Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 54

Mats Bergman Productive Signs: Improving the Prospects of Peirces Rhetoric1

Abstract Studies of C. S. Peirces theory of signs have typically focused on the sub-disciplines he branded grammar and critic, with comparably little attention paid to the third semiotic branch, that is, to the line of inquiry he identified as rhetoric or methodeutic. However, Peirces elevation of rhetoric to the status of the highest division of logic should not be ignored; the future prospects of his sign-theoretical project are arguably closely tied to the conceptualisation and development of the third branch. This article traces the development of Peirces rhetoric and explores the tension between the rhetorical and methodeutic perspectives in his mature theory of signs, with the aim of preparing the way for a re-evaluation of the hierarchy of sign-theoretical disciplines. The article concludes with a sketch for a rhetorical approach to Peircean sign theory.

KEYWORDS: Charles S. Peirce, Rhetoric, Methodeutic, Grammar, Anthropomorphism

Introduction

Although Peirce, somewhat modestly, characterised himself as a pioneer of the

coming science of semiotics,2 there is still much to consider in his contributions

to and proposals for this line of study. Arguably, we have not yet caught up with

Peirce in all respects. As new studies of Peirces contributions emerge, there is a

growing appreciation not only of the part of the system he completed, but also

of the many possible paths of study he began clearing but did not fully explore.

One of these proposals, which I feel may not have been assessed as thoroughly

as it should, is Peirces claim or suggestion that rhetoric is the highest and most

living branch of logic (c. 1895: CP 2.333). Studies of Peirces semiotics that is,

1 Paper Presented at the 31

st Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, 2006

2 Many Peircean semioticians prefer the name semeiotic, and dismiss the more common term

semiotics. The validity of this choice and the accompanying criticism of the word semiotics is debatable (see Deely 2003). Also, contrary to an oft-repeated claim, Peirce uses semiotics at least once in his writings. Here, I opt for semiotics, as there is no need to distinguish Peirces theory from other semiotic points of view in this context. Semeiotic can be useful as a marker of an explicitly Peircean approach, to clearly indicate its divergence from the semiological tradition

stemming from Ferdinand de Saussure.

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 55

his logic in the broad sense have typically focused on the sub-disciplines he

branded grammar and critic, with comparably little attention paid to his third

semiotic study, that is, to the line of inquiry he identified as rhetoric or

methodeutic.

This emphasis is partly understandable in view of the fact that Peirces

writings on explicitly rhetorical issues tend to be sparse and mostly

programmatic. Yet, the usual reaction to his proposal has been a rather half-

hearted acknowledgment, if not outright neglect; the centre of the Peircean

semioticians interest has primarily been grammar, as displayed by the attention

to formal relations and the taxonomy of signs. This focus is unquestionably easily

defended; there is no denying that Peirce himself finds the organization of sign

types to be one of the major tasks of semiotics. Nor do I mean to claim that there

would not have been an impressive amount of work, classifiable as semiotic

rhetoric in Peirces sense, done after his death. Furthermore, if I am not

mistaken, it is possible to discern a growing, explicit interest in Peircean rhetoric

at the moment. I have in mind recent efforts by Vincent Colapietro (2006), James

Liszka (1996; 2000), and Lucia Santaella (1999), for instance. But in spite of all

this, it would be an exaggeration to proclaim the existence of a current rhetorical

trend within Peircean semiotics.

In this article, I aim to make a couple of small contributions to the

discussion of Peirces rhetoric. Mainly, I wish to argue that we should take

Peirces elevation of rhetoric to the status of the highest branch of logic very

seriously indeed, not least because it may have significant consequences for his

semiotic project and its future viability. I wish to review the relationship between

grammar and rhetoric, and argue that certain changes in Peirces later semiotics

(which Colapietro [2006] has recently dubbed Peirces rhetorical turn) calls for

a reconsideration of the hierarchical outlook that straightforwardly prioritises

grammar over rhetoric.

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 56

Conceptions of Rhetoric

Before considering the role of rhetoric in Peircean semiotics, it is useful to

consider how Peirce presents it as a part of the hierarchy of sciences. As so many

questions regarding Peirces semiotic project, his division of semiotics into three

branches involves many complex questions. Here, matters can be simplified by

focusing on two different conceptions of the field of the philosophical study of

signs, connected with his early and late semiotic phases.

