustomer’s requirements and the software designers, and did this until his retirement in 1999.

Vaughan’s initial work in railways was with customer information systems following their success with flight information systems installed atHeathrow Terminal 3 and Gatwick. Their first systemfor British Rail was installed in Easter 1976 atLondon Bridge for Southern Region’s real-timePassenger Information based on links to traindescribers and a mini-computer-based mastertimetable system. The first introduction of the microprocessor in the signalling field in the UK wascarried out in 1977 by Vaughan Systems, led byAndrew but with the support of Dina who led thesoftware development, and Geoff Monk, theEngineering Director, who led the hardware develop-ment. It was for three fringe-box train describers tobe added to the relay-based STC train describer atSaltley PSB when the Saltley control area wasaltered as part of the improvement to cross-Birmingham train services at that time. The company went on to provide large, micro-basedtrain describers at Wolverhampton and Chester, andthen moved into TDM systems, and later panel multiplexers. In the early 1980s Vaughan designedand installed one of, if not the earliest VDU-basedsignalling control system, installed in Leicester PSBoperating in conjunction with a conventional panel,which was the forerunner of the control systems nowinstalled in Dublin, Ireland, and at Stoke and Rugbycontrolling a large part of the recently resignalledWest Coast Main Line.

With the acquisition of Vaughan Systems byHarmon Industries of Missouri, USA, in 1996,Vaughan Harmon Systems, as it became known,moved into the supply of vital signalling systems

with a contract to resignal the Norwich-Cromer linewith American electronic interlockings and levelcrossing controllers and Andrew was a mostencouraging supporter of this development, believ-ing that adoption of new technology could bringsimilar cost reductions to those which had comeabout with the implementation of micro-based traindescribers 20 years earlier.

Many IRSE members will have seen Andrew at hisentertaining and extremely informative lectures atthe IEE Signalling Vacation Schools where he was anenthusiastic presenter. One of my lasting memoriesof him is arms waving, getting wound up with someesoteric argument about how best to show traininformation on a passenger information display. Hejoined the IRSE as a Fellow in 1985 having presented a paper at the first IRSE InternationalConference in 1984 on the subject of the use of on-line timetable data in railway control systems,again an example of his forward thinking.

Outside his all-consuming work activities, Andrewwas involved in trying to preserve the rural environ-ment where he lived in Hertfordshire. To this end hewas chairman of two committees, the local branchof CPRE (Campaign to Protect Rural England) andthe Broxbourne Woods Area Conservation Society.He was a great lover of travel, good food and finewines. He died peacefully in his sleep on 3rd April2005, and is survived by his wife Dina and daughterHarriet. Colin Porter

17OBITUARIES

18

Sixth Annual Members’ LuncheonThe sixth annual Members' Luncheon was held

on 16th June 2004 when 85 members of theInstitution, including 15 Past Presidents and 14members with over 50 years membership, tookluncheon at the Victory Services Club in SeymourStreet, London. An enjoyable 3-course luncheonwith wine was consumed with pleasure.

The 80th person to serve as President since theInstitution's formation in 1912, Mr John Corrie,was regrettably not able to attend. In his absencethe Junior Vice-President, Mr John Francis,addressed the members present with a briefspeech and mentioned the forthcoming pro-gramme for Mr Corrie's presidential year of office.The Senior Vice-President, Mr Jacques Poré,mentioned his forthcoming Convention inStrasbourg in September 2005.

Mr K W Burrage, IRSE Chief Executive, reported that the current membership of theInstitution was 4,005 and continues to growsteadily. Thirty-four members have over 50 yearsmembership, 14 of whom were able to accept thePresident's invitation to be present at the luncheon as guests of the Institution. He said thatmembers having over 60 years membership wereno longer a rarity and were represented at thelunch by Mr Ronald Post with 65 years of membership. Our longest serving member is MrWilfred Hardman, residing in New Zealand andaged over 90, with 75 years of membership. MrHardman corresponds regularly with the officeand sends his best wishes to those present at theluncheon today. Many other members who wereunable to attend in person had also sent letters ofapology and good wishes.

Regrettably 12 members had died since thelunch last year, including five of our 50 year members who had been regular attendees atthese lunches since their commencement sixyears ago. Among these was Peter Guyatt andAlistair McKillop, also Mr D J Kidd who hadachieved 73 years membership of the Institution.The Institution is grateful for the service that all ofthese friends and colleagues performed for theInstitution during their time with us.

The last year had been another very busy and successful one for the Institution, which continues to grow and progress from strength to

strength. Due to the success of the recruitmentcampaign last year we now have over 4,000 members.

The Licensing Scheme continues to grow andwell over 5,000 licences have now been issued.

Work on the training and development frontcontinues and is well respected in the industry.

(left to right) Robin Nelson, Clive Kessell, Cy Porter, FrankRayers and Bob Barnard Photo: C H Porter

(left to right) Philip Wiltshire, Jim Waller, Bill Boddy and DonHeath Photo: C H Porter

John Francis Photo: C H Porter

Ken Burrage Photo: C H Porter

The re-launch of IRSE News, that is now produced monthly, and sent to all overseas members by airmail so that they can feel in closer touch with the Institution affairs, has beenwell received.

Last year the Institution turnover was over£1million pounds for the first time in its history.

Mr Burrage said that none of this substantial

effort would be possible without the whole-hearted support and hard work of the Institutionteam comprising Linda Mogford, Mark, Karen,Derek, and all the staff in the office, as well as thesubstantial contribution from the voluntary effortsof our members. He concluded by expressing histhanks on behalf of the membership to the staff ofthe Institution for their hard work and whole-hearted support during the last year.

The luncheon concluded in a most pleasant andhappy atmosphere of friendship and camaraderieand had been thoroughly enjoyed by all present.

Members attending the luncheon with over 50years membership of the Institution were MessrsG Amoss, R Brown, D G Brown, R Bugler, HFensom, I Foster, B Grose, B Hillier, P G Law, L S

Lawrence, J Lethbridge, M Page, R Post and V HSmith.

Past Presidents present at the luncheon wereMessrs R E B Barnard, W Boddy, R Brown, EGoddard, A Howker, C Kessell, L Lawrence, RNelson, D Norton, C A Porter, C H Porter, FRayers, J Waller, P Wiltshire and V H Smith.

Mr Burrage said that ideas for the collectivenoun to describe a group of Past Presidentsincluded: a “merriment”, a “plethora”, a “perfec-tion” and a “proliferation” – members may be able to think of other more (or less!) appropriate collective nouns.

The Seventh Members’ Luncheon has beenprovisionally arranged to take place onWednesday 15th June 2005 at the same venue.

K W Burrage

19SIXTH ANNUAL MEMBERS’ LUNCHEON

(left to right) Brian Hillier, Hugh Fensom, John Lethbridge,Peter Law and George Amoss Photo: C H Porter

(left to right) Bill Boddy, Don Heath, Claire Porter and DavidNorton Photo: C H Porter

INTRODUCTIONLook ahead some 25 years: what do you think rail-

ways will be like? Recently, many railways have beencarrying their largest amount of traffic ever, yet theystill have a falling market share, and this shows that society still requires transport to support its economic activities. Much transport depends on oil,a diminishing resource. Rail transport can providefuel efficiency on trunk routes and electrified rail-ways are less dependent on oil fuel. It is my opinionthat railways have much to offer to society in thecoming decades. The degree to which railways willachieve such support of society's economic activitydepends on two things: an ability to attract invest-ment and an ability to deliver a valued service. Forboth of these to be achieved railways must improve,both their performance and their image. Thisimprovement depends greatly on control and communication.

Looking back 25 years, we can see in theProceedings of this Institution, records of manyadvances in technology. I offer for debate my opinion that the next 25 years will be less about further novel technologies, but instead be aboutmaking better use of the technology we have. Thisrequires much better understanding of the railway,its systems and equipment, by all the peopleemployed in the rail industry. That this progressdepends on control and communication shows thecritical importance of this Institution to the eco-nomic activity of society in future decades. The IRSEprovides a forum for sharing ideas internationally.We need to recognise that what suits some railwayswill not be appropriate for others. Equally, there is nomerit in repeating avoidable mistakes and incurringwaste in development effort. If the IRSE can supportthe professional development activities of its

members, then those members will achieve an ability to question established practice in a positiveand informed manner. Railways that then adopteffective communications and control measures willbe able to achieve the quality and efficiency neededby society. This encouragement of professionaldevelopment and support for members is the themefor the Institution's activities for this coming year.

The IRSE has developed considerably in recentyears, from a London-based organisation to onewhere the strength of the Institution is now in theinternational and regional sections, supported by acentral staff in London. Communication within theInstitution is therefore important and IRSE News andthe Website are now well established and essentialmeans of enabling the Institution to serve its members. Attendance at centralised meetings andseminars is dropping. However, I question thedegree to which members can achieve professionaldevelopment without meeting others and discussingmatters together, and without visiting and seeinghow other railways solve their control and communi-cation problems. With all the imperative for economy, managers will need to know that the IRSEprovides value for those attending its meetingsbefore they permit their younger staff to take a fullpart in Institution activities. The Institution nowneeds to address its communication to the railwaycommunity as a whole, and be seen to be playing itspart in delivering an efficient railway.

There is no value in improving communicationchannels if we do not know what to communicate.The very name of the Institution has often been discussed. Why Signal engineers? Why not Systemsengineers? Why engineers - does this exclude soft-ware or project management? It is my experiencethat this debate has only served to confuse. The

20

The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers(COPYRIGHT RESERVED)

Presidential Address

of

J D CORRIE CEng FIEE FIRSE

given at the IRSE AGM

held at the Institute of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Friday 23rd April 2004

I Bear a Far Shining Sign

Institution of Railway Signal Engineers has flourishedfor 90 years and now has its highest membershipever. It is well respected internationally. Merelyrebranding will not solve the problems of our industry. Instead we must put real effort into under-standing our role. Only then we can communicate itto others. What is railway signalling? What is the roleof a railway Signal Engineer? So far, I have used thetwo terms “control and communications” applied tothe railway industry and, in my view, “Signalling” isthe combination of these two terms. Other insti-tutions provide forums for control engineers, forcommunication engineers, even for systems engineers. The IRSE has two distinguishing characteristics from these other institutions: it focuses on railway applications while still respectinggeneral practice, and it focuses on the act of signalling to a train that the train may proceed.

The distinguishing feature of a railway is the use ofsteel wheel on steel rail to achieve economy of energy in moving things. That is the key attribute thata railway has to offer. It is also the key difficulty thatsignal engineers need to solve, because trains havehigh inertia and poor adhesion. Once a train hasbeen permitted to travel at speed, it is difficult tostop dependably, because the kinetic energy has tobe taken from it through small areas of contact withthe rail. Consequently, the granting of permission fora train to proceed is an onerous task that involvesensuring that its route ahead is protected for as longas the train needs to discharge the inertia after braking has commenced. This can be a long time ordistance. With the high adhesion between rubbertyres and a road, it is often possible for a road trafficcontrol system to expect to revoke permission for avehicle to proceed and to expect some emergencybraking or avoiding action to be achieved promptly.Although railway braking technology has advancedover the years, poor railhead conditions still preventdependable reliance on train's brakes having aprompt effect. While general vehicle control theorycan be applied to railways, railways will only beeffective if signal engineers take care when com-municating to a train when that train can proceed.Whether that signal is to a human driver or to anautomatic driving system on a train does not matter.It is still a signal. The IRSE is special because itfocuses on satisfying the control and communi-cations needs of railways through assurance of the quality with which trains receive movement authorities. You can find experience on many partsof this process in other places, but I suggest that youcan only find the expertise for the whole of this primeactivity, much needed by our society, in theInstitution of Railway Signal Engineers.

Many Presidential Addresses commence with astatement about how honoured and privileged thenew President feels at their appointment in such animportant body. I certainly feel that, and indeed amsomewhat overwhelmed by it, but I also feel aresponsibility to society to help this Institution fulfilits purpose. I hope that by identifying the definingideas involved in signalling and explaining them fromfirst principles, that we will help society make gooduse of appropriate technology to fulfil the funda-

mental requirements of signalling. By articulating thefundamental principles, we enable signal engineersto assure that they are achieved. It is from assuringthe quality of signalling that rail transport will contribute to the economic development and qualityof life of our worldwide society. I ask you for yourhelp by questioning my attempts to provide a rationale for applying signalling to the many differentrailways worldwide. Please use IRSE News to correct my arguments, please contribute your experience to the discussions of the key features,and please challenge the philosophy. It is only whenwe can all understand each other, that signal engineers themselves will be understood, and it isonly when we are understood that we will be effec-tive. This year’s programme is designed to provokeunderstanding of the basic principles of signalling.

SOME EXAMPLESTo illustrate how I think this fundamental thinking

should proceed, some examples may be helpful. Irecognise that much of what follows seems to applymost to the UK position at present. This is becausethe UK railways have been restructured, and thisprocess has disturbed the steady development ofcareers of railway staff. People new to our industryhave been brought in to lead development based ontheir experience in other industries. Many falseassumptions are made about how railways function,especially with regard to recognising the unwrittenassumptions that underpin established standards,which may no longer be relevant to a changedorganisation. Now, many other railway administra-tions are considering some form of restructuring andI suggest that the lessons now being learnt in the UKwill be of value to other railways too.

Firstly I question whether signalling has becomeunnecessarily complex. New entrants to our industrysee it as the application of some simple logic.Specifying the logic required is no simple task on amixed traffic railway where all the layouts are different or where the traffic patterns to be controlleddiffer. Previously, those skilled at the signalling arthave risen to this challenge with ever-greater ingenuity, solving each problem as it has arisen, butcreating ever more complexity for those who have tomaintain the system. Signalling has become likechess – a set of agreed rules but each game reflect-ing the personal preferences of the players. Thesepersonal preferences will be based on the experience of the expert. These experiences will beof different systems operating in different conditions.In some cases they will be based on following blindly the practice on which the expert was broughtup, and in other cases in an overreaction to the problems of the systems previously encountered. Allthis history appears an impossible irrelevance to anew entrant, but the only rational explanation of whysignalling is done as it is today is to consider thedevelopment of the art over two centuries of opera-tional and technical development. This situation isnot sustainable or defensible. I suggest that thereare two things to be done: firstly to determine thebasic principles of signalling, and then to apply themin a standard manner. This may mean that in

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 21

particular cases, certain layouts will need more civilengineering work to permit a limited set of tech-niques to be sufficient. Geographical signalling wastried with relay interlocking but abandoned becauseof the apparent economy of not providing and maintaining relays that were actually redundant atparticular applications. When using processor-based interlockings, this expense does not apply so a more modular “Geographical” approach to signalling may be helpful to designers and maintainers alike, thus facilitating more safety, main-tainability and overall economy.

The next matter to determine is the use of reversion of a signal aspect in signalling principles.To someone new to the industry, it sounds a safething to do to put the signal back to a stop aspect.As explained before, trains cannot be expected tostop just because they are approaching a red signal,because of their inertia and the low level of adhesionthat can be guaranteed with the track. If red signalsare not to be passed, the train must be given a warning of the need to commence braking wellbefore the red signal. It follows that safety dependson the adequacy of this warning, and not of the ability to revert a signal to red. The ability to requirea train to commence braking when suddenly dangeroccurs ahead has been helpful in a number ofinstances, but its effectiveness is not guaranteed. Ifsafety has to be guaranteed, then there must be nosudden occurrence of danger ahead. Given the inertia of trains it follows that primary safetydepends on preparing the route for a train before itis allowed to enter, and then holding that route untilthe train has used it or come to rest. Some secondary safety can sometimes be achieved byputting signals back to their most restrictive aspectin an emergency, but safety cannot be guaranteed –only risk reduced. Consequently, those who writesignalling principles should make sure that they distinguish between primary and secondary safetyfeatures, and specify the integrity necessary to beassured for each type of function so that safetyassurance can be economic. It is always more difficult to make a safety case for something whichhas to work or operate when danger is to be avoid-ed, rather than to have a system that moves fromone safe state to another and so permits movementsto continue only when the safe route is extended.

Mechanical signalling with block working func-tions on this principle – the safety is by moving fromone safe state to another which has been preparedto be safe. Relays have been able to provide safereversion, and much signalling today depends onthis feature. However, reversion requires muchbandwidth for communication and high processingspeed to be effective in time. Such principles will beunlikely to be effective for radio-based cab signallingsystems and interoperability with ERTMS (EuropeanRail Traffic Management System) will particularlyrequire railways to use signalling based on sequential rather than reversionary principles.Control systems for docking supertankers do permitvessels with high inertia to be managed, but not atthe headways necessary for running a railway junction. Signal engineers should avoid ever

specifying a primary safety requirement that requiresa movement authority to be revoked, and challengeany request to do so.

There has been a change in perception of the roleof a signal. Are signals there to indicate when a trainmay proceed safely, or are they there to stop it?Previous generations of signal engineers used longdrawings, aspect sequence charts and train graphsto ensure that a properly planned train service wasnot delayed by the signalling. They designed for traffic to flow. Today, layouts are seen on narrowcomputer screens and the process has become oneof putting signals where they protect something.Trains now have more reliance on signalling, yet thelack of diversity in signal engineering generally doesnot provide a wrong-side failure rate adequate forthis new dependence to be safe. More attention isneeded to the safe planning of traffic flows in time-tables if today’s signalling standards are to remainadequate. There is a need to change attitudes to signals and deliver the integrity required for thedesigns to be safe. ATP is no help when the signal itis enforcing is displaying a false proceed aspect.

Another misconception that is common amongthose new to signalling is that moving block systemscan minimise headways. Moving block does workand is safe as demonstrated by the Docklands LightRailway and similar systems. However, today’s trainsare faster and have better brakes than previously, sothe time taken for a train to pass through its brakingdistance is reduced. There is thus little more to beachieved from moving from four aspects towards aninfinite number because of the law of diminishingreturns. Alternatively, there is considerable improve-ment in capacity to be gained from regulating theflow of trains so that they arrive at points of conflict(junctions and station platforms) at the optimumtime. Such regulation is not itself a primary safetyfeature but it does ensure that the capacity providedby the safety principles is actually achieved. Whilethis may put more reliance on the safety system toremain safe, safety is also achieved by running a service reliably to a planned timetable. A compre-hensive control system can also increase the monitoring of the safety functions. In this way tracklayout capacity can be exploited without loss ofsafety, and also without the complexity of movingblock principles. This is of further importance withLevel 2 and 3 ERTMS systems because of the bandwidth demands of moving block communi-cations. ERTMS is a philosophy for railway trafficcontrol and regulation, enforced through ETCS(European Train Control System). Much develop-ment has been done on modules for ETCS but thereal benefits are to be gained from developing theregulation features of ERTMS. On today’s railways,improved flow control reduces the need for expensive infill of intermittent ATP systems, thusreducing their cost to more affordable levels, as canbe seen in Sweden.

There is misplaced trust of track circuits. Thesehave given dependable performance for 125 years,but recent changes to the railway environment haveexposed their principal flaw. The need to conductcurrent through the train’s wheelset to put the track

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS22

circuit into its safe state is becoming more difficult toguarantee today. This is because of new designs ofwheelsets and suspension systems on trains.Further problems are caused by emi from new traction packages under credible failure conditions.The considerable cost of a safety case regardinginterference between new efficient traction packages and track circuits can be avoided by usingaxle-counters, or can be reduced if the track circuitsare used in a sequential logic system that exposesany malfunction in their detection of trains. Withmodern control systems it would be difficult to showthat risk had been reduced to be as low as reasonably practicable without the provision of suchmonitoring.

The need to understand the requirements of therailway’s Rules and Regulations before commencingto specify signalling is often overlooked. The railwayneeds to be safe under all normal, failure and credible fault conditions, and in the transitionsbetween these states. This is achieved through theoperating principles. The signalling merely auto-mates these principles when it works. Under failureconditions, train movement continues under manualimplementation of the rules, often with lower capa-city, but trains can be kept moving. Thus, some signalling which is safe on one railway may not besafe on another if the operating rules are different.One example is the different “stop and proceed”rules. On surface lines these can involve signal-to-signal working and thus signalling equipment maybe centralised. On a metro, where trains should notbe stationary for too long in tunnels without forcedventilation, these rules may give a limit to the distance over which signal-to-signal working appliesand then permit signals to be believed. The assump-tion behind this is that the signalling failure will onlybe local in its effect. Consequently, centralised signalling is inappropriate for this rule on such metros.

It is these kinds of complexities that confoundtoday’s project managers. They would like to thinkthat if they have seen something work on one rail-way then it will work well on another. They thuswould like to procure signalling in bits and pieces inthe hope that when assembled on site all will be well.Also, because signalling equipment forms a smallerproportion of the budget than civil engineering, it issometimes assumed that the civil engineer shoulddesign the layout to minimise cost. What is actuallyneeded is a systems approach where the require-ments and limitations of a route are considered andthe signalling used to optimise the traffic flow undernormal and failure conditions. In this way the needfor additional platforms or refuge loops is identifiedearly and service reliability can be enhanced. Peoplewho are good at this type of systems thinking arerarely good project managers because they tend tokeep on optimising and do not readily accept theneed for a design freeze. In my view, both types oftemperament are required for a successful project,and success therefore depends on teamworkbetween those with the systems overview and thosewho do the detailed project management of deliver-ing that overview. In this way the parts are bought

and put in place but their effective interfacing is alsoassured. Much mention is made today of managingcompetence, but few competence managementsystems recognise the need for people to have theappropriate temperament for the work to which theyare assigned. Experience can be a source of badhabits. Competence systems need to address actual capability.

As mentioned before, existing railway standardsare not always relevant to new developments. Newentrants to the railway industry tend to believe thatcompliance with standards is all that is needed tomake a safe and efficient railway. Existing standardsmay be based on assumed custom and practice thatwould be known by those who have been in theindustry a long time and thus are omitted for reasonsof efficiency. Many things are changing in today’srailways which make these assumptions invalid. Thechallenge is to recognise when this occurs. Projectsshould compare their designs to the standards tosee where they do not comply and investigate allnon-compliances, because the standards mandatethings for good reasons based on long experience.All assumptions, dependencies and caveats need tobe identified and complied with if railways are to usenew systems or be operated in a novel manner or ina changed environment. However, with new systemsit is sometimes necessary to change the standard. InEurope, there is a policy of interoperability to achieveopen access and economic integration of trade. Thisis to be achieved by issuing standards and ensuringthat railways comply. It is inevitable that for manyyears to come there will be contrasting practicesinherited from the earlier national networks and thusrecognition of unwritten assumptions, dependenciesand caveats that underpin specifications will be crucial, particularly with regard to operating rulesand practices.

SOME PERSONAL EXPERIENCESThese opinions have been derived from my

experiences throughout my career. I left school a fewmonths after Dr Beeching’s Report was published.You can imagine the careers advice I received whenI wanted to work on the railway. So, I undertook anApprenticeship with the Marconi Company workingon developing aircraft communication and navi-gation equipment as “this will use your engineeringinterest”. I am glad that this taught me the basics ofcommunications, so that eventually I became aChartered Radio and Electronics Engineer. Duringthis time I was an active member of the BluebellRailway Preservation Society and was trained as afireman, signalman and guard, and gained experi-ence of many other railway-related duties. I did notfind satisfaction in trying to design aircraft equip-ment because I never really understood its purposeand I had to ask others whether my designs wereany use. It is from this frustration that I have learntalways to try and explain the reasons for a principle.I then moved to join the Westinghouse Brake &Signal Co Ltd and found that I had much to learn,but that I could understand the use of the productson which I was working. It was through them that Ireceived formal training in signalling, and then

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 23

passed the IRSE examination. I attended IRSEevents and activities and this broadened my under-standing of the contrasting merits of the approachtaken by different railways, particularly between thenational railway and the London Underground. I wasinvolved in the development of computer based traindescribers, the Southern Region AWS, a VDU-basedreplacement for control panels for LondonUnderground and automatic train driving systems forthe Madrid Metro. In this way, I was able to applycommunications engineering to railway control systems. That is why I do not see the differencebetween signalling and communications. Good signalling is distinguished by how it makes use ofcommunications, and good railway communicationsis distinguished by providing the bearer for the information required by signalling. To me they areinseparable.

I left the railway industry for four years duringwhich I worked on control systems for high-energyphysics and medical applications. I then returned toWestinghouse to apply the new skills I had acquiredfor using computers for process control. After sometime working on the Hong Kong Mass TransitRailway signalling, I returned to research work oncomputer-based interlockings and processor-basedtrack circuits. Although I spent a short time on SSIdevelopment, it did not seem to me to be providingthe facilities needed for signalling – especiallyregarding geographical interlocking and reversionarysafety principles. I acknowledge that SSI has madea major contribution to railways and remains a mosteconomic solution to many UK signalling require-ments. However, it does permit the signal designerto implement both good and bad practice and thusthere remains opportunity for error in the data preparation that needs to be controlled by soundmanagement and testing processes, and thisreliance might be reduced if the data were in a geographical format. I was actually working on therequirements for developing radio cab signallingwhen the opportunity arose to develop a new inter-locking for London Underground, notionally becauseof concern about the compatibility between SSI andLondon Underground’s operating procedures, butalso because of the need to minimise equipmentinstalled in tunnels. From this opportunity theNeasden computer-based interlocking was developed, which uses geographical signalling principles. This was the subject of my first full IRSEPaper, presented jointly with Colin White of LondonUnderground in 1986. It was a later design changethat demanded some reversionary principles notoriginally envisaged which complicated the designand has caused some problems, but the system isstill functioning after over 15 years in service. I thenreturned to developing a radio cab signalling systemand that was proposed for Cornwall but never proceeded with. It was from this work that I developed an understanding of the communicationsneeded for signalling, and the effect of specificationwording on the cost of developing a safety case. Ilater worked on the specification for the Westraceinterlocking but again there was a decision to makethis non-geographical and reversionary (features

that I find objectionable) so I decided instead tobecome a consultant. During this second time withWestinghouse I became further involved with IRSEactivities, particularly joining the ExaminationCommittee and be involved with its change to themodular system of papers.

I joined Mott MacDonald in 1988 and was involvedwith the development of the Manchester Metrolinksystem. While concentrating on signalling, it was themulti-disciplinary nature of the design thatimpressed me and its success has been consider-ably assisted by the systems engineering principlesincorporated in the initial specifications. I laterapplied this approach to the Functional Specificationof the Central Line Resignalling for LondonUnderground described in a paper that I wrote jointly with Richard Williams of Mott MacDonald forAspect 99. I was involved in the assessment of thetwo trial ATP installations in Britain which has led tomy criticism of the use of infill. I led the valuation ofRailtrack’s signalling and electrification assets for itsflotation and provided safety advice on the pro-posals for restructuring London Underground whichhas taught me the importance of knowing the condition of assets. I chaired the DLR’s consider-ation of safety of their change to moving block signalling and learnt the need to understand contrasting philosophies when cross-accepting systems. I have been involved as IndependentSafety Assessor with the assessment of emi-signalling safety cases for over half the new electrictrains on the UK national network, the developmentof the “Yellow Book” on “Engineering SafetyManagement” and the cross-acceptance of theAnsaldo Italian interlocking design to CheadleHulme. I was ISA for the original TCS developmentsplanned for the West Coast Main Line, and laterLead Systems ISA for the whole of that upgrade project. From these experiences I have learnt thenecessity for agreeing the interpretation of require-ments.

My role as Independent Professional Assessor forTPWS (Train Protection and Warning System) hasbeen a most challenging assignment. This systemwas applied to UK railways by Regulation becauseof the need for some form of train protection, perceptions about the cost of ATP, and pessimisticexpectations of the development of ERTMS. My ownview is that ATP could be afforded if control systemswere developed to avoid the need for expensive provision of infill – a feature that permits poor operation and should be avoided. The cost of apply-ing ATP to British lines could be further reduced bychanging some of our signalling principles, ratherthan altering systems that work well on other railways to fit our existing approach. The analysisconsidered the safety benefits of TPWS but not thesafety problems that it introduces. I remain concerned that many signal engineers in Britain areapplying TPWS without full understanding of all therisks that require to be addressed, managed andmitigated. I am further concerned that new signallingis being designed on the basis that the TPWS issomething to be added after the layout is signalledto minimum standards. Instead, I suggest that the

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS24

protection afforded by TPWS should be consideredbefore signalling the layout, so that overlap lengthscan be matched to the remaining risk. When re-railing, the cost of putting an insulated block joint oraxle-counter head in a different position is minimal. Isuggest that in many cases longer overlaps wouldreduce risk to be as low as reasonably practicablewithout limiting headway. The UK still has much todevelop if it is ever to have satisfactory train protec-tion. In my opinion, signalling of new layouts shouldconsider train protection as part of the signallingsystem and not as an addition to it.

I have continued to benefit from IRSE activitiesand have been privileged to serve on its committees.It is from this industry and institution experience thatI am aware of the differences between many contrasting railways’ practices and have learnt torecognise the common fundamental elements. Ihave observed the problems of specifying a systemso that the signalling acquired from external sourcesmatches the railway’s expectations, and I haveobserved the problems caused to the efficient development of a safety case by incompletelyexpressed standards. I consider that there is a benefit from structuring the requirements for signalling, so that it can be assured to fit into the overall railway requirements using staff withpractical levels of competence. I have developed a programme for Institution activities for the comingyear to expose those ideas to the profession and stimulate discussion about the merits of my suggestions. Our Convention in Ireland will offer visits to communications and control equipmentfrom the mechanical age to the present ERTMSrelated components, on main line, suburban andlight rail applications. In Dublin we will see the effectthat membership of the European Community ishaving on encouraging railway development andalso be able to contrast the efficiency of the safetyacceptance processes with those operating in theother countries. In Belfast we will see the recentdevelopments there including their signalling trainingschool facilities. The papers for the year commencewith consideration of the role of communicationsand signalling in railways, then study the signallingprinciples, review the signalling implications of different forms of point operation and detection, lookat the new forms of signalling equipment and its useto control traffic, and then develop the rationalebehind interlocking design. It is my hope that thepapers will provide the IRSE Proceedings with anexplanation of the reasons why signalling has developed as it is and how recognition of the keyfundamental ideas will enable systems like ERTMSto be applied with safety reliability, and economy. Ithank the authors for accepting this challenge.

HOW THE INSTITUTION WILL HELP ITS MEMBERS

From all this it will be evident that the IRSE isready to play its crucial role supporting the renaissance of rail transport. Peter Stanley, in hisPresidential year, showed us the prospects forERTMS. I thank Colin Porter for his leadership of theInstitution and the work that you have just hearddescribed in the Annual Report. The Recruitment &

Publicity Committee is making the industry aware ofthe services the Institution offers. The recent campaign to increase the number of AccreditedTechnician members is most important because signalling will only achieve safety and reliability if thetechnicians who use and service it join in and contribute to the Institution’s activities. The Training& Development Committee has, with support fromthe SRA, developed the Body of Knowledge and significantly developed the IRSE Examination studymaterial. IRSE News is now published ten timeseach year. The Licensing Scheme, initiated by Colinten years ago, has been a pioneering achievement ofthe Institution in setting standards of competencefor certain railway safety activities, and its is nowrecognised by two major railways in Britain as part oftheir signalling competence management policy. TheScheme’s administration has recently been restruc-tured to further improve on this success. With theencouragement of recent Presidents, the YoungerMembers’ Section is flourishing once again.

The IRSE Examination continues to be respectedas a standard for demonstrating a professionalunderstanding of signalling. It is of concern that sofew entrants to the signalling principles paper thisyear showed acceptable comprehension. Indeed themisunderstandings apparent in many papers showhow poorly the basic principles of signalling havebeen conveyed to those enthusiastic enough to prepare for the examination. This loss of under-standing in the industry is an impression that I havegained over recent years and was the reason why Ihave prepared a programme this year on the funda-mentals of signalling. For next year, Jacques Poré isdeveloping a programme on how to manage changeof signalling and influence decision-makers. It is myhope that this year we will be able to understand signalling ourselves so that we are ready to explainhow signalling can achieve efficient control and provide the management and customer informationnecessary to make railways “user friendly”.

CONCLUSIONI have tried to explain my own understanding of

why railway signalling is important to the economicsuccess of society in the coming years, and how thisInstitution is prepared and ready to encourage thedevelopment of signalling necessary to achieve thisto best effect. I do not ask you to agree with me, butinstead to use the Institution's activities to challengeall ideas for the purpose of better understanding thecore principles of our art.

In many parts of the world, the travelling publichas no idea of the potential for convenient rail travel. They are thus not likely to vote for politicalleaders who support rail transport unless the potential is explained convincingly. Internationally,there are promising signs of what is achievable.Heavy haul has developed from the US, Australianand South African experience. Dedicated high-speed rail travel has been demonstrated in Japanand further developed in France and Spain. Tiltingtrains on existing routes are now in service in Italyand Britain. New metros demonstrate the potentialfor serving cities, but the challenge now is to

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 25

upgrade existing metros to similar quality of service.New light rail schemes are valued for leading regeneration of many towns. While this shows thepotential, the public has also been let down whenpromises are not kept and costs are exceeded. Thefuture of rail transport depends on the industry delivering the promise, and this requires under-standing what is feasible, making practical plans andsticking to them. The international activity of theIRSE encourages us to identify best practice andshare it to global benefit.

Some would argue that the future lies withERTMS, mandated in Europe as a set of boxes, andto be applied without all this expensive pondering ofbasic ideas. It seems to make signalling so simple.In my view ERTMS has much to offer, but visions of using it without systems engineering are animpractical hope that will lead to disappointment.The objectives of cab signalling with ATP are right inmany cases. The economy of a fixed block Level 3system is essential for reducing infrastructure costs.But, ERTMS is part of a policy for interoperabilitythat is going to be very expensive to providethroughout whole continents. The US has highlystandardised railways, but they introduced the concept of “short lines” where lower-cost standardswere more suited to local conditions and theeconomies achieved permitted the feeder lines tocontribute to the success of the network as a whole.While ERTMS will be a major part of signalling in thecoming years, there will also be a need for low-cost

control for important feeder services. ERTMS will bea success only where the communications andcapacity management issues are solved throughsystems engineering. Consequently, the future of railnetworks, metros and light rail schemes depends onsignalling being a part of delivering a transport policy. Safety, reliability and economy should beexpected without question, and convenience, comfort and security be delivered qualities thatmake rail an attractive mode of transport, rather thanone society is forced to use by congestion on alternative modes. This release of rail’s potential canonly be effective if those involved understand theimplications of what they are doing.

It follows that the rail industry needs a vision, yeteconomic pressures so often preclude a chance todream. However, research into railway systems engineering has been a victim of recent reorganis-ations. There is no longer the significant researchinto the practicalities of applying new ideas so thatall the unexpected lessons are identified during trialsso that initial installation on real schemes can proceed to planned programme. In the absence ofthis vital process, the Institution has a further role –to encourage the collective experience of signalengineers worldwide to ensure that we can change,but in a manner that does not incur project risk. Youare the members of this Institution. I look forward toworking with you this year as we address theseimportant challenges.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS26

27

Technical Meeting of the Institutionheld at

The Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Wednesday 13th October 2004

The President, Mr J D Corrie, in the chair.114 members and visitors were in attendance. It was proposed by Mr F Heijnen, seconded by Mr D McKeown and carried that the Minutes

of the Technical Meeting held on 10th March 2004 be taken as read and they were signed by the President as a correct record.No apologies for absence had been received. There were two new members present for the first time since their election to membership

and the President introduced them to the meeting amidst congratulatory applause.The President then introduced Mr D Woodland, of Bechtel Ltd, and invited him to present his paper entitled “Railway Control Philosophy”.

In his presentation Mr Woodland began by exploring what the term ‘railway control’ generally means today. He went on to consider the maincomponents or sub-systems to provide the functionality of network planning, train control, station/line control and network control. He con-cluded by considering whether some of the concepts and assumptions underpinning the present philosophy are appropriate for the future.

Following the presentation Messrs A Kornas (Mott MacDonald), T George (retired), R Wood (AEA Tech), N Flowerday (Brown & Root), JHolmes (Halcrow Rail), P Craig (Bechtel), A C Howker (Past President), The President, D Weedon (Network Rail), C H Porter (Lloyd’s RegisterRail), Jan Seebrook (Conation Technologies), A Salisbury (Thales Telecomm), K Walter (Atkins Rail) and D McKeown (Independent Consultant)took part in the discussion. The presenter dealt with the questions in a comprehensive manner and the President then proposed a vote ofthanks and presented the speaker with the commemorative plaque customarily awarded to authors of the London paper.

The President thanked members for their attendance and their questions and then issued reminders to register to all who wished to attendthe Railway Interfaces Seminar in London on 18th November or the Oresund Bridge technical visit on 26th/27th November.

The President closed the meeting at 1945 by announcing that the next meeting in London would be the Technical Meeting to be held on10th November 2004 when Mr F How will present a paper entitled “Railway Signalling Philosophy, Principles and Practice”.

Railway Control PhilosophyDaniel Woodland MEng CEng MIEE MIRSE1

INTRODUCTIONThe term “philosophy” can refer both to a set of

ideas that underpin a particular field or activity, andto a critical analysis of those ideas. Accordingly, theauthor will start with an exploration of what the term‘railway control’ generally means today, before considering whether some of the concepts andassumptions underpinning that philosophy areappropriate for the future. The paper will set thescene for the remainder of this year’s IRSE lectureprogramme and, it is hoped, will prompt seriousdebate and discussion directed towards developinga railway control “philosophy” for the future.

Throughout this paper the author defines terms ashe believes they are most commonly used world-wide, but must acknowledge that his geographicalbase makes a bias towards UK terminology almostinevitable. It must also be noted that the recentlypublished IRSE textbook on Metro RailwaySignalling has come to different conclusions as tosome terminology that “is generally accepted world-wide” (Goddard 2003, p75 and throughout). Theauthor requests that readers bear with him where hisunderstanding is clearly inferior to their own. Afterall, it is not so much the terminology as the conceptsand assumptions described that are of importance inunderstanding the philosophy of railway control andits potential impact on railways of the future.

RAILWAY CONTROL SYSTEMSHistorically, signalling engineers have mainly been

responsible for the safe control of the movement oftrains. However, the introduction of modern tech-nology has led to demands for a more rigorous

approach to railway control, encompassing allaspects of customer comfort and well-being. Hencesafe control of operations must now be achievedwithout neglecting the operational requirements tokeep passengers informed, regulate trains, saveenergy, manage stock and crew allocation, enableand protect track work and generally provide foroptimum usage of the track. In other words, railwaycontrol must ensure the safe and efficient trans-portation of people and goods, so as to satisfy theexpectations of customers, regulatory authoritiesand the railway operators. It must, therefore, dealwith:

• Network Planning: determining the ‘plan’ forsafe and efficient operation;

• Train Control: ensuring that multiple trains areable to run safely and efficiently;

• Station and Line Control: locally or remotelymanaging passenger flows, staff and equip-ment;

• Network Control: overall supervision and management of network operation.

The main components or sub-systems required toprovide these activities and the context within whichthey must operate are shown in Figure 1. It shouldbe noted that the operation of these sub-systemsrequires both equipment and human elements,including drivers, signallers, controllers, maintainersand station staff.

NETWORK PLANNING

Network planning could be considered a part ofnetwork control (discussed later) but, since theactivities that it represents largely shape a railway’scontrol system, it will be outlined first.

Long-term planning activities help to identify the1 The author is Signalling/Systems Engineer with Bechtel Limited

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY28

transportation demand that a given railway mustmeet, together with the finance and other resourcesrequired in doing so. They may also define safetyobjectives for elements of the railway’s control system, or may even identify particular technologicalapproaches that must be followed (for example,when new legislation governing railway activities isintroduced, such as the European interoperabilitydirectives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC).

Further long-term activity determines the railway’sstrategy for technology (eg tried and tested versusstate of the art) and operating methodologies (egregulation objectives, manual or automatic driving,and rules and regulations to be implemented).Depending on the attitude adopted by the railwayauthority, strategy may drive (and constrain) systemdevelopment, or opportunities for system develop-ment may drive revised strategies. In either case thetwo activities are interrelated and must be con-sistent, both within themselves and with each other,if the transportation demand is to be met in an efficient and timely manner. Inconsistencies such asimposing existing rules and regulations on radicallydifferent technology will almost certainly undermineeffective system development, and are likely to leadto the expected advantages of new technology failing to materialise.

Medium-term network planning activities (typicallysix months to two years before operation) must prepare workable timetables, stock and crew diagrams that meet the aspirations of passengers,operators and regulators, or at least form an accept-able compromise with each group’s ideals.

In a perfect world, that would be the end of net-work planning. However, in the real world any planset in place months before implementation is likely

to need amendment due to circumstances unfore-seen at the time it was drawn up. Examples include:the insertion of an engineering train into thetimetable; line closure for an engineering posses-sion; or the need to impose a speed restriction overa section of line. In such cases short-term planningactivities may be required to amend the publishedtimetable, stock and crew diagrams so that a viableservice can be operated.

Of course, even then circumstances may make itimpossible to stick to the plan, but this would typically be dealt with in (or close to) real time by service control activities, considered later.

TRAIN CONTROL

Train control is perhaps the component of railwaycontrol most familiar to members of the IRSE. Manymay even think of it as a synonym for signalling.However, it is far more than that. Train controlencompasses all elements of the safe and efficientcontrol of train movements, including:

• Train Operation: movement control of trains(acceleration and braking);

• Service Control: real time management of thetrain service, including crew and rolling stock, tofulfil the planned schedule and servicedemands;

• Signalling: management of route availabilityand integrity, together with means of advisingdrivers of service control instructions.

As shown in Figure 2, numerous manual and automated systems are required to work together inorder to fulfil all of these activities both in steadystate conditions and in degraded modes.

Train Operation

In the early days of railways, train control con-

Figure 1 – The Railway Control System

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY 29

sisted solely of train operation activities, relying on asystem of ‘drive by sight'. So long as visibility wasgood, all that the human driver needed to controlmovement was a means of applying traction powerand braking effort, coupled with geographicalknowledge, anticipation of braking performance andpowers of visual observation. Operating under thisarrangement, all three elements of train operation(driver, traction control and brake control) were safety-critical. As the density and complexity of railway traffic increased, making on-sight train operation inadequate to ensure safety in an efficientway, the human driver continued in a safety-criticalrole, controlling the train’s traction and braking systems in response to trackside signalling indi-cations.

Besides responding to the signalling system,modern drivers must consider adherence to thetimetable, energy use and passenger comfort.Everything on or about the line must be observedand, if necessary, responded to as the journey proceeds. Drivers carry out train preparation, undertake station duties and manage any faultalarms on the train. When necessary, they must alsocommunicate with other staff on the train and withthe controlling signal box.

In practice drivers carry out these tasks withremarkable reliability, averaging around 17 years ofdriving between occurrences of a Signal Passed at

Danger (SPAD), yet human error is still a major causeof accidents. As a result of this, the 2001 IRSEreview of UK signalling philosophy concluded thatthe way to ensure safety is to “circumscribe the roleof humans with safety devices that will eliminate theharmful consequences of human error”, and went onto recommend “provision of a system of automatictrain protection” (IRSE 2001, pp12, 33 and WG2p52).

Automatic Train Protection

Numerous systems with widely different levels offunctionality have been, and still are, referred to astypes of automatic train protection (ATP).

• Systems such as AWS and Crocodile providewarnings to draw the driver’s attention to signalaspects, but can be overridden.

• TASS provides over-speed protection throughdefined areas of the track.

• Automatic train stop systems (such as mechanical trainstops, Signum and TBL1)enforce compliance with movement authoritylimits.

• Comprehensive ATP systems provide enforce-ment of speed restrictions and movementauthorities.

These systems are often divided into two categories. Intermittent ATP systems (eg BR-ATP,TBL2, KVB, ETCS Level 1) are based on localised

Figure 2 – Train Control Activities

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY30

intermittent transmission via transponders or loops.Continuous ATP systems (eg ATB, TVM, Seltrack,ETCS Levels 2 and 3) are based on continuoustransmission methods.

Of course, even comprehensive ATP is only trulycomprehensive when applied to all trains and alltrack throughout the line. Many systems with thecapability to supervise speed and movement authority are either not able to do so continuously orare not applied in a way that does so, and would bebetter considered as ‘partial’ ATP. Examples includeIndusi, ASFA and TPWS, as well as the original BR-ATP installations (where not all trains were fittedand there were gaps in the areas of track fitment).

Whilst ATP systems offer safety improvements byeliminating many forms of driver error that may resultin SPADs and excessive speeds, it is important tonote that even in comprehensive form they are not acure for all causes of overruns and overspeeding.For instance, problems of low rail adhesion canactually become worse under ATP, if a full emergency brake application is invoked.

Clearly not all types of ATP are equal in safety performance. They also vary widely in efficiency,particularly with respect to capacity and cost. As aresult the optimum approach to ATP may vary fromone railway to another. However, the author, as anexaminer for the IRSE’s membership examinations,is often dismayed by how little understanding manycandidates show of this when choosing betweenATP system types. History suggests, moreover, thatthe examination candidates are not alone. In the UKmany decisions on ATP system development andimplementation would appear to demonstrate a similar confusion.

Automatic Train Operation

Since ATP only addresses the driver’s primarysafety tasks, it leaves a large number of the operat-ing activities required for efficient operation in thehands of humans. Automatic train operation (ATO)seeks to automate these non-safety activities inorder to produce “a method of operation in whichthe movement of the train is automatically controlledwithout the intervention of a driver, who, if provided,exercises only a supervisory function” (BSI 1998).

It is important to reiterate that the function of traindriving is safety critical. However, as shown in Figure2, ATO is not a safety system. It cannot, therefore,exist without ATP.

ATO can be implemented in one of three forms:

• Driver-accompanied: where a human driversits in a cab at the front of the train, monitoringsystem performance, observing the line aheadand controlling door opening/closure during station stops. The driver can intervene in theevent of an abnormal situation to prevent a collision or other incident from occurring, and isavailable to deal with system failures, drive thetrain manually or co-ordinate evacuation.

• Train captain-operated: where a staff memberis on board, but not necessarily in a driving cab.They are usually given other duties, such aschecking tickets. Train captains can control door

opening/closure, deal with system failures, drivemanually or co-ordinate an evacuation.However, they are not available to monitor system operation/track status continuously andmay not be able to intervene in emergencies(such as obstruction of the track ahead).

• Unaccompanied: where trains travel with nostaff members on board, there is no operatoravailable to monitor the system’s operation orthe track status. The system must be able tocope with automatic door opening/closure andmust control its own departures from stations(including reversing at terminals), unless platform-based staff are available to performthese functions. Careful consideration must alsobe given to procedures for emergency handlingof equipment failures and passenger evacu-ation. Means must be provided for dealing withthese situations remotely, or for staff to gainaccess to a train stopped mid-section.

ATO can be used to shorten journey times byensuring maximum train performance, or to reduceenergy consumption by use of coasting when thetimetable permits. It can also maximise line capacityby: ensuring that all trains behave in the same manner; alleviating a major cause of train cancella-tions (staff absenteeism and sickness); and avoidingthe problem of train crew displacement followingservice disruption (a major factor in the servicerecovery rate). Full automation also allows quickeradjustment of the service to demand, quicker turn-around at terminals and the opportunity to continuefull service off-peak at marginal cost.

Despite the number and scope of these benefits,there are also major constraints on progress towardsfull automation. These include the social implicationsof reducing staff numbers, psychological factors indehumanising the system and difficulties with policing the system to protect passengers from vandalism and physical attack. There are also opera-tional problems within the concept of automatedsystems, such as the inability to recover from complete system failure and the associated risk ofpassengers becoming stranded without assistancebeing available.

Automatic Train Control

Automatic train control (ATC) is often used as acollective term for ATP and ATO, as represented inFigure 2. Before nationalisation, some UK railwaysalso referred to in-cab warning systems as ATC, ausage that has been perpetuated in some places, forinstance in Australia. Alternatively the term is some-times applied to a system directly controlling atrain’s brake and traction interface, as a sub-systemof ATO. This is an historical usage from the earlydays of automation. A more widely used alternativeadopts ATC as a reference to all railway automation,including ATP, ATO, ATS, ATR and ARS (see Goddard2003, p75). Readers should feel free to annotateFigure 2 in accordance with their own preference ifthey disagree with the author’s.

Light rail and metro systems, where all trains havesimilar physical and performance characteristics, areideal for the application of ATC systems. The typical

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY 31

mixed-traffic scenarios of main line railways aremore difficult to automate fully. As a result they havetended to limit the application of ATC to the ATPfunctionality, mainly on high-speed lines. Other ATCfunctions are now beginning to be considered formain line railways, as evidenced by the KOMPASATO development projects and Intermobil RegionDresden operational tests in Germany (Eberhardt2001, p7). However, such projects are the exceptionrather than the rule.

ATC systems are generally credited with offeringimprovements in performance (through ATO) andsafety (through ATP). These can, in turn, lead to costbenefits, through greater utilisation of infrastructureassets and the potential to reduce staffing levels.

Whilst ATO and ATP eliminate a number of undesirable human attributes from the system,humans do have a remarkable ability to adapt to circumstances, think rapidly and take action to avertdanger or to compensate for inadequacies in systemdesign. It is, therefore, important to understand theroles that are played by both the technical systemand human driver where ATC is introduced, particularly during response to, and recovery from,abnormal situations. With use of ATO it is alsoessential to ensure that the ATC systems are morerobust than the conventional systems they replace,so that design inadequacies do not occur.

Service Control

Service control encompasses the real-time controlof a railway service, including: Train Regulation;Route Setting; and Traffic Monitoring.

Service control was originally a localised safetycritical function. Railway policemen determinedwhen it was safe for trains to proceed, typically onthe basis of time interval working. However, with theintroduction of signalling interlocking, the safety critical component of the activities was largely takenon by the ‘signalling system', leaving service controlwith a non-safety critical role under normal operatingconditions. Over time local control has also largely,but not always, been replaced by centralised controlof large areas by fewer staff and even automation ofsome control functions, often referred to as automatic train supervision (ATS).

ATS systems are not safety critical – their failuredoes not directly affect the safety of the railway. Ofcourse, as noted in Figure 2, no system will everfunction perfectly all of the time, so the safe management of degraded conditions is fundamentalto the overall philosophy of railway control. It may bepossible to provide redundancy and graceful degradation within the safety-critical (signalling) systems in order to enable continued operation withthe same division of safety responsibility as undernormal operation. However, where this is not possible, some elements of service control willregain their original safety critical nature. Examplesinclude issuing of verbal instructions via voice communication systems, and the return of safetycritical route availability and integrity functionality tolocal manual control (scotch, clip and hand-signalling).

Although not safety critical under normal operating

conditions, service control functions should still bedesigned so as not to stress the safety systems. Inthis way the safety critical systems act as a safetynet, with multiple failures of different systemsrequired simultaneously for unsafe conditions tooccur.

Train Regulation

“The dynamics of train operation are essentiallyunstable” (Goddard 2003, p21). The purpose of trainregulation is to achieve the best possible service bymanaging this instability. Regulation objectivesdepend on the railway’s operating strategy.Examples include:

• running to a pre-defined timetable;

• achieving an even service interval;

• first come first served;

• dispatching by train type priority;

• maximising energy efficiency;

• or even response to customer demand (ie thenumber of passengers on station platforms).

Regulation to maintain even service intervals hasin the past been performed very crudely through thesignalling system by delaying individual trains. Thishas the disadvantages of delaying customers (whoprefer to travel as quickly as possible), causing compound delays (that may eventually require traincancellation or turn back to recover normal service)and causing gaps to develop between trains (whichcan lead to passenger build up, delaying the follow-ing train, further increasing the gap and adding additional service instability).

With the advent of more sophisticated moderncontrol systems, alternative regulation techniqueshave become possible. These typically involve running the normal service with coasting, such that:

a even service intervals can be maintained byspeeding trains up as well as slowing themdown;

b the speed of trains can be regulated on theapproach to junctions so that they do not arriveuntil a route is available, avoiding the need tobring trains to rest and thus improving run-time.

This approach requires regular reviews and adjust-ment to train progress and is best suited to an automated approach, known as automatic train regulation (ATR). Whilst some advantage can beobtained by passing advice on optimum speed profiles to human drivers, ATR is also ideally suitedto automatically driven trains.

Route Setting

The most fundamental activity carried out by a signaller is route setting. Before a train can beallowed to proceed through a route all points that itwill traverse must be set correctly, and conflictingroutes must be blocked (by setting individual conflicting signals to danger or by use of flank protection in point setting). When it can be assuredthat the route is clear, authority to make the movement can be given. In the days of the railwaypoliceman, route setting was achieved by means oflocal manual movement of points and signals (still a

32 RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

fall-back option today). This was clearly a safety critical activity. With the introduction of signal boxes,all of the route elements within a station area couldbe controlled from a single location. Initially this wasachieved by means of rods, chains and wires thatconnected the route elements to levers in the signal box. Over time, technological developmenthas enabled even greater centralisation of control, with route elements being remotely controlled by means of electric, pneumatic and radioconnections.

In parallel with the development of remote control,technological means were developed for ensuringthat only safe route combinations could be set andcleared. This became known as ‘interlocking'.

The interlocking effectively automated the safetycritical elements of a signaller’s route setting activities, making route setting itself non-safety critical, as shown in Figure 2. In more modern systems the continued advance of technology hasmade it possible to automate the rest of the route-setting task as well, and to provide a significantreduction in the signallers’ workload. This is knownas automatic route setting (ARS).

A simple example of ARS can be found in LULprogramme machines. These utilise rolls of punchedplastic film containing details of the expected trainsand their required routeing or timing. Machines canbe coupled together to ensure that, as long as trainsarrive in the assigned order, the required routes areset automatically at the correct times. If a train isdetected for which the train describer informationdoes not agree with the punch card programme or ifa train does not arrive when expected, an alarm issounded in the control centre where a switchenables selection of route setting by programmemachine, on a ‘first come, first served’ basis or bythe signaller. There is also a “Train Cancelled” push-button to step the machine to the next entry ifrequired (Dell 1958, pp84, 100). Obviously, similarfunctionality can be easily provided in modern computer-based systems.

On main lines in the UK the term ARS is applied toa more complex system that also includes somebasic regulation functions at a localised level. Thesystem receives information from train describersand the master timetable system and uses it to perform route setting for all timetabled train move-ments, even when the service is disrupted. Manyother routine activities, such as train monitoring,track circuit monitoring, automatic code insertionand timetable handling are also performed by BRARS, leaving the signalman to focus on more seriousproblems such as stock failures and signalling failures. Because of the scope of BR ARS it has beenargued (and the author supports the view) that itshould more accurately be described as a form ofATR, or even ATS, since it does more than just setroutes (State of the Art 1998, p341-2).

Traffic Monitoring

Route setting and regulation alone are not sufficient to ensure efficient service control. A higher-level traffic-monitoring element is alsorequired to supervise train movements by:

• obtaining information on the location of specifictrains and providing it to signallers, ARS andpassenger information systems (ie traindescriber functions);

• monitoring service performance, such as trackcircuit occupations (for correct sequencing andtime in section), including recording of this datafor future analysis;

• initiating action to ensure safety and availabilityof the line when unusual events occur;

• watching for serious service perturbations fromwhich regulation alone is unlikely to recover inorder to initiate additional action, such as turn-ing, rerouteing, adding or cancelling trains andother higher-level decisions about divergencefrom the timetabled service pattern;

• managing recovery from serious perturbationsto the service in real time to ensure that traindestinations are appropriately balanced, bunching and conflicts are minimised, and staffand stock resources are available when andwhere required.

Service performance, along with train and crewmovements, can be monitored either through thesignalling system or by an independent means.

Perhaps the closest that we have come to theimplementation of a fully automatic traffic monitoringsystem in the UK is BR ARS. Besides the route setting and basic regulation functions already discussed, BR ARS monitors track circuits for correct sequence of operation, raising an alarm tothe signaller if a track circuit becomes occupied orclears unexpectedly or if a train is an unusually longtime in section. Action based on these alarms is thenleft to the human operator.

The author is not aware of any system currently inuse that carries out major perturbation recoveryautomatically, probably because of the complexity ofdeciding on the right course of action. Instead it isthe usual practice for the automated system to operate an alarm, drawing a human operator’s attention to the need for action, and subsequently toprovide information to support decisions by thatoperator. However, as technology continues toadvance, automation of the complete response isbecoming more feasible.

Clearly there is a great deal of overlap between thefunctions of ATS, traffic monitoring, ATR, and ARS.The author believes that the differences can best beunderstood by considering them as a hierarchy offunctions as shown in Figure 2.

Signalling

Signalling evolved in response to increasingspeeds and complexity of traffic that made pure on-sight operation unsafe, uneconomic or both.Today, the main functions of a signalling system areas follows.

• Lock: set up a safe route for the passage ofeach train over the track that it is to traverse,and preserve that route in front of the train whilstit is making its movement.

• Block: maintain safe separation between trains.

• Interlock: prevent conflicting moves (at junctions, when crossing a route that could betaken by another train, and at level crossings).

• Unlock: release the route after the passage ofthe train, for use by other trains.

These functions represent the activities requiredfor ensuring route availability and integrity, com-monly encompassed within the term ‘interlocking’.Including them within an automated system prevents signal operator error from causing unsaferouteing of trains. Interlocking, therefore, representsautomation of the signaller’s primary safety tasks(the signaller’s ATP).

To utilise the interlocking functions the signallingsystem requires a fifth function, that is some meansof authorising a train to enter a route that has beenset up for it and of indicating to the driver the maximum safe speed relative to track geometry anddistances to signals or obstructions. This has traditionally been achieved through signal aspects atfixed locations along the track, supplemented by driver’s route knowledge and speed limit indicationsigns. However, in recent years the technology hasbecome available to achieve these aims by othermeans (such as radio communication to in-cab displays) and also to supplement the movementauthority by supervision and enforcement. The distinction between signalling and train operationhas therefore become blurred. Hence, the IRSE alsodefines a sixth function of signalling as to “superviseand/or enforce the train to stay within its movementauthority” (IRSE 2001, p9). Since supervision andenforcement of movement authorities (ATP) is concerned with automation of the driver’s primarysafety tasks, the author does not agree that it shouldbe considered a function of signalling. He prefersinstead to consider it an aspect of train operation,under the umbrella of train movement control, asshown in Figure 2.

A seventh function can also be identified in themajority of current signalling systems. This is theability to detect and protect against some failures orabnormal situations in or around the track. Thisfunction has come about in part as a by-product ofthe technology used in signalling systems. This isparticularly true of track circuits, which provide aconvenient operational means of replacing signals todanger from the location of an incident by use oftrack circuit operating clips, or in some instancesautomatically, for example following circuit-breakingrail breaks or obstruction of the line by conductivematerial.

Even though this functionality is not an originally-intended feature, it has become widely relied uponto provide protection under some circumstances. Inconsequence it must now be considered a part ofthe signalling system, particularly when upgradingsystems in ways that remove the protection mechanisms. If the replacement systems do notinclude the functionality inherently, care must betaken to assess the risk that this represents and toidentify alternative means of mitigating that riskwhere necessary.

STATION CONTROL

Station control is perhaps the most diverse group-ing of control functions to be found on a railway,encompassing:

• management of staffing levels, which may varyconsiderably through the day;

• local control of train services, particularly platform management, with its significantimpact on dwell times, but also local panel operation and manual route setting (scotch andclip);

• customer management, such as disseminationof journey information and passenger flow management throughout the station, includingticket provision, gate control, boarding andalighting from trains, whether in normal, congested or emergency conditions;

• environment management (lighting, fans, air-conditioning, lifts and escalators);

• asset monitoring and management, arrangingfor repair of station equipment by appropriatedepartments and implementing any degradedmode operation required until that is done;

• co-ordinating works access for station staff,emergency services, contractors, maintenancestaff, cleaning companies, catering providers,etc;

• local control of incidents relating to train oper-ation, track and signal repair, security, fire,police, ambulance services and, ultimately,emergency evacuation.

It may also include responsibility for staff protection on the track in and around station areas.

Historically, human operators carried out all station control activities manually, making themhighly labour intensive, but in modern rail systemsnumerous technological solutions are available toassist. Security and monitoring of passenger flowscan be conducted from the station control room, oreven remotely, by means of CCTV. The same is truefor passenger information systems, which can provide audible and visual information in localisedareas or throughout a station complex, all under thecontrol of a single operator if required. Ticket gatescan be used to control entry and egress, whilst tickets can be sold via automatic machines, assist-ing and enforcing revenue collection with minimalstaff supervision. Alarm systems can also be pro-vided to detect overcrowding or fires and to respondto passenger activated alarms.

Most of these systems can operate automaticallywithout the need for human intervention. Fire alarmsystems can notify the fire service automatically andactivate sprinklers, usually with the facility for operator override in case of a false alarm. Passengerinformation displays and audible announcementscan be linked to the train describer system in orderto provide automatic updates of expected trainarrivals. Other messages can be triggered on a timeinterval basis, or in response to abnormal situationsdetected by the CCTV system such as loiterers nearstation entrances. When an abnormal situation is

33RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

detected CCTV cameras can also be selected auto-matically for display to control room staff, either inthe station or remotely. Such automation providesthe opportunity to manage station control activitiesfar more efficiently.

Where humans are still required, on-line help systems can be associated with alarms and indica-tions in order to assist the operator in determiningthe best course of action.

Such technological solutions make possible much greater integration between train and stationcontrol systems than ever before, particularly in the areas of passenger information and platform management.

LINE CONTROL

In many respects line and station control appear to be alternative names for the same functionality.Indeed, the system model in Figure 1 shows themutilising the same sub-systems. The difference can be found in the scope of control. Whilst stationcontrol deals with local issues in a particular geographical location, line control takes a broaderview of operation throughout a line. It is con-cerned with monitoring overall line operation, including resource allocation, information dissemi-nation, etc.

On most metro railways line control co-ordinatesall activities on a single line. On main lines the linegrouping may be associated with areas of respon-sibility, for example those of a particular train operating company (for passenger flow relatedactivities) or infrastructure maintenance company(for asset monitoring and management).

NETWORK CONTROL

The tasks required to achieve railway control aregenerally divided amongst a number of staff roles.On UK main line railways these would include:

• Signallers dealing with normal running of trains;

• Signalling supervisors dealing with local perturbation management, such as rerouteingtrains from fast to slow lines, and changing theplanned train order at junctions;

• Station Supervisors/Managers dealing withstation control activities, such as re-platforming;

• Infrastructure maintenance controllers deal-ing with infrastructure (signalling, track, etc)maintenance and faulting activities;

• Stock controllers dealing with faulting, re-allocation of stock and ensuring availability ofstock for maintenance;

• Train crew resource supervisors dealing withchanges to crew allocation following an incident;

• Train running controllers dealing with moreserious perturbations by retiming, cancelling,diverting or terminating short of destination anyaffected train on a given line or geographic area.

These staff roles may be divided geographically(perhaps line by line) and split between differentorganisations. Returning to the example of UK mainlines, signallers and train running controllers are part

of Network Rail, stock controllers, train crew supervisors and station managers are part of thetrain operating companies and infrastructure maintenance controllers are part of either NetworkRail or an infrastructure maintenance company.

Network control is required in order to addressstrategic operating decisions with potentially widerimpact than a single station, line or company basedarea of responsibility, such as train diversions orcancellations and other timetable modifications. Itmay also be required in order to co-ordinatebetween train and station control activities, particu-larly if regulation strategies are linked to demand, inthe form of platform crowding. The objective of network control is to determine the actions thatshould be taken in order to minimise disruption onthe overall network.

With modern computer techniques there is anopportunity to consider provision of enhanced decision support tools (such as simulators runningfaster than real time) or even automation of some, ifnot all, of the station, line and service control functions that have been outlined, in order to assistin achieving optimal overall network control. This isas yet a vision for the future in the UK. To date, theclosest we have come is arguably the use of traingraph displays to assist signallers at the CheritonEurotunnel and Ashford CTRL control centres, orperhaps the ‘Control Centre of the Future’, providingcontrollers with up-to-date train running informationfor the whole network, installed in many signal boxes on Network Rail infrastructure. Other initiatives (such as the Network Management Centrefor WCML and the LUL Central Line ATR) have beenlaunched with the aim of providing improved network control, including predictive simulation for‘what if’ scenarios, but have yet to come to fruition.Clearly this is an area where there is room forimprovement in future railway control systems.

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

The observant reader will have noticed an additional ‘bubble’ in Figure 1 that has not yet beenreferred to directly – the communication systems(radio, telecomms and data transmission) that gluethe rest of the railway control system together. Theauthor does not propose to describe these in detailin this paper. However, it is important to note thatrailway control cannot operate without a com-munications backbone, whether verbal, visual,mechanical or electromagnetic. As the Presidentstated in April, “Good signalling is distinguished byhow it makes use of communications, and good railway communications is distinguished by providing the bearer for the information required bysignalling” (Corrie 2004). They are indeed insepar-able, and the observation applies equally to otheraspects of railway control.

FUTURE ISSUES IN RAILWAY CONTROLUp to this point the author has covered the

philosophy of today’s railway control systems.Whilst this philosophy is broadly satisfactory at thecurrent time, some of the concepts and assumptionsthat underpin it do not yet appear to be either fully

34 RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

mature or clearly understood. As a result, difficultiesare encountered in gaining system approvals, andopportunities for greater safety and efficiency aremissed. This situation must be addressed if we areto gain optimal benefit from future railway controlsystems.

Within the constraints of space available for anIRSE paper it is not possible to address all possibleareas of concern thoroughly. However, the authorwould like to raise some issues that he considers tobe significant for the future.

HUMAN FACTORS IN AUTOMATION

As may be apparent from the discussion of whatrailway control means today, there has been (and stillis) a drive towards increased automation of railwaycontrol functions. The motivation for introducingautomated systems is usually to reduce workloads(and thus staffing levels) and to improve on the safety performance of human operators. “A commonresponse to the complexity of human informationprocessing is to suggest that by automating theentire system human frailty can be eliminated”(Moray 2001, p15). However, even highly automatedsystems still require human intervention at times and“although it might seem that automation woulddecrease the risk of operator error, the truth is thatautomation does not remove people from the system – it merely moves them to maintenance andrepair functions and to higher-level supervisory control and decision-making. The effects of humandecisions and actions can then be extremely serious” (Leveson 1995, p10). The main issues toconsider with automation therefore move away fromdirect (real time) operator errors to the following:

• Errors in preparation: Errors in system designor the data on which the automated systems actmay be subtle and not reveal themselves for along time, or may be introduced as a result ofwrongly executed actions and misrepresen-tation during data entry by an operator.

• Maintenance errors: Automated systems mustbe maintained by staff who are often less wellqualified than the operators they have replaced.

• Isolation from the system: Operators mustoften rely on indirect (and sometimes mislead-ing) information about the system state.

• Delayed reactions: If the automated system isextremely reliable, human supervisors maybecome complacent and cease to monitor itproperly. They may then be unable to reactquickly or take effective control in a timely manner following failures in the system.

• Deskilling: Deskilling can be a major cause ofinappropriate action (eg the use of an ATO system may lead to reduced driver ability todrive trains safely following equipment failure).

• Overloading: Where automation enables staffreductions, the remaining operators may rapidlybecome overloaded if the system fails.

• Communication errors: Errors in verbal communication are most critical in relation todegraded modes of operation. Most forms ofATP for example will not prevent this as they

include manual override facilities.

• Attention conflicts: Conflicts such as requiringa driver to look at in-cab displays and linesidesignals simultaneously may cause importantinformation or events to be overlooked.

• Incorrect assumptions: If all trains on the network are not ATP fitted, or there has been asystem failure, staff assumptions that the automated system is providing protection will beincorrect and may lead to inappropriate actions.

(Leveson 1995, Short 2001 and Smith 1999.)

When considering the above it is worth noting thatengineers can only automate what they understand.Hence, if automation is taken to its limits, it is thoseaspects of the system that are too difficult to automate that are left to the human operators. Theseremaining tasks are then more complicated for theoperator and may have to be carried out with areduced understanding of what is happening withinthe system, making human error all the more probable. In addition, if automation makes theremaining human operators subordinate to themachine, rather than the machine subordinate tothem, operators may lose their sense of purpose,resulting in poor quality of work or high employeeturnover.

Automation eliminates neither the opportunity fornor the effects of human error, and may even makethe situation worse for some types of error. It is thusimportant to consider the role that humans playwithin the system, and to design it accordingly. Inother words, an overall systems approach must betaken, considering the effects of technical failuresand interactions with staff, passengers and the public.

Based on considerations such as these, “the consensus is now that a combination of human andmachine is better than either alone” (Moray 2001,p15). In general, “computers are better at drawingsimple conclusions from large amounts of data(deduction) whereas humans are better at drawingcomplex decisions from small amounts of data(induction). An information system which can takecare of deductive reasoning and provide the operator with reliable, salient information from whichhe can perform inductive reasoning is most likely tooptimise operator performance” (Cobb et al 1996,pp10-11). In accordance with this approach,machines should be designed to assist, rather thanreplace, the skills and abilities of human operators.Thus, rather than striving to minimise humaninvolvement in the system, we should consider therole and work load of human operators so as to minimise the risks that they introduce whilst makingmaximum use of the strengths that they can contribute.

Unfortunately, “it is absolutely clear that the railway industry, including signal engineers, do notunderstand enough about human factors and cannot demonstrate how they have been taken intoaccount in the development of railway systems”(Cooksey 2001, p4). This is a weakness that must beaddressed in the development of future systems forthe automation of railway control.

35RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

CONTROL AND PROTECTION

In most industries, control (day-to-day operation)and protection (intervention in case of unsafe controldemands) are kept separate by use of diverse data,software and hardware. This is done to keep protection systems simple (and thus reliable andpredictable), and to ensure that the protection system continues to function correctly if the controlsystem fails to do so and vice versa.

The introduction of modern microprocessors hasenabled significant integration of functions andinclusion of automatic protection within control systems. In such cases, large cost savings can begained by avoiding the need for duplication, butthese savings bring with them a significant risk ofsimultaneous control and protection system failure.For this reason, whilst equipment suppliers offersuch products to chemical and material processingplants, independent protection systems are oftenretained even though this incurs additional costs.

In some industries, the argument for integration ofcontrol and protection functions is not based on costalone. A classic example of this is the aerospaceindustry – which, in the provision of public transportvehicles, offers an interesting comparison with railways. In the case of passenger aircraft flight control systems, mechanical linkages are now commonly being replaced by digital fly-by-wire control systems. These enable greater flexibility,improved response to control demands, moreadvanced autopilot systems and the facility to protect automatically against control demands thatcould result in a stall or overstress the airframe.However, they also have inherently lower integritythan their mechanical predecessors. To mitigate this,it has become necessary to provide redundancythrough multiple (usually identical) signal sources,computers and data transmission routes, all withinternal and cross channel fault monitoring to isolatefailed equipment and ensure safe operation. A modern civil aircraft has at least two flight manage-ment systems, auto pilots and auto-throttle controllers, designed with an overall probability offailure of less than 10-9 per flight hour. However, thisalone is not considered to be enough. As an additional safety measure, provision is made toswitch to a dissimilar redundant (usually analogueand/or mechanical) backup system if the digital system fails. Circuits providing warning signals in thecockpit are also usually kept independent of the circuits or systems providing controlling actions. Thedissimilar system may offer less functionality thanthe primary fly-by-wire control, but this approachguarantees that a flight-critical function is not lost ifa generic software, hardware or data fault causes allidentical redundant components to fail (Moir et al2001, p211; Pratt 2000, pp26, 29-30 ).

Unfortunately, whilst advanced digital fly-by-wiresystems bring the benefits of improved control andincreased integration, they also bring greater complexity to the development process. This canmake it far more difficult to prove safety and, ultimately, obtain safety certification. The fact hasnot been lost on the aerospace industry. As a result,

the integration of functions is not always carried out,even when technically possible. The benefits to begained are instead assessed with respect to systemsafety and availability objectives, and integration isonly pursued where these outweigh the expecteddifficulties. An example of this can be found in theAirbus A320, where the Air Data Computer andInertial Reference System were integrated within thesame line replaceable unit, but retained use of separate computing devices in order to keep theindependence of the two functions and ease the certification process (Leondes 1992, p439-441; Moiret al 2001, p289).

So how does this apply to railway control? Controland protection functions have historically been keptseparate on railways too. Since the introduction ofthe interlocking, service control functions, whethercarried out by human operators or automated systems, have dealt with control and the interlockingwith protection. The control is further designed notto stress the protection system, ie it acts as a firstlayer of safety protection, filtering out unsafe routedemands before they are passed to the interlocking.Similarly, where there is no ATP system, the driver ofa train is the primary safety system for train movements.

When an ATP system is introduced and the driveris allowed to control the train in the same manner asbefore, he/she can continue to act as the primarysafety system for the train’s movements whilst theATP effectively acts as a secondary safety system(or safety net) in case of driver error. Early appli-cations of ATC (such as the mechanical trainstop)followed this approach, leaving control with a humanoperator (the driver) whilst taking protection into anautomated system. The human operator would notintentionally rely on the protection system and thusprovided a layer of safety independent of the safetycritical protection system. This remained the casewith the first introduction of ATO to passenger service, on LUL’s Victoria Line, which used codedtrack circuit transmissions for train protection andindependently coded spot loop transmissions forATO driving instructions. However, in more recenttimes, the separation between control and protec-tion has often been lost in train operation.

Whilst the Victoria Line ATO/ATP arrangementensured independence between control and pro-tection functions, the later Central Line ATO systemobtained target speeds from the train borne ATPsystem. Any failure in the ATP system that mightresult in unsafe target speeds would thus impactboth the ATP and ATO, whether caused by hard-ware, software or data errors.

The equivalent arrangement exists in most modern ATP systems for use with a human driver(including BR-ATP and ERTMS). If indications of target speed and movement authority are providedto the driver by the ATP system, they will influencethe way in which he/she controls the train. Any errorin the ATP generated target data is then likely to mislead the driver and cause him/her to make thesame error, undermining the independence of control and protection.

36 RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

The saving grace up to now has been that driverscan observe independent lineside signals and arerequired by the railway’s operating rules to regardthem as their primary movement authority. Thus, byfollowing the rules, drivers may be able to spoterrors in ATP targets and continue to control trainmovements safely. However, as we begin to move toin-cab signalling, with no lineside signals, this will no longer be the case. The ATP system will be providing both protection and control instructionsbased on the same hardware, software and data,and the driver will have no independent means ofassessing the validity of in-cab signals.

Such systems may well still be safe, but proof ofthat safety is going to become far harder. They couldbe made safer still, and the safety approval processsimplified, by following best practice in the widerindustry and ensuring independence of control andprotection functions.

EFFICIENCY, SAFETY AND DRIVING CUES

As already discussed, regulation has in the pastbeen performed very crudely through the signallingsystem, trains being either rerouted or delayed byholding signals at red. Regulation in this way is inefficient and can extend the time required to recover from a perturbation. With the introduction ofin-cab signalling systems it becomes possible toachieve a much finer level of regulation. However,any attempt to do this whilst in-cab signalling is apart of the ATP system is bound to increase thecomplexity of the system, making it even harder togain safety approval.

Besides regulation and direct target information,in-cab signalling systems in use today also includesome cues that are used by drivers. An example ofthis is the AWS bell and horn which, whilst intendedas a driver warning system on approach to signals atcaution or danger, is also used by drivers to helpthem assess their location, whether they receive aclear or caution indication, particularly in adverseweather conditions. Whilst such cues may not havebeen intended for the use that they are put to, drivers do now rely upon them and would need torevise their route cues if they were removed. Thiswas one of the main reasons that active use of AWSwas retained when the far more comprehensive BR-ATP systems were brought into operation. Althoughthe protection provided by AWS became largelyredundant, BR-ATP did not provide equivalent driving cues. Incidentally retention of the AWS warnings also provided an independent (albeit inferior) layer of protection and indication to the driver, boosting the overall integrity of the BR-ATPsystems. However, this resulted in drivers having torespond to multiple indications and alarms, initiatedby the conventional signalling, BR-ATP and AWS,bringing the potential to annoy or even distract somedrivers from the safe control of their train.

With ERTMS it is (at least in theory) possible toprovide driving cues through the in-cab display.However, such use further complicates what is predominantly intended as a safety system and maymake safety approval harder to gain.

Clearly there is potential for in-cab signalling

systems to assist the driving task. So how can thepotential benefits of improved signal clarity,enhanced regulation and clear driving cues begained without suffering the problems of attentionconflict and safety approval? The author believesthat the answer lies in deciding what the purpose ofthe displays is. If the purpose is to prevent an ATPintervention, perhaps effort would be better spentdesigning compatible ATP supervision criteria andoperating rules. If it is to provide driving and regulation cues in support of efficient railway operation, perhaps the answer is to make the in-cabsignalling and regulation instructions independent ofthe protection system, whether AWS or a moreadvanced ATP, much as the Victoria Line ATO provides independent driving instructions.

With such an in-cab system in place, the driver’sjob could be simplified significantly. One consistentset of driving guidance could be provided that wouldhelp the driver to know what was expected ofhim/her (rather than what is permitted by the signalling system), including speed restrictions,movement authorities and station stops. An independent and unseen ATP could then provideprotection against driver error or failings in the driving guidance system’s advice. There would beno need for multiple system alarms and indicationsto distract and annoy the driver, who would insteadreceive far clearer instructions to support the opera-tional aspects of their driving task. Not only wouldsuch an arrangement make life easier for the driverand simplify safety approval, it would also createopportunities for enhanced regulation systems(Mitchell 2003, p11), and pave the way for full ATO inyears to come.

