Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
1994 Cover Design by Brian J. Koch - Graphic Design Student
"I see history as a compilation of layers and dements that make up a whole with
an interactive, cyclical aspect. Viewing time as transparent layers, solid separate parts,or as a complete entity are all plau sib. le.histodeal,interpretations, and these same views
can also be translated into most artlsnc images.
THE WITTENBERGHISTORY JOURNAL
Wittenberg University • Springfield, Ohio
Volume XXIII.Spring 1994
Editor's Note:The 1994 History Journal is dedicated to Dr. Albert A. Hayden in recognition of his retirementafter teaching at Wittenberg from 1959 until 1994. Dr. Hayden has specialized in British andIrish history and has published one book, New South Wales Immigration Policy, 1856-1900,as well as numerous articles, essays, and reviews. He has also served as managing editor of
Studies in British History and Culture, a monograph series of the North American Conferenceon British Studies. Dr. Hayden has served for over two decades as Wittenberg's pre-law and
graduate school advisor. I-fighly regarded on campus as a demanding yet deeply caring teacher,
Dr. Hayden has become particularly well-known for his reading colloquium, The Irish Question.Dr. Hayden's contributions to the historical profession earned him the Distinguished ServiceAward from the Ohio Academy of History at the 1994 spring meeting. The History Journalstaff similarly would like to recognize his contributions to Wittenberg by dedicating the 1994
Journal to him.
Finally, a few notes of appreciation: I would like to thank the members of my staff fortheir insights, hard work, and support. This journal would not have been possible without thededication of such an outstanding group of people. I would also like to thank Carol Kneisley inthe Publications Department for her hard work and patience in the production of the end product.Finally, I thank Malykke Bacon and Dr. Charles Chatfield for their guidance and support.
Molly Wilkinson
History Journal Staff
Editor ............................................................................................. Molly Wilkinson
S ................. Malykke Bacon
emor LOltor ...................................................
Staff ........................................................................................ Julie Carpenter
• Pamela EhresmanKathy FargeySusan Klump
Seth MartinDr Charles Chatfield
Faculty Advisor ..............................................................
Cover ................... Brian Koch
40,., *..,O..,....O*O.°• *. O• ° O* O*O* "" O* *O*'O • °O°O*°*°*
Table of Contents
0 1Cesar Chavez: Trampling
Down the Vintage, 1965-197 ............................................................
by Kathy Fargey
Scandal Strikes Charles Stewart Parnell: The Fall of the Irish Leader ............................................. 3
by Pamela Ehresman
Fritz Fischer: The 'Traitor fromriam urg ...........................................................................
by Barry Jacldsch
The 1969 CBS Walkout: The Means Justified the Ends .......... 15
by Malykke Bacon
Education in Occupied Japan ................................................................................................. 19
by Laura Sponseller
John C. Calhoun's - A Disquisition on Government ......................................................................
25
by John Bennett
How the Shah Won: The CIA's Role in the Iranian Coup of 1953 ................................................ 28
by Pare Ehresman
Address correspondence to:
EditorThe Wittenberg History JournalHistory DepartmentWittenberg UniversitySpringfield, Ohio 45501
Cesar Chavez, Trampling Down the Vintage, 1965-1970by Kathy Fargey
Each year, three senior history majors are chosen as finalists for the distinguished Mmaha and Bob Hartje Award and asked
to wnto• - " 1994 award
a narrative historical paper. The papers e judged by the faculty of the History Department- Kathy Fargey received the
for this paper.
