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Issue #1 alleged that an interpleader is a petition, hence cannot be subject

to demurrer.

The action of interpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby a person

who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly

or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that

the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider

themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required

to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to

one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a personagainst a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in

respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate

among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are

styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the

action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

Hence, demurrer is proper.

Philippine Commonwealth Government cannot be compelled to litigate

without its consent, which also holds true in an action for interpleader. There

is no substantial difference between making it defend itself against it will in a

case where it is a defendant and compelling it, without its consent, to

interplead in an action commenced by another person. In one and the other

case it is compelled, without its consent, to maintain a suit or litigation, andthis is what the legal principal prohibits.

Issue #3 alleged that Colegio de San Jose, Municipality of San Pedro and the

Government are contending over the right of collecting the rents over the

hacienda, hence interpleader was proper.

An action of interpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for lack of the

basis of reason relied upon by the plaintiffs in their complaint, namely, that

there are two entities, the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the Colegio

de San Jose, contending over the hacienda and claiming to be entitled to

collect the rent or canon coming therefrom. Carlos Young is not included

because according to his own admission, he is a mere lessee of the Colegiode San Jose, Inc., and does not claim any right of ownership adverse to the

latter. It also appears from the allegations said complaint of interpleader that

the municipality of San Pedro also admits that the Commonwealth of the

Philippine is the owner of the hacienda by transfer and right of escheat.

Issue #4 has to do with the holding of the court that the complaint of

interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is premature inasmuch as there

has been no order yet that the defendant litigate among themselves.

In the opinion of the court it is necessary that there be a declaration to this

effect before the defendant truth requires such and good practice demands

that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or complaint of

interpleader until after the court has ordered that they should litigate among

themselves. This procedure will do way with groundless suits, and will save the

parties time, inconvenience, and unnecessary expenses.

JOSE A. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-25138 August 28, 1969

Facts:

Appeal on purely questions of law from an order of dismissal of the complaint

for interpleader, on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, as

certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. We affirm the dismissal on the

ground that where the defendants sought to be interpleaded as conflicting

claimants have no conflicting claims against plaintiff, as correctly found by

the trial court, the special civil action of interpleader will not lie.

Plaintiffs are occupants of housing units at Project 4 under lease from thePHHHC and are paying monthly rentals to PHHC. PHHC announced that the

management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be

transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHC debts to it.

PHHC informed tenants that they will be entitled to purchase units and that

30% of the rentals they had paid will be credited as downpayment. Some of

the tenants accepted and these payments were turned over by the PHHC to

GSIS. However, PHHC through its new Chairman-General Manager refused to

recognize all agreements and undertakings previously entered into with GSIS,

while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was

upheld in its contention by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the

Secretary of Justice.

Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendants-

corporations caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral and

material damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the

monthly amortizations or payments.

Issue:

w/n the filing of an interpleader suit was proper

Held:

Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. It requires

as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject

matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims

no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in

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part is not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations

may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the

management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting

claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs.

No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the

PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement,

ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or

amortization payments.

The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability,

and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover

agreement of between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to

their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are

between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant

corporations were in conformityand had no dispute, as pointed out by the

trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made

directly to the PHHC alone.

ZOILA CO LIM vs. CONTINENTAL DEVELOPTMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-41818 February 18, 1976

Facts:

Continental Development Corporation filed a complaint for interpleader

against the defendants Benito Gervasio Tan and Zoila Co Lim alleging that:

1. In the books of the plaintiff, there appears the name of the defendant Tan

as one of its stockholders initially in 1975 with 50 common shares, and

subsequently credited with 75 shares by way of dividends or an outstanding

total stockholding of 125 common shares of the par value of P250.00 each.

2. Defendant Tan has since 1972 been demanding the release to him of the

certificates stock but which the plaintiff has not done so far and is prevented

from doing so because of the vehement and adverse claim thereto by the

other defendant, Zoila Co Lim.

Issue:

w/n the filing of interpleader suit was proper

Held:

It is patent from the pleadings in the lower court that both defendants Tan

and Lim assert conflicting rights to the questioned shares of stock.