The pros and cons of such an approach need tobe considered further, along with any alternativeideas, if we are to achieve the best from our driversand regulation systems in the future.

ADHESION MANAGEMENT

It is a core assumption of railway control thattrains can stop. Generally, the assumption is valid,but in conditions of poor adhesion it may not be. Forexample, typical UK main line trains have a nominalfull service brake rate of up to 0.09g and an emergency brake rate of 0.12g. Once built, the trainsare tested against these deceleration rates under dryrail conditions only. There is no performance speci-fied for low adhesion conditions, which means thatthe braking rates actually achieved could be farlower. In fact, whilst the coefficient of adhesionbetween a clean steel wheel and rail is between 0.4and 0.6, on the actual railway adhesion levels“between 0.05 and 0.09 are quite common and very low adhesion conditions (below 0.05) occur frequently enough to cause significant operationaland safety problems” (Tunley 1999, pp M13/1).Attempting to brake a train’s axles at a higher ratethan is supported by the available adhesion is likelyto cause the train to slide, significantly extending thebraking distance and damaging the wheel treadsand rail head.

Whilst the safety of trains specified to the existingbraking performances has proved historically

37RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

adequate, they have been operated by professionaldrivers (who know better than to apply a full brakeapplication in areas of poor adhesion), on lines fittedwith conventional signalling systems (which usuallyallow a 25% contingency between the signal spacing and trains’ theoretical stopping perform-ance). It is not the usual practice to make suchallowances in ATP system algorithms. There is certainly no allowance in BR-ATP (apart from the signal’s overlap) and only a ‘provision’ in ERTMSalgorithms (which it is not obligatory to use). Eventhen, when the ATP intervenes with a brake appli-cation, it does so at full brake rate, regardless of theprevailing adhesion conditions. Whilst ATP systemsare still overlaid on conventional signalling thisshould not cause too many difficulties, assumingthat the trains are fitted with a reasonable wheelslide protection system to mitigate the ATP’s highbrake rate demand, since the signal spacingallowance still applies. However, as we move to in-cab signalling without lineside signals it is importantto reassess the provision made for poor adhesion.

Provision could be achieved by repeating the conventional signalling approach of adding a signifi-cant margin to theoretical braking distance, withconsequent effect on capacity. Perhaps a more efficient solution would be the sharing of real timeadhesion measurement between trains, enabling following trains’ drivers and ATP systems to predictand allow for lower braking rates where poor adhesion is encountered. A third possibility would beto address the problem from a rolling stock, ratherthan train protection, perspective. Railways inEurope and Japan are able to achieve significantlyhigher brake rates reliably (even in times of pooradhesion) than is currently possible in the UK,through combinations of enhanced wheel slide protection, auxiliary tread brakes, sanding and rail/wheel adhesion free braking techniques. Significantscope exists for enhancing the braking performanceof UK trains in this way (Woodland et al 2003).

There are undoubtedly other solutions to thisproblem as well, and the author will look forward tohearing of them as the change to ‘in-cab’ signallingapproaches.

SPEED, SEPARATION AND CAPACITY

Do passengers want infrequent, quick, airline-stylejourneys or would they prefer more frequent butslower trains? The answer to this is perhaps both –but is it possible to provide both?

The train following headway that can be achievedwith an ‘n’ aspect signalling system is determined inpart by the design speed (V) and in part by the actual speed of operation (Vact). In simple terms(ignoring system delays, sub optimal signal spacing,driver behaviour and other complications such asstation stops) this means that, where b = brake rate,L = train length, O = overlap and S = sighting distance, the headway time will be given by:

With four or more aspects, if a train’s actual speedis sufficiently below the design speed it may becomepossible to stop safely within a reduced number ofsignal separations. This is typically the case for localpassenger services operating over a line designedfor intercity trains. It may also be the case when theservice is recovering from a serious perturbation.When this occurs, trains can proceed past cautionary aspects without the driver needing toadjust their speed. Since in these conditions thetrain in front is not impeding the following train,headway is still being achieved.

Similarly, where trains run above the line speed(such as the West Coast Main Line tilting trains), anadditional block separation may be required toensure safe braking distances between trains. Theauthor will spare you the equations representingthese scenarios, but graphs of the results (see Figure3) illustrate the headway effect that is produced (forfurther details see Woodland 2004).

Driving on a lower number of aspects significantlyreduces the headway impact of slower trains in fixedblock areas, whilst in moving block areas with a highline speed those slower trains may even enablehigher throughput (tph). In contrast, running a higherspeed service (effectively on an additional aspect)can result in significantly reduced throughput,despite the higher speeds of travel.

In both cases the headway achieved with a fixedblock arrangement remains dependent on thedesign speed for the line. This is not the case formoving block, which can adapt and optimise safeseparations according to actual operating speeds.

It is interesting to note that ‘professional driving’standards (previously known as ‘defensive driving’)encourage brake application as soon as a restrictiveaspect is sighted, even when the train’s actual speedand braking performance would allow later appli-cation. This is one reason why UK railways haveexperienced worsening capacity problems in recentyears. The introduction of comprehensive ATP within-cab signalling (whether fixed or moving block)should help to reduce these delays.

At this stage it should be noted that Figure 3assumes all trains to have the same performance.Intermixing trains with different performance wouldsignificantly reduce the throughput achieved, as represented in Figure 4. In this snapshot: operatingfast trains only would allow 50tph; slow trains onlywould allow 42tph; and alternating fast and slowtrains would allow only 39tph. On a realistic railwayany speed differential is likely to occur over largerdistances, further reducing the mixed traffic through-put.

A more realistic picture can be gained by considering a real railway. Traffic through theChannel Tunnel includes a nominal 20tph, based on26-minute duration Eurotunnel car shuttle paths. AEurostar actually requires 2.66 of these paths for a21-minute journey; two flighted Eurostars take 3.66paths between them; one freight train takes 1.66paths for a 28-minute journey, 2.33 paths for a 30-minute journey or 3 paths for a 32-minute journey(Goldson 2003, p8). Capacity utilisation can

38 RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

Htn = V2(n–1) + S+O+L for n>2Htn =2bVact(n–2)

+Vact

for n>2

Dividing 3,600 by this headway time gives theheadway throughput in trains per hour (tph).

therefore be significantly enhanced by flighting services of similar performance in the timetable.

The capacity could be increased even further bylowering Eurostar speeds and increasing freightspeeds, albeit at the expense of slower passengerjourneys and the need to invest in faster freighttrains. Conversely, increasing the speed of thefastest trains would significantly reduce the overallthroughput of a mixed traffic line. Ultimately, the bestcapacity will always be achieved when all trains havethe same performance characteristics – a strongargument for increased segregation of traffic typesthrough investment in dedicated high speed, freightand commuter lines, as practised in France andGermany.

Where segregation is not possible, fixed block

signalling becomes constrained by the design performance assumptions. However, moving blocksystems are able to adjust and provide the minimumpossible separation for the actual speeds of traffic.As a result, they may well provide additional benefitsfor mixed traffic railways.

Fixed versus Moving Block

Adding real-world complications to the headwayequations results in significantly lower headway(tph), but the same overall shapes of curve. With in-line station stops considered, the predicted headway values become much more realistic, asshown in Figure 5. The author has taken the oppor-tunity in this example of comparing a few differentblock arrangements, including LUL-style 2 aspectsignalling and the use of block section overlaps (as

39RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

Figure 3 – Variation in Train Following Headway with Actual Speed, for Fixed Design Speed

Figure 4 – Mixed Traffic Capacity

in TVM 430, for example). It is interesting to notefrom the graph that the predominant factor in deter-mining the relative capacities with different blockarrangements at low speeds is the length of theoverlap or safety margin assumed. This is not thecase at higher speeds, where the braking distance(proportional to the square of the speed) becomesfar more significant.

Obviously, system delays (such as warning margins, equipment response and propagationtimes), junctions and driver behaviour further impactrealistic headways, reducing the actual capacityachieved. However, the same general comparisonscan be drawn between block types. Modelling by theauthor has shown that, accounting for such complications, an in-line station stop has the mostsignificant headway impact. When one is present(with a 30s dwell), a 125 mile/h (200 km/h) fixedblock in-cab system would be expected to give anincrease in capacity over conventional 4-aspect signalling (depending on the signal spacing) of 11-

15%, whilst moving block would provide an increasein the region of 29-34% (that is, a 21-22% increaseon fixed block in-cab). If all stations included twoplatforms per direction, junctions (acting as a fixedblock constraint) would have a more significanteffect. A fixed block in-cab system would then beexpected to give an increase in capacity of 19-26%and moving block of 21-28% (only a 1% improve-ment on a fixed block in-cab system). See Table 1 forthe most significant assumptions in this modelling(Woodland 2004).

On a metro railway with an in-line station stop of30s dwell and 40 mile/h (64 km/h) line speed, moving block would provide an increase over a fixedblock in-cab system in the region of 5.6%. If all stations included two platforms per direction, thiswould actually improve to 6.9% (Woodland 2004).

Clearly this is a subject for another paper in itself,but these results indicate significant steady-statecapacity benefits to be gained by changing fromlineside to in-cab signalling and further benefits to

40 RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

Figure 5 – Comparison of Stopping Headway for Different Block Arrangements

Table 1 – Modelling Parameters

4-aspect signalling Fixed block in-cab Moving block

Sighting time 8s 13s ATP Intervention margins

Safety margin 180m Track section 100m(25m for metro)

Train location accuracy 2s track circuit 20m update error

clearance delay 4s update interval

9s track 1s processing on board train

System delays clear to 3s trackside processing

signal reset 2s transmission delay

41RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

be gained by changing to moving block – particu-larly with in-line station stops.

When it is further considered that moving blockwould provide the potential for improved perform-ance under mixed traffic operation and perturbedconditions (by optimising to the actual conditions,rather than design assumptions), the author believesthere is a strong case for pursuing its application.

Regulation and Network Control

It is not only the driver’s in-cab regulation displaythat requires attention in maximising safety andthroughput, but also the regulation systems andstrategies implemented in control centres.

It has already been noted that the introduction oftrain graphs, predictive simulation and other formsof decision support, coupled with coasting basedregulation, would help to improve control of the service. Unfortunately, whilst a lot of effort has beenexpended in developing such systems, their imple-mentation has often been given low priority.

With the introduction of moving block, if thethroughput and reliability of railways are to increaseas expected, regulation and network control willbecome even more critical. The potential for bunch-ing of trains, simultaneous traction demand and bottlenecks at fixed block constraints (such as junctions and tunnel ventilation shafts) will becomemore significant, and the complexity of the regu-lation required to avoid gridlock, let alone achieveservice optimisation, will increase (particularly following perturbation). In consequence, a higherpriority will need to be applied to implementingimproved systems for regulation and network control.

SYSTEM THINKING

If space permitted, much more could be said concerning issues for the future of railway control.Most of the author’s ‘issues’ have focussed on the technology required for train control. However, optimum solutions for enhancing railway perform-ance may not always lie in the area of train control,nor be best provided by the application of advancedtechnology.

The potential for developing enhanced train braking performance has already been mentioned.Increasing the ATP intervention rate for operation at125 mile/h (200 km/h) to 1.5 m/s2 could providemoving block capacity increases of up to 20%,whilst at the more typical metro line speeds of 40mile/h (64 km/h), similar increases could be achievedwith a service brake rate of 2.8 m/s2 (Woodland et al,2003, pp19-20). Such high braking rates are beingachieved reliably and safely on comparable railwayselsewhere in the world, and offer more significantpotential for capacity increases than a change fromfixed to moving block train separation.

Alternative, less high-technology, train-basedsolutions for capacity increase can also be found byincreasing train length, providing additional doorsand modifying seating arrangements.

If station control is considered, improved platformmanagement can gain significant capacity benefits.Practical initiatives on the LUL Victoria Line have

demonstrated dwell time reductions of around 10%through improved platform management, based onplatform staff activities and without any significantadditional equipment (Horsey 2000, pp2, 73).

Moving on from capacity issues, system thinkingmay also be able to assist in optimising railway safety. The largest risks on railways are not usuallydirectly associated with train control – they are morelikely to include issues such as slips, trips and falls,vandalism and trespass. For optimal safety performance it may be better therefore to spendavailable funds on mitigating these risks, rather thanmaking train control safer. Instead of striving to prevent train collisions by implementing ATP, perhaps as an industry we should be seeking waysin which control systems can assist in the reductionof the more significant (and mundane) risks. Not onlywould such an approach improve overall railwaysystem safety, it may also provide a means of justifying control system solutions, including ATPand ATO, that we would otherwise struggle to justify. For example, intruder and obstacle detectionare required for driverless ATO. Could such systemsalso be used to help reduce the risks associatedwith vandalism and trespass?

We need as an industry to put far more effort intounderstanding cross-system (multidiscipline), cross-network and even cross-modal issues and solutionsif we are to achieve a rail transport product that provides an optimum contribution to society’s transportation needs.

CONCLUSIONSIn the real world of limited resources, are the

interests of rail safety and efficiency best served byexpenditure on ATP, enhanced train braking, newlonger trains with more doors, additional platformstaff, improved adhesion management, state-of-the-art moving block control or the installation ofseatbelts? The author does not think that this question can easily be answered without furtheranalysis and reference to specific cases. However, itis clear that chasing buzzwords such as ‘ATP’,‘Moving Block’ and ‘In-cab Signalling’ is unlikely toproduce the benefits expected unless careful consideration is first given to the overall objectivesof the potential enhancement.

In this paper the author has attempted to outlineboth the current philosophy of railway control andsome significant areas for future development. It isclear that there are several different approaches that can be taken, particularly when it comes toautomation and other advanced forms of tech-nology. However, if optimum safety and efficiencyare to be obtained it is important that a consistentphilosophy is adopted, utilising a multi-disciplineapproach to develop systems that address clearpurposes and are based on well-understoodassumptions.

Whilst ideas for the solution to some ‘futureissues’ have been presented as a part of this paper,they are intended as discussion starters only. It ishoped that this will prompt debate and innovationwithin the industry that will ultimately lead to an

42 RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

improved railway control ‘philosophy’ that willenhance the safety and efficiency of future railwayoperations.

REFERENCESBSI, ‘BS IEC 60050-821 International Electro-

technical Vocabulary – Part 821: Signalling andSecurity Apparatus for Railways’, British StandardsInstitution, 1998

Cobb S, Nichols S, Herr S, ‘Human Factors ofReal-Time Information Systems: VIRART Report No.VIRART/96/135’, British Rail Research, 1996

Cooksey A, ‘Implications for Signalling of theLadbroke Grove Inquiry’, IRSE, 2001

Corrie J, Presidential Address, IRSE, 2004

Dell R, ‘Automatic Junction Working and RouteSetting by Programme’, IRSE, 1958

Eberhardt M, ‘Driverless Operation of main lines’,Future Trends in Signalling and Train Control, IRSE,2001

Goddard E (Ed), ‘Metro Railway Signalling’, IRSE,2003

Goldson R, ‘Passenger Operator’s Perspective ofNetwork Capacity’, AGRRI Network CapacitySeminar, 2003

Horsey CI, ‘Railway System PerformanceImprovements on an Existing Metro’, MScDissertation, University of Sheffield, 2000

IRSE, ‘Signalling Philosophy Review’, IRSE, 2001

Leondes CT (Ed) ‘Control and Dynamic Systems:Volume 52, Integrated Technology Methods andApplications in Aerospace Systems Design’,Academic Press Inc, 1992

Leveson N, ‘Safeware – System Safety andComputers’, Addison-Wesley, 1995

Mitchell I H, ‘Signalling Control Centres Today andTomorrow’, IRSE, 2003

Moir I, Seabridge A, ‘Aircraft Systems:Mechanical, Electrical, and Avionics SubsystemsIntegration’, Professional Engineering PublishingLtd, Second Edition, 2001

Moray N, ‘Perception Attention Automation andthe Perception of Signals’, Signalling SafetyConference, IQPC, 2001

Pratt RW (Ed), ‘Flight Control Systems PracticalIssues in Design and Implementation’, IEE, 2000

Short R, ‘Human Factors and Railway Signalling’,Signalling Safety Conference, IQPC, 2001

Smith A, ‘Addressing the Human Factor, EnsuringTechnological Advances are not Compromised byPoor Human Performance’, Train Control &Protection Conference, IIR, 1999

State of the Art, ‘Train Control ManagementCentres: State of the Art’, Modern Railways, 55 (596)May 1998 p341-343, 1998

Tunley J, ‘Managing Low Adhesion for ImprovedOperational Safety & Performance’, First RIATraction and Rolling Stock Course, 1999

Woodland D, Schmid F, ‘The Limitations of TrainBraking and the Potential for Increasing RailwayCapacity through Enhanced Train BrakingPerformance’, LUL Signal and Electrical Engineers’Technical Society, 2003

Woodland D, ‘Optimisation of Automatic TrainProtection Systems’, PhD Thesis, University ofSheffield, 2004

The discussion was opened by A Kornas (MottMacDonald) who thanked the speaker for a well presented paper. He asked if human factors duringdegraded modes of operation were being addressedtaking into account the application of more auto-mation.

D Woodland advised that the design of systemswas now taking account of these situations with theprovision of off-line simulation and training facilitiestogether with recognising the necessity for drivers tocontrol trains and Signallers to set routes and regulate traffic.

T George (retired) congratulated the speaker onhis excellent paper which had many stimulating andchallenging points. He wished to comment on one ofhis elements and presented a short discussionpaper on “Control and Protection”:

Mr Woodland’s paper states that historically control and protection functions have been keptseparate on railways, but is this true?

Example 1: Mechanical signalling. Control exercised by signaller pulling levers to move pointsand signals. Protection provided by mechanical

interlocking that prevents any unsafe movement, nofailure of the interlocking can move points or clearsignals because it’s passive and has no energy of itsown; it stands between the signaller’s muscles andthe railway and no movement is possible withoutagreement from both the signaller and the interlock-ing, therefore control and protection are clearly separate in this case.

Example 2: Control centre with electronic inter-locking. Control centre requests routes and theinterlocking, positioned between control centre andrailway, accepts or rejects. Looks the same as themechanical example, however, the energy comesfrom the interlocking and not the control centre; failure of the interlocking could move points or clearsignals all by itself. Additionally, if the control centreuses automatic route setting, route requests fromcontrol centre and acceptance by interlocking areboth governed by the SAME information about trackoccupancy, either from track-circuits or axle-counters. There is now no clear separation betweencontrol and protection. An extreme example is ordinary track-circuit-block automatic signalling

Discussion

where control and protection are completelymerged.

Example 3: ATO (or Driver) and ATP: As pointedout in the paper, there is no independence if ATO (ordriver) gets movement authority and target speedfrom the ATP. Even if the train-carried ATO and ATPequipment are completely separate, there is no independence if both respond to the same track-to-train message. Even if separate ATO and ATP messages are used, both are likely to be triggered bythe same track occupancy information be it fromeither track-circuits, axle-counters or radio reportfrom train ahead; again, there is no clear separationbetween control and protection. Even the 1960sVictoria line system mentioned in the paper doesn’thave ATO/ATP independence because the spot loopcommands are used mainly for accurate stationstopping; for basic function of maintaining train separation the ATO regulates the train speed byresponding to speed code information obtainedfrom the ATP.

What lessons can be drawn from these examples?Railway signalling systems don’t have much inde-pendence between control and protection, evenwhen at first sight they appear to have. This meansmost equipment is relied on critically for safety withall the disadvantages, risks and non-compliancewith good safety-engineering practice that thespeaker has pointed out in his paper. We need to recognise this situation and strive to design signalling systems that genuinely separate controland protection. If not fully practicable, eg wherearchitecture is prescribed by European specifica-tions, we should look for ways of providing diversitysuch that complete reliance for safety is not placedupon either single items of equipment or infor-mation. There are cost-effective ways of doing this,highlighted by our President in his PresidentialAddress when advocating sequential logic to reducesafety reliance on track-circuits. We need to take thismatter of control and protection seriously; theClapham accident showed us how automatic signalling is vulnerable to a single-point failure.Railway signalling is out of step with good practiceas used in other safety industries and Mr Woodlandis to be congratulated for pointing it out so clearly inhis paper.

D Woodland informed that he is only aware of onepaper that has previously been published on thissubject, on the IEE Railway Professional Website,that recommends separation of the control and protection function.

R Wood (AEA Technology) wondered if the speaker had looked at either dynamic block, wherethe changing block length is dependent on trainspeed and braking rates, or given any considerationto zero braking distance.

D Woodland explained that his calculations hadbeen undertaken for every metre of travel to deter-mine the speed and hence recalculate the brakingdistance. Zero braking distance was modelled butnot included in the paper as the benefits were negligible.

N Flowerday (Kennedy, Brown & Root) noted that

over the years, we have moved to more centralis-ation of controls with the consequent risk of losingcontrol of large areas in failure situations. He askedif the speaker believed that control centres wouldbecome more distributed with modern technology.

D Woodland responded by stating that LUL aremoving to centralised control with remote interlock-ings. These interlockings include a local controlpanel that can be utilised if necessary; however,operating procedures during failures do need to beconsidered.

J Holmes (Halcrow) noted that if you increasebraking rates you increase capacity but wondered ifthis could be achieved in the UK compared with foreign situations.

D Woodland believes it is possible to achieveincreased braking rates using conventional tech-niques and quoted figures for the following systems;Paris Metro (rubber-tyred) 2.8m/s2, Tyne & WearMetro 2.0 m/s2 and Japan 1.5m/s2.

P Craig (Bechtel) observed that the provision of anadditional platform together with concentrating onstation dwell times would increase capacity; with theprovision of a second platform, he wondered whatthe increase in capacity would be.

D Woodland advised that the increase in capacitywas 50% with moving block but 80% with fixedblock.

A Howker (Past President) commented that interlocking was primarily concerned with correctlysetting up a route and not achieving train separation.He additionally observed that in the current environ-ment, defensive driving techniques and station dwelltimes are such that increases in capacity are unlikely to be achieved; the existing signalling hasserved us well and introduction of management centres will probably enable affects of perturbationsto be more effectively controlled rather than bringabout increases in capacity.

D Woodland agreed that the modern driving techniques do result in drivers braking earlier butargued that use of ATP with in-cab regulation wouldhelp the driver know what he should be doing.

J Corrie (IRSE President) was asked about his ownideas on moving block and responded:

It is my current opinion that the theories regardingmoving block don't work, can’t work and thatDaniel’s equations relate to theoretical capacitywithout explaining the control needed for practicaloperation to ever achieve the capacity shown. Theymodel signalling performance but not all the factorsthat define a train's response to changing restrictivesignals. Trains have inertia. The best way of workinga platform is for the following train to arrive at braking distance to the overlap at the entry to theplatform, just as the first train clears the overlap afterthe platform. In this way the following train has unrestricted entry into the platform. This minimisespassenger journey time and maximises use of stockand crews. However, it does not maximise trackcapacity in terms of trains per hour. Ultimate trackcapacity occurs when the following train comes torest at the overlap at the entry to the platform, and

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY 43

then accelerates hard into the platform as the previous train leaves, vacating short sections in theplatform as it goes. Clearly this gives muchincreased power consumption, and its effectivenessdepends on being able to accelerate quickly to minimise the time taken to pass the length of theplatform. Docklands Light Railway uses a goodmoving block system, but regulates its trains to fixedblock principles to reduce peak power consumption.

When the Bakerloo line was converted to driver-only operation, its trains had to stop accurately inthe platform by CCTV monitors. Drivers approachedmore cautiously and extended the platform occu-pation time. The following trains were then stoppedbehind, so the service operated as if there weretwice as many stations as all trains became held intunnels between stations. The solution was toremove a few trains from service until drivers learnthow to stop accurately. Using fewer trains allowedthe service to run unhindered. Later the full servicecould be restored. This shows that there is insta-bility when traffic regulation is dependant only on thesafety aspect information shown by signals.Headways between trains reduce until the pointwhere the following train is restricted by the first.Then, the following train is slowed prematurely andtakes longer to go through the platform, so headwayis lost. The only way to maximise use of availablecapacity is by flow control of the following train.Models need to account for all the variations in thetrain's response to aspects clearing in front. TheVictoria line’s “Slow Approach” régime is elegantlysimple and effective. In my opinion, moving blockcannot improve on this to any useful extent.

I have seen our industry lose credibility over theJubilee line moving block and West Coast’s traincontrol signalling. We must get ERTMS right. Thisrequires efficient ETCS to be complemented byeffective regulation in the ERTMS management layer.Without this, the capacity benefits will not justify thecost savings expected from ERTMS. This is whyDaniel’s paper on control is so important. It raisesimportant issues that deserve continuing debate.

D Weedon (Network Rail) asked if the effects ofdelays had been considered in the calculations.

D Woodland replied that he had not studied thisbut was aware that the WCML TCS team had donesome work in this field and also that various simu-lation packages existed that could examine delayaffects.

C H Porter (Lloyd’s Register Rail) stated that therewas a general perception that signalling systemswere expensive enough and we should concentrateon simplification, not further complexity. He wondered if separation of control and protectionsystems would result in doubling the number ofsafety cases required.

D Woodland agreed that modern systems were

expensive, mainly as a result of the developmentcosts and safety case requirements. He felt that separation of control and protection systems wouldactually simplify a lot of the processes.

J Seebrook (Conation Technologies) suggestedthat human factors should be considered in the initial stages of development.

D Woodland replied that human factors elementsshould be an integral part of development but quiteoften were not.

J Corrie (IRSE President) commented that with abrand new railway, development includes humanfactor issues but with changes to existing infrastruc-ture it is not always the case; custom and practicecan make it difficult to adapt staff from previousphilosophies. High staff turnover also has a bearingand different human factors are needed for the twoscenarios, new and adaptation.

A Salisbury (Thales) suggested that efforts shouldbe concentrated on reducing trespass, vandalism,slips and falls to improve reliability.

K Walter (Atkins Rail) recalled that after theClapham accident, the D of S&TE had asked if ATPcould have prevented the accident, the reply havingbeen “Yes, but only if it had been wired from a sep-arate interlocking that was wired from a separateform of train detection.”

D McKeown (Independent Consultant) stated thathe would like more of this from the IRSE! He thencommented how the operators have become moredistant from the real world citing the examples ofsignal indications generally presented to signallerscompared to what is often provided for techniciansthat are only occasionally viewed and the lack of“scale” in IECC displays. He questioned the speaker’s thoughts on how we should adopt a unified approach to different countries; should weeither automate rules and regulations or automatesignalling with different rules and regulations for failure conditions. He also asked what the units ofcapacity were and wondered if it was possible tomodel “the real world”.

D Woodland replied that he believed that we needconsistency in how systems and the rules and regulations work and are designed together; theincorrect approach was to select an off-the-shelfsystem and pick and choose to suit the operatingrules. He advised that there were no specific units ofcapacity and explained that there are different packages to model “the real world”, mainly simu-lation systems that are doing this today. He finallycommented that he believed that a driver’s percep-tion is very different to that of an engineer and theremay be times when it is better for that driver not toknow how the signalling actually works!!

J Corrie (IRSE President) thanked D Woodland forhis thought provoking paper and for those who hadtaken part in the subsequent discussion.

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY44

ABSTRACTIn April 2001 the IRSE published a review of

signalling philosophy in the aftermath of some serious rail accidents, in particular that at LadbrokeGrove. The report focussed on two key areas ofinterest, signalling principles and human factors, andit contained recommendations for the rail industry inGreat Britain as a result of its findings.

This paper takes up the theme of signalling principles once again, by exploring the fundamentalrequirements for train control systems and question-ing whether some of the principles that are appliedin Great Britain need reconsideration, particularly inthe light of ERTMS and the demand for greater reliability, capacity and affordability.

FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FORTRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS

The IRSE Signalling Philosophy Review [Ref 1],published in April 2001, contained numerous recommendations regarding signalling principles.These addressed:

• how signalling principles should be documentedand their application managed;

• overrun protection measures and risk assess-ment methodologies;

• signalling system specifications, architecturesand management;

• degraded modes of operation and signallingsystem reliability.

On re-reading those recommendations, it is evident that they remain highly relevant to thenational rail network in Great Britain and, indeed, to

45

Technical Meeting of the Institutionheld at

The Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Wednesday 10th November 2004The President, Mr J D Corrie, in the chair.138 members and visitors were in attendance. It was proposed by Mr K Walter, seconded by Mr D Hotchkiss and carried that the

Minutes of the Technical Meeting held on 13th October 2004 be taken as read and they were signed by the President as a correct record.Apologies for absence had been received for Mr J Poré. There were no new members present for the first time since their election to

membership.The President then introduced Mr F How, of Atkins Rail, and invited him to present his paper entitled “Railway Signalling Philosophy,

Principles and Practice”.In his presentation Mr How explored the fundamental requirements for train control systems and questioned whether some of the

principles that are applied need reconsideration, particularly in the light of ERTMS and the demand for greater reliability, capacity andaffordability. Following the presentation Messrs J Francis (Westinghouse Rail Systems), I Harman (Network Rail), A C Howker (PastPresident), M Savage (Savoir Technology), P Bassett (AEA Tech), A Simmons (Network Rail), T George (WRS retired) and J Holmes(Halcrow Rail) took part in the discussion.

The presenter dealt with the questions in a comprehensive manner and the President then proposed a vote of thanks and presentedthe speaker with the commemorative plaque customarily awarded to authors of the London paper.

The President thanked members for their attendance and their questions and then issued reminders to register to all who wished toattend the Railway Interfaces Seminar in London on 18th November or the Oresund Bridge technical visit on 26th/27th November.

The President closed the meeting at 1945 by announcing that the next meeting in London would be the Technical Meeting to be heldon the 8th December 2004 when Mr A Kornas will present a paper entitled “Points and Point Machines”.

1 The author is with Atkins Rail UK

Railway Signalling Philosophy, Principles and PracticeFrancis How MA(Cantab) CEng FIRSE MIEE MIOSH1

many other railways. The industry could probablyonly claim to have made significant progress in oneof the areas mentioned above, namely improve-ments in overrun protection measures and the associated risk assessment processes. Progress isnot totally absent in other areas, but it is slow andpatchy.

The very first recommendation relating to signalling principles was as follows: “There shouldbe a defined and agreed set of fundamental safetyrequirements that is common to all methods of signalling used on UK main-line railways. This setshould be applicable to the whole system, regard-less of whether they are fulfilled by technical meansor by application of procedures and rules.” Thereport contained a draft set of fundamental requirements, and subsequently I have revised andextended this set, as shown in Appendix A to thispaper.

The requirements are split into four subsets, thefirst of which relates to the operational performanceof a train control system. Signal engineers haveoften debated whether a signalling system is pro-vided primarily for safety purposes or to enabletrains to move. It is a somewhat fruitless discussionbut, on the basis that a signalling system which doesnot facilitate the movement of trains is not worthhaving, I have put the operational requirements first.There then follow the core functional safety requirements and the essential supporting safetyrequirements. There are various points to note aboutthese requirements:

• Apportionment of functionality and performancebetween people, processes and technology hasbeen deliberately avoided.

• The context of the report in which they were

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE46

originally presented was the national rail network in Great Britain, although most railwaysthroughout the world should be able to subscribe to them.

• Not all the safety requirements are equal interms of the dependability with which they mustbe performed.

• The requirements are still probably not entirelycorrect or complete. Perhaps the IRSE hassome unfinished business here, possibly jointlywith the Institution of Railway Operators.

TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR SIGNALLING SYSTEMSSTANDARDS – THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

Railway administrations may be able to agree onthe fundamental requirements for train control systems, but differences emerge as soon as we startto specify how these requirements are implemented.If we compare signalling systems on metros, high-speed lines, heavily used commuter routes andfreight-only routes we find differences, which arisefrom the need to meet differing operational needsand to provide affordable solutions appropriate toeach situation. Even railways that are basically thesame in terms of speeds, traffic densities and typesapportion responsibilities differently between peopleand systems, with different system architectures anddifferent technical solutions. This is largely a consequence of the various development paths thatrailways in different countries have taken. We seethis variation not only between countries but alsowithin countries. In Great Britain for instance wehave mechanical signalling, colour-light signalling,token systems and radio electronic token block(RETB). The technical principles of operation and theassociated operating rules are different for each ofthem.

For the national rail network in Great Britain, thehighest level technical requirements for train controlsystems are known as signalling principles, and theyare articulated primarily in the form of Railway GroupStandards [Ref 11]. They cover a whole range ofsubjects: the setting, holding and release of routes;the types, provision, spacing and visibility of linesidesignals; aspect sequences; the control of overrun,speed and tilt; train detection; point control; andlineside signs (to name but a few). These standardsdeal with the application of signalling technologyrather than fundamental requirements, although theyvary in the degree to which they are technology-specific. They are focussed primarily on safety, butwith a performance perspective. Four-aspect signalling, reduced overlaps and permissive workingare all examples where signalling principles aremade flexible to meet the operational needs of therailway. The signalling principles are complementedby operating principles, procedures and rules, andare also supplemented by Network Rail’s companystandards, which address the technology-specificapplications in greater detail.

The lifetime of a Railway Group Standard is considerably shorter than that of the signalling systems to which it applies, and so the majority of

signalling in this country is not fully compliant withcurrent signalling principles. This is principallybecause the cost of resignalling precludes frequentmodernisation of the infrastructure to reflect currentstandards. When resignalling does take place, theassociated changes in technology and operatingprinciples tend to lead the changes to the governingstandards rather than to be led by them.

In practice, the majority of changes that are madeto signalling principles are fairly minor, and there is avery practical reason for this. A railway is a systemthat performs a set of functions by employing acomplex, interactive mixture of technology, people,procedures and rules. It is almost impossible tochange one function, or the means by which it isperformed, without affecting something else.Examples abound – the replacement of track circuitsby axle counters, the introduction of tilting trains,and the adoption of “defensive” driving styles, tomention but a few. The signalling system is one partof this complex mix. The economic, operational andsafety-related implications of changing the signallingprinciples are significant for anything but the mosttrivial of alterations. These difficulties do not sit easily with the goal of European interoperability, norwith the international nature of signalling systemsuppliers, who do not always understand or want tograpple with the complexities and idiosyncrasies ofnational railway administrations.

DEPENDENCIES AND ASSUMPTIONS THATUNDERPIN SIGNALLING PRINCIPLES

The complexity of the railway system and of thepart that signalling plays in it is further demon-strated by considering the dependencies andassumptions associated with signalling principlesand with the design of a signalling system. Here aresome examples that apply every time a route is setfor a train:

• The driver is competent and possesses routeknowledge, and in particular can relate thetrain’s position and the signal aspects displayedto the safe speed for the train.

• The driver will not deliberately disobey signalsinstructing him/her to stop the train.

• Train service planners and signallers route trainsonly on lines where they are physically and electrically compatible with the infrastructure.

• The train braking performance is compliant withRailway Group Standards.

• The train will operate the train detection systemscorrectly.

• Trainborne systems such as AWS, TPWS andATP are functioning correctly (or if they are notthe driver is aware of the fact, and will applyspecified arrangements for the safe working ofthe train).

• The infrastructure is in a safe condition (thetrack-bed is sound, the rails are intact, correctlysecured and to gauge, bridges are capable ofbearing their loads, clearances are correct, andso on).

Dependencies between the various elements of a

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 47

railway are often not understood at all well. As hasalready been indicated this makes change to onepart of the railway system difficult, for fear of upsetting the apparently-safe present situation insome unpredictable manner. The prolonged agonising in Great Britain over the approval of newtypes of signal head has been a case in point.

When we do make changes, we sometimes get itwrong. When new wheel profiles were introduced forrolling stock it was discovered that there were problems with shunting of track circuits, becausehunting of the wheels no longer kept a sufficient areaof the railhead clean to ensure good electrical conduction. This was exacerbated by an apparentlyunrelated decision made some years previously, thatcutting back lineside vegetation was a luxury wecould not afford. Could anyone have foreseen sucha conspiracy of dependencies?

Railway Group Standards specify some of therequirements that make dependencies just that –dependable. However, in many cases those requirements place the burden of responsibility onpeople and processes. All the serious train movement accidents on Great Britain’s national railnetwork over recent years have been primarily dueto failures of processes and people, not to technicalfailures of signalling systems and equipment.

That fact raises two questions. Firstly, could andshould we do more to provide protection throughtechnical solutions, instead of depending so heavilyupon people? Secondly, have we misplaced ourenergies – instead of concerning ourselves aboutmaking signalling systems even safer, should wefocus greater effort on ensuring that people at all levels and in all parts of the industry are organised,competent and committed to the correct applicationof safety-related processes day in, day out?

HOW SAFE DOES A SIGNALLING SYSTEM NEEDTO BE?

Although one of the primary purposes of a signalling system is to keep trains moving, much ofthe energy of the designers of signalling systems isexpended on making sure that the system reverts toa safe state in the event of something going wrong.This is usually interpreted as requiring signals torevert to red (that is, to "Stop") in an attempt to stoptrains approaching the location where the defect orproblem is. In fact Railway Group Standards in GreatBritain say very little about reversion. There are forinstance no absolute statements that require a protecting signal to revert to red if a train detectionsection unexpectedly shows occupied, if detectionis lost on a set of points, or if the signal ahead fails.Nevertheless almost all modern signalling systemsincorporate reversion.

Examples involving reversion to a safe state thathave been the subject of recent or long-runningdebate amongst signal engineers in Great Britaininclude the following:

• what facilities should be provided for stoppingtrains in an emergency, and how dependablethey should be;

• how fail-safe the control logic for TPWS should be;

• what aspect(s) and aspect sequence(s) to display when a required sequence cannot bedisplayed because of a fault (eg lamp failure).

There are plenty of other examples of unresolveddebate about how much safety protection a signalling system should provide and about howdependable the system should be in performing itssafety functions, such as:

• whether track circuits should be required todetect broken rails;

• the extent to which overrun measures such asflank protection, two successive reds and pro-tection beyond the overlap should be provided;

• whether to prove the correct sequential operation of track circuits or to depend on theintegrity of each track circuit.

In considering these, we need to be aware of theissues that underlie the technicalities. We are makingtrade-offs between safety, dependability and cost.More safety usually means more complexity, andmore complexity usually erodes reliability and maintainability. Conversely, arguing for less safety isextraordinarily difficult – we should be trying to makethe case for spending less on safety than we currently do (what is known in the UK as the “reverseALARP” argument).

In many cases safety protective measures areadded to, or retained within, the design of the signalling system simply because we do not apply aholistic, quantitative approach to understanding thecost-benefit-risk equation. Instead we find ways ofoptimising the fail-safe nature of the design withoutconsidering the wider implications of what we aredoing.

One way of tackling issues of this sort is to investigate systematically the unintended effects ofa proposed change to a signalling principle, as wellas the intended effects. Thus, for example, a sideeffect might be increased technical complexity, orincreased complexity for drivers or signallers whichcould increase the likelihood of human error.Weighted Factors Analysis [Ref 2] is one tool thatcould be used to assess the benefits and disbenefitsof a stated objective.

THE IMPACT OF ERTMS ON SIGNALLING PRINCIPLES

The advent of ERTMS has both offered the opportunity for and necessitated a major re-examination of the signalling principles applied tothe national rail network in Great Britain. ERTMSLevel 1 offers some possibilities for change when alltrains are fitted, but it is at Level 2 (without linesidesignals) and at Level 3 (without track-based traindetection) that we are forced to rethink radically ourapproach to signalling the railway.

The ERTMS specifications are mainly concernedwith the transmission of movement authority datafrom track-based sub-systems to the train and the interpretation of that data on board the train.They are and intend to be largely silent about topics such as where to position ends of authority(roughly the equivalent of lineside signals), the provision of overlaps, track-based train detection,

the setting, locking and release of routes, andapproach locking.

Under the auspices of the Strategic Rail Authority,work is in progress to develop new signalling principles for ERTMS Level 2 applications (no line-side signals) in Great Britain. The initial focus is on apilot project on the Cambrian line in Wales [Ref 8].Key areas on which attention has been focussedinclude the following:

• The positioning of “route setting locations”.Route setting locations are the positions fromwhich and up to which movement authorities areissued. Unlike lineside signals, there are veryfew safety-related restrictions on where theycould be positioned, or on how many are provided. In practice, however, a set of rules isrequired to guide designers on the optimumarrangements to meet operational requirements.There are significant opportunities here forimproving traffic flow at nodes such as stationsand junctions, although to gain most benefitautomated traffic regulation through train speedcontrol is also needed.

• The provision of safety margins. ERTMS doesnot mandate the provision of a safety marginbeyond the end of authority (the safety margin isbroadly equivalent to the overlap). In practice,however, safety margins will usually be pro-vided, although the reasons for their provisionare not the same as on a railway with conven-tional lineside signals. The first reason is that, ifno safety margin is provided, the convergenceof the braking, warning and intervention curvesprevents the driver from actually reaching theend of authority. Secondly, safety margins canbe provided as a means of protecting againstthe potentially unsafe consequences of odometry errors. The question of how long thesafety margin needs to be is the subject of considerable debate. In the vicinity of junctionsand stations it is sometimes desirable to have asafety margin that is considerably shorter thanthe normal overlap length, to optimise opera-tional flexibility and, potentially, to permit theuse of a combined berth and overlap traindetection section. Another option that is beingexplored is the provision of a safety marginbefore the end of authority instead of beyond it,which creates in effect the ERTMS equivalent ofa delayed yellow. A third option is the use ofdynamic or variable safety margins whoselength is adjusted to suit train characteristics.

• Margins between braking curves. The BR-ATPsystems in use on the Great Western andChiltern routes in England have margins ofaround 5 km/h between the permitted speed for the train, the speed at which a warning isgiven and the speed at which the system inter-venes. Some railway administrations in Europeconsider that smaller margins are practicablewithout drivers experiencing unnecessary inter-ventions. Another view is that the marginsshould be fixed on a train class specific basis,since drivers are probably able to control the

speed of some trains to within tighter limits thanothers.

• Other overrun mitigation measures. Measuressuch as flank protection could be abolishedbecause of the ATP functionality that ERTMSprovides. Concerns would nevertheless remainabout the protection of train movements whichare not made in a fully ATP supervised mode.However, the most expedient solution in thesecircumstances may be to apply additional operational restrictions to protect train move-ments, rather than retain additional protectionmeasures within the signalling system. There isalso the problem of poor adhesion, and theextent to which the signalling system can andshould provide protection against an overrun insuch circumstances.

• Shunting movements. The ERTMS specifica-tions adopt a method of controlling shunt movements which does not accord well withcurrent practice in Great Britain. The specifica-tions provide for the setting up of shuntingzones, within which shunting movements can bemade freely. Control is handed from the signallerto the local shunt movement controller. Trainswithin the area are automatically stopped byERTMS if they attempt to stray outside the zone,and movements by other trains into the zone areprevented. On the national network in GreatBritain, most so-called shunting movements aremade along or across running lines, usually tofacilitate joining and splitting, or change ofdirection of locomotive-hauled trains. The keyrequirement is to enable such movements to bemade whilst maintaining the safety of othertrains on the running lines. The use of shuntzones seems to be a cumbersome way ofachieving this. ERTMS provides fully or partiallyATP supervised movement authorities, whichcould be used to achieve the same objective.

• Revoking movement authorities. ERTMSLevel 2 can provide the means for a driver toreceive a revised movement authority at anylocation, unlike lineside signalling where suchinstructions can be received only when a drivercan see a signal whose aspect has altered. Thismakes it necessary to develop new principlesfor emergency stop instructions to trains, andfor shortened movement authorities (where therevised position of the end of authority for thetrain is closer than the original). There is ofcourse no guarantee that a train will receive anemergency stop instruction, so we need to resistthe misplaced temptation to regard emergencystop instructions as a primary means of avoidingan accident.

• Choice of national values. The ERTMS specifi-cations permit national railway administrationsto assign their own parameters in respect of certain functions. Examples include parametersto define what a train is to do if it loses GSM-Rcommunication with the infrastructure, and todefine the maximum distance that a train canmove without a movement authority before the

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE48

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 49

brakes are tripped. These examples illustratethat there are some features of ERTMS-basedtrain control systems where principles need tobe established for which there are no equiva-lents in conventional signalling.

One of the most significant areas of change for thenational rail network in Great Britain as a conse-quence of introducing ERTMS will be a change independence upon drivers’ knowledge of the routesover which they drive. This change is particularlystriking when we consider the signalling arrange-ments at diverging junctions. At present we useroute signalling predominantly, whereby signals onthe approach to a diverging junction inform the driver which route the train is to take. The driverinterprets this information, using his route knowledge to adjust the train speed to match thepermissible speed through the junction. ERTMS bycontrast informs the driver directly about the permitted speed on the route ahead, and indeed bymeans of ATP functionality it ensures that the drivercontrols the train speed correctly.

Despite the value of ATP the major benefit ofimplementing ERTMS on the national network inGreat Britain lies not in train protection but in thescope for removing lineside infrastructure, specifically signals in Level 2 and track-based traindetection in Level 3. This has the potential to reducecapital and operating costs, facilitate greater operational flexibility and capacity particularly atnodes (junctions and stations), and eliminate asource of unreliability. There is of course the risk thatcosts and unreliability are not reduced, but justtransferred to the trains because of the addition ofERTMS onboard equipment. There are also majorpractical problems regarding the migration toERTMS Level 2 and Level 3 systems whilst keepingthe railway running. Moreover, despite the potentialto reduce the capital cost of ERTMS infrastructurefitment, overall the costs are still very high, particu-larly in respect of train fitment, and this presents aserious threat to its successful implementation.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNICALSTANDARDS IN SIGNALLING SYSTEMSTHE UTTERLY RELIABLE SIGNALLING SYSTEM

A few months ago a railway operations colleaguemade reference in a document to the need for an“utterly reliable signalling system”. At the time it wastempting to suggest the word “utterly” wasremoved, or replaced by something more attainable.On later reflection, even if total reliability is notachievable, his quest for a level of dependability thatis substantially better than we experience today onBritain’s railways is a very reasonable one. Signallingsystems in Britain are not as dependable as theyshould be – and lack of investment, or the state ofthe track, are not adequate excuses for this state ofaffairs.

It is interesting to note that signalling principles arestatements of the ideal, in that they express thesafety and operational functionality or behaviour thatwe wish to have. Little attention is given at the principles level to how reliably these functions or

behaviours are to be performed. There are someexceptions, for instance in the Railway GroupStandards for AWS and TPWS, and in the High-Speed Control-Command and Signalling TechnicalSpecification for Interoperability (CoCoSig TSI). Thelatter specifies a tolerable hazard rate for randomfailures of an ETCS system of 1 in 2 x 109 per hour,although the basis for this figure is questionable.Further work is in progress to refine the ETCS tolerable hazard rate figures [Ref 9], to include a distinction between rates for wrong-side and right-side failures.

Reliability is an "emergent" property of a system,that is a characteristic generated through the combination of the technology, the applicationdesign and the operational environment of the system (including the operating rules and the peoplewho apply them). Other examples of emergent properties are safety, traffic capacity and journeytime.

Because reliability is an emergent property, it isimportant to examine the contribution made to it atdifferent levels if we are to understand it and optimise it. The most important of these are the following:

• At the product level – with particular focus ontrackside equipment for train detection, signalsand points.

• At the sub-systems application design level –taking into account the physical, electrical andoperational environment in which the productsand sub-systems will be required to operate.

• At the systems level – with particular focus onprevention and mitigation of failures with thepotential to cause major and chronic outages ofsignalling systems [Ref 3]. This means adoptinga “threat-centred” approach to systems design.

• At the operational rules level – examining inparticular whether the rules for operating indegraded modes provide an effective mix ofsafety precautions and operability. SwissRailways (SBB), for instance, have rules that areless onerous than those in Great Britain for coping with track circuit failures, and experienceindicates that their safety record in this respectis no worse (although there may be cultural reasons for this) [Refs 3 and 6].

• At a scheme-specific level – in the knowledgethat not all routes require the same levels ofinvestment in system reliability and availability.

COMPLEXITY VERSUS RELIABILITY

The design of signalling systems has been calledboth a “cottage industry” and a “black art.” Thesedescriptions are not an acknowledgement that signalling is intrinsically difficult for the non-expert tounderstand, for indeed the fundamental require-ments are remarkably self-evident. Rather they are acomment about signal engineers who, in their questfor ever greater safety and to accommodate theneeds of operators, have invented multitudes of signalling principles, bespoke systems, applicationdesigns, design rules and caveats. Complexity is rifeat all levels, and this is reflected in the wide range of

specialisms in which signal engineers engage andthe amount of “opinion engineering” that exists inthe industry. The term “opinion engineering” is usedhere to refer to unstructured debates based uponqualitative arguments having insufficient commoncurrency for a meaningful comparison of the relativemerits of the arguments to be made.

Complexity is not something to be applauded. Itincreases both direct and indirect costs. It oftendoes not deliver the benefits claimed. A great deal ofinformation has to be generated for the purposes ofsupporting the system through the life-cycle. It generates considerable difficulties in terms of main-taining a supply of competent engineers to supportthe system life-cycle. Most significantly in the context of this paper, it jeopardises reliability.

Complexity manifests itself in a number of ways inthe design of systems. Firstly, the component countusually increases and this will increase the prob-ability of random (hardware) failure within the system. Although this is a universal problem, it isworst in the harsh trackside environment. Secondly,the system architecture tends to involve more interfaces and, unless the system is specificallydesigned from concept as a single entity with interfaces whose behaviour is precisely defined,problems are likely to arise. Thirdly, and perhapsmost significantly, greater complexity usually meansthat the processing activities of the system becomemore demanding. Unless the application designershave a sound understanding of the limitations of thesystem and of the specific application requirements(including signalling principles), it is likely that theywill unwittingly embed flaws in the design. Theseflaws, or systematic errors, will not necessarily manifest themselves during system validation, par-ticularly if traditional methods of testing are used. Itmay take just hours, or it may take months or evenyears for these problems to be exposed during operational service by an unusual circumstance thathad not been envisaged by the designers. It couldbe that the problems are discovered only when lateralterations to the system are being designed. Whena problem does appear the effects can be dire. It cancause severe operational disruption directly. It canjust as likely cause equally serious disruption indirectly, if it is wrong-side in nature and the systemhas to be taken out of service (or constraints have tobe placed on its use) until the problem is diagnosedand rectified.

From all this a general principle emerges which isrelevant to product designers, application designersand to those who produce signalling principles andapplication rules [Ref 7]:

“An increase in the complexity of a design shouldnot result in lower reliability.”

DEGRADED MODES

The best approach to making a system intrin-sically reliable is by applying a combination of methods during the concept design and construc-tion phases, including:

• a systems approach to specification and design[Ref 10], with particular attention to interfaces;

• modelling, simulation and reliability prediction;

• avoiding or reducing design complexity wherever possible;

• using high-quality components and sub-systems, operating at de-rated operational andenvironmental stress levels;

• quality assurance of materials and processes;

• production and pre-commissioning testing.

However, these cannot always achieve therequired level of operational availability, and thenadditional measures are required. These range fromduplication of sub-systems, so that even in the eventof a failure full operational continuity is assured,down to the most basic of degraded mode facilities.The table in Figure 1 illustrates those employed forsignalling systems.

Reliability comes at a price, even though the costof unreliability may be far higher. Again, it is necessary to adopt a structured and numeratetrade-off study in order to assess the costs and benefits of providing various back-up facilities aspart of the system architecture and design. Thetrade-off is between:

• the capital cost of providing back-up sub-systems;

• the direct and indirect costs of partial or totalloss of functionality that are avoided by the provision of back-up systems;

• the safety risks associated with operating therailway in degraded modes.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES AND SAFETY

Reliability is one factor that affects decisionsabout the architecture of signalling systems. Safetyis another. When mechanical signal boxes weredeveloped, the signaller interface (levers) and theinterlocking (mechanical locking) were all part of thesame physical system. Little distinction was madebetween high safety integrity and low safety integrity parts of the system. With the advent of control panels and relay-based interlockings, the latter were required to demonstrate high safetyintegrity, whereas the control panel and associatedsub-systems were regarded as needing a lesserintegrity, and were implemented in lower integritysub-systems. Now the wheel is coming full circle,and in some of the newer systems, we have recom-bined some of the low and high safety integrity functionality in single, high-integrity systems.

As a consequence we are at risk of confusing theintegrity required for some of the signalling systemfunctions with the integrity of the sub-systems inwhich they are actually implemented. This can haverepercussions which may prove costly:

• Processing time in the high integrity sub-systemis consumed on low integrity tasks, although it ismore expensive than the equivalent processingtime in low integrity sub-systems.

• Verification activities and safety cases are morecostly, because all the functions performed bythe system (even those which do not need to be of high integrity) have to be considered interms of their potential for adverse safety

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE50

impact on the correct behaviour of the highintegrity functions.

DEMONSTRATING SAFETY AND RELIABILITYSAFETY CASES AND RISK ASSESSMENT

In Great Britain, where the concept of risk being“as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) isenshrined in the Health & Safety at Work Act, engineers have shied away from defining safety targets for railways. This has its merits. It permits different levels of safety to be achieved in differentsituations, and it promotes continuous improve-ment. But it comes at a price – quite literally, in theform of expensive safety cases and sometimes over-engineered systems. That price is making railwaysignalling almost unaffordable, and the problem hasto be addressed. So what is the root cause of this?

• Is it that the concept of the safety caseapproach is wrong?

• Is it the Yellow Book [Ref 4], or the application ofthe Yellow Book, that is wrong?

• Is it the ALARP principle, or our interpretation ofit, that is wrong?

• Is it that signalling standards are persistently driving up the safety requirements without dueregard to the costs and benefits?

• Is it that we have established a culture in whichindividuals are reluctant to make safety decisions, and opt to syndicate the risk insteadin a more democratic, but also bureaucratic,process?

• Is it that we permit too much “opinion engineer-ing” when assessing the sufficiency of safetyarguments?

In truth, probably no single one of these can belabelled as the cause. But there is much to be saidfor the view that the current fragmented industrystructure, coupled with a litigious environment andthe fear of public criticism, has fostered a culturewhich is dominated by opinion engineering and, atthe same time, not conducive to decision-making.

As a means of assessing risks and benefits,numeracy can be useful to facilitate informed, structured debating and decision-making. In BritainNetwork Rail is placing the discipline of Six Sigma[Ref 5] at the heart of much that it is doing toimprove railway performance. Six Sigma is a qualitymanagement process that helps companies to focuson developing and delivering near-perfect productsand services cost-effectively. Six Sigma adopts ahighly numerate approach to improving processesand products. By extension I suggest that a similarapproach to safety cases can help reduce the extentto which opinions dictate what is sufficient and what

51RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

Operating Mode Examples Functionality Offered Safety Levels Signaller Aware? Drivers Aware?

Duplicated systems, offering normaloperation

Duplicated ortriplicatedprocessors withredundancy

Normal operations Full safety maintained

No (except for theneed to change tostandby systemwhere this is donemanually)

No (except possiblyduring changeoverto standby systems,where this is donemanually)

Minor impairment offunctionality

Fall-back aspectsequenceswhere normalsequenceunavailable

Near-normal operations, withminor impairment offacilities. Train canstill be signalled

Full safety maintained

Possibly – aspectsmay be more restrictive and trainmovements somewhat slower

Possibly – aspectsand sequences maybe more restrictivethan usual

Reduced functionality

Override systems to allowa reduced set ofroutes to beused

Operations continue,but with loss ofsome facilities.Trains can still besignalled normallywith the facilities thatremain

Full safety maintained

Yes – not all routesare available for signalling trains

Possibly – trains mayhave to be routeddifferently from normal

Degraded modeaspects

Normal signalsat red. Trainssignalled usingProceed onSight signals

Significant disruptionto normal operation.Trains unable to besignalled except withdegraded modeaspects

Full safety not maintained by thesystem – greaterdependence onapplication of rules

Yes – normal proceed aspects notavailable, andProceed on Sightaspects usedinstead. Not allroutes available

Yes – normal proceed aspects notdisplayed, Proceedon Sight aspectsused instead. Someroutes cannot beused at all

Signals at redor black, voicecommunicationavailable

– Major disruption tooperations. Trainsunable to be signalled except byverbal instructionsfrom signaller to driver

Full safety not maintained by thesystem – majordependence onapplication of rules

Yes – signals at redor black; signallersusing voice instructions to drivers to authorisepassing of signals atdanger

Yes – signals at red,drivers authorised bysignaller voiceinstructions to passsignals at danger

Signals at redor black, voicecommunicationnot available

– Driver proceeds “onsight” at automaticsignals, but cannotpass controlled signals

Full safety not maintained by thesystem – totaldependence onapplication of rules

Yes – signals at redor black; signallerunable to communicate withdrivers

Yes – signals at redor black; driversunable to communicate withsignallers

Figure 1 – Levels of Degraded Mode Functionality

more should be done to achieve an ALARP solution.There is nothing magic about this, and indeed theALARP concept would appear to favour a quantifiedmethodology, but it is remarkable how frequently theconclusion is drawn during a safety assessment thata risk is or is not ALARP without a number in sight!

However, a numerate approach is not without itsdrawbacks:

• It would be quite possible to construct an equally costly safety case regime based on theproduction and analysis of large quantities ofdata.

• If the risk is small, numerate approaches maywell be unnecessarily expensive.

• Sometimes sufficient data may not be availableto permit a numerate approach.

• Data does not provide all the answers of itself –it needs interpretation in order to inform theassessment of risk.

An example of how a numerate approach can usefully be applied to safety cases was on theManchester South Stage A Project. The safety argument was based on the derivation of a numberof acceptance criteria expressed in quasi-mathematical form, together with a series of arguments demonstrating that these criteria hadbeen met by the system in its UK application. A typical expression is shown in Figure 2.

The acceptance criteria were based upon a “blackbox” approach to the system, regarding it as an entity which receives inputs, processes them anddelivers outputs. The most general requirement forsuch a system is that it should produce no incorrectoutputs – meaning in practice not zero, but less thana tolerable limit. A "correct" output is one which islogically correct, timely, and not likely to be misunderstood. The attractiveness of this approachis precisely that it does not demand a detailedunderstanding of the black box, so long as sufficientis known about the system architecture and designfor order-of-magnitude probabilities to be assigned.The methodology embraced all parts of the overallsystem, taking account of the whole life cycle of the

system and including people and procedures as wellas technical components and sub-systems.

DEMONSTRATING RELIABILITY

Arguably, if reliability is as important a property ofa signalling system as safety, then the demon-stration of reliability should be as important as thedemonstration of safety. Regrettably, this is not usually the case at present.

Reliability & Availability is one of the five “essentialrequirements” for interoperable systems specified inthe EC Interoperability Directives and supportingTechnical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs),the others being safety, environment, health andtechnical compatibility. A train control system that isbeing designed to interoperable standards musttherefore demonstrably meet the essential require-ments for reliability and availability. This is a newchallenge, both for contracting entities (usually thetrain operator or infrastructure controller) who haveto produce evidence that the essential requirementshave been met, and for the Notified Bodies that perform the conformity assessments of that evidence.

There is a risk that wasteful and excessive effortwill be applied to the production of “reliability cases”in order to provide the necessary evidence, just ashas been done for safety cases in the past. Thismust be avoided, but there is no doubt that theimbalance between the attention given to safety andthat given to reliability must be redressed. Themethodology for demonstrating that reliability tar-gets will be met is a subject in its own right, andbeyond the scope of this paper.

CONCLUSIONThe signalling industry in Britain needs to unite to

pursue a number of goals, which in combination willmake signalling principles, application rules and systems more cost-effective and more closelyfocussed on meeting the needs of users, while stillacceptably safe. Two of these goals are generic, andapply to all systems. The third applies specifically tothe implementation of ERTMS, where there is aonce-in-a-lifetime opportunity to establish a set

52 RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

Figure 2 – Typical Quasi-Mathematical Safety Acceptance Criterion

of application rules from first principles, unclutteredby the baggage of the past. The goals are as follows:

1 Get passionate about reliability

• Pursue reliability in the specification and designof signalling systems with the same vigour aswe currently pursue safety.

• Adopt a threat-centred approach to systemdesign, in order to identify causes of unreli-ability and apply trade-off studies to select optimum solutions.

• Challenge complexity in signalling principles,application rules and system design, unless it has demonstrably no adverse effect on reliability.

2 Challenge the over-engineering of safety

• Make greater use of numerate methodologies inthe specification and demonstration of safetyperformance in order to avoid opinion engineer-ing and to facilitate decision-making.

• Challenge the prevailing wisdom that signallingsystems should incorporate reversion.

• Apply “reverse ALARP” arguments where thereis evidence to suggest that existing safety measures in signalling principles are excessivein relation to the benefits they bring.

3 Develop cost-effective, customer- and operator-centred signalling principles for the ERTMS “signal-less” railway

• Start with the fundamental requirements, ratherthan by adapting the existing signalling principles.

• Ensure that the principles can be applied inways that do not compromise the operationalneeds of the railway unnecessarily.

• Promote the use of standard solutions, ratherthan permitting a “pick and mix” approach toapplication design.

REFERENCES1 IRSE Signalling Philosophy Review, April 2001

2 A G Hessami & A Hunter, Formalisation ofWeighted Factors Analysis, Knowledge BasedSystems 15 (2002) 377-390

3 Rail Safety and Standards Board research study

into catastrophic train control systems failures,see www.rssb.co.uk

4 Engineering Safety Management Issue 3 (the“Yellow Book”), ISBN 0 9537595 0 4 andwww.yellowbook-rail.org.uk

5 A short introduction to Six Sigma, by GE (one ofits main advocates) can be found atwww.ge.com/files/usa/en/commitment/quality/sixsigma.pdf. Numerous other websites andbooks are available on the same subject.

6 K Winder & A Annis, “The Needs and Expec-tations of Train Operators”, IRSE Aspect 99Conference

7 F Schmid & N König, “Reliability demands thesimplification of train control techniques”,Railway Gazette International, September 1995

8 2003/04 year end report by the SRA’s NationalERTMS Programme team, www.sra.gov.uk/publications

9 Requirements on risk and hazard analysis forinteroperability for the control-command andsignalling sub-system (Index 47) (Work in preparation by European Economic InterestGroup for the European Rail Traffic ManagementSystem)

10 Standards on the subject of systems engineer-ing include ISO 15288, EIA 632 and IEEE 1220

11 Railway Group Standards are available atwww/rgsonline.co.uk/rail/main.html

ABBREVIATIONSALARP As low as reasonably practicable

ATP Automatic train protection

AWS Automatic warning system

CoCoSig TSI Control Command and SignallingTechnical Specification forInteroperability

ERTMS European rail traffic managementsystem

ETCS European train control system (partof ERTMS)

GSM-R Global system for mobile communi-cations, for railways

TPWS Train protection and warning system

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 53

APPENDIX AFUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONS AND SIGNALLING (VERSION 5)

The following fundamental requirements supportthe overall purpose of a signalling system. They arean amplified set of the requirements set out in theIRSE’s Signalling Philosophy Review [Ref 1]. Thedefinition of train control systems includes people,processes and supporting technology.

• Where the word system is used, it refers to thetrain control system.

• Where the term signalling system is used, itrefers specifically to that part of the train controlsystem which is implemented by means of technology.

1 Core operational requirements for train control systems

1.1 The system should facilitate efficient and effective use of the infrastructure (track and stations) by trains.

The system should meet the needs of operatorsin terms of:

• permitted train movements (normal running,joining & splitting, platform sharing, shuntingetc);

• permitted routing of trains;

• capacity utilisation;

• flexibility of operations.

1.2 The intrusiveness of the system into the efficientand effective running of the railway in perform-ing its safety function should be minimised.

The need for safety can conflict with the need tofacilitate efficient and effective operations. Inseeking safety, designers of the system shouldconsider the impact that their proposed designmight have on the operability of the railway.

1.3 The reliability and maintainability of the signalling system should be sufficient for it tofulfil the operational requirements for which it isprovided.

The specification and attainment of appropriatelevels of reliability are essential to the delivery ofthe timetabled train service. Reliability also contributes to overall levels of system safety.Maintainability is essential in order to ensure thatthe specified levels of reliability and safety continue to be met throughout the service life ofthe system.

1.4 The signalling system should provide degradedmode facilities to enable trains to move whenelements of the signalling system have failed, soas to avoid over-reliance on human intervention.

This includes the provision of degraded modesof operation. The arrangements should alsofacilitate timely recovery to normal operationsafter rectification of the defect.

2 Core functional safety requirements for traincontrol systems

2.1 Before a train is given authority to move on tothe section of line:

a the line should be proved to be secure (to pre-vent derailment and potential conflict withother authorised movements); and

b the line should be proved to be clear of othertraffic (to prevent collision), except in specialcircumstances where a train is permitted toenter an occupied section of line.

The term “secure” actually refers to a limited setof safety requirements, primarily relating to thepositions and locking of points and the routeingof other trains. The signalling system does not,for instance, prove that the line is clear of allphysical obstructions, or that the track gauge iscorrect.

Special circumstances for movements on tooccupied lines include platform sharing, coupling of trains, permissive working of freightlines, and shunting.

Where the train is stationary at a station, depotor siding, all duties (train preparation, loading,unloading, closing doors etc) must also be completed before the train is moved, but thisdoes not necessarily have to occur before theauthority to move is given to the driver.

2.2 After authority to move on to the section of theline has been given, the security of the lineshould subsequently be maintained until:

a the complete train has passed clear; or

b the authority has been rescinded and it isproved that the train has come to a stand, orhas sufficient space to come to a stand, shortof the start of the section of line.

2.3 The train driver (or automatic train operationsystem) should be given unambiguous, con-sistent and timely information to enable the trainto be controlled safely.

This covers the requirement to give the driverclear proceed/stop information; the provision ofwarning information regarding the approach to astop signal where necessary (ie caution signalsor equivalent); the provision of speed and route-ing information on the approach to line speedchange locations and junctions etc.

Train control data entry sub-systems on boardthe train which are used by the driver are alsowithin the scope of this requirement.

2.4 Sufficient space should be provided betweenfollowing trains to allow each train to brake to astand safely. This space should be calculated on the assumption that the train ahead is stationary.

That is, motorway-style driving is not allowed.

2.5 Controls should be in place to prevent and/ormitigate the consequences of:

a drivers passing the limit of the movementauthority given to them;

b drivers exceeding the maximum permittedspeed for the train.

This requirement covers overlaps, train pro-tection systems, flank protection, etc. It alsoincludes other measures, eg train driving

54 RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

procedures, driver competence etc.

2.6 Protection should be provided for the public andtrains at level crossings.

Not all level crossings are necessarily protectedby the signalling system itself; in simple cases anindependent means of protection may be provided.

2.7 Means of protecting engineering work should be provided.

This should include facilities for: controlling theaccess of trains to sections of line where work istaking place or where safety has been reducedas a result of engineering work; ensuring that thesection of line is clear of obstructions (engineer-ing vehicles etc) when work is complete andbefore trains are allowed to run over it; restrict-ing the speed of trains to protect track workersor because of the condition of the line; warningtrackside workers of the approach of trains. Alltypes of engineering work are included, not justwork affecting the train control system itself, andthe purpose of the protection is three-fold – toprotect operational trains; to protect work sites;to protect workers.

2.8 The signaller should be provided with unam-biguous, consistent and timely information and suitable control facilities, to enable safeauthorisation of train movements.

This includes the information required under failure and degraded mode conditions, so far aspossible, as well as normal operations. Therequirement also includes ancillary informationsystems such as train describers, critical faultalarms and data entry systems, upon which thesignaller depends. The term signaller alsoincludes other personnel who may have responsibility for authorising train movements.

2.9 The system should have facilities for communi-cation between signallers and others.

This includes not only driver-signaller communi-cation but also, for example, communicationbetween signallers in neighbouring control centres, and between signallers and emergencyservices. The nature of the communications systems should be appropriate for the purposesto which they are to be put, taking into accountboth normal operations and failure/degradedmode situations.

2.10 Means of preventing trains being routed on tolines with which they are not compatible shouldbe provided.

Incompatibility in this context refers to incom-patibilities of gauge between track and train,incompatible traction supply systems for thetrain or incompatible trainborne train controlsub-systems.

2.11 Facilities for stopping a train in an emergencyshould be provided.

This requirement could be met by the use ofradio communication rather than by use of thesignalling system itself. The speed and reliabilitywith which a message can be given to a train tostop needs to be commensurate with the risksassociated with the emergency.

3 Essential supporting safety requirements fortrain control systems

3.1 The level of safety performance of the systemshould meet specified targets.

Targets should be commensurate with, or betterthan, levels of safety performance of systemsalready in service, should meet the reasonableexpectations of users and should comply withlegal requirements.

3.2 The system and the associated operating rulesshould be compatible with each other.

The system and the associated operating rulestogether constitute the wider train control system. Their compatibility and completenessare essential for safe operation of the railwayunder normal, degraded and emergency conditions.

3.3 In the event of a failure of the signalling systemit should remain in, or revert to, a state whichpreserves the safety of trains.

Modern signalling systems usually revert to asafe state (for example, signals revert to danger).This may not always be necessary in fact (forexample, in mechanical systems conditions forclearing a signal are tested only at the time ofclearing).

3.4 The signalling system should not be subject to,nor be the cause of, unsafe interactions withother systems or equipment.

This includes environmental compatibility andelectromagnetic compatibility. It includes bothinteractions where there is an intentional inter-face with other systems and equipment, andthose where there is no such interface. “Othersystems and equipment” refers to other railwayinfrastructure, trains, and non-railway systemsand equipment.

3.5 The system should be designed so as to facili-tate maintenance and modification, so as toensure its continuing safe operation.

It should be possible for maintenance activitiesto be performed without undue risk, either to theoperational railway or to the personnel carryingout the work.

3.6 Personnel who use, operate and maintain thesignalling system should be demonstrably competent to do so.

This includes the competence of drivers, signallers, maintainers and others whose activities contribute to the overall safe workingof the system.

55RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE56

The discussion was opened by J Francis (WRS)who thanked the speaker for his wide ranging andpassionate paper. He wondered if we were becoming slaves to ever more stringent safety add-ons that restricted flexibility and reduced performance, such as the removal of permissiveworking and ROLs; the arguments for greater safetyappearing to outweigh the argument for running therailway. He was sure that drivers did not deliberatelydisobey signals but varying degrees of protectionincluding double reds, flank protection and exten-sion of protection beyond the overlap, were addedto treat the symptoms and meet the principle ofALARP rather than tackling the fundamental reasonsfor trains disobeying signals through technical solutions. If this was done, the reduction in complexity and resultant increased reliability, availability and flexibility would lead to improvedsafety and he asked the speaker if we could, andshould, do more to provide protection through technical rather than human means. He also questioned if ERTMS was already getting it wrong bynot tackling throughput but treating route settingand issuing of movement authority as one and thesame thing; a flaw that will complicate and limit thefunctionality, rather than revert to the established“mechanical signalling” principles of separating theroute setting and issuing of the movement authority.This method can align routes of any length andselect a termination point anywhere within thatestablished route thus providing flexibility by including equivalents of permissive working, ROLsand assisting in restricted headway situations.Considering this, he questioned the speaker ifERTMS can bring any merits.

F How responded by saying that he had gravemisgivings with the technical resolution of problemsas he believed that the more fundamental issuesshould be tackled. Unless there was a good reasonfor making something more complex, it should notbe done as it led to unreliability and difficulties forthe maintainers; the issue of TCAs and TCAIDsbeing a case in point. With ERTMS, he advised thata different approach is being adapted from“mechanical signalling” principles and that route setting and movement authorities can be separate inERTMS. The concept of interlocking is differentwhen a movement authority can potentially be fromand to anywhere; this could also present difficultiesfor the Signaller.

I Harman (Network Rail) asked to what extent weshould engage in debate with those for whom weprovide a service instead of just guessing.

F How responded that we have to engage with allof those who are affected by our systems, workingwith them will improve the light in which we are atpresently seen; we cannot live in a vacuum. As aprofession, Signal Engineers are defensive and if wesee a problem we want to fix it and close all possible loopholes.

A Howker (Past President) wondered if we haveforgotten the driver; he guessed we had! He

observed that the separation of interlocking frommovement authority limits had been discussed forsome years but nothing had happened. From a reliability point of view, reversion of signals was nowone of the biggest causes of delay but had not generally been applied in mechanical systems, double reds brought no benefits and caused delaysand he wondered if the signalling principles, andsubsequent 'bolt-ons', should be looked at from areliability point of view. He also suggested that the1930s practice of having three or four meetingsdevoted to a single topic should be considered.

F How agreed that past papers did have topicsthat were carried over but this was not now done.Whilst internal dialogue is beneficial, it should betaken outside of the Institution.

M Savage (Savoir Technology) raised the issue ofover-engineering which implied less spending on re-signalling and a consequent move further backdown the safety ladder and questioned the speakeron the percentage of the signalling budget that couldbe diverted to deserving causes.

F How replied that he had not considered percentage savings but said that what we do toachieve safety is done in a very inefficient manner.He believed that there might be significant saving ifdone throughout all disciplines and that NetworkRail believed that signalling systems are too expensive and unaffordable; in the long term this isnot in the industry’s interests.

P Bassett (AEA Technology) asked the speaker’sviews on developing a meaningful speed signallingdisplay, ie common exit with various routes to it andwhy, following the implementation of TPWS, it hadnot been developed for use in Permissive Workingsituations.

F How advised that speed signalling of junctionswas not developed at the time because it wasbelieved ERTMS was on the horizon and would alleviate the problem. It also doesn’t actually solvethe problem but creates another method of signalling and improved signing such as bannersshould be considered. All of these options need tobe discussed with a wider audience. He agreed thatuse of TPWS might have helped in some permissiveworking circumstances but not all.

A Simmons (Network Rail) clarified that TPWS inreversion controls was included for reliability, notsafety, within the rules and the necessity to cautionall trains when a failure was detected. He furtherexplained that the business case and availabilitydrove this measure and there are a number of caseswhere it has been perceived that the over compli-cation of safety is the driver whereas it is really reliability. Another example is axle counters wherethe safety issue is based on good performance leading to reliability and safety; LED signals weredeveloped to tackle the root cause of safety and notprovide the complication of stepping down ofaspects. A lot of thought has been put into whatappear to be safety issues but are actually basedupon improving reliability. He also advised that some

Discussion

of the West Coast Route Modernisation problems,that had been mentioned, were to be resolved.Finally, he stated that the objective was to have discussions once, set the rules and apply these procedures consistently to prevent “optioneering”thus lowering costs and preventing re-work. Whatwas needed was the introduction of signallingcheaply and quickly otherwise sustainable signallingwould not be delivered in the UK.

F How replied that axle counters, whilst not a badidea, were an illustration of how other complicationshad been introduced that needed to be thoughtthrough. He agreed that LED signals did introduceintrinsic reliability to the first line of defence negatingthe need to consider the "what if" scenarios and that standardisation was preferable to bespoke solutions.

T George (retired) believed that Engineering SafetyCases should record in a succinct way the evidenceto demonstrate safety. He also pointed out that item3.3 in Appendix A of the paper can be interpreted asmeaning that trains should be stopped but the definition of “fail-safe” by H Hadaway, LUL CS&TE(IRSE Proceedings 1966/67, p161) which was “safety for traffic”, could infer keeping trains moving.He wondered if more attention should be given whenconsidering the root cause of accidents, to safe-guard against single point failure in the signalling system. Finally, with regard to items 2.6

and 2.11 in Appendix A of the paper, he suggestedwe consider providing emergency facilities to stoptrains immediately if a dangerous situation is knownto exist.

F How agreed that Engineering Safety Casesshould be a “Top Level Document” but would stillhave to refer to the supporting evidence and that theHadaway wording does not mean putting the signalto red. He believed that a measured approach wasrequired when looking at the root cause of acci-dents. Some good and not so good ideas have beengenerated as a result of accident enquiries and theindustry needs to look carefully at both the cost andrisk of implementing these ideas, solutions and recommendations.

J Holmes (Halcrow) observed that taking a threatcentred approach to signalling systems with itemssuch as risk registers and mitigation measures,increases costs.

F How clarified that he accepted that things thatdeal with safety are essential but questionedwhether we can devote energy in the same sort ofproportion to the reliability.

J Corrie (IRSE President) thanked F How for hiscomprehensive paper, which had certainly provokedsome interesting points for debate, and also to thosewho had taken part in the subsequent discussion.

57RAILWAY SIGNALLING, PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

58

INTRODUCTIONThis paper forms one of a series that have been

produced with the aim of reminding all signal engineers of the basic underlying principles behindthe application of railway signalling control. It is notthe intention to explain how we do things, but ratherwhy we do them the way we do. This particularpaper looks at the subject of point machines andtheir control, as well as some recent developmentsin the UK.

Points need to be controlled, locked and indicatedin order to fulfil their role in train routeing, flank protection and trapping. While the signal engineercan be relied upon to ensure that the these perform-ance criteria can be met, he relies in turn on the civilengineer to ensure that the points are robust enoughstructurally to withstand the forces placed on themby the passage of trains, and that there is an adequate opening throughout the point switch forwheelsets to pass through safely. Points can contribute greatly to the safety of the railway as asystem, but at the same time they must be respected as a complex component of the modernrailway with many interfaces in need of careful management.