The grapes of wrath were growing in the vineyards ofDelano and other parts of California. From September 1965to July 1970, Filipino and Mexiean-American agriculturallaborers were on strike against California's vineyardowners. The workers endured conditions like thosedescribed in Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath: low wages,malnutrition, poor housing, lack of medical care, longhours, and exposure to heat, chemicals, and dust on the job.They were also denied the legal right to bargaincollectively. (1) Nonetheless, the workers carried out astrike under the organization of the United Farm Workers(UFW) Union, directed by Cesar Chavez. The strikersdemanded a raise from $1.20 per hour to $1.40 per hour,higher incentive wages for extra boxes of grapes picked,and the right to union recognition. Five years later, thelongest agricultural strike in California's history ended afterthe UFW won recognition and contracts from twenty-six ofCalifornia's major grape companies. (2) Cesar Chavezhighly influenced the course of the strike. He developedimportant UFW policies and tactics and took a very activepart in organizing and seeking support for the strike. Hisleadership is an important part of the story of the grapestrike.
When the strike began, Chavez announced aUFWpolicy of nonviolence, telling strikers, "No union movementis worth the life of a single grower or his child, or the life ofa single worker or his child." (3) Chavez invited civil rightsactivists from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating"Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality to helporganize pickets and encourage nonviolence. (4) Chavez
• * . . * ,t • Swas also active m orgamzang pmketmg, church meemag
marches, and sing-ins." (5) Sometimes he joined picketlines himself, such as those in Coachella, where he onceorganized about thirty vehicles to block vineyard entrances.(6) Cbavez put his and the UFW's focus on action intowords: "Most of us in this movement get turned off byrhetoric. We' re an action movement. We keep moving night
and day." (7)Chavez kept moving, developing new tactics and
responses during the strike. He personally decided toimplement an important UFW tactic: a boycott, whichinvolved convincing customers nationwide not to buyCalifornia table grapes until vineyard owners settled withthe UFW. He first directed the boycott against GuimarraCorporation, California's largest grape producer, thenordered the boycott extended to all California table grapeswhen Guimarra used other labels. (8) Chavez alsopublicized the UFW policy on nonviolence. When thePresident of the California Grope and Tree Fruit League,E.L. Burr, accused the UFW of sponsoring terrorism,Chavez responded in an open letter in The ChristianCentury, HAs letter stated that strikers were committed to"militant nonviolence" although some of them had beenvictims of violent attacks. He wrote of the strikers' struggleto "overcome... not by retaliation er bloodshed but by adetermined nonviolent struggle carried on by those massesof farm workers who intend to be free and human." (9) InFebruary 1968, when tensions between strikexs andvineyard owners were rising, he began a twenty-five dayfast against violence. This fast attracted publicity, and a"tent city of sympathizers" grew around the Delano gasstation where Chavez stayed during the fasL RobertKennedy and over 6,000 farm workers joined Chavez for aMass held at the end of the Fast. (10)
Throughout the strike, Chavez actively sought supportfor the UFW. He waveled to Stanford and Berkeley to askcollege students to help organize the strike and to pickeL(11) In December 1965, Chavez gave Walter Renther, headof the United Auto Workers (UAW), a tour of the picketlines around Delano, allowing Reuther to eany the UFWbanner. In return, Reuther gave the UFW $5000 a monthfrom UAW funds. (12) Chavez also courted church suppert,maintaining "a close association with the Roman CatholicChurch (he [received] holy communion each morning) andexcellent relations with California's liberal Protestants."(13) In June 1970, Chavez addressed two hundred churchleaders, Including Catholic priests and nuns, MigrantMinistry workers, and "representatives from Episcopal,
2 - The Wittenberg History Journal
Congregational, Presbyterian, Methodist, Lutheran, andother Christian groups" in a hall in Delano. (14) Heexpressed gratitude for church support in building the UFWand asked for continued support for the union. (15)
Chavez's efforts paid off when twenty-six ofCalifornia's major grape-growers signed contracts on Jiffy29, 1970, recognizing the United Farm Workers, raisingwages to $1.80 per hour plus 20 cents per extra box ofgrapes picked (and promising specific wage incaeases for1971o72), and providing 10 cents per hour for a UFW
medical fund. (16) Chavez took a very active and importantpart in the grape slrike, making important decisionsregarding nonviolence and the grape boycott, encouragingsupport from various quarters, and personalty organizingstrike activities. He proved to be a man of nonviolence,action, and hard work. Through the years, he continued towork on behalf of fama workers. His funeral procession inApril 1993 included about 25,000 people shouting UFWslogans such as, "Viva ia Causa!" ("Long live the cause!and "Viva Cesar Chavezt" (17) For many of California'sfarm wolkers, his truth is marching on.