Petitioner Continental Development Corporation expressly stated in the

complaint that both defendants, through their respective lawyers,

threatened to take punitive measures against it should it adopt any steps

that may prejudice their respective interests in the shares of stock in question;

and that it is not sufficiently informed of the rights of the respective claimants

and therefore not in a position to determine justly and correctly their

conflicting claims.

Since there is an active conflict of interests between the two defendants over

the disputed shares of stock, the trial court gravely abused its discretion in

dismissing the complaint for interpleader, which practically decided

ownership of the shares of stock in favor of defendant Tan. The two

defendants should be given full opportunity to litigate their respective claims.

Rule 63, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court only requires as an indispensable

requisite:

that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made

against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the

subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the

claimants.

GREGORIO R. SY-QUIA vs. THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR and FILADELFO DE LEON

G.R. No. L-22807 October 10, 1924

Facts:This is a petition for a writ of mandamusto compel the Sheriff of the Province

of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale.

Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed

a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their

mercantile, establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, as

security for a debt.

When the debt fell due and no payment was made, petitioner, in writing,

requested the sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property and to

sell it at public auction under the provisions of section 14 of the Chattel

Mortgage Law. The sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its

contents and fixed the date of the sale at.

In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon presented an adverse claim to the

property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods on

which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia was given had been sold

long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was executed and

that, therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect.

The sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims,

suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under

section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to

interplead.

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Plaintiffs allege that the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the sale was a

ministerial one and praying that the sheriff be commanded to proceed.

Issue:

w/n the sheriff may be compelled by mandamus despite the filing of an

interpleader suit

Held:Though it, perhaps, would have been better practice for the sheriff to sell the

property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the

action of interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that the facts

shown do not justify our interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay

himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the

consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the

petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event. In

these circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending the

determination of the action of interpleader seems justified.

MARCELO A. MESINA vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986

Facts:

Respondent Jose Go purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's Check for

P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said check on the top of the desk of

the bank manager when he left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the

check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy, who had then a

visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to answer a phone call on a

nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he

returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone. When Jose Go inquired

for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not in his folder and

nowhere to be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the bank to

accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which suggestion Jose Go immediately

followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to the policeto report the loss of the check, pointing to the person of Alexander Lim as the

one who could shed light on it.

The records of the police show that a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro

demanded payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being

held by his client. He however refused to reveal the name of his client and

threatened to sue, if payment is not made. Respondent bank, in its letter

replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in the bank and is

laying claim to it.

Unsure of what to do on the matter, respondent Associated Bank filed an

action for Interpleader naming as respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe,

Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bankreceived summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain

Marcelo A. Mesina from the RTC of Caloocan City. Respondent bank moved

to amend its complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of

Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe.

Simultaneously, respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy, informed Cpl.

Gimao of the Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the

possession of Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner. When Cpl. Gimao went to

Marcelo Mesina to ask how he came to possess the check, he said it was

paid to him by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to

elucidate further. An information for theft was instituted against Alexander

Lim.

Mesina, instead of filing an answer to the interpleader suit, filed an Omnibus

Motion to Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautelaalleging lack of jurisdiction in view of

the absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and

lack of personality to sue

The trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner

Mesina and ruling that respondent bank's complaint sufficiently pleaded a

cause of action for interpleader. Subsequently, respondent judge issued an

order declaring petitioner in default since his period to answer has alreadyexpired.

Issue:

w/n IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner as in

default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader

complaint

Petitioner argues in his memorandum that this order requiring petitioner to file

his answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging that since he is presumably

a holder in due course and for value, how can he be compelled to litigate

against Jose Go who is not even a party to the check?

Held:

Such argument is trite and ridiculous if we have to consider that neither his

name or Jose Go's name appears on the check. Following such line of

argument, petitioner is not a party to the check either and therefore has no

valid claim to the Check. Furthermore, the Order of the trial court requiring

the parties to file their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to

interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in compliance with the

provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. What else is the purpose of a law

suit but to litigate?