It is felt that in order to explain adequately why wedo things ‘the way we do’ a brief history of the development of points is necessary, and it is for thisreason that some old ground has been covered inthis paper. At the same time, since more than twogenerations have passed since this subject was lastcovered in a paper such as this, the author feels thatno apology is necessary. Whilst it is accepted that itis impossible to cover all aspects of points and point

machines in the limited space available it is hopedthat this paper will act as a good reference for furtherreading and will contribute to the debate on how toimprove the reliability of points in the UK. It shouldalso act as a reminder to signal engineers both newand old as to how we arrived at where we are.

POINTS AS PART OF A SYSTEMPoint machines and their connections can be

viewed in simple terms as a stand-alone elementwithin the signalling system. They can also beviewed as a nuisance or a source of poor systemreliability – particularly when it is your own perform-ance target that is affected.

Closer examination reveals that they are in factone subsystem of a far more complex system thatspans many railway disciplines. A typical pointmachine interfaces to the following railway sub-systems:

• electrical power supply;

• signalling interlocking;

• train detection system;

• rolling stock (not only physically by rolling contact, but also indirectly by means of tractionreturn currents);

• track formation (the track must provide an adequate opening at the toe of the points fortrain wheels to pass, must maintain a suitablegap throughout the length of the switch, andmust withstand all the forces applied to it bytrains without significant deformation);

• the kinematic envelope;

• other installed trackside equipment, includingoverhead line equipment (OHLE);

• operation and maintenance personnel;1 The author is Head of Rail Systems with Mott MacDonald, York

Points and Point MachinesAntony S Kornas BEng CEng MIEE MIRSE1

Technical Meeting of the Institutionheld at

The Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Tuesday 8th December 2004

The President, Mr J D Corrie, in the chair.106 members and visitors were in attendance. It was proposed by Mr W Morton, seconded by Mr R E B Barnard and carried that the Minutes

of the Technical Meeting held on 10th November 2004 be taken as read and they were signed by the President as a correct record.Apologies for absence had been received for Mr P W Stanley. There was one new member present for the first time since election to member-

ship who was introduced to the meeting amidst applause.The President then introduced Mr A Kornas, of Mott MacDonald, and invited him to present his paper entitled “Points and Point Machines”.In his presentation Mr Kornas first explained how points can be regarded as one sub-system of the complex system that forms the railway

infrastructure and then went on to explore the opportunities for greater reliability in points performance. Following the presentation Messrs D McKeown (Independent Consultant), C Burton (WRS retired), I Harman (Network Rail), D Mills (Metronet SSL), L Wilkinson (IndependentConsultant), P Woodbridge (Lloyd’s Register Rail), R Martin (Network Rail), C A Porter (Past President), J Holmes (Halcrow Rail), R E B Barnard(Alstom), D Weedon (Network Rail), W Morton (retired), S Isbister (Network Rail), M Nash (Network Rail), J Phillips (Metronet BCV), W Boddy (PastPresident) and J Jenkins (Network Rail) took part in the lively discussion. The presenter dealt with the questions comprehensively and the Presidentthen proposed a vote of thanks and presented the speaker with the commemorative plaque customarily awarded to authors of the London paper.

The President thanked members for their attendance and their questions.The President closed the meeting at 1945 by announcing that the next meeting in London would be the Technical Meeting to be held on

12th January 2005 when Mr J Francis will present a paper entitled “Block Working, Route Holding and Train Detection”.

• track maintenance equipment (both rail mounted and hand held);

• switch heaters;

• the environment.

This list is by no means exhaustive, and perhaps itillustrates the complexity of this small but crucialpart of the railway system. Each of these interfacescan contribute to the failure of an individual pointmachine and thus the railway as a system. Fullattention must therefore be paid to them all if thepoint mechanism is not to prove unreliable. The railway industry must work together to manage themas one system, otherwise the many initiatives aimedat improving the performance of switches and crossings may be doomed to failure.

At the risk of controversy it is suggested that it isthe interface with the civil engineer that warrants thegreatest attention.

THE CIVIL ENGINEER’S ROLEThe development of switches and crossings has

taken place over many decades. During the earlydays of railways, line speeds and the resultant axleloadings were relatively low and so there was littledemand for high performance switches. As the aspirations of railway operators moved towardshigher speeds and heavier trains there grew theneed for advances in the design and construction ofswitch and crossing units.

Because switches and crossings perform such avital role in the operation of a modern layout, anynon-availability due to failure or the need to carry outmaintenance can have serious consequences fortrain operations. One of the most significant contri-butions to long-term reliable point operation is correct installation in the first place. This has toinclude the formation as, if the ballast supporting thelayout is not of uniform depth throughout its entirelength and breadth, the layout will always suffer fromtopographical problems that will manifest them-selves as ride quality issues and ultimately failure of civil and signalling engineers’ components. Thereis clear evidence that suggests that wear and tear onall components within switches and crossings areaccelerated significantly if the formation is notinstalled and maintained to a sufficiently high standard. Adequate access to the infrastructuretherefore has a significant part to play.

With this in mind it is probably worth consideringthe number of switch and crossing units that havebeen installed within tight possession régimes, andthen subsequently subjected to the same restrictedaccess for maintenance activities. Despite the vastimprovements in manufacturing processes that havetaken place over recent years there is little evidenceto suggest that the effectiveness of maintenance hasimproved by the same margin, with the net resultthat the railway still suffers badly from points failures.

Before moving on to more modern types of pointcontrol and point machines it is worth consideringthe many variants of switch and crossing design currently available within the UK, as a better under-

standing of this will no doubt be of benefit to all.

Switches themselves come in a variety of lengths,depending upon the line speed requirements of theturnout. The shortest switch is designated as an ‘A’switch and can generally be seen utilised in depotsor as a trap point. The longest is a ‘J’ switch, and isa 125 mile/h RT60 switch.

Many variants of rail profile can be seen throughswitches and crossings in the UK. Figure 1 depictsthe following common configurations:

• bull-head, inclined, with 95lb rail section;

• bull-head, inclined, with 97.5lb rail section to aformer Great Western Railway pattern;

• flat bottom, inclined, with 109lb, 110A and 113Arail sections;

• flat bottom 110A and 113A vertical design toimperial standards;

• flat bottom 110A and 113A to metric standards;

• flat bottom, vertical, shallow depth designsusing 113A flat bottomed stock rails and UIC54B switch rails;

• flat bottom, vertical, shallow depth designsusing RT 60 rail.

It follows that only if the correct installation andmaintenance techniques appropriate to each typeare adhered to correctly will the various componentsdeliver the required performance.

A SHORT HISTORY LESSONBefore reviewing modern solutions for point

machines and their control it would be appropriateto go back to the beginning.

By the late 1860s the UK railway totalled approximately 23,000 route miles, with around26,000 connections to passenger lines. Of these,few were concentrated in signal boxes or interlockedin any way. At the same time passenger carryingswere approaching 300 million people per annum.The Government’s Board of Trade (later theDepartment of Transport) was charged with the difficult task of regulating the railway industry,although at that time they had no legal powers.Accompanying the unprecedented increase in trafficwas a rise in the number of serious accidents, manyinvolving points. Despite these accidents many ofthe railway companies' officials, including notablytheir signalling engineers, were still against provisionof controls to improve safety. Their view was thatsuch provision was not commercially viable andindeed would be an impediment to the smooth operation of the railway. In 1889, however, aRegulation of Railways Act was passed, bringing theweight of the law to bear on ensuring nation-wideapplication of interlocking. This Act heralded thebeginning of the safety culture that has underpinnedthe rail industry to this day.

The 1889 Act was applied through the Board ofTrade requirements. Those requirements that areconsidered to be relevant to this paper are reproduced below for information:

• On passenger lines all crossover roads and allconnections for goods or mineral lines and

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES 59

sidings shall be protected by home and distantsignals.

• In order to ensure that the points are in theirproper position before the signals are lowered,and to prevent the signalman from moving themwhile a train is passing over them, all facingpoints must be fitted with facing point locks andlocking bars, and with a means of detecting anyfailure in the connections between the signalcabin and the points.

• The levers by which the points and the signalsare worked are to be interlocked.

• The interlocking is to be so arranged that thesignalman shall be unable to lower a signal for

the approach of a train until after he has set thepoints to the correct position for it to pass.

• After having lowered the signals to allow a trainto pass, he shall not be able to move any pointsconnected with, or leading to, the line on whichthe train is moving.

• Safety points are to be provided on goods linesand mineral lines and sidings at their junctionswith passenger lines, with the points closedagainst the passenger lines and interlocked withthe signals.

• Junctions of single lines are to be, as a rule,formed as a double junction.

In summary the regulations required that points be

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES60

Figure 1 – Common Switch Rail Profiles

interlocked with signals, that they be fitted with astock rail gauge tie, at least two stretcher bars, andan additional stretcher through which would pass alocking bolt. There were also to be means of detecting the position of each switch, and of the correct operation of the locking bolt by the signals.

MECHANICAL POINTSThe provision of interlocking and a drive for

centralisation of control brought station areas andsidings under the control of larger signal boxes. Thearea that could be covered was still very much governed by the complexity of the layout and thephysical demands that could be placed on the operator.

Mechanical points are operated by the use ofchannel rodding which runs on rollers securely fixedto timber or concrete bases at intervals of about 2m.The maximum length over which mechanical pointscan be reliably operated was set at 320m (350 yards)in 1925 and has never been challenged, for goodreason. The limits were set to limit the physicaldemands placed on the signalman, and to avoidproblems caused by expansion and contraction ofthe point rodding and connections due to changes inambient temperature.

A single trailing point end or crossover would beoperated by a single lever from the signal box. A facing point end or crossover is subject to more rigorous controls. Due to the need for a facing pointlock and detection of the correct movement of theswitches, additional equipment is required (seeFigure 2). Most mechanical facing points are workedby two separate levers from the signal box, one to lock and unlock the points and one to throw the switches.

There are some points which for reasons of economy are operated by a single lever. This type of operation, known as 'economical' operation,requires one stroke of the lever to unlock the points,swing them and lock them again. This is realised bythe use of escapement cranks and, whilst it reducesthe signalman’s workload and the time required toset a route, it increases the physical effort required.

Both configurations feature a lock rod which rigidly connects the two switches, through which aplunger is thrust to maintain the switches locked. Itshould be noted that this arrangement only provesthat the switches are in the correct position in relation to the lock plunger. The locations of theswitches in relation to the stock rails are proved indirectly by the mechanical relationship betweensole plate, sleeper and chair. This indirect relation-ship places a great deal of responsibility upon thecivil engineer to ensure that the points are maintained to an acceptable quality.

With mechanical installations there is the risk thatthe points could be moved while a train is betweenthe signal and the facing points over which the routewill take it because, once the signal lever has beenreplaced into the frame, the mechanical locking isremoved. Prior to the introduction of track circuits,locking bars were utilised to maintain the locking ofthe points until such time as the train had passed

over them. A locking bar is a steel bar that runs parallel and close to one of the running rails betweenthe protecting signal and the point end. The bar islocated on rockers which are in turn mounted onbrackets fixed to the bottom of the rail head. By amechanical arrangement, the locking bar is oper-ated by the same lever as the facing point lockplunger. When an attempt is made to withdraw thefacing lock plunger the locking bar must risetowards the railhead. If a rail vehicle is situatedbetween the protecting signal and the point end, theflanges of its wheels will prevent the locking bar fromrising, and hence prevent the points being unlocked.Whilst the provision of locking bars satisfies Boardof Trade requirements they are by no means infallible, and require the strict observance of Rulesand Regulations if their frailties are not to beexposed.

A further application of the locking bar principle isthat of fouling bars. In junction areas where the rearof trains could be stood foul of other running lines, afouling bar is operated by the points lever that wouldenable a fouling movement to be made. In this wayif a vehicle stands foul of an adjacent running linethen the points cannot be moved and safety isensured.

THE MOVE TO POINT MACHINESThe introduction of electricity to the railway

allowed the control of points to be extended beyondthe 320m distance restriction imposed by mechanical points. The earliest forms of controlwere all-electric, all-pneumatic or what was to

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES 61

Figure 2 – Mechanical Facing Point Lockand Connections

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES62

become an early favourite, the electro-pneumaticsystem. Early development was steady to say theleast and initial innovation was aimed at directreplacement of the mechanical link between thepoint lever and the point switch.

The earliest examples of electro-pneumatic pointscan be traced back to 1899 in the McKenzie &Holland butterfly crank driven by a single electro-pneumatic cylinder. In this, the basic pull-push principle of the mechanical rodding was retained, aswere the locking bar and the facing point lock.

Large ‘power’ installations over the next ten yearsor so (including Doncaster, York, Newcastle and HullParagon) continued to use electro-pneumaticmachines in this way until such time as the engineers grew a little bolder. With the introductionof the track circuit the need to use the locking bar as a primary form of route holding became unnecessary, as the track circuit did this more effectively without the need for complicatedmechanical equipment. At around the same time theprinciple of the economical mechanical facing pointmechanism described earlier was adapted to form acombined machine that would unlock and throw thepoints and then lock them again in one movement.Despite opposition from engineers and operatorsalike, the opportunity was also taken to move thelocking bolt from the four-foot into the machinelocated in the cess. This formed the basis for themodern combined point machine of today.

GROUND LOCKSWith the move towards power working of points

there was a sharp rise in incidents attributable to theprimitive control circuits employed. One electro-mechanical device that was widely employed tosafeguard against the unauthorised movement ofpoints on the ground was the ground track lock.

The ground track lock is an independent means oflocking the points, doing so only when the switch isin the correct position. It features a gravity operatedelectromechanical plunger that is released when thepoints have completed their movement. The plungeracts upon the facing point lock plunger or the lockrod of a point machine.

As experience was gained in the application ofpoint control circuits the need for track locks wasquestioned and their appearance on the main linerailway rapidly diminished.

THE COMBINED TYPE ALL-ELECTRICPOINT MACHINE

The majority of point machines installed in the UKare of the combined all-electric type. The term ‘combined’ is historical and refers to the inclusion ofpoint drive, locking and detection within one unit asdescribed above.

Point machines can be adapted to operate mostswitch configurations and can operate from a varietyof power supply sources. Despite differencesbetween manufacturers, they all share certain keyfeatures. They all have an electric motor, a clutch, atransmission to connect the motor to the pointswitch, a throw bar and a locking and detection

mechanism. The machine is fitted parallel to the running rails, requiring the civil engineer to installextended sleepers. A facility to operate or 'wind' thepoints manually is always provided.

An important feature of all forms of point machineis electrical snubbing. Early point machines sufferedfrom mechanical failure due to the stresses involvedin bringing the motor to a rest at the end of its stroke.A great deal of energy is involved in moving a pointswitch, and it must be dissipated quickly before theswitch makes contact with the stock rail in order toprevent forces being fed back through the drive bar,the gearbox and ultimately the point machine casting. The principle that a DC motor acts as a generator when in free motion is applied to bring themotor quickly to a stand by dissipating this energy inan electrical load.

STRAIGHT-THROUGH MACHINEIn operation of the straight-through type of

machine (see Figure 3) the drive from the motor istaken via a clutch to a ball screw. To throw the pointsfrom one lie to the other, the drive slide travels itscomplete movement in one direction. This motion isknown as a ‘straight-through’ motion.

Locking of the points is achieved by the provisionof two lock dogs riveted or welded to the drive slide.Because the machine operates in one direction onlythe lock dogs are different in profile, to ensure thatthe lock can only be engaged when the points havebeen driven to the correct position.

IN-AND-OUT MACHINEThere is a significant difference between the

operation of this machine and that of the straight-through machine. The electric motor drives a gear-box with a pinion which in turn drives a bevel orcrown wheel. The latter carries a roller whichengages an escapement attached to the drive bar. Italso drives the locking bar through a connecting rod(see Figure 4).

The initial movement of the wheel moves the locking bar. This draws the lock dog out of thedetector slides and lock slides, thus unlocking themachine. As the wheel continues to turn, the rollerthen imparts a lateral motion to the escapement, andthis acts to throw the points. At the end of the throwthe locking bar moves back, pushing the lock dogback through the lock slides and detector slides.

This ‘in and out’ motion of the locking bar can beseen to replicate the operation of economicalmechanical points.

RAIL CLAMP POINT LOCKSRail clamp point locks, or 'clamp locks' as they are

generally known, were developed by British Rail.They have the advantage that, as the switch rail andstock rail are inherently locked together, problemswith loss of detection associated with gauge spreadare removed. Provided the civil engineer maintainsthe gauge, the problem of the relationship betweenstock and switch rails is overcome and overall reliability is improved (see Figure 5).

The key difference between point machines and

clamp locks is that the latter are operated by anelectro-hydraulic arrangement. Point drive isachieved by the use of an electric motor which drives one of two single-acting hydraulic actuators,one for the normal direction and one for reverse.These act on a thrust bracket mounted in the centreof the sole plate in the four-foot.

The clamp locks themselves feature a lock body

attached to the stock rail. The switch rail is fittedwith a drive lock slide and a detection blade. Whendriven through the lock body by the actuators, thedrive lock slide acts on a hook-shaped lock arm.This lifts up behind the stock rail when the switch railis fully closed, locking the two firmly together.Electrical detection is achieved by the use of high-grade microswitches, two of which are located ineach clamp lock unit.

Despite being directly compatible with existingsolid state interlocking, clamp locks are not now apreferred point drive mechanism. Apart from routinefailures associated with hydraulic connections,clamp locks suffered from detection failures due todeterioration of the limit switches.

Another significant failure associated with clamplocks was fracture of the lock body assembly. Earlyclamp lock bodies were of cast construction and,due to the repeated stresses associated with highspeed switches, many suffered cracks due to metalfatigue. This fault was rectified by the addition ofsupport brackets until such time as a modified bodywas developed. There were also problems associ-ated with the lock arm seizing in the locked position.A worrying failure has been associated with trappedair in the hydraulic system. This failure can unlockthe points under a train and is known to have contributed to a number of derailments.

Many of the failures could be put down to manu-facturing defects which have been eliminated byproduct development. Nevertheless signalling andcivil engineers need to consider what proportion of

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES 63

Figure 3 – Straight-Through Combined Point Machine

Figure 4 – In and Out Combined Point Machine

the failures were due to mismanagement of the critical interface between the disciplines.

THE EUROPEAN VIEWA review of point operating mechanisms would not

be complete with a look over the Channel at mainland Europe, where freedom from regulation bythe UK Department of Transport has made possiblea slightly different approach to point control.

Although early point switch systems were similarto those in the UK utilising, for example, mechanicalback drives, the design of switch systems in Europehas not relied on a fixed stretcher bar linking theswitches. This allowed development of conventionaland in-sleeper point drive systems utilising the ‘pawllock’ system, which was used as early as the 1970s.The pawl lock is driven by a conventional pointmachine via a gearbox, and it acts to unlock, throwand relock the switches in the same way as theBritish clamp lock (see Figures 6 and 7). It is possible to configure these points to be trailable ifrequired.

On longer switches the mechanical back drive hasbeen dispensed with, additional point machines andassociated pawl locks acting to operate and securethe switch at intermediate positions. Lack of stretcher bars, adoption of hollow sleepers andreplacement of mechanical backdrives with additional machines make for a highly compact andfully tampable switch system, requiring far lessmaintenance than conventional UK arrangements.

It is interesting to note that these machines or theirdirect predecessors have been available in Europefor many years and have delivered consistently highreliability figures.

SUPPLEMENTARY DRIVESSupplementary drives are added to switches for

two reasons, firstly to ensure that the switch rail fitscorrectly against the stock rail for the entire length ofthe engagement, and secondly to ensure that the

necessary flange way clearance is maintainedbetween the open switch and its respective stockrail throughout the length of the switch.

The majority of supplementary drives are of themechanical type, which has the advantage of beingcompatible with all types of conventional pointmachine. Also since the connection is of a rigidnature, an obstruction anywhere along the switchwill prevent the point machine from obtaining detection. There are, however, a number of disadvantages with mechanical drives, whichinclude wear and friction causing problems with thecorrect fitting of the switch. A failure of the mechanical drive itself could lead to the rear of theswitch not being driven. For the longest switchesthere are hydraulic supplementary drives available.These are generally used where clamp locks are theprime driver, and do not suffer from the disad-vantages relating to mechanical drives.

As the length of switch increases so does the riskassociated with failure of the rear of the switch to follow the toe. In order to mitigate these risks additional electrical detectors are fitted at suitableintervals along the length of the switch. The numberand location of supplementary detectors dependsupon the length of switch and the method of drive.Figure 8 shows the location of supplementary drivesand detectors for a variety of switch and rail configurations.

POINT INTERLOCKING CONTROLSThe introduction of the track circuit allowed the

locking bar to be dispensed with and gave the signalling engineer a method of holding the roadahead of the train continuously. The advent of relayand electronic interlockings has allowed far easierexploitation of safety features such as flank protection, as well as implementation of complexfacing point controls.

There now follows a brief description of the principal controls that may be seen applied to points

64 POINTS AND POINT MACHINES

Figure 5 – Rail Clamp Point Locks showing (top) thrust bracket and hydraulic actuatorsand (bottom) close-up of lock body assembly and drive lock slide

within a typical interlocking. Readers will be able toidentify many parallels between these controls andthose in mechanical interlockings. These are highlighted for those unfamiliar with mechanicalinterlocking.

An anti-preselection feature is associated with theswitch or other device that operates the points. Thisprevents the signalman from placing or storing a callon the points at a time when they are unavailable tobe called. It protects against momentary operationof a track circuit (‘bobbing’) allowing the points tomove beneath a train.

Points are set and locked by all signal routes thatread across them. This control is applied directly tothe points and, once applied, is not released until thesignal route is normal. This can be likened to thedirect mechanical locking between a signal lever anda points lever.

Historically, route holding was provided by lockingbars as described above. This feature is now knownas maintained locking and is realised by sequentialoperation of the track circuits between the signaland the points. Sufficient track circuits are includedto ensure that a train has passed clear of the pointscompletely, including the track circuit over the pointsthemselves generally. This is a control that was not

practicable in purely mechanical installations in thepast, and there were many derailments for lack of it.

In addition to maintained locking, which is onlyeffective when a route had previously been set fromthe protecting signal, the track circuit over the pointsis applied to the points directly regardless of thestate of the signals. This feature, known as deadlocking, is extended to include any track circuits thatare considered to be foul of the points for adjacentmoves. Points will be prevented from moving to aposition which would permit a movement to takeplace that could collide with a train or vehicle leftstanding foul. This feature was afforded by foulingbars in mechanical installations. Point drive circuitsare arranged so that, should a dead-locking trackcircuit become occupied whilst the points are atmid-stroke, they will complete their move. It is ofinterest to note that in electro-mechanical areas asealed release is provided in order to free the pointsshould a dead-locking track circuit fail. No such freedom has been permitted in UK electronic inter-lockings, although the introduction of axle countersin lieu of track circuits may see the introduction ofsuch a feature.

If facing points are provided within an overlap thena significant departure from mechanical principlestakes place in that, provided they are free to be setto an alternative valid overlap, then they are left freeof interlocking controls. In mechanical territory thesignalman is prohibited from changing the overlaponce a proceed aspect has been displayed to thedriver, even though it may have been some significant distance away. This relaxation allowsroute setting to be carried out sequentially in thedirection of travel, and leaves the freedom to selectany available overlap before locking the points witha forward route set subsequently.

If facing points within the overlap are close to theprotecting signal then they will become locked bythe occupation of a track circuit on the approach tothe signal, so that if a train overruns accidentally itwill not find the points in mid position. Designers

65POINTS AND POINT MACHINES

Figure 6 – German Pawl Lock Point System

Figure 7 – Pawl Lock Mechanical Arrangements

should consider whether this control, which wasdeveloped for relay based interlockings with parallelprocessing, can be safely applied to electronicschemes. An overrunning train can travel a con-siderable distance in the time it takes an electronicinterlocking to detect occupancy of a track circuitand then lock the points.

Trailing points are subject to the same interlockingcontrols as facing points, but are in addition lockedwhen in the overlap. Where movements would otherwise be restricted it is usual to provide a timedrelease, to allow points in the overlap to become freeonce a train has been proved to be at a stand at theprotecting signal. Care must be taken when arranging these controls to ensure that an over-running train prevents this release.

Some controls that are commonly applied but areperhaps less obvious are those associated withtrapping and with flank protection. Flank points arepoints which are not directly in the line of route or inthe overlap but which lead to the route, and whichcan be controlled so as to protect the signalled routein question by diverting unauthorised moves. Carefulconsideration needs to be given to the application offlank protection to ensure that the line on to whichunauthorised movements are to be diverted doesnot increase the risk of collision. To that end it is normal to divert trains on to a line that is pre-dominantly used for movements in the same direction. In mechanical installations, in the absenceof dead-locking by track circuits, point-to-pointlocking was applied routinely in order to ensure thatthe requirement to hold the road was met as well asto enforce the correct operation of points during

degraded working.

One of the principal Department of Transportrequirements was that passenger lines should beprotected against unauthorised movements out ofsidings or other non-running lines. This requirementis met today in the form of trapping protection, and the drive towards ALARP (risk as low as is reasonably practicable) in terms of overrun risk has contributed towards renewed vigour in its application.

Another control that has been in and out of favourover recent years is that of self-normalisation orrestoration. This refers to the practice of returning aset of points to their more protective state in termsof overrun protection. In the case of trap points thisis straightforward. The signalling engineer shouldnot lose sight of the risks associated with prematuremovement of such points, and this should be bornein mind when applying such measures.

It became the practice to dispense with point-to-point locking because it was deemed to complicatethe interlocking design unnecessarily, to contributeto failures and to delay route setting potentially.Point-to-point locking does still provide a real benefit however, as the requirement to ensure correct setting of the route during degraded operation is as valid today as it ever was. Points areproved to be set, locked and detected in all signalsreading over them. The detection provided from thepoint machine proves that the points are locked andthat the switches are in the correct position. Thedetection is required to be present before a move-ment authority can be issued to the train driver in the

66 POINTS AND POINT MACHINES

Figure 8 – Location of Supplementary Drives and Detectors

form of a proceed aspect. Should detection be lostfor any reason, the signal will revert to its mostrestrictive aspect. Whether or not the train driver willhave the opportunity to react to this change of status is questionable with conventional signallingsystems.

The signalling engineer needs to consider whatinformation needs to be known about the status ofpoints, and when and how it should be passed to thetrain driver.

ROBUST TRAIN PROTECTIONFor many years there has been a tendency to look

no further than the overlap in terms of point setting.This situation was made worse by the adoption ofoverlaps shorter than the 400m (440 yards) that wasthe standard in mechanical territory. The conse-quences of a signal being disregarded can bereduced if some common sense is applied to thesetting of points beyond the overlap. Extended overrun protection can be provided by setting pointsbeyond the overlap away from a possible point ofcollision. Such points are maintained in that positionuntil required by a forward route. The safest diversion would be to a passenger line reading in thesame direction. If this is not possible, the nextchoice would be to any other passenger line, followed by a goods line and last of all a siding. Afurther option is to provide a set of trap points leading to a sand-drag.

Points beyond the overlap may be ‘soft-called’ toa position which gives a safe overrun. This meansthat they are called when the route is set, and theymove if they are free. If they are not free the route isstill set normally, as they are not required to belocked and could indeed be called by another routeat any time.

An emerging trend, in modern processor-based

interlockings particularly, is 'single ending' of points.This refers to the practice of controlling each end ofa crossover separately, which permits effective flankprotection to be applied and reduces the operationalimpact should one end of the crossover fail.

Decisions on whether to provide any or all of thesemeasures, which can prove costly, are dependentupon the outcome of risk assessment. If due consideration is given to them then the overall riskcan be reduced. This, combined with a greateracceptance that TPWS is effective for most trains formost of the time, can result in an errant train beingrouted away from danger and brought safely to astand.

THE DRIVE FOR RELIABILITYMany of us have arrived at the railway station to

commute to work, only to have the start of the dayspoilt by that familiar phrase, “Due to a points failure....”.

The generic term 'points failure' covers a greatvariety of problems, from defects in track geometryto failure of individual components connecteddirectly or indirectly with the actual operation of theswitches.

Failures of point switches and their subsystemsmake up a significant part of the total annual traindelays experienced by Network Rail. Analysis of themost common failure modes reveals that hydraulicleaks, motor brushes, detection components, andwear and maladjustment in safety-critical mechani-cal components account for the vast majority of failures attributable to the signalling engineer. Manyof these failures start with deterioration or failure ofcivil engineering components which may themselvesoriginate from poor installation or maintenance.Figure 9 shows the most significant 80% of failurescontributing to train delays.

67POINTS AND POINT MACHINES

Figure 9 – Point Failure by Type contributing to train delays

Efforts to address these issues are under way in the form of reliability-centred maintenance programmes such as the enhanced switch andcrossing maintenance programme. This initiativeactually allows for increased maintenance activity,targeting key switches with the aim of detecting andcorrecting deficiencies before they lead to failure.The key objectives of enhanced maintenance are:

• to maintain a stable, vibration-free formation;

• to maintain track gauge;

• to maintain stretchers, sole plates and point fittings;

• to maintain the point operating mechanismsthemselves.

Where this initiative goes further is that it calls forexamination of related subsystems, such as pointheaters and signalling cables to adjacent apparatuscases.

This initiative, coupled with risk based main-tenance techniques, allows maintenance effort to betargeted at those switches that are subject to themost use. The success or failure of these measuresis affected directly by the ability of maintenance personnel to gain access to the equipment regularlyand for a sufficient time to diagnose and correctdeficiencies before they manifest themselves in significant failures. Clearly this is where improvedaccess to the infrastructure is vitally important tosuccess.

THE HIGH PERFORMANCE SWITCHSYSTEM

Not content with the stalemate that had beenreached in terms of measurable improvement topoints reliability, Network Rail laid down a speci-fication and commissioned Balfour Beatty in collaboration with IAD Rail Systems to develop apoint mechanism that would perform to it.

Using a systems engineering approach therequirements were captured and a prototype knownas the Switch Actuation Mechanism (SAM) wasdeveloped. Following laboratory testing, the firstSAM was installed on a set of trailing points atTamworth in 1998. This installation was subjected toa 23-month period of monitoring during which thepoints were operated 28,000 times, for 70,000 trainstravelling at speeds of up to 160 km/h (100 mile/h).Following the test the SAM was developed furtherand rebranded as the HPSS point mechanism.

The key features of the HPSS (see Figure 10) areas follows:

• Twenty-five-year life with low maintenancerequirement.

• Switch rails driven to stall against the stock rail,eliminating the need to adjust the stroke.

• Use of brushless motor technology, providinghigh power and reliability.

• Non-backdriving lead screw and brakes to holdthe switch securely.

• Continuous switch and stock rail position detec-tion with non-wearing, non-adjustable sensors.

• An Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to record andmaintain key operational parameters, allowingfor traceability and condition monitoring.

• Hollow bearer location of all equipment, toenable full machine tamping.

• Compatibility with standard lineside apparatusand circuitry.

The HPSS comprises four subsystems:

• High Performance Switch Actuator (HPSA);

• Detection Sub-Assembly (DSA);

• Torsion Back Drive Assembly (TBDA);

• ECU.

The HPSA is the equivalent of the point machineand is the electromechanical element that providesthe actuation, locking and detection functions for thepoint switch. As the actuator is located in a resilienthollow bearer there is no need for extended sleepersor associated fittings. It is claimed that the bearerwill actually deliver plain line track quality throughswitch and crossing work – much to the delight ofthe civil engineer.

The DSA utilises linear variable differential trans-formers (LVDTs) to detect switch position. Thisdevice is in effect a transformer with an adjustablesecondary winding. The primary winding is formedof a cylindrical body through which the secondary ispassed. The primary is fixed to the stock rail, and thesecondary to the switch rail. It can be seen from thisarrangement that the output of the transformerdepends upon the position of the switch rail in relation to the stock rail. Both switch rails are fitted

68 POINTS AND POINT MACHINES

Figure 10 – HPSS Layout (top) and HPSATechnician’s Handset (bottom)

with transformers, so that at least two transformersare present on the shortest switch. The outputs oftransformer pairs are cross-referenced, to ensurethat the closed and open switches have movedsimultaneously.

The Torsion Back Drive subsystem consists of atorsion tube and adjustable stretcher bars which arelocated in the four-foot. Operation of the back driveis initiated by movement of the switch rails followingoutput from the actuator. Located at each end of thetorsion tube are cranks which act to transfer drivefrom the front of the point switch to the additionaldrives. There is escapement within the system tolose approximately 50mm of lateral travel necessarybetween the toe and the rear of the switch.

All stretchers and detection equipment are locatedin hollow bearers. This ensures that the HPSS canbe fully tamped, avoiding the need for manual packing of sleeper bays.

The ECU is divided into two subsystems. The firstdeals with motor control and contains duplicatedpower electronics to control a 3-phase thyristor-controlled DC brushless motor. Motor currents aremonitored and action is taken if the motor currentstrays beyond specific limits. This is designed toprevent the deformation of a switch should it beobstructed for any reason. The motor control boardalso contains electronics to control the machinebrake. The HPSS is fitted with two independentelectromagnetic brake coils that act to lock the gear-box when no movement command is received bythe actuator.

The second ECU subsystem deals solely with thematter of point detection. When the detection is firstset up at commissioning, the outputs of the LVDTsare stored in the ECU memory. Each time the pointsare moved the detection logic compares the outputof the LVDTs with the values stored in memory and,provided they are within defined limits, detection isconfirmed.

Communication with the ECU is established byconnecting a password-protected handheld com-puter. All point operating parameters can beaccessed via this unit and down-loaded at the depotfor the production of asset records. This facility iscurrently being developed further with the intro-duction of user-friendly condition monitoring.Condition monitoring can be used as a tool to predict when a switch is likely to fail. If the motorcurrent or time taken to obtain detection changessignificantly then this can be flagged up as a signthat all is not well on site. Maintenance activities canthen be prioritised to ensure that remedial action canbe taken before a failure of the switch occurs.

CONCLUSIONPoint machines have changed little in principle

over the last 50 years. This is understandablebecause the essential requirements have not

changed since the dawn of railways.

Points perform a vital role in the efficient and saferouteing of trains. They should also be called uponto perform an important secondary role in mitigatingthe risks arising from signals being passed at danger.

Perhaps against the odds, we have squeezed evermore reliability out of individual components untilsignificant progress in this area is no longer possible.The development and introduction of new-generation point operating devices such as theHPSS aim to take the railway industry to new levelsof reliability and to reduce train delays significantly.

Only when the interfaces between the signallingand civil engineers are fully understood and managed will we ever see full delivery of the theo-retical benefits that modern point switch designscan offer us.

Finally, in order to stimulate debate the authorwould like to pose some questions to the rail industry.

Clamp locks are clearly a versatile point drivemechanism, able to operate the longest and highest-speed switches on the network. Significant effortwas put into improving their reliability before they fellfrom favour. If clamp locks had benefited from beingsubjected to a more co-ordinated multidisciplinarymaintenance regime, might we have arrived at theultimate point drive mechanism some years ago?

There have been efforts to bring the best ofEuropean practice to the UK. Nowhere is this moreevident than in the application of European computer-based interlocking technology. However,as long as we insist on retrofitting this technology tosatisfy our current rules and principles we will almostcertainly fail to realise the full potential of what is onoffer, and this is likely to result in a more compli-cated and less reliable railway. There have been significant developments in point switch technologyin Europe. Is it not time that we adopted some of thistechnology for direct application in the UK?

While we continue to move ever-longer switchesmore often and to transfer ever-increasing axle loadsover them, can we ever achieve the reliability towhich we aspire?

With maintenance activities being returned toNetwork Rail control the industry is perhaps betterplaced today than at any time in recent history totake a collective look at the maintenance of pointsand crossings in order to challenge maintenanceprocesses and procedures, and to ensure that we donot continue to do things ‘the way we do’ for ever.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe author would like to express his acknowl-

edgements to Network Rail, Siemens TransportationSystems, Westinghouse Rail Systems, IAD RailSystems, Catalis and the Permanent Way Institution.

69POINTS AND POINT MACHINES

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES70

The discussion was opened by D McKeown(Independent Consultant) who thanked the speakerfor his paper. He believed that the point machine iswhat drives the whole points system and that backdrives are a part of that system. He pointed out thatpoints are different from anything else that signal engineers deal with; they are unable to be duplicated, redundancy cannot be incorporated andmaintenance is seen as an art in itself. He asked thespeaker why point systems from abroad are notdirectly imported into the UK, questioned the reasonfor development of the HPSS, rather than the clamplock, and whether it would be more widely used. Hefinally wondered what actions Network Rail couldtake to improve the approach to point maintenance.

A Kornas agreed that there was a general reluctance to allow foreign point operating systemsto be directly applied in the UK because we believedthat our specifications were better; anything imported is expected to comply with our standards.Whilst he felt that there was a better philosophyabroad to giving access for maintenance staff,Siemen's had been unable to get their machine towork on 113lb rail. He also concurred that reputationof the clamp lock had suffered because of the extracare and attention required, compared to pointmachines, but was unaware of what the drive hadbeen to develop the HPSS. He felt that treatingpoints as a multi-discipline system, ie signalling, PWay, etc, rather than just considering the signallingelement would improve point maintenance.

C Burton (WRS retired) advised that snubbing protection in point machines was provided to prevent the internal mechanism from destroyingitself from the surplus of energy. He also queried whythe HPSS had been developed with a 25-year lifewhen many point machines were still working reliably after 50 years of continuous service. Henoted that no new machines would be developed ifthe attitude of not wanting different spares prevailedand stated that he believed most point failures couldbe attributed to P Way defects.

A Kornas pointed out that snubbing problemscause some machine failures; this being the weakpoint of their design. He advised that the intentionfor HPSS was that the equipment would remain onsite for the designed length of time, although the lifespan has yet to be proved, whereas some pointmachines will have undergone workshop overhaul.He believed that it was sensible to minimise sparesholdings within a geographical area to assist withstaff familiarisation but felt that the industry neededto consider the way forward and then adopt thattechnology. Finally he agreed that most failures wereattributable to the P Way.

I Harman (Network Rail) believed that there were anumber of human factors associated with clamplocks, it being difficult to visualise what is happeningwithin the mechanisms, and the designers gave noconsideration to maintenance requirements.

A Kornas recognised that each form of point drivehas different competence requirements and lessons

have been learnt with clamp locks.

D Mills (Metronet SSL) advised that ground tracklocks were still a requirement on LondonUnderground to ensure that there is no potential formovement either from stored energy or creeptogether with the risk of the non-proved and non-locked auxiliary air switch been out of correspondence with the command device; pointmachines don't require this feature as the energysource is totally removed once movement is completed. He then questioned why, with the modern form of shallow depth switches, we do notuse the designed switch openings of 160mm thatalso then maintains the flangeway throughout theswitch length without the use of supplementary drives.

A Kornas stated that the nominal switch openingof 110m had always been applied and for longswitches it was necessary for a supplementary driveto hold the switch closed throughout its length aswell as maintain the flangeway.

L Wilkinson (Independent Consultant) stated that itwas essential to treat points as a system with the PWay and provide the opportunities for maintenanceto prevent failures.

A Kornas totally agreed but said that in reality thisjust did not happen.

P Woodbridge (Lloyd’s Register Rail) wondered ifresearch had shown why the UK insisted on stretchers whereas the Continent did not.

A Kornas advised that there were no specific reasons why although the dynamics of linking biggerand stronger rails together increases the load leading to more force being required to move theswitches compared to independent switch move-ment.

R Martin (Network Rail) noted that the mean timeto repair, a big issue for the operators, was not covered in the paper.

A Kornas explained that with Reliability CentredMaintenance (RCM), knowledge of the asset is better and failure prediction can be made enablingpossessions to be booked to undertake main-tenance before failures occur; the operators, however, have no incentive to stop traffic and do notallow access until the failure has actually occurred!The conflict arises in knowing what to do and when,there being no systems in place that can do this atpresent.

C A Porter (Past President) believed that it waswrong to blame the P Way for all of our ills, the problem being that we do not lay down specifiedparameters within which the signalling equipmentwill work and there is little communication betweenthe two disciplines.

A Kornas replied that it was questionable how tomonitor a “vibration free environment” but it was afact that point equipment did not like being“bounced about”.

J Holmes (Halcrow Rail) asked the speaker if he

Discussion

could clarify the life cycle costs of an HW pointmachine, seen as the preferred method of operation,relative to the higher first costs of the HPSS.

A Kornas stated that the comparison showed theHW point machine as being more reliable than aclamp lock whereas the high capital cost of theHPSS would probably go against its use.

R E B Barnard (Alstom) believed that there werestill arguments between trailable and non-trailablemachines, some countries specifying their use whilstsome point machines can be configured and hewondered what was the solution?

A Kornas noted that there had been trailablepoints in the UK on lightly used lines but not on themain line. He was also aware that the Siemensmachine was configurable but ultimately, our operators did not require trailable operation.

D Weedon (Network Rail) wondered if there was afundamental problem in using the point operatingmechanism to maintain and detect the gauge as wellas detecting the tolerances of the open and closedswitches. He questioned whether we could increasereliability by simply monitoring the open and closedswitches and not worry about the gauge.

A Kornas replied that it is difficult to specify limitsfor all tolerances and disciplines and that themachine does need to allow for gauge monitoringbecause the switch rails are linked and not indepen-dent.

W Morton (retired) also raised the issue of trail-ability and advised that this is universally providedoverseas noting that an FPL cannot be provided inthese circumstances. He also observed that asswitch length increases, it is harder to keep theclosed switch rail in place and supplementary drivesare required to hold the switch in place during trainmovements; this can be by either mechanical orelectrical drive but care needs to be taken not to create rail bending around an obstruction!

A Kornas acknowledged that with mechanicalsupplementary drives, disconnection can occur andsome form of second detector is required.

S Isbister (Network Rail) stated that there were laiddown P Way tolerances, the real problem lay in providing point mechanisms to meet the operatorsrequirements, such as high speed turnouts withnumerous supplementary drives and detectors. Thisleads to unreliability and probably indicates that thesystem is not fit for purpose.

A Kornas agreed that higher speeds did increasewear and tear but wondered if there were still under-

lying problems causing the failures and questioned ifwe should be designing a more tolerant mechanismfor that particular type of layout.

M Nash (Network Rail) questioned why the graphin Figure 9 in the paper did not include any pointheater failures. He also observed that the papermade no mention of either the train operated, storedenergy, device or switch rollers.

A Kornas explained that the graph was limited toonly illustrate 80% of the most significant failuresand other failure categories did not appear, theobjective being to highlight and tackle the mostcommon problems first. He agreed that roller bearings were a good idea provided that they wereset correctly to actually reduce friction.

J Phillips (Metronet BCV) advised that point topoint interlocking was provided on LUL but not discussed in the paper and considered it usefulunder times of individual operation of point ends.

A Kornas acknowledged that this feature was provided on some schemes and did assist the operator during failure conditions when route cardswere utilised.

W Boddy (Past President) observed that this hadbeen an interesting debate but didn’t believe that anholistic, whole life, approach was been taken toobtain the greatest reliability for each of the depart-ments’ requirements. This applies equally from thedesign of modern junctions, where the number ofpoint ends at a double junction has often increasedfrom two up to four, to the physical positioning ofpoints on the ground to avoid problematic site conditions.

A Kornas agreed that the P Way design shouldtake into account the requirements of all depart-ments.

J Jenkins (Network Rail) referred to the EalingBroadway accident caused by equipment hangingfrom rolling stock and questioned if this should beconsidered in the design of point operating mechanisms.

A Kornas accepted that certain types of mecha-nism would not be as vulnerable and protection fromexternal objects could be provided although ultimately maintenance of rolling stock should beensured.

J Corrie (IRSE President) thanked A Kornas for hiswell-researched paper that had certainly provoked alively debate, and those who had taken part in thediscussion.

POINTS AND POINT MACHINES 71

INTRODUCTIONThe use of steel wheel on steel rail, resulting in a

low coefficient of friction, is one of the key attributeswhich enable railways to be an energy-efficientmode of transport. This same attribute howeverplaces demands on how the signal engineer mustcontrol the railway, especially where the weights andspeeds of trains are high. It dictates that:

• issue of a movement authority can only beallowed provided the route is aligned and clearof obstruction (including other trains);

• the route must be protected for the movementuntil it has been traversed, or until the train hasstopped and will no longer use the route;

• adequate warning of the end of the movementauthority (that is, the route) is required.

This paper will explore what this means in terms ofthe practical solutions which have evolved in trainseparation and route holding over the lifetime of railways, highlighting differences between them anddebating issues for the future. A paper such as thiscan only touch on the issues, all of which deserve farmore detail and explanation than it is possible to dojustice to here. There are thus omissions and simplifications in the pursuit of brevity.

DEFINITION OF BLOCK WORKINGBlock working is the means by which safe separ-

ation of trains is achieved. A variety of methodsexist, having developed and evolved to match needsand to harness technology.

Initially trains travelled at relatively low speeds andwere driven under line-of-sight conditions. The same

applies to many tram lines today, especially wherestreet running occurs. This is basically a “No Block”system. Many goods lines operated under “NoBlock”, some of them lasting almost to the end ofthe twentieth century. Signals were normally left atclear, being used only to indicate that the route wasset, and not the status of the line ahead. Only whenthe route was to be changed or a train was to bestopped specifically was the signal placed at danger.

The safest method of ensuring that there is no wayin which trains can collide is a régime that allowsonly a single train on any one line. Applied univers-ally it would dictate a separate track having to bebuilt for every train. In most cases this basic methodis impractical, but there are lines where it is appro-priate. This is known as “One Train Working” (OTW)block, formerly “One Engine in Steam”. Many branchlines are still operated in this way, the driver’s authority to proceed being a tangible piece of hardware such as a wooden staff.

On busier routes the solution was to provide passing places and to timetable movementsbetween them strictly so as to avoid conflict. Wheretraffic demanded, multiple tracks were laid. To prevent head-on collisions the practice of enforcinga normal direction of traffic flow was adopted. Thishas led to the standard designations of up anddown, eastbound and westbound or northboundand southbound. Separation between followingtrains then becomes the issue.

TIME INTERVALWhen railways were in their infancy there was no

means of communication along the line other thanthe trains themselves. Initially a method of “timeinterval” working was imposed to allow trains to follow one another. This assumed that the line ahead

72

Technical Meeting of the Institutionheld at

The Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Wednesday 12th January 2005

The President, Mr J D Corrie, in the chair.130 members and visitors were in attendance. It was proposed by Mr D McKeown, seconded by Mr M Govas and carried that the Minutes of the

Technical Meeting held on 8th December 2004 be taken as read and they were signed by the President as a correct record.Apologies for absence had been received for Messrs A Kornas and C Kessell. There were three new members present for the first time since

election to membership and these were introduced to the meeting amidst applause.The President then introduced Mr J D Francis, of Westinghouse Rail Systems Ltd, and invited him to present his paper entitled “Block Working, Route

Holding and Train Detection. In his presentation Mr Francis explored how the signal engineer used appropriate control measures to enforce the separationof trains and secured the line for their safe passage. He illustrated his presentation with a wide variety of interesting and illuminating examples of the signalling technology used over the years and amused the audience with a number of anecdotes drawn from his wide experience. Following the presentation Messrs C H Porter (Lloyd’s Register Rail), D Hotchkiss (RSSB), S Clarke (Lloyd’s Register Rail), E O Goddard (LUL), Q Macdonald (Atkins Rail),A C Howker (retired), P Humphreys (Lloyd's Register Rail), A Simmons (Network Rail), D Stirling (Reading University) and A Harrison (Lloyd’s Register Rail)took part in the lively and light hearted discussion. The presenter dealt with the questions comprehensively and the President then proposed a vote of thanksand presented the speaker with the commemorative plaque customarily awarded to authors of the London paper.

The President thanked members for their attendance and their questions. The President made announcements of forthcoming events and informed themeeting of the recent publication of Technical Report No 7 of the International Technical Committee. The report was now on sale to members and availablefrom the Institution office in the usual way. He closed the meeting at 1945 by announcing that the next meeting in London would be the Technical Meetingto be held on the 16th February 2005 when Messrs I Shannon and R Short will present a paper on “Developments in Interlocking”.

Block Working, Route Holding and Train DetectionJ D Francis FIRSE MIEE AssocIRO1

1 The author is Head of Research with Westinghouse Rail SystemsLimited

73BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

was clear after a period of time unless positive information was received otherwise. The idea was toachieve separation by keeping trains a minimumtime apart. Each train was despatched from a stationor junction only after a certain time had elapsedsince the previous train had left. In a typical case afollowing train was allowed to proceed cautiouslyafter five minutes, or at full speed after ten minutes.Whether to stop, to proceed cautiously, or to run atfull speed was communicated to the driver by therailway policeman by hand signals.

Time interval working proved fallible, for there wasoften no knowing if a train had stopped or failed andcould thus be collided with. Hence, in addition to thedisplay of a red tail light on the rear of the train, visible and audible protection by the guard in a timely fashion was important as a mitigation measure. Needless to say, there were neverthelessregular incidents where one train happened upon therear of another.

SPACE INTERVALWhen the electric telegraph was invented it was

harnessed to provide communication between stations. This offered the ability to determine thateach train, complete with its red tail light, hadpassed between telegraph stations before a follow-ing train was allowed to proceed, thus ensuring theline was clear by space interval.

This positive method of determining train move-ment was initially applied at tunnels. It led to theestablishment of block posts, the block sections ofline between which were regulated by the block telegraph. The term "block" may have come from anabbreviation of "blocked", referring to the occu-pation of the line by a train.

SINGLE LINESTo enhance safety on single lines with passing

places, the space interval principle that only onetrain could occupy the line between any two passingplaces at any one time was adopted. This was operated by providing a physical baton for each section of single line. Only the driver in possessionof the baton or “staff” for that section of line couldtravel over it. Instead of allowing only a single trainon the line, this allowed multiple trains to operate butlimited entry to each section to a single train.

Any imbalance between movements in each direction created a problem, which was addressedby ingenious methods of staff-and-ticket workingand divisible staffs. Eventually electricity was harnessed to connect instruments housing morethan one staff, tablet or token. Ensuring that onlyone of them could be out of an instrument at anytime made possible any combination of daily movements.

DOUBLE LINESIn accordance with the philosophy that the line is

clear unless occupied by a train, the message sentto the rear block post when a train arrived completeat the forward one was “line clear.” The signal guarding entry to the section was then set to

proceed again, remaining in that position until thenext train entered the section. Early block telegraphinstruments were, therefore, binary, mimicking theexpected position of the section signal. They weresimple to operate and clear in terms of their message. Known as absolute block, the method wasinstalled by enlightened railways before eventuallybeing mandated by law. The “line clear” indicationdid not, of course, take any account of the actualintegrity of the railway between the two block posts,only of the fact that no train was present.

Following an accident at Abbots Ripton in 1876,the philosophy was changed so that the section wasassumed to be blocked until a request was made fora train to enter. The request became “Is line clear?”and three-state instruments were invented to reflectthe new working. Many existing two-position instru-ments were modified to provide three indicationssupporting this methodology. The three states were,and still are, “line blocked”, “line clear” and “train online”. Different terms having the same meaning havesometimes been used, for example “normal” or“closed” for “blocked”, and “train in section” for“train on line”.

Despite widespread adoption of the three-statesystem, some two-position instruments survived inuse until as late as the 1990s.

In New South Wales, a four-position instrumentwas adopted as standard which gave “line closed”,“line clear”, “train on line” and “train arrived” indications. At the time of writing eight of theseinstruments still exist in use.

The eventual full adoption of space interval working or absolute block on multiple track routesdid not see the end of time interval working. Thisremained as a fall-back method right up to the 1980sin the UK, allowing signalmen to pass trains whenblock and telephone communication were both severed.

Initially there was concern amongst railway managers that block working would restrict the volume of traffic which could be passed. In realitythe opposite has been found to be true provided sufficient blocks are installed, as trains can bepassed forward at regular intervals at line speed withconfidence that the line is clear.

One of the most interesting things to learn whenstudying the evolution of block working is the fascinating array of instruments that were developedby individuals, either on behalf of railway companiesor specialist suppliers, and the number of specialfeatures or combinations of apparatus that weredevised to meet local needs and preferences. Theseingenious instruments combined electrical, magnetic and mechanical engineering to producevery clever but economic solutions, whilst the instrument housings and their internal componentsreflected the craftsmanship of the time. They soughtto maximise effectiveness whilst minimising linewires and power consumption. Pioneers like Walker,Preece, Harper, Tyer, Spagnoletti, Hodgson, Sykes,Webb and Thompson brought their powers of invention to double and single line working.

Under block working the line is generally split into

74 BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

interlocked areas separated by stretches of plainline. Interlocked areas comprise concentrations ofpoints and their protecting signals controlled fromsignal boxes, and so tend to be at stations or junctions. They are given the title of “yard” or “station limits” (regardless of whether there is anactual yard or station). The plain line stretches arecalled “block sections”. Where interlocked areas aresome distance apart and traffic levels demand it,“break section” signal boxes are provided in order tosplit plain line stretches into more than one blocksection.

Absolute block working relies on the space separation principle – only one train is allowed on adesignated section of line and, before a train isallowed to enter it, the section must be clear together with a safety margin as far as a clearingpoint beyond it. One might say that once a train hasbeen given permission to proceed, an “absoluteblock” is placed on the entry of any other train intothe section of line until it is clear again. The processrelies upon co-operation between two signalmen,which provides a degree of diversity.

PERMISSIVE BLOCKIn some circumstances it is still necessary to

permit more than one train to occupy a block sectionat the same time. Traffic movements at a station forinstance may require trains to join or split. Manyfreight-only lines could handle their traffic only if several trains were allowed to proceed cautiouslybehind one another through the section. The permissive block system was introduced to handlethese situations, the name being in distinction toabsolute block.

LOCK AND BLOCKThe fitting of interlocked frames to control points

and signals proceeded separately from the provisionof block working in the UK until the late 19th century. At first block working apparatus dealt onlywith the block section itself, but over time it waslinked with activity in station limits and the wholeprocess of passing a train along the line was integrated, so ensuring safer movement of traffic.

In the 1870s the concept of “lock and block” wasimplemented by some manufacturers (notablySykes). Patent No 662 of 1875 was an importantmilestone. This set about linking the signalling to thelogical progress of the train, both through the blocksection and from signal to signal. The system foundwidespread use, particularly on some of the heavilytrafficked lines around London. The “union of lockand block” was finally enforced by legislation in theform of the 1889 Regulation of Railways Act, following the disaster at Armagh in the same year.

Many variants existed with nuances to suit individual layouts, but in essence a sequence ofoperations linked to the actual movement of the trainforced sequential locking, and integrated it withoperation of the block instruments. Mechanical linkages connected the levers with the lock andblock instruments, and treadles were used to determine the progress of the train. Whilst simple inconcept, the system was complex in application asa result of the amount of equipment involved. Itshould be noted that, with lock and block, rear andadvance sections of the same line are combined intoone instrument, unlike other absolute block apparatus.

The emergence of standard block instruments oneach company’s lines eventually led to the adoptionof controls that achieved the same result but withless paraphernalia. The Midland Railway’s RotaryBlock is a classic example. Generally, a range ofcontrols were adopted as shown in Table 1.

Provision of all these controls in conjunction withblock working creates an integrated process ofpassing a train along the line which is designed toreduce human error.

The line clear release acts on the section signal.Sequential locking applies from the section signalback through each signal approaching. Replace-ment and arm proving together with train arrival isthen passed into the line clear to the box in rear. Ineffect the mechanisms act in the opposite directionto the movement of the train.

OTHER SPACE INTERVAL SYSTEMSVariations in the use of technology and the rules

Line clear release To ensure the section signal complies with the block indicator

To ensure only one train at a timeis signalled into the forward section

To prove the train has arrived atthe home signal

To prove that the distant andhome signals are replaced and thehome signal lever is normal beforeline clear is transmitted

To enforce replacement of the signals behind every train

Prevents two trains in the blocksection simultaneously

Prevents two trains in the blocksection simultaneously

Prevents two trains in the blocksection simultaneously

Enforces protection of train in station limits (prevents two trainsbeyond the home signal)

Prevents two trains between onepair of signals

Control Purpose Safeguard

a) One train, one pullb) One Line Clear, one pull

Berth track or treadle proving

Interlinking, NC, HNC, lever normal

Rotation or sequential locking

Table 1 – Typical Controls

75

surrounding its use have led to the evolution of subtly different Space Interval systems amongst theworld’s railways. Examples are as follows:

• Track Circuit Block – the line is divided into sections each protected by an individual signalcontrolled by track circuits

• Automatic Block – the line is divided into definedblocks governed by automatic signals con-trolled by track circuits

• Absolute Permissive Block (APB) – a variationon automatic block that uses permissive signalsfor following moves but absolute signals foropposing moves

• Direct Traffic Control (DTC) – a method of dispatching trains by radio that uses fixedblocks for movement authority

• Electric Token Block (ET) – electrically linkedmachines at the ends of the section hold magazines of tokens. Only one token can be outof its machine at any one time. Possession ofthe token gives authority to enter the section.Variations exist with a staff or a tablet in place ofthe token

• Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) – a vari-ation of key token working. “Virtual tokens” aretransmitted by radio between a central elec-tronic interlocking and electronic display unitson board trains

TRAIN ORDER WORKING

Other methods of working such as “train order”and “track warrant control” are not fixed block systems in the true sense. Although space interval innature, they allow storage or preselection in the“order” rather than proof of space clear whenissued. They could, therefore, sit under the title ofvariable space interval. Using radio nowadays theygive limit of movement and other instructions, notnecessarily based on defined blocks, but on a specific location or milepost. The instructions coveractions required of the train crew, such as operationof local points or the need to wait for an opposingtrain, whilst it is also possible to allow maintenancecrews to work behind a train or to follow it closelyalong the line. Such “orders” can, therefore, potentially be numerous in their content given thegeography of a stretch of railway and the need tocater for different situations every day. Strict language and protocol (eg phonetic alphabet andrepetition of messages for confirmation) are essential for safety, as is reliance on train crews tooperate and monitor wayside equipment.

A typical “order” or “warrant” might be:

“Train Order No.15 of 12.01.05. Train D187,locomotive 3976 at Pelistry, depart Pelistry, travel

to track 1 at Newford taking track 2 at TelegraphHill to await meet with train H215, locomotive3924.”

This is illustrated in Figure 1.

This order gives permission for the train to leavePelistry and travel all the way to Newford, instructingthe crew which track to take there, but demands thatthey wait on the way at Telegraph Hill on track 2 fora train travelling in the opposite direction to pass.Clearly train H215 must possess an order which“interlocks” to ensure that it passes D187 atTelegraph Hill taking track 1. The rest of the ordercontent may be quite different in terms of startingand destination points and meetings with othertrains.

Computer assistance is often provided today tocheck the validity of these systems, and to ensurethat the orders comply with operating rules and language. In many cases data transmission and display to and from the locomotive enhances safety.

TRACK CIRCUIT BLOCKThe concept of distributed interlocked areas or

station limits interspersed with plain line block sections is perpetuated into modern power signalling, although many of the interlockings areremotely controlled from a central signal box.Latterly it has evolved to embrace a central inter-locking handling a number of outlying interlockedareas and, in certain cases, the intervening blocksections as well.

In some cases there are no intermediate signals atall between interlocked areas. At the other extremethe weight of traffic demands continuous signallingsuch that, to a driver, there is no apparent differencebetween block section and station limits. Indeed thisdistinction no longer exists on lines continuously signalled with colour light signals, although facilitiesmust still be provided for shunting, joining and splitting movements.

Such lines operate under track circuit block (TCB)regulations. These are founded on absolute block inthat only one train is allowed between signals (within a signal section), and that before the train isallowed to proceed the line must be clear, togetherwith a safety overlap beyond the next signal (akin tothe clearing point). This is achieved by proving thatthe relevant track circuits are unoccupied. TCB hasbeen applied to both multiple and single-track lines.It can allow for bi-directional working and canencompass permissive working where necessary.

Between interlocked areas particularly, TCB hasassumed the characteristics of pre-Abbots Riptonsignalling by returning to the “line open” philosophywhereby signals remain at clear except when

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

Figure 1 – Philosophy of Train Order

protecting a train. Regardless of the number of possible aspects, an automatic signal or a controlledsignal set to automatic working gives a binary,stop/proceed indication for the section it controls,exhibiting the proceed aspect normally. In effectsuch a signal gives a movement authority which iscontinuous, but only visible to the driver as heapproaches the signal. It switches to proceed assoon as the section becomes clear, regardless ofwhether a train is approaching which requires entryto the section.

Continuity of checking, by virtue of control via thetrack circuits, coupled with a fail-safe design thatensures reversion, probably means that the “lineopen” concept is acceptable. Unlike the signals ofthe Abbots Ripton era, a modern colour-light cannotstick at green – can it?

Table 2 provides a comparison of the operationalattributes of TCB versus those of manual and transmission block.

TRAIN DETECTIONThe whereabouts of trains in and around an

interlocking area was initially established on a purely visual basis. Complete reliance was placedupon the signalman to maintain separation and tohold routes. In one of its roles the block instrumenttracked the presence of a train between signalboxes in the section, while the tail lamp – again visual – gave proof of train completeness, as well asacting as a stop signal at the rear of the train. Whena signalman was not in a position to see the taillamp, alternatives such as staff-operated plungersor loop side telephones were provided. In moderntimes tail lamp cameras connected to CCTV monitors in the signal box have even been used.Similarly track circuits and even axle countersextending the full length of the block section havebeen used to prove the section clear in lieu of visualconfirmation, thereby using TCB elements toachieve absolute block results. Train detection androute holding by human observation continue to anextent today at many manually signalled sites.

The track circuit first came into use as a reminderappliance, an adjunct to the signalman’s eyes and

memory. It was used to remind a signalman that hehad a train waiting at his section signal or that onehad arrived at his home signal. It was a substitute forRule 55 (Module S4 of today’s Rule Book), whichrequired the fireman to go to the signal box. Its rolein these individual situations was then extended, toadd new locking functionality such as:

• releasing the signal reading over the track circuit;

• providing sequential operation of block instru-ments and section signals;

• enforcing controls such as “approach release ifno line clear” (compulsory Rule 39a which todayis Module TS1 Section 4.7.1).

Later the role of the track circuit was extended intothe realms of route holding and clearance proving,substituting for mechanical lifting bars. Ultimatelycontinuous track circuiting led to the introduction ofTCB and its equivalents. Many of the safeguardseventually established with absolute block workingwere embedded into TCB, but some were not. Forexample, automatic replacement of a signal to danger by movement of the train removes the needfor the rotational feature between successive signals. This is replaced by a disengaging functionfor each signal which ensures the controls are normalised before being allowed to call the signalagain. There is, however, no protection in the aspectcontrol against loss of train shunt, although tracksequencing exists on some systems and alarms maybe generated by others.

The track circuit could be said to be of fail-safeconstruction since it relies upon continuity of energisation to register that no train is present.However, whilst a failure in continuity will manifestitself as a phantom train, an actual train must adviseits presence by shunting current away from thereceiver through its wheels. The improved suspen-sion, disc brakes and lighter weights of modernvehicles conspire with contamination on the rail toundermine the ability to divert the track circuit current away from the receiver. In addition, there isthe possibility of interference from modern tractiondrives causing false operation of the receiver, either

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION76

Table 2 – Comparison of Block Philosophies

Request and accept process co-operative between two signalmen

Automatic

Line normally open

Separate equipment to correlateclass and routeing

Train completeness inferred fromtrack vacancy. Train need neverbe viewed

Train position trackedcontinuously and consistently;sectionalised

Automatic

Line normally closed?

Separate equipment to correlateclass and routeing (but could bein train message)

Train completeness inferred fromtrack vacancy, or monitored onboard. Train need never be viewed

Train position trackedcontinuously; high degree ofdefinition(?)

Manual Block (eg absolute, token) Train Circuit Block Transmission Block

Line normally closed

Inherent exchange of train classand routeing

Train completeness checked byviewing tail lamp. Coincidentally,viewing checks safety (doors,load, fire, axles)

Train position tracked by instrument and human observation; sectionalised

77

“false clear” or “false occupancy”.

Axle counters have been used as an alternative totrack circuits. They were first used where track circuits were uneconomic, or were unreliable due toenvironmental considerations. A long single-linesection between interlockings could suit the economics of an axle counter rather than multipletrack circuits. The wet environment of a tunnel or asea wall location, or the steel construction of abridge, might be better served by axle counters fortrain detection. As a result a railway operated underTCB may have some of its blocks controlled withaxle counters rather than exclusively by track circuits. Developments in axle counter technologyhave narrowed the economic benefits in comparisonwith track circuits to the extent that continuous traindetection can now be achieved by axle countersalone, even through switches and crossings.

Debate continues today on the relative merits ofaxle counters and track circuits. Some comparisonsare recorded in Table 3. The advantages or otherwise of each depend on many factors but thedifferences, and therefore the implications of usingthem for TCB working, have yet to be adequatelyunderstood. As far as the rule book is concerned, nodistinction is made between the technologies, andyet they function in quite different ways and havevery different operating and failure modes.Economic and safety comparisons should not belimited to analysis of failure modes but should coverassociated costs, maintenance needs, reliability anda host of other factors.

To continue with the term TCB is, therefore, to prolong the use of a misnomer. Perhaps we shouldfind a new name such as “fixed block” or “contin-uous block” in order to be independent of the technology. We could then choose to append thedetection method to the high level name to result insomething like “fixed block using track circuits”. Onthe subject of misnomers, it may be noted that the

axle counter counts the wheels on one side of thetrain and not its axles.

HOLDING THE ROUTERoute holding is the preservation or locking of the

route ahead of a train once a movement authoritysuch as a proceed signal has been given to it. Theroute is locked to prevent the movement of points,the opening of interlocked level crossings, and anyauthorisation of opposing or conflicting movements.Once the route is locked there must of course be ameans of unlocking it subsequently to allow alternative routes for other trains once the train hastraversed the route or it can be determined that thetrain will not use it. A key issue in design is ensuringthat a transient situation, such as a power blip or afault in the equipment, does not cause the route tobe released erroneously ahead of a train.

Route holding can be split into two major components, the second of which can be furthersubdivided into three parts (see Figure 2). The firstmajor component deals with reserving the route forthe train while it is approaching the route but has notyet entered it. This is known as approach locking.The second holds the route once the train hasentered it, and is known as route locking. On somerailways the holding may extend beyond the end ofthe route into an overlap.

APPROACH LOCKING

For a train running at normal speed along a line,the earliest point at which the driver will know that anew movement authority has been issued is justprior to the point from which braking would have hadto start if it had not been issued (for example,approaching the first caution or distant signal whichapplies to the signal at the limit of the movementauthority). It is at this “point of no return” that theroute must be held for the train if the movementauthority has been given, because the train is nowunlikely to be able to stop before it enters the route.

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

Mode Track Circuit Axle Counter

Able to detect a broken rail Sometimes ✓ No ✗

Able to detect a rail is missing Sometimes ✓ No ✗

Able to detect a metallic object across the rails Sometimes ✓ No ✗

Able to detect road/rail vehicle joining in mid-section Usually ✓ No ✗

Capable of erroneous reset No ✓ Maybe ✗

TC operating clip and TC operating device effective Yes ✓ No ✗

Automatic detection on start-up or following recovery Yes ✓ No ✗

Prone to damage during track maintenance Yes ✗ Yes ✗

Affected by traction interference Maybe ✗ Maybe ✗

Affected by railhead contamination Yes ✗ No ✓

Affected by sudden changes in weather Sometimes ✗ No ✓

Loss of train in section Sometimes ✗ No ✓

Able to function in poor or saturated ballast conditions No ✗ Yes ✓

Table 3 – Comparison Between Track Circuits and Axle Counters

train is at a stand. This means that the timer has tobe set to a maximum value to cover the worst-casecondition and worst-case train.

Situations can, therefore, arise that cause un-necessary delay. For example, if a train is waiting ina station platform but is unable to depart for somereason, the platform starting signal is placed to danger so that the route may be released to allowother moves to take place. Even though the train isat a stand and the driver and signalman have agreedthe signal will be replaced, the full timing cycle muststill be run before the route is released. This could beovercome by the driver operating a plunger at thesignal to release the approach locking immediately,or by an override control in the signal box. Drivers inthe UK already operate a device in their cab knownas the driver’s reminder appliance (DRA) whenstopped at a red signal. This displays a red light andprevents traction from being applied, but there is nofeedback of it into the signalling system.

ROUTE LOCKING

Within the route itself, holding is performed in anumber of ways. In manual systems mechanical lifting bars were first used to prevent facing pointsbeing released whilst a train was approaching or traversing them. These lifting bars worked in co-operation with the facing point lock (FPL). Wheresuccessive facing points existed in the route, eachFPL was locked by the previous FPL so that each setof points could only be unlocked behind the train. Inrecognition of their risk, and to reduce the need toprovide holding on facing points, their use wasrestricted for many years. Early layouts employedtrailing connections and fixed diamonds betweenlines in preference to facing points. Track circuitswere then substituted for lifting bars, but the successive locking remained. Regulations assistedin route holding by mandating that the signalmanshould not replace the signal to danger until the trainhad passed clear of the facing points thus maintain-ing the mechanical locking. Lifting bars were alsoused within the fouling area of some points to provethat trains had passed clear before the points couldbe moved.

Since no FPL was necessary on trailing points,they generally remained free of route holding andthus it fell to the signalman to hold them in positiononce the signal had been replaced. However, to adda degree of security, the lever controlling the signalbeyond a nearby set of trailing points would, when inthe reverse position, lock the point lever in its currentposition. This is known as rear locking.

In more modern electro-mechanical installations

The purpose of approach locking is to hold theroute on behalf of a train once authority has beengiven for it to enter the route. If movement authorityis withdrawn then the approach locking will preservethe route until such time as either:

(a) the train enters the route, because it was tooclose to stop (eg it passes the signal);

(b) the train comes to a stand before entering theroute (eg it stops at the signal); or

(c) it is determined that the train did not receive themovement authority (eg it will not experience adowngrade in aspect).

The entry of the train into the route is easily determined from the train detection system, andfrom this point route locking will continue to hold theroute. Ensuring that the train has come to a standbefore entering the route is more difficult.

With manual block working in its basic form,approach locking is generally a human activity. Thereare no external controls to prevent the signalmanfrom replacing signals to danger and then alteringthe route or setting up a conflicting route. This having been said, there are places where electricalcontrols have been applied to reduce the risk oferror. So the signalman exercises judgment basedon the position of the train, its speed, its travellingtime, his view from the window and the demands ofrules and regulations.

With TCB working, approach locking is appliedwithin the interlocking equipment when the signal iscleared. Removal or normalisation occurs by passage of the train [case (a) above], by a timing element [case (b)] or, in certain cases, by provingthat no train is approaching [case (c)]. This last isknown as the “comprehensive” form.

In case (b) the timer is set to a period commen-surate with assuming that the train has stopped if ithas seen a downgrade of aspect. This is regardlessof whether a train has accepted the movementauthority – if indeed there is a train approaching atall.

The timer is restrictive and so, where it is useful torelease approach locking if a train has not yetreceived the movement authority, a “comprehen-sive” release can be added. This makes use of alook-back facility to determine whether there is atrain in the approach locking zone. If no train isfound then the approach locking is released imme-diately. If a train is found then timing is invoked asbefore. There is, of course, no interaction betweenthe train and the interlocking to determine that themovement authority has been withdrawn or that the

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION78

Figure 2 – Components of Route Holding

79

greater use of track circuits throughout the layoutenabled a higher degree of dead-locking and evenroute locking, by means of relay circuitry controllingelectric lever locks. Back locking was also employedto protect motor operated points. The term “backlocking” arose from the fact that the signal lever wasonly allowed to return part way in the frame on itsway back to its Normal position unless the train hadbeen proved to have traversed the points.

Relay and processor based interlockings usuallyemploy continuous track circuiting or axle countertrain detection to lock the route and then to releaseit a section at a time behind the train. This is wherethe three sub-elements of route locking may beused, namely back locking, direct locking and sec-tional release route locking.

For a simple layout with no facing points, or wherethere are facing points close to the start of the route,back locking is sufficient, but it will hold the entireroute until the train has passed through it.

Where layouts are more complex and traffic workingdemands it, then it is appropriate to release the routeprogressively behind the train as it moves forward.The locking is therefore applied in sections, startingwith the back locking at the entrance to the routeand progressing sequentially through “directionalroute locks” to the end of the route. These routelocks are reset successively (sectionally released) bythe passage of the train, usually through clearanceof an associated track circuit or axle counter section.Providing there are no opposing routes, or points inthe overlap, these route locks need only extend tothe end of the pointwork in the route. Indeed the lastset of points need only be provided with dead locking by the train detection, as this will havebecome active through the presence of the trainbefore the last route lock is reset.

Where opposing moves are possible or there ispointwork in the overlap that requires to be locked,the route locks must extend to the end of the routeto prevent an opposing movement being authorisedor the points in the overlap being moved. Trailingpoints in the overlap are always route locked.However, there are situations where certain facingpoints remain free, provided alternative overlapsremain available, until a forward route is set or(depending on their proximity to the end of the route)until the train is approaching closely.

Once the train has come to a stand at the end ofthe route, the points in the overlap can be released.If an opposing move on to the stationary train is permitted, it can now be authorised. Resetting thisfinal route lock therefore takes place once the trainhas occupied the final track section for a prescribedperiod of time. This is based on an assumption thatthe train must now be at a stand rather than receiptof any positive indication to that effect.

Whereas the back locking element normally seeksto prove sequential movement of the train before itreleases, the subsequent route locking and deadlocking are released by single actions upon eachassociated track section becoming vacant. Hencethere is the possibility of the route holding beingreleased inadvertently if the train detection system

fails to register the presence of the train contin-uously. A degree of protection against transient lossis provided by applying a short time delay.

If no movement authority has been issued orrequested, route locking will not be invoked. This isa key consideration during degraded working whentrains are being hand signalled or authorised to passsignals at danger. Similarly a runaway train, or anunsignalled movement within a possession, has noroute locking protection.

When equipment is disconnected or malfunctionswe resort to a fall-back process, taking advantagewhere possible of lower level functionality thatremains operational. For example, points may bealigned individually by the relevant keys being heldin position and covered with a reminder device toprotect the route during the movement of the train.The signalman is assisted by reference to a route listwhich documents the required position of the points,including those providing flank protection. If there ismore than one signalman on duty a second operatorwill check the actions of the first to give a degree ofdiversity.

Where points do not respond to remote control ordetection is not received, the route holding has to beprovided on the ground by application of clip andscotch once local alignment has been undertaken.

It is interesting to compare the relative attributes ofroute holding between types of signalling to recallthe differences between them. Table 4 provides thishigh level comparison.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION-BASED SIGNALLING

In future the opportunity will exist to applyapproach locking in a superior manner. With transmission-based signalling such as ETCS Levels2 and 3 movement authority is sent directly to thetrain, and the train can update the radio block centre (RBC) to confirm its response to removal of itsmovement authority. Where a train has its movementauthority shortened or removed, the RBC can checkthat it can still control it within the revised authority.If it can, the approach locking can then be releasedimmediately.

This feature is significant when deciding the frequency at which movement authorities are issued,and whether the end of a route and the limit ofmovement authority coincide. It is perhaps time toreflect on the meaning and future relevance of theterms “route” and “route setting,” and perhaps torevert to earlier understanding. The term “route set-ting”, as we use it today, originates from the earlypower signalled installations. It became widespreadfollowing the introduction of relay interlockings.These received their commands from route-settingpanels which embodied the complete process ofaligning the route and issuing a movement authorityin a combined action. Prior to this, the setting up ofa route was independent of the subsequent action ofissuing a movement authority. Perpetuating the definition of a “route” restricts the ability to issuemovement authorities for a prescribed distance or toa prescribed location that does not coincide with the

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

beginning or end of a route, and it implies that thegreater the number of contiguous routes that are set,the longer the movement authority will be.

Assuming a movement authority cannot be givento a destination beyond the rear of a preceding train,there are two possible methods by which movementauthorities could be issued.

With the line clear ahead, the first method wouldsee only sufficient authority to enable the train to runfor a short defined distance, the actual distancedepending upon the train’s speed (see Figure 3). Theauthority would be replaced (that is, extended) athigh frequency, thereby using much bandwidth butavoiding the need to shorten an authority in theevent of changes in priority ahead. Revocation of anauthority would only be necessary in the event of anemergency, whilst loss of communication could betaken by the train as a command to stop. Such stop-ping would be invoked so that the limit of movement is not exceeded. The higher the fre-quency at which authorities are issued, the closerthe convergence between supervision and revo-cation, until revocation would become unnecessaryif authorities could be issued continuously. Thismethod would be a prerequisite for moving blockwhere trains can be spaced a minimum distanceapart based upon their speeds.

The requirements for route holding would be similar to those for intermittently spaced signals,receipt of each new authority being similar to thesighting of successive green signals (but possiblymore frequent). Where movement authorities can beissued into a route to the rear of a preceding train

already occupying that route, then holding mustcontinue to be exercised despite any forward move-ment of the preceding train.

The second method would see authority grantedfor greater distance and hence time, perhaps to thefirst obstruction, conflict or preceding train howeverfar away they are (see Figure 4). In this case thelength of the route(s) to be locked or held becomesmuch greater. The approach locking of each portionextends back further, to the present position of thetrain, and it has to remain effective until the criteriafor releasing it are met. The likelihood of having toshorten or revoke authorities becomes greater inpractice. Since the authority has been given directlyto the train and has been accepted on receipt, anyshortening or revocation must be acknowledged bythe train, and the train must also give an undertakingthat it can and will stop in order to release theapproach locking. The relationship between routesetting and movement authority is, therefore, germane to the type, frequency and revocationimplications of movement authorities, and hencebears on the communication needs and the safetyevaluation of the entire system.