1 Information abota the conditions faced by California's grapepickers can be fotmd in these sources:
Richard Tobin, ='The revolution is not coming. It is here.';'
Saturday Review, 17 August 1968, 13.Martin Dubermm, "Grapes of Wrath," The New Republio, 2
December 1967, 24.lmnes P. Degrmn. "Monopoly in the Vineyards: The
'Grapes of
Wrath' Strike;'Nation, 7 Pubraary 1966, 151-152.
Endnote$9 Cesar Chavez,"Letter frem Delano," The Christian Centwy,
23 April 1969, 5.
10 "California: Cesar's War," 23.
2 "Lalx . Victory for Cesar Omvez " Nervs xi, 10 August 1970, 56.
3 Tobin, 62.
4 Andrew Kopkind, =The Grape Pickers Stakc," The New
Republic, 29 January 1966, 13.
5 "California: C.esar's War," Tin , 22 March 1968, 23.
6 =Seething Vineyards," Newsweek, S Jdy 1968, 62,
7 "Labor:. Victory for Cesar Chavez," 56.
"Bishops Support C.¢s ar Chavez." America, 30 May 1970, 3.
"Breakthrough for La Hudga," Time, 27 June 1969, 18.
=California: Cesar's War." TL, n*, 22 March 1968, 23,
Chavez, Cesar. "Leuer frctn De1 ao." The Christian Century,
23 April 1969, 4-5.
"Omvez: One Battle Ends, Anothex Begins." US. News and Worm
Report, 10 August 1970, 49-50.
Cleath, Robert. "Rendering Unto Cesar." Christianity Today,
3 July 1970, 32-33.
Degum, James P. "Monopoly in the Vineyards: The 'Grapes of Wrath'Strike." The Nation, 7 February 1966, 151-154,
Dubennan, Martin. "Grapes of Wrath." The N w Republic,
2 December 1967, 24-26.
Fidds, Gary. "Great affection," 25,000 - strong, for Chavez."
USA Today, 30 April 1993 3.
8 Seething Vineyards," 62.
11Kopkind, 13.
12 Ronald B. Taylor, "Hueisal The Boycott That Worked," TheNation, 7 September 1970, 167-168.
13 "purseveranee and Purity Pay Off for Ctmvez," The Christian
Century, 12 August 1970.3.
14 Robert Cleath, =Rendering Unto Cesar," Christianity Today,
3 July 1970, 32.
15 Ibid.
16 "Chavez: One Bstfle Ends, Another BegUms," US, News andWorm Report, 10 August 1970, 49-50.
17 Gray Fields, "'Great Affection,' 25,0 0 - strong, for Chavez,"
USA Today, 30 April 1993, 3.
BibliographyKopkind, Andrew. "The Grape Pickers Strike," The New Republic,
29 January 1966, 12-14.
"Labe The Black Eagle Wins." Titan, I0 August 1970, 10-11.
=Labor:, Victory for Caesar Chavez."Newsw ek, 10 August 1970, 56-57.
"Perseverance and Purity Pay Off for Ctmvez." The Christian Century,12 August 1970, 3.
Sulandlul, Victor. "More Grapes of Wrath," Am*r/ca, 17 August 1968,
104-105.
"Seething Vineyards." Newsweek, 8 July 1968, 62.
Taylor, Ronuld B. "Huelgal The Boyeot that Worked," The Nation,7 Se .-mber 1970, 167-169.
Tobin, Richard. "'The revolution is not coming, It is here.'"
Saturday Review, 17 August 1968, 12-15+.