The first recorded appearance of the term semiotic in Peirces writings

merely states that logic is a species of symbolistic, which in its turn is a branch

of semiotic, the general science of representations. For the young Peirce, logic

is not a synonym for the doctrine of signs, but rather the branch of the semiotics

of symbols that examines the relations of symbolic representations to their

objects (1865b: W 1:303). He does not pay much attention to the other parts of

semiotics. We are told that there is a science of copies and a science of signs,3

which accompany the science of symbols, and that symbolistic is divided into

grammar, rhetoric, and logic (see fig. 1); but only the logical part of semiotics is

described in any detail.

2 By signs, Peirce in this context means the kind of representations later named indices. Copy is an early name for icon.

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 57

Figure 1. Peirces classification of the sciences in Teleological Logic (1865b).

Peirces characterisation of the science of representations in his youthful writings

is rather meagre; it is not possible to form any detailed conception of its scope

and content. Nonetheless, some general features of the proposed domain of

inquiry may be discerned. In the first place, Peirces early attention to the science

of semiotics follows from an endeavour to find a definition of logic that would

avoid the pitfalls of psychologism (1865c: W 1:308). Thus, it is evident that the

representations, which the various branches of semiotic study, are not to be

explicated by an examination of the actual workings of the human mind.

The unpsychologistic emphasis is a pervasive feature of Peirces semiotics,

early and late alike. In addition, the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric can

also be found in his mature sign-theoretical writings. However, one of the

interesting traits of Peirces first efforts to characterise semiotic inquiry is that

they indicate that he was not originally all that interested in the study of all kinds

of signs; rather, what he was looking for in his earliest classification of semiotics

was a way to delimit the domain of logic, or the study of how symbols can stand

truthfully for their objects.

Nevertheless, Peirce does offer some attempts to characterise the tasks of

the different branches of symbolistic in his early writings. In Teleological Logic,

he asserts that the science of the general conditions to which every symbol is

subjected in so far as it is related to a logos is General Grammar, to a language is

General Rhetoric, to an Object is General Logic (1865b: W 1:304). In another

passage from the same period, Peirce describes the task of rhetoric as that of

investigating the laws of a symbol translating anything (1865a: W 1:274).

Now, when one turns to Peirces later writings, at least one major change

in his conception of the semiotic sciences that affects the scope of rhetoric may

be discerned. The in-between level consisting of the science of copies, the

science of signs, and symbolistic is removed. In his mature semiotics, Peirce

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 58

actually divides logic into the three sub-disciplines or branches of grammar,

critic, and rhetoric or methodeutic.

This is related to the relatively well-known fact that Peirce changes his

mind about the relationship between semiotics and logic as his thought

develops. Whereas the young Peirce strives to carve a place for logic within the

part of semiotics he calls symbolistic, the older Peirce conceives of logic as

semiotics; and this is to include grammar and rhetoric as well as logic in the

narrow sense, or critic as Peirce most often calls the second branch of semiotics.

The term logic is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses.

In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the

attainment of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary

laws of thought, or, still better (thought always taking place by means of

signs), it is general semeiotic. (c. 1897a: CP 1.444)

Peirce now argues that as long as every logical relation is a semiotic relation

(which he naturally holds it to be), then the deeper comprehension of logic

requires an understanding of all forms of signs and their functions. Consequently,

he urges logicians to widen the scope of their research. Peirce even asserts that

the broader investigation is part of the duties of the logician (1909a: MS 640.10).

Logic (Semiotic)

Grammar (Syntax) Critic (Logic in Rhetoric / Methodeutic

the Narrow Sense)

Figure 2. Peirces Division of Logic in His Later Philosophy

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 59

There are many motives behind this expansion, some explicitly states while

others are not, but for our purposes here three reasons are particularly striking.