Where track-based train detection continues inuse, route holding and releasing remain unchangedapart from the participation of the RBC in the releaseprocess. Where the train determines its own position, route holding changes its nature. Themeans of release is no longer contained wholly within the interlocking, but involves communicationfrom the train to the RBC and onwards to the interlocking.

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION80

Signal

Mechanical

Electric(colour lightor motorsemaphore)

Transmission-based

Reversion

Mechanical detectiongives reciprocal lock-ing at trackside

Electrical detectiongives no reciprocation

No reversion

Movement authority iswithdrawn

Position of traindetermineseffectiveness

Movement authority iswithdrawnDoes not rely onposition of train, butposition determineseffectiveness

Degree of guaranteetrain will react?

Train Detection

Line clear checkedonly at time of issue ofmovement authority

Line clear checkedcontinuously*

Some flank protection

Loss of train shunt cancause false clear

Line clear checkedcontinuously*

Points and FPLs

Detection of facingpoints in routechecked only at timeof issue of movementauthority

Detection of facingand trailing points inroute checkedcontinuously*

Some flank protection

Detection of facingand trailing points inroute checkedcontinuously*

Some flank protection

MovementAuthority

Transmittedcontinuously;seenintermittently

Transmittedcontinuously;seenintermittently

Transmittedintermittently;seencontinuously

* Processor-based check on a continuous cyclic basis; introduces reliability issue

Table 4 – Comparison of Route Proving Attributes

81BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

Figure 4 – Long Distance Issue of Movement Authority

Figure 3 – Minimal Distance Issue of Movement Authority

LOOKING FORWARDPrevious and current signalling systems have

evolved over time. To overcome their failings wehave bolted on protection and assistance, and theyhave added complexity.

To overcome the signalman's human failings weadded interlinking, sequential locking and line clearrelease. Latterly for the driver we have added TPWSand TPWS+ to enforce limit of movement authority.To overcome electrical shortcomings of train detection we have added the track circuit actuator(TCA) on the train, and then the track circuit actuatorinterference device (TCAID) at the trackside. Toaccommodate the differences between track circuitsand axle counters we have now added telephonesand a new radio system.

A penalty we pay for adding complexity is a reduction in reliability.

We must tackle the differences between track circuits and axle counters. We must understand fullythe implications of transferring the movementauthority on to the train. We must understand howself position reporting by trains will function. Wemust also research new ways of detecting the presence of trains that do not rely upon countingwheels or passing electrical current through the rails.

Centralisation of control has hampered our abilityto deal with failure situations. A minor points failurewhere the FPL would not engage or the detectionwould not make could once have been dealt with bythe signalman or station staff applying somelocalised remedy – such as a size ten boot.Nowadays we provide “rapid response” to such incidents through field managers or mobile opera-tions managers, but they have many miles of railwayto cover. We now rarely provide any means of overriding failed safety devices.

A track circuit failure holding a set of points couldonce have been circumvented by the use of a sealedemergency release. In our route holding controls, afailed track circuit will prevent release of the holdingbeyond the failure. Thus a moving train which leavesa track section occupied behind it will continue tolock the remainder of the route until the fault is rectified. Some railways provide an override allowingthe route holding to be released in such a situation,thereby improving availability. More widespreadadoption of such facilities should be encouraged.

In determining future signalling systems we mustembed the fundamental requirements so that we donot need to add complexity. The next generation ofsignalling should incorporate the functionality fortrain position reporting, train integrity, route holding,route releasing and adherence to movement authority as a complete system.

TIMELINE1837 Five-needle telegraph, Cooke & Wheatstone,

Euston to Camden

1839 Telegraph, Paddington to West Drayton

1840 Telegraph first used to govern train move-ments, London & Blackwall Railway

1841 Telegraph first used to protect trains through

tunnels, Clayton Tunnel, Brighton Railway

1842 Single-needle telegraph, Cooke &Wheatstone. Morse-type code

1845 Bell-code system used by Bristol &Gloucester Railway at Wickwar Tunnel

1847 Use of telegraph for signalling trains throughBox Tunnel

1852 Two-position block instrument first used

1854 Three-position block instrument first used onLondon & North Western Railway, Clarkdesign

1861 Clayton Tunnel disaster, first where block sig-nalling is in use

1864 Two-position Walker block instrument usedextensively on South Eastern Railway

1868 Facing point lifting bar, Livesey & Edwards,widely used

1869 Spagnoletti induced needle introduced

1875 Sykes Lock & Block patented

1876 Abbots Ripton disaster, Great NorthernRailway. Snow causes signal to stick at Clearin “Open” block working

1876 Collision at Arlesley, Great Northern Railway.Led to adoption of clearing point beyondhome signal

1876 Alexander Graham Bell invents the telephone

1876 W Robinson of Brooklyn, New York patentsthe track circuit

1878 First railway telephone – Derby, MidlandRailway

1880 Single line staff instrument devised by Webb& Thompson

1889 Armagh disaster – Time interval working

1889 Regulation of Railways Act enforcing ‘Lock,Block & Brake’

1892 Board of Trade requires all signals weightedto ‘fail-safe’

1893 King’s Cross, Great Northern Railway – Firstuse of track circuits to control signals andprotect trains automatically

1895 Railway Clearing House ‘agreed’ telegraphbell codes prescribed. However, many variations continue in use

1903 AC track circuits introduced on DistrictRailway enabling rails to carry both tractionreturn and track circuit current

1910 Hawes Junction accident, Midland Railway.Light engines waiting at section signal forgotten by signalman. Leads to greater useof track circuits

1910 Midland Rotary Block first introduced

1915 Quintinshill disaster, Caledonian Railway.Shunted train forgotten by signalman

1934 Winwick Junction accident, London, Midland& Scottish Railway. Train at home signal forgotten by signalman

1935 King’s Langley accident, London, Midland &Scottish Railway. Two trains in section

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION82

83

C H Porter (Lloyd’s Register Rail) congratulatedthe speaker on a comprehensive paper and askedthe speaker’s views on why the use of train orderswas never perpetuated in the UK.

J Francis replied that he was unsure why butnoted that the UK had generally adopted the blockworking option.

D Hotchkiss (RSSB) questioned how the positionof MAGLEV vehicles was achieved, wondered ifroute holding should be called “maintained locking”and finally questioned why, with community lines inprospect, the Cambrian line had been chosen for theERTMS Trial Site.

J Francis guessed that some form of positiondetector located MAGLEV vehicles. He agreed thatlocking was applied and then maintained for thetrain movement but thought it was probably socalled because of the association with the route setting method.

J Corrie (President) commented that for MAGLEVvehicles, fouling bars would have to rise a lot higherthan normally but all other signalling rules applied!

S Clarke (Lloyd’s Register Rail) observed thatroute locking was often only provided, certainly onthe Western Region, for indication purposes on thesignalman’s control panel and led to the contra-diction of apparently releasing one half of a set ofcrossovers when route lights extinguished.

J Francis agreed that the practice of route setting,together with the provision of white route lights forthe signalman and the logic provided for this purpose, depends on what the observer under-stands by the extinguishing of route lights over a setof points, however, it is then easier to apply as a

principle and standardises circuitry.

E Goddard (LUL) stated that he believed in theKISS principle: keep it as sequentially stupid as youpossibly can. He wondered if we should have a competition for the most complex layout and thesequence most likely to confuse signalmen! He alsonoted that the speaker had rushed over the subjectof axle counters and finally questioned what happens with sequential systems when somethingeither goes wrong or starts in the middle, especiallywith transmission-based signalling.

J Francis argued that we have to signal historical,complex layouts that lead to the numerous permu-tations; new layouts don't tend to get built that way!He had no preference for either track circuits or axlecounters but did agree that there are problems whensequential systems either get out of sequence or arestarted up.

Q Macdonald (Atkins Rail) clarified the reasons forselection of the Cambrian line for the ERTMS trials:there is no conflict with existing signalling, only alimited number of trains require fitment and there arelong periods of no train service to access and experiment with the equipment. He also believedthat in future routes would be set between logicalplaces with space allocation separately allocatedwithin the valid route and direction of travel.

A Howker (Past President) concurred that absolutepermissive systems work well with train orders, andthe Cambrian would meet the criteria for its use butwas unaware of why they weren't more widely used.

P Humphries (Lloyd’s Register Rail) put forwardthe view that route setting and movement authoritiesin ERTMS were not contiguous but were analogous

Discussion

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION

1935 Welwyn Garden City accident, London &North Eastern Railway. Two trains in section.Leads to design of block control known as“Welwyn Control”

1937 Castlecary accident, distant signal stuck atclear

1947 South Croydon, Southern Railway. Sykes’Lock and Block. Signalman forgot train anderroneously operated release key

1955 Barnes, British Railways (Southern Region).Sykes’ Lock and Block. Signalman forgottrain and erroneously operated release key

1967 First application of axle counters in UK atGlasgow Queen Street

1976 Worcester Tunnel Junction collision duringTime Interval Working

REFERENCESRequirements for Passenger Lines and

Recommendations for Goods Lines of the Minister ofTransport in Regard to Railway Construction andOperation. HM Government 1950.

The History and Development of RailwaySignalling in the British Isles. Volume 1, BroadSurvey (Stanley Hall).

The History and Development of RailwaySignalling in the British Isles. Volume 2, TheTelegraph and the Absolute Block, Single LineOperation (David Stirling).

Signalling Philosophy Review. IRSE.

Manual Block. Paper to IRSE in 1946 by B FWagenrieder.

IRSE Green Booklets Nos. 16 and 20.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would like to thank Westinghouse Rail Systems

for allowing me to produce this paper and expressthanks to colleagues who assisted in its preparation.

to setting a route onto a reversible line; the route isset right through from the entrance to the far end butseparate movement authorities can be given withinthe route.

J Francis agreed that there were similarities, theroute is established for the direction of travel but nomovement authority is given all the way through;each individual movement authority could bedeemed to be a sub-route.

A Simmons (Network Rail) advised that theVictoria and Central lines all work on this principle asdoes the ATP system.

J Francis commented that what starts on Metro’scomes to the main lines later!

J Corrie (President) also noted that on LUL thelocking starts at the far end of the route and worksback towards the train.

D Stirling (Reading University) queried the point ofan overlap if the overlap locking extended beyond it.

J Francis explained that the reason is to preventconverging or opposing movements, stoppinganother train ingressing into the protected area.

C H Porter (Lloyd’s Register Rail) referred to theCarmuirs layout illustrated in the presentation andwondered how we fit modern train control systemsin areas such as this and still retain operational flexibility.

J Francis could only suggest that all will berevealed when it comes to actually commissioningthe new technology!

Q Macdonald (Atkins Rail) reinforced the fact thatlocking of route and space allocation do need to bedifferent things and also said that he didn’t believethat it would be difficult to re-signal Carmuirs withmodern technology.

A Howker (Past President) again reiterated thatoriginally interlocking was separated from train separation and this must also apply to movementauthorities otherwise there would be more problemsin combining them in the future.

J Francis agreed that the signalman’s life had beenmade easy by route setting panels where everythingis done for him. The interlockings that have beencreated are a hybrid of all of these features and havecomplicated the issue but he believed that move-ment authorities, train detection, locking and holdingof routes must be kept separate. Although they obviously do interact with one another, they are separate entities.

C Harrison (Lloyd’s Register Rail) pointed out thatthere was nothing new in applying auto workingwhere route locking is maintained through severalsections but with separate movement authoritiesfrom signal to signal.

J Francis agreed stating that this situation waseffectively a primed route; route holding left in placewith movement authorities given automatically. Theroute is locked and fixed movement authorities aregiven but with individual routes and an authority intopart of a route or extend through the route behind amoving train.

D Hotchkiss (RSSB) reminded the audience thatthe concept of locking and selection levels wasfound in various types of geographical interlockingsthat meet these criteria.

J Francis agreed that locking could be left in placewith selection being either a one-shot or re-strokefeature.

J Corrie (IRSE President) thanked J Francis for hissplendid paper and contribution made by all thosewho took part in the subsequent discussion.

BLOCK WORKING, ROUTE HOLDING AND TRAIN DETECTION84

85

Interlocking DevelopmentsIan Shannon BSc(Hons) CEng MIEE1 and Roger Short CEng MIRSE MIEE1

1 The authors are with Atkins Rail UK

ABSTRACTInterlockings are not quite as old as signalling, but

they have long been almost inseparable from railwaysignals. This paper considers interlockings on anumber of levels: the functions performed by theinterlocking in the control of train movements; thetechnology of building a “high integrity engine” toprovide these functions; and the means by which therequired signalling functions are programmed intothe interlocking.

INTRODUCTION“The past is a foreign country: they do things

differently there,” is one of the best-known openingsentences in English literature. In railways the past isnot so much a foreign country as a provincial districtwhere the visitor can go to see things being donedifferently. Almost all of the types of interlockingdescribed in this paper can be found activelyemployed on a railway somewhere, even thoughtheir concept, and in some cases their actual manufacture, may date back 50 or even 100 yearsinto the past.

In this paper we concentrate mainly on pro-grammable electronic interlockings which, whetherthey are called solid state, processor-based or computer-based, can be considered the norm formodern signalling applications.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The development of interlockings has been driven,not only by increasing traffic density, but also bytechnological innovation. Although this section ofthe paper separates out interlockings into five distinct types, it is not appropriate to view the

development of railway interlockings as occurring indistinct phases. Innovations were being made continuously and many of these have not survived.In a sense, any such endeavour resembles naturalevolution and selection: if a system was too expensive to build or too hard to maintain then it disappeared.

When railways were in their infancy, not only werethere not many trains or routes but train speeds werelow and therefore routes were driven by line of sight.As the complexity of the railway system increasedand junctions were utilised policemen were stationed at them to direct traffic. Semaphore signals became a mechanical replacement for thepolicemen and signalling was born.

In the beginning, signals and points were oper-ated manually and at their actual locations. To easethe signaller’s job, and using rods and wires, thecontrol was located at a single point, normally in araised cabin for better view. Signals were operatedby stirrups and returned to “at danger” under gravity. In 1843, Charles Hutton Gregory arrangedthe stirrups at the Bricklayer’s Arms Junction[1] sothat conflicting signals could not be given. This ispossibly the first example of interlocking, althoughas yet there was no interlocking between signals andpoints.

Thirteen years later, in 1856, John Saxby incorp-orated levers operating interlocked points and signals in a single row and true interlocking wasborn. In 1859, the inspecting officer refused toapprove the arrangements for Willesden Junctionuntil interlocking between points and signals wasprovided[2]. Parliament was not far behind in makinginterlocking a statutory requirement, and theRegulation of Railways Act of 1889 required,amongst other things:

Technical Meeting of the Institutionheld at

The Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Wednesday 16th February 2005

The President, Mr J D Corrie, in the chair.102 members and visitors were in attendance. It was proposed by Mr K Walter, seconded by D McKeown and carried that the

Minutes of the Technical Meeting held on 12th January 2005 be taken as read and they were signed by the President as a correct record.There were no apologies for absence and no new members present for the first time since election to membership.The President then introduced Messrs Shannon and Short, of Atkins Rail UK, and invited them to present their paper entitled

“Interlocking Developments”.In their presentation Messrs Shannon and Short considered interlocking on a number of levels; the functions performed by the

interlocking in the control of train movements; the technology of building a "high integrity engine" to provide these functions; and themeans by which the required signalling functions are programmed into the interlocking.

Following the presentation Messrs J Poré (Alstom), N Rushby (Conation Technologies), D Newing (Lloyd’s Register Rail), A Simmons(Network Rail), T George (retired), R E B Barnard (Alstom), I Harman (Network Rail) and P Halliwell (Network Rail) took part in a livelydiscussion. The presenters dealt with the questions comprehensively and the President then proposed a vote of thanks and presentedthe speakers with the commemorative plaques customarily awarded to authors of the London paper.

The President thanked members for their attendance and their questions.The President made announcements of forthcoming events. He closed the meeting at 1950 by announcing that the next meeting in

London would be the Technical Meeting to be held on the 23rd March 2005 when Messrs Sevestre and Laurin will present a paper on“Signalling for High Speed Lines in France”. Senior Vice-President J Poré will preside at this meeting due to the President undertakinga Presidential visit to the Australasian Section AGM.

INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS86

• adoption of a block system of working on allpassenger lines;

• interlocking of points and signals;

• fitting of all trains carrying passengers withsome form of automatic continuous brake.

Interlocking history can be divided into five over-lapping phases under the following headings:

• mechanical;

• electro-mechanical (electric power used tooperate mechanical interlocking);

• relay;

• electronic;

• programmable electronic.

Mechanical Interlocking

A wide range of mechanical interlocking deviceswere invented during the second half of the 19thcentury. The tappet interlocking invented by Stevens& Sons in 1870[1] became very popular. This inter-locking consisted of two perpendicular sets of metalbars. Tappets were riveted to one set of the bars(tappet blocks) and the bars in the other set (lockingbars) had notches cut into them. The tappets couldlodge into the notches. Moving a lever associatedwith signals or points would result in the locking barsmoving to one of two stable positions; normal orreversed. The tappet blocks would move in thedirection perpendicular to that of the locking bars.

In the example shown in Figure 1 the DistantSignal is called S1 and the Home Signal is called S2.

It is possible that this is how the word “interlock-ing” came to be used in the railway industry.

Electro-mechanical Interlocking

The introduction of air brakes in 1869 by GeorgeWestinghouse generated interest in the use of compressed air for actuating signals and points. Thefirst interlocking system using a steam driven aircompressor was used to control seven signals andfour points in 1876 at the Centennial Exposition inPhiladelphia[3]. The response time depended on the

distance. Points at 400 feet were operated in sevenseconds, whilst it took 45 seconds to set a signal at1,000 feet. Gradually, mechanical frames werereplaced by various types of power interlocking such as hydro-pneumatic and electro-pneumatic systems. The use of hydraulic actuation systems(which especially took hold in France) and the intro-duction of electricity essentially removed the delaysassociated with the use of compressed air.

This second generation of interlocking still usedthe old mechanical frames but relied on electricpower to operate points and signals. Now, leverframes were replaced by miniature levers. The firstfully electric interlocking system was installed in theUnited States in 1890 in East Norwood, Ohio. Allpoints and signals were operated electrically ratherthan by fluid pressure or compressed air.

Although the introduction of power did not changethe basic interlocking technology, there were twoimportant and distinct changes:

• The signaller could control a much wider area.This brought in the era of centralised control.

• More complex interlocking operations weremade possible. For example, in the 1900s routesetting systems were introduced in France. Theeffort required to reverse a route lever to set allpoints and signals for that route and lock allconflicting routes mechanically was beyond thesignaller’s strength.

Thus power interlocking systems showed morecomplexity and sophistication than the old manualsystems.

Relay Interlocking

In 1872 track circuits were invented by WilliamRobinson in the United States. An interesting articlein Scientific American[4] describes this “mostadvanced type of mechanical appliance for railroadsafety.” The track circuit was used to replace the signaller whose job was to manipulate a single signal. The system used compressed air (piped to

Figure 1 – A representation of the Stevens & Sons tappet interlocking

87INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

the signals) and batteries. It was, in a rudimentaryway, the first relay interlocking system. It was alsofully automatic.

From early days relays were being used in railwaysignalling in combination with mechanical interlock-ing. Robinson’s track circuit used a relay. Initially,track circuits were used in places where trains werelikely to stand for long periods and be forgotten. Anindicator in the signal box would ensure that the signaller would not forget the existence of a train.Relays also brought in the possibility of automation.Thus in the 1900s automatic interlockings wereintroduced for crossovers in the United States andbegan to replace mechanical devices where a signalman was not needed [3]. In the next decade all-relay interlocking systems using stick relays andslow release relays were used to automate trainmovements on a bi-directional single track (AbsolutePermissive Automatic Block System) [3].

Relay interlocking, the ability to incorporate inputsfrom track circuits, and the introduction of colouredlight signals introduced the modern age of signallingand interlocking.

Clearly it is much easier to design, build and modify relay-based interlocking systems than corre-sponding mechanical systems. The intention is toensure that a set of rules are obeyed, and it is easier to implement these rules using relay circuitsthan locking bars. In addition, relays are also cheaper to manufacture and modify. The introduc-tion of different types of relays (eg slow release andlatching relays) allowed more complex designs to beimplemented. Such systems could not have beenrealistically implemented using mechanical inter-lockings. The introduction of relays allowed checkssuch as lamp proving. Indeed manufacturers produced modules of plug-in relays for specific purposes such as lamp proving.

Relay-based systems can form part of sophisti-cated train control systems. A large proportion of theTransmission Voie-Machine (TVM) systems on theFrench high-speed network and in the ChannelTunnel use a hybrid system whose safety core uses“fail-safe” relay interlocking. However, the system isbuilt so that the interlocking logic is not continuallychallenged by potentially unsafe commands issuedfrom higher levels in the system architecture. Thestate of the railway is also maintained in software,and commands are validated in software beforebeing processed further. The newer lines, includingthe route of the TGV Mediterranée and the ChannelTunnel Rail Link in the UK, use a version of the TVMsystem based on the SEI processor based interlock-ing.

The Delhi Main Station appears in the GuinnessBook of World Records as having the world’s largestroute relay interlocking system, with 11,000 relaysallowing up to 1,122 signalled movements, installedby Northern Indian Railways [5].

Electronic Interlocking

In the 1960s there was some interest in develop-ing fail-safe electronic logic gates based on ferritecores as an alternative to relays for signalling applications. In the UK two interlockings based on

this technology were brought into service, onedeveloped by Mullard on the BR Western Region atHenley-on-Thames[6] and one developed byWestinghouse on the London Midland Region atNorton Bridge. These were technically successfulbut there were no further applications, presumablybecause they did not offer sufficient economic orperformance advantages over relay interlockings.

There were many developments of fail-safe electronic circuits for signalling applicationsthroughout the 1960s and 1970s. However, anyprospect of interlockings constructed from electronic logic circuits was swept away by theavailability of microprocessors, although many of thecircuit techniques developed over these years foundapplications in the interface circuitry of the new programmable interlockings.

Programmable Electronic Interlocking

The availability in the 1970s of electronic pro-cessors sufficiently compact and robust to be usedin industrial systems triggered an upsurge of interestin developing interlocking systems based on thenew technology. The first such interlocking to bebrought into service was the Ericsson JZS 750 atGothenburg in Sweden in 1978[7].

The first programmable electronic interlocking tobe commissioned in the UK was the SSI installationat Leamington Spa in 1985, developed jointly by BRResearch, GEC and Westinghouse. Since then manyother systems have been developed including:

• Adtranz (Bombardier) Ebilock;

• Alcatel Elektra;

• Ansaldo ACC;

• Siemens SIMIS;

• Westinghouse Westrace.

Some of these are generic systems with two separate programmable components, namely:

• signalling principles, which may change fromone railway (country) to another;

• geographical data, which depend on the layoutof the controlled area.

In others, such as SSI, the geographical data contains all the required information. In essencegeographic data consists of a set of rules that propagates changes derived from an alteration in thestate of monitored equipment or a signaller command.

The generic systems hold out the promise of simpler programming for subsequent applicationsafter the initial investment in programming the signalling principles into the system. However,where signalling principles are not fully compre-hensive and prescriptive, or where there is a need forspecial customised controls to be provided (forexample as a result of an overrun risk assessment),the need for frequent updates to the logic whichencodes the signalling principles can be onerous.

With the introduction of microprocessor-controlledinterlocking, safety validation became even moreimportant.

Mechanical or relay interlockings were composed

88

maintained around any train by preventing proceedsignal aspects being given for movements into thespace occupied by the train or into which it hasauthority to proceed, and that it also ensures thatpoints over which a train is to move are correctlypositioned.

For a given signal control area this function ofinterlocking is performed by a complex assembly ofequipment known as an "interlocking." The way thatinterlocking is embedded in the overall system ofrailway control, and the place of interlocking in thearrangements for controlling train movements, areset out in Daniel Woodland’s paper “Railway ControlPhilosophy”[8], Figure 2 of which shows interlockingapparently squashed flat under the weight of theother systems that it has to support.

Figure 3 shows the interlocking at the heart of amultiple loop system for controlling the railway. Theinterlocking drives all signals, points and other itemsof signalling equipment and monitors the states oftrack circuits or other means of train detection, thepositions of points and the states of signals.

In addition to protecting against collision by preventing the signalling of conflicting movements,the interlocking can also protect against certaintypes of derailment by preventing movements frombeing signalled over points which are not correctlydetected, by ensuring that appropriate signalaspects are displayed to trains that are routed overjunctions, and by contributing to the control of thespeed of trains approaching junctions by not clearing the relevant signal until a predeterminedtime after the train has occupied a track circuit onthe approach.

WHAT DOES THE INTERLOCKING KNOW?

When is it safe for a train to move? The interlocking

of relatively few components. These could be constructed to a very high standard and inspectedregularly to ensure correct working. A micro-processor contains millions of elements which havea superficial resemblance to a locking frame, compare Figures 1 and 2!

The logic of a mechanical or a relay interlocking israther easy to understand. It is easy to recognise“independent” modules and test them fully. This isnot the case for software systems whose “logic” isinordinately more complex. To run the interlockingon a computer would require complex software foroperating system device handlers and other soft-ware components.

THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BYINTERLOCKINGCONTROLLING TRAIN MOVEMENTS

The role of interlocking in a modern signalling system is to ensure that, in the case of manually driven trains, appropriate proceed aspects are displayed by lineside signals, or by other forms ofmovement authority displayed to the driver in thecab, only when it is safe for a train to move in accordance with the aspect displayed. The interlocking also ensures that items of railway infra-structure, principally points, can be moved onlywhen it is safe. A vast wealth of ingenuity and efforthas been invested by the designers of interlockingsystems in satisfying the conditions implied by thephrase “only when it is safe”. For automatically driven trains an equivalent interlocking function isinvolved in ensuring that commands to move aresent to trains only when it is safe.

An alternative description of the function of aninterlocking is that it ensures that a safe space is

Figure 2 – The High Integrity Engine: Microchip or Locking Frame?

INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS 89

can actually determine “when it is safe” only in relation to the information which is available to it,and this generally consists of binary informationrelating to track occupancy, position of points, andwhich signal aspects are alight.

An interlocking also has stored information avail-able as a component of its logical operations.Depending on the technology of the interlocking, thestorage medium may range from electronic memorythrough latched relays to the positions of levers in alocking frame, but storage of information is a featureof all interlockings. Precisely what is stored may varyfrom one type of interlocking to another, and isdetermined by the signalling logic and geographicaldata for the area concerned. In general the inter-locking will store the results of at least some of itslogical operations in order to hold and lock pointsagainst potentially conflicting demands. Fleetinginputs, such as input commands from the signalleror from automatic route setting systems, will alsoneed to be stored. Stored information can be usedto deduce the sequence in which events such astrack circuit occupations occur, or the length of timewhich has elapsed since the occurrence of an event.

With this information available the signal engineercan design the logic of the interlocking so as to prevent the signalling of train movements whichconflict with movements signalled for other trains,the actual position of other trains, or the potentialpositions of other trains in the event of signals beingoverrun.

PROTECTING THINGS OTHER THAN TRAINS

In addition to the logical relations between signals,points and track circuits other functions can be provided by the interlocking. For example, worksites or engineering possession areas can be protected in the same way as trains, in response toinputs from the signaller or by the operation ofswitches at the trackside. Controls may be providedto enable the signalling technicians to isolate itemsof equipment for maintenance purposes. Many ofthese functions rely on the interlocking’s memory tomaintain the relevant protection, and this can causecomplications in some circumstances (see below).

Railways often require the interlocking to includefactors relating to the state of the infrastructure indetermining “when it is safe”. This can be done tothe extent that sensors giving the appropriate inputsto the interlocking are provided, for example wheretrip wires or similar devices are used to detect roadvehicle incursions on to the railway line. It happensthat track circuits have some capacity to detect broken rails, flooding, derailed trains from adjacenttracks and some other types of obstruction. No special logic is required in the interlocking torespond to this. The loss of the clear status of thetrack circuit is sufficient to provide protection as aresult of its effect on the signalling logic relating tothe presence of trains.

INTERLOCKING IS AS INTERLOCKING DOES

A distinction is sometimes made between “pure”interlocking functions, such as the locking of routes

Figure 3 – Closed Loop Control of the Railway

INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS90

and the exclusion of conflicting routes, and functions such as the separation of following trainsand the provision of correct aspect sequences. Thismay well be a meaningful distinction where the different functions are implemented by differentpieces of equipment or, as in the case of absoluteblock, by means of different physical principles(sequences of human actions involving block instru-ments as against mechanical interlocking), but forthe typical programmable, processor-based interlocking all these functions are performed by acoherent set of signalling logic and geographicaldata executed by the same processor. There seemsto be little advantage in making a distinctionbetween these types of signalling function, and inthis paper the pragmatic, instrumentalist view istaken that any signalling function performed by aninterlocking can be regarded as an interlocking function.

With the development of modern train control systems such as ERTMS where an on-board systemgenerates the equivalent of signal aspect infor-mation, and usually more besides, for displays in thecab, there is a movement towards interlockingsreassuming their “pure” classical functions. TypicalERTMS applications are currently envisaged as having an interlocking to provide the control andlocking of routes and points while a separate system, the Radio Block Centre (RBC), controls thetransmission of corresponding movement authorityinformation to the trains. It would be quite feasible inprinciple to include the ERTMS functions within theinterlocking, but it is easy to understand the pragmatic decision of the system designers to avoidthe complexity of an all-purpose interlocking and todevelop a separate RBC system.

Although the substitution of in-cab displays forlineside signals might relieve interlockings of someof the functions that they currently perform, thedevelopment of the signal-less railway might actually increase the demands made on inter-lockings. The absence of lineside signals wouldfacilitate the provision of numerous short sections ofroute to allow trains to close up in station and junction areas, while the replacement of fixed traindetection systems by train position reporting and the introduction of flexible or moving block arrangements for train separation will call for thedevelopment of entirely new concepts in inter-locking.

EQUIPMENT FAULTS

To Revert or Not to Revert?

An important factor in determining “when it issafe” is that all of the relevant signalling equipmentshould be functioning correctly. The signalling logicprogrammed into an interlocking is generallydesigned on the fail-safe principle, so that if any itemof signalling equipment is detected by the interlock-ing to be not operating correctly (eg no detectionobtained from a set of points or no lamp provingreceived from a signal) then the interlocking willadopt a more restrictive state for train movements inorder to ensure safety, eg by not allowing signals toclear for train movements up to the defective signal

or over the defective points.

It is the usual practice with processor-based interlockings to monitor the status of all signallingequipment continuously so that if, for example, atrack circuit in a route goes to the occupied stateafter the signal reading over it has become clear, theinterlocking will replace the signal to danger. Thisapproach to signalling logic design has been called“reversion.” It has been suggested that it is an undesirable feature, as it tends to cause trains to besubjected to an emergency stop followed by adegraded-mode movement (ie the driver beingauthorised to pass a signal at danger) simplybecause of an equipment fault. It is pointed out thatreversion is a largely inevitable feature of the designof relay logic, but hardly exists in mechanical signalling.

With regard to the possibility of designing pro-cessor-based interlocking on a non-reversionarybasis, this may be feasible but its desirability wouldhave to be considered carefully. Where track circuitoperating clips were an established means of providing emergency protection, for example, itwould hardly be acceptable not to respond to a track circuit becoming occupied unexpectedly. Anon-reversionary approach would also tend todiminish any safety benefits obtained from track circuits with regard to detecting broken rails, floods,or other obstructions.

Where axle counters are concerned there may belittle or no safety benefit in replacing a signal to danger if a “section clear” status is lost ahead of atrain, although this could be a symptom of a rogueroad/rail vehicle having intruded on to the track andtravelled over a detection point.

Where loss of points detection is concerned, thebalance of risk between the possibility that thepoints may have moved out of correspondence andthe possibility that there is merely a failure of detection circuitry needs careful calculation on thepart of the logic designer.

It should be considered that the adoption of anon-reversionary approach could complicate thesignalling logic, possibly leading to significant costsand even to increased risk of errors, if it were decided that some factors should cause reversionand others should not, eg if it were decided thattrack circuit occupancy should cause reversionwhilst loss of points detection should not.

THE PROVISION OF A HIGH INTEGRITYENGINEA MULTI-LEVEL MODEL

The engineering of a programmable, processor-based interlocking ranges in its scope from design of customised electronic circuitry for signalling interfaces, through the application of processortechnology, information transmission, data manage-ment software and logic programming, to the designof signalling logic for a specific control area. It is notreally possible to hold all these systems aspects inmind at the same time. It is necessary to be able tounderstand, and to design and develop, someaspects of an interlocking system without having all

the time to consider the detailed effects on others.

The way in which this can be done is illustrated bythe multi-level model in Figure 4. This is looselybased on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)model used in telecommunications. In the interlock-ing model the lower levels are not as strictly transparent to the higher levels as they are in the OSImodel, but the model fulfils the same purpose ofhelping to make a complex system comprehensible.

signalling logic. To a large extent this is actuallyachieved in practice, but there are sometimes features of the lower levels of the interlocking system which require the signalling designer toinclude features in the structure or content of thesignalling logic which are not required by the signalling system itself. Failure to recognise suchconstraints, some examples of which are givenbelow, can have serious consequences for safety.

TWO-DIMENSIONAL TIME

Time is one of the aspects of physical reality whichcauses the specific realisation of the “high integrityengine” to intrude on the pure abstraction of the signalling logic. There are at least two dimensions oftime so far as an interlocking based on a serialprocessor is concerned. One is absolute duration, ordelay. The other is the relative position of events intime.

Interlockings have to react to an environment thatcannot wait. Reactive software systems can beeither event driven/asynchronous, where each reaction is triggered by an input event, or sampling/synchronous based on periodic sampling of inputs.As far as is known to the authors, all processor-based interlocking systems use a sampling ratherthan an event driven mode of operation. It is theperiod of this sampling and the position in time ofthe sampling instant relative to the occurrence ofexternal events that give rise to the two dimensionsof time.

The dimension of delay is significant mainly in relation to the response time of processor-basedinterlockings. For a command from a signaller totake effect, or for an effective response to a changeof state of an item of signalling equipment, eachprocessor involved must execute one or more programme cycles, and there may be a number ofprocessors operating in series in the central inter-locking, communications and trackside interfaceroles. To these processing times must be added thetime required for the transmission of data over serialdata links between processors. These cycle timescombine to give typical overall response times ranging from hundreds of milliseconds up to severalseconds. The response time depends on the designof the interlocking system, and in many cases variessignificantly depending on the complexity of the signalling logic associated with the event con-cerned, and with the number of events to which theinterlocking is reacting at the same time.

Time delays of up to a few seconds are not usually significant for most signalling functions,although they could have an adverse effect on trafficcapacity in a high density railway such as a mass-transit system. The situations where the responsetime of an interlocking might have an adverse effecton safety are primarily those where a rapid responseto an emergency is required, for example where asignaller might need to replace signals to danger toprotect an obstruction on the line or a train whichhas failed to stop at a signal at danger. In such casesthe interlocking response time is but one factor, andoften one of secondary importance, among manywhich contribute to the risk of accident, examples of

91INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

The lowest level of the model represents the physical system: the electronic components, circuitboards, connectors, conductors, optical fibres andso on. The next level represents the safety manage-ment and communications software, sometimesreferred to as firmware, which animates the hardware and provides most of its fail safe or highintegrity behaviour in the face of failure or disturbance.

The next level represents the logic managementsoftware which organises the system’s memory andgenerates responses to inputs from the signaller orfrom lineside equipment by executing or interpretingthe signalling logic and geographical configurationdata contained in the highest level.

In some interlocking systems the top level is subdivided into two sublevels: one being the generic safety logic needed to configure the inter-locking to the signalling principles of the railway network concerned, and the other being the geographical configuration data specific to the areawhich the interlocking controls. In these systems thegeneric logic remains unchanged from one install-ation to the next within a given railway network andonly the geographical data has to be changed foreach specific location. In other systems all of thesignalling logic and geographical data has to berecreated anew for each installation.

The three lower levels can be thought of as constituting a high integrity logic engine which performs the interlocking functions programmedinto it by means of the logic and data in the highestlayer. The techniques which enable this high integrity to be achieved are discussed further in thesection on system architectures below.

Ideally this logic engine would be transparent tothe signalling logic and data in the sense that itwould place no constraints on the design of the

Figure 4 – Multi-level model of interlocking

other factors being the time required to detect andreport an obstruction and the response time of thesignaller. As a consequence, the response times ofinterlocking systems are generally not critical forsafety, although there may be exceptions to this, forexample the provision of a SPAD indicator.

The other dimension of time concerns the relativeposition of events in two time frames: the time frameof the real world and the time frame of the interlock-ing programme cycle. Depending on the time atwhich external events occur in relation to the periodic sampling of inputs and the processor programme cycle, events which are nearly simul-taneous in real time can take effect within differentcycles of the programme, and can even from the“viewpoint” of the processor occur in reverse orderto reality. This can cause the processor to generatean incorrect response, and although in many casesthis may be corrected in the next programme cycle,it could result in a persistent incorrect and possiblyunsafe state.

It is for this reason that some interlocking systemsimpose constraints on the way that designers areallowed to structure the interlocking logic to preventany incorrect operation as a result of the relative timing of events.

MEMORY

Most, if not all, of the information processed in aninterlocking is held in some sort of memory. Inputsfrom lineside equipment, inputs from the signaller,and outputs to lineside equipment are all stored inmemory. When the system is working normally, thecontents of its memory are continually refreshed asinputs are sampled and outputs are recalculated.Problems arise when it is no longer possible to besure of the correct state of items of data in the system memory, after an interruption of power orafter a loss of communication.

For most of the information used by the interlock-ing (states of track circuits, point detection, signallamps, etc), the usual strategy adopted in interlock-ing software is to cause them to default to a restrictive state until positive input information hasbeen received. For example, on power up all memory areas relating to signalling equipment mightbe set to zero, and a zero in a memory location representing a track circuit would be treated by theinterlocking as an occupied track circuit. Similarly, inthe event of loss of external communication memory areas would be set to this default state.

There are, however, some items of memory whichit is important to retain through loss of communi-cation or loss of power. Examples of these are situations where the interlocking stores a control toprevent a route from being set into an engineeringpossession area (a signaller’s reminder) or to disconnect a defective item of equipment. For itemsof this sort it is generally necessary to rely on humanmemory or the signaller’s written records to restorethe controls after a power interruption. The alterna-tive strategy, of using the system memory in such away that all controls of this type will default to arestrictive state following a loss of power, will resultin the signaller having to go through a procedure of

removing all the unwanted controls on power-up,with a distinct probability that a wanted control willinadvertently be removed in the process.

The lockout systems used in some modern inter-lockings store the lockout status using an externallatched relay, in effect an external non-volatile memory which is capable of retaining the currentstatus during power outages. With the application ofcurrently available technology (eg flash EPROMs) itshould be possible to expand this form of applica-tion to other functions (eg signaller’s reminders) witha consequential safety improvement.

The safe management of memory is particularlyimportant in architectures which employ a standbysystem for availability. A cold standby would have togo through a power-up process in effect. A hotstandby requires careful precautions to avoid harm-ful effects as a result of divergence between thestandby system and the system which it is replacing.

The question of reversion mentioned above is, interms of the high-integrity engine, often a questionof whether to set memory to a default state in theevent of interruption of communication. If a simplereversion rule is not followed there may well be aneed for more complex interlocking logic, to causeconditional reversion in some circumstances or toprovide some form of manual override to enable arelease if reversion is not automatic.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTUREINTERLOCKING ARCHITECTURE

Processor-based interlocking systems have beenaround for more than 25 years and the basic concepts have been described in previous IRSEpapers[9] and [10]. Further, modern interlocking and signalling are highly specialised subjects which havebeen virtually closed to other disciplines includingcomputer professionals. The market is also verysmall. One may be able to sell millions of databasesystems across the world, but selling a few hundreddigital interlocking systems would be a small miracle. The combination of these factors impliesthat there have not been many experiments, thatthere is little experience gained and thus there arenot many widely accepted architectural principlesgoverning these systems.

Here we look at some basic features. SSI hasbeen chosen as the basis for comparison and discussion.

HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE

One consideration in selecting the hardware architecture of the system is meeting the reliabilityand availability requirements. Other important considerations are minimising trackside cabling andease of maintenance. Thus there are some simi-larities between various hardware architecturesmissing from their software counterparts.

Redundancy

In SSI three identical Central InterlockingProcessors (CIPs) execute identical software in aTriple Modular Redundant (TMR) or two out of three(2oo3) configuration. When there is a disagreement,the “faulty” sub-system is isolated and the remaining

92 INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

two can continue operating the railway until they arerepaired or there is a further disagreement, at whichtime the system will shut down completely. The sys-tem is connected to Trackside Functional Modules(TFMs) by duplicated, redundant connections. TFMsdrive and monitor signalling equipment. Each TFMhas duplicated processors running a fixed programme in a 2oo2 configuration such that theyhave to agree for normal operation. This is obvious-ly only an outline of the hardware architecture andmore information can be found in the literatureincluding [11].

The choice of a TMR configuration for SSI influenced the development of many other systems.These include Alcatel’s Elektra, Ansaldo’s ACC andSiemens’ SIMIS W, although the latter can also beimplemented in 2oo2 configuration.

The choice of TMR is not however universal.Availability being one of the main requirements of aninterlocking system generally, SIMIS W is ratherexceptional in allowing a 2oo2 implementation [12].

Westrace is the prime example where the inter-locking software is executed on a single processor.Here availability is ensured by using a hot (or cold)standby system. As a design principle Westraceprocessors executing vital software use self checking, inter-processor health monitoring anddiverse software execution paths to counter possible hardware faults which would cause erroneous outputs [13].

Another approach is that of information redundancy based on single-channel systems withsecure coding of data. This is used in the VitalCoded Processor (VCP) developed by ALSTOM,which is composed of a functional unit (the coded monoprocessor) and a checker. If the mono-processor does not execute its programme correctly, due either to a hardware fault or to anexternal disturbance, the output data will not satisfythe coding rules and will be rejected by the checker.This system is used on the Paris Metro and on othermass transit lines in France and elsewhere. A similarprinciple but with digital coding is used in VitalProcessor Interlocking (VPI), developed by GRS inAmerica and used there and in Italy and theNetherlands.

The 2oo3 architecture provides both reliability andavailability. In the context of modern processors, the2oo2 configuration is sufficiently reliable but is notviewed as supporting the required availability. Itshould be noted that random hardware failuresoccur rarely. In general, a computer failure is usuallydue to a shutdown resulting from a software error.Therefore it may be enough to ensure that the repairtime is brief, and to let the single machine control theinterlocking. However, it is much easier and cheaperto provide a different architecture than to ensure abrief Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), use special purpose hardware and get the safety argumentaccepted! Westrace provides reliability by the meansdiscussed earlier. Availability is provided by thestandby system. There is very little to choosebetween these configurations but there is a trendtowards minimisation of hardware components and

ease of maintenance which favours Westrace’sarchitecture.

Distribution

For a system such as SSI or Westrace, the fullinterlocking functionality is executed on a singleprocessor and other processors, which may be situated at the trackside and at some distance fromthe interlocking system, provide equipment inter-faces. Two or more such interlocking systems canbe interfaced to cover a wider area, but each inter-locking can be viewed as a separate system andconfigured separately. In the case of SIMIS W, theCentral Management Computer (CMC) is connectedvia the interlocking bus to a number of area controlcomputers (ACCs) which manage the interlockingfor a specific area of the scheme and each of whichis connected directly to trackside equipment.

Existing systems fall roughly into three categories:

• Centralised processing and I/O. The systemhas no outdoor intelligence, hence can onlymonitor and control relatively short schemes.The main example is Alcatel’s Elektra (an example of a "short and fat" system).

• Centralised processing with distributed I/O.The prime example here is SSI. There arerestrictions on the amount of signalling equip-ment that an SSI can control, the number oflinks and the response time. Each TFM controlsand monitors two signals or points typically. TheTFMs are connected to the SSI data link viaData Link Modules, each of which can serviceup to five TFMs. The data links are duplicatedand each pair can communicate with up to 63TFMs. The data link cycle time is fixed so thatthe response time on a lightly populated datalink is the same as a heavily populated one. Theresponse times are not all that good but this ismainly due to the age of SSI. More modern systems are not so restricted. This is clearly themost popular interlocking architecture, otherwell-known examples being Westrace,Ansaldo’s ACC and the Ebilock system.

• Distributed processing and I/O. In a systemsuch as SIMIS W, interlocking functions are executed on ACCs, each of which controls a particular geographic area. There is no intelligence in the outdoor equipment, signallingequipment being connected directly to theACCs. It is worth noting that the size of thescheme will not have appreciable impact on itsperformance. Furthermore, interlocking failurescan be localised. SIMIS W is an example of a"long and thin" system.

Considering cabling issues, there is little to choosebetween the last two architectures.

Regarding the integrity of object controllers, theiravailability has not generally been regarded as beingas important as the availability of the interlockingprocessor. Systems such as SSI which employ 2oo2do not have the level of availability provided byWestrace.

SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE

As for the hardware architecture, there is also a

93INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

wide range of software architectures employed.

SSI

The simplest of these is that of SSI. The code isexecuted as a repeated cycle. This major cycle isdivided into 64 minor cycles. The first minor cycle isdevoted to data exchange with the diagnostic subsystem. During each of the remaining minorcycles the interlocking software processes a message from one TFM and transmits a message toone TFM.

Elektra

ELEKTRA’s software contains two diverse chan-nels running on different processors:

• Interlocking Processor (ILP) – this determinesthe functional behaviour of the system;

• Safety Bag Processor (SBP) – this channeldetermines whether interlocking actionsrequested by the ILP are safe.

To avoid common mode errors, ILP and SBP software have been specified separately and codedby different teams using different programming languages (the procedural language CHILL for ILP,and a rule-based language executing on a knowledge-based system for SBP).

ILP is a conventional software interlocking system,monitoring input and generating commands. Onreceiving a command, the knowledge base (SBP)checks it against a data base of rules interpreted inthe context of the scheme data for safety before itcan be executed.

The system interfaces to signalling equipment viaduplicated Interlocking Peripheral Controllers (IPCs)co-located with the ILP and SBP. There is no outdoor intelligence. The architecture for the controlof redundancy is more complex than has been outlined. See [14] and references therein. [15] also provides further information on the system.

Westrace

Westrace also uses two-channel software diversity with the channels executing different representations of critical data (true and comple-ment). Thus there are two distinct paths through thesystem with one path executing. Note that it is notpossible (or sensible) to duplicate all software. Forexample, since interlocking software executes on asingle processor, there is only a single scheduler(core operating system). These are checked separately. The way that Westrace checks its‘health’ is by using an external watchdog, whichmust be refreshed at frequent intervals. If the interlocking stops behaving correctly, the watchdogdoes not get refreshed and this in turn will then shutthe interlocking down.

SIMIS W

Finally, we very briefly discuss SIMIS W’s softwarearchitecture. The interlocking software executes onACCs which are configured and co-ordinatedthrough the CMC. The CMC contains two compo-nents.

Overhead Management Component (OMC) – themain function of this unit is to configure the ACCswhich perform the actual interlocking. The con-

figuration data is held in CMC’s memory.

Interlocking and Interface Component (IIC) – thisperforms a wide range of functions:

• temporary storage and transfer of all processstates to the operation and display level;

• checking operator commands and transmissionto ACCs;

• fault management.

SYSTEMS THINKINGTo understand how the safety of an interlocking is

assured it is necessary to consider, not only how thehardware and software of the interlocking are composed, but also the procedures, tools and people that produce, operate and maintain it.

The system architectures described above willachieve a high level of safety integrity with regard todisturbances and hardware faults, and will executethe interlocking logic correctly only if their softwareis correct. Can we not ensure the correctness of thesoftware by rigorous testing?

VALIDATION OF INTERLOCKING SOFTWARE

Let us consider for a moment the place of testingin ensuring that software based components of therailway are going to operate as expected.Misconceptions about the role of testing abound, sohere is a quote from Dijkstra’s Turing award lectureof 1972 [16]. Whilst it is not a definition, it does capture the essence of testing:

"Programme testing can be used to show thepresence of bugs, but never to show theirabsence."

However, surely if we perform exhaustive testingthen we can assure ourselves that the componentworks exactly as intended? Software errors aredetected by testing when one of the programmesequences which will reveal them is executed andan incorrect output or system state is observed. Arequest that every line of software is visited at leastonce may appear modest. However, this is only possible for relatively simple systems. Consider theexample of a Train Describer programme. This system contains over 300 modules with each module having an average of 1.6 conditional state-ments. Thus the whole system contains about 500conditional statements. Such a system could havearound 2500 paths. Let us say that this is too manyand that there are only 250 or around 1015 paths. If wedo 1,000 tests a second, it would take around25,000 years to complete and this is not really acomplex system.

This example illustrates the well-known fact that,in general, it is not practicable to test any non-trivialsoftware system exhaustively. It is for this reasonthat standards such as EN50128 or IEC61508require many production and analysis techniques, inaddition to testing, to be applied in order to ensurethe safety integrity of software.

The developers of processor-based interlockingswere among those pioneers of safety-critical processor systems who were responsible for building up the array of techniques and principles on

94 INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

which these standards are based, and which arenow common to applications ranging far beyond therailway industry. It is beyond the scope of this paperto enlarge on techniques as various as structuredprogramming, Fagan Inspections and static analy-sis, but some further consideration is given to formalmethods (see below).

DESIGN, PROGRAMMING AND TESTING OF SIGNALLING LOGIC ANDCONFIGURATION DATADESIGN AND PROGRAMMING

The process of designing the signalling logic andgeographical configuration data and programming itinto the interlocking, generally known as interlockingdata preparation, is set out in Figure 5, whichexpands the block labelled “data preparation system” in Figure 4. In systems which have genericsafety logic and separate geographical configurationdata there would be two parallel processes, each ofthe basic form of Figure 5, but generally with morescope for automation in the process for preparingthe geographical data.

The integrity of the lower levels of the process, thetransformation and compilation of the logical designinto machine code and its loading into the highintegrity engine of the interlocking may be assuredby using tools of a suitable level of integrity, or moreoften by techniques based on diversity, such as performing the same transformation using two different software tools and comparing the results.

ENSURING CORRECTNESS

Interlocking logic is in essence the implementationof signalling principles for a particular arrangement

of interlocking hardware for a given scheme and layout. Although the full logic for a given installationmay appear large, it can be divided into a set of relatively small processes. These processes can berepresented as finite state machines. The principlesof a finite state machine are explained in AppendixA. In contrast with the design of a module in a programme such as that of the train describer out-lined above, there is relatively little complexity. Forexample, the design of the train describer module isclosely coupled with the design of the “surrounding”(eg calling and called) modules, while interlockinglogic processes are largely independent of one other.The number of all possible states of inputs to thestate machine for a typical interlocking process istherefore usually limited, and so it is possible to testfully all the combinations of inputs to a process,although it may well not be feasible to test allsequences of inputs.

Sufficient confidence in the adequacy of testingwould have to be based on a number of provisos, asfollows:

• The rest of the interlocking system works correctly. For example, the operating systemexecutes the state machines in a deterministicmanner, with no variations in the sequence ofexecution or relative timings which could produce incorrect results.

• The language in which the rule is coded has pre-cise syntax and semantics. For example, weneed to identify what tests to perform.

• The specification language has precise syntaxand semantics. This is needed to decidewhether the tests have succeeded or failed.

95INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

Figure 5 – Programming the Interlocking

• Any tools used in the production of logic anddata or in the implementation of testing can betrusted sufficiently not to produce errors whichwould not be found by functional testing.

Except for the second point, the other provisos arenot currently satisfied and are not expected to berealised in the foreseeable future. As a result, weneed to use appropriate software development techniques coupled with a full testing regime toallow the commissioning of interlockings.

Because of the practical limitations to the extentof testing, other checks usually have to be applied tosupplement testing in order to give sufficient confidence in the correctness of interlocking logic.This is true even of relay interlockings, where physical checks such as wire counts are made toeliminate errors which might otherwise not bedetected. In the case of SSI a desk-top check ismade of geographical data to ensure that there isnothing in the logic, such as links to variables thatshould not be used by the process in question,which would not be exercised by the normal testingprocess.

It might be expected that, as with the software ofthe high-integrity engine itself, the correctness of theinterlocking logic could be ensured by compliancewith one of the relevant standards, such asEN50128. Unfortunately this is not the case.

There is mention of data preparation in at least twoof the relevant standards, EN50128 and RIA 23. Theprincipal European Standard in this context isEN50128, but what it requires or recommends withregard to the preparation of configuration data is notin itself sufficient to ensure that the above acceptance criteria will be met. EN50128 has beencriticised by Faulkner[17], who points out that,although the need to identify a data life-cycle andproduce various documents are proposed, a majorweakness of the standard is that it does not identifya requirement for the definition of a data model, andthat “the representation, in terms of the data model,and realisation, in terms of the production of theapplication data, and the subsequent maintenanceof the data are not addressed.”

It may be observed that the sections of EN50128dealing with configuration data do not make reference to any techniques or procedures, unlikethe sections that deal with software production, nordo they make any reference to safety integrity level(SIL) other than in connection with a general require-ment relating to tools.

The section of RIA 23 that deals with configurationdata is similar in many respects to the corre-sponding section of EN50128 (in fact, the wording ofsome clauses is so similar that it is clear that RIA 23must have been the source of the equivalent items inEN50128), but it does also contain a table of techniques and methods for use in data preparation,with recommendations relating to which ones areappropriate for each SIL.

Without formal proof we can never be sure of the correctness of the interlocking logic. Testability,however, provides a high level of confidence in this component of a digital interlocking – an

informal proof.

SYSTEM ENGINEERINGREQUIREMENTS COMPLEXITY

Modern interlockings are quite flexible, and we arevery inventive in their use. For example:

• as a result of overrun risk assessments, signalcontrols are often now required to provide protection in the event of a signal passed atdanger (SPAD);

• checks on the sequential operation of track circuits are used to mitigate the effects of railhead contamination;

• interlocking logic is used to enforce precautionsin the reset and restoration of axle counters.

This means that the interlocking logic being programmed is becoming more complex. It is unfortunate that programming of the interlockinglogic (in an inadequate terminology) is still referred toas data preparation. Although signalling principlesare well understood, their implementation too isbecoming ever more complex. In theory, there is nolimit to the resultant complexity required of the interlocking.

Whilst an instinctive aversion to complexity shouldbe resisted, it must be recognised that increasedcomplexity entails costs which need to be weighedagainst the benefits of the function involved. Thecosts of logic design, verification and testing, whichare already a significant element in the cost of signalling schemes, are likely to increase sharplywith increased complexity, as will the time requiredfor these activities. The probability of residual undetected errors in the interlocking logic is likely toincrease in spite of the greater verification and testing effort. As interlocking becomes more complex the effective capacity of interlockings, interms of numbers of signals, points and otherobjects controlled, is likely to be reduced due to theextended programme cycle time required by themore complex logic.

If, as seems likely, the requirements being placedon interlockings are increasing and becoming evermore complex then the need to augment testing withother techniques will become stronger. It is wellknown that most problems with software based sys-tems are in the specification of requirements. Ifrequirements could be rigorously specified andchecked this would increase our confidence andmake testing easier. One possible way of achievingthis would be through the use of formal mathemati-cal techniques.

FORMAL METHODS

Formal mathematical methods hold out thepromise of solving many of the problems of vali-dation of interlocking system software and ensuringthe correctness of interlocking logic.

The UK railway industry has flirted with usingthese techniques and an IRSE seminar in 1996 laidout possible uses for formal methods. Some parts ofthe industry, notably manufacturers, use these techniques in order to develop their products. It isnotable that the published papers on such appli-

96 INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

cations of formal methods emanate largely fromacademic institutions.

Formal methods are based on expressing eitherthe specification or design of software, or both, in aformal notation. The notation of the predicate calculus in the following example is perhaps themost eye-catching of many such notations:

∀υ∈PV(P).A(VPI(P, ids(P), υ)), A, ς, 2.max({td(χ1),...., td(χn)}) |= χMathematical deductive or analytical techniques

can be used to establish with certainty the truth orconsequences of the statements which comprisethe formal representation of the logic. Twoapproaches to the application of formal methods tointerlockings have been tried fairly widely: theoremproving and model checking. The theorems to beproved are statements of the type “any signal con-trolling the entrance to an occupied section willalways be red”. Proving such theorems to be trueprovides a level of assurance that would haverequired a vast amount of testing. An example of theuse of this technique for proving the correctness ofa VPI in the Netherlands can be found in [18], fromwhich the above character string was taken.

In model checking the formal representation of thesystem is used as a state machine, which isexplored using a model checker which symbolicallychecks all reachable states of the machine to verifythat specified properties are satisfied [19]. Intuitively,model checkers can be seen as “exhaustive simulators”, ie tools which simulate the behaviour ofthe system for all possible inputs and in all possiblestates. Symbolic model checking can be automatedmore readily than theorem proving, which reliesheavily on human interaction. Model checking hasbeen applied to the safety management firmware ofan interlocking [20] and to the correctness of inter-locking logic [21].

It has been said of formal methods, in the contextof reasoning in general, that they enable you to beabsolutely certain that you are right, but notabsolutely certain what you are right about. In partthis is a reflection of the facts that correspondencebetween the terms used in a formal system and reality is not a formal property, and that the use offormal notation does not ensure the completeness ofthe formal representation. This is a particular problem when introducing formal methods in thedesign of signalling logic, as the notations are unfamiliar to signal engineers.

A further limitation of formal methods is that manyof the notations do not include any concept of time.Also formal methods do not embrace the wholeprocess of programming the interlocking. They areapplicable to the top level of Figure 5, the design ofthe interlocking logic and configuration data,although this is probably the area which is most susceptible to error.

WHERE IS IT ALL GOING?At present the technology of the “high integrity

engine” is, if not in a period of stasis, experiencing aperiod of unremarkable evolutionary development.In the near future we can expect interesting changes

in signalling principles and in the functions performed by interlockings, as ERTMS becomes areality.

Perhaps the area most urgently in need ofimprovement is the arrangements for the program-ming of the interlocking. The cost and time investedin programming and ensuring the correctness ofinterlocking logic and configuration data are majorfactors in the economics of signalling modernisation.With regard to safety the probability of residualundetected error in logic or data is a vulnerable pointin the overall scheme of interlockings.

The gaps in standards relating to this program-ming, the prolonged infancy of potentially usefultechniques such as formal methods, and the need tomake formalised representations more understand-able to signal engineers all require attention.Perhaps other techniques such as expressingSignalling Principles as a formal grammar could beused.

Perhaps it should be the IRSE which considerswhether these techniques could be used to form-alise Signalling Principles and move the industry forward. Certainly the IRSE could take a more proactive and visible lead in the development anddirection that the industry should be taking.

REFERENCES1 See for example, Training Manual, Introduction

to Railway Signalling by British Railway BoardSignal & Telecommunication EngineeringDepartment (1991), or J C Calvert, Principles ofInterlockinghttp://www.du.edu/~etuttle/rail/lock.htm

2 J C Calvert, Principles of Interlockinghttp://www.du.edu/~etuttle/rail/lock.htm

3 J C Calvert, Power Interlockinghttp://www.du.edu/~etuttle/rail/power.htm

4 Electro-Pneumatic Block Signal System,Scientific American, April 1895. See for example,http://www.catskillarchive.com/rrextra/sdbk.Html

5 The Economic Times, 6/8/2000 orhttp://rrtd.nic.in/ddaug2k.html

6 J Heald and G Gore, Contactless Switching withParticular Reference to Square Loop Ferrites,IRSE, London 1962.

7 B Stevens, Computerised Interlocking System –A Multi-Dimensional Structure in the Pursuit ofSafety, IRSE, Gothenburg, 1978.

8 D Woodland, Railway Control Philosophy, IRSE,London, 2004.

9 R Short, The Design of Fail Safe ProcessorSystems, IRSE, London, 1980.

10 J Mills, Processor Based Safety Systems, IRSE,London, 1986.

11 SSI Overview Guide, ed. D Newing and MCastles, ISBN 0 9533 3560 7.

12 G Kopperschmidt, SIMIS Fail-Safe Micro-computer System Applications and Features,ASPECT 95 International Conference onAdvanced Railway Control, London, September1995.

97INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

13 M W Howell, Westrace – A Second GenerationElectronic Interlocking, Vacation School onRailway Signalling, 1998.

14 Fault Tolerance in Railway Signalling Systems: Astudy of Elektra Interlocking System (McGillUniversity, Quebec, Canada)http://www.adinfo.qc.ca/alex/elektra/elektra.pdf

15 J Arlat, Composants COTS et sûreté de fonc-tionnement, March 2004. See for example,http://www.laas.fr/RIS/Ateliers/DEPEND-CASE/08-Arlat.pdf

16 E W Dijkstra, The Humble Programmer,Communications of ACM 15 (1972).

17 A Faulkner, Safer Data: The use of data in thecontext of a railway control system, in“Components of System Safety: Proceedings ofthe Tenth Safety-Critical System Symposium,Southampton 2002”, ed. Redmill and Anderson.

18 J F Groote, S F M van Vlijmen and J W C Koorn,The Safety Guaranteeing System at Station

Hoorn-Kersenboogerd, Proceedings of COMPASS '95, 1995, Logic Group PreprintSeries catalogue.

19 T Hlavaty et al, Formal Methods in Developmentand Testing of Safety Critical Systems: RailwayInterlocking System. In Intelligent Methods forQuality Improvement in Industrial Practice.Prague: CTU FEE, Department of Cybernetics,The Gerstner Laboratory, 2002, vol. 1, pp14-25.ISSN 1213-3000. See for examplehttp://cyber.felk.cvut.cz/EUNITE02-IMQI/clanky/hlavaty.pdf

20 A Cimati et al, Model Checking Safety CriticalSoftware with SPIN: an Application to a RailwayInterlocking System. SAFECOMP 1998: 284-295.

21 K Winter and N Robinson, Modelling LargeRailway Interlockings and Model Checking SmallOnes. 25th Australasian Computer ScienceConference, Adelaide, Australia.

98 INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS

APPENDIX ASTATE MACHINES

It is common to represent processes used for control or similar logic functions as Finite StateMachines (often referred to simply as statemachines), the basic elements of which are shown inFigure 6 below. There are various ways of repre-senting a state machine. The version used here hasbeen chosen as being the most intuitively under-standable from an engineering point of view.

A finite state machine (FSM) may be formallydefined as follows.

1 A finite state machine has:

• K states, S = {s1, s2,..., sK}, with initial state s1

• N inputs, I = {i1, i2,..., iN}

• M outputs, O = {o1, o2,..., oM}

• Transition function T(S, I) mapping each currentstate and input to a next state.

• Output function O(S) mapping each currentstate to an output

2 Given a sequence of inputs, the FSM produces asequence of outputs which is dependent on s1,T(S, I) and O(S).

Each of the processes within the interlockinglogic, such as the process for controlling a set ofpoints, can be represented as a finite state machine.The complete interlocking programme could beregarded either as a large state machine or as an aggregate of state machines implementing individual processes.

Figure 6 – Finite State Machine

DiscussionJ Poré (Alstom) thanked the speakers for their

paper and initially commented on their statement“everybody speaks English”; why should there beany problems! He also noted that in recent yearscost was considered a major factor with moderninterlockings being just as expensive, and havingonly a limited life, compared to more conventionalrelay-based types, and he wondered how invest-ment could be encouraged. Finally he asked thespeakers’ views of future interlockings with the introduction of ERTMS and, in particular, degradedmodes of operation.

R Short agreed that there are ambiguities with alllanguages! He suspected that modern interlockingsare expensive because of the programming and validation costs, noting that SSI was developed tospecifically reduce cabling and building (relay room)costs; he also noted that electronics may have to be replaced because of the lack of skills to repro-gramme. For the future, he thought there was potential for a change in design methods with lessexternal equipment to manage and opportunities toconsider how to manage degradation.

N Rushby (Conation Technologies) referred toDijkstra, who had examined formal methods of validating systems, and wondered if his work hadbeen forgotten.

I Shannon advised that Dijkstra was mentionedbecause he believed that the objective of testingshould be to find bugs and whilst there had beeninsufficient time to expand on this theme in thepaper, Dijkstras’ work was important and techniqueshave been used to develop interlocking engineswhich led to cost reduction.

R Short cautioned that it is easy to fall into the trapwhereby configuration is called “programming”rather than “Data Preparation” although good soft-ware and programming practices still need to beapplied. For SSI, static and testing checks of thecoding is undertaken and considered sufficient.

D Newing (Lloyd’s Register Rail) considered thatthe difficulties of applying UK Signalling Principlespointed to the fact that our layouts are too complex.

R Short responded by suggesting that a means todevelop the “measure of complexity” is requiredwhich could then be used to weigh-up the cost/benefits of the relevant Signalling and P Way costs.

I Shannon advised that in software engineering, a“complexity” metric had been developed that drovedown costs although he observed that the philos-ophy in the UK was to have a large number of signalling rules applied flexibly, which led to complexsituations, whilst overseas a smaller number of rulesare applied more rigorously.

A Simmons (Network Rail) informed that theNetwork Rail philosophy is to address issues ofcomplexity, such as alternative routes and bi-directional signalling.

T George (retired) commented that the historicaloverview didn’t address the issue that mechanicalinterlockings were passive and hence less safety

critical than modern interlockings because even ifthey fail they cannot provide energy to move pointsor clear signals. He also noted that there were manytechniques used to detect software errors but not inthe data preparation; this is the weakest link. Headditionally stated that software is developed in anR&D environment whereas the data preparation isundertaken in a project environment, with all of theassociated pressures, which could lead to anincreased risk of errors. Finally he believed that thereis no diversity of logic within interlockings and consequently safety is critically dependent on theabsence of even a single error, whereas other industries do not rely for safety on the absolute correctness of a single defence.

R Short noted that passive faults may be overlooked; because processors are active andfaults are more likely to be recreated there are multiple protections in the application. There maywell be safety benefits from complexity such as theuse of continuous measurements may be used as anopportunity to cross-check the logic.

I Shannon believed that the R&D environmentcould be part of the problem if it is believed thatsomebody else will detect any errors.

R E B Barnard (Alstom) believed that there was achallenge to develop formal assessment criteria forinterlockings using a measure of complexity todetermine if the system can be both tested andmaintained, noting that formal methods are used fordesigning some systems; these move the problemselsewhere rather than solve the actual problem. Healso questioned the human factors involved in datapreparation to ensure that tasks undertaken aresuch that errors can easily be found.

I Shannon noted that formal methods shouldn’tstop people applying their intelligence but it doesovercome language problems; trying to forcethrough structured formalisation techniques, wherepeople go through systematic requirements, is complex and costly but should be used if cost benefits can be demonstrated.

R Short agreed that human factor issues are veryimportant and there is no easy answer althoughencouraging checkers to find problems, in the sameway that testers write test logs, may be a solution.

I Shannon advised that using an adversarialapproach in software development has worked previously.

I Harman (Network Rail) believed that it was difficult to differentiate between the “black box”(interlocking) and the human who wants a devicethat can be programmed with geographical rules.The designer needs to know that if rules are put intothe “black box” it will perform as expected and thereare different processes to making the “black box” dowhat it does compared to the specific configurationof that “black box” and more complexity is intro-duced by blurring these divisions.

R Short informed that the paper attempted to separate the high integrity engine, which just does

INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS 99

as it is told, from the designer who doesn’t knowhow it works. In real life you have to know how itworks as this impinges upon what you can ask it todo. There is also no translation between the ControlTables and the logic that goes into the machine, iethere is no formal mechanism for turning the ControlTables into the actual design. He acknowledged thathuman factors are complex.

P Halliwell (Network Rail) commented that testerstry to find things that aren't included in the ControlTables and questioned the language of ControlTables with the relationship to the equipmentemployed and even whether Control Tables are relevant to the principle that is being applied.

R Short answered that it might be possible toreformat Control Tables into a more “designer-

friendly” state but the biggest problem is that theactual format is not sufficiently comprehensiveenough to cater for all the extra and special controlsthat are applied; these extra and special controlsshould be standardised rather than reformatting thetables. He agreed that in testing, it was generallyfeasible to test for every condition that should bepresent but unreasonable to find something else thatshouldn’t; there are other testing techniquesemployed that reduce the possibility of this happen-ing such as wire count and continuity checks and indata preparation a method to check that no stray“connections” are present is required.

J Corrie (IRSE President) thanked I Shannon and R Short for their paper and contribution to the subsequent discussion.

INTERLOCKING DEVELOPMENTS100

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RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY102

Technical Meeting of the Institutionheld at

The Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

Wednesday 23rd March 2005The Senior Vice-President, Mr J Poré, in the chair.91 members and visitors were in attendance. It was proposed by Mr D McKeown, seconded by Mr M Govas and carried that the Minutes

of the Technical Meeting held on 16th February 2005 be taken as read and they were signed by the Senior Vice-President as a correct record.There were apologies for absence received from the President, who was visiting the Australasian Section, and also from Mr R E B Barnard.There were no new members present for the first time since election to membership. The Chairman then introduced Mr C Sevestre, of SNCF,and invited him to present the paper entitled “The Evolution of Signalling on the High Speed Lines in France”. In his presentation, which hemade in an amusingly informative manner, Mr Sevestre traced the development of the high-speed lines in France and of the Trains à GrandeVitesse (TGV), from the struggle to establish the initial concept in the context of post-War reconstruction and of the oil crisis through to thepresent day and to future developments, with special attention to the signalling systems created to meet the ever-increasing demand forspeed. In particular they describe the solutions adopted for the recently opened Paris–Marseille LGV Mediteranée and for the LGV Est whichis currently under construction. Following the presentation Messrs W J Coenraad (Holland Rail Consult), P Bassett (AEAT), UnidentifiedSpeaker, C H Porter (Lloyd’s Register Rail), D Weedon (NR), P Duggan (WRS), C Kessell (Centuria Comrail), I Mitchell (AEAT),I Harman (NR),P Van de Mare (FGW), D Woodland (LUL), G Harris (LUL), J Phillips (Metronet Rail) and D McKeown (Independent Consultant) took part inan interesting and lively discussion. The presenter dealt with the questions, Mr C H Porter then proposed a vote of thanks and Mr Poré presented the speaker with the commemorative plaque customarily awarded to authors of the London paper.

The Chairman thanked members for their attendance and their questions. Mr Poré then made announcements of forthcoming events andclosed the meeting at 1950 by announcing that the next meeting in London would be the Annual General Meeting to be held on the 22ndApril 2005 followed by the 41st Annual Dinner at the Savoy Hotel.

The Evolution of Signalling on the High-Speed Lines in FranceChristian Sevestre and Michel Laurin1

1 The authors are with French National Railways (SNCF)2 This chapter is largely based upon Alain Bernheim, The hard-

fought battle of French HSL to establish itself (Revue Généraledes Chemins de Fer special issue, 2002)

HISTORY2

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

World War II mutilated the railways in France. Theextent of damage in 1945 was appalling. Some forward-looking, visionary minds in government circles at that time planned to cover the railway lineswith tarmac, thus laying the foundations of theFrench motorway system, which was still in limbo.By a short head, it was decided to reconstruct therail system, because the ability of rail to carry bulkyloads served a useful purpose for conventionalindustries. Reconstruction was facilitated by a timely innovation, the introduction of the single-phase alternating-current power supply systemusing the industrial frequency of 50 Hz at 25 kV.

The commissioning in Japan in 1964 of the NewTokaido line with passenger trains operating atabout 210 km/h confirmed the expectations of theSNCF leaders. The SNCF Research Department wascreated in 1966 to co-ordinate the work of the various experts, and presented its “CO 3” plan forthe new Paris-Lyon line. The possibilities given bythe infrastructure, the rolling stock and the operatingmodes made a good commercial case with attrac-tive prospects for profitability. The proposed planwas communicated by the French Secretary ofTransport to the Council of Ministers. The conceptwas felt to be quite incongruous, attracting the comment that the wisest plan would be to closedown the SNCF Research Department!

Leading French economic circles were prone to

quote the rail mode as a system which had had itsday. The famous 1955 speed record of 331 km/h inthe Landes region (see Figure 1), the running of 200km/h trains between Paris and Toulouse (LeCapitole) and Paris and Bordeaux (L’Étendard andL’Aquitaine), the sight of a new generation of comfortable 160 km/h trains revitalising ridership onthe south-east network – none of these was enoughto change the Government’s orientation towardsroad solutions.

At the same time domestic airlines were under-going a similar boom. Some legitimate questionscould be raised about the new service offerings ofthe rail mode during the 1967-1969 period. Werethey a mere respite before doom set in, or did theyforeshadow, in a rather shy way, a genuine railrevival? Could rail enhance its speed performancestandards by improved rail technology and cost-efficiency?

THE TECHNICAL BATTLE

The 1955 speed record in the Landes region(Figure 1) had a big impact in the media and showedthe vast potential of electric rail traction. However, asubstantial technical research effort was needed torun at more than 320 km/h on a routine basis. Bogieshad to be lighter, axle loads lower, resistance to forward motion reduced, braking power increasedand current collection improved. Indications fromthe signalling system must be transmitted to the driver safely.

All these problems were solved by selection of anarticulated train design, and of cab signalling.

THE POLITICO-ECONOMICAL BATTLE

The technical feasibility being virtually established,in 1969 SNCF assessed the predictable economicperformance of the Paris-Lyon plan. It seemed quite

THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE 103

adequate as the debt could be paid off by a reason-able horizon. In fact, the World Bank provided all theinvestment funds, and the debt was paid off withinten years.

However, the technical feasibility and profitabilitywere not perceived as obvious good news by thedecision-makers or politically influential people. Howcould you gamble on such a plan when rail wasknown to be on the decline and virtually doomed?The thinking in the French Ministry of Finance inresponse to a company which ran into the red, yearin year out, was to let the railways disappear andtake their financial troubles with them.

This economic criticism was in line with the position taken by DATAR, the French National LandPlanning and Regional Development Authority3.DATAR had always opposed TGV plans on principle,on the grounds that they could not bring any benefitin terms of land development, on top of which Lyonmight become another suburb of Paris – shocking!The rail plan was deemed to be élitist, being concerned only with business people and the particular value they put on time. The supporters ofinland waterways were also opposed to the Paris-Lyon plan, because they thought it could hurt their own plan for gauge-widening on the Rhine-Rhône canal. Airlines registered their opposition too,and received the support of the powerful Minister forCountry Planning who declared, “Compared to air,rail has no future.” Despite such adversity faced bythe rail mode, the findings of the CoquantCommittee confirmed the excellent viability of the Paris-Lyon rail plan, and the plan wasratified by the Interministerial Committee of 25thMarch 1971. However, the Ministry of Finance persisted in its opposition and ordered a new financial audit.

1973 saw the outbreak of the first oil crisis. Theeconomic facts of life in the transport world changed

dramatically. A second Interministerial Committee(6th March 1974) decided on the construction of theParis-Lyon rail line, but recommended the use ofelectric traction instead of the gas turbine inheritedfrom aeronautical technology which had beenfavoured up to that time. The InterministerialCommittee of 6th March 1974 also launched themajor nuclear power scheme of EDF, the FrenchElectricity Board. In other words, the decision tosupport the rail project was justified by the fact thatthe electric railway would consume nationally-produced energy.

To summarise, the political development processwas a difficult one, and victory was by only thesmallest of margins. It took a third InterministerialCommittee in 1976 to give the official go-ahead, withthe “Declaration of Public Utility”, which authorisedthe start of construction. In 1977 the Secretary ofTransport decided to delay the commissioning of thenorthern part of the line by one year in order tospread the financial burden. In the same year SNCFfinally ordered the first electric TGV sets. The southern section of the new Paris-Lyon line enteredrevenue service on 27th September 1981, and thenorthern section was opened in 1983.

THE SOUTH-EAST HIGH-SPEED LINEMAIN FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS SYSTEM

The main features of the South-East High-SpeedLine (HSL) and its operations system are the following:

• The HSL is dedicated to passenger traffic.

• The commercial speed is 270 km/h.

• The HSL is compatible with the existing railwaynetwork. The new line is connected to the conventional network at several points, so thatTGV sets can run on the conventional network.

• In the nominal operational mode, the HSL allowsa five-minute headway between TGV sets.

• The line is closed during the night to allow maintenance work to be done in the absence ofcommercial trains.

• To guarantee an acceptable quality of service incase of incident on one of the two tracks, bothtracks are reversible and may be run at maxi-mum line speed. They are connected every 20to 25 km by crossovers.

• The line is equipped with passing loops foremergencies and for maintenance works atintervals of 80 km.

• Trains can pass through diverging junctions at220 km/h.

• Trains are able to cross over from track 1 totrack 2 at 160 km/h.

• The line is equipped with the TVM300 track-to-train transmission system.

• All crossovers are controlled from signal boxeswith relay interlockings. The number of standardtrack layouts is kept to a minimum.

• All signal boxes are controlled remotely, from acontrol centre at the Gare de Lyon in Paris. If theremote control fails, it is possible to operate

Figure 1 – The 1955 world speed record

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THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE104

each signal box locally.