Scandal Strikes Charles Stewart Parnell:The Fall of the Irish Leader
by Parf /a Ehr mz
In 1875 Charles Stewart parnell first championed the causeof Irish Home Rule in parliament and soon became the"uncrowned king of Ireland" -- nearly fifteen years later hisfollowers had abandoned him and Home Rule lay dying.The complex, curious, and speedy downfall of such arevered political figure hinges on the public discovery of hislove affair with the wife of a colleague. Eventualcondemnation by most of his own paxty, by the EnglishLiberal party, and by the Catholic Church slipped a chokehold around Parnell's neck, strangling the once indomitableIrish leader -- all because of his moral Wansgresslon.
Chortles Parnell was elected to Parliament at the age of29, and in the next few years rose to national prominence asthe leader of the newly formed Irish Nationalist party, alsoknown as the Irish Home Rule party. He developed aparliamentary obstruction campaign which infuriated theHouse of Commons and awarded political power to theNationalists. Parnell avoided violence in his movement forHome Rule and tenants' fights, adopting a boycott strategyin which farmers would shun anyone who evicted a tenanLBeginning in 1885, he required each member of theNationalist party to vote with the majority, thereby playingthe Liberal and Conservative parties against one another.His major accomplishments included forming alliances withthe Catholic Church in Ireland and with the Liberal party inEngland, led by Prime Minister William Gladstone.Persuaded by Irish agitation, Gladstone had becomecommitted to the principle of Home Rule. Both of thesealliances were devastated following the reaction to Parnell's
relationship with Mrs. Katharine O'She&Parnell's leadership of the Nationalis! party was .
complicated with paradoxes: he was an aristocrat leading amostly middle-class party, aProtestant leading apredominantly Catholic movement, and a landlord leading acampaign against lundlordism. In addition, public leadershipdid not seem to come naturally to him; he disliked publicspeaking, noise, or large crowds and has been characterizedas "solitary" and"mysterious" (1) An Englishmandescribed him as "cold and uncommunicative," having noneof "the characteristics of an Irishman." (2) Yet Parnell wasprofoundly passionate about two things: his power, whichhe would light until the end to uphold, and Katharine,
whom he would never relinquish.Unfortunately, Katharine O'Shea, wife of Captain
William O'Shea, belonged to the English ruling class thatthe Irish despised. Mr. and Mrs. O'Shea pursued anunwaditional marriage, with Katherine residing at her estatein the country and her husband living in London. Katharine,or Kitty, met Mr. Parnell when she solicited his support forher husband, an Irish candidate for parliament. Described aslove at first sight, their secret love affair continued for tenyears, from 1881 to 1891. Throughout this period, timO'Sheas enforced a sort of political blackmail on parnell,manipulating him to support the Captain in Parliamentaryelections in retm'n for the Captain tonting a blind eye on thelove affair. Parnell performed this service -- despiteO'Shea's insistence on openly denouncing Parnell'sNationalist causes -- so that he could stay with theCaptain's wife. In fact, Parnell took up residence withKatharine at her country estate, and she bore him threechildren, parnell considered her to be his wife and wantedher to divorce her husband so they could marry.Unfortunately, no matter how estranged they were, neitherKatharine nor her husband would consider a divorce as longas Katharine's elderly Aunt Ben remained alive. Aunt Benwealth promised a sizeable inheritance for the O'Shens;acc dingly, they kept up the appearance of a marriedcouple (the Captain visiting Kitty on weekends) in order toplease the old woman. One biographer of Parnell, F.S.Lyons, argues that because Parnell acceded to Kitty's wishto have both him and her Aunt' s money, this meantconducting a secret love affair with a married woman forten years, leaving himself "vulnerable to attack in a way noresponsible leader.., should ever have done." (3)
After eight years of Katharine's extramarital allair, herAont Ban finally died at the age of 96, leaving all of bermoney exclusively to Katlxaine. The Captain, therefore, hadwaited all of those years, overlooking his wife's affair, fornothing. He joined her brothers and sima-s in contesting thewill, and since there was no longer any gain in continuinghis "faux" marriage to Kitty, he introduced a petition todivorce her. Most importantly, Captain O'Shca namedParnell as co-respondent in the divorce. Always theuppormnist, O'Shea offered Kitty the chance to divorce
4. The Wittenberg History Joanaal
him, but only if she would pay him £20,000. Unable to gether hands on that much money, she could not play hisblackmail game. Therefore, the original divorce petitionstood as filed in December 1889 by the Captain, (for purelyfinancial reasons.) The trial date was scheduled forNovember 15, 1890, nearly a full year later.