The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details in

support of its action for Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader,

respondent bank took an precautionary and necessary measures to bringout the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances

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known to him and now that private respondent bank brought these

circumstances out in court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light

of these facts), petitioner charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these non-

issues."

Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed an

abuse of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and reasons

why respondent Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case. Both

parties were given an opportunity to present their sides. Petitioner chose to

withhold substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to present their

side-this is the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the petition. IAC

decided the question by considering both the facts submitted by petitioner

and those given by respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the

scope of the remedy sought in the petition.

CLARO RIVERA vs. HON. FELICISIMO OCAMPO

G.R. No. L-5968 August 5, 1953

Facts:

Atkins, Kroll & Co. filed an interpleader suit requesting that the Court decide

who among the defendants are entitled to the sum of P21, 792.49 which the

former deposited in court clerkship. This amount represents the value of the

second batch of steel rails sold to the applicant Atkins, Kroll & Co. Inc. by

Cathay Ceramics, Inc., under a contract existed between the two.

Jesus L. Uy preemptively claimed on the amount of the second batch

excluding S. Rivera and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. Associated

Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., on the other hand, claimed that the amount be

paid to Rizalina S. Rivera and the balance is paid to it.

One day after the case is filed, the Cathay Ceramics, Inc. filed an urgent

motion asking to withdraw the deposit and to replace it with a bond, but was

opposed to by Rizalina S. Rivera and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc

CFI rendered a decision authorizing the clerk of court to deliver a certain

amount of the deposit to defendant Uy and the balance to defendant

Cathay Ceramics upon filing by Cathay Ceramics of a P25,000 surety bond.

Issue:

w/n the removal of the deposit is allowed pending an interpleader suit

Held:

The depositary, says the Civil Code, cannot use the thing deposited without

the permission of the depositor. (Art. 1766 Spanish Civil Code, Article 1977,

Civil Code of the Philippines), as a corollary, it cannot dispense to other use.

The end for which they deposit the amount claimed by the defendants is

frustrated if one or two of them utilize it for their advantage.

MENZI & COMPANY, INC. vs. FRANCISCO BASTIDA

G.R. No. L-42278 March 25, 1936

Facts:

In a civil case (Francisco Bastida vs. Menzi & Co.), final judgment was

rendered ordering Menzi & Co., Inc., to pay to Francisco Bastida the sum of

P21,633,20 with legal interest thereon.

Prior to the issuance of a writ of execution of the final judgment so rendered,

Menzi & Co., Inc., received written notices from Levy Hermanos, Inc., The

Bank of Philippine Islands, Manuel Bustamante, Filipinas Lumber Co., Inc., the

Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc., Claro M. Recto, Jose M. Casal, Alberto Barretto

and Manuel Nieto alleging that they were Francisco Bastidas creditors in the

amounts specified by each of them and that, their respective claims, being

preferred claims, they asked to be paid with preference. In order that the

courts might finally determine the alleged preferences and the order in

which they should be paid and to avoid subsequent responsibilities, Menzi &

Co., Inc., brought an action of interpleading against all the said creditors and

deposited the sum of P29,774.49 with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of

Manila.

Pending the appeal and before it was considered, the creditor and appellee

Claro M. Recto filed a motion withdrawing his claim on the ground that being

now a member of this court he does not desire to intervene as litigant in any

case pending before it, preferring to collect his credit for professional servicesdirectly from the then plaintiff Francisco Bastida. The motion was favorably

acted upon and therefore said creditor has ceased to be an appellee in this

case.

Judgment was rendered in said case ordering that the credits be paid in the

order and preference as follows: Levy Hermanos, Inc., Claro M. Recto, Jose

M. Casal or to his assignee Macondray & Co., Alberto Barretto, the sum of

P100 as attorneys fees and P76.04 as judicial expenses to Harvey and

OBrien, and the balance to the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

Jose M. Casal was one of the attorneys for Francisco Bastida in civil case No.

31956 and on September 9, 1933, he filed a notice of attorneys lien for the

sum of P6,000 with the records and notified Menzi & Co., Inc., thereof; on the12th of said month this court, in a resolution, made said attorneys lien of

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record. Attorney Casal later transferred all his interest in said attorneys lien to

Macondray & Co., Inc., who substituted him in this appeal.