• The line is electrified at 25 kV, 50 Hz.

• Crossovers and power supply equipment arecontrolled remotely from a unique control centre.

• Maintenance is carried out by dedicated HSLteams located in a few places along the line.

THE HSL SIGNALLING SYSTEM

Objectives

The main objectives of the signalling system onthe South-East HSL are the following:

• to maintain train spacing at 270 km/h;

• to allow a five-minute headway between TGVsets;

• to transmit signalling information to the driver.

Technical Solutions

• On the classical network the line is divided intoblock sections averaging 1,500m in length(Figure 2). Applied to the TGV, the length ofblock sections would have been 8,500m.

• Furthermore, there must be two block sectionsbetween two TGVs running at maximum linespeed, to prevent the second train from encountering stop signals due to the first one.The classical automatic block would have led toa distance between trains of more than17,000m.

• The solution for the HSL was to divide the distance of 8,500m into four block sections of2,100m each, the train coming to a completehalt before the end of the third.

• A permanent speed control system has beeninstalled which acts directly on the train brakingcircuit whenever the maximum authorisedspeed is exceeded. In all cases, this speed control enables the TGV to be brought to a complete halt before the protected point.

• Figure 3 shows the stopping sequence of a TGVset on a line equipped with TVM300.

• The speed levels displayed in the cab flashwhenever the speed within the block sectionahead is more restrictive, so that the driver cananticipate the braking process and enter theblock section with his train in braking mode.

• An intermittent transmission system handlesadditional functions such as:

– TVM initialisation and cut-off when switchingfrom conventional line to new line and vice-versa;

– power switch-off;

– pantograph lowering;

– radio channel selection.

In each block section the maximum authorisedspeed is transmitted by the lineside equipment tothe train. If the driver exceeds this speed, an emergency brake application is made. The speedtransmitted must permit the train to slow down orstop before the protected point. This is made possible only by the existence of a complementaryblock section, called an overlap. Figure 3 shows howthe speed control system ensures a stop ahead ofan occupied block section.

THE ATLANTIC HIGH-SPEED LINEMAIN FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS SYSTEM

The main difference between the South-East andAtlantic HSLs lies in the maximum speed, which is300 km/h (186 mile/h) on the Atlantic line comparedwith 270 km/h (168 mile/h) on the South-East line.The profile of the line is less torturous than that ofthe South-East line, with maximum gradients of2.5% instead of 3.5%.

Taking this profile into account and to increaseoperational profitability, the new TGV sets weredesigned with two more cars (20 cars instead of 18),and with only two traction bogies at each end of thetrain (instead of three on South-East TGV sets). TheAtlantic TGV sets were also equipped with more efficient anti-slip protection.

Thanks to these developments the line was splitinto block sections more precisely. The sectionlength took account of a wider range of responsetimes to controls, and of the actual track profile. Theblock section length was reduced from 2,100m to2,000m. This reduction, combined with the speedincrease from 270 km/h to 300 km/h, allows a four-minute headway, although the stop sequence takesfour block sections on the Atlantic HSL as opposedto three on the South-East HSL.

Compatibility between the two TGV systems wasconsidered essential, to permit standard AtlanticTGV rolling stock to operate on the South-East HSLwith a few additional facilities incorporated in itsequipment.

Progress in technology over the last few years,especially in computer technology, has made it possible to achieve an even better balance betweencosts and equipment performance for the AtlanticTGV control centre by comparison with the South-East TGV control centre. Furthermore, maintenanceand track work procedures have proved to be controls somewhat restrictive in practice on theSouth-East TGV HSL. An attempt has been made to

Figure 2

THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE 105

simplify them while preserving the same degree ofsafety, and incorporating further improvements aswell as cutting the cost of operations.

SIGNALLING SYSTEM

Introduction

The main enhancements to the South-East systemare:

• more information has been incorporated into thecontinuous track-to-train transmission systemto adapt to the speed of 300 km/h;

• more information has been incorporated into theintermittent track-to-train system to allow:

– the transmission from the TGV line to a conventional line operated at >160 km/h (lineequipped with advance warning flashinggreen aspect signal);

– transmission on entering a section with dualsignalling (section for mixed TGV and con-ventional trains);

– transmission of the instruction to lower thepantograph.

The technology used for the track-to-train transmission system on the Atlantic HSL is only marginally different from that for the South-East TGVsignalling. But, in fact, the extensions outlined abovewere borne in mind from the very outset when theSouth-East TGV signalling system was originallydesigned.

Lineside Relay Signal Boxes

A special effort has been made to:

• simplify some of the procedures followed by thecontrol centre permanent way supervisor whentrack maintenance work is to be carried out onthe line;

• standardise as far as possible the operatingspecifications for lineside interlockings con-trolling crossovers between up and downtracks, and interlockings controlling passingtracks;

• protect track gangs and work sites.

Simplified Procedures

Experience on the South-East HSL has shown thatwork trains, such as ballast trains, tampingmachines and OHLE maintenance trains, often haveto pass Nf lineside markers (mandatory stop – seeFigure 4) with the cab signal system displaying“stop”. When this happens, authority to proceed hasto be given by the signalman in charge of operationsto the permanent way supervisor. This, in turn,means that a procedure for exceptions has to be setin motion by the signalman, and it is also a source ofdelays for the maintenance crew.

However, if the “stop” signal is displayed in thedriver’s cab, the train can proceed past an “Nf”marker if the white lamp for the marker is lit. On the

Figure 3 – TVM 300 speed curve

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THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE106

South-East HSL, the logic controlling the white lampwhich allows a driver to proceed slowly is as complex as the logic controlling the “line clear” cabdisplay at high speed.

This logic has been simplified on the Atlantic TGVsystem to take into account only those safety functions that are strictly required for traffic at lowspeed (points locked and detected in the correctposition, correct directional interlocking, verificationof safety mechanisms protecting work crews orpower supply or OCS sections not under voltage innon-active position). As a result, fewer authoris-ations to proceed will be required from signalmenand less equipment (relays etc) will be needed tohandle them. Naturally, all these simplifications havecontributed to cutting costs.

Standard Interlockings

Standard specifications have been used for theAtlantic TGV and have contributed to simplificationand repeatability, with inherent benefits for designwork and implementation. One of the main con-straints arising from this standardisation has beenthat markers indicating entry to and exit fromAtlantic TGV tracks equipped for reversible workinghad to be all at the same distance from thecrossovers controlled. Although this is only a minorconstraint when interlockings are located on leveltrack, it is more important when they are not, especially if the gradient is steep, on account of differences in lengths of block sections on rising anddescending gradients, and this can affect train headway. Since gradients on the Atlantic TGV arenot as steep as on the South-East HSL (2.5% asopposed to 3.5%), the effect of standard blocklengths on capacity has been judged acceptable,with the result that the system is simpler and costsare lower.

Protection of Track Gangs and Work Sites

On the South-East HSL, safety procedures requirethat the signalman refer to his instruction manual tosee which routes he must bar (from one to 12 routes,six to seven on average for each protection procedure).

On the Atlantic HSL, he need only refer to thesafety zone number requested by the permanentway supervisor. Furthermore, permanent way supervisors have special track switches near relaysignal boxes and at the most convenient points (nearpoints zones) to perform with ease operations needed for supplementary safety measures calledfor under safety regulations.

Control Centre

The main differences between the South-East TGVand Atlantic TGV control centres are:

• A simple version of the track diagram panel,which still features the conventional layout but issmaller because only general traffic informationis displayed (routeing, train describer data)whereas signalling details have been transferredto VDUs.

• Far more extensive use of computer technology.Advances in technology prompted SNCF todesign and develop computer modules in liaison

with French manufacturers, each module performing a basic signalling function4.

THE NORTH HIGH-SPEED LINEMAIN FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS SYSTEM

From the very beginning, the studies for the NorthHSL required an improved headway of three minutes, that is 20 trains per hour. TVM 300 allowsSouth-East services to run at 270 km/h with a headway of five minutes, and Atlantic services run at300 km/h every four minutes. Despite the highly satisfactory performance and excellent reliability ofthe equipment, these parameters were not con-sidered good enough to cope with the anticipatedvolume of traffic on the North HSL. The SNCF tech-nical departments were, therefore, asked at the endof 1987 to design a signalling system which wouldallow a three-minute headway at 300 km/h.

This objective was not achievable without a significant development of the signalling system,that is TVM 430. Apart from the three-minute head-way criterion, the development of TVM 430 wasintended to meet a number of other objectives. Inparticular, provision was to be built in for a possiblefuture increase in maximum line speeds. The NorthHSL has been built for 320 km/h, and the signallingis designed to accommodate a further increase to350 km/h or more. However, trains did not exceed300 km/h in the first few years.

Another requirement was that TVM 430 must caterfor various speed ranges, in order to maximise theuse of constrained layouts on urban sections of theroute. Equally it must be compatible with existingsignalling, so that trains equipped with TVM 430 canrun on the South-East and Atlantic HSLs.

To meet these objectives three main alterations tothe control structure were required:

• The deceleration speed steps have been alteredfrom 300-270-220-160-0 to 300-270-230-170-0.

• The stepped ATP speed control curve has beenreplaced by a smoother, more detailed curvewhich matches the braking curve normally followed by the driver more closely.

• A flashing signal has been added to the range ofcab indications, in order to give advanced warning of the state of the signal in the nextblock when the train is approaching a speedreduction. This allows the driver to start brakingin advance of the main indication, and enablesthe block length to be reduced from 2,100m or2,000m to 1,500m on level track.

The revised control curve configuration and cabsignalling displays are shown in the lower part ofFigure 5.

SIGNALLING SYSTEM

Data Transmission

In order to expand the capacity of the cab signalling, it was necessary to increase substantiallythe number of data messages transmitted from track

4 See Jean-Pierre Auclair and Jean-Michel Wiss, Modular com-puter systems for signalling applications (Revenue Générale desChemins de Fer, September 1984)

to train. The principle of modulating the carrier frequency of the UM71 track circuits has beenretained, but the number of different frequencies isnow 27 compared to 18 used on the earlier lines. Bycombining the presence or absence of each of thesefrequencies in the modulation signal, 27-bit messages can be composed. Six bits are reservedfor codes which guarantee data integrity, leaving 221

items of useful information. This is a considerableimprovement over the 18 basic messages trans-mitted by TVM 300.

The transmitted messages provide the followinginformation:

• The railway on which the train is running.Railway networks using the TVM 430 systemcan define the meanings of the message fieldstotally independently. This allows networks tohave totally different operating modes (eg theNorth HSL, the Channel Tunnel).

• Lengths and gradients of block sections.

• Speed limits (indication of maximum authorisedspeed in the block section, target speed to beobserved before the next block marker, andspeed restrictions).

The speed codes enable the on-train computer tocalculate the appropriate indications for the cab display, and whether they should flash. The equip-ment also calculates the parabolic control curve, themaximum speed allowed in the block section, andthe ATP target speed at the end of the section.

Technical Development

When the TVM 300 system was designed at theend of the 1970s, signalling equipment was basedon discrete electronic components. Safety wasobtained by systematic analysis of hardware component failures. TVM 300 was designed inaccordance with this safety principle.

For TVM 430 it was clearly impossible to use discrete electronic components any more, for various reasons, including the complexity andexpected performance of the equipment, especiallyon board where advanced data processing was

required. Safety analysis of complex discrete electronic systems was more and more difficult (notto say impossible) if all the failure modes resultingfrom standardisation were taken into account.

It was decided to use digital technology for TVM430 with large-scale integrated components. Safetyis based on hardware redundancy and the codedmonoprocessor developed for SACEM, the controlsystem developed for RER line “A” in Paris.

Functional Description of Trainborne Equipment

The two safety functions achieved by the TVM 300train borne equipment are:

• display of signalling information in the cab;

• speed control.

Technical Description of Trainborne Equipment

• Messages from the trackside are filtered,demodulated, identified and processed by twosingle processors in parallel.

• The results of these two processors are com-pared throughout the processing cycle by anexternal coded monoprocessor.

• The safety of the coded monoprocessor ischecked by an external hardware dynamic controller.

• The coded monoprocessor and the dynamiccontroller shut down the outputs in the event ofany disparity.

Each unit composed of two single processors, acoded monoprocessor and a dynamic controller isitself duplicated, for reasons of availability ratherthan system integrity.

Technical Development of Trackside Equipment

Trackside equipment located at roughly 12 kmintervals identifies the states of signals and com-poses the messages to be sent to the train.

Each set of trackside equipment has two centralprocessors to guarantee availability. Each centralprocessor has the same architecture as the train-borne equipment. One processor is operational atany given time, receiving inputs from the track and

107THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

Figure 5 – TVM 430 speed curve

trains, processing the information and outputtingdata messages. The second unit is held on hotstandby, initialised and ready to take over if themachine in use should fail. Switchover is triggeredautomatically if a failure occurs, but transfer can alsobe effected by a command from the control centre.

The input/output devices are not duplicated. Onlysome critical inputs are duplicated in such a waythat no single failure can shut down more than twoblock sections.

Interlockings and Control Centre (Figure 6)

The interlockings of the North HSL are PRCI type(relay interlocking with computerised control com-mand system). They are controlled remotely by acontrol centre at Lille which is similar to the Atlanticcontrol centre.

The remote control system and the signal boxcommand and control system are duplicated. Localsignal boxes can be locally operated, in exceptionalcircumstances only and following intervention by themaintenance service.

The only significant innovations are:

• the use of LEDs for control panel diagram(Figure 7);

• a maintenance works protection module calledMGPt; this enables procedures for obtainingauthority to work and returning the track to service after work to be simplified by allowingdirect communication with the gangs on thetrack via a voice recognition and synthesisersystem.

THE MEDITERRANEAN HIGH-SPEEDLINEMAIN FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS SYSTEM

The main objective of the Mediterranean HSL wasto offer customers a brand-new standard of per-formance – Paris to Marseille in three hours. Thesecond objective, in line with SNCF’s volume-oriented policy, was to give a strong boost to frequency of service with 90% punctuality (allowingten minutes leeway in relation to the expected arrivaltime), for 280 TGV sets per day.

The main innovations of the Mediterranean HSLare the following:

• the Integrated Interlocking and SignallingSystem (SEI);

• the MISTRAL signal box command and controlsystem;

• the crosswind protection system;

• the anti-seismic system.

All these systems are remotely controlled by thecontrol centre located in the Marseille Signal Box 1(Figures 8 and 9)

THE INTEGRATED INTERLOCKING ANDSIGNALLING SYSTEM (SEI)

Background

When SNCF began to design and develop a computerised interlocking (SSI) for its conventionallines in co-operation with ALSTOM, it carried outinvestigations with CSEE Transport into the possi-bility of integrating signal box signalling functionsand TVM 430 cab-signalling functions so as to create a single system handling all the signallingfunctions of a high-speed line, the IntegratedInterlocking and Signalling System (SEI). The projectwas pursued with the aim of equipping theMediterranean HSL, which was finally commis-sioned on 10th June 2001.

Functional Description

SEI was thus developed to combine all the

108 THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

Figure 6 – North HSL Control Centre in Lille

signalling functions of a signal box for a high-speedline. Besides the systems installed in the field, thetools required during the life-cycle of SEI were developed, namely:

• production line for configuring SEI for a particu-lar site according to the signalling programme inplace, or for modifying an existing configuration;

• test tool for testing the installed applicationsdata and so validating them, both for commis-sioning and in response to system or equipmentrevisions;

• maintenance support tool, not only for main-taining the equipment but also for performingmaintenance operations required under variousconditions as a result of the introduction of information technology.

SEI equipment was installed in the signal boxesand in unattended electronic equipment roomscalled “intermediate equipment boxes” (CAIs) alongthe high-speed line. It performs the following functions:

• receive commands from the remote control station, which may be of MISTRAL or SNCI type(SNCI standing for “standardised computercontrol system”), and from the local OperationsInterface Module (MINTEX);

• send back acknowledgements and supervisorymessages to the remote control station and theMINTEX;

• detect when trains are present;

• process signal box functions such as route setting and points control;

• acquire data affecting the signalling from hot-box detectors, road vehicle intrusion detectors,etc;

• calculate movement authorities for trains andsend signals formatted for TVM 430 signalling tothe track transmitters.

From Figures 6 and 9 the architecture imple-mented on the Mediterranean HSL can be comparedwith that on the North HSL, with the elimination ofthe MCKT route command and control module andmost of the relays.

109THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

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Figure 9 – Mediterranean HSL Control Centre in Marseille

It is significant that one relay interface has beenkept to serve the field equipment. Field equipmentcan, in fact, be located several kilometres away fromthe control centre, as a result of the extended coverage of this concentrated equipment. The connecting cables run parallel to the 25 kV AC catenary and so are subject to strong inductivefields. The simplest and most cost-effective way offiltering out the inductive effects is to use NS1-typerelays for the interface.

Technical Description

SEI is designed so that it can be used at differentsites, and even on lines where different signallingprinciples are in force. This is achieved thanks to athree-layer architecture as follows:

• A “generic” layer contains all the hardware andthe software to manage it. This layer containsthe elements which assure the required level of safety, and is independent of signalling principles and of the specific site.

• A computer application layer corresponds to thesignalling principles specific to a given networkor a given group of railway lines. This layer canevolve without upsetting the validation of thegeneric layer.

• A layer of parameters (application data) specificto each site, also embodied in software, whichcan likewise evolve without upsetting the twoprevious layers.

The Computer-Aided Maintenance System

SEI includes a computer-aided maintenance system which includes a Central Computer-AidedMaintenance System (SICAM) and local systems(SILAMs).

Local Computer-Aided Maintenance System

Each set of SEI equipment is associated with aSILAM, connected to the processing unit. TheSILAM records the states of all inputs and of thevariables defined in the design principles, so that amaintenance worker can reproduce the operation ofthe signal box in the event of an incident.

Besides this function of assisting with fault clearing, the SILAM helps to make safety-relateddecisions such as protection decisions. In a hard-wired signal box it is possible to remove straps onthe equipment frames in order to prevent certaincommands from being issued, or to “freeze” an incident during maintenance. These technicalactions are also required in a computerised signalbox, but the circuits are no longer accessible. Herethe SILAM allows designated variables to be set tothe desired state, without overriding the interlocking.

Another, subsidiary function provided by theSILAM is downloading of application software to thePC boards from the signal box CD-ROM.

Central Computer-Aided Maintenance System

All the local SILAMs on the line are connected to aSICAM. The latter has an archival storage function.In addition, it allows any SILAM on the line to beconsulted from any signal box, using a PC con-nected to the data network or even a PC connectedto the public switched telephone network.

Extensions

Having an architecture open to different appli-cations, the SEI complies with other functional specifications. In particular, it is being deployed byCSEE Transport on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link(CTRL) between London and the Channel Tunnel(Figure 10).

CSEE Transport is also adapting the system tohandle the functions required for the European RailTraffic Management System (ERTMS), in the contextof the Madrid-Lerida HSL project in Spain.

On the East HSL in France, the SEI will be connected to an ERTMS system in due course.

It can even be adapted to constitute a com-puterised interlocking on a conventional railway line.

THE MISTRAL SIGNAL BOX COMMAND ANDCONTROL SYSTEM

Background

Analysis of past experience with operation of large PRCI type interlockings, and the technicalneed for systems designed to overcome obso-lescence problems (the computer systems used sofar were developed some 15 years ago), led to a proposal in 1994 for the development of a new generation of command and control systems for signal boxes. This was the MISTRAL project,approved and financed by the French rail infrastructure authority, RFF. Following a Europeancall for tenders, Schlumberger SEMA was entrustedwith the task of developing and implementing thisnew generation of systems.

Functional Overview

The performance of the current generation ofcomputerised command and control systems in signal boxes has been satisfactory for standard traffic management, having in particular met expectations in the area of productivity gains.Nevertheless, analysis of past experience showedthat significant progress had to be made in the management of degraded modes (out-of-courserunning, etc). This has become the main scope ofthe new functions to be implemented in the MISTRAL system.

In general terms, the new generation aims at making operators’ workstations more ergonomic,thus permitting upgraded management of degradedmodes. It is worth noting, however, that the overallprogress made consists in a “seamless” process, forit includes the procedures currently used.

Significant progress was made on the followinginterfaces:

• MISTRAL Man/Machine Interface (MMI)

– combines the MMIs for the various modules;

– gets rid of the operator’s notion of technicalsystems (controls, programming, traindescriber, monitoring, alarms etc) and createsa single “function” view;

– displays the different alarms hierarchically ona single screen.

• Train programming, which provides the operatorwith:

110 THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

– a single train programming mode, regardlessof the area controlled (plain line or node);

– display of traffic conflicts,

– readily-available, global controls for modifyingthe programme in real time, with clearly visibleeffects.

In addition, management of failures in safety-related installations is a difficult task, given theircomplexity and the need to have recourse tounwieldy procedures and documentation. Accord-ingly, it was necessary to develop a StandardisedVisual Control System (SNCO) which would:

• improve performance by assisting operators in failure detection procedures, through the classification of information useful to solve particular problems and the incorporation ofinformation from the “pink form”;

• in large stations, complement the informationdisplayed on the wall-mounted mimic panel –the latter can then be simplified by suppressingor combining controls, to become a functionaltraffic diagram.

Experience also showed that there was a need togroup the alarms displayed to the operator on different carriers and organise them hierarchically soas to facilitate their detection. This is done by anAlarm Unifying Module (MFA), which also allowsvisual display of the operational status of each module installed (Computer-based Alarm Displayfunction, IAI).

There is also a training tool, organised around atraffic simulator and an interface so that eventsassociated with the MISTRAL system can be simulated. This can be configured for any site,regardless of the modules that are actually imple-mented on that site.

Technical Description

Figure 11 shows the architecture of a typicalinstallation using MISTRAL modules. The systemhas an “operating system” which is divided into anumber of modules, each corresponding to a specific function and to self-contained equipment,as follows:

• The MISTRAL MMI controls the operator work-stations, providing dialogue, alarm and imagedisplay.

• The SNCI Module (Standardised ComputerControl System) provides management of controls (eg routes, safe working of trains).

• The SNPI Module (Standardised ComputerProgramming System) provides traffic programming functions, with respect to thescheduled timetable and actual train positions.

• The Train Describer Module provides infor-mation on the positions of trains for the stationoperators, identifying operative and approach-ing trains and their positions within the overallstation area.

• The SNCO Module (Standardised Visual Control

111THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

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System) provides:

– visual display on screen of indications fromitems of signalling equipment (signals, pointsetc);

– the operator’s course of action in case ofequipment failure (so incorporating the “pinkform” procedure).

• The MGPt Module (Maintenance works pro-tection module) permits approximately 20 maintenance operators, as a result of works programming, to present requests simul-taneously through a voice interface.

• The SNIM Module (Standardised ModuleInterface System) ensuring the acquisition offield equipment and links between the new andold generation modules.

• The MFA Module (Alarm Unifying Module) centralises and classifies alarms and directsthem to the operators or to a surveillance centre, depending on their nature.

• The MAINTENANCE Module monitors the system, sending data and functions to the main-tenance and transport operators as required.

In addition, a set of tools facilitates implemen-tation and tests:

• The data preparation software packagePROPAR for signal boxes creates applicationdata to configure the modules of the operatingsystem for the specific application. This config-urability makes the modules site-independent.

• The environmental simulator toolbox SIMEV validates the modules or their application databy simulating the environment of each module.The MINTEX module can host other MMIs notbelonging to the MISTRAL system, but the overall number of applications is limited to 20.

Safety Requirements

In general terms, the failure rate regarding safeprocessing of functions directly linked to the centralised control centre and/or the operator mustbe less than 10-6 per hour and per item of equipment(safety integrity level SIL2).

System Capacity

All MISTRAL system modules are designed so thatthe system as a whole can handle:

• six first-level operator workstations (TrafficInspector), each having up to four screens;

• four second-level operator workstations (TrafficAgent), each having up to four screens;

• processing of 32,000 remote monitoring (RM)commands and 16,000 remote control (PC)commands, with an average of 4.5 changes ofstate (RM) and 2.5 remote controls (RC) per second, and in peak periods 2,000 changes ofstate in 10 seconds;

• storage of 16,000 items of signalling informationfrom the trackside or from the new generationmodules, with complementary data, the timeand the validity level;

• 20 operating configurations;

• 64 remote controlled signal boxes;

• 1,200 train describer berths;

• 1,500 movements per day.

Conclusion and Follow-Up

This new generation was first used at Marseille StCharles PRCI, and is being installed in all new signalboxes from mid-2003.

PROTECTION AGAINST CROSSWINDS

The effects of crosswinds are relatively well-known for cars. In the railway field, the phenomenonfirst became an issue in Japan, with its violenttyphoons and metre-gauge track. It has since beentaken into account by Deutsche Bahn for trains withlightweight leading vehicles, and more recently bySNCF for the new Mediterranean HSL.

The Mediterranean HSL, in comparison with theother HSLs and the conventional Valence-Marseilleline, presents a specific risk of trains being over-turned or overthrown by violent crosswinds as aresult of the following principal factors:

• The line is located in an extremely windy area.The construction standards indicate a maximumwind speed of 183 km/h.

• The existence of a large number of very highbridges (the Angles viaduct is 60m high) andmajor embankments up to 26m high gives a significant accelerating effect to these winds.

In addition to wind screens, a high crosswinddetection and warning system has been imple-mented on the line, comprising anemometer (windmeasuring) stations at various key locations. It was implemented largely in manual mode from 10thJune to 8th October 2001 and subsequently auto-mated.

There are two wind alarm thresholds, derived fromnomographs that gauge the velocity and the angle ofthe mean wind in the area against two different trainspeeds (300 km/h and 170 km/h). When the meanwind calculated from the nomographs exceeds oneof the wind versus train speed thresholds, the system trips speed restrictions to 170 km/h and 80km/h respectively in the affected area (typically 20km each side of the station).

According to the definitive regulations, signal boxstaff are advised of the status of the various cross-wind detection systems via a wall-mounted mimicpanel at the traffic control centre in Lyon and the linescreens in Lyon and in Signal Box 1 in Marseille.

When a wind measuring station fails, it auto-matically trips a speed restriction to 80 km/h in itsarea.

The operators can intervene to cut out a failedwind measuring station and restore line speed inaccordance with their rule book. Permission to takesuch action is given by the train controller, but it canonly be given if there is no storm warning for theperiod corresponding to the expected repair timeand following a report on local conditions given bythe repairman on the spot.

No more than two adjacent measuring stationsmay be cut out at the same time.

112 THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

THE SEISMIC DETECTION SYSTEM

The Mediterranean HSL crosses areas having ahigh seismic risk. These areas represent 70% of thetotal length of the line. To prevent the risk of earthtremors, and in compliance with laws on protectionagainst these risks, SNCF has taken substantialmeasures both in terms of the design of engineeringstructures and monitoring of seismic activity andimmediate action to adapt train operating conditionsaccordingly.

A seismic detection network monitors seismicactivity in the zone at risk in real time. The equipmentused has to comply with severe constraints toensure good performance and eliminate the risk offalse alarms. This type of network can be deployedon any line where there are seismic risks.

The seismic detection system consists of a centraldetection station in Marseille (PC DSI), connected tosensors located along the high-speed line and positioned at certain signal boxes and controlpoints. South of kilometre 535 the new line is divided into “seismic detection zones” coveredeither by the Lyon Traffic Control Centre (four zones)or Signal Box 1 in Marseille (18 zones). These seismic detection zones process information trans-mitted by three successive sensors.

There are two levels of detection, “minor seismicactivity” and “major seismic activity”.

If minor seismic activity is detected, a speed limitation of 170 km/h is applied automatically onboth tracks in the affected area, and a “minor seismic alert” is set in the corresponding signal box.

If major seismic activity is detected, a “generalsection protection” command is issued over bothtracks in the affected area, and a “major seismicalert” is set in the corresponding signal box.

All seismic activity detected is reported, virtually inreal time, to the Environment Monitoring andAnalysis Department (DASE) of the Atomic EnergyCommission (CEA). The DASE checks the recordsproduced by its own sensors and confirms whetheror not there has been a tremor in the area concerned. This area-wide response, YES or NO, isissued automatically within at most ten minutes, andis received at the PC DSI via the MISTRAL Man-Machine Interface (which centralises all alarms) atSignal Box 1 in Marseille. This either confirms all cur-rent seismic alerts, or cancels them automatic-ally(including those within the range of action of theLyons Traffic Control Centre, which is warned auto-matically only in the event of a confirmation, bymeans of a flashing warning light). A seismic alertcan also be cancelled manually, using a device withrestricted access available to the train controller.

If the alert is not confirmed, traffic can resumeunder normal conditions. If minor or major seismicactivity is confirmed, the controller has to report tothe supervision centre and may only cancel thespeed restriction or general section protection command, if necessary subject to restrictions, onthe authority of the civil engineering works manager,following completion of all necessary checks.

In the absence of automatic feedback from the

DASE, the Marseilles traffic controller must use his“CEA-DASE” hotline to contact the DASE (in whichcase the non-confirmation of the alert is transmittedby fax). If appropriate, he will also inform the trafficcontrol centre in Lyon.

In the event of complete system failure, trainspeeds are limited to 170 km/h by instructionsissued from the two signal boxes, at the end of aneight-hour period. The same applies in the case offailure of more than two successive sensors at theend of a 24-hour period.

In the event of a major alert followed by confir-mation of seismic activity by the CEA (or in theabsence of a reply from the CEA), it is necessary tosend maintenance staff to the sites affected in orderto establish under what conditions, if any, traffic canbe resumed. Unless the first members of the maintenance team to reach the spot find that nodamage has occurred and judge that traffic canresume, albeit dead slow or at caution, given thetime needed to inspect the site and repair any damaged infrastructure it will be necessary to organise evacuation of passengers.

THE EAST EUROPEAN HIGH-SPEEDLINE5

MAIN FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS SYSTEM

With 300 km of new line from the Île-de-France(Vaires) to Lorraine (Baudrecourt) operating at 320km/h, the East European High-Speed Line projectwill bring the TGV to over 26 European cities. It willoffer Paris-Reims in 45 minutes, Paris-Metz andParis-Nancy in 1 hour 30 minutes, Paris-Strasbourgin 2 hours 20 minutes and Paris-Frankfurt in 3 hours45 minutes.

One of the reasons why this project is taking tangible shape today, with commissioning sched-uled for 2006, is the very firm political resolve whichlies behind it. Preliminary studies were carried out asearly as 1985, culminating in a public domain decreeon 14th May 1996. It took four more years to line upthe funding for the project, the agreement for fund-ing the line being signed on 7th November 2000.

SNCF and RFF contributed 22% and 17% respectively and, for the first time, the majority of thefunding for a project originates from public funds(61% of the total package).

Given the two main objectives underlying the EastEuropean HSL project, those of regional develop-ment and of consolidating European unity, the project was dependent on strong support from thevarious communities affected. Various analysesshowed clearly that the economic viability of the project would be hard to secure without externalfunding. The topographical context for the EastEuropean high-speed line is similar to the conditionssurrounding the North HSL, although the East HSLreaches out to population catchment zones threetimes less dense.

As a result the project presents a new challenge tothe “owners” or project developers during both the

113THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

5 This chapter is largely based upon Valérie Assayag, The EastEuropean TGV Project (Revue Générale des Chemins de Fer special issue, 2002)

construction phase and the future operations phase.They must meet strict safety and environmentalrequirements as well as ensuring a high standard ofservice, and innovate to anticipate the demands ofcustomers in 2006, all while keeping costs undercontrol.

TWO DEVELOPERS FOR A SINGLE PROJECT

The East European HSL project is a combinationof new infrastructure and services created to enablecustomers to travel under the most comfortable,fastest and safest conditions. For the first time in thehistory of the construction of high-speed lines, thesetwo components are being developed by two separate project developers, RFF and SNCF.

The 1997 railway reform culminating in a separ-ation between the infrastructure manager and therailway operator, is reflected in this project.Nonetheless, because of SNCF’s longstandingexpertise in building high-speed lines and the needto ensure cohesion between infrastructure and operations, the company is active in several areas:

• SNCF will launch operation of the new line. It willdesign and introduce the full chain of servicesoffered to customer requirements, encompass-ing design of reliable and comfortable rollingstock to the choice of destinations, TGV servicefrequencies and pricing as well as defining service quality in stations.

• SNCF is responsible for designing and buildingnew stations for the project (Champagne-Ardenne, Meuse and Lorraine, jointly with RFF)and rolling stock maintenance facilities.

• SNCF together with RFF will make sure that theoptions adopted for the railway infrastructurewill enable safe operation of the lines and meettheir commitments to their customers.

• SNCF will contribute to the project the know-how it has acquired in building high-speed lines.It will also provide support to RFF in building thenew line both by assisting the project developerand as a prime contractor (civil engineering, rail-way equipment, power supply and upgrading ofexisting lines) under RFF responsibility.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The New Line and Upgrading Work onConventional Lines

In the first stage, the project consists in building anew 300 km line between Vaires and Baudrecourt(instead of the 406 km in the initial project betweenVaires and Vendenheim). The East European HSLhas been designed for a potential speed of 350 km/hand will be operated at 320 km/h. The line will beelectrified at 25 kV, 50 Hz and equipped withERTMS, as specified in the European directive onthe interoperability of high-speed trains, togetherwith TVM 430 (the signalling system used on theMediterranean and North European HSLs). Five substations connected to the EDF main grid will provide power supply for the new high-speed line.

It is of interest to note that each new high-speedline in France showed an increase in design speedcompared with the previous one. The North HSLwas designed and built for a maximum speed of

320 km/h and is operated at 300 km/h. TheMediterranean HSL was designed and built for 350km/h and is operated at 300 km/h. The East-European HSL is the next step in this speed build-up.

The line will be connected to existing lines so thatTGVs can work through to stations located in thehearts of the cities served.

RESULTS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNTThe French HSL network (Figure 12) is beyond

doubt a commercial and financial success. In 2004,more than 40 billion passenger-km have beenachieved at a commercial speed higher than 250km/h. Every day SNCF runs more than 500 TGV sets(Figure 13) on time in accordance with its customers’expectations.

Compatibility of the TGV with conventional lines isa major competitive advantage. The basic designdecisions have been confirmed through the variousgenerations of TGVs, and major performanceimprovements have been made in the process.

The most relevant choice concerned the traindesign, an articulated electric multiple unit with apower car at each end. All other aspects of thedesign were fertilised by this initial design feature:aerodynamic performance; overall savings in termsof capital and operating costs; externally-radiatednoise; pressure sealing; minimising the effects ofderailments; improved comfort standards (easy steparrangements, simple inter-vehicle communication,low noise levels, better bogie stability and ability toaccommodate a top-quality suspension system).

On top of this impressive list of assets, the articu-lated design turned out 15 years later to be the mostappropriate for the design of the double-deck TGVsets (Figure 14). Pressure-sealing of the train wasmade easier thanks to the inter-vehicle communi-cation system. There was communication throughthe whole length of the train, so that seating capacity was optimised throughout the two decks.

The experience has demonstrated that the safetycase of the whole system was correct and that thesafety margins decided during the original designand through the various subsequent evolutions weresufficient.

Even if the signalling of the French HSLs hasproved its efficiency, safety and reliability, each newHSL has been the opportunity to make someimprovements, not forgetting the basic principle,“Innovate only when necessary.”

The French HSL system has also demonstratedthat its full potential has not yet been exploited.

We cannot resist the pleasure of mentioning thatthe system holds two illustrious records:

• The speed record of 515.3 km/h achieved morethan ten years ago with an Atlantic TGV set (seeFigure 15).

• An endurance record achieved on 2nd May2001 when one of our “Network" sets (TGV-Réseau – Figure 16) covered the distancebetween Calais and Marseille in 3 hours 29 minutes, in other words at an average of 305

114 THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

km/h – an outstanding performance, especiallysince it was achieved in the midst of regular services between Calais and Valence.

It is of particular interest that these records wereachieved using series production equipment – trainsand lines – tweaked only slightly for the occasion.They were a good opportunity therefore to test the

behaviour of the different components underextreme conditions.

From a technical point of view, these results canbe only achieved under the following conditionsapplied to the signalling equipment.

• Strict respect of technical design rules and test-ing and commissioning procedures, validated

115THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

Figure 15 – TGV at 515.3 km/h

Figure 13 – “Duplex”, “Sud-Est” and “Réseau” Figure 14

Figure 12 – Existing and future French High-Speed Lines

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by experience gained in developing or modifyinga new signalling system;

• Permanent training of maintenance and operating staff. “Safety and reliability are neverto be taken for granted. It’s a day-by-day struggle.”

• Structured monitoring and systematic analysisof the operational behaviour of signalling equip-ment by an Infrastructure Supervision Centre.

RECENT AND FUTURE EVOLUTIONGENERAL TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

New equipment and installations are now widelybased on digital technology.

This technological evolution is unavoidable andbrings, beyond doubt, many advantages.

Nevertheless, we would like to make some comments.

It used to be said that computerised equipmentcan be modified easily. This is very far from the truth.

The newer the equipment is, the sooner it facesobsolescence problems.

To be slightly provocative, a computerised inter-locking costs the same as a relay interlocking, butlasts for only half as long.

We consider obviously that the infrastructure manager has succeeded in getting adequate andcomplete maintenance and technical documentationfrom manufacturers (when still existing), in pre-serving competent maintenance internal staff orsub-contractors and well dimensioned volume ofspare parts.

The historic railway networks are less involved insignalling system design, and are focussing morethan in the past on operational needs and on technical compatibility with existing equipment.

It is a good and normal evolution, but the manufacturers need to have competent, hard-to-please customers.

I hope nobody will forget that:

• railway systems, and especially signalling systems, are highly integrated. The interfaces,technical, organisational and human, are usuallyvery complex and not fully formalised;

• the weight of the past and compatibility with theexisting network are essential issues to be takeninto account;

• safety is very difficult to obtain, and very easy tolose.

GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENTS

Separation of Infrastructure Manager andOperators

The creation of RFF in France and more generallya clearer separation between infrastructure managerand railway operators.

This new organisation involves serious individualbehaviour changes, important organisational adap-tation, a clear definition of responsibilities of eachactor and a real and permanent desire to worktogether for the benefit of railway mode.

Whatever the organisation, everyone has to beconscious that the only pertinent technico-economical criterion is the LCC. It is easy to say, butdifficult to achieve.

Optimising the cost of investment to the detrimentof future operations and maintenance costs must beavoided.

Whatever happens, precautions must be taken to retain experience and specific railway skills, especially in signalling field.

European Standardisation and Interoperability

European standardisation has without any doubthelped signalling manufacturers and railway engi-neers both from the technical and the financial pointof view. Interoperability is an enthusiastic projectand will contribute to the success of the rail trans-port mode in the future.

SNCF and RFF have decided to equip the EastEuropean HSL with ERTMS Level 2 and TVM 430.Some SNCF TGVs will be equipped with ERTMS atthe opening of the East European HSL.

As usual in the railway field, migration from thepresent situation to the future ideal is a very long andcomplicated process. In this perspective, all newTGVs bought by SNCF will be equipped with dual-standard trainborne equipment (TVM 430 andERTMS Levels 1 and 2).

SPECIFIC TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

TGV-R Will Run at 320 km/h Soon

Until now, on all French high-speed lines equippedwith TVM 430, the trackside sends the trains the signalling information required for TGVs to run at 320km/h. The stop sequence is then calculated for fiveblock sections from maximum speed at 300, 270,230, 170 km/h before the train stops. TGV-Réseautrains (TGV-R) recognise these speed levels, but usethem in a restrictive way allowing a maximum speedof 320 km/h. A test track has been created on theSouth-East HSL, and will allow SNCF and RFF toprogress in this field.

TGV-NG at 350 km/h

Studies for a New Generation TGV (TGV-NG)which will run at 350 km/h are already in progress.From the signalling point of view, a stop sequence offive 1,500m-long block sections is planned. Thisimplies a significant increase of braking capacity.Trials have already been performed by SNCF withthe linear eddy current brake, with encouragingresults for the rolling stock engineers. However,there are some problems to be solved (effect on hotbox detectors, rail heating, possible effect on moving point blades).

GSM-R

The general availability of GSM-R will provideinteresting new opportunities for staff protectionduring maintenance works (warning by radio of theapproach of trains).

Integration of ERTMS and SEI

See above.

THE MAIN PROJECTS OF NEW HSL IN FRANCE

See Figure 17.

116 THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

REFERENCESRGCF = Revue Générale des Chemins de Fer

Bernard GUILLEUX, La signalisation des lignesnouvelles – Évolution vers la TVM 430 (RGCFOctober 1991)

Jean-Paul GUILLOUX, TVM 430 enhances traincontrol capacity (Railway Gazette International,August 1992)

Bernard GUILLEUX and JP KIEKEN, L’évolution dela signalisation (RGCF November/December 1996)

Michel DUPUIS, The Atlantic TGV operations system (RGCF special issue, The Atlantic TGV)

Dominique QUERO, Le système MISTRAL decommande/contrôle des postes d’aiguillage (RGCFFebruary 2002)

Dominique QUERO et Van-Tho DOAN, Prise en

compte de l’aléa sismique de la ligne du TGVMéditerranée (RGCF February 2002)

Louis-Marie CLEON, Michel PARROT et Van-ThoDOAN, Les vents traversiers sur la LGV Méditerranée(RGCF February 2002)

Philippe LE BOUAR, The Integrated Interlockingand Signalling System (SEI) (RGCF special issue, 20years of TGV Services, 2002)

Alain BERNHEIM, The hard-fought battles ofFrench high-speed rail to establish itself (RGCF special issue, 20 years of TGV Services, 2002)

Valérie ASSAYAG, The East European TGV Project(RGCF special issue, 20 years of TGV Services,2002)

Gérard VANSTAEN, The safety case for theMediterranean High-Speed Line (RGCF specialissue, 20 years of TGV Services, 2002)

117THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

Figure 17 – Main project of new HSL in France

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DiscussionW Coenraad (Holland Rail Consultant) thanked

Christian for his paper and agreed that safety andreliability are a day-to-day struggle. He questionedthe speaker on interoperability, asking if the old andnew train sets are compatible with the old and newlines and if this presented any problems. He alsorequested clarification of how the MGPt moduleworked.

C Sevestre advised that all of the TGV sets areequipped with TVM430 except the Atlantique TGVsets, which are still equipped with TVM300. Heexplained that the MGPt module allows all of therequests from track-workers to be logged prior tothe possession start time, with permission given tobegin work after the last train has passed thus maximising use of possession times.

J Poré (Alstom) advised that the Atlantique trainsets were also unique with respect to their length,which was based upon the length of the existing station platforms that they were built to serve.

P Bassett (AEAT) noted that the evolution toTVM430 allowed for a 3-minute headway and hewondered what the theoretical speed was to main-tain that headway. He also wondered why there wasa reluctance to develop locomotive operated trainson the high-speed lines.

C Sevestre was unaware of what the theoreticalspeed should be but stated that locomotives werenot developed because their higher axle loads wouldlead to increased wear and tear and the gradientswould prevent full use of the high-speed lines.

An unidentified speaker asked if SNCF, as theyhad developed TVM, the intellectual property rightson the equipment and were paid if it was used else-where in the world.

C Sevestre informed SNCF do get paid each timeTVM equipment is sold pointing out that the mainexport market is to China.

C H Porter (Lloyd’s Register Rail) questioned if thefitting of TVM430 and ETCS on the same trainutilised totally separate items of equipment.

C Sevestre explained that the PCB type equip-ment would be separate but they would be locatedin the same rack noting that all equipment that couldbe common would be.

D Weedon (Network Rail) noted that developmentof the UM71 track circuits utilised rate coding (frequency of modulation) rather than the bettermethod of one modulating frequency with digitalcode superimposed on signal and wondered why.He also asked how the filtering was achieved.

C Sevestre confirmed that rate coding was usedwith filtering achieved by reed equipment onTVM300 and by FFT in TVM430. The only problemwas with response times on short track circuits.

W Coenraad wondered if the older trains were to be retrofitted with the latest equipment for inter-operability purposes.

C Sevestre advised that there were no plans to doso although commercial issues my result in the

Thales TGV sets being modified.

J Poré further explained that various scenarioswere being discussed at the present time withregard to interoperability on other lines.

P Duggan (WRS) was interested in what would bedone differently if the project were starting again.

C Sevestre informed that he had not been afounding member for the high-speed lines and thedecision at the time was taken to innovate only whennecessary, examples being TVM and pantographdevelopment. There is now enough experience tosimplify procedures, an example being the main-tenance of the TVM430.

C Kessell (Centuria Comrail) pointed out that it isdifficult to get people to invest and he questioned ifthe lines were profitable and whether passengernumbers were rising taking into account the com-petition from low-cost airlines.

C Sevestre confirmed that all the lines, exceptEurostar, were profitable and that passenger numbers were rising although not as rapidly as theinitial increase following opening of the lines. He didn’t believe that there was any real impact from thelow-cost airlines in France at the moment; they arenot readily accessible to the general public.

I Mitchell (AEAT) asked what the driver machineinterface would be.

C Sevestre informed that the ERTMS MMI wouldbe utilised, this being the only standard that will beproduced by the supply industry with the possibilityof adding specific controls such as TVM430.

I Harman (Network Rail) questioned the order ofprecedence between TVM430 and ERTMS and if thedriver could switch between them. He also wantedto know how the operators deal with the failure of atrain solely equipped with ETCS.

C Sevestre advised that there are existing pro-cedures, such as “run on sight” for failure situations.

J Poré explained that there is no in-built redundancy, reliance being placed on the reliabilityof the equipment.

P Van de Mare (FGW) wanted to know if ERTMSwas going to be taken into Paris itself or if there wasa changeover point.

C Sevestre explained that there would be achangeover point, generally at the end of the high-speed lines, from where conventional signallingwould be utilised.

J Poré further advised that the TVM fitted lineswould be equipped with ERTMS Level 2 whilst newlines would be ERTMS fitted only; TVM will not be afall-back but is there to provide compatibility withthe new and existing trains.

D Woodland (LUL) observed that the SIL of theERTMS MMI is less than the existing TVM430 display and questioned what mitigation is beingused to justify this.

C Sevestre stated that a different philosophy hasbeen adopted; combining the display with the ATP

System gives an overall safety presentation as highas the TVM display.

G Harris (LUL) wished to know what “permanenttraining” and the “pink” form meant.

C Sevestre informed that, with a large proportionof staff retiring in the near future, a major trainingprogramme will be required to train the new andinexperienced staff. The “pink” form is simply a failure route card.

J Phillips (Metronet Rail BCV) noted that the high-speed lines have been designed for potentiallyhigher speeds and asked what the signalling andcivil engineers would need to do if these higherspeeds were to be introduced.

J Poré explained that the civil engineering of thelines was built for 350 km/h whilst the signalling wasinstalled for 320 km/h. If higher line speeds weredemanded, the length of the signalling block

sections would have to be reviewed.

D McKeown (Independent Consultant) wonderedif, because SNCF is still in reality an integrated railway, approvals could be given by line managerswhereas other railway systems require largeamounts of paperwork and questioned if there wasa market for cross-country high-speed lines thatavoid Paris.

C Sevestre commented that any decision shouldbe taken by competent engineers and not by dogmatically applying rules. He also advised thatthere are already two cross-country lines althoughthese are mainly used for freight traffic.

C H Porter (Past President) thanked C Sevestre foran excellent paper commenting that the UK has hadto rely on French technology to introduce high-speed lines into this country!

119THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNALLING ON THE HIGH-SPEED LINES IN FRANCE

Technical Paperread to the

Midland & North-Western Section

Wednesday 8th September 2004

ABSTRACTIn recent times, the UK railway industry has seen a

number of developments involving new technologyin signalling. Many of the developments haverevolved around the production of light.

This paper considers recent developments froman optical viewpoint. Examples are given of theintroduction of light emitting diodes (LEDs) into rail-way signals and indicators. The benefits of LEDtechnology are discussed, some case studies aregiven, and the process of optical testing and assess-ment is described. A progress report is given of aworking party recently set up at the NationalPhysical Laboratory, chaired by the author, to consider the challenges with optical measurement ofLED clusters.

A BRIEF HISTORYOn the opening day of the first passenger railway

in 1830, Joseph Locke driving the ‘Rocket’ atspeeds considered extremely modest by today’sstandards, was confronted by the Lord Mayor ofLiverpool, who was struck by the train and later diedfrom his injuries. The need for some sort of signallingfor trains was recognised, and the first solution wasthe posting of ‘policemen’ at junctions, stations,level crossings, etc. The ‘policemen’ gave one ofthree handsignals:

• One arm held out horizontally, meaning clear /proceed normally.

• One arm raised above the head, meaning slowdown and proceed with caution.

• Both arms raised above the head, meaningstop.

However, there was no communication between‘policemen’ so the choice of signal was governed bythe time elapsed since the last train had passed.This was often measured using an egg-timer! Theguard of the train had the special responsibility to‘protect’ his train with red flags and detonators.

The early growth of the railway saw attemptsbeing made to develop fixed signals. In the 1830s,the commonest form was a rectangular boardmounted on a post. When the board was displayedhorizontally, this meant ‘danger’ and when pivotedparallel with the track (almost impossible to see), thismeant clear. A positive indication was developed byGWR in about 1840 with a disc as the clear signaland a crossbar as the danger signal. This designincorporated a two-sided lamp with a red light fordanger and a white light for clear.

In 1841 the first ‘semaphore’ signal was intro-duced by the London and Croydon Railway. Theterm ‘semaphore’ was adopted from the then important system of sending messages by means offlags held at different angles to represent the lettersof the alphabet. The semaphore signal incorporatedslotted signal posts and a red light for danger, awhite light for clear, and (interestingly) a green lightfor the new ‘caution’ indication. Semaphore signalswere used widely until the 1870s when a seriousaccident occurred at Abbots Ripton where a semaphore arm froze and could not be reset to danger. Thereafter, the slotted signal posts weregradually abandoned and replaced by two-positionsignals with the horizontal position indicating danger, and the lower quadrant indicating clear. In1893 the use of the green light as a ‘clear’ indicationbecame standardised and red continued as ‘danger’.

During and after the 1914-18 war, various

LED Cluster Technology in

Railway Signalling Applications

Hugh Barton1

1 Independent optical specialist

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LED CLUSTER TECHNOLOGY IN RAILWAY SIGNALLING APPLICATIONS

attempts were made to improve signalling:

• 3-position signals, copied from American prac-tice, involving the use of the upper quadrant.

• The development by the Metropolitan railway of2-position distant signal arms painted yellowand displaying a yellow light at night for caution.

• The introduction of ‘colour light signals’ (search-light and multiple aspect types) which were sufficiently bright to be visible in daylight, thusobviating the need for the semaphore arm.

In 1924 IRSE recommendations emerged:

i 3-position semaphore signals should be abolished, and 2-position signals should work inthe upper quadrant with the ‘off’ indication.

ii Yellow to be adopted as the ‘caution’ colour,and the arms of distant signals to be paintedyellow,

iii Colour light signals may show as additionalpreliminary caution indication of two yellowlights.

The 1924 IRSE recommendations have remainedin place, and were supplemented in 1978 by theintroduction of flashing yellow and double-yellowaspects on the approach to certain high speeddiverging junctions. With the creation of NetworkRail, the BR drawings for some existing signallingequipment were replaced by Company Standards(Specifications and Procedures) which have identified the need for, and led to the developmentof:

• Clear and unambiguous format of signals.

• The development of Long-life SL35 signallamps.

• The innovation and development of alternativetechnologies for the production of light in line-side signals and indicators which use colouredlights.

Signal lamps are traditionally constructed usingtightly coiled tungsten wires supported in an inertgas environment. The life of the lamp is governed bya number of features, including:

• the purity of the tungsten in the filament, and thegas-fill used;

• the quality of construction of the lamp;

• the lamp’s operating conditions (voltage, vibra-tion, ambient temperature).

An example of the percentage of electrical powerconverted to colour light in the red aspect of a

typical colour light signal is shown in Figure 1.

In response to LED signal developments, twoapproved variants of 8,000 hour SL35 lamps haveemerged.

These lamps give the prospect of scheduled lampreplacement, with the associated improvement insignal performance with potentially fewer ‘black-aspects’.

With the development of fibre-optic technology,certain fibre-optic signals were developed in the1980s and early 1990s. The first initiative for thedevelopment of a suite of signals and indicatorsusing fibre-optic technology emerged fromBombardier Transportation in the later 1990s/early2000. These long-feed fibre-optic signals and indicators are currently installed at Paddington andLeeds.

121

Power remaining for opticalParameter Value output (% of input power)Typical input electrical power (SL35 lamp) 24.0 watts 100%Approx output optical power from lamp 5 % of input 5.0%Approx % of light collected by inner (red) lens 35% (calc) 1.8%Typical % of light transmitted by inner (red) lens 8 % (est) 0.14%Typical % of light transmitted by outer (clear) lens 94 % (est) 0.13%Overall percentage of electrical input power converted touseful optical power for the colour light signal red aspect 0.13%

Figure 1 – Conversion of Electrical Power to Optical Power in the Red Colour Light AspectNote that this surprisingly low result is intended to illustrate the electrical inefficiency of the signal, and does not reflect its optical performance.

Figure 2 – Bombardier Long-feed Fibre-optic Signal

In the late 1990s, Howells Railway Productsdesigned an LED colour light signal to mimic theoptical properties of the conventional colour lightsignal. Also, in the late 1990s, Westinghouse RailSystems introduced an LED colour light signal, thedevelopment of which involved:

• optical characterisation testing, ref RT/E/S/10062;

• outdoor viewing tests, leading to developmentof the design of the LED modules;

• further optical characterisation testing and further viewing tests, leading to a trial on theChiltern Line.

Also in the late 1990s, Dorman Traffic Productsdeveloped an LED Position Light Signal, the impactof which on the failure rate of ground position lights(GPLs) can be seen from Figure 3 (information supplied by Network Rail).

In the early 2000s, Network Rail West Coast sponsored a new test site (Asfordby) for trialling LED

LED CLUSTER TECHNOLOGY IN RAILWAY SIGNALLING APPLICATIONS

POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF LED SIGNALSLED signals are widespread in road traffic

signalling and in the railway signalling of other countries including Canada and Australia. There aremany potential benefits of LED signals, including:

• potential for improved service life and reliabilityof signal;

• mechanically robust;

• possible to design without coloured filters,thereby reducing or avoiding phantom;

• scope to increase optical performance;

• scope to improve signal sighting and reducestructures.

DIFFICULTIES IMPLEMENTING THELED TECHNOLOGY

The implementation of LED technology requirescareful engineering. Some of the difficulties are listed below:

• limited service track record, although this isincreasing;

• concerns of stability (especially yellow LEDcolour & intensity with currently available

colour light signals. Extensive observation tests executed in 2001 by Atkins Rail gave invaluable dataon the ‘readability’ performance of the four colourlight signals including:

• Signal House Ltd, under development,

• Westinghouse Rail Systems Ltd, has been trialled on the Chiltern Line;

• Variable Message Signs Ltd, now has NetworkRail approval for trial (see Figure 4);

• Alstom Transport Information Systems Ltd.

Also in the early 2000s, Dorman Traffic Productsdeveloped an LED solution to the Wig-Wag light andto the TPWS/RETB Indicator, which marked theintroduction of blue as a signalling colour.

Most recently, Dorman Traffic Products has developed and obtained network approval for a‘searchlight-style’ LED colour light signal. This signaldelivers all three aspect colours from inter-populated LED clusters in the lower aperture, withyellow light from the upper aperture. Following trialsat Reading Station and Hayes Junction, the signalincorporated a wide-angle viewing feature known asan ‘eyebrow’ due to its 10 o’clock to 12 o’clock radial position (see Figure 5).

122

Figure 3 – Failure Rates Recorded for Position Light Signals through the introduction ofDorman LED Version (shown right)

Figure 4 – VMS LED Signal Figure 5 – Dorman LED Signal

LED CLUSTER TECHNOLOGY IN RAILWAY SIGNALLING APPLICATIONS

AlGaInP LEDs) (see Figure 6);

• failure modes (can be unpredictable);

• exterior optical surfaces may need heating;

• optical measurement techniques (colour, lumi-nous intensity, etc) may need development.

AN ‘LED CLUSTERS’ WORKING GROUPIn order to address the increasingly difficult task of

conducting meaningful optical measurements onprototype LED signals, an LED Clusters WorkingGroup was set up in December 2002, with diversemembership:

• National Physical Laboratory, consultancies.

• LED signal and beacon authorities (Network Railand the General Lighthouse Authority).

• LED suppliers, LED lighting and signal manufac-turers, optical measurement providers.

The aims and objectives of the LED ClustersWorking Group were to:

• Monitor existing and emerging LED develop-ments.

• Understand the optical issues concerning LEDclusters.

• Develop a ‘best practice’ guide for LED clustermeasurement.

• Provide an input to CIE in LED cluster measure-ment.

• Promote the uptake of internationally-agreedbest practice.

• Ensure that relevant organisations are involvedand briefed in the process.

A round-robin measurement exercise was conducted using artefacts kindly supplied byWestinghouse Rail Systems and Marl International.The results of this exercise indicted that significantmeasurement discrepancies were possible between

manufacturers, test houses and the NationalMeasurement Institute. The results were presentedto the annual meeting of the NPL ORM Club (2003),and a Best Practice Guide was initiated. The LEDClusters Working Group identified the possible reasons for the measurement discrepancies anddeveloped each item into a guidance note within thedocument. As the document is nearing completion,a second round-robin measurement session isunderway to validate the Best Practice Guide.Preliminary results suggests that closer agreementhas been achieved between the participants. It isanticipated that the Best Practice Guide will beissued in late 2005, vie CIE Division 2, TC 2-50. CIEis the Commission Internationale De L’Eclairage(International Commission on Illumination). For further information visit:

http://www.npl.co.uk/optical_radiation/ormclub/fig/

and

http://cie2.nist.gov/documents/CIE%20D2%20quadrennial%20report.htm

CONCLUSIONThe prospect of new technologies for the produc-

tion of light in railway signals can bring significantbenefits in terms of performance, reliability andwhole-life cost, but the technical challenges inimplementing such technology should not be under-estimated. The development of signals using LEDand possible other future optical technologies needsto match the anthropometry of the driver population,not the other way round.

ABOUT THE AUTHORHugh Barton is an independent optical specialist

with 14 years’ experience in the railway industry.

Hugh is the UK representative for CIE Division 4,Lighting for Signalling and Transport, and can becontacted at hugh@opticonsultinguk.com.

123

Figure 6 – Illustration of the theoretical difficulty achieving yellow colour compliancewith yellow AllnGaP LEDs (chart by C Gutteridge)

RAILWAY CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

track and signalling improvements were undertakenin the vicinity of the new station.

In view of the massive increase in population inHong Kong arising from the exodus of people fromwhat was then Communist China, the HK Govern-ment had in the 1970s embarked on a project of creating new towns in the area known as the NewTerritories, this is area of Hong Kong from north ofKowloon to the border with China.

The concept was that these new towns would beself-sufficient; the people who would be resident inthese towns would also have their place of work inthe same locality. However, the business communitydid not go along with this idea and consequently themajority of the new town residents had to travel intourban Kowloon and Hong Kong Island to their placeof employment.

Many of these new towns were served by the KCRand the HK Government consequently authorised aproject to double track and electrify (25 KV) the linefrom Hung Hom to the border with China to improvethe transportation links to these new towns. The signalling system was replaced by 3/4 aspect colourlights with track circuit block controlled from anentrance/exit panel located in the terminal station atHung Hom. Relay based interlockings operated fromthe Hung Hom control panel, via Westinghouse S1and S2 remote control systems, were sited at specific locations, eg the EMU maintenance facilityat Fo Tan.

My involvement with KCR commenced inNovember 1982. After spending approximately 25 years with British Rail I decided that a changemight achieve my hopes of further promotion in mychosen career of signal engineering and this coincided with a vacancy for a Chief S&T Engineer

124

Before I deal with my experiences in Hong Kong itmaybe helpful to those members who are notacquainted with Hong Kong to outline the history ofthe Kowloon-Canton Railway.

The Kowloon-Canton Railway, or the KCR as it ismore commonly known, was the British section ofthe rail line from Hong Kong to Canton, or as it isnow known Guangzhou. The line opened in 1910and was a single line with passing loops at somestations and the signalling system utilised tabletmachines and semaphore signals.

The initial traction was steam to be later replacedby diesel. The terminal station in Hong Kong(Kowloon) was located adjacent to the Star Ferry(which provides a ferry service between Kowloonand Hong Kong Island) and hence a first step inachieving an integrated transport system was born.

As you are no doubt aware, Hong Kong is verymuch a place driven by the almighty dollar and inthis respect the owners of the KCR, namely theHong Kong Government, realised that the landoccupied by the rail line along the waterfront inKowloon was extremely valuable for property development. Consequently a deal was done andthe stretch of line from the terminal station at StarFerry to a location at Hung Hom was sold to a consortium of property developers with the provisothat the property developers construct a new terminal station in Kowloon.

A new terminal station was therefore constructedin the Hung Hom district of Kowloon, adjacent to theKowloon portal of the Cross Harbour road tunnel.This would enable rail passengers to access HongKong Island by changing to taxis or cross-harbourbuses. In association with the construction of thenew terminal station (opened in 1975), an element of

Technical Paperread to the

York Section

Thursday 9th December 2004

Kowloon – Canton Railway Corporation

“Signal Engineering to Corporate Planning”

Syd Barley (KCR Retired)

(CS&TE) with the Kowloon Canton Railway in HongKong, which I duly applied for and was ultimatelysuccessful.

By November 1982 the double tracking, electri-fication and new signalling for KCR had been completed up to and including the Fo Tan EMUmaintenance facility, and a three-car EMU servicehad been introduced between Shatin and Kowloon(Hung Hom terminal) approximately 1/3 of the totalline length of 34km. My remit as the CS&TE was toimplement a maintenance organisation for signallingand telecommunications and as an after thought theautomatic revenue collection system (ARC) was alsoincluded. Nobody was quite sure how to deal withthe ARC and as it utilised technology similar in somerespects to the latest telecomms technology it wastherefore decided that the S&T organisation shouldassume responsibility for the maintenance of theARC equipment.

My major role as the CS&TE in fact, became inconvincing the KCR management that you need toemploy the right calibre of person to undertake themaintenance of S&T and ARC equipment. I like tothink that I was successful in this respect as a veryprofessional department was created utilising bothlong-serving KCR staff together with suitable individuals from outside the railway industry.

With regard to the technical aspect of my position,I convinced the management that we had the capability to undertake minor changes to the signalling system resulting from later changes to thetrack layout. In the early days the changes to thedrawings etc had to be contracted out to the originalsignalling system provider, ie WBS, but as time wenton we did implement a small drawing office sectionwithin the main civil engineering drawing office.Major issues on the maintenance side were the decisions to replace the WBS electro-hydraulic pointmachines by style 63 machines on the main linepoint layouts due to continued difficulties with thepoint detection micro switches. Increased frequencyof the EMU service meant that delays due to pointfailures could no longer be tolerated.

The single rail dc track circuits in the entrance toBeacon Hill tunnel, through the Lion Rock hills, werereplaced by axle counters (SEL). The tracks in thetunnel are laid on a concrete raft and during periodsof heavy rain the track circuits in the tunnel entrancewould fail approximately one hour after the rain commenced. If the rain continued for several hoursthe track circuits further in the tunnel would also fail.Replacing these track circuits by axle counters over-came the problem. Although it was not 100% proved(to do this would have meant digging up the concrete raft) we were of the opinion that the trackcircuit failures resulted from the fact that the insu-lated rail pads were contaminated with a mixture ofbrake dust and brine which when wet provided apath for the DC track current via the rail spikes andthe reinforcing rods in the concrete raft. KCR freighttrains operating from Lo Wu (border station withChina) to Kowloon in addition to hauling standardtype boxcars also hauled a mixture of refrigeratedwagons (brine being utilised for refrigeration) and

wagons of live pigs. Hence the brine and other “liquid” from the pigs was deposited on the rail padstogether with brake dust. The EMU drainage fromthe roof of each car was at each end and as the trainentered the tunnel the rainwater was also depositedon the rail pads resulting in the eventual failure of thetrack circuits. Following the replacement by axlecounters for the track circuits on both lines enteringthe tunnel no further failures occurred.

Three other major projects were initiated duringmy time as CS&TE, the major one being completedafter the next step in my career with KCR.Approximately three years after the new EMU service was fully implemented between Kowloonand Lo Wu (July 1983), four SPADs occurred withinthe space of two months. Without going into detailsregarding each incident, it was decided that suchincidents could not be tolerated and managementagreed that we should investigate the provision ofATP (the system eventually being commissioned inthe late 1990s).

The second project was carried out in co-operation with the MTRC and it was the creation ofthe stored value ticket for the ARC system.Passengers were able to have their tickets encodedup to a total value of HK$200 and the ticket could beused on both KCR and MTR. Cubic Western Datathe original supplier of ARC equipment to both KCRand MTR undertook the development of the storedvalue ticket.

The third and to me the most interesting was theprovision of a train radio system. The need for thetrain radio system was driven by the Corporation’sdecision to move to “Driver Only Operation” and tobe able to compile a performance specification for adedicated radio link we sought advice from BR,MTRC, radio suppliers etc. We discussed with theHK Postmaster General the allocation of frequenciesfor the radio system we required, advising them thatsimilar systems to the type we required utilised frequencies in the 450Mhz range. We were advisedthat it was not possible to allocate frequencies in thisrange in Hong Kong as these were reserved for useby government security organisations. Frequenciesin the 130-150Mhz were eventually allocated and asomewhat sketchy performance specification wascompiled. Following a tendering procedure a contract was awarded to Cable & Wireless (HK Ltd)to design and install the train radio system. The radioside of the contract was OK; it was the computercontrol system that presented the problems. C&Wcontracted out the software development to a localsoftware company who, after several months,walked away from the project, as they were unableto design a system that provided our requirements.C&W took over the software development them-selves and even after commissioning of the trainradio system it was several months later before allthe “bugs” were overcome. Whilst the contract document contained clauses specifying liquidateddamages for failing to deliver a working system bythe agreed completion date these were not invokedby the Corporation as it was considered that littlebenefit would be gained by adopting a confron-tational attitude.

125KOWLOON – CANTON RAILWAY CORPORATION “SIGNAL ENGINEERING TO CORPORATE PLANNING”

In 1986 KCRC (the HK government decided KCRshould become a Corporation in Feb 1983, with aManagement structure similar to MTRC) embarkedon the first of what was to become a regular organi-sational change. I together with other senior man-agers were deemed surplus to requirements as oth-ers absorbed our respective departments.

I was offered the position of DevelopmentManager in the fledgling Project Division and subse-quently found myself responsible for managing consultants charged with the design and construc-tion of a second station in the new town of Tai Po.The HK Government was continuing to develop andexpand the new towns in the New Territories andidentified the opportunity to build further high-riseblocks in the north end of Tai Po adjacent to the KCRrail line. The population of these new high-riseblocks would be 50,000. The Corporation wasrequired to operate on prudent commercial lines andconsequently undertook an exercise to determinethe projected patronage for a new station construct-ed within the new housing development. Taking intoaccount the new population, together with existingdevelopments that would fall within the station’scoverage, it was deemed to be financially beneficialto construct the new station. To cut a long storyshort, the station was built but not before severalproblems had to be overcome, the main one beingagreeing a completion date so that the station wouldbe available for use when the first new occupants ofthe high-rise apartments moved in.

The HK Government indicated that their contractors would complete the first of the newblocks earlier than originally planned and it wastherefore imperative that the rail station was completed to coincide with their completion dates.After discussions with the KCRC Project andFinance Directors, it was agreed that I would initiatediscussions with our consultants and main con-tractor to determine the overall cost of acceleratingthe station construction programme. The overallcost was approximately HK$ 1,000,000 (£100,000)which by today’s figures is not very much but in themid 1980s with a fledgling Corporation representeda fairly substantial outlay. It was agreed we wouldpay the acceleration costs and the station was duly completed to meet the date required by Government. Unbeknown to KCRC was that theGovernment ended up in dispute with their housingcontractor (Korean) and as a result the stationopened without any of the high-rise blocks beinginhabited. We did, however, provide a much neededservice for the already established developments inthe general area. I would add that the Governmentdeclined our request to consider penalty paymentsfor their failure to complete as agreed! From thisexercise I gained a detailed knowledge of how mycivil engineering colleagues operate and to a lesserdegree the intricacies of civil engineering.

Shortly after completion of this station project afurther reorganisation was implemented by KCRCand the Engineering Division, to which the fledglingproject section belonged, was replaced by thePlanning & Project Division and my days as a hands-on Project Manager were finished. I was appointed

to the position of Senior Planning Manager.

However, I was secretly relieved, as all the projectwork being undertaken in those early days was primarily civil works and having had the experiencewith the new station I had come to the conclusionthat civil engineering was basically digging holesand pouring concrete!!

Again three major topics stand out during my timewithin the planning organisation:

1 The expansion of the main freight depot, which issituated adjacent to the Hung Hom terminal station in Kowloon and has waterfront access toHong Kong harbour. One of the HK Government’sways of obtaining land for various projects was byreclaiming parts of Hong Kong harbour. In thisrespect it was agreed that approximately 30hawould be reclaimed immediately adjacent to theKCR freight yard for the primary purpose ofexpanding the rail freight facility. The CommercialDirector of KCRC at this time was extremely profit-orientated and decided that if a concretepodium was constructed above the new rail freightfacilities it presented the opportunity for a majorproperty development project to be undertaken.To avoid boring you with the discussions, financialjustification etc that took place with Governmentover at least four years after this proposal for covering the proposed expanded freight depotwas put to the Government, the outcome was thatKCR was eventually allocated only 5ha of thereclaimed land for the expansion of the freightdepot. My part in this long drawn out project wasto manage the design of the rail facility includingthe preparation/award of contract to our designconsultants. The major facility within the expanded depot was to provide for containerloading/unloading (containers were going to andcoming from China). Because the rail depot had awaterfront frontage access to what is known as“Mid-Channel” containerisation by barge was easily available. Instead of docking at the majorcontainer port in Hong Kong, smaller vesselsdocked in the harbour and the containers were off-loaded to sea-going barges for transfer to land,thus avoiding the high costs imposed by the container companies for use of their port facilities.In closing, I would add that a podium was con-structed above the 5ha expansion and serviceapartments, office blocks and a hotel have recently been completed by a partnership ofKCRC and one of the major HK property develop-ment companies.

2 At the commencement of this paper I made reference to a spate of SPADs that occurred in theearly days of the EMU operation and the suggestion that KCR should give consideration tothe provision of ATP. In my capacity as the SeniorPlanning Manager I had to prepare the planningbudget on a 5-year basis and included within thisbudget was a cost for undertaking identified feasibility studies. Topping my list was the feasibility of overlaying an ATP system on to theexisting signalling system and the need to improvethe headway as it was becoming apparent that

126 KOWLOON – CANTON RAILWAY CORPORATION “SIGNAL ENGINEERING TO CORPORATE PLANNING”

with a continuing increase in passenger volumeKCRC would have to not only increase train lengthbut also increase train frequency. A study wastherefore undertaken by consultants appointed bythe Planning Section and as a result a contractwas awarded one year later for the production of adetailed specification for the design of an ATP system including improvements to the headway toallow for a 24 12-car EMU trains per hour operation in the peak periods.

Although my involvement in this project ceasedafter the feasibility study report was produced, Ifollowed its progress up to the final commission-ing in 1998/1999, some 12 years after the initialidea was floated. The system that was providedwas designed and installed by Alstom and is verysimilar to the prototype installed on the formerWestern Region main line out of Paddington.

3 The project for which I like to think that my smallorganisation was primarily responsible for its commencement is the West Rail line linking theNorth West New Territories (NWNT) and the urbanarea of Kowloon. The initial ideas were first discussed in late 1990/early 1991 and the firstrevenue earning trains commenced service inDecember 2003. The original proposals by KCRCwere based on constructing a new freight singleline from the Chinese border to the Hong Kongmarine container terminals to capture the expand-ing container freight between China and HongKong. However, when the Government was madeaware of these proposals they requested theCorporation to expand the studies to include theprovision of a passenger service linking the newtowns in the NWNT with the urban area. Problemswith the existing bus services and road congestionwere becoming extremely embarrassing for theGovernment, who were the responsible party inpersuading people to move to the new towns withthe proviso that good transport links would beprovided to the urban areas. Consequently thestudy was expanded and included the provision ofan electric multiple unit train service to meet theGovernment’s requirement with stations beinglocated in the principal new towns in the NWNT.

Following completion of these initial studies,which included both technical and financial implications, the Government requested theCorporation to make a formal submission toimplement the project. Such a submissionrequired a detailed alignment of the new rail line,exact location of new stations, type of traction,environmental impact assessment, constructioncost estimates, revenue estimates including possible property development revenue and manyother items relevant to such a major undertaking.Our Chairman/Chief Executive at that time, whichI am sure many of you may know, Mr Kevin Hyde,decided that it was necessary to engage the services of qualified consultants to undertake thetechnical/environmental/financial preparation ofthis Government submission. Bechtel wereappointed following a tendering exercise to undertake the technical/environmental aspectsand similarly HSBC were appointed to compile the

requisite financial document. In this respectBechtel provided construction cost data to HSBCand KCRC financial division produced projectedrevenue data and maintenance costs.

It was decided that the new line would bereferred to as West Rail and not the PortPassenger line, which, in hindsight, was a verygood decision because the freight proposals havenot materialised. The new freight line was plannedon the basis that Hong Kong was the southernoutlet for China’s developing manufacturingmachine and this together with containerisationwas the major opportunity for KCRC to expand itsfreight business. However, for the project to succeed it was essential to have the support of themarine container terminal operators and clearlyshow that moving containers by rail was beneficialin both time and cost. To cut a long story short, theterminal operators were of the opinion that thenew line and rail container terminal were 15 yearslate and that the land designated for the rail freightterminal could be put to better use as a containerstorage area to support their dockside facilities. Inaddition, the cost of road-hauling the containersfrom Shenzhen (mainland China) 34km from theHong Kong container terminals was still con-sidered to be competitive with KCRC’s rail proposals. Hence West Rail was developed as apassenger line only.

The appointment of Bechtel eventually led tosome unpleasant discussions etc with Govern-ment, initiated originally by Hong Kong’s appointed legislators, and this ultimately resultedin that Kevin’s contract was not extended follow-ing his six years in charge of KCRC. The newChairman/Chief Executive, Mr K Y Yeung, a formerGovernment Secretary for the Treasury, decidedthat Bechtel’s services would not be required following completion of the submission toGovernment and that the subsequent manage-ment of the project should be undertaken by an in-house organisation. Consequently an in-houseorganisation was duly set up and it consistedmainly of ex-MTRC project staff and those members of Bechtel who had decided theyenjoyed the work in Hong Kong and hence decided to transfer to KCRC.

Having assisted Bechtel in the preparation ofthe Government submission document, myinvolvement with the West Rail project also ceasedon the formation of the in-house project organis-ation. I returned to the Planning & Project Divisionand was appointed to the position of GeneralManager Infrastructure responsible for the preparation of the Corporation’s proposal toGovernment for the implementation of the “EastRail Extensions”. This project (to be com-missioned mid-end of 2004) consists of extendingthe Kowloon-Lo Wu line from the present terminalstation in Hung Hom back to approximately theoriginal terminus in the area close to the Star Ferryterminal. In addition, a new line is to be con-structed from Tai Wai to Ma On Shan. The teamundertaking the preparation of this proposal wascomprised of consultants and in-house staff and it

127KOWLOON – CANTON RAILWAY CORPORATION “SIGNAL ENGINEERING TO CORPORATE PLANNING”

was made very clear by Government that the complete proposal (technical and financial) shouldbe completed within a 6-month timescale. Thiswas duly achieved and Government agreementwas received to take the project forward to imple-mentation. I remained with this project in the earlydays of implementation until I was moved to theteam undertaking the preparation of theCorporation’s proposal for a new line from Shatinto Hong Kong Island. This proposal was unique inthat KCRC was in competition with MTRC toundertake this project. Should KCRC be success-ful it would enable KCRC to have a direct line toHong Kong Island, which has always been perceived as MTRC territory. The proposal was

submitted just prior to my retirement in December2001 and, after much deliberation by Government,the project was awarded to KCRC much to thedisgust, I might add, of MTRC. The KCRC proposal was to extend the new Ma On Shan-TaiWai line to Hong Kong Island but I now understandthat it has been decided to extend the existingEast Rail line instead.

I should add that at this moment in time the HKGovernment is studying a proposal to merge thetwo rail corporations and consequently the furtherdevelopment of the Shatin to Hong Kong Islandhas been put on hold pending the outcome of themerger proposal.

128 KOWLOON – CANTON RAILWAY CORPORATION “SIGNAL ENGINEERING TO CORPORATE PLANNING”

INTRODUCTIONThis has been a year so full of highlights. Members

in our Sections and Committees around the world,together with the Institution’s permanent staff, haveachieved: a membership of over 4,000; LicensingScheme compliant with its procedures; the Body ofKnowledge produced; more guidance issued onpreparing for the Institution’s Examination; highestnumber of modules sat in the Examination; publi-cation of “Quality of Service in Railway TrafficManagement Systems” by the InternationalTechnical Committee; the 100th Edition of IRSENews, re-launch of the Younger Members’ activities;an enhanced website; accreditation to register engineers of all grades with the Engineering Council;new South East Asia Section being planned; and theincorporation of the new trading company IRSEEnterprises Limited. Most of these happenedbecause of things that were planned before the yearstarted and I wish to thank all those who had laid thefoundations for these successes, and particularly mypredecessor – Colin Porter.