Parnell took advantage of this lapse of time to assurehis colleagues that the divorce case would have no bearingon his honor or continued leadership of the Nationalistparty. Fellow party members in turn assured the press thatthey would stand by their leader, regardless of whatoccurred in the divorce court. Most made this pledgebecause they believed Parnell's asstaanees that the casewould not taint him. Parnell genuinely thought the affaircould never daraage his c eer because of his belief that aman's private life should be kept separate from his public
life. (4)The length of time before the trial also gave Mrs.
O'Shea the opportanity to file countercharges against herhusband, accusing him of having an affair with her sister.These countercharges have been called "foolish andwicked," and Katharine "quick tempered and sharp-tongued... a primitive female fighting with her claws." (5) Hercoantercharges alienated public sympathy from her side andmade her seem like a spiteful woman in the eyes of theworld, for the whole world was watching as the scandalunfolded. Because of Katharine's countercharges, hercounsel held only a watching brief, and Parnell, choosingnot to defend himself, was not represented at all. Thissituation provided the Captain with the opportunity topresent his side of the story without any oross-examinadonto point out its falhcies. His account was dramadc: heplayed the part of the trusting husband, deceived by hisscheming wife and her lover. He and his lawyer span talesof Pamelrs aliases, disguises, secret trips, and mostdamaging of all, the "fLre escape episode." This storydetailed how Parnell, staying at Kitty's home, slipped outonto the rear fire escape when Captain O'Shcaunexpectedly appeared for a visit. The press zealouslycovered the court proceedings, causing the general public toview Charles Parnell as a deceitful, immoral man. (6)
Because Captain O'Shea was not cross-examined, thewhole question of his connivance in his wife's affair neversurfaced. Most historians agree that the Captain knew aboutthe affair and in some cases even encouraged it for his ownpolitical and financial benefit, politically, as discussedpreviously, he received parnell's influential support inelection campaigns. The deal between the two men emergedblatantly at Galway in 1885 when Parnell pressured hisparty members to withdraw their candidate in favor ofCaptain O'Shea, a man they knew would vote against theparty. Financially, proof exists that Parnell paid the Captain£600 per year, which biographer Joan Haslip interprets as amethod of keeping O'Shea quiet concerning the affair. F.S.Lyons summarizes his view on the Captain's innocence:"we can show that to remain ignorant of [the affair] for 8
years required on his part acapacity for ignoring unpleasantfacts so superhuman as to be beyond belief." (7)
The public, however, did not hear this evidence onParnell's behalf and observed only the portrayal of a manwho took advantage of his colleague' s hospitality.Immediately after the trial, many Irish !VIP's wereambivalent. On the one hand, they felt deceived by Parnellbecause he bad spent a year down-playing the damage thedivorce would inflict on his c ter. The radical Irishleader Michael Davitt never forgave Parnell for misleadinghim as to the outcome of the divorce case and condemnedhim on moral grounds. On the other hand, Parnell was theirking, their brilliant leader who bad transported them a longway on the journey to Home Rule, and they did not wish toabandon so great a man.