Alberto Barretto is one of the attorneys who defended Francisco Bastida. He

filed a notice of attorneys lien in the case and notified Menzi & Co., Inc.,

thereof. This court, in a resolution of the 19th of said month ordered that the

attorneys lien be attached to the record. Said attorney claimed 10% of the

funds on deposit. The court, however, reduced it to P1,000.

The Bank of the Philippine Islands claims that in the appealed judgment the

court erred: (3) in holding that Alberto Barrettos credit enjoys preference

over its claims; (4) in also giving preference to Jose M. Casals credit over its

claim; (5) in also giving preference to Claro M. Rectos credit over its claim;

(6) in granting to the attorneys for the herein plaintiff fees in the sum of P100

and in considering said fee as preference credit over its claim

In its third assignment of error, according to section 37 of the Code of Civil

Procedure on which Attorney Barretto bases his claim, a lawyers lien on

judgments and decrees for the payment of money and the preference

thereof arise only from the date on which the right is caused to be entered

upon the records and the adverse party notified thereof. We therefore holdthat the third assignment of error is well founded and that the credit of the

Bank of the Philippine Islands is superior and has preference over that of

Attorney Barretto.

In the fourth assignment of error, the generally accepted doctrine is that an

attorneys lien may be assigned or transferred without the preference thereof

being extinguished, with the exception that the doctrine does not extend to

cases where the assignment carries with it a breach of the attorneys duty to

preserve his clients confidence inviolate. Although an attorney cannot

assign a contract for his services to be rendered, and substitute another

attorney in his place, without the consent of his client, he may assign a debt

substantially due for services rendered; and where a firm of attorneys was to

receive a certain compensation for their services, provided they should

accomplish certain results, the surviving partner may, after the services whichthey promised to render, and the ends which they agreed to accomplish,

were all practically rendered and accomplished, assign all the right and title

of the firm in the contract for such services, and all the moneys due or to

become due thereunder, and the assignee may recover upon the contract.

We hold, therefore, that the mere assignment of the attorneys lien did not

result in extinguishing the preference.

However, it appears that Attorney Casals lien was caused to appear in the

records and notice thereof to the adverse party was made only on

September 9, 1933, long after the mortgage executed by Bastida in favor of

the Bank of the Philippine Islands, which was registered on December 3, 1932.

Resolving Attorney Barrettos claim we stated that pursuant to the provisions

of section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attorneys lien enjoyspreference only from the time it is entered upon the records and notice

thereof served on the adverse party. This provision is applicable to the case

of Attorney Casal and therefore his claim is inferior to the mortgage credit of

the Bank of the Philippine Islands and cannot be paid preferentially. We hold,

therefore, that the fourth assignment of error is likewise well founded.

In its fifth assignment of error, the Bank of the Philippine Islands questions

Attorney Claro M. Rectos credit and the preference thereof. In a resolution

of March 18, 1936, said claimant was eliminated as party to the case and in

view thereof, and because he is no longer interested in any judgment to be

rendered therein, it is unnecessary to pass upon this fifth assignment of error.

In its sixth assignment of error, Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure

which authorizes the bringing of an action of interpleading contains no

provision relative to fees of the attorney for the plaintiff in such actions.

However, taking into consideration the purpose of an action of interpleading,

it seems just that the fees of an interpleaders attorney be defrayed with the

funds sought to be distributed, unless there be some reason justifying

payment thereof by some of defendants in the case. According to many

authorities, complainant is entitled, as a part of his costs, to an attorneys fee

commensurate with the services of his counsel in the cause, eventually to fall

on the claimant who was in the wrong and made the litigation necessary,

and this is expressly provided by the statute in some jurisdictions. In any case,

the allowance for the attorneys fees should be limited to a reasonable fee

for necessary services. It appears that the amount of the fees granted is not

questioned nor is it claimed that it is exorbitant or unreasonable. Truly, the

sum fixed is very reasonable and proportionate to the amount and quality of

the professional services rendered. As to the order of payment of these fees,

the law is likewise silent; but being in the nature of costs, according to the

American doctrine referred to above, they should be paid in preference to

all claims and at the same time as judicial costs.