Firstly, it is clear that Peirces mature conception of logic as semiotics entails that

grammar, critic, and rhetoric are not to be restricted to the study of symbols

that is, to habitual or conventional signs. They are to be concerned iconic and

indexical representations as well (1909b: SS 118). Secondly, the logician should

not restrict him- or herself to the representation of objects, as the young Peirce

proposed. In fact, logic traditionally deals with such things as definition and

signification, which are more matters of the interpretant than the object in

Peirces view (1909b: SS 118). As we have seen, already in his early studies,

Peirce suggests that rhetoric is particularly focused on the interpretant; in the

later phase, the realisation that many of the tasks of the logician are more

matters of sign-interpretant relations than of sign-object relations become a

reason to expand the scope of logic to include rhetoric. Finally, in an almost

pragmatic spirit Peirce states that the extension is needed for linguistic and

rhetorical applications (1904a: MS 693.188-190). This indicates that one reason

for facilitating productive connections between logic and other pursuits. Perhaps

it is not so odd, after all, that Peirce, the staunch defender of an unpsychological

conception of logic, suggests that the borderline between logic and psychology

need not be so strictly drawn when we come to rhetoric, the third branch (c.

1902: CP 2.107).

Rhetoric vs. Methodeutic

So far, our examination of changes in Peirces philosophy has suggested that the

importance of rhetoric grows when we move from the early logical writings to

the mature conception of logic as semeiotic. However, there are two features

of his thought that seem to limit the scope and prospects of semiotic rhetoric.

Firstly, Peirce apparently wishes to find a more clearly defined and delimited

function for the third branch as methodology. Secondly, his continued allegiance

to a certain hierarchical vision of the sciences may hinder an appreciation to the

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 60

dual position of the rhetorical domain as the starting point as well as the

concluding field of semiotic studies.

In his later writings, Peirce first employs the term rhetoric, and defines it

as the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs

from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another (c. 1896: CP 1.444).

The task of rhetoric is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific

intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings

forth another (c. 1897b: CP 2.229). As such, the emphasis of rhetoric would

naturally be on interpretation and other semiotic effects. This conception does

not seem to differ radically from that presented in Peirces early writings, apart

from the significant divergence in scope noted above.

However, approximately in 1902, the focus of the third sub-discipline of

semiotics begins to turn toward methodological matters, something that is

reflected in Peirces new preferred name, methodeutic (see Peirce 1906: CP

4.9). The occurrence of this shift can be seen quite concretely in Minute Logic,

where the two terms still co-exist, albeit somewhat uneasily.4 About a year later,

the matter appears settled. From there on, the third sub-discipline is

predominantly defined in terms of the principles of the production of valuable

courses of research and exposition (1903a: EP 2:272).

Thus, it would appear that Peirce has replaced rhetoric with the better-

defined methodeutic, at the same time restricting its scope to the study of

effective methods. Some scholars have drawn this very conclusion; for instance,

according to Santaella (1999: 380), the third branch of semiotics develops from a

narrow to a broad sense. However, at roughly the same time as this

transformation takes place, Peirce also continues to write on rhetoric, and even

proposes a quite intricate scheme of various rhetorical studies in Ideas, Stray or

Stolen, about Scientific Writing (1904b). In this context, Peirce defines the third

branch of semiotics as the science of the essential conditions under which a sign

3 In one variant of the text, Peirce explicitly states that he prefers "Speculative Rhetoric" over

"Methodeutic" or "Methodology"; but in other drafts, methodeutic is used.

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 61

may determine an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever it signifies, or may,

as a sign, bring about a physical result (1904b: EP 2:326).

In Ideas, Stray or Stolen Peirce suggests that rhetoric could be divided

into the rhetoric of art, the rhetoric of persuasion, and the rhetoric of science

(see Peirce 1904b: EP 2:329). This, in turn, could be interpreted to imply that

methodeutic is a part of rhetoric, namely the rhetoric of science.

Some reconstructive work seems to be needed. Joseph Ransdell

enumerates three principal functions of the third semiotic discipline; it can be

conceived variously as the general methodology of inquiry, as a theory about

how beliefs are established when truth is sought, or as a theory about the

representational process considered as an autonomous interpretant-generating

process (Ransdell 1997: 19). The autonomy claim is somewhat controversial,

but if we speak more broadly about a theory of interpretant generation and

communication, then Ransdells summary should be acceptable to all parties.