Most of the Nationalist party met at Leinster Hall onNovember 20, 1890, three days after the divorce trial, toproclaim its unanimous support for Parnell. Some membersattempted to link the divorce case to past peliticalconspiracies against Parnell, namely the Phoenix Parkmurder case in which Parnell was connected to themurderers through a letter that was printed in thenewspaper. In court, it had been revealed that the letter wasa forgery and that Parnell was innocent. Perhaps, somethought, this matter with the O'Sheas was another peliticalconspiracy, another attempt to destroy their powerful leader.Other members supported Parnell solely because theypredicted that the English would reject him. The Irish MPT.P. O'Connor asserted, "It is for the Irish alone to choesetheir leader .... "Expressing the view that Parnell hadsacrificed so much for the Irish that they could not turnaround and forsake him, O'Counor also stated:
Mr. Parnell had done too much for the Irish peopleto go back on him now. I declare that the wholeIrish people will support the envoys in upholdingMr. Parnell, and there is convincing proof thatIreland is socially, enthusiastically, and fiercely onthe side of the Irish leader. (8)
Yet, Haslip argues that many of the men who spoke in favorof Parnell at Leinster Hall had loyalty only "skin deep" andwould support him only as long as Prime MinisterGladstone remained silent. Indeed, Parnell had ignored thefact that one man exercised a greater spell over the peoplethan even he did, and this man was William Gladstone. (9)
At First, Gladstone did stay silent. The Liberal Prime1Wunister chose to leave the matter of Parnell's future to thIrish, contenting himself with observing detachedly.However, a meeting of the Liberal party at Sheffield (on theday after the Irish met at Leiuster Hall) changed his mind.The Nonconformists, regarded as the backbone of theLiberal party, used this meeting to denounce Parnell as the"most infamous adulterer of the century." (10) TheNonconformists believed that if the Irish chose to supportParnell, then Ireland would be unfit for self-government-
Scandal Strikes Charles Stewart Parnell: The Fall of the Irish Leader 5
John Morley, Chief Secretary for Ireland, was moved by theNonconformists' denunciations and retunaed to urgeGladstone to break with Parnell or else accept the demise ofHome Rule. Gladstone heeded this warning and reluctantlyagreed that the Irish leader must be sacrificed in order tosave Ireland. One Conservative NIP believed that Gladstonewas unnecessarily frightened by the Nonconformists andstated: "Cowardice -- sheer cowardice -- was the cause of
parnell's overthrow." (11)Yet political realities forced Gladstone to consider the
consequences that Parnell's publicized love affair wouldhave for the future of the Liberal party. The Grand Old Manworried that Libernl victories would disappear and that theConservatives would dominate. For their part, theConservatives were eager to use the divorce scandal as apolitical weapon against the Liberals who were allied withthe ignominious additerer. Lord Salisbury, the formerConservative Prime Minister, proclaimed,
"Kitty O'Shea.
deserved to have a monument raised to her in every town mEngland." In fact, one writer suspected that the divorcepetition was the result of Conservative involvement, citingCaptain O'Shen's connections with Joseph Chamberlain.Although isolated facts support this speculation, noconclusive evidence exists. (12)
Due to the outcry at Sheffield and to fears ofConservative ascendancy, it became clear to Gladstone thatremaining attached to the brandished Irish leader wouldimpair not only the Liberals" continuance as theGovernment in power but also seriously damage the wholecause of Home Rule. Therefore, Gladstone wrote thefamous letter which included the critical passage:
... notwithstanding the splendid services renderedby Mr. Parnell to his country, his continuance atthe present moment in the leadership would beproductive of consequences disastrous in thehighest degree to the cause of Ireland .... Thecontinuance I speak of would not only place manyhearty and effective friends of the Irish cause in aposition of great embarrassment, but would rendermy retention of the leadership of the Liberal party,based as it has been mainly upon the presentationof the Irish canse, ulmost a nullitY. (13)
Nearly all of England and Ireland interpreted this statement,taking into account Gladstone's usual circumlocution, tomean that he would resign his leadership of the Liberalpatty if Parn!ll did not retire.