LEONARDO R. OCAMPO vs.LEONORA TIRONA

G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005

Facts:

Ocampo bought the subject parcel of land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the

registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, tenant of Breton, was informed of

this arrangement and started paying Ocampo rent. Some months thereafter,

Ocampo received a letter from Callejo Law Office stating that Tirona will stop

paying rent because the area has been declared under area for priority

development. Ocampo then wrote a demand letter for payment of rental.

Despite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and

refuses to heed Ocampos demands. Ocampo then filed a complaint for

unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before the MTC.

Tirona answered by asserting that Dona Yaneza was the owner, not

Ocampo. Tirona subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend her answerbecause a lawyer did not assist her in her initial answer. In her amended

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answer, Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land.

Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the

land.

MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo because of non-payment of rent and

because of the termination of Tironas right to possess and occupy the

subject land. Tirona changed theory in the RTC and raised that it was

Rosauros sister Ma. Lourdes who could validly sell the land to Ocampo. The

court did not believe her and still ruled in favor of Ocampo. CA considered

partition of the estate of Alipio as a prerequisite to Ocampos action so it

reversed the decision of the MTC and RTC.

Issue:

Who has the right of possession of the subject land? What should have been

filed by Tirona to show good faith of Tirona in not paying rent?

Held:

The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes

Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable

diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have

awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a billof interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not

know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the

property.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property

whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or

partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in

whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court

and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider

themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required

to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to

one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person

against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation inrespect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate

among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are

styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the

action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. METRO CONTAINER

CORPORATION

G.R. No. 127913. September 13, 2001

Facts:

Sept. 1990, Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from

RCBC in the amount of P30 million which was secured by a real estatemortgage over a Valenzuela property. LEYCON failed to settle its obligations

prompting RCBC to institute extrajudicial foreclosure LEYCON as a response,

filed an action for Nullificatoin of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages

against RCBC but eventually RCBC was able to consolidate its ownership

over the property due to LEYCONs failure to redeem. Metro Container

Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property from LEYCON was

demanded by RCBC to make rental payments. LEYCON filed an action for

Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN.

METROCAN, meanwhile, filed a complaint for Interpleader against LEYCON

and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims

among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully

receive the payment of monthly rentals. In the Interpleader case, an

amicable settlement was made between METROCAN and LEYCON with

respect to back rentals. However, in the Unlawful Detainer case, METROCAN

was order to pay LEYCON whatever rentals were due. METRPCAN claims

interpleader case is moot and academic because of amicable settlement.

RCBC alleges, however, that the decision of the lower court in the ejectment

case cannot render the Interpleader action moot and academic.

Issue:

W/N the Party who initiates the interpleader action may be compelled to

litigate if he is no longer interested to pursue such cause of action?

Held:

It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action because

LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals as lessor and RCBC was

making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in

its name. The Supreme Court said that the unlawful detainer case involves

issue of material possession and not of ownership, therefore, the reason for

the interpleader ceased when the lower court rendered judgment ordering

METROCAN to pay LEYCON.

This was made clear when the trial court, in denying RCBC's "Motion for

Inclusion as an Indispensable Party" declared that "the final determination ofthe issue of physical possession over the subject premises between the

plaintiff and the defendant shall not in any way affect RCBC's claims of

ownership over the said premises, since RCBC is neither a co-lessor or co-

lessee of the same, hence he has no legal personality to join the parties

herein with respect to the issue of physical possession vis--visthe contract of

lease between the parties." As aptly pointed by the MeTC, the issue is limited

to the defendant LEYCON's breach of the provisions of the Contract of Lease

Rentals.

Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC

rendered judgment in Civil Case whereby the court directed METROCAN to

pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises.

Because there was already a judicial fiat to METROCAN, there was no more

reason to continue with the interpleader case. Thus, METROCAN moved for

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its dismissal not because it is no longer interested but because there is no

more need for it to pursue such cause of action.

It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to

protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in

respect of one liability. It requires, as an indespensable requisite, that

conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made

against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the

subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by theclaimants. The decision in Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the conflicting claims

insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.