Taking rhetoric as an umbrella term, Liszka (2000: 470) argues that

rhetoric as speculative rhetoric (i.e., as an account of the conditions of

communication and the fixation of belief) and rhetoric as methodeutic (i.e., as a

systematic procedure for inquiry and for the systematisation of the sciences) are

reconcilable within scientific rhetoric, which works to underscore the formal

conditions of inquiry as a practice, including its presuppositions, purposes,

principles, and procedures. Apart from certain doubts that could be entertained

concerning the aptness of the term formal conditions in this context,5 Liszkas

proposal offers a good summary of the scope of Peirces rhetoric. It retains the

notion that the study of communication is an integral part of semiotics, while at

the same time paying due heed to the scientific setting of Peirces project. At any

rate, it seems apposite to retain rhetoric as a broader category, not least because

of the possibility of pursuing a debate between Peirces semiotically charged

rhetoric and other conceptions of rhetorical inquiry.

4 Admittedly, Peirce sometimes describes the third logical science in such terms, but it might be

more appropriate to use theoretical or even speculative rather than formal to avoid confusions. Moreover, it is advisable not to read conditions in a strong transcendental sense.

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 62

Anthropomorphic Perspectives and Rhetorical Evidence

The second difficulty facing a re-evaluation of the role of rhetoric in Peirces

semiotic approach may prove more challenging and controversial. The

hierarchical point of view that permeates much of Peirces writings on the

sciences also seems to affect his conception of semiotics; clearly, he often

suggests the straightforward priority of grammar in relation to rhetoric, which

can be taken as an indication that the precarious study of rhetoric should build

on a firmer groundwork of grammar (which builds on more fundamental studies

such as mathematics and phaneroscopy).

What is problematic about such a perspective? It seems quite natural that

a grammar of signs would scientifically speaking precede the study of the use of

signs. Certainly, this is the way the division of labour has been set up in most

conceptions of syntax and pragmatics, beginning with Charles Morris (1938) and

Rudolf Carnap (1946), at least. Indeed, from a certain point of view, grammar is

to be given priority over rhetoric namely, in the sense that grammatical studies

can provide rhetorical inquiry with concepts and principles. Yet, it is important to

take this hierarchy in the right spirit: as a heuristic model of use for furthering

systematic inquiry, but not necessarily as the whole truth of the matter. A

grammar that operates in a magisterial fashion, producing elaborate systematic

structures while ignoring all questions of their applicability (a task for lesser

disciplines), is in danger of turning into a mere glass-bead game an a priori

pastime for detached intellectuals. In spite of its principled rigour, such semiotic

constructions can begin to crumble when faced with the question of upon what

base the edifice is supposed to stand or how to motivate its abstract forms and

concepts.

With the risk of building up straw men, it could be claimed that too much

of the semiotics done in a Peircean mould just accepts certain premises, and

then presents the whole theory as formally as possible, or quasi-deductively. This

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 63

may limit the broader appeal and possibly even hamper the future usefulness of

Peirces semiotics.

The alternative path which may be viewed as a rhetorical approach into

the Peircean science of signs is to place the emphasis on those parts of Peirces

semiotics in which he not only suggests that the theory is an abstraction from

actual practices, but also derives central conceptions, such as object and

interpretant, from ordinary sign use, such as communication (e.g., Peirce 1907;

cf. Bergman 2003; 2004; 2005).

In his criticism of the Hegelians, Peirce maintains that philosophers must

not begin by talking of pure ideas, vagabond thoughts that tramp the public

roads without any human habituation, but must begin with men and their

conversation (c. 1900: CP 8.112). The point here is not that we should restrict

ourselves to signs in our minds in a nominalistic spirit, nor make a sop to

Cerberus, but rather that it is healthy to acknowledge that what we know of

signs and how they work in the world is based on what we know of the ways of

such signs that we are most familiar with and signs in communication seem to

be pre-eminently important in this regard. As Peirce puts the matter, we ought

not to think that what are signs to us are the only signs; but we have to judge

signs in general by these (c. 1903: NEM 4:297).