Ninety-two years after the Institution was foundedit is still most active in fulfilling the ‘objects’ set in theoriginal Memorandum of Association: “The advance-ment for the public benefit of the science and practice of signalling (which... shall mean the wholeof the apparatus, electrical, mechanical or other-wise, methods, regulations and principles wherebythe movement of railway or other traffic is controlled)...” In my travels round the local and international sections this core activity was much inevidence, to the obvious benefit of railways of alltypes around the world. All Sections held interestingprogrammes of meetings and some also held othervisits and functions. I wish to thank sincerely theauthors of the papers presented at my request inLondon. They rose to my challenge to record thefundamentals of railway control and communica-tions as relevant to today's technology. Systemssuch as ERTMS will only be a success if we addressthe specifications and the detail of their application.This depends on understanding the fundamentals. Insome papers and on our visits we have seen histor-ical means of achieving principles. This was notintended as an opportunity for nostalgia, but as alesson in simplifying the engineering through think-ing about the requirements. It is difficult to see thebasic principles in modern systems where the logicis buried in a microchip. It takes professional disci-pline to minimise complexity with all the temptingcapability of today’s technology. This discipline isessential if systems are to achieve dependable quality standards safely and economically. The

papers in this year’s Proceedings will form a route-map for those achieving the Institution’s ‘objects’ for tomorrow’s railways. Given the changes to cab-signalling of one kind or another that is now gathering pace, the changes to train detection methods, and the revolution in communications systems, it is my hope that the Proceedings for thisyear will give those new to the industry an introduc-tion to the basic ideas so that they may benefit morefrom understanding all the other IRSE publications.While I thank the authors for recording these funda-mental concerns, I look forward to the Institutioncontinuing the debate about the principles and practices to achieve them.

At our Annual Dinner in the Savoy Hotel, almost500 members and their guests from the industryheard from our Chief Executive, Ken Burrage, aboutthe initiatives being taken by the Institution to helpour industry and our members, and he remindedemployers of the benefits to them of permitting theirstaff to take full advantage of being involved in theInstitution’s activities.

The Convention in Ireland took members andguests to Dublin with a day trip to Belfast. Throughthe kind hospitality of Iarnród Éireann and NorthernIreland Railways members saw how investment intransport was being facilitated through new signalling and communications systems and that awide range of technologies were giving good service. This allowed members to remind them-selves of the fundamental principles that the equipment has to fulfil and contrast different ways ofachieving these requirements. The Training School inBelfast also showed the benefits of investing in people. Guests enjoyed seeing the countryside inIreland and visiting a few of the many attractions inthat country.

Visits were also arranged to Malmo to visit theOresund Link and to Manchester to see the new signalling in that area. The Oresund Link was amodel case of systems integration as we saw all thedisciplines well interfaced. This had been a particu-lar challenge because of the differences in signallingprinciples, ATP and telecommunications systems inSweden and Denmark. In Manchester the ACC interlocking system cross-accepted from Italy toEdgeley was described and visited, as was therecently refurbished mechanical signalling inStockport. Again, this demonstrated the value ofsystems integration methods and the need to understand the contrasting approaches to signallingsystems to achieve successful operation.

At the end of May, I visited the North American

129

The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers(Incorporated 1912)

Ninety-Second Annual Report

1st January to 31st December 2004

Section at their AGM in Nashville. Bill Scheerer wasthanked for his leadership during this new Section’sfirst year and they then set themselves a busyschedule of events and tasks for the year ahead.Among these were the production of a textbook onNorth American Signalling and Telecommunicationspractice and a look at how Competence Manage-ment might be introduced to a continent where it isimpractical to insure the operation of the Institution’sLicensing Scheme. In August I visited the SouthernAfrican Section whose members are achieving valuable technical developments and progress withnew schemes despite the many difficulties faced bythe railways in Southern African. I was particularlyimpressed by their approach to interlocking design.November saw me visiting Hong Kong where theexemplary punctuality of all the railway services was impressive. The control centre systems weredesigned to manage traffic regulation and the resultwas obvious improvement in capacity and regularity.The railways worked with a wide range of tech-nologies in their signalling and telecommunicationsequipment but each suited its purpose and the staffwere very versatile at maintaining the systems. Theinterest in the IRSE Examination in Hong Kong wasjust one indication of their professional approach. Atrip into China saw the growth in capability there andthe Hong Kong Section is increasing the awarenessof the Institution in China. I will be visiting Australiaafter this is written, but the plans for the AustralianConvention in Sydney this year indicate that theSection there is thriving too. So, much good work isbeing done in all of these non-UK Sections, but thereis still scope for some of the lessons to be shared. Itis good also to see the plans being made for startinga new section in South East Asia.

In the UK, I have visited all the local Sections andfound much of interest. The two Seminars held thisyear raised ideas to be developed. The Seminar onInterfaces was well supported by the otherInstitutions who sent speakers to add to those fromthe IRSE and contacts were made to enable suchco-operation to continue. The Seminar onCommunications showed that this is a subject that isvery much part of signalling but needing its ownspecial approach if it is to satisfy the railway require-ments without using specially designed systems.

During the year, we were advised that theInstitution of Electrical Engineers and the Institutionof Incorporated Engineers were forming a newInstitution. While we were invited to join this venture,Council decided to consider all the implications andunderstand more about how this new Institution wasto function and how the IRSE's objectives might beachieved if we did join. The Younger Members helda debate on the issue that addressed the needs oftoday’s railway engineers as their careers developedin the current railway industry structure. A fewrecognised that there were benefits for those engineers who moved between industries, but themajority felt that they appreciated the specialistinterest achieved by the IRSE and that dual mem-bership was available to those who felt the need forbroader activities. This debate will continue as thenature of the new Institution becomes more

apparent. The IRSE has worked well with both theIEE (at its Vacation School particularly) and with theIIE who act as employer for our staff, help with registering Chartered Engineers, producing IRSENews and co-operate in many other ways. We wishthe new Institution well if the IEE and IIE membersdo vote for its formation, and look forward to co-operating with it.

The Institution has responded to a number of con-sultation requests, sometimes in our own name andsometimes as part of the Railway Engineers Forum.These subjects have included views on theGovernment proposals concerning the organisationof the Railway in the UK and the Rail AccidentInvestigation Board. I thank Clive Kessell for hiswork representing us on, and Chairing, the RailwayEngineers Forum. The IRSE has updated its positionpaper on ATP and has supported the continueddevelopment of ERTMS.

As the Institution grows, so its finances becomemore complex. The Institution has now established awholly owned trading company, IRSE EnterprisesLimited, to ensure an appropriate treatment for VATpurposes is secured for the benefit of the Institution.Any surplus that trading company generates will begift aided back to the IRSE.

The IRSE Examination is another activity that isthe victim of its own success! More people sat modules this year than ever before and this createsa large workload for those who volunteer to do themarking. A working group has been set up under the T&D Committee to develop ideas aimed at preserving the standards and effectiveness of theexam but making it more efficient to administer. Topermit those studying under the current arrange-ments to complete all their modules, and to developthe revised study material, the new arrangementswill not commence before 2008 and there will betransition arrangements. One idea being investi-gated is to make the first module in a format suitedto be sat “on-line” to enable candidates to sit thiscompulsory module at any time of the year. It ishoped particularly that this will make the exam moreaccessible to members outside the UK.

This year a candidate from Hong Kong has wonthe Thorrowgood Scholarship. Congratulations aredue to all there and in Australia and in other overseasexam centres where the examination was taken. Ithank all members who help those studying for theexam, in their workplace or in study groups.Competence is a vital part of achieving the “publicbenefit” from the Institution’s activities. Decision-makers in railways need to be fully aware of thelong-term need to develop experience to add to theoretical studies when addressing the practicalmatters necessary to run reliable services on efficient railways. It is good to see a growing numberof applicants for Student membership from companies giving training to new recruits.

As part of its activities for this year, the AuditCommittee has conducted a survey of non-UKmembers to see how they benefit from their membership and to understand how they feel thatthey may be better served. This emphasised the

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT130

important role played by IRSE News in keeping allmembers informed of each others’ activities, and thewebsite received many comments showing howimportant this is to non-UK members.

Another promising development has been the re-launch of the Younger Members’ activities. Nolonger split off into their own section, they now provide activities for all the younger members of theInstitution. Thanks are due to John Haile and theYounger Members’ Committee for all the effort theyhave put into making the events they held this yearso successful. In September they held a seminar ontrain-borne signalling systems and in January theyfollowed their AGM with the discussion on the futureof the Institution and the Examination Review. Bothevents were well attended.

With over 4,000 members, the Institution is nowstronger than ever to fulfil its objectives. The pressures for transport continue to grow and modern control systems will enable railways toadapt and become appreciated. Despite 92 years ofsuccess there remains much to be done and theInstitution continues to develop its service to itsmembers and its industry. I record my good wishesto Jacques Poré as the new President and to theInstitution in all its activities.

MEMBERSHIPThe table below gives the numbers in each class

of membership at the end of the year.

The total membership at the start of the year was3,918 and there continued to be a gradual increaseduring the year to a total membership of 4046 at31st December 2004, ie an overall increase of 3.3%.All the Corporate classes of membership eithermaintained their numbers or showed an increase. Itwas also pleasing to see that the overseas membership had increased its numbers and that themajority of the Accredited Technicians recruited as aresult of last year’s campaign had retained theirmembership.

The Membership Committee met nine timesthroughout the year and processed over 300 appli-cations or transfers of membership. Council isappreciative of the efforts of the Membership

Manager, Mr Derek Edney, and the members ofMembership Committee for their work in con-sideration and recommendations to Council of applications for membership and/or registration.

Obituary

It is with regret that the Council records thedecease of the following 7 members during the yearP R G Guyatt, A N McKillop, (Fellows); R Chase, DKennett, P Harris, WR Smith, (Associate); and KKetchen, (Accredited Technician).

Council was saddened by the loss of all thesemembers; a number of who were strong supportersof the Institution for a considerable number of yearsand in various ways had contributed significantly tothe Institution’s work.

LONDON HQ OFFICEThe Institution staff continued to occupy modest

office accommodation on the 3rd floor in Savoy HillHouse. The accommodation comprises four smalloffices. A small storeroom is also available to storethe Institution's publications, stationery, publicitystand, archives etc. The office is normally staffedMonday to Friday, 0900 to 1800, UK time, and outside these hours messages can be left on ananswer machine. Communication via e-mail or fax ispossible at all times. The telephone system is connected to the UK railway telecommunicationsnetwork permitting calls to be made on this systemas well as via the UK national telecommunicationsoperators.

The staff changes implemented in November 2003and mentioned in last year's report have proved tobe successful.

Linda Mogford as Administration Manager continues to be the initial point of contact forrequests and queries from members and non-members alike. She is also responsible for keepingthe membership database up to date and progress-ing membership subscription payments.

Karen Gould has very successfully managed theheavy workload of the Licensing Scheme. Assistingher in this task were Roger Button, Linda Collins andLinda O’Shea plus temporary clerical help asrequired.

Richard Hobby, as Training and DevelopmentAssistant, has managed the Institution’s T&D activities and provided the administrative support forthe professional examination.

Mark Watson-Walker as System Manager hasensured that the Institution’s IT systems, upon whichthe management of the Institution’s membershipand licensing activities heavily depend, have beenmaintained and developed to provide members andlicence holders with good quality services.

Derek Edney, continued his excellent work asMembership Manager and deals with all member-ship and Engineering Council registration matters.He also manages the Institution’s recruitment andpublicity activities.

Martin Govas, having recently retired from his full-time railway employment, has now joined the HQteam where he continues to serve as the Institution’s

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 131

ChangeClass Total on

2003

Corporate MembersHonorary Fellows 20 0Fellows 429 +206Members 1,178 +013Associate Members 894 +043Total Corporate 2,521 +062

Non-Corporate MembersHonorary Fellows 3 00Companions 18 –002Associates 609 +111Students 243 –024Accredited Technicians 652 –019Total Non-Corporate 1,525 +066

Total UK Membership 2,891 +094Total Overseas Membership 1,155 +034Total Membership 4,046 +128

Treasurer as well as providing other financial adviceand expertise as required.

Ken Burrage, as the Chief Executive Officer of theInstitution, continues to be responsible for managingthe London office and for implementing the decisions of Council. He also provides the focalpoint of contact for other institutions and externalorganisations, liaising with the Engineering Council(UK), Government departments and the chief execu-tive officers of other professional bodies to makecertain that the IRSE viewpoint is heard. He is alsoresponsible for ensuring that the legal requirementsof the Institution’s Articles of Association, theRegistrar of Companies, and the CharitiesCommission are met.

FINANCEThe Institution made a modest surplus on its

overall activities in 2004. The Licensing Scheme surplus was £4,660 and that on the Main activities£4,367.

Income from subscriptions was markedly ahead ofthe increase attributable to the small increase inrates implemented during the year. This was a resultof the increased membership numbers. The lowerincome from conventions compared with 2003 wasmatched by a similar drop in expenditure. NoASPECT conference was held during the year.Secretarial & Accommodation expenses were higherbecause fewer administration costs could be allocated to Other Activities. The contract for thework included in Other Activities is near completionand there is little likelihood of similar work in the nearfuture. Thus action has been taken to avoid theongoing overhead costs. Postage costs continuedto increase due to the larger membership and theaverage size of IRSE News. The cost of producingthe Railway Telecommunications textbook was offset by reversing the provision for £10,000 made in 2003. The balance sheet has been adjustedaccordingly.

Towards the end of the year the investment port-folio management contract was transferred toRathbones. In doing this £897 held as cash at thetime of transfer was passed back to the IRSE.Council also authorised £40,000 from other reservesfor Rathbones to invest. These two actions togetherexplain the £99,103 invested shown on the balancesheet. Additional provision was made for future conventions to more closely match the higher levelof payments in advance required for these events.

The Licensing Scheme incurred exceptional costsin reviewing the criteria for signalling designlicences. £5,000 was taken from the DevelopmentFund to help meet the costs. Whilst the core costsincreased as a result of the demands being placedon the administration these were adequately covered by increased income.

There is nothing special to report for the fouraward funds other than to say that Rathbones havebeen asked to refocus the portfolio held for the WingAward. The objective is that the annual income atleast matches the normal award value of £500.

The charity’s risk assessment and reserves policy

were amended after review and agreed by theTrustees on 14th January 2004. The investment policy of the Institution was re-issued after consul-tation with Rathbones and the agreement of theTrustees on 12th January 2005.

Looking to the future, it does appear likely that twolarge UK-based institutions will merge during 2005or 2006. One of these, the Institution of IncorporatedEngineers, currently supplies most of our admini-strative and accommodation services on a contractual basis. It may well be that this will not beappropriate in the future and alternative arrange-ments will have to be established. Sufficient reservesare available to do this, as well as cover the otherrisks identified in the risk assessment.

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENTThe year has seen the start of some new initiatives

in the training and development area, as well as thesubstantial completion of the various SRA-fundedprojects begun in previous years. Bob Barnard hascontinued to chair the Institution’s T&D Committee,with T&D Manager Richard Hobby maintaining theIRSE’s presence in industry training circles, carryingout much of the office work, and also administeringseveral events on behalf of the Institution.

The IRSE’s T&D work relies heavily on the enthusiastic involvement of people from across theindustry, on the T&D Committee itself, and also asauthors and reviewers of material. We are grateful for

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT132

Charts illustrating the proportions of incomeand expenditure by activity

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 133

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’MAIN BALANCE SHEET AT 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Accumulated FundAs at 1st January 2004 268,700 226,626Plus excess of Income over

Expenditure 4,367 273,067 42,074 268,700

Current Liabilities & ProvisionsSubscriptions in Advance 109,725 95,904Sundry Creditors and

Accrued Charges 93,419 203,144 158,148 254,344

Textbook FundBalance at 1st January 2004 20,000 10,000Less expenditure 10,000 –New provision – 10,000 10,000 20,000

Provision for future Conferences 10,000 10,000

Provision for future ConventionsBalance at 1st January 2004 15,000 15,000New provision 10,000 25,000

Development Fund 120,000 120,000

641,211 687,744

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Fixed AssetsComputers & Office Equipment 57,559 57,034Less Depreciation 57,341 218 56,246 788

Investments in Equity Portfolioat Cost 99,103 60,000Note: Mid-Market Value

2004 £127,2292003 £81,334

Investments in GovernmentSecurities at Cost – 2,940Note: Mid-Market Value

2004 –2003 £4,080

Current AssetsSundry Stocks at Cost:

Technical Publications 35,388 21,380IRSE Ties 833 844

Presidents’ Badges 2,025 834Presentation Plaques 144 215Thorrowgood Scholarship

Medals 164 38,554 197 23,470

Sundry Debtors & Paymentsin advance 68,223 67,891

Cash at Bank:Current Accounts 23,589 26,495Deposit Accounts 278,028 377,458National Savings Investment

Accounts 133,039 128,275Cash in Hand 457 435,113 427 532,655

641,211 687,744

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’THORROWGOOD SCHOLARSHIP BEQUEST FUND

BALANCE SHEET AT 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Capital FundBalance as at 1st Jan 2004 4,310 4,308Add surplus for year (25) 4,285 2 4,310

Current Account with IRSE 99 (23)4,384 4,287

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Quoted Investments at Cost 1,060 1,060Note: Mid-Market Value

2004 £1,6752003 £1,632

National Savings Investment A/c 3,324 3,2274,384 4,287

REPORT OF THE AUDITORS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS

We have examined the accounts of the Institution of Railway Signal Engineers set out on pages 5-8, together with the annual accounts of theInstitution prepared in accordance with Part VI of the Charities Act 1993 and the Companies Act 1985 for the year ended 31st December 2004.

As auditors of the Institution we reported to the members on 23rd March 2005 on the accounts of the Institution for the year ended 31st December2004 prepared under Part VI of the Charities Act 1993 and the Companies Act 1985 and issued an unqualified audit report thereon.

In our opinion the accounts set out on pages 5-8, which have been prepared from the full annual accounts, correctly reflect the state of affairs ofthe Institution as at 31st December 2004 and the results of the Institution’s transactions for the year then ended.

Ian Katté & CoChartered AccountantsRegistered AuditorPyrford 23rd March 2005

President: J D CORRIE Vice-President: J PORÉ Treasurer: M H GOVAS

This is a Restricted Fund. Awards are made only in accordance with the donor’s wishes.

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT134

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’MAIN INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTFOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2004

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’THORROWGOOD SCHOLARSHIP BEQUEST FUND INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Proceedings & Technical PapersPublication of Proceedings 19,967 17,464Printing Papers & Blocks 4,217 5,358Editing 2,200 2,200Prizes 130 26,514 108 25,130

Technical PublicationsStock 1st January 2004 21,380 11,778Printing 22,765 28,841

44,145 40,619Less Stock 31st Dec 2004 35,387 8,758 21,380 19,239

Thorrowgood Medal 33 33IRSE Ties

Stock 1st January 2004 844 950Less Stock 31st Dec 2004 833 11 844 106

Expenses of MeetingsAccommodation 8,452 4,581Refreshments 1,993 10,445 1,655 6,236

Expenses of FunctionsConventions and ASPECT2003 136,669 332,147Dinners 26,181 25,867Technical Visits & Seminars 20,585 7,657

Other Activities 25,772 67,030

Office ExpensesSecretarial & Accommodation 177,866 125,161Treasurers’ Fees 8,000 5,500Postage & Misc Expenses 71,289 60,357Committee Meeting

Accommodation 2,627 259,782 6,062 197,080

Printing & Stationery 7,638 7,485Presidents’ Badges 235 238Auditors’ Remuneration 3,900 2,875Grants to Local Sections – 1,800Newsletter 58,479 44,909Depreciation of Fixed Assets 1,087 5,930Computer Maintenance 7,256 7,410Secretarial Expenses –

Australia/South Africa 4,549 4,417Institution Entertaining/Presidential

Expenses 112 –Textbook

Production 11,946 481Provision (10,000) 1,946 10,000 10,481

Future Convention Provision 10,000 –Development Fund Provision – 20,000Balance being excess of Income

over Expenditure 4,367 42,074614,319 828,144

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Subscriptions ReceivedArrears in respect of earlier

years 10,989 20,580For the current year 211,017 222,006 173,421 194,001

Donations 1,376 1,275Entrance Fees 5,250 6,150Income from Proceedings

Sales – including papers/adverts (net) 52,937 54,063

Advance Copy RegistrationFees – 30

Sundry SalesBooklets & Text Books 31,837 26,185IRSE Ties & Badges 119 31,956 240 26,425

Interest on Investments 12,054 11,116Examination 13,865 6,626Functions

Conventions and ASPECT 2003 166,059 344,883Dinners 33,393 32,709Technical Visits and Seminars 32,356 17,703

Other Activities 42,499 133,163

Realised Gain on Stock Disposal 568 –

614,319 828,144

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Scholarship Prizes – Current Year 150 150Surplus Transferred to Capital

Fund (25) 2125 152

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Interest on Investments 125 152

125 152

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 135

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’LICENSING SCHEME BALANCE SHEET

AT 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Accumulated FundAs at 1st Jan 2004 55,806 45,587Surplus 4,660 60,466 10,219 55,806

Current LiabilitiesSundry Creditors 525 525Licence Fees Received in

Advance of Issue 216,479 13,917

Licence Fees – Years 2-5 Fund 449,525 395,105

Development FundBalance at 1st Jan 2004 30,000 20,000Less expenditure 5,000 –New provision – 25,000 10,000 30,000

751,995 495,353

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Fixed AssetsComputer & Office Equipment

At Cost 31,791 29,369Less Depreciation 26,549 5,242 22,135 7,234

Current AssetsStocks – logbooks 5,582 2,070Sundry Debtors 170,648 123,841Cash at Bank

Current A/c 1,811 7,947Deposit A/c 568,712 353,601

Cash in Hand – 746,753 660 464,993

751,995 495,353

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’SCHOLARSHIP FUND BALANCE SHEET

AT 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Capital FundBalance as at 1st Jan 2004 24,910 24,915Add surplus for year 87 24,997 (5) 24,910

Current Account with IRSE 1,028 428

26,025 25,338

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Quoted Investments at Cost 13,765 13,765Note: Mid-Market Value

2004 £6,4242003 £6,273

National Savings Investment A/c 22,260 21,573

26,025 25,338

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’ROBERT DELL BEQUEST FUND BALANCE SHEET

AT 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Capital FundBalance as at 1st Jan 2004 10,972 10,864Add surplus for year 10,119 10,108

11,091 10,972

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Capital FundBalance as at 1st Jan 2004 11,141 11,265Add surplus for year 1,0(103) 11,1(124)

11,038 11,141

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Quoted Investments at Cost 10,000 10,000Note: Mid-Market Value

2004 £19,6782003 £17,992

Current Account with IRSE 11,091 11,97211,091 10,972

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Quoted Investments at Cost 10,850 10,850Note: Mid-Market Value

2004 £10,4852003 £9,644

Current Account with IRSE 12,188 12,29111,038 11,141

THE WING AWARD FOR SAFETY FUNDBALANCE SHEET

AT 31st DECEMBER 2004

This is a Restricted Fund. Awards are made only in accordance with the donor’s wishes.

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT136

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’LICENSING SCHEME INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Licensing Registrar’s Services& Office 186,942 143,864

Appraisal Engineer’s Fees 61,198 50,978Engineer’s Fees – 1,755Logbook – Printing Costs 4,997 6,941Printing & Stationery 5,373 6,026Postage & Telephone 2,122 6,316Audit Fees 550 475Miscellaneous Expenses 9,728 7,197Depreciation of Computer &

Office Equipment 4,414 4,401Accreditation 7,339 22,002Insurance 7,738 7,738Licence Review Costs 46,983 –Development Fund Provision – 10,000Surplus 4,660 10,219

342,044 277,912

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Licence Fees Received fromYears 2-5 Fund 133,602 98,030

Licence Fees Received – Year 1 47,005 52,602Appraisal Fees Received 70,131 42,983Bank Interest Received 10,111 5,665Controlled Documentation fees 39,190 40,703Additional Copies of Controlled

Documentation 9,064 4,880Sale of Logbooks 27,941 32,597Donations – 452Transferred from Development Fund 5,000 –

342,044 277,912

Note: Licence Fees are taken into the income account equally over the five years a licence is valid

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’SCHOLARSHIP FUND INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Scholarship Prizes – Current Year 850 850Expenses – 11Surplus transferred to Capital Fund 87 (5)

937 856

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Interest on Investments 787 831Donation 150 25

937 856

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS’ROBERT DELL BEQUEST FUND INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Scholarship Prizes – Current Year 300 300Surplus transferred to Capital

Fund 119 108419 408

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Interest on Investments 419 408

419 408

THE WING AWARD FOR SAFETY FUNDINCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2004

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Award 500 500Surplus transferred to

Capital Fund (103) (124)397 376

31st Dec 2004 31st Dec 2003£ £

Income from Investments 397 376

397 376

the voluntary efforts of these people, and the supportof their employers.

After the completion of the SRA-funded projects,we expect T&D work to be scaled down to the levelsupportable from the Institution’s own budget.

SRA-FUNDED PROJECTS

IRSE Examination Student Resource Pack

Enlarged and enhanced student resource packshave been produced for all modules of the IRSEExamination except Module 2, which will require arather different approach. Each CD-ROM containsinformative text introducing each of the topics covered by the module, suggestions for activitiesthat students can undertake individually, or as a localstudy group, and extensive reference sources (keypapers are provided on the CD-ROM itself.

Sales of these new resource packs have beenencouraging, with 50 copies of Module 1 Pack soldto organisations, study groups and individuals, 30copies of Module 5, and sales of the other modulesgrowing once they have been released.

BTEC Railway Signalling Teaching Resource Pack

Work is still progressing on the resource pack withthe final issue expected to be released in April 2005.

Engineering Technician Training Scheme

The employer’s manual is currently with theappointed publishers ready for publication on to CD-ROM. The employee’s manual is currently in theprocess of being written and it is hoped both manuals will be ready for use by April 2005.

IRSE PROFESSIONAL EXAMINATION

The number of people applying to sit the IRSEProfessional Examination reached a new high in 2004with a total of 168 applicants sitting a total 448Modules. This year there was a total of 12 exam centres across the world – London, Croydon, Bristol,Birmingham, York, Scotland, Western Australia, NewSouth Wales, Queensland, Hong Kong, Thailand, anda new centre ran successfully for the first time inSingapore.

Review of the Institution’s Examination

The Institution’s Examination has been running inits current modular form for ten years. A review wastherefore due, and the President established a smallworking group to initiate this work. The workinggroup considered the need of the signalling industryfor a respected qualification, the effect of technologychanges in both signalling and telecommunications,and the recent changes in routes to Institution corporate membership. Discussion also took placeon how best to address the situation of engineers indifferent countries, and in particular the need to formally define equivalents to the examination andconditions for granting exemptions to particular candidates. The group also recommended a clarifi-cation of responsibilities within the Institution for theexam syllabus and structure, the setting and markingof papers, and the administration of the exam in centres worldwide. The working group report wasaccepted by Council, who delegated T&D Committeeto produce a detailed proposal for a revised syllabus,structure and administrative arrangements, which –

because of the need to give potential candidatesadequate notice of the changes – are expected tocome into effect during 2007 for the examination thatwill take place in 2008.

IRSE ENDORSEMENT OF TRAININGCOURSES

There has been interest from a number of trainingproviders, in Britain and other countries, in someform of “IRSE Endorsement” of training courses, sothat prospective students and their employers can beconfident that the courses will deliver the promisedresults. This is particularly relevant in Britain where,with the fragmentation of the industry, there are manytraining providers with widely different resources andcapabilities, and courses with the same or similarnames may be available from several providers. Afterdetailed consideration, the Institution decidedagainst offering formal academic “Accreditation”,since few higher education courses offer pre-dominantly S&T content. We are carrying out somepilot assessments on selected UK and overseascommercial and academic courses, to determine thepracticality and value of such IRSE endorsement.

AWARDSThorrowgood Scholarship

The Thorrowgood Scholarship is awarded annually under a bequest of the late W JThorrowgood (Past President) to assist the development of a young engineer employed in thesignalling and telecommunications field of engineer-ing and takes the form of an engraved medallion anda cheque for a sum to be used to finance a studytour of railway signalling installations or signallingmanufacturing facilities. The award is made to theInstitution young member attaining at least a passwith credit in four modules in the Institution’s examination.

The Thorrowgood Scholar for 2003 was Mr JamesCarney, of Mott MacDonald, Cardiff, and he was presented with his award at the Annual GeneralMeeting in April 2004.

Dell Award

Under a bequest made by the late Robert DellOBE (Past President) this award is made to anemployee of London Underground Ltd for achieve-ment of a high standard of skill in the science andapplication of railway signalling. The winner of the2004 Dell Award was Mr George Clark, of Tube LinesLtd, and he was presented with his award at theAnnual General Meeting in April 2004.

Wing Award for Safety

The 2004 Wing Award for Safety, commemoratingthe life and work of the late Peter Wing (Fellow), waspresented by the immediate Past President, Mr C HPorter, to Mr Barry West, of Amey Rail, a nominee ofNetwork Rail, at the National Railway EngineeringSafety Awards held in Birmingham on 29th April2004 for his contribution to improving track safetyperformance.

LICENSINGThis has been yet another very busy year for the

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 137

Licensing Scheme as it continues to meet thedemands of the industry. As of 31st December 2004there were a record number of valid licences standing at 6,183, a 23% increase on the previousyear. Sales of the IRSE Professional DevelopmentLog Book also continued to be high with 960 beingsold in 2004.

John Corrie stepped down as Chairman of theLicensing Committee in April 2004 to be replaced byJohn Francis. Our thanks go to John Corrie for all hishelp over the two years of his tenure, which were aparticularly challenging time for the Scheme and toJohn Francis for his leadership throughout the rest ofthe year.

A number of other changes have taken place tomembership of the Committee with new representa-tives joining. Philip Wiltshire continued as the official Minutes’ Secretary until Peter Stringer, whojoined earlier in the year, took up the role inNovember. David Jeffrey filled the vacancy for a representative from the supplier side of the industry,whilst Dave Harford stood down as the Telecomsrepresentative at the end of the year and will bereplaced in 2005 by Andy Nattrass. The remainder ofthe Licensing Committee members have continuedto serve, representing a cross section of the industryto ensure the impartial operation of the scheme.

Five sub-committees were set up during the yearto focus on specific areas on behalf of the mainLicensing Committee. This arrangement hasimproved the running and development of theScheme whilst enabling Licensing Committee tomanage more effectively. The sub-committees comprise:

• Management Review Sub-Committee: respon-sible for continuous improvement of theScheme and ensuring that it operates to the requisite standards. Colin Porter (Chairman),Paul Mann and Francis How.

• Formal Complaints Sub-Committee: respon-sible for ensuring that the Scheme’s FormalComplaints process is implemented con-sistently, in accordance with the Scheme’s procedures. Dave Weedon (Chairman), PeterStringer and Maurice Poole.

• Audit Sub-Committee: responsible for reviewingthe activities of all Assessing Agencies, andlooking for opportunities for the Scheme toimprove through the internal audit process.John Colvin (Chairman), Mike Moore, MauricePoole.

• Scheme Procedures Sub-Committee: respon-sible for reviewing the existing regulations andprocedures and improving them, and aligningthem to the new ISO17024 standard. AndyNattress (Chairman), Mark Watson-Walker,Philip Wiltshire.

• Licence Development Sub-Committee: respon-sible for the review and development of competence standards. Francis How(Chairman), Dave Harford, Mike Moore, MarkWatson-Walker and David Jeffrey.

The number of recorded Assessing Agents

remains at 40, but the number that were active andapproved throughout the year increased from 28 inthe previous year to 36. Two of the AssessingAgencies previously suspended were reinstated,whilst a number of new temporary suspensions wereimposed and cleared over the year, mainly due tocompetence assessment paperwork being incorrectly completed. One Agency remains suspended, one is in abeyance and three are stillworking towards initial approval, whilst two newAssessing Agents gained their initial approvals. Atotal of 40 surveillance visits were carried out overthe year, and over 400 Competence Assessor interviews were completed against the new compe-tence assessor criteria. Our thanks go to all theAppraisal Team Members who were so active duringthe year to achieve this.

As part of ongoing two-way communication withusers of the Scheme two Appraisal Team members’meetings took place during the year and twoAssessing Agency meetings. Thanks are expressedto Lloyd’s Register Rail for hosting the latter twomeetings.

An audit visit by UKAS in November successfullycleared all the outstanding NCRs against theEN45013 standard and the sanctions imposed during the previous year were lifted. A number ofpeople were involved in the enormous effort requiredto achieve this, for which the Scheme is most grate-ful. Work began on reviewing the new ISO17024standard that supersedes the current standard inApril 2005 and against which the Scheme will haveto demonstrate compliance from that date. It isanticipated that a revision to the Scheme documen-tation and working practices will result.

A number of staff changes have taken place in theLicensing office. Karen Gould continued in her roleas Licensing Registrar and Linda Collins in her roleas Licensing Administrator. Alex Doy left in Februarywhilst Roger Button and Linda O’Shea joined onfixed term contracts after initially covering roles ontemporary assignments. Additional temporary staffhave provided cover as and when necessary.

Mark Watson-Walker has continued to provide hisexpert guidance on the Scheme’s Systems issuesand to support the development of five new orrevised competence standards. Initial feasibility onupgrading computer software systems has beenundertaken.

The year ahead promises to be equally challengingas the scheme works towards compliance with thenew ISO17024 standard and continues to grow andadapt to meet our customers' developing needs forcompetency management.

Licence Status as at 31st December 2004Total Licences issued since thestart of the scheme 8,130Total Licences valid 6,183Licences issued or renewed in 2004 1,406

Formal Complaints received in 2004 7

Licence Revocations 1Licence Number 1001103 PAR Huntington

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT138

139

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGThe 91st Annual General Meeting was held at the

Institution of Electrical Engineers, London, on Friday23rd April 2004 when the composition of the newCouncil was announced, as follows:

President: J D Corrie

Vice-Presidents: J PoréJ D Francis

Members of Council from Class of Fellow:W J Coenraad A J FisherF Heijnen F HowJ M Irwin P A JenkinsI Mitchell A SimmonsD Weedon J F Wilson

Members of Council from Class of Member:A S Kornas Mrs C PorterG Simpson K L WalterD N Woodland N C Wright

Members of Council from Class of AssociateMember:J Haile C Lake

The formal proceedings included a hearty vote ofthanks to the following members, for their long andbeneficial association with the work of theInstitution, who were retiring from Council:

• C Kessell, Fellow, Council member for 16 yearsand President in 1999/2000;

• S Angill, Member, Council member for 8 years.

This was followed by the inauguration of the newPresident, Mr J D Corrie, who gave his PresidentialAddress.

COUNCIL MEETINGSSeven meetings of the Council were held during

the year during which the business of the Institutionwas conducted. The Articles of Association providefor the current Chairpersons of local sections, bothin the UK and overseas, and also Country Vice-Presidents to attend Council meetings and Councilis always pleased to welcome any who are able tobe present at a Council meeting in London.

After taking legal and financial advice, Councilagreed to the formation of a wholly owned sub-sidiary trading company called ‘IRSE EnterprisesLtd’ to undertake fund-raising events on behalf ofthe main Institution. The new company was officiallyincorporated and registered on 21st February 2005.It is expected that this new venture will be of considerable assistance in furthering the work of theInstitution.

ANNUAL DINNERThe Savoy Hotel, London, was the venue for the

40th Annual Dinner held following the AnnualGeneral Meeting on 23rd April 2004. Nearly 500members and their guests were present.

The newly installed President Mr John Corrie introduced his guests and the principal guest on thisoccasion was the Institution’s Chief Executive, MrKen Burrage, who spoke of the contribution theIRSE and its members can make in providing safe,efficient and cost-effective signalling schemes

providing that they are working in an organisationalenvironment that supports and values their efforts.

An excellent 4-course meal was efficiently servedto the large gathering by the staff of the Savoy.

Council is grateful for all the hard work that MrQuentin Macdonald undertakes every year to ensurethe success of this popular event.

MEMBERS’ LUNCHEONThe sixth annual Members’ Luncheon was held on

16th June 2004 when 85 members of the Institution,including 15 Past Presidents and 14 members withover 50 years’ membership, took luncheon at theVictory Services Club in Seymour Street, London. An enjoyable 3-course luncheon with wine was consumed with pleasure.

The 80th person to serve as President since theInstitution’s formation in 1912, Mr John Corrie, wasregrettably not able to attend. In his absence theJunior Vice-President, Mr John Francis, addressedthe members present with a brief speech and mentioned the forthcoming programme for MrCorrie’s presidential year of office. The Senior Vice-President, Mr Jacques Poré, mentioned his forth-coming Convention to Strasbourg in September2005.

Mr K W Burrage, IRSE Chief Executive, reportedthat the current membership of the Institution wasnow over 4,000 and continued to grow steadily.Thirty-four members have over 50 years’ member-ship, 14 of whom were able to accept thePresident’s invitation to be present at the luncheonas guests of the Institution. Mr Burrage said thatmembers having over 60 years’ membership wereno longer a rarity and were represented at the lunchby Mr Ronald Post with 65 years of membership.The IRSE’s longest serving member is Mr WilfredHardman, residing in New Zealand, and aged over90, with 75 years of membership. Mr Hardman corresponds regularly with the office and had senthis best wishes to those present at the luncheon.Many other members who were unable to attend inperson had also sent letters of apology and goodwishes.

Regrettably 12 members had died since the lunchlast year including five of our 50-year members whohad been regular attendees at these lunches sincetheir commencement six years ago. Among thesewere Peter Guyatt and Alistair McKillop, also Mr D JKidd who had achieved 73 years’ membership of theInstitution. The Institution is grateful for the servicethat all of these friends and colleagues performed forthe Institution during their time with us.

Members attending the luncheon with over 50years’ membership of the Institution were Messrs GAmoss, R Brown, D G Brown, R Bugler, H Fensom, IFoster, B Grose, B Hillier, P G Law, L S Lawrence, JLethbridge, M Page, R Post OBE and V H SmithOBE.

Past Presidents present at the luncheon wereMessrs R Barnard, W Boddy, R Brown, E Goddard,A Howker, C Kessell, L Lawrence, R Nelson, DNorton, C A Porter, C H Porter, F Rayers, J Waller, P

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT

Wiltshire and V Smith OBE.

The luncheon concluded in a most pleasant andhappy atmosphere of friendship and camaraderieand had been thoroughly enjoyed by all present.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONThe International Convention was held in Dublin,

Ireland, between 31st May and 4th June 2004,returning to the “Emerald Isle” after an absence of20 years. Two hundred and forty-six members andguests, representing 14 countries from around theworld, were present at the event. Following the welcome speeches members enjoyed a number oftechnical presentations and viewed a wide variety ofinteresting technical installations, including a mostinteresting day spent with Northern Ireland Railwaysin Belfast. Whilst the members were engaged ontechnical, activity a number of interesting and enjoy-able tourist visits were arranged for the guests, andmembers and guests together enjoyed a number ofexcellent social events.

A full report on the Convention has already beenpublished in IRSE News and will also appear in theInstitution’s Proceedings. The Council is apprecia-tive of the arrangements made by the ConventionOrganising Committee and the officials and staff ofthe railways in Ireland, and also for the generoussupport of the Convention’s sponsors that made theoccasion a memorable and enjoyable one. Particularmention should also be made of hard work of theConvention Organiser, Mr Roger Penny, who hadtaken over the role of organising the Conventionfrom Mr Ray Weedon. Ray had been involved withthe organisation of conventions since 1958 and thePresident made a special presentation to him at theConvention dinner on 4th June in appreciation of hisorganisational skill and expertise over many yearsfor which Council is indebted.

LONDON TECHNICAL MEETINGSThe level of attendance at the six technical

meetings held in London easily maintained the levelsof recent years at over 100 plus at each meeting andthose who were present enjoyed good topicalpapers and interesting lively discussions. TheCouncil is grateful to those who find the time fromtheir increasingly busy schedules to prepare andpresent papers at these meetings. Thanks are due toMr P Grant, Papers Assistant Editor, for the servicehe has provided in the transcription and editing ofthe tapes of the discussion following the Londonpapers for publication later in the Proceedings.Thanks are also due to Mr D Stratton, the PapersEditor, for proof-reading and preparing the papersfor publication.

CONFERENCES AND TECHNICAL VISITSThe Institution programme again contained a wide

variety of opportunities for attendance at technicalconferences and technical visits.

This year conferences were held on 18thNovember in London on Railway Interfaces, and on3rd March in London on Railway Control andCommunications.

Technical visits were held on 26th/27th Novemberto the Oresund link in Denmark and to Manchesteron 4th/5th March.

These events received a good level of support andCouncil is appreciative of the hard work and effortcontributed by those concerned with the organisa-tion and administration of the events and especiallyto Keith Walter for his help with the technical visits.

PUBLICATIONS AND PUBLICITYIRSE News

IRSE News has continued to grow in size and popularity around the world, as well as continuing tobe an effective communications medium to themembership and the S&T industry in general. In the25th edition of the publication, it was calculated thatthe 100th edition would appear in 2022. In the 50thedition of the publication, the estimate was reviseddownwards to the earlier date of 2006, but such isthe popularity and demand for IRSE News that itreached its 100th edition in December 2004, with arecord 64 pages of technical papers, articles, newsfeatures and pictures.

The publication is produced in an A4 format, andissued for ten months each year with the July/August and December/January editions combined.The size of each publication usually runs to 28pages; however, from time to time it is largerdepending on the size of the London technicalpapers which are included and published beforeeach London technical meeting. Regular featuresinclude the News View, Interesting Signals, IRSEMatters, Section News, Feedback and MembershipMatters. A new feature – Curiosity Corner – has beenintroduced recently. This feature provides pictures ofinteresting and unusual, modern and bygone signalling and telecommunication equipment fromaround the world, with a request to the membershipto identify what each photograph is and where it wasor is located. The Feedback feature has becomeincreasingly popular, with many members writing into respond or comment on the London technicalpapers, articles and current technological advances.The editors acknowledge the support of contributorsand wish to encourage all members to offer articles,letters or photographs for inclusion.

This year saw a change in the editorial arrange-ments when Mr J D Francis handed over the editor’s“chair” to Mr I Allison. The Council is grateful for thehard work Mr Francis has done to develop IRSENews over the years and is appreciative of theefforts of the new Honorary Editor, Mr I Allison, andof the Honorary Assistant Editor, Mr A J RRowbotham, for the work they undertake in continuing to produce this very important means ofcommunication with and between members of theInstitution.

Proceedings

The Institution’s Proceedings for 2003/2004 waspublished as usual in October, within six months ofthe close of the session and the Council is gratefulto Ms Andrea Parker, Honorary Editor, for her workleading to such prompt publication. This year theProceedings were again also made available in

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT140

CD-ROM format. All members have been given theopportunity to indicate their preference for receivingthe Proceedings in either hard copy or the new CD-ROM version in future years.

Website

The Institution’s website, located at www.irse.org,continues to be a major source of reference formembers and non-members alike and major additions or changes are often announced in IRSENews. The website is particularly useful for non-members, who are able to find out more about theInstitution and obtain membership informationdirectly without having to contact the HQ office.

An annual review of the site usually takes place inthe last few months of the calendar year, but in thislast session it was decided to delay the updatingand retain the same format for the time being. Acomplete revision of the IRSE website was plannedfor early 2005.

The website contains details of technical meetingsand events held at the London centre, together withthose held at UK provincial centres and these arepublicised as early as possible and reviewed often toensure the site remains without dated information.This allows both members and non-members alikethe opportunity to enter details in their diaries, thusensuring they do not miss important events. TheYounger Members' Section in particular has beenquite active this year and the website has provedinvaluable in providing information about events.The website also contains details of overseas sections, visits, seminars, etc, and in some caseshyperlinks are provided to registration and application forms for technical visits, conferences,dinners etc.

The website is managed by the Institution’sPublicity Officer, Mr David Crabtree, who is alwayskeen to point out that constructive feedback is welcome, providing a useful way of gauging visitors’needs for the website.

Council is grateful to Mr Crabtree for his continuedassistance in maintaining the Institution website.

Recruitment & Publicity Activity

The Recruitment & Publicity Committee has metfive times throughout the year and is grateful to thecompanies who have sponsored these meetings bythe provision of the venue and hospitality. Work continues in the active promotion of the Institution’sactivities throughout the profession.

The IRSE publicity stand was deployed at theRailtex Exhibition, held at the National ExhibitionCentre, Birmingham, UK, between the 2nd-4thNovember 2004. The Committee expresses thanksto all the volunteers who manned the stand through-out the exhibition. A review of the content of the display panel graphics for the publicity stand hascommenced; with a view to producing new updatedpanels for 2005 together with other associated publicity material.

Council is appreciative of the efforts of DerekEdney and the members of the Recruitment &Publicity Committee for all the work they do to

promote the activities of the Institution and toencourage people to become members.

New Publications

Over the years the Institution has produced anumber of excellent textbooks and other publi-cations that are of significant benefit, not only tothose studying for the examination but also as acontinuing professional development service to all professional signal and telecommunications engineers.

New publications made available during the yearincluded the new textbook published by the IRSEentitled ‘Railway Telecommunications’, a publicationof the Signal Record Society ‘Signalling Atlas &Signal Box Directory’ and the 7th Report of theInternational Technical Committee entitled ‘Qualityof Service’.

These and a full list of the publications availablefor purchase by members at preferential rates canbe obtained from the Institution's website togetherwith an order form.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER BODIES

Engineering Council

The Institution is a fully nominated body of theEngineering Council UK, licensed to registerIncorporated Engineers and EngineeringTechnicians. During the year the Institution soughtand received ECUK approval to extend its licence toinclude the ability to register Chartered Engineers.Past President, Mr Colin Porter, has been elected torepresent the Group C Institutions (these are thesmaller ones similar to the IRSE) on the governingboard of ECUK.

Institution of Incorporated Engineers

The collaborative arrangements with theInstitution of Incorporated Engineers that permitsjoint membership of both Institutions at reducedsubscription levels has been continued.

The Council is grateful to the IIE for its ready helpand co-operation in providing accommodation andservices at Savoy Hill House for IRSE use.

Institution of Railway Operators

The Institution continues to liaise with operatingcolleagues in the development of the Institution ofRailway Operators by the exchange of ideas andinformation.

Railway Engineers’ Forum

Together with the Institutions of Civil, Electrical,Mechanical and Permanent Way Engineering, theIRSE has continued as a member of the RailwayEngineers’ Forum that arranges technical meetingson railway engineering topics of multi-disciplinaryinterest. The IRSE took over the chairmanship of thisbody for two years with effect from 2003 and PastPresident Mr C Kessell continued to serve as theREF Chairman.

INTERNATIONAL TECHNICALCOMMITTEE

The International Technical Committee continuedwith its work and published its seventh report,

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 141

“Quality of Service in Railway Traffic ManagementSystems” in December 2004.

COMMITTEESThe following were appointed to serve on the

standing committees shown and the Councilextends its thanks to them for the valuable work theyundertake on behalf of the Institution:

Management Committee: Messrs J Poré(Chairman), J D Corrie, R E B Barnard, J D Francis,M Govas, J Irwin, P Jenkins, C H Porter, P WStanley, F Wilson, D Woodland and K W Burrage(Secretary).

Membership Committee: Messrs C Kessell(Chairman), D S Angill, P Batley, R Blakey, J D Corrie,D A Edney (Secretary), P Grant, D Mason (ECUKrep), R Harding, C H Porter, Mrs C Porter, P WStanley, J Tilly, F Wilson and K W Burrage.

Finance Committee: Messrs C H Porter(Chairman), R E B Barnard, J D Corrie, J D Francis,M H Govas (Treasurer/Secretary), J Poré, P WStanley and K W Burrage.

Training & Development Committee: Messrs R EB Barnard (Chairman), W Alexander, B DChowdgury, I Livesey, Ms K Gould, A Fisher, O King,A Kornas, M Moore, R Moore, R Nelson, G Neacy, MPoole, J Sadler, A P Smith, C R White, and R Hobby(Secretary). Advisors: K W Burrage (IRSE ChiefExecutive), P Wason (IIE Chief Executive), J DFrancis (Junior Vice-President).

Examination Committee: Messrs C R White(Chairman), I Brown, K Donnelly, P Hetherington, D AHotchkiss, C Lovelock, A Kornas, T Lee, S Rodgers(Secretary), R C Short, N T Smith, C I Weightman,and D N Woodland and R Hobby.

International Technical Committee: J Poré,Chairman (France), W J Coenraad, (Netherlands), IGal (Hungary), E O Goddard (UK), G Hagelin(Sweden), Y Hirao (Japan), S Hiraguri (Japan), CKessell (UK), F Kollmannsberger (Germany), LLochmann, (Czech Republic), L Matikainen (Finland),F Montes (Spain), J Noffsinger (USA), R Seiffert,(Switzerland), C Sevestre (France), O Stalder,(Switzerland), P W Stanley (UK), K Stolte(Netherlands), J Stutzbach (Germany), K Suwe(Suwe) and A Zierl (Austria).

Licensing Committee: Messrs J D Francis(Chairman), J W A Colvin, D Harford, F How, P Mann,M Poole, P J Stringer, P Wiltshire (Secretary) and DN Weedon. Ex Officio: C H Porter (LicensingTreasurer), Ms K Gould (Licensing Registrar), MWatson-Walker and R Bell. Advisors: K W Burrage(IRSE), M D Moore and P F Wason (IIE).

Recruitment & Publicity Committee: Messrs D AEdney (Chairman), I Allison, D S Angill, D WCrabtree, J Duffy, P Eldridge A Fisher, M Glover, J DFrancis, M Hewitt, I Mitchell, R H Price, A J RRowbotham, D H Stratton, S Turner (Hon Secretary),G F Wire and D Woodland.

Internal Auditors: C Kessell, Mrs C Porter and FWilson

OVERSEAS AND UK LOCAL SECTIONSAND YOUNGER MEMBERS’

The overseas Sections of the Institution inAustralasia, Hong Kong, North America andSouthern Africa, and the Midland & North Western,Plymouth, Scottish, Western and York local Sectionsin the United Kingdom all continued to operate successfully. Each Section arranged its own pro-gramme of meetings and other events during theyear, details of which appear in the Proceedings.Local meetings of members in Central Europe continued to be held occasionally. Members inSingapore and South East Asia are considering theformation of a local section based in Singapore.

The Younger Members continued to arrange meetings during the year for the younger membersof the Institution. This year’s programme includedthe usual meeting for the IRSE Examination reviewas well as a forum event in association with thePresident and members of Council to debate theproposal for the formation of a new Institution asadvocated by the IEE and IIE. The consensus view atthe end of the meeting was that the younger members preferred that the IRSE should remain asan independent institution providing for the specialist S&T discipline.

The Council wishes to record its thanks to theOfficers, Committee members and all others in theSections, both overseas and in the UK, for the excellent work they undertake in organising themeetings and other events. Their dedication, hardwork and enthusiasm, when under increasinglyheavy day-to-day work pressure, is a major contri-bution to the success of the Institution.

The Officers of the Sections were:

Overseas

Australasian Section: Chairman, Mr C R Page;Country Vice-President, Mr P R Symons; Vice-Chairman, Mr T G Moore; Hon Secretary & Treasurer,Mr G Willmott.

Hong Kong Section: Chairman & Country Vice-President, Mr P Gaffney; Vice-Chairmen, Mr FFabbian, Mr K W Pang; Hon Secretary, Mr F L Hui.

Southern African Section: Chairman, Mr R CGould; Country Vice-President, Mr A le Roux; Vice-Chairman, Mr R W Kohler; Hon Secretary, Mr VBowles; Hon Treasurer, Mr J C van de Pol.

North American Section: Chairman, Mr DThurston; Vice-Chairman, Mr K Bisset; Secretary/Treasurer, Mr G Young.

UK

Midland & North Western Section: Chairman, MrI Allison; Vice-Chairman, Mr I Johnson; HonSecretary, Mr W Redfern; Hon Treasurer, Mr CWilliams.

Plymouth Section: Chairman, Mr A D Wilson;Vice-Chairman, vacancy; Hon Secretary & Treasurer,Mr D Came.

Scottish Section: Chairman, Mr A King; HonSecretary, Mr I Hill; Hon Treasurer, Mr A McWhirter.

Western Section: Chairman, Mr P Duggan; HonSecretary, Mr D Gillanders, Hon Treasurer, Mr M Brookes.

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT142

York Section: Chairman, Mr R Price; HonSecretary, Mr J Maw; Hon Treasurer, Mr A P Smith.

Younger Members’ Section: Chairman, Mr JHaile; Hon Secretary, K Goodhand; Hon Treasurer, C Oyekanmi.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSMany people worldwide make the Institution

function. I thank Council for its support of this year’sactivities. I also record my thanks particularly to KenBurrage (Chief Executive), Colin Porter (immediatePast President), Martin Govas (Treasurer), RogerPenny (Convention Organiser), Keith Walter (Visits),Quentin Macdonald (Annual Dinner), Bob Barnard(Training & Development Committee), Bill Scheerer(founding the US Section), Ryan Gould (SouthernAfrican Section), Franco Fabbian and Francis Hui(Hong Kong), Trevor Moore and Richard Bell(Australia), Peter Cuffe, Páraic Ó’Lochlainn andMalcolm Overton with their teams (Convention), IanAllison and Tony Rowbotham (IRSE News), David

Crabtree (website), Colin White and DanielWoodland (Exam Committee), John Francis(Licensing Committee), David Stratton (R&PCommittee), Clive Kessell (Membership & AuditCommittee), John Haile (Younger Members), and allthe Section secretaries and committee members.Inspired by Linda Mogford, the office staff havegiven wonderful service in administering theInstitution’s business including membership activities (Derek Edney), licensing (Karen Gould andteam), systems (Mark Watson-Walker), and training(Richard Hobby). Many Past Presidents have givenme sound advice for which I am most grateful.Personally, I wish to thank my colleagues at MottMacDonald for all their support, and also my wife,Nicola, and my family.

J D CorriePresidentSavoy Hill HouseSavoy HillLondon WC2R 0BS March 2004

143NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT

A company limited by guarantee registered in England No. 125685Registered Charity No. 1046999

PREVIOUS MINUTES AND AUDITOR’SREPORT

It was proposed by Mr D McKeown (Fellow) andseconded by Mr C White (Fellow) and carried thatthe Minutes of the 91st Annual General Meeting heldon 23rd April 2004 be taken as read and they weresigned by the President.

The President then asked the Secretary to readthe Report of the Auditor, which he did.

ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS2004

The President commented upon the main featuresof the Annual Report for 2004, in particular hereferred to the continued increase in membership,the successful programme of technical papers andvisits, the production of the 100th edition of IRSENews, the extension of the Institution’s ECUKlicence to include the registration of CEng and theformation of the new trading company IRSEEnterprises Ltd.

At the request of the President, the Institution'sTreasurer, Mr M H Govas, reviewed the Statementsof Account and Balance Sheets for the year. MrGovas said the Institution had achieved a satis-factory financial result in 2004. On a total turnover ofjust under £1m, a modest surplus of £4,367 hadbeen obtained on the Institution’s main account andthe Licensing Scheme had also achieved a smallsurplus of £4,660. The President then asked whetheranyone present wished to discuss any point in theAnnual Report and Accounts. Mr C A Porter (Fellow)asked about the sundry debtors on the LicensingScheme, Mr F Hewlett (Associate) asked about theturnover of membership and Mr D McKeown(Fellow) about the rates charged by the IEE foraccommodation and refreshments at meetings as heobserved that these rates continued to rise. TheTreasurer and the Chief Executive responded to thequeries that had been raised to the satisfaction ofthe questioners.

There being no further questions, it was proposedby the President, seconded by Mr F Heijnen (Fellow)and carried that the Annual Report and Accounts forthe year 2004 as presented be adopted. ThePresident then put the motion to the meeting whichwas carried with none against.

COMPOSITION OF COUNCIL 2005-2006The President announced that as a result of the ballot that had been held the Institution's Council for the year 2005-2006 would be composed asunder:

President: J Poré

Vice-Presidents: J D FrancisW J Coenraad

Members of Council from class of Fellow:

A J Fisher I MitchellF Heijnen C R PageF How A SimmonsJ M Irwin D WeedonP A Jenkins J F Wilson

Members of Council from class of Member:

Mrs C Porter D N WoodlandA S Kornas N C WrightG Simpson K L Walter

Members of Council from class of AssociateMember:

J Haile C Lake

The President then proposed a vote of thanks tothe following retiring member of Council for his longand valuable service to the Institution:

• R E B Barnard, Fellow, Council member for 15years and President in 2001/2002.

The meeting showed its appreciation and thankswith applause.

AUDITORThe President announced that the Institution's

Auditors, I Katte & Co, of 8 Wexfenne GardensPyrford, Woking, Surrey, had indicated their willing-ness to continue in this capacity for a further yearand it was the recommendation of the Council thatthey should do so. It was proposed by Mr DMcKeown (Fellow) seconded by Mr R Penny (Fellow)and carried with none against that I Katte & Co beappointed Auditors to the Institution for the year2005.

OTHER BUSINESSAWARDS

Dell Award

The Dell Award is made annually under a bequestof the late Robert Dell OBE (Past President). It isawarded to a member of the Institution employed byLondon Underground Ltd (or its successor bodies)for achievement of a high standard of skill in the science and application of railway signalling. Theaward takes the form of a plaque with a uniquelydesigned shield being added each year with therecipient’s name engraved on it and a cheque for£300 to spend as the recipient wishes.

The winner of this year’s Dell Award is John Joyce,of Tube Lines, and Mr Corrie presented Mr Joyce

144

Ninety-Second Annual General Meeting

Minutes of the Ninety-Second Annual General Meetingheld at the Institution of Electrical Engineers, London WC2

on Friday 22nd April 2005

The Retiring President, Mr J D Corrie, in the Chair

with the Dell Award amidst applause.

Thorrowgood Scholarship

The Thorrowgood Scholarship is awarded annually under a bequest of the late W JThorrowgood (Past President) to assist the develop-ment of a young engineer employed in the signallingand telecommunications field of engineering andtakes the form of an engraved medallion and acheque to be used to finance a study tour of railwaysignalling installations or signalling manufacturingfacilities. The award is made, subject to satisfactoryinterview, to the Institution young member attainingat least a pass with credit in four modules in theInstitution's examination.

The Thorrowgood Scholar for 2004 is Mr PeterChung, of MTRC in Hong Kong.

Mr Corrie explained that the incoming President,Mr Poré, would present Mr Chung with theThorrowgood Scholarship award during the forth-coming Presidential visit to Hong Kong Section laterin the year.

Wing Award for Safety

The Wing Award for Safety was introduced in 1994to commemorate the life and work of the late PeterWing, a Fellow of the Institution and employee ofBritish Rail, who during his career made a majorcontribution to the cause of line side safety. Theaward takes the form of a certificate and an amountof £500 to be devoted to personal development andis made to an individual who it is considered hasmade an outstanding contribution to railway tracksafety by, for example, coming forward with a novelidea for improving safety, is a long term champion ofimproving track safety standards or has made a significant contribution to the awareness of tracksafety in his business.

The Wing Award for Safety this year had beenmade to Mr Phil Broad, Maintenance Delivery UnitManager, Ashford, Kent, nominated by Network Railfor his work in improving trackside safety in Kent.The President presented Mr Broad with the WingAward amidst applause.

ELECTION OF HONORARY FELLOWS

The President announced that the Council haddecided at its meeting earlier in the day to elect thefollowing to become Honorary Fellows of theInstitution in recognition of their long and distinguished service to the profession and to theIRSE:

• Leslie Lawrence, President 1981/1982

• Cliff Hale, President 1987/1988

• David Norton, President 1984/1985

• Frank Rayers, President 1989/1990

• Brian Heard, President 1992/1993

Also Bob Woodhead, Harry Ostrofsky and Hennie

van de Venter for their work over many years in support of the Southern African Section and ClaytonTinkham for his work in support of the formation ofthe North American Section.

The meeting showed their approval of thisannouncement with warm applause.

NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT TAKES THE CHAIR

The retiring President, Mr J D Corrie, then invitedthe newly elected President, Mr J Poré, to take theChair, which he did amidst applause, and Mr Corrieinvested him with the Presidential Chain of office.

VOTE OF THANKS TO MR J D CORRIE

Having taken the Chair, Mr Poré invested MrCorrie with his Past President's Medallion and proposed a hearty vote of thanks to him for theexcellent way in which he had carried out thePresidential duties during the past year. This proposal was carried with enthusiastic applause.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The President, Mr J Poré, then delivered hisInaugural Address, a copy of which will appear inIRSE News and in the Proceedings.

A vote of thanks to him for his Address was proposed by Mr P W Stanley (Fellow) and carriedwith applause.

The President then declared the meeting closed.

COUNCIL MEETING FOLLOWING THE AGM FORTHE RECORD

Welcome of New Council Members

Mr C R Page, Invensys Rail Systems, Australia,(not present at the meeting).

The Chief Executive will send him a welcome letter and the Council information pack.

Co-option of Past Presidents to the Council

The following three Past Presidents were co-optedto serve on Council in accordance with Article 14.4:

J D Corrie (President 2004-2005)

C H Porter (President 2003-2004)

P W Stanley (President 2002-2003)

Authority to Sign Cheques

The following were authorised with effect from20th April 2005 and, until further notice, Messrs P WStanley, J D Corrie, M H Govas, C H Porter and K WBurrage to sign cheques on the Institution’saccounts and to authorise the Treasurer, M H Govas,and the Assistant Treasurer, Mr C H Porter, to transfer monies between the various Institutionaccounts without prior reference to Council. Mr J DFrancis, as Senior Vice-President, was added to thelist.

The President then declared the Council meetingclosed.

NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 145

146

41st Annual DinnerThe Savoy Hotel, London, was the venue for the

41st Annual Dinner held following the AnnualGeneral Meeting on 22nd April 2005. About 450members and their guests were present.

The newly installed President, Mr Jacques Poré,introduced his principal guest for the evening, MrBernard Schaer, Director of Engineering, SNCF, whoaddressed members and their guests before

proposing the toast to the Institution, which wasenthusiastically endorsed.

An excellent 4-course meal was efficiently servedto the large gathering by the staff of the Savoy.

Members and their guests spent a most success-ful and enjoyable evening together with another nearmaximum attendance at the event.

K W Burrage

147

The International Convention held from 31st May –4th June returned to Ireland, the 'Emerald Isle', afteran absence of 20 years; being based in the capitalcity of Dublin. Ireland's economy has experiencedhuge growth in recent years and continues to grow;thus the phenomenon of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ was bornbringing with it increased demand for rail transport.Irish Rail, Iarnród Éireann (IÉ), is currently upgradingthe Dublin Area Rapid Transit (DART) network byextending platforms to accommodate eight-cartrains. This is phase one of the project; phase two,when authorised, will re-signal the central area forcloser headway operation and on completion therewill be a 70% increase in capacity through centralDublin.

MONDAY 31st MAY 2004

Following registration at the Jurys BallsbridgeHotel a welcome reception was held in the Ballroom;where there was a technical exhibition by sponsorsof the Convention.

The President, John Corrie, accompanied by hiswife Nicola, extended a warm welcome to the 246 attendees from 14 countries to the Convention commenting on the attendance by eight pastPresidents of the Institution. He went on to thank thesponsors and the local organising committee, led byPeter Cuffe of IÉ, for their efforts in making theConvention possible.

Peter Cuffe then gave a short introduction to theevents of the week and the theme for this year's convention “Communication between all of us andcommunication on the railway”. He commented that“Iarnród Éireann was still a vertically integrated rail-way” – this brought a hearty cheer from the floor!

The President responded by thanking Peter onceagain and concluded the evening by wishing every-one a very enjoyable Convention.

TUESDAY 1st JUNE 2004

The President formally opened the Convention byintroducing Dick Fearn, Chief Operating Officer of IÉ,who gave the opening address. Dick spoke in depthon a number of subjects including:

• extending a warm welcome to the Conventionon behalf of IÉ;

• the economic and social growth of Dublin – “youcan measure the growth by the number ofcranes on the skyline and there are many”;

• the need for more trains with increased fre-quency and the role the S&T Engineer plays inachieving that aim. Requirement to relieve congestion not only in Dublin but Cork, Limerickand Galway;

• introduction of new fleet of four-car diesel multiple units primarily for the north and north-west Dublin commuter services. However, theintroduction of these gave rise to an insatiabledemand – thus increase train length from four-car to eight-car formations but still more areneeded;

• Irish Government has recently agreed funding

for the introduction of new commuter servicesbetween Cork and Midleton; including the reinstatement of the currently disused linebetween Glounthaune and Midleton;

• there is a shared vision within Ireland, which alsoreflects in transport - “Transport is a crucial partin economic growth”. Ireland is a full member ofthe European Union (EU) and benefits from part-funding of projects by the EU;

• development is not only within IÉ, the new lightrail scheme in Dublin which connects bothHeuston and Connelly stations is comple-mentary to the IÉ operations;

• the centralised traffic control (CTC) – signalling,train control and locomotive control all togetherin one building and the CTC is being extendedas areas are resignalled. “The vision of one con-trol for the whole IÉ network is being realised”.

IRSE Convention 2004: Dublin, Ireland

Peter Cuffe, Iarnród Éireann Photos: C H Porter

Malcolm Overton, Chief Signal Engineer, Northern IrelandRailways

Roger Penny, Convention Co-ordinator

On conclusion of the address the Presidentthanked and made a presentation to Dick on behalfof the Institution. Following thanks to the manysponsors of the Convention the guests departed fora sightseeing tour of Dublin.

After a coffee break the President spoke of thetheme for today which was "Looking to the Future"and a series of technical presentations on this subject followed. He commented “in the afternoonmembers, by inspection of mechanical signallingsystems, would be reminded of the Principles ofSignalling as we have to re-learn these basic principles if we are going to move forward with technology. To move to ERTMS we need to reuse thetheories behind mechanical interlocking, whichchecks things when they change state, becauseradio doesn't offer the integrity to be able to dependon being able to revoke a movement authority at anyinstant, as for example could be achieved withrelays.”

'Looking to the Future' Technical Presentations

Alan Knight, Alcatel – Axle Counter Developments

• Requirement for improvement in the reliabilityand performance using axle counters as traindetection – being introduced in large numbers inthe UK and Switzerland.

• Increase immunity to EMI – interference resulting from traction current both ac and dc,also magnetic eddy current track brakes;

• Old systems – communication link between trackside detector unit and evaluator, situated ininterlocking (I/L), by cable subject to EMI. New systems put the intelligence into trackside unit

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND148

and use digital transmission over fibre opticlinks. This technique has been employed on the Galway and Waterford lines using theSynchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) network ofIÉ;

• Comparison on life-cycle costs between Axlecounters and track circuits (TC) shows signifi-cant savings due to reduction in maintenancecosts of trackside components over TCs. Inaddition, spares holdings are reduced, with thelatest generation of axle counters, due to reduction in types of board and commonalitybetween products.

New Products

• AzLM; high-performance multi-purpose system;one evaluator unit can supervise several sections (eg station area). The evaluator has aserial link to interface with an Alcatel electronicI/L, in addition a relay interface is provided forconnection to other types of I/L. Configurationmay be non-redundant ‘two out of two’ vitalcomputers or fully redundant ‘two times two outof two’ or ‘two out of three’ architecture;

• AzLS; low-cost version; the evaluator is com-bined with the detector unit; provision of relayoutput only – single section used, for example,at block section signals where the detector unitis located at the signal. An economic solutionwould use a combination of both; with AzLS forthe block sections between station areas wherethe AzLM would be utilised.

Phil Hickey, National Railway Supplies – BlockSignalling, Restoration for 'Life Extension'

• Modernisation of signalling systems in Irelandhas significantly reduced the number of blocksignalled areas using the, Webb & Thompsonmanufactured, Electric Train Staff (ETS) instru-ments.

• However, there are still areas that have not beenmodernised and, to increase the reliability level,the ETS instruments have been subject torestoration and refurbishment.

• The project utilises the NRS local agent inIreland, Rivval, who together with IÉ arrange collection of equipment, despatch to NRS forrefurbishment and return to IÉ for installation.

• Several variants of ETS instruments existdepending on whether dry cell battery supply orhand generator operation.

• NRS has over a century of experience of rail-ways together with a skilled workforce, backedby specialist knowledge (original equipmentmanufacturers specifications etc), to ensure the restoration is to the original specification.

Restoration Process

• Due to the age and usage of the equipment, theinstruments show extensive wear and tear, forexample in the galvanometer display, cam andcontact block as well as damage to the cast ironcasing.

• Initial Investigation – on receipt at the NRS workshops the instruments are broken down

Eco-Lock at Arklow

ERTMS-ATP cab display in DART train

into component parts for evaluation of workrequired.

• Operational Activity – cast iron componentsreturned to bare metal; crack tested thenrepaired as necessary. Old brittle slate contactmaterial replaced with Tufnol. Coils rewoundand galvanometers repaired as necessary. Allbrass components cleaned back to bare metaland polished.

• Build Assembly – units are rebuilt (eg to originalmanufacturers' specification as appropriate);fully inspected and tested prior to despatch.

• Restored equipment now in use has removed anumber of faults and increased the overall reliability of the block systems.

Malcolm Overton, Chief Signal Engineer –Northern Ireland Railways (NIR)

• Northern Ireland (NI) is part of the UK but has a different culture. The railway is still verticallyintegrated and ‘Translink’ is the integratedbus/rail company comprising Ulsterbus, Citybusand NIR.

• Vision for transport – clock face timetables forbus and railways.

• Programme of investment in modernising andupgrading Northern Ireland Railways was identified in the ‘AD Little Strategic SafetyReview’, commissioned by Translink and published in March 2000.

• Investment in infrastructure – New diesel multiple units; the Bangor line track has beenrelayed with the Larne line to be relaid and resignalled.

• However, investment relies heavily on UK government funding. As NI is now under directrule from London, (with the NI Assembly currently suspended), there is a different strate-gic view such that there is a possibility of the linenorth of Ballymena to Londonderry and north ofWhitehead on the Larne line may be closed.

• Malcolm then outlined the visit to Belfast –Belfast Central the rebuilding of old station intonew light and airy structure. The guests will havea city tour. Visit to Cultra transport museum. NIRworkshops and training school. Train trip onrecently re-opened line between Bleach Green –Antrim (with new station at Mossley West). A‘One Day’ scratch card ticket for Translink services was supplied for everyone.

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND 149

Special DART train at Malahide

Signal box at WicklowMembers inspect mechanical point operating equipment atWicklow

Conference guides

Heuston Westcad

Peter Cuffe – IÉ

Outlined the programme of visits for Wednesdaythese being:

• Connelly – centralised traffic control;

• Heuston – station, control centre and plantroom;

• Maynooth – control centre.

After the technical presentations and coffee break,members departed from the hotel for the short walkto Lansdowne Road DART station; where they joineda special DART train to Malahide. On the journeythere was a demonstration of the ATP system andthe integration of the ATP display into the standardERTMS cab display fitted to the rolling stock. By theuse of the ERTMS cab display it will be possible toupgrade the ATP in the future without significantchanges to the cab layout. The driver’s speed-ometer has two displays; the permitted speed andthe actual speed. Should the actual speed exceedthe permitted speed an audible warning is given. Ifthe driver acknowledges then the train is braked tothe new speed and may continue normally butshould the driver fail to respond to the warning thenthe train is braked to a stand. On the journey toMalahide and return to Pearce the driver admirablydemonstrated these modes of operation!

On arrival at Pearce the members rejoined theguests and joined a special train for Wicklow andArklow. This consisted of heritage vehicles providedby the Railway Preservation Society of Ireland withthe presidential party travelling in the palatialrestored Irish State coach. This was built for EdwardVII as an opulent clerestory roofed, single gangwaysaloon later becoming the Irish State coach.

During the journey a buffet lunch was provided.

On arrival at Wicklow the guests departed for acoach tour of the Wicklow Mountains. They visitedIreland's most famous village Avoca, where the TVseries 'Ballykissangel' was filmed. Avoca is situatedin the beautiful Vale of Avoca. After visiting the handweavers guests strolled back through the villagebefore travelling on to Glendalough (valley of the twolakes). Concluding a very enjoyable afternoon theguests returned to Wicklow by coach.

The members then departed by coach for Arklowwhere displays of the ‘Life Extension Works’ had

been arranged. These included:

• Mechanical Locking Frame renovation – displayby Atkins Rail into the refurbishment of lockingframes carried out for both IÉ and in the UKNetwork Rail’s West Coast Main Line project atStafford.

• ‘Life Extension Works' – of special interest wasthe remanufacture of components for the economical facing point lock (Eco-Lock). Fullmaterial traceability of these components is possible using a unique numbering system.These are used extensively on IÉ and in thisarrangement a single lever is used for the pointmovement as well as the facing point lock. Theinitial movement of the lever unlocks the points;further movement moves the points to the newposition with the final movement locking thepoints in the new position. An example of anelectro-pneumatic drive developed for the Eco-Lock system was also demonstrated. The signalbox operating floor was visited and noted theuse of reflective material on mechanical semaphore signal arms.

On completion of the visit members rejoined thespecial train to return to Wicklow. On arrival furtherdisplays were inspected:

• NRS – demonstration of single line control usingrestored electric train staff instruments;

• Signet Solutions – had a video presentation ontheir training and development programmes,together with assessment, competence assurance and process design activities.

Again the opportunity for a quick visit to the signalbox was taken before rejoining the guests and thetrain travelling to Greystones for dinner at La ToucheHotel.

Following an excellent dinner and the President giving votes of thanks to the sponsors and organisers of the day, the party returned to Dublinand the hotels by service DART train.

WEDNESDAY 2nd JUNE 2004

As a means of keeping everyone "on their toes" during the day Peter Cuffe had arranged a 'TreasureHunt' where members had to look for 21 clues andnote these down, the winner being announced at thedinner on Friday night.

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND150

Colin Porter (Past President) and former BR staff atWicklow

John and Nicola Corrie in the Irish State coach en route toWicklow

The members departed by bus for ConnellyCentralised Traffic Control (CTC).

The technical visit included:

• traffic regulation office – this included the trafficcontrol, Long Line Public Address (LLPA) systems and the locomotive control facilities;

• CTC mainline – this contains VDU-based consoles, supplied by GE TransportationSystems (GETS), covering the area south andwest of Dublin to Cork, Limerick, Athlone andGalway, northwards to Dundalk on the key routebetween Dublin - Belfast and the border withNorthern Ireland Railways. It was noted thatthese routes have train describers, cab signalling (CAWS) and full train radio coverage;

• CTC suburban – the VDU-based consoles coverprimarily the DART system. The electrified DARTline, at 1.5 kV O/H, between Malahide, Howthand Greystones operates with driver only operation under full ATP. Of note was the separate CCTV monitor console for control ofthe level crossings. All the pictures are recordedfor incident management together with additional low level cameras at some crossingsfor recording vehicle number plates;

• telecommunications equipment room – here theequipment for the transmission systems, tele-phone exchange, train radio, CCTV and LLPAwere inspected. The transmission equipmentutilises the national railway optical fibre networksupporting the Synchronous Digital Hierarchy(SDH) network;

• power room – the main power supplies to theCTC are backed up UPS and standby diesel generator;

• signalling equipment room – the various remotecontrol systems together with the train describerand local interlocking (I/L) were viewed.

Members then travelled by bus to Dublin’s

Heuston station for visits to the station redevelop-ment project. The original terminal station wasdesigned by Sancton Wood and completed in 1848.A two-year development project, which retained theoriginal listed building, has provided new platforms,modernisation of the track layout, signalling, ancillary services and the provision of a second concourse.

A tour of the facilities included:

• new station concourse – a refreshment stop wasprovided to view a display and model depictingthe rebuilding project. In addition, the variouspublic information systems utilising LED andTFT displays which had been provided by theData Display Co Ltd were inspected;

• station control room – here the public addresssystem and the impressive station CCTV surveillance and security facilities were noted;

• plant room – noted here were the twin walleddiesel fuel storage tanks. The pumping equip-ment for serving each of the platforms with fuel,water for both refilling the coach water tanksand cleaning purposes. New rolling stock is fitted with retention toilets; and a vacuum system is provided together with holding tanksfor the effluent. (It is most important these arekept in their separate pipes!);

• control centre – the resignalled area is operatedby a Westinghouse Rail Systems Ltd (WRSL)Control and Display (WESTCAD) system. Thiscomprises LCD display screens; three normallydisplaying the detail views with the fourth showing alarms etc; with the human machineinterface by keyboard and mouse. The inter-locking areas are controlled by three WRSL 2MHz solid state I/Ls; in addition a WRSL traindescriber (TD) has been provided to providetrain descriptions on the signallers display andto link to Connelly CTC. It was noted that provision has been made for future control fromthe CTC; when Heuston control centre will beretained as an Emergency Control Point (ECP);

• equipment rooms – the SSI, WESTCAD, TD,telecommunications and transmission systemequipment were all inspected. Of particular notewas the Continuous Automatic Warning System(CAWS); this is unique to IÉ and is an overlaywarning system utilising coded track circuits torepeat the signal aspect in the driver’s cab. Forthe control of the CAWS by the SSI new data-constructs were required to cater for the complex track layout at Heuston.