Gladstone addressed the letter to Morley and intendedfor him to show it to Parnell before the Nationalists met toelect a party chair. In a sort of comedy of errors, however,Parnell could not be found. Therefore, the Nationalist partyentered Committee Room 15 to decide the fate of its leaderwithout knowledge of Gladstone's ultimatum as expressedin the letter. On November 25, the party took a vote andreelected parnell as sessional chairman. Richard O'Brien, a
contemporary of Parnell, argued that this action "affima[ed],in effect, that his public life should not be cut short by hisprivate transgressions as exposed in the proceedings of theDivorce Court." (14) However, his public life could be cutshort by opposition from Gladstone. Upon leaving thecommittee room, the Nationalists were besieged by Liberalmembers, asking,' Do you realize what you have done. Itwas then that the Irish learned of Gladstone's letter.
The Irish members split in their reactions to thepowerful and momentous letter. One group viewed it as anultimatum which demanded a choice between Gladstoneand Parnell, between England and Ireland. Seen in thatlight, these men did not hesitate to choose Ireland,regardless of the moral issue involved. They would notallow an English lender, not even Gladstone, to dictate tothem. Besides, the whole basis of the Irish movement hadbeen serf-reliance: "Why, it is notorious that all whichIreland has obtained from England has been obtained not bya policy of alliance, but by a policy of defiance." Thisposition created somewhat of a dilemma because the partyhad spent years persuading the Irish to trust Gladstone inorder to achieve land reform and Home Rule. How couldthey now ask their people to repudiate him.9 Yet these men,the Parnellites, truly felt that if they did not support Parnell,Ireland would not display self-reliance and therefore wouldnot deserve its freedom. (15)
The other faction of the Nationalist party, known as theanti-Pamellites, believed that Gladstone's letter presented achoice not between Gladstone and Parnell but betweenParnell and Ireland. These members reasoned that securinga Home Rule Act depended more on Gladstone's coulfunedleadership than on Parnell's. Supporting Parnell, theybelieved, would result in Gladstone's resignation andsubsequent Conservative nile, wrecking Home Rule' schances for success. Therefore, to support Parnell and breakwith Gladstone seemed"sheer madness." (16)
Some anti-Parnellites later explained that they voted forPameli on November 25 only with the understanding that hewould immediately resign. Parnell, however, refased toretire gracefully and bow to the wishes of those who wouldfollow Gladstone. Instead, he assumed a fighting stance,writing a reply to Gladstone's letter in the form of aManifesto which ruthlessly attacked the Liberal party andits leader. After he read the Manifesto to fellow partymembers, they declared that they disapproved of everyword. The published Manifesto, which alienated even moreof the Nationalist party fxom Parnell, has been called a"death-warrant to his political career" and "the brutal andabrupt reversal of the whole trend of Nationalist policy;,Pameli had become politically impossible." (17) F.S. Lyonstakes a different view of the Manifesto, arguing that Pan llwas clever to have written it because it diverted attentionaway from the moral issue of the divorco to the politicalissue of the alliance with the Liberals. Whatever eamell'smotivations for writing the Manifesto, it is inmguable that itwas "so bitter and uncompromising as to make any hope of
6. The Wittenberg History Journal
reconciliation between him and his former allies
impossible." (18)As for the second alliance, the Nafionalist atholic
alliance, all seemed well -- at first. The hish CatholicChurch remained silent for two whole weeks after thescandal broke. Archbishop Walsh had made up his mind notto speak out against Parnell's in'unomiity because heassumed that the Irish people would support Parnell, and hedid not want to fight the people. Ideally, Walsh wanted theNationalist party to reject Parnell on its own, without anyovert influence from the Church. Observing the first week'sevents in dismay (Leinster Hall, reeleedun of Parnell), herealized that pressure had to be applied to the Nationalists,bat he wished to deal with it privately rather than publicly.