This suggestion may raise an eyebrow or two. A formalistic semiotician,

who embraces Peirces un-psychologistic programme, might find this contention

perilous; almost inevitably, it will lead to an anthropomorphic conception of

semiotics. That is, the properties of certain human signs are taken to be

characteristics of all signs, without any logical guarantee of the validity of the

generalisation. Adherents of biosemiotics (or more radical variants of universal

semiotics) may be equally appalled by this unexpected emphasis on the human

sphere. At the other end of the scale, humanistic thinkers could fault Peirce for

expanding the boundaries of semiotics beyond its proper human habitat, that is,

for not being anthropocentric enough.

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 64

Peirces reply to such worries is worth quoting:

If I were to attach a definite meaning to anthropomorphism, I should

think it stood to reason that a man could not have any idea that was not

anthropomorphic, and that it was simply to repeat the error of Kant to

attempt to escape anthropomorphism. At the same time, I am confident a

man can pretty well understand the thoughts of his horse, his jocose

parrot, and his canary-bird, so full of espiglerie; and though his

representation of those thoughts must, I suppose, be more or less falsified

by anthropomorphism, yet that there is a good deal more truth than falsity

in them, and more than if he were to attempt the impossible task of

eliminating anthropomorphism, I am for the present sufficiently convinced.

(c. 1906: NEM 4:313)

In other words, the attempt to escape anthropomorphism will lead to the

postulation of things-in-themselves, beyond human reach. Peirce, who so

vehemently opposes psychologism in logic, surprisingly concludes that we can

know only the human aspect of the universe (1911: SS 141). In Pragmatism

(MS 291), Peirce claims that man is so completely hemmed in by the bounds of

his possible practical experience, his mind is so restricted to being the instrument

of his needs, that he cannot, in the least, mean anything that transcends those

limits (c. 1905: CP 5.536). This human-centred stance (as we might say for a lack

of a better term) does not lead to an absolute separation between the fields of

human mind and nature.

Furthermore, in a suggestive passage, Peirce indicates that grammar needs

to employ so-called rhetorical evidence that is, inferences drawn from our

commonplace experiences of assertions. This evidential base is formally

imperfect. Yet, it does not only provide the initial material for the inquiry, but

also constitutes the testing ground for the systematically developed analysis (c.

1895: CP 2.333). All this fits nicely with Peirces oft-repeated claim that

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 65

philosophy ought to be based on common, everyday experience; in this dynamic

field, from which all semiotic abstractions emerge, ordinary communicative

exchanges in all their complexity are the most full-blooded semiotic

phenomena available.

This indicates that grammar must, in certain respects, lean on rhetorical

considerations which, in turn, suggests that the relationship between grammar

and rhetoric is not to be construed as a straightforward hierarchy, in which

grammarians, oblivious to the interests and worries of rhetoricians, pursue their

studies in an a priori manner, eventually handing over principles and concepts to

the lower order. The picture that begins to emerge is more multifaceted,

involving a continuous give and take between the two modes of semiotic inquiry,

and perhaps casting some doubt on the validity of pure semiotic grammar (if

such a thing is even conceivable).

Even so, the reassessment of the relationship between the semiotic

disciplines should be performed with care. While the proposal calls for a partial

overturn of old priorities, it is nonetheless not a call for an unstructured

discipline without distinctions and divisions of labour. There is certainly the

danger that we might end up in a situation in which grammar and rhetoric

support each other, like two drunken sailors (1903b: CP 8.167). The challenge

here is to find a reasonable balance, which not only avoids a vicious circle but

also provides the whole project of Peircean grammar with a rhetorical

motivation.

Nor does all this mean that we should simply turn the tables and proclaim

the dominance of rhetoric, somewhat like the renaissance humanists or some

20th century proponents of rhetoric have wanted to do. On the contrary, it is

possible to retain grammar as a quasi-formal doctrine of signs. The only thing

that the emphasis on the rhetorical approach necessitates is a healthy check on

formalistic tendencies. That is, it acts as a reminder of the fact that even the

most elegant and well-ordered semiotic concepts, classifications and theories are

abstractions from sign use, and not least that they must also stand the

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 66

pragmatic test of possible application in rhetorical studies. From one point of

view albeit an admittedly narrow and incomplete one rhetoric is the

beginning and end of semiotics; grammar is a means for improving our rhetorical

practices, that is, our habits of communication and methodeutic of inquiry.