Members then transferred by bus to the GlenRoyal Hotel Maynooth for lunch.

To improve capacity on the single line betweenClonsilla – Maynooth; the section was doubled, resignalled and level crossings modernised by theintroduction of manually controlled four-barrier installations monitored by CCTV.

Following lunch members had technical visits ofthe following:

• signalling control room – this is located withinthe station building and contains a WESTCAD

Mechanical signal with reflective arm at Wicklow

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND 151

system controlling the WESTRACE interlockings(I/L). It was noted that the remaining single linesection (Maynooth – Enfield) remains under thecontrol of Electric Staff Instrument interfaced tothe local I/L;

• signalling equipment room – the WESTRACEinterlocking equipment and transmission system were inspected. The transmissionequipment utilises the railway SDH network;

• a demonstration of the WESTRACE event logging system MoviolaW was given in the generator room. MoviolaW is a software system,which allows the recording and ‘playback’ ofevents from the WESTRACE interlockings; thusallowing technicians to fault find more efficientlyand operators to evaluate incidents.

On completion of the technical visits membersreturned to the Dublin hotels by bus.

The guests programme for the day included, atKilbeggan, a tour of Locke's Distillery (believed to bethe oldest licensed pot still distillery in the world)now a museum of industrial archaeology. Lunch wasat Shannonbridge in the The Old Fort Restaurant,the building constructed as a bridgehead defenceagainst Napoleon in approx 1810. After lunch guestsvisited Clonmacnoise to view the remains of theancient 6th century monastic settlement. After a veryinteresting day they returned by coach to the hotels.

THURSDAY 3rd JUNE 2004

After an early breakfast in the hotels, membersand guests journeyed by service DART train toConnelly to join the special train for the journeyacross the border to Belfast Northern Ireland.

On arrival at Belfast Central station the guestsdeparted for a tour of the town and shopping in theCity Centre. The tour included the slipway where thepassenger liner ‘Titanic’ was launched. Built at theHarland & Wolff shipyard; the world's largest ship ofthe time at 46,329 tons gross was completed on 2ndApril 1912. The liner, during its maiden voyage, hit aniceberg and sunk on 14th April 1912, with the tragicloss of 1,517 passengers and crew. Concluding thetour, guests then rejoined the members for lunch atthe Ulster Folk & Transport Museum.

The members then split into their respective colourgroups for technical visits.

During a tour of Belfast Central station the follow-ing areas were covered:

• the new PIS display on the station which islinked to the train describer system;

• the station facilities are covered by CCTV surveillance and security staff 24 hours a dayseven days a week. Of special note was the station car park where the parking fee is only50% of the cost if travelling by rail, otherwise fullprice;

• signal box – the TD systems provide train track-ing, reporting and real time data for passengerinfor-mation throughout all of NIR. The latestsystems are VME based and include data-logging and off-line analysis of train movements.For the rebuilding of the line between Bleach

Green and Antrim, (re-opened in 2001), theexisting entrance exit panel could not accom-modate the addition of the section. ThreeWESTCAD VDU screens are mounted aboveand designed to replicate the existing panelstyle. The WESTCAD includes the provision of‘Signal Passed at Danger’ (SPAD) alarms andcontrols three relay-based interlockings via TDMremote control;

• level crossing predictor – a demonstration of theWRSL WESTex predictor for use at 'UserWorked Level Crossings' was given; the solutionemploys audio frequency track circuit tech-nology to control the warning devices. All theequipment is housed at the crossing and thefirst installation on NIR will be commissioned atMuckmore, near Templepatrick on the BleachGreen to Antrim line, where it has been operating in ‘shadow’ mode since January2004. The system monitors the approachingtrain; to ensure a uniform warning time at thecrossing is given irrespective of the train speed.

On completion of the visit members joined a special NIR diesel multiple unit for the short trip, viathe Cross-Harbour link (opened in 1996), toYorkgate; on alighting from the train there was ashort bus transfer to York Road Maintenance Depot.

At the depot a tour of the following areas was undertaken:

• for moving a complete train carriage by road; amonster eight axle sixteen double wheel tractorunit with steer-able axles is used, it is paintedbright red and nicknamed “Thunderbird Six”together with the driver “Virgil”;

• the facilities are very much self-sufficient allowing for the complete strip-down and refurbishment of coaches, diesel engines andancillaries. As well an underfloor wheel lathe forreprofiling wheel sets a fully equipped spraypaint booth is provided;

• new NI railways three-car ‘C3K’ Diesel MultipleUnits, built in Spain, were observed undergoingcommissioning tests before entering revenue service later this year.

The members were then welcomed to the NIRailways training centre where demonstrationsincluded:

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND152

Belfast station concourse

• electrically operated point layout with supple-mentary drive;

• fibre optic and conventional lamp signals and indicators;

• level crossing equipped with lifting barriers;

• electronic systems; including the latest gener-ation WRSL TMD remote control system (S3);this is a development of the existing highlyproven and reliable system but based on a modern platform with increased processingpower.

After the visits the members joined a special trainfor the trip to Antrim over the restored Bleach Green– Antrim line and returned to Belfast. On conclusionof the technical visits the members travelled by trainto Cultra, joining the guests for lunch at the UlsterFolk & Transport Museum.

The museum was set up to illustrate the way of lifeand traditions of the people of the north of Ireland.The Cultra site, formerly part of the estate of SirRobert Kennedy, was acquired in 1961 and themuseum first opened in 1964. Following the open-ing, in 1993 and 1996, of the award winning Roadand Rail galleries these together with Ballycultratown, a heritage recreation of houses and shops etcshowing life in times past, firmly established themuseum as one of inter-national importance.

After lunch at the Cultra Manor there was free timeto explore both the cultural exhibits together with theTransport Museum before returning to Belfast by service train. On arrival at Belfast the party walkedthe short distance to the Hilton Hotel where anexcellent meal was enjoyed by all.

At the conclusion of dinner the President, JohnCorrie, thanked the sponsors for the day and made presentations to Malcolm Overton’s assistants whohad done so much in the organisation of the day.Clive Bradberry, Infrastructure Executive NIR, againgave thanks to the NIR team and hoped that everyone had enjoyed their day concluding with atoast to the IRSE. John then made a presentation toMalcolm’s wife and proposed a toast to NIR.Malcolm and his team proposed a toast to the mem-bers and guests visiting Northern Ireland to whichKen Burrage, Chief Executive IRSE, responded.

As the evening closed everyone returned toBelfast Central station to join the special train for thereturn journey to Dublin.

FRIDAY 4th JUNE 2004

As the guests had no formal activities until theevening reception and dinner; there was time toeither relax or go shopping in Dublin.

Some guests decided to join the members for thetechnical visit to the LUAS, (which means “speed” inIrish), this is a new light rail system soon to bebrought into service in the Dublin area. The initialsystem consists of two lines; line A (Red Line) being15 km long and runs from Connelly station on theeastern side of Dublin via the bus station and the citycentre, on the northern bank of the River Liffey, toHeuston station and then southwest to Red Cowand Tallaght. Line B (Green Line), which is 9 km long,

largely follows the route of a disused railway linefrom Sandyford in the south-east, via Dundrum to StStephen's Gate on the south side of the city; withonly the final section through the city streets. Thetrack gauge of LUAS being 4ft 81/2in, compared withthe Irish railway gauge of 5ft 3in. Alstom manufac-tures the Light Rail Vehicles (LRVs) to their 'Citadis'pattern; vehicles for line A being 30m and line B 40mlong. The differing vehicle lengths are determined bythe system design capacity of 2,700 passengers/hour/direction for line A with 3,600 passengers/hour/direction for line B. These figures based onfive-minute headways.

Departing by bus from the hotels the party travelled to the Red Cow Depot of line A for the visit.

On arrival at the depot the party divided intogroups to view the following:

• control room – the control room is provided withfully integrated systems, supplied by Alcatel, necessary for system operation and supervisionof both A and B lines. CCTV is provided for bothoperation and security at all LRV stops androad/rail intersections. LRVs generally have priority at junctions and the control system will initiate road traffic signal sequence accordingly.An automatic vehicle location system, to locatethe positions of the LRVs, is provided and utilises transponders fitted at various places onthe tracks. Using this system the positions ofthe LRVs are displayed on colour monitors onthe control desks. Variation to timetable operation alarms are also provided together withradio communications using the Tetra system.Full monitoring and remote control of the 750Vdc O/H power supplies is also provided;

• wheel lathe – an underfloor wheel lathe is provided to enable the LRV wheels to be reprofiled without removal of the bogies from thevehicles;

• bogie change facility – a complete LRV may belifted using vehicle lifting jacks to enable thebogies to be changed. Bogie washing facilitiesare also provided with the bogies moved using aremote controlled vehicle;

• roof inspection of control equipment – all theLRVs are low floor so much of the control gearis located in weatherproof modules situated onthe vehicle’s roof;

• LRV ride from depot to Tallaght – the partyjoined one of the LRVs for a trip to Tallaght; during the ride opportunity was taken to examine the on-board systems provided for theoperator.

On conclusion of the morning visit to the LUAS system the party returned to their hotels with the afternoon being at leisure.

The last official activity on the Friday night was theConvention reception and dinner at the JurysBallsbridge Hotel. After an excellent meal thePresident rose to make his final address. He commented on the theme of this year’s convention,being “Communication and Teamwork”, and askedeveryone to raise a toast to the sponsors without

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND 153

whom the event would not have been possible.Turning then to thank the inspirational Peter Cuffeand his team, who seemed to be able to work the‘Magic of Merlin’ in ensuring all the various activitiesthroughout the week run smoothly, he went on tospecially thank the various representatives of theInstitution who also contributed to the success ofthis Convention; especially Roger Penny, theConvention Co-ordinator, together with DavidMcKeown and the members colour group leaders.Concluding with personal thanks to his wife Nicolafor all the help and support throughout the week.

Peter Cuffe then gave the results of the membersquiz held on Wednesday; there having been 36returned quiz papers, which represented 25% of thetotal. Continuing he again thanked all the organisingteam, guides and the colour group leaders. MarkNeilan, on behalf of all colour group leaders, thankedeveryone for the week and commented on howmuch they had enjoyed themselves. Speaking inFrench, he then volunteered their services to theSenior Vice-President for the 2005 Convention to beheld in France. Peter then concluded by making presentations to the President and his wife.

The President then made a special presentation toRay Weedon, who had arranged 47 conventions, starting in 1958, including giving guidance for this

year convention in Dublin. Ray received the awardwith great acclaim by all present. The President continued by asking everyone to raise a toast toIarnród Éireann and in conclusion requestedJacques Poré (Senior Vice-President) to give a briefoutline of next year’s convention. Jacques then gavedetails of the convention to be held in Strasbourg,France, on the 26th-30th September 2005.

The formal part of the evening then finished,everyone enjoyed the Céilí (traditional Irish dancingand band) and danced until the early hours ofSaturday morning.

I conclude this short article on the convention bythese personal thoughts – “Ireland made us trulyvery welcome, the weather held up all week, the visits and hospitality were excellent. We saw howtraditional mechanical technology can be blendedwith the latest technology to form an integratedmodern railway control system. The convention wasthoroughly enjoyed by everyone and many newfriends were made; this emphasises the theme of'communication and teamwork' which is increas-ingly needed in the rapidly changing world thattoday S&T professionals find themselves in. Will Isee you, the reader, in Strasbourg next year? I verymuch hope so.” Derek Edney

IRSE CONVENTION 2004: DUBLIN, IRELAND154

The Early History of the IRSEThe Formation of the Institution by Ken Burrage

THE ASSOCIATION OF RAILWAY COMPANIES’SIGNAL SUPERINTENDENTS AND SIGNALENGINEERS

On 2nd January 1891 a preliminary meeting washeld in London between four of the leading signalengineers of the day with the object of forming anAssociation of Railway Companies' Signal Super-intendents and Signal Engineers. The following fourpersons were present and may be considered as theFounders of the Association:

• Mr Malan Hull and Barnsley Railway

• Mr Wilson Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway

• Mr Cockburn London & South Western Railway

• Mr Pryce North London Railway

Mr Malan was elected President for 1891 and MrPryce Hon Secretary. The first ordinary meeting ofthe Association was held in London on 29th April1891 and the total membership at that time was 11.The purpose of the Association was to provide anopportunity for the leading figures of the day in signal engineering to meet and discuss matters ofcommon interest and to agree the adoption of standard practices in signal engineering for their railways. As well as technical matters in signal engineering they also considered operating practices and the rates of pay, terms and conditionsof employment for signal maintainers and installers.They met at conferences held twice a year in Mayand September at various locations around the

country, usually at the headquarters of one of themember railways, and the conference invariablyincluded the opportunity for a visit to a local install-ation of topical interest.

The Association rules allowed only the principalsignal engineer of a railway to become a memberand this rule was strictly enforced. The importanceand standing of the Association gradually grew. Thefirst overseas member was elected from NewZealand in 1900. By the 10-year anniversary of itsexistence in 1901 there were 19 members, includingoverseas members from India, New Zealand andNatal, and the Association was recognised by theBoard of Trade (the railway regulator of the day) as abody of experts. The Board of Trade was accord-ingly willing to supply Association members withcopies of railway accident reports and theAssociation had been able to influence the Board ofTrade to revise the Railway Regulations in certainrespects specific to signal engineering.

At the 35th conference held on 26th September1907 at the George Hotel Glasgow, Mr B H Peter,Signal Engineer of the Metropolitan District Railway,was duly elected a member of the Association. Itwas also agreed that Mr W C Acfield, SignalEngineer, of the Midland Railway and at the time alsothe Hon Secretary of the Association, should beelected the President for 1908, (the significance ofthese appointments will be apparent later in thestory). By this time there were 30 members of the

Association and the agenda items and discussionfor the 1907 Glasgow meeting covered such diversetopics as:

• descriptions of new signalling installations thathad been recently commissioned;

• a standard specification for signalling wire;

• long burning signal lamps;

• comparative costs of signal lighting, oil burningversus gas;

• record keeping for signalling renewals;

• single line working, shunting trains to allow others to pass;

• level crossing gates worked by power systems;

• track circuits, leakage currents;

• overtime pay in signal departments (it was minuted that most railways did not allow over-time pay during the week until 54 hours hadbeen worked, but that overtime was paid for aSunday worked).

The technical visit on this occasion was toinspect the G & S W R electro-mechanical signallingat St Enoch Station, Glasgow.

THE SIGNAL ENGINEERING SOCIETYThe year 1905 was an important milestone in the

history of railway signalling and could also be said tohave led indirectly to the formation of the Institutionof Railway Signal Engineers. It was in that year thatthe District and Metropolitan railways in London hadbeen electrified and automatic signalling installed.Many features of a novel kind were included on theDistrict Railway installation. Continuous track circuit-ing, train describers, platform train indicators, andautomatic train stops were provided and are all features that became standard practice.

Coincidentally with the work in London much larger projects were under way elsewhere on themain lines in Britain – for example large electro-pneumatic installations at Newcastle and Glasgow,whilst the largest ever mechanical frame was inprocess of erection at the locomotive yard box atYork on the NE Railway with 295 levers in a singlerow.

The work on the District Railway referred to aboveled to a desire by the staff concerned to establish a"study circle" to facilitate discussion on problemsand experiences. In this they were joined by staff ofthe Bakerloo and Piccadilly tube railways, bothopened in 1906, and as a consequence, “The SignalEngineering Society” encouraged by B H Peter(Signal Engineer of the Metropolitan DistrictRailway), was formed in 1907. This initiative to formthe Signal Engineering Society was a matter of considerable interest to the Association of RailwayCompanies’ Signal Superintendents and SignalEngineers who viewed this development with somesuspicion. In 1908 Mr W C Acfield, SignalSuperintendent of the Midland Railway, who wasthen President of the Association of RailwayCompanies Signal Superintendents and SignalEngineers, wrote to Mr Peter to find out what it wasall about.

Mr Peter replied,

“Dear Sir

The Signal Engineering Society

This Society was started by some of the men onthe District and "Tube" railways staff during the lastwinter.

There are about 150 men concerned on theselines with the signalling work, and many of themwished to join some society for getting in touch withoutside work.

They found however that there was no society forwhich they were eligible, so started their own, towhich anyone employed in the design, constructionor maintenance can belong. The Society is in no wayin opposition to your association, and is merely to encourage the men to take an interest insignalling work. Papers are read on various subjects, visits are arranged to works etc, and smallconcerts held.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd) B H Peter”

It was clear from this development that some formof association was desired to enable signal engi-neers in general, irrespective of their employingcompany or position in the company, (and not justtheir bosses who were meeting in the Associationreferred to above), to meet and exchange ideas andviews, and to develop their knowledge of the practice of signal engineering.

THE INSTITUTION OF SIGNAL ENGINEERSAnd so it was on 1st February 1910, eight senior

members of the signalling engineering profession(including Messrs Peter and Acfield above) met toconsider the desirability of forming "an associationof those engaged in railway signalling work" and theInstitution of Signal Engineers (the predecessor toour existing Institution) was formed.

The Greek motto, used to this day, arose from asearch for something that would express the inten-tion of the founders to combine interests in signaland telegraph work. In Roman script this reads"Sema phero telauges" thus Sema (a sign), phero (Ibear) and telauges (far shining). The Institution is, ofcourse, now very international but it is interestingthat the first overseas members were in fact electedas early as November 1910 – one from the NWRailway of India, one from the Great India PeninsulaRailway and one from the New Zealand GovernmentRailway.

Mr A T Blackall, Signal Engineer of the GreatWestern Railway, was elected as President and in hisPresidential address at the inaugural meeting of theInstitution on 8th November 1910 he defined“Signalling” as:

“The whole of the methods and means by whichthe movement of traffic is controlled.”

And he went on to say that it is axiomatic that:

“A signalling system must provide for safetywithout undue sacrifice of economy, whether intime or money.”

From the papers presented in 1910/1911 it was

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE IRSE – THE FORMATION OF THE INSTITUTION 155

evident that the lack of standardisation between railways was a headache to manufacturers, althoughthe railways themselves were very protective of theirindividual practices and designs. It was in March,1911 that W C Acfield, Signal Superintendent of theMidland Railway, proposed that a committee beformed to agree upon a standard form for signs andsymbols used by the various organisations on drawings and diagrams for mechanical and electricalwork in railway signalling and, although littleprogress seemed to be made, it was one of the firstexamples of an initiative by the Institution to influence practices and procedures.

In November 1911 it was brought to the notice ofthe Council that, through some legal misdirection,there was an irregularity in the constitution of theInstitution. The resultant legal tangle took some 18months to resolve and it was necessary to startagain.

THE INSTITUTION OF RAILWAY SIGNALENGINEERS

The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, as itexists today, was incorporated on 11th November1912, Mr A T Blackall, Signal Engineer of the GreatWestern Railway, being elected the first President.

At the end of the inaugural session there were atotal of 103 members – 41 from the railways of GreatBritain, five from Irish Railways and 28 from firms ofrailway signalling contractors. Overseas representa-tion included members from various states in India,Ceylon, the Federated Malay States, Australia, NewZealand, South Africa, Argentina and the USA.

In the inaugural session of the reformed 1912Institution held on 25th February 1913, Mr R J Insell,Assistant Signal Engineer of the Great WesternRailway, defined the purpose of signalling as:

“The provision of facilities for working the trafficand ensuring safety are the two points upon whichour whole being hangs.”

So from the very beginning of our Institution andthroughout its 94 year history to date our watchwordhas been safe, economic, operation of railway traffic.

Our current President, John Corrie, is the 80thperson to become the Institution's President. Duringthe First and Second World Wars the usual arrange-ment to elect a President annually was temporarilysuspended and the same person continued to serveuntil normal operations were resumed. Two personshave had the unique distinction to be elected toserve as President for two terms of office. RobertDell served in 1949 and again in 1966. Jim Wallerserved in 1978 and again in 1991.

The full list of IRSE Presidents is shown below withphotographs of our first President A T Blackall andof our current President John Corrie.

1913 Alfred Blackall ……………………………………GWR1914 Josiah Sayers…………………………………………MR1915-20 Arthur Hurst …………………………………………NER1921 Charles Ellison ……………………………………NER1922 Wilfred Acfield ………………………………………MR1923 Robert Insell ………………………………………GWR

1924 W Thorrowgood………………………………………SR1925 Arthur Bound ……………………………………LNER1926 Frederick Downes ……………………………LNER1927 Ernest Fleet ………………………………………LNER1928 William Every ……………………………………………LT1929 Richard Berry ………………………………………LMR1930 William Wood ……………………………………LNER1931 James Punter ………………………………………Tyer1932 Charles Carslake ………………………………LNER1933 William Challis…………………………………………SR1934 Ralph Griffiths ……………………Westinghouse1935 Herbert Morgan……………………………………LMS1936 Walter Roberts …………………………………RS Co1937 Harry Proud …………………………Westinghouse1938 George Crook ……………………………………GWR1939-43 James Boot …………………………………………GRS1944 Major Falshaw Morkill ……………MOD (LTE)1945 Major Falshaw Morkill ……………MOD (LTE)1946 Herbert Dyer…………………………………………LMS1947 Frederick Castle …………………………………SGE1948 Arthur Moss ……………………………………………ER1949 Robert Dell ………………………………………………LT1950 Frank Horler …………………………………………SGE1951 Sydney Williams …………………………………LMR1952 Thomas Lascelles ……………………………Sykes1953 Tom Austin ……………………………………………SGE1954 John Fraser …………………………………………BTC1955 George Brentnall …………………………………BTC1956 John Kubale …………………………………………GRS1957 Bill Woodbridge ……………………………………WR1958 Jack Tyler…………………………………………………SR1959 Douglas Shipp ……………………Westinghouse1960 Walter Owen …………………………………………LTE1961 George Hathaway ………………Westinghouse1962 Robert Green …………………………………………ER1963 Sidney Davis ………………………………………LMR1964 Edward Rodgers …………………………………BRB1965 Perrin Coley …………………………Westinghouse1966 Robert Dell ………………………………………………LT1967 Harry Hadaway ………………………………………LT1968 Bert Reynolds ………………………………………BRB1969 Oswald Nock ………………………Westinghouse1970 Armand Cardani …………………………………LMR1971 Maurice Leach ………………………………………WR1972 Laurie Tuff ………………………………………………SR1973 Dennis Webb ………………………………………GRS1974 Victor Smith………………………………………………LT1975 David Jewell …………………………………………ScR1976 Harry Duckett………………………Westinghouse1977 Bill Whitehouse ……………………………………BRB1978 Jim Waller………………………………………GEC-GS1979 Ken Hodgson ………………………………………BRB1980 Ray Brown ……………………………………………LMR

156 THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE IRSE – THE FORMATION OF THE INSTITUTION

A T BlackallFirst President

John Corrie80th President

157THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE IRSE – THE FORMATION OF THE INSTITUTION

1981 Leslie Lawrence ……………………………………LTE1982 Philip Wiltshire…………………………………………ER1983 Yves Paris …………………Jeumont Schneider1984 David Norton ………………………Westinghouse1985 Norman Hurford ……………………………………LTE1986 Jurg Oehler ………………………………………Integra1987 Cliff Hale …………………………………………………SR1988 Tim Howard …………………………Westinghouse1989 Frank Rayers …………………………………………ML1990 Jacques Catrain …………………GEC Alsthom1991 Jim Waller ……………………………GEC Alsthom1992 Brian Heard …………………………………………BRB1993 Robin Nelson …Engineering Council/BRB

1994 Anthony Howker ……………………RAILTRACK1995 Eddie Goddard ……………………………………LUL1996 Bill Boddy ……………………………GEC Alsthom1997 Alastair Wilson……………………Adtranz Signal1998 Cy Porter ………………………………………………LUL1999 Clive Kessell ………………………Racal Telecom2000 Helmut Uebel……………………………………Alcatel2001 Bob Barnard ……………………………………Alstom2002 Peter Stanley …………………………………Ingenica2003 Colin Porter………………Lloyd’s Register Rail2004 John Corrie ……………………Mott MacDonald

John Corrie is the 80th person to be President.

The Honorary Fellowsby Ken Burrage

Council at its meeting in April 2005 elected asHonorary Fellows of the Institution Bob Woodhead,Harry Ostrofsky and Hennie van de Venter for manyyears’ work in support of the Southern AfricanSection, and Clayton Tinkham for his work in theformation of the North American Section, and alsoelected the following Past Presidents: LeslieLawrence, Cliff Hale, David Norton, Frank Rayersand Brian Heard in recognition of the exceptional services they had individually rendered over manyyears in furthering the objects of the profession andthe Institution. This is a high honour that Council canbestow on an individual member and readers maybe interested to learn how this distinction comesabout. At its beginning in November 1912 the membership of the IRSE consisted of sevenFoundation Members. They were:

• W C Acfield, Signal Superintendent, MidlandRailway, Derby (member of Council);

• A T Blackall, Signal Engineer, Great WesternRailway, Reading (the first President);

• C Dutton, Signal Superintendent, LondonBrighton & South Coast Railway, New Cross(member of Council);

• H W Firth, Electrical Engineer, Great EasternRailway, Liverpool Street (member of Council);

• R J S Insell, Chief Assistant Signal Engineer,Great Western Railway, Reading (the firstTreasurer);

• A H Johnson, Signal & Telegraph Engineer,

London & South Western Railway, Wimbledon(member of Council);

• J Sayer, Telegraph Superintendent, MidlandRailway, Derby (the first Vice-President).

These were the far-sighted S&T engineers of theday that decided on the name of the Institution andestablished its objects, (which are still as valid todayas they were when they were first written over 90years ago), and they also signed its Memorandum ofAssociation establishing the IRSE as a legal entity.They were the leading signalling and telecommuni-cations engineers of their era. They represented across section of the industry both in discipline and inrailway organisation, another principle that we stilluphold today.

The first annual report shows that there were 91Members, 51 Associate Members, 15 StudentMembers and also seven Honorary Members. Sothere have been Honorary Members of the Institutionof Railway Signal Engineers from its very beginningin 1912.

The Honorary Members were:

• C E Denney, Signal Engineer, LS&MS Railway,Cleveland, Ohio, USA;

• J W Jacombe-Hood, Chief Resident Engineer,London & South Western Railway, Waterloo,London;

• C C Rosenberg, Secretary-Treasurer, RailwaySignal Association, Pennsylvania, USA;

Alistair Wilson Anthony Howker Robin Nelson William Boddy

• A H Rudd, President, Railway Signal Association(America), Philadelphia, USA;

• A Siemens, Managing Director, Siemens Bros &Co Ltd, Westminster, London;

• S P Wood, Managing Director, McKenzie &Holland Ltd, Westminster, London;

• Lt-Col Sir H A Yorke, Chief Inspecting Officer ofRailways, Whitehall, London.

Article 11 of the first Articles of Association of thenewly formed Institution shows that the Council hadthe “power to elect as Honorary Members any persons they may, for special reasons, deem suitableor desirable but such Honorary Members shall possess no voting power.” It is interesting to speculate what special reasons may have led theCouncil to elect these first Honorary Members. Wecan suppose that they wished to foster a close relationship with their colleagues in America byestablishing ties with the Railway Signal Associationand the operating railway in the USA. They presum-ably felt that the senior management of the leadingsignal companies of the day would be useful to thenew Institution and that it would also be helpful tohave the support of the Railway Inspectorate. Thesetoo are principles that the Institution continues to follow today!

By the 10-year anniversary of the Institution in1923 the membership had more than doubled fromthe original 171 to 434 members and the Institution’sfirst secretary, W H Cotterill, had been elected anHonorary Member in 1922 in recognition of his services to the IRSE as secretary since its inceptionin 1912. In 1923, A T Blackall, the first President anda Founding Member, was also elected an HonoraryMember. So by this time the Institution’s Council hadestablished a practice of honouring exceptional service to the work of the Institution by electing suchpersons as Honorary Members.

THE 1945 REVISIONIn the years that followed the Articles of

Association were amended from time to time to keepup to date with the developing railway scene and toassist with the smooth running of the Institution. Asubstantial revision of the Articles took place in 1945in which Article 11(c) now defined the qualificationfor Council to have the power to elect as HonoraryMembers “persons, (who in the opinion of theCouncil) have rendered, or are in a position to renderservices to the Profession, or the Institution, or havefurthered the objects of the Institution, and aredeemed by the Council worthy of such election”.Another of the Articles explained that HonoraryMembers were still not entitled to vote but at leastthey were not liable to pay any entrance fees or subscriptions! The number of Honorary Members atthis time varied only very slightly over the years andremained at between seven and ten.

The next significant development came in 1964when at the AGM that year the Articles were revisedagain, this time to better define the status of members by introducing the concept of Corporateand Non-Corporate members. CorporateMembership included all those in the classes of

Member and Associate Member and certain of theHonorary Members. The Corporate Members werethose considered to be qualified as signal engineersand they were given the right to vote on policy matters affecting the Institution. The Non-Corporatemembers were the remainder of the membership.This revision to the Articles solved an anomaly thathad existed since the Institution’s formation. It willbe remembered that from the beginning HonoraryMembers had no voting rights. So when Councilwished to honour a member by electing them as anHonorary Member, as they did to the first presidentA T Blackall in 1923, they effectively disenfranchisedthe Institution’s most distinguished Membersbecause they lost their right to vote on Institutionaffairs! This was clearly not a satisfactory state ofaffairs and it was corrected by the 1964 revision tothe Articles which made provision for two sorts ofHonorary Members. Those that were previouslyqualified as corporate members remained a corporate member, and thereby retained votingrights. Those that were Non-Corporate membersprior to their election remained Non-Corporate aftertheir election as Honorary Members.

In 1969 there was a further change to the Articlesto improve the status of Institution members. AnExtraordinary General meeting of the Institution heldon 5th November 1969 agreed that the classes ofmembership should be re-designated. The classesof membership of Honorary Member, Member andAssociate Member were redesignated as HonoraryFellow, Fellow and Member respectively. The qualification for the Council to elect a person to theclass of Honorary Fellow remained as stated above.Honorary Fellows continued to be corporate members retaining their voting rights if they werecorporate members prior to their election asHonorary Fellows, and they were not required to paya subscription. One of the first to be elected to theredesignated class of Honorary Fellow was RobertDell OBE the well known Chief Signal Engineer ofLondon Transport and twice President of theInstitution in 1949 and 1966. In 1969 there were1,458 members in total and 12 Honorary Fellows,nine Corporate and three Non-Corporate.

THE 1995 CHANGESThe final chapter in the story so far concerning the

history of the grade of Honorary Fellow came in1995 when the Articles were revised again. As partof this revision a new grade of Companion was introduced. This was because over the yearsCouncil had felt that they wished to be able to electinto Institution membership eminent persons who,although not signal engineers, were nevertheless ina position to further the objectives of the Institution.Typically such persons might be the ManagingDirector or Chief Executive of a major signallingcompany or railway administration. Council did notfeel able to elect such persons as Honorary Fellowsbut nevertheless did wish to provide them a grade ofmembership appropriate to their senior status in theindustry.

Consequent upon the introduction of the grade ofCompanion there was also a slight revision to the

158 THE HONORARY FELLOWS

Article that specified the requirements for election asHonorary Fellow, which now gave the Council power“to elect as Honorary Fellows persons, who in theopinion of the Council have rendered outstanding orexceptional services to the Profession, or theInstitution, or have furthered the objects of theInstitution, and are deemed by the Council worthy ofsuch election.” Honorary Fellows are not required topay subscriptions and if they were Corporate members prior to their election they retain their rightto vote on Institution affairs.

This remains the situation in the current Articles(approved at the AGM in April 2002). Council regularly gives consideration to those who it considers have rendered outstanding or exceptionalservices to the profession or the Institution and itproposes these persons for election as HonoraryFellows. It also gives consideration to those who by

their occupation of a position of eminence should berecommended for election as Companions.

With the recent nine new elections there are currently 32 Honorary Fellows in a membership ofnearly 4,000. The others are: W G Boddy, J Boura, A R Brown, K W Burrage, J Catrain, A C Howker, H A E De Vos tot Nederve, P H F Dibden, A Exer, E O Goddard, B H Grose, S Hall, T S Howard, R CNelson, A R McKenna, J G Oehler, N F Reed, W JScheerer, V H Smith OBE, J Waller, R L Weedon, A DWilson and F P Wiltshire.

As a matter of interest there are currently 20Companions and these are: R Adams, M Barclay, C E Burch, J N Candfield, J A Cotton, J A C Drake,D R Gillan, Dr C J Goodman, N J Grady, D L Heath,G L Kline, K Laird, A S Le Roux, H Leibbrand, LordR A H Methuen, D A Poole, A W D Puddick, FSmaxwil, D Tunnicliffe and Prof K D Wiegand.

159THE HONORARY FELLOWS

2004 Examination Resultsasked by the question on the exam paper. Thisapproach inevitably resulted in low marks beingawarded for the question concerned.

The Committee is hopeful that the recent publication of the Institution textbook RailwayTelecommunications will result in an increase in thenumber of Candidates for Modules 4 and 6 for the2005 examination.

Finally, candidates for the 2005 examinationshould note that, due to a clash of dates with theStrasbourg Convention, the examination will takeplace on Saturday 8th October 2005 – one weeklater that the previously advertised date. Candidatesfor the 2005 examination are also reminded thatapplications must be submitted by the 30th June.

Stephen Rodgers

2004 turned out to be another record year for theIRSE examination with 311 modules sat by candi-dates, an increase of 32% from 2003.

The Examination Committee would like to congratulate all the successful candidates whopassed a total 157 modules between them giving anoverall pass rate of 50% – slightly up from the 2003examination.

The Committee is concerned, however, that somecandidates were not fully prepared to sit the exami-nation. This was especially the case for Module 1where the pass rate was only 37%. The Committeenoticed an increase in candidates offering a 'standard answer' to some questions – withoutdemonstrating an understanding of the underlyingprinciples or addressing the specific points being

Candidate M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7

Armstrong, I P C

Barnby, M C P

Bignell, J P

Bignell, Rebecca P C

Bignell, Ronnie P

Bilston, S C P

Broderick, M C C

Burkett, R C P

Cardiff, A C C

Cassidy, C C C C P

Chapman, A P P

Chung, H C C C D

Cox, S C C P C

Cross, G P C P

Currens, J C

Dave, U P

Denham, D P

Dhelaria, J P P P

Dunning, J C P

Dzimba, J P

Candidate M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7

Egan, J P C

Essex, M P C C D

Fidler, P P P

Frend, D P

Fry, D P P D P

Goei, A P P

Gonye, S P

Gracey, P P

Harris, M C P P

Hatcher, C C C

Horton, N P P P

Hutton, D P

Johnson, D P

Khalid, A C C

Khovabut, S P

Kittijirayu, S P

Lant, R C

Lau, S C

Lockwood, S P

Manion, P C

Candidate M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7

Marshall, J C

Mercado, M P

Mitchell, G P P

Mooney, G C P

Moyo, D P P

Murphy, E P

Murungu, L P

Mynott, A P P

Newby, J C C

Ng, K C

Nguyen, T P C

Nipariyai, N P

Olliff, L P

O’Neill, M P P C D

Parker, S P D P

Pochroj, B C

Pointon-Bell, J P P P

Puntprasert, S D P

Rahman, M P P

Reddy, N P P P P

Reid, A P C

Reynolds, D P

Ruddy, C P

2004 EXAMINATION RESULTS160

Candidate M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7

Sanderson, C C

Savopoulos, A C

Sharpe, J P

Shen, X P

Sloan, R P

Tembo, C P

Thomson, L P C P

Tsang Wai Shan P

Tsang Wai Tat Ivan P

Tse, E P

Tse, W P P P

Wake, C P

Wan, V C C

Wardrop, S P C C C

Warren, M P P P

Webster, M P

Whawell, A P P P

Wong, K C D P

Yau, C P P

Yim, L P P

Zengeni, L P P

P = Pass, C = Credit, D = Distinction

Technical Visit to the Øresund Link26th-27th November 2004

Midday on a cold, rather damp Friday morningsaw just over 50 members with some partners gather at the Savoy Hotel – not the usual one next tothe IEE but the one in Malmo in Sweden, for a welcoming buffet prior to starting our most recenttechnical visit to the Øresund Link. The project,opened in July 2000, provides a road and rail linkbetween Copenhagen in Denmark and Malmo andwas chosen by our President John Corrie as a suitable example for the subject of interfaces, one ofa number of issues which are of particular interestduring his year of office.

Welcoming us to Sweden, Per Olofsson, a longstanding member from Sweden, reminded us thatthe IRSE first visited Sweden in 1962, the year of the

IRSE group looking at model railway layout in training centre Photos on this and next page: Colin Porter

Our President looking at signalling console with RobinNelson

50th anniversary of the founding of the Institution.The last visit was the 1978 Summer Convention toGothenburg. There the highlight of the programmewas the demonstration of the world’s very first computer-based interlocking taken into operation inMay that same year in Gothenburg. There weresome very traditional UK links with Malmo, since the Swedish State Railways on 1st January 1925commissioned a Westinghouse Brake & SaxbySignal Co Ltd Power Frame style K. The interlockingcarried manufacturing number 21 of 409 manu-factured in total. It was equipped with 83 levers – 39points, 33 signal and 11 spares.

Following on from Per, one of the stalwart organisers of the visit, Johnny Restrup-Sørensen,

the Director of Rail Infrastructure from theConsortium set up to build and manage the project,then gave a brief overview of how the project hadbeen set up between the two States, how it wasfinanced, some of the challenges faced during theconstruction period and its utilisation since opening.The link is a total length of nearly 16 km and consistsof a combined road/rail tunnel from Kastrup nearCopenhagen airport to a man-made island,Peberholm in the middle of the Øresund, continuingonto Sweden in a combined road/rail suspensionbridge, with the rail part below the road decking onthe bridge. Quite a civil engineering triumph irre-spective of the interesting systems challengesfaced. The Øresundbro consortium is 50% ownedby each of the two States

Transferring by coach to the Banskolan (SignallingSchool) in Ängelholm, Sweden after lunch, we weregreeted by Thomas Frost, the S&T Senior TrainingAdviser of the school. Then followed a number ofpresentations on the technical features of the link.Lucas Orve from Ansaldo described the two ATCsystems used in each country. There were significantdifferences in the technical equipment used, forexample one using centre track mounted balisesand one using transponders mounted outside therail, but there were also considerable differences inthe driver interface panels (MMI). They had decidedto dual fit the trains using the link with both types ofATC equipment since the work predated the availability of ETCS. The migration of the train acrossthe link and the transfer from one system to theother was shown in a sophisticated PowerPoint presentation. The plan was to potentially upgradethe wayside equipment by dual-fitting between

Copenhagen and Malmo to permit trains fitted witheither system to travel over the link, rather than tomaintain the requirement for dual-fitted trains.

Stig Poulsen from Bombardier then covered themethod of interfacing the signalling interlockings.Each country had used Ebilock 850 computer-based

161TECHNICAL VISIT TO ØRESUND LINK

ATC changeover point on Peberholm

IRSE group climbing steps to underneath of Øresund bridge

General view of Øresund bridge from Peberholm

IRSE group under bridge: Colin Porter, Frans Heijnen, TonyHowker, Nicola and John Corrie, John Batts

View inside cab showing Danish and Swedish ATP systemson trip Malmo to Kastrup

Bob Wyatt holding Red tour leader’s flag, Kastrup

interlockings with identical hardware. However, therewere significant differences in the software and data,reflecting the different signalling principles and practices between the two countries. There were different external interfaces to signals and the track-side ATP equipment as well as different voltagesused for the external connections. Fearful of theapproval requirements if a software-based interfacebetween the two countries had been used, the safeand pragmatic option chosen was to do it withrelays! A relay interface to connect the Danish lineblock system to the Swedish interlocking wasdesigned, and to eliminate the need for softwarechanges, fictitious signals driving resistors ratherthan real lights were used at the interface.

Anders Malmburg from Banverket covered thetelecommunications systems used. Describing thebackground of the Eirene and Morane projects todevelop the GSM-R prototype system, Anders wenton to explain the additional features of GSM-R overpublic GSM radio systems such as group calls, useof priority, functional numbering and location dependent addressing. Banverket, the SwedishInfrastructure Authority, had been the first nationalrailway to implement a national GSM-R system. Sofar 650 out of 800 base stations had been installedcovering over 6,000 km of the network, with completion aimed for 2007. The GSM-R imple-mented in July 2000 on the link was the first commercial use of GSM-R in the world and also thefirst to pass over a territorial border. Siemens hadprovided the base stations and other infrastructurewith the mobiles supplied by Sagem. Problems hadinitially been experienced with handover on exit fromthe tunnel on Peberholm and this has necessitatedsplitting the base station on the island. Leaky feedercable with repeaters was used for radio propagationin the tunnels with antennas used for the open sections. The radio systems used Banverket's ownfibre optic based backbone transmission system forlandline connections. Anders mentioned one of themany benefits of the GPRS, ie packet data, whichwas provided as part of the system was to countreindeer crossing the tracks!

Then Søren Lynge Jacobsen, from DSB, providedan insight into operational aspects of the link. A newfleet of 48 EMU trains had been provided to servicethe link with additional trains subsequently ordered.He described the ownership arrangements for thefleet as well as some details of the operating andtrain crew arrangements. Finally, Thomas Frost, fromthe signalling school, gave an overview of the self-financing school, owned by Banverket, whichprovided signal engineering training on a large variety of interlocking and lineside equipment usedthroughout Banverket. This was followed by a tour ofthe equipment provided for training, which includeda very nice model railway. That completed the afternoon's programme and we set off back toMalmo for the night.

Next morning at 0800 saw a rather better day, dryand not as cold which was just as well as we weregoing on site. Fortunately, this time we could actually see the bridge, it having been shrouded inlow cloud and mist the day before. Those who have

organised visits like this will know the considerableeffort that goes into the exact timetabling of eachsection of the visit necessitating the party being split

162 TECHNICAL VISIT TO ØRESUND LINK

Keith holding the green flag on the island, next to the inter-locking. “A green flag alongside a running railway MrWalter?” Photos on this page: Frans Heijnen

Interesting signals: on the island at the changeover fromDanish to Swedish signalling principles

On the island: everybody trying to capture a train passingby. “Cold and windy but trains have to be photographed”

The President and other members of his tour group on thebridge, next to the railway Photo: Frans Heijnen

into the colour groups for the usual musical chairs aswe cycled through each of the visit hotspots. KeithWalter had arranged this is well as ever, and we sawin turn the following key items.

The elegant, although somewhat draughty,Kastrup station, built as part of the airport, had anumber of novel features. It had no advertisementson the platforms, rather a set of noise absorbing picture panels. Platform edge lights came on astrains approached to show the position and length ofthe trains. Screening wires had been placed abovethe catenary to limit the transmitted emf which couldaffect the airport's control systems. The stationequipment room contained an emergency controlpoint for the local Ebilock 850 interlocking, normallycontrolled from central Copenhagen – quite a largeinterlocking with around 100 signals including thosein the local train depot. This part of the link, knownas the Danish land works, had been completedsome two years before the tunnel/bridge section.

Then it was onto the artificial island, Peberholm,named I understand because it was built near to thenatural island Saltholm, to be able to make salt andpepper islands! Our group first visited the relay roomat the western end of the island near where the tunnel section emerged. This was the location wherethe ATC system transition took place and was thehome of the relay interface between the interlockingsystems of the two countries. DC track circuits werein use on the Swedish side of the link, compatiblewith the 15 kV/162/3 Hz electrification system in usein Sweden with 75 Hz ac track circuits in Denmarkbecause of the dc electrification system used therefor the Copenhagen suburban service. The link itselfis electrified at 25 kV/50 Hz.

At the eastern end of the island, we visited thetelecommunications equipment room. There was ashort presentation describing the 156 Mb SDHbackbone transmission system used on the link.There was also a graphic description of whatseemed an inordinately complex radio transmissionsystem that had to deal with the police, fire, rescue,and public safety radio transmissions as well as theGSM-R used by the trains on the link, and theDanish MSR-3 train radio system. In addition, publicGSM and FM radio transmissions were provided for(and all without relays!). At this site we were able tosee the transition from the surface section of the linkand the bridge section and were able to go up totrack level at the commencement of the bridge.There were three marvellous contraptions, known as"Svabo Lifts" which could run underneath the bridge

to provide facilities for bridge examinations.

Finally, a welcome cup of coffee and cinnamoncakes was provided at the link's road traffic controlcentre Lernacken on the Swedish side of the linkprior to visiting the facility. Here we received theexplanation of why a submerged tunnel had beenprovided as part of the link. It was because the flightapproach to Copenhagen airport was directly overthat part of the link. There were 300 road traffic signscontrolled from the centre, with over 250 CCTV cameras provided on the road section. Two work-stations were provided to carry out the road trafficcontrol task, with remote facilities provided for boththe Danish and Swedish police. It was an impressivebuilding comprehensive control facilities for the tunnel ventilation systems which would be used incase of fire and evacuation.

All the groups then met up, miraculously, for lunchat the Restaurant Kastrup Strandpark, the formerDanish visitor centre used whilst the link was underconstruction, from where we were able to get a goodview of the island and bridge sections. It was animpressive sight, with its gently curving alignment. Itgave our President John Corrie, the opportunity togive a heartfelt vote of thanks to the many presenters who had taken part in the visit, the sponsors who had provided the lunches, refresh-ments and the coaches for travel as well as the tworailway administrations together with the ØresunbroConsortium who had facilitated the visit. JohnnyRestrup-Sørensen from the Consortium and LarsEngström from Atkins, Sweden had made most ofthe detailed arrangements together with Keith Walterand the Institution is indebted to them for their hardwork in arranging such an interesting and rathernovel visit.

163TECHNICAL VISIT TO ØRESUND LINK

Mr Howker taking pictures of the Bombardier interlocking.“Something for your railway, Tony?” Photo: Frans Heijnen

164

During the year, meetings of the AustralasianSection were held as follows.

1 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING FOLLOWED BY A TECHNICALMEETING – MELBOURNE

19th-21st MARCH 2004

The meeting was called to order at 0910 hrs by MrKeith Walker who welcomed 140 members and visitors, these included the IRSE President Mr ColinPorter with his wife Claire and ex President Mr TonyHowker.

The keynote address was presented by Mr TomSargent, GM Infrastructure, Office of Director PublicTransport.

“The Melbourne tram and train network had beenprivatised in 1999 with five franchisees, for terms of12-15 years. The Victorian government realised thatwith the difficulties arising, that to ensure a success-ful system was maintained, some renegotiation wasneeded, this resulted in mergers, so that there arenow only two franchises operating the network, atram and a train.

The new agreements were only signed a monthago, and are of duration of 5-6 years, with a shortextension option; they have built in revenue capswhere increase or decreases enable the governmentto step in.”

Mr Sargent concluded by answering four questions from the floor.

Mr Walker spoke briefly about the Section’s activities during the year.

Following the AGM in Adelaide, successful tech-nical meetings were held in Western Australia andNew South Wales.

Local organised meetings continue to provideadditional exposure to the industry.

The financial report shows that we have strength-ened our monetary position.

The result of the 2004 Election was as follows.

Election of Officers and Committee 2004

Chairman Mr C R Page (F) Vic

Vice-Chairman Mr T G Moore (F) NSW

CommitteeNSW Messrs D C Hayman (AM),

S D Cotton (M), J J Aitken (A)Victoria D J Ness (M), B Luber (AM),

S W Boshier (M)Queensland P A Huth (AM)WA P L Gobetz (F)

Secretary/Treasurer G Willmott (A)

The following members will remain in office for2004:

Country Vice-President Mr P Symons (F) NSW

Public Officer Mr R A Bell (F) Vic

Committee Messrs M R Donald (M) Vic,M R Lyons (AM) NSW lieu A Vaz,

G T Josh (M) Qld, H J Revell (M) QldL D Tran (M) SA, L Costa (F) WA,

A E Neilson (F) NZ

The Committee was deemed to be elected videRule 23(3).

The Committee will co-opt a replacement for MrMoore who resigned, due to election in the positionof Vice-Chairman.

Mr Walker handed over the Badge of Office to theincoming Chairman Mr Charles Page.

Mr Page reported that the criteria for the Byles &Calcutt had not been met this year, we must lookaround our organisation and help the younger members present a paper. We believe that not onlycan they can contribute to our meetings, we havesomething for them. It might only be the chance todevelop themselves by standing in front of an audience.

Mr Page continued: “On a personal note, some ofyou know that my family has had an exceptionallylong association with the IRSE, the first joining in1914. My Dad is still an active member in his 70s.

“I am particularly honoured to have the privilege toserve the Institution in this way, thank you for theopportunity.

“Part of the role of the Institution is to foster professionalism in the industry, facilitate pro-fessional development of you as members; this hasprogressed by the leadership of past Chairman, hardwork of the Committee and the people that havebeen co-opted to help.

“One of the initiatives Keith touched on is theStrategy Project. About four years ago, we identifiedthe need to focus on quality and variety of our technical meetings, if you look back over proceed-ings for that period you will see how far we havecome in getting a higher standard of presentation,more varied representation of sectors of the industry.We now have a number of local meetings being held.It is interesting to note that they are reaching part ofthe industry that is not normally exposed to theissues that we are concerned with.”

There were no further items on the agenda.

Mr Page closed the meeting thanking Mr Walkerfor his effort during the past year, noting that he hadgiven service for eight years on the Committee.

TECHNICAL MEETING

Mr Colin Porter FIRSE, President of the IRSE,addressed the meeting.

Australasian Section

Fifty-Seventh Annual Report – Year Ending 31st December 2004

Section Reports

He thanked everybody for the warm welcome toAustralia, particularly Keith Walker, Phil Gobetz andRichard Bell for the traditional involvement of the UKPresident in the AGM activities.

He was impressed with the speed and efficiencyof the AGM process and in particular, the balancesheet figures, which no one in the UK, as yet, hassighted.

He was born in Manchester in 1950, his early railindustry training with John Barber and RichardStepniewski.

He told us of his experiences from the drawingoffice in 1975, through all facets of the Signal &Communications with BR until joining the privatesector in 96 where he is still employed with Lloyd’sRegister as an Engineering Director.

The main aim of the formation of the Institution in1912 was to advance the science and practice ofsignalling and telecommunications engineering within the industry, it is as true today, as it was then.

The second was Professional Care for protectionof the general public.

He joined the Institute in 1969, worked with RayWeedon in1975 and during that time was in contactwith Noel Reed and Alan McKenna who were theinterface with the UK of the Australian group.

Has made many friends throughout the world, hasseen every type of signalling and communicationsystem it is possible to see, (there is no one correctsolution), the travelling has been fantastic.

The IRSE has a full-time office with some full timeand part-time staff. The head office is busy with currently 4,000 members throughout the world, theduties include licensing issue and renewals; (the UKis making Signalling Competence Certificationmandatory); IRSE exams; recruitment drives; arevised more frequently issued IRSE News; use ofthe web for news items; have been involved withNetwork Rail in initiatives of cost reductions. Wehave one of our former presidents participating inThe Railway Engineers Forum, they are providingpublic papers to the Government and the Press, ofRegulatory Review, these matters are of great inter-est in the UK.

The UK Government was committed to privatis-ation from 1984, the BR change was started in 1992,to be completed by 1997 and this was a complexarrangement, which was against the advice of theBR Board.

The objective was to eliminate subsidies paid toUK rail, but this was not achieved.

Railtrack was placed in administration in 2001,with a new company, Network Rail formed in 2002

During privatisation, some successes with S&Tprojects were achieved with existing technology, butother high profile projects have had enormous problems with difficulties with new technology, ineffective management, cost overruns.

Some benefits in general, new trains, mainly in thelast four years; the companies are very skilled at farestructure and marketing; the S&T have fitted an

enhancement to ATS for train protection and in themain most people in engineering are paid more thanin BR days.

Vertical integration is back on the agenda, changemust start at the top. In the meantime, fortunatelythe railways have kept running, most of the tech-nicians and the people on the ground are still there,all they have to do is change the company name ontheir jackets.

Technical papers were presented by:

Mr Thomas Deveney FIRSE, Rail Networks PtyLtd “Regional Fast Rail – Project Overview”

The paper provides background to the RegionalFast Rail project being undertaken by theDepartment of Infrastructure, Victoria. It describedan outline of the objectives and the existing rail infrastructure against which the project is being constructed, together with the background thinkingbehind the choice of a design and construction contract model for the project and concluded withan outline of some of the contract processes rele-vant to the design phase.

Mr Stephen McClary MIRSE, WestinghouseSignals Australia “Resignalling the Bendigo andLa Trobe Lines”

The Regional Fast Rail project has given the signalengineer the opportunity to provide a major upgradeto the infrastructure of a railway that has seen manyyears of neglect.

A turnkey solution was required for a largely per-formance based specification, where the customerwas clearly aiming to get the maximum benefit froma limited budget.

This paper aims to demonstrate the solutionsadopted by Westinghouse Signals Australia on boththe Bendigo and La Trobe lines. It describes theprocess undertaken from the initial modelling of theinfrastructure to the selection of the appropriatetechnology.

The solutions used are largely new to Victoria,however they are well established on the world market. Much use has been made of commercialcommunication products rather than specialist signalling equivalents. Standard solutions have beenadopted where possible to give benefit to the main-tainers and franchisees, allowing future upgrade andexpansion when required.

Mr Stewart McLean, Alstom Australia “VictorianRegional Fast Rail – A Control and MonitoringPerspective”

The Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS)is the umbrella title to the new Centralised TrainControl (CTC) system and telemetry networks to beinstalled on the Regional Fast Rail (RFR) Project(Ballarat & Geelong corridors). This paper aims toprovide an overview of the TCMS, detailing designdecisions and equipment used and presenting aglimpse of the feature set offered by the new CTCsystem. It concludes by challenging engineers andmanagers to carefully consider the future specifica-tion design of control and monitoring systems.

Mr Andreas Rottman, Siemens Ltd

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Transportation Systems “Why Choose AxleCounters for Track Vacancy Detection

In recent years axle counters have graduallyreplaced track circuits as the main method used fortrack vacancy detection for main line applications,particularly in Europe.

This paper gives an introduction into axle countertechnology, providing details about the axle counting principles, wheel detection and systemconfigurations. A more detailed description of thetrackside and indoor equipment is presented on thebasis of the Siemens Az S 350 U axle counter system.

Axle counters and track circuits are the two mainsystems currently on the market used for effectivetrack vacancy detection. A comparison of the systems has been carried out against selected evaluation criteria relevant to the Australian market.

Also outlined in this paper is a practical exampleof an axle counter application installed at theBritomart Station in Auckland, New Zealand.

Mr Cameron Earl, Works Infrastructure “RemoteLevel Crossing Monitoring”

Remote monitoring technology has become commercially viable to the Victorian rail industry overthe past 10 years, due to the availability of small,cost effective industrial microprocessors, coupledwith the expansion of mobile phone coverage incountry areas. Isolated locations such as active levelcrossings now have a reliable, longer-range mediumthat allows the transmission of timely and usefulquantities of data.

The Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) hasapproved a project for the remote monitoring of all132 level crossings on the ARTC Victorian StandardGauge Rail Network. This is based on the desire todetect crossing faults and to implement the NationalCode of Practice (NCOP) for inspection frequencies.

The monitoring system will be designed for futureexpansion, to enable data collection from other signalling infrastructure if required. This also tieswith the possibility of satellite technology become aviable medium for the improved control of rail traffic,which would rationalise the present signalling system.

Mr Paul Lowney, Department of Infrastructure “APower Point Presentation on the Craigieburn RailElectrification Project”

This is part of the State Government policy of“Linking Victoria” and will provide a high qualityaccessible public transport mode to the area.

Based on the project scope ridership is projectedto increase from 600-700 to 6,500 daily by 2021.

Craigieburn station will be extensively remodelledwith three new platforms, a bus interchange andextension of the car parking facilities.

Panel Session chaired by Mr C Page.

Project delivery in the vertically segregated rail-way. How well is it working?

Panel: Messrs T Howker, R Tapsall, J Clarke, HDeJong.

Sample opinions from the panel.

Partnership spread the risk – share pain and gain.

The old railway was dysfunctional, needed to bedivided.

Old system completed the work, now OHS andinterface problems.

Repeat same mistakes; interface never easy;numerous standards; too many people to blame.

Old system regulated its own costs did not have toblame someone.

Good project management is the real answer.

Mr S Cotton spoke in appreciation of all presen-ters and moved a vote of thanks, which was passedby acclamation.

Mr Page called all paper presenters, panel sessionmembers and the President to receive a Plaque inappreciation for their contributions during the day.

SATURDAY 20th MARCH 2004

In the morning, the field trip started with aninspection of a Regional Fast Train trial site, wherethe TPWS and axle counter equipment is beingassessed for performance.

The afternoon was a visit to the Qantas Airlinesimulator for pilot training and refresher courses,where small groups at a time were shown the flightdeck of an Airbus 300.

SUNDAY 21st MARCH 2004

A social day concluded the meeting with a bus tripto Daylesford, unfortunately it was a cold windy day,as it is a pretty little town in the high country. Anenjoyable train trip followed in an old rattler (rail car)run by an enthusiastic group of volunteers on part ofan abandoned track that was originally to Ballarat.Lunch was at the Holgate Brewhouse and then backto the airport and our Melbourne hotel for some.

2 THE KUALA LUMPUR MEETINGWAS REPORTED BY MR RICHARDBELL

The July technical meeting of the AustralasianSection of the Institution with the theme “AdvancingTechnology in Malaysian Signalling” was held overthree days at the Concorde Hotel, Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia.

The meeting commenced on Monday 19th Julywith a formal opening by Y B Datoí Sri Chan KongChoy, Minister of Transport Malaysia, with approxi-mately 70 members and visitors, both electronic andprint media present. The Ministerial party includedMr James Wise, High Commissioner for Australia,Tuan Haji Muhd Safaruddin Muhd Sidek, DeputySecretary General, Ministry of Transport, Y Bhg TanSri Datoí Thong Yaw Hong, Chairman KTMB, EnMohd Salleh Abdullah, Managing Director KTMB,and Y Bhg Tan Sri Zaki Tun Azim, Chairman EmrailSdn Bhd.

Following a welcome address by Trevor MooreFIRSE, Vice-Chairman IRSE Australasian Section,Mr James Wise spoke briefly, noting the strengthen-ing trade relations between Australia and Malaysiaand welcoming delegates from Australia. The

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Minister then delivered the keynote address, welcoming delegates, highlighting the MalaysianGovernment’s continuing investment in rail infra-structure and vehicles with the objective of land-bridge services between Malaysia and Thailandand further North. This technical meeting will providea forum for the sharing and exchange of valuableideas and experiences and provides a foundation forfuture exchanges as the railways of Malaysia develop.

The Minister then declared the Convention openwith the sounding of a ceremonial gong.

After morning tea, the first technical session, withTrevor Moore chairing, commenced with a papertitled “Traffic Management System: ILTIS” presentedby Guiliano Masino, CTC/TMS Manager SiemensMalaysia. ILTIS is a traffic management system thatintegrates centralised traffic control, train describer,automatic route setting and automatic train reportinginto one system. The new ILTS train control facility atKuala Lumpur Sentral will allow KTMB (MalaysiaState Railways) to eventually remote control itswhole network from one control room. The variouscontrol, reporting and maintenance facilities requiredby KTMB and provided by ILTIS were described.

The next paper, “Train Detection Used on the KLMonorail” was presented by Zachary Piper, EngineerUnion Switch & Signal, Malaysia. The monorail withits pneumatic tyres, running on a concrete beam,precludes the use of conventional methods of vehicle occupancy detection. The system utilisedwas adopted from a platform door alignment appli-cation designed by US&S for Copenhagen Metro.The system utilises AFO transmitters each driving acoil at each end of the train and AFO receivers connected to fixed coils adjacent to each signal. TheAFO receivers feed directly into the Microlock IIprocessor based interlocking which provides thenecessary logic and interlocking functions.

The third paper of the session, titled “KualaLumpur Monorail”, was presented by Peter Jones,Project Manager, Emrail Union Switch & Signal. Therationale for the monorail, its technical facilities withparticular emphasis on the control and interlockingof the beam switches (points) and the distributedwayside processor-based interlockings weredescribed. The commissioning strategy included theintroduction of a reduced revenue service running atdouble signal spacing prior to commissioning of thefinal ATP system. The final commissioning will takeplace over 13 ‘mini’ commissionings to minimise thedisruption to revenue services.

Each paper was followed by a question andanswer session where members and visitors wereinvited to clarify any matter within the papers.

The Chairman the called upon John Aitken tomove a vote of thanks to the presenters who werethen presented with plaques in appreciation of theircontributions.

An afternoon of inspections followed of the KLMonorail control centre at Tun Sambanthan, a beamswitch (point machine) at Titiwangsa, the not yetcommissioned, but under active test, ILTIS ControlCentre at KL Sentral and the currently operational

Ansaldo CTC System at old KL Central station.

Tuesday’s Technical Session commenced with apaper: “Westrace in Malaysia” by Owen ClenickMIRSE, Manager Regional Manager, Invensys RailSystems, Australia. Owen described two projectsutilising Westrace processor-based interlockingswithin the KTMB system in Malaysia. First a 2.5 kmextension from Butterworth to North ButterworthContainer Terminal. This project involved five barrier-protected level crossings, an interface with the existing relay interlocking at Butterworth and extension of the existing remote control panel atPrai. The special features associated with the levelcrossing protection required by KTMB weredescribed as were a few environmental field equip-ment problems.

The other project involved the replacement of copper line wire bearers on 59 electric single tracktoken system sections. A Westrace processor-basedinterlocking was installed at each station with signalling relay interfaces to the token instruments atthat station. The Westrace interlockings all com-municate vitally via an optic fibre based network.The system is totally transparent to the operationsstaff. A training facility was provided to familiariseKTMB technical staff with the system and equip-ment.

The second paper was “ERL Signalling Malaysia”presented by Marco Maurer, Project Director,Siemens Malaysia, described the signalling andassociated systems provided on the new dedicateddouble track Express Rail Link between KualaLumpur International Airport and Kuala LumpurSentral. Both a 160 km/h express service betweenSentral and the airport and a commuter servicestopping at the three intermediate stations and KLSentral are provided. The features of the system are:standard gauge, continuous welded rail, 25kV electrification, ATP with trackside signals, axlecounter track occupancy detection, trailable in-sleeper point machines with pawl locks. The systemis controlled from an operations centre located adjacent to the maintenance depot at Salek Tinggi.The control room houses both operations and main-tenance staff for the whole line and depot.

The third paper of the session, presented bySahaizee Sarudin, Manager EMAS, was titled “ERLOperations”. (EMAS is a joint venture betweenSiemens AG and Express Rail Link SB this providesmaintenance support for ERL.) The paper describedthe line, the services offered, patronage, and normaland degraded operating modes.

Howard Revell was then invited to move a vote ofthanks to the morning’s presenters who were thenpresented with plaques acknowledging their contri-butions to the meeting.

Members and visitors then boarded coaches andtravelled to Putra Jaya where they were joined bytheir partners for lunch at Putra Jaya SeafoodRestaurant. The conference members then travelledto Salek Tinggi ERL depot for a demonstration of aSiemens in-bearer point machine including ademonstration of operation against an obstructionand a simulation of a ‘run-through’. The ERL control

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room was also inspected. The room houses operations controllers for both line and depot and aninfrastructure controller who controls not only allinfrastructure maintenance but also the tractionpower supply. The party then returned by joining anERL service train at Salek Tinggi station and travelled to KL Sentral where they transferred to theKL Monorail and returned to the Concorde Hotel.

Members, visitors and partners all enjoyed a buffet dinner of Malaysian food followed by an enter-taining display of traditional Malay dancing atSaloma Theatre Restaurant.

Wednesday’s technical session was chaired byLes Brearley.

The first paper, titled “Modernisation of KTMB’sSignalling and Communications Systems”, pre-sented by Lee Heng Cheong, General ManagerSignalling Communications & Electrical, KTMB, provided an overview of KTMB’s S&C System fromnon-interlocked single line crossing stations throughinterlocked stations with and without track circuiting;from token based block, to power signalled auto-matic blocks. The level of investment in S&C systems is largely dependent upon the MalaysianGovernment. There is now an initiative to create aland bridge from Singapore to the Thailand borderand beyond. The Rawang-Ipoh modernisation is ademonstration of this.

This was followed by a paper titled “Rawang toIpoh Signalling” presented by William Jack, ProjectManager, Union Switch & Signal, Malaysia. The project includes the provision of electrified doubletrack (metre gauge), renewal of bridges, eliminationof level crossings, fourteen new stations, two newhalts, all mainline turnouts 1 in 15, replacement of alltrack circuits, automatic power signalling with CTCcontrol.

The third paper of Wednesday’s session, titled“Introduction of New Wayside Component ofAutomatic Train Protection System”, was presentedby Raja Aziz Raja Daud, Engineer, Union Switch &Signal, Malaysia.

The paper described the functionality of a soft-ware configurable encoder to interface between theUS&S Microlock system and the ATP system.Another development was an Advanced SpeedEnforcement System, interfacing with Microlock II,which had been developed for application on NewJersey Transit, USA.

Then followed a Panel Session, chaired by LesBrearley, with the topic “Are European StandardsRelevant to Asia?”.

The members of the panel being: Lee HengCheong, KTMB; Howard Revell, Union Switch &Signal; Philip Goetz, Siemens Malaysia; OwenClenick, Westinghouse Signals Asia.

Each panel member was invited to present theirviews in a 5-minute address.

These views ranged from the relevance of standards to the effect of cultural differences on theinterpretation of standards.

The audience then contributed for a further 30

minutes with questions and observations.

Philip Gobetz was then invited to move a vote ofthanks to the morning's presenters who were thenpresented with plaques acknowledging their contri-butions to the meeting.

Apologies for the following members were presented to the meeting: Charles Page, DavidNess, Geoff Willmott, David Cotton, Lee Tran, PhilEllingworth, Alan Carey and Keith Walker.

The Chairman closed the meeting with thanks tothe various sponsors and the local organising committee.

The final functions of the Conference were fieldinspections.

Members travelled to the new Sungkai station,part of the Rawang to Ipoh project. Facilitiesinspected included the new station, local controlroom for both signalling and passenger information,new equipment room with Microlock II processorbased interlocking, remote control and indicationfacilities.

The coaches were then reboarded and transferredto Kalum Pang where a field location and associatedturnout, with point machine was inspected.

The partners’ programme was enjoyed by tenladies in Kuala Lumpur.

Our first day was made up of a trip to the SelangorPewter factory, which was very interesting, andmaybe costly for a few. Then it was on to BukitTinggi high up in the mountains, and included a walkthrough the Japanese Garden.

Day 2 it was off to the Butterfly Park, OrchidGarden and the Bird Park.

Day 3 we went to the KL Tower for a magnificentpanoramic look at Kuala Lumpur. Then it was off tothe Twin Towers shopping centre for a bit of retailtherapy. After which we went on to the Chinatownarea for lunch and a little shopping in the ChinatownMarkets.

The programme was well organised, and I think Icould safely say was enjoyed very much by all concerned.

3 TECHNICAL MEETING – ADELAIDE,SA

29th-30th OCTOBER 2004

Mr Charles Page Chairman opened the meeting at0900 hours, welcoming 50 members and 26 visitors.

He noted that a survey sheet on aspects of themeeting was issued at registration and asked all tocomplete the form; the information is feedback thatenables committees to improve these meetings. Adraw for an excellent bottle of red is a reward foryour opinion.

Mr George Erdos FIRSE, TransAdelaideMr Alistair Morrison MIRSE, Alstom Australia“The TransAdelaide CTC Replacement Project”

This paper is a continuation of that made to theIRSE in Adelaide on 14th March 2003. That paperreviewed the existing TransAdelaide (TA) rail signalling system with a particular emphasis on theCTC System; looked at the need for replacement of

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that system; examined the review; tendering andevaluation processes leading to the award of a contract to Alstom Australia Pty Ltd. Finally lookedat the ALSTOM bid and the systems that are to bereplaced.

In this paper we will briefly revisit the need forreplacement of the CTC. We will also look at somesafety related issues that have occurred locally andexamine how these have influenced the project withan emphasis on strategies aimed at improving TA’ssafety performance.

ALSTOM will then provide a project status report,with a particular focus on ARS, alarms, fault management and pseudo interlocking and outlinefeatures to be delivered. The paper will finally examine strategies leading to the eventual com-missioning of the new CTC system and how this willbe achieved while simultaneously ‘mitigating therisk’ and any system downtime.

Mr Les Brearley FIRSE, US&SMr Javier Gonzalez, US&SMr Lee Tran MIRSE, TransAdelaideAssoc Prof Mr Ken Kwong, Central Qld University“Post-Graduate Programme in RailwaySignalling: Experience One Year On”

Risk management is about identifying what can gowrong, assessing the risk of the undesirable eventand putting into place corrective action to reducethe risk. An essential risk mitigation control for allphases of a signal and communications system life-cycle is the use of a competent signal engineeringstaff.

The significant shortfall in competent staff avail-able to the industry has been recently filled by thedevelopment of a Post Graduate Diploma in RailwaySignalling by the Co-operative Research Centre forRailway Engineering and Technologies (Rail CRC).This provides a broad-based programme in railwaysignal engineering knowledge.

This paper provides an update on the progress todate with the development of the programme andthe experience gained in running the course for thefirst time. This paper has been jointly prepared by:Les Brearley, who provides an overview of the programme and the current progress with development. Javier Gonzalez, who provides a students perspective. Lee Tran, a workplace mentor,who considers the programme from both a supporting organisation and mentor's perspective.Associate Professor Ken Kwong, the ProgrammeCo-ordinator, provides the perspective of the delivery organisation, Central QueenslandUniversity.

The programme is being developed with wideinput from the industry and will require further ongoing support during the delivery phase. The successful establishment of this course is a vital element in ensuring there is sufficient competentsignal engineering staff for future industry needs.

This paper builds on those presented to theInstitution in August 2002 and November 2003.

The keynote address was presented by the HonTrish White MP, Minister of Transport.

Ms White told the meeting that her backgroundwas in communications and signalling, but of a different type, there were exciting times with thecoming technology.

The rail industry is not only the key to relievingroad congestion, but is environmentally friendly.

The SA Government is investing in urban rail withnew rolling stock, track upgrade, station renova-tions, train control replacement, new transport hubat Mawson Lakes, plus an integrated system ofroad, rail and shipping at the port of Adelaide, aimedat an important State target, export efficiency offreight transport.

Another issue we see right across Australia, is acritical shortage of skilled trained technical pro-fessional expertise; the rail industry is no exception.In a competitive market, the rail industry needs tohave a mind to recognise this and plan to ensure ouryouth are effectively educated, to fill these jobs inthe future.

The challenges of today’s leaders in creating aviable and prosperous future in this industry are significant; it’s not just the safety-critical infrastruc-ture but what we need to see is a prosperous railindustry moving this State and country to a bettereconomic future and safer community.

“I do wish you every success with the future andthat the networking of sharing ideas and coming forward with proposals at this Convention will beboth rewarding and fruitful. It gives me great pleasure in declaring this Conference officiallyopened.”

Mr Page presented an IRSE plaque to Ms White inappreciation for her address.

Panel Session chaired by Mr C Page “Signalling &Communications – Mitigating the Risk”.

Panel: Mr B Nye, CEO – Australasian RailwayAssociation. Mr A Milazzo, Director Transport Policy,DTUP. Mr D White, State Manager SA & NT, PacificNational. Mr S Goldsworthy, SA Rail SafetyRegulator. Mr D Huxley, Business Manager,TransAdelaide.

Each member was allowed a five-minute presen-tation about what they do, or how they think theycan mitigate risk in terms of rail safety and be influential in achieving this within their areas ofresponsibility.

Some comments that came from the panel.

Alarming factor that trains can move into a network and cannot communicate with other systemtrains.

A common rule book was discussed byCommissioners in 1904.

Commissioners decreed in 1905, that SignalEngineers from the states had no need to meet, butfor accountants it is a requirement.

Australia must have a common communicationsframework.

Annual rail safety audits are onerous.

Industry keen to use off-the-shelf technology toensure core safe working system.

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Mr George Erdos FIRSE, Australian TransportSafety Bureau “The Evolution of Rail Safety”

Trains and railways have captured the imaginationof people for more than 200 years. This is reflectedin the huge following of rail enthusiasts who continue to chase trains all over the world endeav-ouring to capture that last photograph before another piece of history potentially vanishes intoeternity.

However, in recent times, governments and communities worldwide have recognised that railtransportation is the salvation for congestion andenvironmental problems faced by their countries asroad and air transport struggle to meet ever growingdemands. As a result, we are now seeing a renaissance of both heavy and light rail in manycountries.

Today, rail is recognised as one of the safestmodes of transport. However, this postulate can beused to resist reform and hide underlying problemsof inadequate capital investment, the need for cultural change and/or inflexible management style.Ultimately, have we learnt the SAFETY lessons of thepast or will we need to relearn these lessons throughthe bitter experience of accidents and collisionsrelived.

In this paper, I will briefly review a history of railwayaccidents; look at some safety developments with aparticular focus on ‘signalling and communications’.Finally, I will focus on the Australian scene andexamine where I believe we need to go as an indus-try to enhance our current rail safety performance.

Mr Tony Simes, Australian Transport SafetyBureau “SPAD Mitigation – A Regulatory View”

The responsibility for rail safety regulation lies witheach State or Territory.

All have enacted their own rail safety legislation,with the exception of the Australian Capital Territorywhere rail safety is administered by NSW. The frame-work is based on co-regulatory principles, wherebyeach rail organisation is predominately responsiblefor the management of its rail safety related opera-tions.

The Rail Safety Regulator is responsible foradministering each of the organisations accredita-tion and verifying their obligations under the relevantrail safety legislation.

A ‘signal passed at danger’ describes an incidentwhen a train passes a stop signal without an authority.

SPADs present one of the highest safety risks facing the rail industry and are only one precursor toa potentially catastrophic rail incident. They occurwhere there is an interface between driversemployed by rail operators and signalling infrastruc-ture managed by track owners. It is, therefore,essential that all parties co-operate and apply anappropriate level of resource and commitment toreduce the likelihood of a SPAD incident.

This paper presents a rail safety regulator’s viewon SPADS and their mitigation. Topics covered willdiscuss investigation of incidents, the potential

cause, evaluation of risks, identifying control measures and the periodical review of the risk management process. Issues relating to recording,reporting and trending of SPAD incidents at organi-sational, State and National levels.

Mr Peter Short, Department of Transport andUrban Planning, Transport SA “The Aftermath ofSalisbury”

This paper details the events following the tragicaccident of 24th October 2002, when the Ghan passenger train collided with a car and public trans-port bus at the Park Terrace level crossing,Salisbury. Four people died and 26 were injured inthe accident.

The State Government initiated a number of investigations into the cause of the accident and toidentify safety initiatives that could be implementedat and around the level crossing to reduce the risk ofa similar accident in the future.

The key safety initiatives were trialled over a six-week period and showed to significantly reduce therisk of a traffic queue forming on the level crossing.Following the trial further works were implementedto improve the efficiency of the road network in theimmediate vicinity of the level crossing and to furtherimprove safety.

Since the implementation of the initiatives, theDepartment has received no incident reports relatingto traffic queues on the level crossing.

Dr Tim Drew, Work Health Clinic, Mile End“National Standards for Health Assessment ofRail Safety Workers”

New medical standards for rail safety workerswere adopted across all Australian States andTerritories as of 1st July 2004. The new standardrepresents a significant step in the improvement ofrail safety and is the first time a common system ofhealth assessment has existed across all Australianjurisdictions.

The new standards adopt a risk managementapproach and reflects best practice in assessing thehealth of rail safety workers. The standard is theresult of extensive research and input from a widerange of government, industry and medical stake-holders, although initially developed for Victoria, itwas modified and then mandated for applicationacross all Australian jurisdictions following on fromrecent rail accident investigations.

In this paper we will examine the genesis of thestandard, its makeup with particular focus on "RiskMitigation" strategies and finally the obligations ofemployers, employees and medical practitioners inthe implementation of the standard.

Mr Richard Tullo AMIRSE, Australian Rail TrackCorporation “Signal Technical Auditing,Mitigating the Risk in a Contract Environment”

Two alliance contractors carry out signal main-tenance on the ARTC Network. In Victoria thealliance contract agreement is a combined signal,track and civil agreement, in SA the signal allianceagreement is separate from track and civil.

To comply with the requirement of AS4292, ARTC

170 AUSTRALASIAN SECTION

regularly undertakes technical audits of the workcarried out under these contracts.

Signal related failures are responsible for themajority of the infrastructure related train delays. Asignal audit has been developed and will be con-tinually developed, to ensure compliance to thestandards and procedures required by ARTC. Bycarrying out audits, it is ARTC’s goal to maintain andimprove their signalling infrastructure. The audit isalso a critical element in the ongoing task to improvetrain operations.

The signal technical audit has been carried out byan ARTC internal auditor for the last year and hasachieved positive results.

This completed the presentations.

The chairman called Mr Keith Walker, who congratulated all speakers on their contribution tothe success of the day; they were then all called forward and presented with a Plaque by Mr Page,with the usual acclamation from the floor.

Saturday 30th October 2004

The field day inspection was split into two partiesin the morning as Transport SA Traffic Control Centreat Norwood limited the number of visitors in a group.