REFERENCES

Bergman, M. 2003. Peirces Derivations of the Interpretant, Semiotica 144.1/4,

1-17.

Bergman, M. 2004. Fields of Signification: Explorations in Charles S. Peirces

Theory of Signs. Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki 6.

Vantaa: Dark Oy.

Bergman, M. 2005 C. S. Peirces Dialogical Conception of Sign Processes,

Studies in Philosophy and Education 24, 213-233.

Carnap, R. 1946. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.

Colapietro, V. 2006. Peirces Rhetorical Turn. Paper presented in the research

seminar of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Helsinki, May

2006. Available at

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/rhetoricalturn.pdf.

Deely, J. 2003. On the Word Semiotics, Formation and Origins, Semiotica

146.1/4, 1-50.

Liszka, J. J. 1996. A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles sanders

Peirce. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Liszka, J. J. 2000 Peirces New Rhetoric, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce

Society XXXVI.4, 439-476.

Morris, C. W. 1938. Foundations of Semiotic. Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press.

Peirce, C. S. 1865a. On the Logic of Science (Harvard Lectures) , in Writings of

Charles S. Peirce, vol. 1, ed. the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1982).

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 67

Peirce, C. S. 1865b. Teleological Logic, in Writings of Charles S. Peirce, vol. 1,

ed. the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1982).

Peirce, C. S. 1865c. An Unpsychological View of Logic to which Are Appended

Some Applications of the Theory to Psychology and Other Subjects , in

Writings of Charles S. Peirce, vol. 1, ed. the Peirce Edition Project

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1895. That Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions Are One in

Essence, with Some Connected Matters, in the Collected Papers of Charles

Sanders Peirce, vol. I, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1931).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1896. The Logic of Mathematics; An Attempt to Develop My

Categories from within in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,

vol. I, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 1931).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1897a. Unidentified fragment, in the Collected Papers of Charles

Sanders Peirce, vol. I, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1931).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1897b. Unidentified fragment, in the Collected Papers of Charles

Sanders Peirce, vol. II, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1932).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1900. Review of Josiah Royces The World and the Individual, in

the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. VIII, ed. A. W. Burks

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1902. Minute Logic, in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders

Peirce, vol. II, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1932).

Peirce, C. S. 1903a. A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, in The Essential Peirce,

vol. 2, ed. the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1998).

Signs vol. 4: pp. 54-68, 2010

ISSN: 1902-8822 68

Peirce, C. S. 1903b. Review of J. M. Baldwins Dictionary of Philosophy and

Psychology, vol. II, in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol.

VIII, ed. A. W. Burks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

Peirce, C. S. 1904a. Reason's Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory of

Discovery; Wherein Logic Is Conceived as Semeiotic. Partly unpublished

manuscript (MS 693).

Peirce, C. S. 1904b. Ideas, Stray or Stolen, on Scientific Writing, in The Essential

Peirce, vol. 2, ed. the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1998).

Peirce, C. S. c. 1905. Pragmatism, in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders

Peirce, vol. V, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1934).

Peirce, C. S. 1906. Phaneroscopy, in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders

Peirce, vol. IV, ed. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1933).

Peirce, C. S. 1907. Pragmatism, in The Essential Peirce, vol. 2, ed. the Peirce

Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).

Peirce, C. S. 1909a. Essays on Meaning. Preface. Unpublished manuscript (MS

640).

Peirce, C. S. 1909b. Letter to Lady Welby, in Semiotic and Significs, ed. C. S.

Hardwick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

Peirce, C. S. 1911. Letter to Lady Welby, in Semiotic and Significs, ed. C. S.

Hardwick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

Ransdell, J. 1989. Is Peirce a Phenomenologist? (retrieved from ARISBE in

2001:

http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/phenom

.htm)

Santaella, L. 1999. Methodeutics, The Liveliest Branch of Semiotics, Semiotica

124.3/4, 497-519.