The Traffic Control Group viewed the dynamiccontrol of intersections throughout Adelaide wherethe light cycle is managed to facilitate peak hourtraffic or other stoppages.

An over view was shown of the control of entryand exit of The Southern Expressway. This is a two-lane reversible flow 20-kilometre highway that easesthe congestion of commuter and leisure traffic to thesouth coast. The work day flow is to Adelaide in themorning and reverse in the afternoon, weekend andpublic holiday traffic is the opposite.

The second group visited TransAdelaide train control centre where Alstom are engaged in thereplacement project (paper1), then to the SuburbanRailcar Depot to inspect the driver vigilance controlsystem.

Both groups then met at McClaren Vale for lunchand return to Adelaide for the completion of themeeting.

The Southern Expressway was travelled partiallyin both directions for the luncheon.

Thank you is extended to the following, for theirassistance in providing sponsorship for events,trade displays and advertisements at technicalmeetings through the year:

Invensys Rail Systems – Westinghouse SignalsAustraliaVoranTMG InternationalSiemens Transportation SystemsRailPersonnelConnell Wagner Pty LtdAsia Pacific RailUnion Switch & SignalAlstom Australia – Rail TransportAustralian Rail Track CorporationRail CRCTransAdelaide

ASAS PermatangEmrailG J RundingIntercontinental freight ExpressIQRMitsui & Co LtdSiemens MalaysiaSoon Foh IndustryUniversal Cables

Local meetings were programmed as follows:

Victoria12th May 200411th August 200417th November 2004

Unfortunately the 11th August meeting had to becancelled due to an administrative error.

All meetings were held at Transport House, 589Collins Street, Melbourne

The topics and presenters were as follows:

12th May 2004“Integrating Maintainer and Crossing Monitors(deployment, detection and dissemination of dis-aster data)” by Mr Wayne MacDonald ofWestinghouse Signals, Australia

Mr MacDonald provided the audience with anoverview of the capabilities and benefits of WSA'sSEAR product range which provide for a modularapproach for the introduction, including centralisedstorage and management, of level crossing performance monitoring and analysis data.

This meeting was attended by approximately 40members and visitors.

17th November 2004“ATO/ATP Experience in Hong Kong” by Mr NickThompson

Mr Thompson outlined his experiences and recollections gained through his involvement in thedevelopment, installation and introduction into service of Hong Kong's ATO and ATP capable signalling systems. The presentation includeddetails of the Hong Kong network, the history of theproject and a summary of key program milestonesand achievements.

“Level Crossing Safety Camera Trial” by MrRodney Dedman

Mr Dedman presented background informationand results, including video footage, of a trial "redlight camera for level crossings" system developedand trialled in Melbourne to gain an understanding ofdriver behaviour and risk factors, including their frequency, occurring everyday at metropolitan levelcrossing sites. Mr Dedman's video footage includegraphic views of car drivers entering closed levelcrossings with full view of approaching trains.

This meeting was attended by approximately 60members and visitors.

NSW

9th March, joint RTSA, Train Radio – John Aitken

13th April, joint RTSA, Video Monitoring of TrackCondition – RIC

27th April, Signalling Project Practices in the UK –

171AUSTRALASIAN SECTION

Allan Brock

25th May, joint RTSA, Rail Safety – KentDonaldson

8th June, joint RTSA – RailCorp – Vince Graham

22nd July, International Convention Dublin – PeterSymons plus presentation by Signalling GraduateStudents

26th August 26, joint PWI/RTSA – Millennium Train– Alstom

21st October, Parramatta Rail Link – Alstom

2nd December, Communications Systems – JohnAitken

Queensland

Approximately 25 members attended a presen-tation at Eagle Farm on the 17th February, by JoeWilliams and Peter Stringer on the “ChangingContractor Client Relationships for Signal Design”.This explained the difficulties encountered and overcome where the traditional roles of client andcontractor where changed part way through a relatively small signalling job.

On 28th April, a combined meeting with the RTSAwas held in the Engineers Australia building. A presentation was given on the planning processesused in the supply chain from the coal mines,through the rail link to the port and then onto ships.The interfaces between each of these links were discussed.

On 8th June, approximately 20 members gatheredat the QRI building to listen to a presentation on theresignalling of Queen Street Station, Auckland, NewZealand which was ably given by Brian Steele inspite of his physical injuries at the time. Brian covered the basic signalling arrangements, difficulties experienced in undertaking the projectand various stages of the works. He then gave anoverview of the different levels of ERTMS and thestatus of projects underway in Europe.

Approximately 30 members and guests attended alocal technical meeting held at Eagle Farm onTuesday evening 10th August. The first topic was theSignalling Course being prepared by the Rail Co-operative Research Centre and being delivered byCentral Queensland University. Brett Hillcoat presented the students’ perspective and explainedthe good and not so good points of the teaching andassessment processes used. This included the benefits of workplace activities and mentor arrange-ments and the difficulty of justifying a grade. LesBrearley gave an authors perspective of the course

and explained the purpose was to assist the development of competent signalling engineeringpractitioners. He explained the time and commit-ment supplied by a large number of IRSE membersin preparing and reviewing the course material.

The next topic was the IRSE InternationalConvention held in Dublin. George Nikandros gave aexplanation of the Irish network and through a number of selected photos showed the main point ofinterest viewed during the convention.

The meeting concluded with refreshments compliments of US&S.

On 22nd September, a combined meeting washeld with the RTSA who had organised as half dayworkshop on human factors. This included a numberof speakers with the IRSE being represented by LesBrearley who spoke about the way that human factors were taken into account in signalling andAlex Borordin who explained how human factorsknowledge was applied to the investigation ofSPADs.

On 7th December, “Advanced Control and itsRequirements on the Underlying Support Platform”was held at Invensys. The presentation was given byOwen Traynor on the requirements for a platform to support the various systems that may be requestedin a train control centre. These systems pose uniquechallenges for the platforms upon which such systems are hosted. This is especially the case in thecontext of large scale, multi-operator systems, withrequirements for emergency backup and high levelsof availability and safety. We are generally presentedwith an array of conflicting requirements for theseplatforms that pose significant difficulties when wetry to satisfy the requirements in a cost effective andtechnically feasible way. The essential elements of acontrol systems platform that are needed to addressthese challenges was discussed with an example ofa specific application of such a platform. The meet-ing was attended by approximately 18 memberswho enjoyed the presentation and the refreshments,compliments of Invensys, which followed.

MEMBERSHIPThe Australasian Section membership as of 31st

December 2004 was 401, with ten approved byCouncil that have not taken up their membership.

The Committee wishes to thank members for theirsupport to the Australasian Section during the year,and looks forward to the continuing attendance atMeetings and Functions in the future.

G Willmott

172 AUSTRALASIAN SECTION

173

Midland & North-Western SectionThe Midland & North Western Section of the IRSE

is 35 years old this year. Having been elected as the35th Section Chairman at the Annual GeneralMeeting on Tuesday 30th March 2004 inBirmingham, this event started off a chain of eventsthat has led to a very exciting and eventful year forboth the Section and myself.

Wednesday 28th April 2004 saw our furthestmeeting south to date, at the Amey Rail offices inBanbury, with an interesting and topical presentationby Graham Wire of Network Rail, regarding theimpending Cherwell Valley resignalling scheme. Thisevent was well patronised by many additional members from the London and southern areas. Wetherefore look forward to a repeat visit to Banbury inthe near future.

Friday 7th May 2004 saw our annual bowling competition at the Megabowl Bowling Centre inBirmingham. Whilst not being as well patronised asin previous years, all members and guests presenthad an enjoyable and eventful evening. This year’swinners were Robert Wood, of AEA Technology, whoreceived the Individual Bowling Award with the highest score, and Railway Signalling Ltd, represent-ed by Adam Smith, Oscar Harley and Gary Hall, whoreceived the Team Bowling Award for the third timein three years!

The 1st Annual Section Luncheon was held onSaturday 3rd July 2004, at the preserved East LancsRailway in Bury, Lancashire. Over 60 members andguests enjoyed a guided tour of the locomotivesheds and signalling installation works being under-taken at Bury South signal box. This was followed bya wonderful four course meal on the railways diningtrain between Bury, Rawtenstall and Heywood. Thisevent was supported with kind assistance from ParkSignalling Ltd. Graham Bannister was also present-ed with the “Chairman’s Award” for 2004, by IanMitchell, the immediate past chairman.

Wednesday 8th September 2004 saw our firstmeeting of the new session at the AEA offices inDerby, with Hugh Barton from OptiConsulting UKproviding a presentation on “Optical Developmentsin Railway Signals”. This presentation included thehistory of railway signal optics, along with the recentadvancement of technology with the use of lightemitting diodes in signal aspects. Again the presen-tation was well patronised and well received by theaudience.

Saturday 18th September 2004 saw the Sectionundertaking a repeat technical visit toLoughborough, Leicestershire, to visit thePowernetics power equipment manufactures andthe preserved Great Central Railway. During thecourse of the afternoon and following visits to theLoughborough, Quorn and Rothley signalling installations and boxes, the Section presented areplica name board for the Loughborough Centralsignal box to the S&T department, in recognition ofthe Section's current and previous visits to the lineand the kind assistance received.

Tuesday 12th October 2004 saw our second

meeting of the session at the Catalis Training Centrein Crewe, with Dave Scarth of Network Rail andAndy England of Balfour Beatty providing a presen-tation on “Life Extension of Relay Interlockings”.This was based on actual projects and experienceson the Eastern Region of Network Rail and detailedthe experiences and problems faced when under-taking this type of work.

Thursday 11th November 2004 saw our thirdmeeting of the session at the ManchesterConference Centre, kindly sponsored by MottMacDonald. Andrew Simmons of Network Rail kindly presented his previous London paper on the“Network Rail Signalling Policy”, although slightlylater than previously advertised!

Tuesday 14th December 2004 saw our fourthmeeting of the session at the Network Rail offices atthe Mailbox in Birmingham, when Colin Mabey gavehis presentation about the “Technology of the M6Toll Road”.

Wednesday 19th January 2005 saw our fifth meeting returning to the AEA offices in Derby, withIan Mitchell giving a presentation and practicaldemonstrations regarding “IECC Developments”.

Thursday 17th February 2005 saw our sixth meeting returning once again to the Catalis TrainingCentre at Crewe, with a replacement speaker andpresentation in place of the advertised “RailwayTelecommunications” presentation. Mike Hewett ofParsons Brinkerhoff Ltd kindly stepped in to give hisinformative presentation on the “Impact of theElectrification System on Signalling”.

Tuesday 15th March 2005 saw our seventh meeting returning to the Manchester ConferenceCentre, kindly sponsored by Parsons BrinkerhoffLtd. Mark Ferrer of Siemens Transportation Systemsgave the presentation “Dorset Coast, One Year On”.This presentation reflected on the Dorset Coast signalling scheme and the experiences of theGerman equipment following time and usage in service within the UK.

Wednesday 20th April 2005, finally saw our eighthmeeting and 35th AGM at the Mailbox inBirmingham once again, followed by Kevin Schofieldof Amey Rail and his presentation “Learning theTrade – a Brief Personal Recollection of How OneSignal Engineer Developed in British Rail”. This wasa most enjoyable event, with many amusing storiestold of events and situations experience by Kevinhimself.

Our ninth and final meeting took place on Tuesday17th May 2005 at Stafford, when Carillion Railundertook a demonstration of point operating equip-ment at their Stafford Training Centre. This eventwas yet again oversubscribed by members andguests at two sessions during the afternoon, withthem both overrunning due to many questions andissues raised during the event.

My thanks must go to all the officers and committee members for their continued support,along with the speakers and their associated

companies and organisations for their time, con-sideration and support. The companies who haveprovided their offices and facilities for venues asmeeting places must get a mention and finally themembers and visitors who regularly attend and

support the Midlands & North-West Section. Finally,may I wish all the best to Ian Johnson and TonyKnowles in their year in the office of Chairman andVice-Chairman respectively.

Ian Allison

174 MIDLAND & NORTH-WESTERN SECTION

North American Section

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEEChairman David Thurston

Vice-Chairman Kendrick Bisset

Secretary Gary Young

Members Vic BabinJoseph Noffsinger

William ScheererWilliam Petit

The North American Section was formed on 24th May 2002 by 28 IRSE members. We began the2005 session on 26th May 2005 by holding our ThirdNAS Annual General Meeting at the QwestConvention Center in Omaha, Nebraska. The 17NAS members and 13 guests (potential members) inattendance were very pleased to welcome IRSEPresident Jacques Poré to our meeting. All in atten-dance appreciated his comments regarding theactivities of the Institution and his thoughts on thefuture of signalling and train control.

The North America Section is currently working onan Introduction to Signalling based on NorthAmerica Signalling, which it hopes to publish some-time next year.

On 27th May we held our second formal technical

activity. This consisted of a technical visit to theUnion Pacific Railroad Harriman Dispatching Centerin Omaha Nebraska. Bill Breeden, Manager SignalEngineering, Union Pacific Railroad, and DanSteinhoff gave a presentation and tour of HarrimanDispatch Center, which controls 19,676 miles oftrack and has an average of 1,436 trains at any giventime.

The Section extends its thanks to Bill Breeden forhosting us and to Bill Petit for his efforts in arrangingan informative and interesting day.

The local Committee for 2005-2006 was electedand remains the same as the previous year as listedabove. Membership in the North American Sectionpresently stands at 42.

The meeting was followed by a members’ dinnerwhere we were able to socialise and get to knowPresident Poré on a more personal basis.

In summary, the North American Section is grow-ing, working to support the goals of the Institution inNorth America and to provide value to its members.The Committee extends its thanks to the RailwaySignal Suppliers Inc for providing the venue of ourmeetings and its support of the Section and itsgoals. David Thurston

The Plymouth Section of the IRSE commenced its2004-2005 papers programme on 23rd November2004 with a Younger Presenters Evening, wherebytwo young engineers each presented a paper of theirown choice. It turned out that their own choices happened to be something of interest to all assembled, fully justifying the decision to go aheadwith this type of paper.

First on (by choice, no press gangs), was MatthewRadmore to present “TI21 is Going Digital”. As anaside here, we can mention Matthew’s mum Barbarahad worked at ML many years ago as a tracer, backin the good old days of real drawings.

Matthew began by stating that development of thedigital version of the TI21 transmitter had beenongoing for two years, allowing for side trackingonto developments of higher priority from time totime. Only the transmitter was being undertaken atthis stage, with the receiver to be modified at a laterdate. The receiver will be more of a safety challenge,although there are some safety considerations forthe transmitter.

The new transmitter will be compatible with exist-ing receivers, so it will not be necessary to have an‘all analogue’ or ‘all digital’ combination. Matthewgave a reasonably detailed account of the sub-systems involved and the process applied to digitising each of them. The account was detailedenough to demonstrate the complexity involved, butnot so detailed so as to lose the audience, althoughhe came close on a couple of occasions.

An excellent feature being built into the transmitteris the ability to monitor its performance in theinstalled position.

Matthew then answered a series of questionsrelating to compatibility, validation, complexity, com-ponent and unit availability, stability and reliability.

This was a good presentation, with the main les-son learned for Matthew is to slow his deliverydown, not a little, but a lot!

Second on was Andrew Jones who presented“ERTMS Balise Positioning”. The main feature of thispresentation was that it went one layer below thegenerally well known techniques about balise usage,and looked at a few of the issues and provided moredetail about various location types.

Andrew began by explaining about the differenttypes of balise employed, namely controlled or non-controlled, ie fixed data. He further explained thecombinations employed and sequences togetherwith how such arrangements are recognised by thetrain. The use or not of balises in association with thevarious levels of ERTMS were described, in particu-lar related to the position of signals, or virtual signalswhere none are employed.

The question period was interesting in that itraised a number of pertinent questions, all essen-tially related to quality.

Firstly, how is it possible to know whether or not afixed balise is programmed, and with which release

of data? This is achieved by marking, keying andlabelling techniques, and there are portable readersthat can be used to check balises when in position.

The next question related to the number of times amessage is transmitted from Balise to train at highspeed. This will vary with message length and trainspeed, but is typically three transmissions at 300kph.

Another interesting question related to recognitionof the location, train direction, the associated dataand sequence thereof, finally how is it ascertainedthat the data is correct for the location and conditions on the ground.

The main lesson learned by Andrew at this paperis to listen to the question. It appeared that Andrewbegan to answer a different question to that asked,but eventually got around to the appropriate answerhaving mulled it over while he was talking.

The second paper of the session was the “LULPPP Project” presented by Richard Rogers and PhilThrelfall of WRSL on 10th February 2005.Unfortunately, due to a serious road accident,Plymouth was gridlocked and the speakers weredelayed. However, the President John Corrie hadchosen this paper for his visit to the PlymouthSection, and was invited to open the meeting with afew words. The delay to the speakers allowed Johnplenty of time for this, which he used to advantage.He made known his belief in the importance of thesections and feedback from members relating to theactivities of the IRSE. He passed on greetings from"Central Office", but most importantly generated aninteresting and active discussion from the floorbefore calling a halt and moving on to the presenta-tion when the speakers were ready.

The presentation by Richard Rogers and PhilThrelfall has been delivered to the Institution on aprevious occasion, so will not be described here.There was interest from members in attendance fora different reason in that WRSL has been contractedby MetronetRail for the LUL PPP project, withBombardier Transportation being a major stake-holder within Metronet. The majority of members inthe room were Bombardier employees, but equally having nothing to do with the project and littleknowledge of it, were very interested in the manyaspects inclusive of system philosophies, technicalproposals and commercial arrangements, all ofwhich were thoroughly dealt with by the WRSL team.Despite a difficult start to the evening, it all turnedout very well, rounded off by a visit to Plymouth’sBarbican area by the President and speakers at theend of the evening.

The final technical paper of the session was heldon 1st March 2005, when Bombardier ProjectManager Mick South presented his paper “The Trialsand Tribulations Encountered in an UndergroundResignalling Project in Eastern Europe – BucharestMetro”.

Mick’s approach was perhaps a little different for atechnical paper when he began with a geography

175

Plymouth Section

lesson, and passed on a lot of information aboutRomania that may not have been known by someattendees. This ranged from the beach resorts of theBlack Sea to the mountains in the north, from +40ºCto -20ºC temperatures, which permitted overheatedbarbecues on the one hand, with plenty of cold, lowcost local beer, to some skiing at the other extreme.The fact that Dracula emanates from Transylvania inRomania was not forgotten, and he ended this partof the paper by reminding all of the very recent over-throw of Ceausescu and the demise of communism.

This last point linked into another area discussed,namely the mindset of the people that continues toprevail, being a culture of mistrust and fear of making a decision. Everything is done by committee,which has been found to be a long winded process,and sometimes no decision is reached.

In terms of the technical presentation, Mickdescribed the project which covered the whole ofthe north to south metro line in Bucharest, Line 2,which is 12 km in length and has 14 stations. FiveEbilock 950 electronic interlockings are employed,with the only optical signals now in place beingstarters at stations and those required for shuntmoves. There are 197 audio frequency track circuits,that also convey ATP data to the trains, and 41 pointnew machines plus balises at stations for ATO precision stopping to complete the trackside picture.

In terms of control and indication an EBIScreensupervisory and control system monitors the linefrom the control centre at Piata Unirii, in addition towhich there is a local control position for each inter-locking.

The combined result is a Bombardier CityFlow 350resignalled railway with ATO and ATP. The lineaccommodates 18 new Bombardier Movia trains,

each with two cabs fitted with ATO/ATP.

The next part of the paper described the experi-ences of working with Romanians, inclusive of customer, fellow employees, partners and sub-contractors. There is a learning curve to be undertaken before being in a position to even partlyunderstand their ways and operations.

Finally, Mick rounded off on a general note with afew pictures showing typical views of an apartment,food, social events and the night life.

During the formalities of the final meeting, the Section was sad to acknowledge the early death ofa long standing local member Graham Spicer, aged60 years. Graham had recently retired but did not getto enjoy his retirement for long, and passed away athome suddenly. He was a gentleman, a supporter ofthe Institution locally, and will be missed.

It was not planned as such, but later realised thatthe Plymouth Section papers in the main followed atheme, namely ERTMS. Perhaps it is a sign of thetimes that without it being a conscious awareness,all resignalling schemes from hereon in will be a subset of one or other levels of ERTMS.

The Annual General Meeting, chaired by AlastairWilson, was held on 8th August 2005 (later thananticipated). The Committee for the coming sessionwas confirmed as follows:

Existing members to continue: Alastair Wilson, JimEasterbrook, John Lovick, Chris Carter.

Newly elected members: Andy Moore, JohnSenior.

Dave Came was confirmed as Treasurer/Secretary.The chair will be decided by the Committee at theirfirst meeting. D Came

176 PLYMOUTH SECTION

Scottish SectionOur 2004-2005 session started in October with a

lecture on “Network Rail Signalling” from AndrewSimmons. Andrew is Network Rail’s Head of SignalEngineering and he described an overview of thecompany's signalling policy. The presentation was ofsignificant interest to many, particularly following thetransfer of maintenance staff in-house, and this wasreflected in the high attendance for this lecture.

(Attendance: Members 39, Guests 8)

In November we were pleased to welcome members of the Institution and guests from all partsof the British Isles (and beyond) to the Annual Dinner.Our speaker was Andrew Hunter of SiemensTransportation Systems and his subject was“Signalling: The Cultural Divide”. Andrew’s presen-tation explored some of the cultural issues that candivide the industry from the perspective of a company entering the UK Railway Signalling Market.In particular he focused on the sometimes difficultrelationship between Engineers and BusinessManagers, and discussed the requirement for rail-way appreciation training for Business Managers

new to the railway industry.

Siemens kindly sponsored this lecture.(Attendance: Members 41, Guests 31)

The dinner that followed this lecture providedample opportunity to continue related discussionsinformally, while catching up with colleagues fromacross the industry in a most relaxed atmosphere.The Marriott Hotel again proved its capability to lookafter us well.

In January the Section welcomed Donald Grantfrom First Engineering. Donald is the local represen-tative for IRSE Licensing in Scotland and he presented a good overview of the IRSE LicensingScheme followed by a workshop that focused on thedocumentation required to gain an EngineeringManager’s Licence. Donald prepared some excellenthandouts that provided clear guidelines and exam-ples to those working towards an IRSE Licence.

(Attendance: Members 16, Guests 2)

In February Trevor Foulkes of Network Rail con-tinued on the theme of Network Rail’s Fixed

177SCOTTISH SECTION

Telecomms Network (FTN) that he presented lastyear. Trevor gave a comprehensive update on theroll-out of FTN, and was also accompanied by PaulCallaghan (also of Network Rail) who managed tocajole the lecture attendees outside the lecture theatre to give a practical demonstration of the lat-est GSM-R equipment. As always it is pleasing tohave such strong support from railway telecommsengineering colleagues at this lecture.

(Attendance: Members 24, Guests 16).

A joint lecture with the Permanent Way Institutionwas held in March, the subject being “PointsMaintenance”. Derek Smitheman of Amey Rail gaveus a superbly illustrated insight into the workings ofpoints. His presentation looked at points as a complete system, and gave some superb illustra-tions of what can happen when points are wronglyset up. This included some of the effects not generally considered, and those taken for granted asbeing the cause of failures.

(Attendance: Members 17, Guests 8)

Following the great success of recent years, it wasdecided to repeat the joint AGM and Quiz Night format held locally in licensed premises. Followingthe AGM business, our Section Committee quiz master, Paul Smith probed our general and (a little)railway engineering knowledge through somesearching questions, in a most relaxed atmosphere.

Scottish Section Committee 2004-05:

Chairman: Alan King

Secretary: Ian Hill

Treasurer: Alistair McWhirter

Members: Peter Allan, Peter RowellTommy Gallacher

Simon LowePaul Smith

Jeff RoyIan Hill

Southern African Section

MEMBERSHIPThe record of membership of the Southern African

Section was converted to a data base during 2004and as part of this process was comprehensivelyaudited. The outcome of this exercise revealed thatdue to a number of emigrations of previous members away from the Southern African Sectionregion as well as resignations, the membership haddropped from 51 to 47 by the end of the 2004 session. This was made up as follows:

Companions 1Fellows 9Members 26Associate Members 6Accredited Technicians 5

The membership per country within the SouthernAfrican Section is:

South Africa 43Zimbabwe 3Zambia 1

OFFICERS FOR THE 2004 SESSIONChairman Ryan GouldVice-Chairman & Visits Rod KohlerSecretary Vic BowlesTreasurer Johan van de PolCommittee Derek Marais (meetings and

event arrangements)Bennie Steyn (papers and IT)

Jonathan Hanford (membership and recruitment)Phil Meyer (IRSE News articles)

Co-opted Members Bob Woodhead(President’s visit)Graham Paverd

Harry Ostrofsky (technical visits)

ANNUAL DINNERThe annual dinner for the 2003 session did not

take place in 2003, but was carried over into the2004 session. This dinner was therefore in effect thefirst event of the 2004 session and took place onFriday 30th January 2004 at the WitwatersrandUniversity Club. The attendance was furtherimproved on the 60 of the previous year, with 67confirmations and 65 finally attending. Mr AndriesTshabalala delivered the address which focused oncurrent training and development thinking, specifi-cally relating to the University of Pretoria – Chair ofRailway Engineering. At the core of this thinking wasthe concept of a virtual professorship whereby anarray of skilled people in the signalling industry pooltheir knowledge, expertise and time to create anintegrated signalling competency and effective professorship. The pressing need to attract new andyounger persons to the Southern African signallingindustry was also emphasised.

A revised paper award system was implementedduring the 2004 session. It was decided by the Committee that the new system would apply to thepapers delivered during the 2002 session onwards.Furthermore, the shifting on of the annual dinnerfrom 2003 into 2004 made it possible for the paperawards for both the 2002 and 2003 sessions to bemade at this dinner.

The Best Paper Award for the 2002 session wasmade to Andreas Matthee for his paper delivered on15th August 2002, titled “Research intoTechnologies Which Can Be Employed for theDetection of Skid Marks on Rails”.

Three other paper awards for the 2002 sessionwere made to:

• Frank Nunneley and Angus Hay jointly – “TheJourney to Being a Second Network Operator”

• Manie Bernard – “Rural Train Signalling withGPS”

• Rudie Barnard – “Harare – Mutare CTC Renewal

SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECTION178

and Telephone Carrier System”

The Best Paper Award for the 2003 session wasmade to Dr Wiehan Le Roux for his paper deliveredon 20th March 2003, titled “Research in ConditionMonitoring of Electrical Machines”.

Three other paper awards for the 2003 sessionwere made to:

• Jonathan Hanford – “The Use of Linux in TrafficManagement Systems”

• Berend Ostendorf – ‘Signalling Projects:Converting Requirements into Reality”

• Johan Pretorius – “The Use of PatternRecognition Algorithms in an Automatic VehicleIdentification System”

TECHNICAL MEETINGSThe technical meetings again contributed signifi-

cantly to the promotion and dissemination, amongstthe IRSE members and guests, of railway signallingand train control knowledge and experience. Sometopics and papers, less directly related to signalling,but more to do with the wider railway engineeringfield, were included in the programme to encourageinformation exchange, discussion and debatearound the environment and context within whichsignalling must function.

The venue for the technical meetings waschanged from the Transtel offices to the Wits Club(Witwatersrand University Club), with generally positive feedback re the venue change.

On Thursday 19th February 2004, the technicalmeeting comprised a discussion session lead by theChairman on “PC Interlocking – Safe? Functional?Feasible?”. The discussion explored the situationthat these questions are being asked and debatedcontinuously. The topic was introduced by JonathanHanford presenting a view for PC-based interlockingbeing safe, functional and feasible, with JohannesJooste presenting a counter-view against. The factors presented ‘for’ were low cost, powerful processing capability, familiar and easy to maintain,appropriate for system redundancy/pseudo-synchronisation/inter-processor-testing/failsafecomparator application and potential for greaterspread of parallel processing using different plat-forms (eg three different processors, three differentoperating systems and three different programmes).The factors presented ‘against’ were current hardware structure not suitable, available softwarenot suitable, insufficient reliability and the high costof validating propriety software and failsafe comparators.

The discussion concluded that from a function-ality and architecture perspective, PC-based interlocking should perform adequately and if configured appropriately should perform safely. Thepotential cost advantage of PC-based interlockingwas recognised to be the key motivating issue, provided the cost of software and failsafe com-parator validation could be contained. It was, however, highlighted that PC equipment is not compatible with the high temperatures experiencedin the South African outdoor railway environment

and that air conditioned equipment housings areessential for such installations. The reliability of suchair conditioning equipment has been found to belacking. The relevance and appropriateness, in theSouthern African context, of relay based interlock-ing, and more specifically the hybrid forms of relaybased safety circuitry and processor based functionality circuitry was recognised.

On Thursday 18th March 2004, a presentationtitled “Open Transport Network (OTN)” was delivered by Jose de Oliveira, General ManagerMarketing, Siemens Building Technologies. The presentation focused on the concept of putting yourentire communications world on a fibre and therebybringing communications back to basics. It expanded on the fact that as rail operators facegrowing competition from other sectors, reliablecommunications are required, specifically in theareas of security in stations and safety of passengers, while reducing downtime and keepingoperating cost under control. Worldwide, two out ofthree urban rail operators rely on Siemens OpenTransport Network systems for their communicationrequirements. The principles of the Open TransportNetwork were explained in detail and that ability ofthe OTN to be able to take care seamlessly andfaultlessly of Voice, SCADA, Data, LAN and VideoSignals was high-lighted, with specific reference toits application in the railway environment.

On Thursday 20th May 2004, Jack van der Merwe,the Gautrain Project Leader, delivered a paper titled“Gautrain: An Update”. This was a privileged opportunity for IRSE members and guests to get afirst hand update on the status of the much publicised Gautrain Project. Jack van der Merwe,who heads up the Gautrain Project, presented to themeeting an overall perspective of the achievementsto date, controversial aspects currently on the tableand the way forward. Numerous questions and alively discussion followed the presentation, primarilyas to the nature of the train operations and the signalling technologies that were planned. As theproject was still in the bidding phase at the time, theoperational and signalling detail had not been decided. Accordingly, it was agreed that furtherinteraction between the IRSE and Gautrain shouldtake place post the announcement of the successfulbidder and during the construction period of the project.

On Thursday 24th June 2004, a paper titled“Communication Based Train Control UsingInnovative Train Positioning” was delivered by JeffBaker, Product Manager, Advanced Systems, GETransportation, Grain Valley, Missouri, USA. It wasmost decidedly an honour to have this offshorespeaker present to the Southern African Section ofthe IRSE. The paper described some of the recentbackground to developments in North America withrespect to Positive Train Control (PTC), and PositiveTrain Separation (PTS), covering both freight andtransit lines. It went on to describe two innovativeapproaches to train location determination, namelyradio ranging, and GPS positioning, and how thesetechniques have been applied in real situations.Radio ranging is derived from the military EPLRS

179SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECTION

technology, and is being applied on the SanFrancisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), using GE'sAdvanced Automatic Train Control (AATC) system.GPS positioning is being used on the Amtrak corridor into Michigan, in conjunction with GE’sIncremental Train Control System (ITCS). The bulk ofthe questions tabled focused on the detail of theIncremental Train Control System, in the context ofits potential application in Southern Africa.

The technical meeting of 24th June took the placeof the joint technical meeting that is normally scheduled in June. The joint technical meeting wasset aside in anticipation of a planned multi-disciplinary railway infrastructure exhibition inSeptember/October 2004. The core objective of theexhibition was to display working demonstrations,across a wide range of railway infrastructure fields,to the full spectrum of players in the South Africanrailway business. This exhibition unfortunately nevermaterialised.

The highlight for the year, in the context of thetechnical meetings was, the paper delivered by thePresident, John Corrie, on Tuesday 10th August2004. This paper was a shortened version of hisPresidential Address, which was first given at theAnnual General Meeting held in London on 23rdApril 2004. The theme was “Communication andControl: The Keys to Railways of the Future”. Thepaper was founded on the opinion of the Presidentthat the next 25 years will be less about further noveltechnologies, but instead will be about making better use of the technologies we have. This canonly be achieved by way of better and more innovative use of available information to optimise,at a non-vital level, the flow of trains, and thereby minimise the extent and sophistication of therequired vital component of signalling equipment.The President strongly supported the use of electronic systems to help the move to cab signalling but, where lineside equipment remainedhe supported the use of traditional equipment,based on the inherent predictability of these devices.The President also postulated that it is only when wecan all understand each other in the world of railways that signal engineers themselves will beunderstood, and it is only when we are understoodthat we will be effective.

On Thursday 16th September 2004, a paper titled“Stray Current Performance and Design of TubularTrack” was delivered by Dr B M Steyn. The paperexplained that the versatility of the tubular track construction, where the concrete rail support structure can be moulded in-situ or pre-cast intosections, had attracted attention and had beenapplied in numerous situations. The stray currentperformance of different configurations of tubulartrack was however of concern and had been studiedmaking use of analytical and finite element models.The employed model had been developed in such away that simulation results could be compared fordifferent configurations and related to in track experimental results. In order to be able to comparethe measurement results to the values obtained forconventional track, a modification of the conven-tional rail to earth conductance was also proposed.

The content and findings of this paper, although notof direct relevance to signalling, was viewed to be ofsuch significance to the railway industry that thepaper has been forwarded to the UK for consider-ation for it to be published by the IRSE.

The meeting of 21st October 2004 served as theAnnual General Meeting and the final technicalmeeting of the Southern African Section of the IRSE2004 session. Subsequent to the proceedings of theAGM, the meeting was addressed jointly by BobWoodhead and Harry Ostrofsky, delivering a less formal presentation describing their recent “UKExperiences”. Over the last couple of years BobWoodhead had, for various periods of time, workedfor Mott MacDonald in Croydon, carrying out evaluations and various other activities whilst HarryOstrofsky had worked for Railtrack for two yearsafter retiring from Spoornet. Their presenters gavethe local IRSE members and guests an exposure,largely by way of photographs, document imagesand drawings, of the unique signalling and train control environments they had been exposed to, thenature and complexities of some of the workingmethods currently adopted in the UK and some oftheir life experiences they had whilst in the UK. Allthe members and guest present thoroughly enjoyedthe exposure to this sojourn.

TECHNICAL VISITAs is customary, the annual technical visit coin-

cided with the visit of the President and his spouse.The technical visit was held in Cape Town, with thelocal arrangements being very ably and successfullymade by the small group of members and theirhelpers in Cape Town. The day was hosted by LouisBeukes, the Infrastructure Manager of Metrorail,Cape Town. The turnout at the technical visit wasmuch better than was initially expected, thanks to the willingness of many of the IRSE members to travel all the way to Cape Town, inspired by thevery enticing programme set out by Louis and histeam.

Louis and his team proudly described and showedthe IRSE group the following:

• The new HR92 interlocking at Bellville and thecomplex commissioning program developed.

• The old miniature lever frame installation thatwas being replaced.

• The Windermere CTC and an array of innovativedevelopments done recently, such as:

– an electronic logging and train time printingsystem (train logging system);

– web enablement of the train logging system;

– a remote control data logging system (datalogging system);

– the “Windermere Protocol Receiver” module(WPR);

– S2/Train Number innovations:

• SPAD alarm system;

• junction delay flagging;

• line monitoring;

• Cape Town remote control;

Western SectionThis session was dominated by new technology

signalling and its introduction and remained wellattended. The Section has had joint meetings withthe Somerset & West Wiltshire branch of the IEE andthe South Wales PWI as is now customary.

The committee members wish to extend theirthanks to Amey Rail, Hyder Consulting andWestinghouse Rail Systems both for the use of theirpremises to host the meetings and for the provisionof light refreshments at the meetings, which continue to be an enjoyable feature of the WesternSection meetings.

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEEChairman Peter DugganVice-Chairman Chris NapperHon Treasurer Mark BrookesHon Secretary Doug GillandersMembers Peter Martell

Ed GerrardAndy Scarisbrick

TECHNICAL MEETINGSThe first meeting of the year was on 12th October

and was preceded like 2003 by the AGM. This wasexpertly chaired and concluded by both PeterMartell as outgoing chairman, and Peter Duggan,the incoming chairman. The main meeting – held inBristol – was entitled “Robust Train Protection” andwas given by Mr Charles Weightman, who is knownnationally for his Principles knowledge.

Mr Weightman introduced his paper by giving anoutline of his career and then stated that the principle behind robust train protection was toimprove train protection and this is to be done byemploying the following tools:

Standard TPWS (required by law) for line speed

– an integrated communication system (ICS andtrain communication).

• The Cape Metrorail operations control centre.

This was a highly organised and most interestingday, requiring expression of acknowledgement andappreciation to Louis and all of his team for all oftheir efforts and hospitality.

The technical visit was concluded with an excellent evening function at the Alstom construc-tion depot in Bellville, a suburb of Cape Town.Alstom went out of their way to present the venue tothe President and his spouse as a truly South Africanenvironment and served an outstanding meal andrefreshments. Unfortunately, the weather was some-what cold and wet, and this put a damper on theevening.

PRESIDENTIAL VISITThe President of the IRSE, John Corrie, and his

wife, Nicola, were officially hosted by the SouthernAfrican Section from the 6th-15th August 2004. ThePresident and his wife flew directly from the UK toarrive in Cape Town on the 6th. They were pivotal tothe annual technical visit on the 7th.

The President and his wife were treated to a suburban train trip on the Simons Town line, followed by a selection of the Cape Peninsularattractions on the 8th. They flew to Johannesburg onthe 9th.

The days of the 10th and 11th were devoted to thePresident visiting Alstom and Spoornet respectively,and the technical meeting held on the evening of the10th. The President’s wife, on the other hand, wastreated to a visit to the De Wildt Cheetah Farm andtheir breading programme and a visit to the LesediCultural Village in Broederstroom.

The President was very impressed throughout hisvisit by the hybrid interlocking route taken by theSouthern African signalling fraternity, as well as the

broader sphere of development work that was beingdone. Much of this was aligned with his perceptionof the required way forward for signalling and traincontrol systems, as conveyed in the paper he delivered at the technical meeting. The Presidentand his wife were finally treated to a visit to theKruger National Park before flying out on the eveningof 15th August.

COMMITTEE AND IRSE MEMBERSThe successes achieved during this session are

attributable to specifically the commitment of andcontributions made by each of the committee members and more generally to the participation ofthe Institution’s members, interested potential members and their families. The individual efforts ofthe committee members are acknowledged and theycan be proud of their work. Equally, without the interest and participation of the members, the IRSEwould not exist. Without the participation of spouses, partners and family members, the IRSEevents would be the poorer.

FOCUS FOR THE 2005 SESSIONThe core challenge for 2005 session remains the

retention of the current membership interest andachieving growth of the Southern African Section ofthe IRSE by securing new members. Indications arethat the efforts made in this regard during the 2004session are beginning to pay off and the good workneeds to be continued. The committee for the 2004session began to explore various avenues of closerco-operation between the IRSE and other railwayrelated learned institutions in South Africa. These initiatives need to be furthered. Effort also needs tobe committed to properly preparing for the 25thanniversary, in 2006, of the existence of theSouthern African Section.Ryan Gould Vic BowlesChairman General Secretary

SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECTION180

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up to 75 mile/h, TPWS- where there is a restrictedoverlap, TPWS+ for line speed up to 99.5 mile/hwhere standard TPWS was ineffective and TPWSOuter Signal for line speeds of over 100 mile/h,Overrun Protection, Flank Protection andExtended Overlap. This would involve the use ofDead Double Reds (DDR) and Conditional DoubleReds (CDR) on the Junction Protecting Signal(JPS or Inner Signal) and the Full line speedProtecting Signal (FPS or Outer Signal).

This requirement led to the production ofRT/E/G/00028 to discharge the requirements ofGI/RT/7006. However, the company standard is tobe split into two technical instructions – the requirements and the methods of carrying out thoserequirements, so that there is consistency of appli-cation and it is not optional. The standard applies tonew and existing layouts and the braking rate to beused is 12%g.

The difference between the four types of TPWSwas explained and how each was effective up to therequired line speed with varying lengths of overlapfrom 183m (200 yards) to 402m (440 yards). Theeffectiveness at junctions was covered by the use ofdouble reds which were mandated for possible converging collisions of 100+ mile/h and for possiblehead-on collisions of 100+ mile/h.

Up to 75 mile/h absolute protection can be gainedfrom TPWS on the inner signal only. No TPWS isrequired on the outer signal. Over 75 mile/h the outersignal is also fitted. There is in the standard a tableof TPWS stopping distances for falling gradients upto 1 in 66. TPWS+ gives an additional OSS at 750mwith a 65 mile/h set speed which together with theTSS gives protection up to 99.5 mile/h. If an OSS is fitted to the outer signal this gives protection up to125 mile/h with a 180m overlap and speed up toaround 140 mile/h for 402m overlaps. An example ofthis fully fitted set up is at Hanslope Junction on theWest Coast Main Line.

Automatic overrun protection is used to put all signals affected back to danger if an overrun occurs.This has been used before but has not been used somuch in the last 10 years.

Flank protection is used to protect a potential collision by moving points in the non-overrun routeaway from the affected route if the signal is passedat danger.

Extended overlaps are extended beyond the normal aspect overlap to give protection from a collision. This is still be worked out and is not yetfinalised.

Mr Weightman then gave four examples of robusttrain protection – Filton Abbey Wood, ColwichJunction, Slade Lane and Rochdale Metrolink.

Junction signalling was then addressed where theaim is to give the driver a positive pre-indication ofthe route he has been given – before he reads thejunction signal which is too late if he has beenwrongly routed. There are to be five methods:

1 Free aspect and a free aspect on the distant signal – MAF;

2 Free yellow with flashing aspects at the distant

signal – MAY-FA;

3 Approach control from red with a single yellow distant signal – MAR-Y;

4 Free aspect with free aspect splitting distant signals – MAF-SD; and

5 Free yellow aspect with double yellow at the distant signal MAY-YY.

The constraints of each of these were explained.

Chris Napper proposed a vote of thanks(Attendance: 42 members, 5 visitors)

The second meeting held in Chippenham on 16thNovember when we were honoured to welcome theIRSE President Mr John Corrie who gave a shortoverview on items in which the Institution was currently involved.

The topic for the evening was entitled “NewSignalling and Train Control for LondonUnderground” and the paper was delivered by MrMark Glover and Mr Richard Roberts, both of WSRL.Mr Glover introduced the paper by asking the question “What is it all about?” referring to theLondon Underground PPP (public private partner-ship). New Labour introduced the concept by seeking to introduce a £16bn investment in LondonUnderground. The underground was split up intothree infrastructure areas which were tendered forcompetitively – Bakerloo, Central and Victoria lines(BCV), Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly lines (JNP)and the remaining lines of the Circle, District andHammersmith lines (SSL). The operations remain inthe public sector.

There was shadow running for 2-3 years beforebids were invited for the 30-year leases available.The BCV and SSL lines were won by the Metronetconsortium of which Bombardier has a 20% equitystake. WRSL have the exclusive signalling contractswith Bombardier to provide the signalling for theVictoria line and the SSL lines. The objective forMetronet is to invest £7bn in 7.5 years. In thoseyears the contract is a reward and penalty contractwhich if targets are exceeded rewards are paid but if they fall short then penalties are extracted. This is called the ISC (infrastructure service charge).Amongst the targets are those for cleanliness of thetrains and stations – ambience, punctuality and performance of the trains – journey time togetherwith the introduction of new trains with ATO, ATPATS and new signalling on the Victoria and SSL lines– control and consistency. There is a requirement toincrease the number of off-peak trains on theVictoria line. WRSL are to provide ATO and controlcentre in the next 15 years on all lines.

Mr Roberts then took over to introduce the technical aspects of the requirements signalling ATOand ATP. In 1968 the Victoria line opened using ATOwith relays and code logic. The trains carry both ATPand ATO. The role of the new control centre is toreceive the timetable and then allow the operators tocontrol the train service in conjunction with thetimetable. This information is then fed out the LSC(local site computers).

An intermediate state will exist whereby the use ofthe existing signalling will be retained but new

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control and information systems will be introducedallowing the introduction of new ATP/ATO trains torun at the same time as the old non-fitted stock. Thiswill retain fixed block control (FBC). Allowing theprocessor to send the control information to thetrains fitted but the unfitted stock to continue toadhere to the existing signalling. Eventually,Westrace will take over all the signalling and the oldwill be decommissioned.

ATP works out the limit of movement authority andis to be the TBS100 Distance To Go system as usedon the Madrid, Barcelona and Jubilee line systems.The ATO will use supervised driving mode initiallybut when it is completed it will have three modes ofoperation from fully automatic mode to completelymanual mode – Manned Automatic (MA), ProtectedManual (PM) and Restricted Manual (RM).

Mr Roberts then showed a series of diagramswhich explained how ATO and ATP work together tobring the train to a halt in the correct place using theinbuilt braking curves and speed restriction curves.

Following a series of questions to both Mr Gloverand Mr Roberts, Peter Martell proposed a vote ofthanks. (Attendance: 51 members, 22 visitors)

The meeting on 14th December was again inBristol, where the title of the paper for the eveningwas “Ansaldo ACC – The Coming of Age” and wasdelivered by Mr Ian McCulloch of Ansaldo. MrMcCulloch introduced the paper by giving a shorthistory of the evolution of the computer-based interlockings which involved the introduction of fivenew techniques – Ebilock, Microlok, Simis, ACC andVHLC. The only level 3 ERTMS system currentlybeing ordered was one for Alaska Railroad. One ofthe greatest wastes of resources was perhaps thatrequirement that each project team had to separ-ately specify and define the then Railtrack’s signalling principles. From the proposed introductionof five new interlockings, only three had come tofruition – the Siemens Simis on the “BournemouthSea Front”, the Ansaldo ACC at “Cheadle HulmeJunction” and the VHLC on the Cromer Branch.However, these have disproved the myth that CBIscould not and would not work in the UK.

About the same time Network Rail rediscoveredSSI, which in some parts meant that CBIs wouldonly ever take a back seat. CTRL was successfullycommissioned using the largest CBI in the UK usingthe Ansaldo SEI. This uses 12 interlockings on phase1 with a similar number to be used on phase 2. Thefirm orders for the Ansaldo ACC to be installed andcommissioned around Europe is currently 150 by2006. The next project in the UK is the Sandbach –Wilmslow project.

The ACC was made for FS – now Italfer – theItalian railway system, and was specified as one thatwould be capable of controlling large and complexnetworks with high traffic levels and capable of predicting failures. Rome was commissioned in 1999and has around 1,000 trains controlled in 24 hours.The ACC was designed so that the software wasdeliberately separated from the hardware andformed an integrated control system and mainte-nance suite. This differed significantly from SSI

where a separate control system is required, egIECC and no bolt-on diagnostic system is requiredas one is integrated in the ACC. Whereas SSI hasaround a 50 SEU capability, the ACC has around a250 SEU capability.

ACC has the interlocking centrally placed linkedby dark fibre to the “Peripheral Posts” (small REBs).The controlled objects are star wired. It supports afull bi-directional ERTMS level 2 interface and willsupport tail cables of up to 600m for points and signals and 2,000m for track circuits. The systemintroduced for FS was a drop down menu drivensystems whereas the system to be introduced forSandbach – Wilmslow will be a “point and click” system using a high integrity mouse. TheMaintainers Support Function (MSF) is a modemdiagnostic system, which gathers data indepen-dently from each of the peripheral posts using atouch screen approach and is replicated in theREBs. A plug-in connection is available in the locations. The MSF carries out a continuous checkof the system and of cable insulation. It monitors signal lamp current, the voltage, current and throwtime of point machines, the track circuit voltage, thenumber of operations of points and has an on-screen fault tree for any hardware faults. The initialsoftware introduced in the system was UK0, whichwas upgraded to UK1 in September, ready for theSandbach – Wilmslow extension in 6th March. Theprinciple of Signalling Logic Requirement Specifi-cation has been adopted for the Sandbach –Wilmslow extension.

Why has the process been so difficult? The reasons proposed were not all the requirementswere defined, the difficulty of assessing and approving valid contractor interpretations of theremit and the continual appearance that sections ofNetwork Rail believed that SSI is the only and thebest system to use.

There then followed a number of questions, followed by a vote of thanks from Ed Gerrard.

Attendance 23 members, 3 visitors)

The first meeting of 2005 on 11th January saw theSection again in Bristol, where the speaker was MrPhil Waddingham of WRSL who gave a paper entitled “West Anglia Route Modernisation”. PhilWaddingham was based at York as a customerwhen Project Delivery was the supplier. His projectsincluded the first installation of a Westcad systemprior to the last four years on the WARM project. Philspoke about the WARM Alliance structure; thescope of the WARM scheme; and the successesthat the project had achieved.

The WARM Alliance was made up of the followingmembers:

Westinghouse – S&TGrant Rail – TrackAlfred McAlpine – CivilsAmec Spie – Electrical and OHLENetwork Rail – Possessions, Isolations,

Test train, ProjectManagement and support

The scheme was to replace the signalling in modern form with no changes in layout covering 200

183

miles of track from London towards Cambridge. Itwas planned to be five stages over five years, butwas finally six stages as stage 3 was split into two.Many local signal boxes were replaced by controlfrom London Liverpool Street:

Stage number Signal boxes closed1 12 23a 23b 14 65 3

Since there were a wide range of old technologiesreplaced by this scheme, there was a lot of interestin the recovered equipment for strategic spares,training and from preservation societies. Spellbrookbox was taken away by a preservation society in onelump.

Potential was built into the scheme for futureupgrades for the link to Stansted airport. In total thejob replaced 750 signals and 375 track circuits. AtLiverpool Street, two new IECC workstations wereprovided to control 13 solid state interlockings. Anew workstation to operate eight CCTV level cross-ings was also provided. One of the bigger challenges of the job was fitting all of the equipmentin at LS. One major part of this was to substantiallyupgrade the air conditioning to the building to fourtimes its original capacity. Much of the new equipment was installed and controlled from the oldinterlocking to reduce the risk of the main commis-sionings.

A local issue at Highams Park saw the box remainthere for six weeks after the commissioning as thelocals thought that it was safer to have a man in thebox watching the crossing rather than rely on CCTVcontrol.

Much use was made of 3D modelling of the levelcrossing layouts using tools developing these fromthe ground plans in order to calculate camera angles.

The alliance employed a dedicated PR teamthroughout the job.

What successes did the Alliance Model promise?

The client perceived that this model would give asafer working environment, lower costs, higher quality and a robust programme. The contractorswere appointed after a competitive tender processand the project was run in two phases – develop-ment (two years) and delivery (three years). Theemphasis was on the contractors working in a noclaim environment and there was an integrated project management team throughout the project.This group had to approve any changes to individualcompany personnel into or out of the delivery teamsto ensure consistency.

At the final reckoning, the project was delivered sixmonths ahead of the programme produced by thedevelopment phase and each stage was below thebudget costed by development. As the project wenton the relative costs of the SEU went down, deliver-ing an SEU at £218000 by the end.

Stage SEU1 100%

2 70%3 90%4 70%5 65%

There was a lively Q&A session, mainly focussingon the difficulties of the definition of an SEU and itsmeaningfulness. There was also substantial discussion about the control of costs in a situationwhere the scope is so clearly defined and not subjected to any change during the life of the project. Finally, given that the model had been seenas successful, there was a discussion on what willcontinue from this in the future as this team wasbeing wound down with no likely continuity to buildon the savings developed.

Following a series of questions, a vote of thankswas given. (Attendance: members 13, visitors 6)

For the February meeting, on the 15th, the Sectionreturned to Chippenham where Mr Doug Gillanders,of Network Rail, give a paper entitled “West CoastSignalling Upgrade”. This was a joint meeting withthe Bath & North Somerset branch of the IEE. MrGillanders introduced the paper by stating that hewould give a chronological outline of the events fromthe start of the project in 1997 to the introduction ofthe new timetable in September 2004 and then lookforward until 2009 when the project is due to becompleted. A brief outline of the West Coast wascovered, together with the implementation and contracting strategy. The short life of the NMC wastouched on which resulted in the interim controlpoints of Wembley, Rugby and Stoke becoming permanent.

The first project to be commissioned was ProofHouse Junction in 1999, which was successful bothin terms of completion date and cost to complete.This set the tone for the Alliancing Strategy adoptedby the programme for the remainder of the works.The next project was the resignalling and re-modelling of Euston, the closure of Euston PSB andthe transfer of control to Wembley SCC over the millennium period. One year later the next section –the Willesden area – was resignalled and controltransferred to Wembley SCC

Attention then transferred to north to Stoke-on-Trent where it was necessary to transfer control intoa portakabin in the car park for a while, whilst thesignal box was refurbished into a signalling controlcentre. The first resignalling was in February 2002and was the Stoke station area only. This was followed in the summer of 2003 with a blockade onroute section 12 which culminated in the resignallingof the section from Colwich exclusive to Kidsgrove.This involved the use of axle counters with the control system being the GETS modular control system (MCS).

In the autumn of 2003, the TCS project was cancelled and the line speed reduced from 140mile/h to 125 mile/h, with the reinstatement of lineside signals, the introduction of the TiltAuthorisation and Speed Supervision (TASS) systemand extended journey times.

Norton Bridge was the next area to be resignalledand control transferred to Stoke SCC in March 2004

WESTERN SECTION

following a blockade of Route Section 3 betweenSeptember and December 2003. This resulted in theclosure of Norton Bridge, Madeley and Betley Roadsignal boxes. A number of new and novel deviceswere introduced in the Norton Bridge area includingAZLM axle counters, Dorman LED signals, 400voltsreconfigurable power supplies, crown posts andplug-coupled point machines. The use of crownposts and LED signals was then explained.

The alterations to Nuneaton were then explainedresulting from the congestion caused by theLeicester – Birmingham services crossing the WestCoast main line. They included a resignalling of thebranch with an SSI in Nuneaton signal box and thereinstatement of an old flyover to achieve grade separation of the two routes. Two new platformswere introduced.

The section between Watford and Bletchley wasthe next area to be resignalled which removed control from the Watford and Bletchley signal boxesand control transferred to the new Rugby SCC. Thiswas commissioning at spring bank holiday 2004 withthe control area from Hanslope to Hillmorton including part of the Northampton loop, transferredfrom Rugby PSB to Rugby SCC in August 2004.

The use of continuous speed signage for per-missible speeds (PS) and enhanced permissiblespeeds (EPS) was detailed together with the use ofaxle counters and the procedures required to resetand restore them to operational use following a failure or engineering works.

The work in the Stockport area, which involved the refurbishment of five mechanical signal boxes,was detailed. This gave the boxes a ten-year life extension. However, this was felt more likely toextend to 25 years.

The proposed works at Bletchley, Rugby station,Nuneaton and the Trent Valley over the next fewyears were outlined with all the works requiring to becomplete by late summer 2008. Line speedenhancement works are continuing north of Creweto allow as much 125 mile/h running as possiblebetween Crewe and Glasgow. The remaining signalboxes at Crewe, Stafford (nos 4 & 5) and Watfordhave not yet been planned in detail to be replaced,as they are outside the scope (now!) of the WestCoast project.

There then followed a number of questions, followed by a vote of thanks from Maurice Poole ofthe IEE. (Attendance 30 members, 22 visitors)

The final paper for the session was a joint paperwith the South Wales PWI and was held in Newporton 4th March. The meeting was chaired by AlecPugh of the PWI. The paper was delivered by Mr PhilBassett who is retired but works occasionally as aconsultant and was entitled “From the Footplate –30 Years of Change”. Mr Bassett introduced himselfwith a look at his early career and his progressionfrom fireman and then driver at Nine Elms depot inLondon. From here he went on to driver training at

Waterloo and subsequently driver training on theLondon Midland Region for which he had to learnabout overhead electrics! He then moved on to ChiefTraction Inspector in the London area and when theEPS came along he became one of the SeniorManagers for the new international train crew depotat North Pole.

Mr Bassett then looked at the signalling and driverrequirements of the new high speed lines to andfrom Brussels and Paris. He pointed out that with the advent of privatisation, and in particular theincreased skills requirements for the Eurostar drivers, the driver had become a marketable com-modity. It cost significant sums to train the Eurostardrivers as not only did they need to know the continental signalling systems and traction systems,but they are also required to be fluent in French.

The historical links of track fault reporting to thelocal P Way staff had changed and in his view notaltogether for the better. Reporting of wet spots andsimilar was done through a local direct link. The linkused to be direct to the local signalman or their control at the end of the run. Now higher speedsprevented clear pinpointing of these issues. Onearea where there had been significant improvementwas in the hand back speeds after engineeringworks. Gone are the days of handing back at 10 or15 mile/h. However, he commented on the TSR indications were not always correct!

When Eurostar started going to Paris andBrussels, the Eurostar drivers were the first non-national drivers certificated to drive on the Frenchrailway system. Mr Bassett then went on to explainthe complexities of the different signalling systemsEurostar has to travel over – KVB, TVM430, TB2 andTB1. He was involved in the design of the Eurostarcab so that the drivers has a blend of manualchangeover of systems together with automaticchangeovers where the automatic operation madesound sense. The voltage changeover and the signalling changeover are the manual systems.

He then looked at the various protection systemsEurostar travels over – the French “crocodile”, AWSand TPWS.

Finally, he showed some photographs of the construction of Phase 2 of the CTRL in and aroundthe various tunnels.

A short amateur video finished off the eveningwhich showed a blatant and stupid disregard forsafety, the perpetrator of which, is now being pursued by the authorities.

This was a most entertaining presentation delivered by an enthusiastic presenter.

There then followed a series of questions, followedby a vote of thanks given by a member of the PWI

(Attendance 10 members, 11 visitors (PWI))

The AGM is to be deferred again to the openingmeeting of the 2005/2006 session.

D GillandersHon Secretary

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York Section

MEMBERSHIPThe York Section membership stands at 385,

which is an increase of 23. This represents 9.5% ofthe total IRSE membership. This compares with9.2% last year.

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEEThe Committee consists of:

Chairman R H PriceVice-Chairman K YewsTreasurer R H PriceVisits Secretary K YewsRecruitment Secretary R H PriceMembership Secretary A P SmithSecretary J MawCommittee D Dyson

R A PinkstoneA S Kornas

I T Moore

TECHNICAL MEETINGSOur first technical meeting of the session was an

updated version of the London paper “An Overviewof Network Rail Signalling Policy” by AndrewSimmons, Professional Head of Signalling forNetwork Rail. Railtrack was formed on 1st April 1994and went into administration on 7th October 2001. Itemerged as Network Rail on 3rd October 2002.Some of the policy in this paper went back toRailtrack days. The initial policy was to enhance theperformance of the existing assets, introduce stateof the art signalling systems, find new suppliers andintroduce new technology. The technical develop-ment strategy being developed by Network Railenvisaged a low risk development of control systems, interlocking systems, train protection andtrain detection. Since Railtrack began to introducenew suppliers no new technology had been intro-duced since the development of SSI and IECC. Itwas decided that new technology would be intro-duced with renewal projects. Many renewals projects have been delivered late and over budgetand generally project costs have been too high tosustain the network. The in-house scheme designwas a concept first derived in 2002. A SignallingNew Works Programme Team has been set up tomanage the front end of project development andproduce scheme plans and functional requirementsto allow the delivery phase of the project to proceedto a fixed scope. Maintenance has largely beentaken in house and a template organisation is beingformulated to integrate maintenance activities. Inconclusion Andrew said that there have been manychanges since 1994 and further significant changesare proposed over the next six months. Long termstrategies and policies have been developed todeliver a reliable and sustainable network now and inthe future and the next regulatory review will providelong term funding.

46 members and 5 visitors attended the meeting,which was sponsored by TICS/Lionverge

The November meeting was a paper given by

David Mee of Lloyd’s Register entitled “RiskAssessment Techniques”. The author began byexplaining some definitions of risk, risk analysis, riskevaluation and risk assessment. He quoted examples within the Railway industry of risk assess-ment techniques for interlockings, rolling stock andtrain detection as well as operational and businessrisk. The basic process for assessing risk from identifying the hazards to arriving at a risk that isacceptable was explored. The hazard identificationprocess with a Hazard Identification Team involvesbrainstorming, HAZOP studies and the use of checklists. The final conclusion should be a well-structured hazard log. A semi-quantified risk analysis ranks the likelihood of an accident occurring (range from 1-8, with 8 being the mostlikely), the probability of the accident happening (1-7) and the severity of the accident (1-7). These are then added together to give a quantitative result. Qualitative risk analysis uses a simple tableapproach, which ranks risk frequency (from rare toregular) and consequence (negligible to severe) toproduce a table, which can then be used to identifyrisk reduction areas. The author concluded with thequestion “Is TPWS fitment, allegedly at a cost of£10m per life saved, actually cost-effective?”

21 members and 3 visitors attended the meeting,which was sponsored by Lloyd’s Register Rail

The December meeting was our traditional non-technical meeting when Syd Barley gave us a talkentitled “Kowloon to Canton Railway – SignalEngineering to Corporate Planning”. Syd began byexplaining that the Kowloon-Canton Railway or theKCR as it is more commonly known was the Britishsection of the rail line from Hong Kong to Canton orGuangzhou as it is now known. The Hong KongGovernment realised that the land occupied by therail line along the waterfront in Kowloon wasextremely valuable for property development.Consequently a deal was done and the stretch ofline from the terminal station at Star Ferry to a location at Hung Hom was sold to a consortium ofproperty developers with the proviso that they construct a new terminal station in Kowloon. In viewof the massive increase in population in Hong Kongarising from the exodus of people from what wasthen Communist China the Hong Kong Governmenthad in the 1970’s embarked on a project of creatingnew towns in the area known as the New Territories,this is area of Hong Kong from north of Kowloon upto the border with China. After many changes of jobSyd ended up as General Manager, Infrastructure,where he was responsible for the preparation of theCorporation’s proposal to Government for the imple-mentation of the “East Rail Extensions”.

29 members and 3 visitors attended the meeting,which was sponsored by Mott MacDonald

In January Steve Allday of Siemens Transportationpresented his paper “Emerging TelecommunicationsSolutions for the Transportation Sector”. The mainmarkets for Telecommunications services are heavyrail (Network Rail and Train Operating Companies),light rail/metro (London Underground, Transport for

YORK SECTION186

London, Nexus and Docklands Light Railway) andtrams (Sheffield, Manchester, Croydon). Thetelecommunications requirements for these includedfixed bearer networks operational radio systems,operational telephone systems, peripheral systems(such as SCADA, level crossings etc) and opera-tional CCTV systems. Retail communications systems consist of information systems (visual displays, PA systems, help points and clocks), surveillance systems (CCTV) and revenue collection.The customer contracting strategies vary betweeneach of the companies and types of market. LightRail/Metro have asked Siemens to provide design,supply, build, maintain and operate contracts as wellas turn key (design, supply, build and maintain).Network Rail however has asked for design, supplyand build as well as just design and build with NRsupplying the materials. The future of telecom-munication services is looking to integration of systems (station management, train/tram runninginformation, asset monitoring and the use of newtechnologies).

26 members and 4 visitors attended the meeting,which was sponsored by Siemens Transportation

February saw a change to the published pro-gramme and the York Section was very glad to welcome Richard Storer of Network Rail who agreedto present a paper at very short notice entitled “TheSignal Maintenance Engineer’s Toolkit”. TheChairman also welcomed the President of theInstitution Mr John Corrie to this meeting. Richardbegan by saying that all of his talk is based on his own personal experiences of signalling main-tenance. He said that maintenance is all about managing risks, safety risk and performance risk. Hereviewed the maintenance specifications from those,which were based purely on the technician knowinghis own area, and targeting maintenance on thoseitems which required attention through the BR “BlueBook” and to the new Network Rail “Red Book” ofMaintenance Specifications. One of the importantaspects of maintenance is asset inspection. Thepurpose of which is to ensure that the asset maintenance strategy is appropriate and that anappropriate renewal strategy is in place. So where isMaintenance now? Network Rail took the decision in2003 to bring all maintenance “in-house”. The resultant reorganisation has integrated the formerIMC management into Network Rail to produce amore streamlined management chain and now performance is at its best level since the Hatfield disaster. Finally what will the future bring? Greaterapplication of low maintenance technology,increased application of condition monitoring,ERTMS bringing in a reduction in track side equip-ment and the utilisation of the signalling system forstaff protection.

25 members and 5 visitors attended the meeting,which was sponsored by Balfour Beatty Rail

Projects

Our final meeting in March saw Andrew Smith ofWestinghouse Rail Systems give his talk “Low CostSolutions for Level Crossing Renewals”. The currentsituation is that there are 8,188 level crossings onNetwork Rail infrastructure with 1,675 of those being

‘active’ level crossings. If a lifespan of a level cross-ing is 30 years then this should result in 56 beingrenewed each year. The actual renewal figure is ten.To address the cost of level crossings WRSL havebeen looking for an affordable option for the pro-tection of un-controlled crossings and one part ofthe solution is the Level Crossing Predictor. At aconventional automatic crossing bi-directional controls are mandatory and this results in expensiveand duplicated train detection. It normally consistsof six track circuits and up to 12 treadles. The levelcrossing predictor provides the same functionality ata fraction of the cost. It requires no power to thestrike in points; it is completely self-contained andcan be overlaid on existing infrastructure. It works byusing the rails as an inductance, providing a constant current into the rails and then measuringthe voltage across the rails. The LCP can work in bi-directional or uni-directional modes, the constantwarning time reduces potential for misuse and up to8 may be linked together to control adjacent cross-ings with overlapping approaches. It can be overlaidon many types of track circuit by selecting the correct termination shunt; insulated joints can be bypassed with couplers. Other advantages are thatthere is a reduced storage requirement; there is lessneed for services and a reduction in civil engineer-ing. At the moment there are over 20,000 predictorsin use worldwide, it is suitable for all types of crossings, it provides effective speed discriminationfor ABCLs, and with additional technology can provide a total solution. The approval strategy hasfollowed the Network Rail ‘Yellow Book’ process andhas used a comparison of American standards withEuronorms and UK standards. In the future to provide appropriate controls to the type of crossingit will be necessary to remove prescriptive controls,allow novel forms of control (keyswitch, swipe card,proximity detector, infrared remote control and auto-matic crossing clear detection) and use a risk-basedapproach for all crossings. Other examples of proposed new WRSL technology are barriermachines, solid state controllers and power supplies.

25 members and 12 visitors attended the meeting,which was sponsored by Westinghouse Rail

Systems

2004 OUTDOOR VISITSThe summer visits for the York Section started

with a visit to Oldham Optics in Scarborough, whichwas attended by 12 members. This small companymanufactures lenses for use in both the military andastronomical fields. The visit started by the company owner (who once worked in the BR workshops) stating the tolerances used when manufacturing the lenses was measured in halfwavelengths of light, a considerable increase in thelevel of precision signal engineers are accustomedto. We were taken through the process of lens manufacture, from seeing the initial material as itarrives as a block of glass, through to the finishedpolished lens.

Our next visit took us to the Embsay – BoltonAbbey Railway. Our first port of call was the signal

box at Embsay, believed to be the last signal boxbuilt by the Midland Railway, around 1923. Themembers were then taken on a tour around the sidings at Embsay where the different types of stockthey own were explained along with their aspirationsfor the site. We then boarded a steam-hauled serviceto Bolton Abbey where we were given a guided tourof the facilities in the area.

The train making a special stop to allow membersto alight at Stoneacre SB and view the Westing-house award-winning site broke the return journey.The obligatory point machine was inspected and itwas noted that due to the lack of a local power supply, the machine was operated using batteriesthat were charged by solar cells.

This visit was attended by 17 members

The third visit took 16 members to the RailwayAge at Crewe where, after a brief introduction byBrian Metcalfe we split into two groups.

A detailed guided tour was given of Exeter WestSB where the history of the box and how it came tobe situated at Crewe was given. Volunteers were onthe SB floor, and with the help of a colleague, whohad the unenviable task of operating a simulatorfrom inside a rail wagon, gave the impression thattrains were running.

We then looked in the old Crewe relay room, complete with shelf type relays, which were operated by the miniature lever frame on the operating floor where an example of a train move-ment was given.

The final visit of the summer was to Henry Williamsat Darlington where following a history of the company a presentation of a recent project onGlasgow underground was given. This involved theinstallation of trainstops and provision of a track totrain transmission system from SACEM. A demon-stration followed showing how the equipment operated. Henry Williams also manufactures fish-plates, G clamps and point clamps. An example wasshown how a fishplate was designed on CAD andhow the cutting process of a die was undertaken bymeans of software, which then drove a cuttingmachine. After a lunch kindly laid on by our hosts wewere treated to a tour of the factory where weobserved the cutting of a mould made from a diepreviously described in the morning. We saw howlocation cases were cut from a piece of sheet aluminium and then folded by a machine and zinccoated. The foundry tour provided the members witha chance to see the fishplate dies that had beenseen earlier actually used when white hot metal wastaken from the furnace and placed between twoparts of a forge and then pressed into shape.

This visit was attended by 23 members

CHAIRMAN’S ANNUAL REPORTThis is the second time that I have had the great

honour to be your Chairman, the first being for the1996/97 session.

I would like to start by giving a word of thanks.Firstly to the other seven members of the YorkSection committee for all their help and support overthe last 12 months and in particular to John Maw,

Andrew Smith and Keith Yews our Secretary,Treasurer and Visits Secretary respectively. Secondlymy thanks go to all the companies that sponsoredour programme of evening lectures at the NRM. Toenable the Section to continue holding our meetingat the NRM it is always vital that we receive sponsorship and as previously it is always a reliefwhen all our talks have sponsorship arranged. Thecompanies for this last session were MottMacDonald, Balfour Beatty, Westinghouse RailSystems, Siemens Transportation, Halcrow andTesting Installation and Correlation Services.

Keith Yews organised four excellent summer visitsto: Embsay & Bolton Abbey Steam Railway, CreweHeritage Centre, Oldham Optics at Scarborough andHenry Williams of Darlington. I was fortunate toattend the latter two visits, which were really verygood and most enjoyable. At Oldham Optics we sawthe manufacturing process of extremely accurateoptical lenses for use in the defence and spaceindustries. At Henry Williams we received a demon-stration of an electronic train stop system that hadbeen developed, manufactured, installed, tested andcommissioned on the Glasgow Underground. Inaddition we saw the new control panel for GooleBridge, however the most memorable item waswatching Signal Engineers all totally enthralled bythe manufacture of P-Way fish plates and G clamps.

We have had a great variety of evening talks all ofwhich were well attended with the average attendance being 41. I was personally pleased towelcome our President, Mr John Corrie, to theFebruary meeting and a special word of thanks to allour speakers and in particular to Richard Storer whostepped in at the final minute to give his talk entitled“Signal Maintenance Engineers Toolkit.”

Finally may I wish Keith Yews, our next Chairman,every success and best wishes for his year in office.

Rod Price, Chairman

TREASURER’S REPORTFrom this year’s accounts, it would appear that the

bank account has dropped over the year, but this isbecause of variations in when income is received,however it can bee seen that we have made a smallsurplus of £102.92.

In addition to our normal business, we organised acommemorative tie marking the 50th anniversary ofthe York Section. There was therefore a one-off costto buy the ties of £1,263.42. The accounts for lastyear show we have sold 74 ties, which means thatwe currently have a shortfall of around £400. A fewmore have since been sold, but we still need to sellapproximately another 35 to break even.

Some years ago it was decided to transfer ourbank account from the Yorkshire Bank to HSBC. Fora while the two accounts were operated in parallel,because some companies pay directly into anaccount by BACS and don’t always check the relevant details. As there had not been any trans-actions for some time, I have now closed theYorkshire account.

I am very grateful to our sponsors for the supportthey give us, which has meant that we have not had

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to approach council for a grant for a large number ofyears. At a time when the quantity of work availablefor companies is reducing, the level of sponsorshipwe have asked for over the last few years has beenincreasing quite rapidly. This is as a result of thelarge increases in hire costs at the NRM as they tryto put their conference and convention work onto amore business-like footing. The rate of increaseshould drop to something nearer the Inflation Rateso I anticipate the increases in sponsorship that weseek will likewise drop.

I am also very grateful to Ernie Thomson for audit-ing the accounts once again.

Andrew Smith, Treasurer

2005 DINNER AND DANCEThe 47th York Section Dinner and Dance was held

on Friday 8th April 2005 at the Moat House Hotel,York. Nearly 200 members, their partners and guestsattended the event. After an excellent meal theChairman of the York Section, Mr Rod Price, invitedthose present to be upstanding and he proposed atoast to Her Majesty the Queen. In a change to theestablished procedure of inviting the Senior Vice-President to be the guest of honour, Rod invited theChief Executive of the IRSE, Mr Ken Burrage, to propose a toast to the York Section. Ken began by

donning a traditional French beret and neckerchiefand addressing the assembled company in French!!!He said that he understood the reason why he hadbeen invited, because Jacques Poré was unavail-able, but nevertheless was honoured to accept theinvitation with his wife, Pat.

After exhausting the few words of French, Kenreverted to English to explain the real meaning of afew words and terms. He concluded by saying thatthe programme for the IRSE in the coming sessionhad naturally an international flavour with speakersfrom France, Belgium, Italy, Holland, Germany, andSwitzerland. He rounded off by proposing a toast tothe “York Section” which was supported by all thosepresent. Rod responded by thanking Ken and Pat forbeing the guests of the York Section, it is always apleasure seeing the Chief Executive in York. He presented Ken with a tie, which commemorates the50th anniversary of the Section.

Following the formalities Rod announced that theever-popular tombola would be starting where, for afew pence the members and guests could walkaway with fabulous prizes. Dancing to the LonghawnTrio continued until 12.30 am.

Once again the Committee thanks Rod for his hardwork in successfully arranging this year’s Dinner &Dance. John Maw, Secretary

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Younger Members’ SectionThe best way to describe the Younger Members’

(YM) Committee at present is “building up steam”. Atthe end of 2004 we held a technical seminar onTrainborne Signalling Systems in London, and inJune of 2005 we held a 2-day conference inBirmingham. Both of which were attended byupward of 80 delegates. The future looks bright asthe YM are already planning even more events.

THE PASTTechnical Seminar “Trainborne SignallingSystems”

The YM put together a half-day seminar lookinginto the present and future of trainborne signallingsystems. The amount of equipment being installedon a train is increasing along with the complexity.This seminar was informative by delivering to thedelegates a range of information that was useful tothem.

AGMIn the January we had a half-day talking about the

YM past, present and future. This was well attendedand a lot of interesting debate occurred whichhelped us to understand how best to take the YMforward, including our decision to drop the word‘Section’ from our title as it was felt that this couldbe too exclusive.

FORUMThere then followed a forum which included

presentations by John Corrie, Daniel Woodland andJohn Haile, who each discussed the pros and consof dissolving the IRSE and forming a greater institution along with the IEE, IIE and others: ‘TheInstitution of Engineering & Technology’. 70% of theYMs present voted in favour of the status quo.

These events were a good way of bringing in theviews and thoughts of the YMs who we aim to serveas well as linking into the main IRSE body.

EXAM REVIEWThe exam review followed the AGM to all those

who either sat the exam last year or who are interested in sitting them this year. This had the usualround of examples of questions and answers whichenabled everyone to understand what is expected.This annual event is an excellent asset to the YMSection and continues to deliver what the YMs need.

CONFERENCE “MAKING HEADWAY”The dust is only just settling with this event howeverthis conference was very well received and the initialfeedback is very encouraging. More informationregarding it will be in next years proceedings. It wasvery well attended by over 80 delegates as well asspeakers, past, present and future IRSE presidents.It was good to see that with all the change in mainline as well as metro companies, these companiesare still able to send so many people to an event likethis.

189YOUNGER MEMBERS’ SECTION

THE FUTURENext year’s programme will begin with the one-

day session at Aspect. This is always on the daybefore the main conference, and work is alreadyunderway to assure that YMs receive the high standard conference which they expect anddeserve.

The committee will be changing shortly and it isthe support and effort of new members that givesretiring members the knowledge that the future is insafe hands. However, these new committee mem-bers will need continuing support from otheryounger members. Therefore if new members wantto get involved to support and drive through newand exciting events then please get in contact andget involved. Your support will help the committee todeliver what you want.

COMMITTEEThe composition of the Younger Members’

Section Committee at the end of the 2004/2005 session was as follows:

Chairman John HaileAlcatel

General Secretary Kevin GoodhandBechtel Ltd

Treasurer Chris OyekanmiWestinghouse Rail Systems Ltd

Publicity Secretary Douglas YoungLloyd’s Register Rail Ltd

Events Co-ordinator Jeremy RickettsBechtel Ltd.

Committee Members Daniel WoodlandLondon Underground

Jessica BignellNetwork Rail

Jill PoytonNetwork Rail

Denis OakleyMott MacDonald

YM Co-ordinator Australasia Mark LyonsRailCorp

Active Non-Committee Members

Lynsey ThomsonLloyd’s Register Rail Ltd

Matthew LuptonAtkins Rail

Buddhadev DuttachowdhurySiemens

Akram MohammedMetronet BCV

Many thanks to all of the committee members,and also those non-committee members who haveworked and supported the YM over the past year.

Kevin D Goodhand

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The Editor would like to thank Linda Mogford, Peter Grant, Ken Burrage, Colin Porter,John Corrie, all the UK and Overseas Section secretaries and the staff of

Fericon Press, Reading, for their assistance and co-operation in the production of theProceedings. The Institution is also most grateful to our colleagues within

the signalling industry who have kindly supported the Proceedingsby placing an advertisement.

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