Despite Waish' s wishes, many clergy, fellow bishops,and especially Cardinal Manning put immense pressure onWalsh to publicly condemn the adulterer. For instance, theBishop of Ardagh wrote to Walsh: "Is it not the duty of us,Bishops, to speak for our people, and to tell the Freemanand our !viP's that God's commandments mast be respectedand that HE cannot be ignored." (19) With the advent ofParnell as political leader, the Nationalist party had risen inpower over the Irish Catholic Church. Manning viewed theParnell affair as the perfect opportunity for the Church toreassert its power over Ireland. Walsh, therefore, did notonly have to consider lay politics but also had to contendwith ecclesiastic politics as well, including the influence ofRome. Walsh wrote that the Pope "had a personal dislikesomehow, to Parnell, and was not pleased with me forhaving constantly defended him." (20) Only after Parnellpenned his Manifesto and it became clear that most of hisparty would desert him did Waish finally resolve to add theChurch's weight against the Irish leader, pleasing hisclerical colleagues. On December 3, he sent a telegram tothe Nationalist party which read: "Mr. Parnell unfit forleadership, first of all on moral grounds, social and personaldiscredit as a result of divorce court proceedings, also inview of inevitable disruption, with defeat at elections, wreckof Home Rule hopes, and sacrifice of tenants' interests."
(21)The Catholic Church condemned Parnell on moral
grounds, as expected, but what about the of society?The value system of Victorian England regarded divorce asalmost taboo, yet extramarital affairs were not uncommon.Affairs were tacitly accepted as long as they remainedclandestine; but as soon as the loverS broke the eleventhcommandment -- that is, "don't get caught" -- they wereseverely punished. According to F.S. Lyons,
"Involvement
in the divorce court, especially, was assumed to be fatal toany public man." (22) As evidence of Lyons's statement,Charles Dilke, a Liberal NIP, had recently been mined by adivorce scandal in 1885. In his account of Parnell's life,O'Bfien quotes an old Feninn leader on the doublestandards of British Victorian morality: "These English arethe most exWaordinary people in the world. You never canmake out what is virtue and what is not virtue with them,
except mainly that virtue is always on their side, whatevertheft side is?' (23) In Pumell' s case, English virtue censuredhis affair with Katharine O'Shea, partly out of politicalconsiderations. When the English considered Home Rule,they wondered how Ireland could nile itself when its leaderwas a deceitful man. As a result, moral and political issuesmerged; according to Lyons: "conveniently, moralindignation and political expediency alike seemed to pointto the exit of the Irish lender." (24)
Accordingly, after locking themselves in CommitteeRoom 15 for several days of intense deliberations, most ofthe Nationalist memberS walked out, abandoning Parnell, ineffect mining him. Bat he Would not give up e sily. In thenext few months, he mmried Katharine and campaigned forthree candidates in by-electious in Ireland. The Nationalistnewspaper Freeman's Journal stuck by him to the end, butthe Pall Mall Gazette demanded his retiremenL TheCatholic Church launched a major campaign against him,garnering the support of the anti-Parnellites. As a result, allthree of Parnell's candidates lost their elections. Always asickly man, he died shortly afterwards on October 6, 1891,less than a year after the divorce.
After Parnell's death, the Nationalist party split threeways and never regained its effectiveness. Gladstonecontinued Iris crusade for Home Rule, introducing a HomeRule Bill in 1893, but the bill failed to pass the House ofLords. Home Rule, then, was pronounced dead for thecentury. The whole episode (Parnell' s fall, Home Rule'sexpiration) caused Irish youth to become disillusioned withhaving a parliamentary party and finding a constitutionalmeans to self-government. Their discouragement may go along way in explaining the turmoil in Ireland today. Thehistorian A.N. Wilson writes, "Had that aunt been eithermore broad-minded or longer lived, it is conceivable that weshould have peace in the streets of Belfast today." (25)
Like Wilson, it is fun to play "what if' with history, nomatter how futile. So, what if the Nonconfomaists had notfussed over parnell's adultery, or even if they had, what ifGladstone had paid them no attention? It is probable thatGladstone may not have written the letter that triggered arearrangement of political allegiances and eventuallyParnell's Manifesto, which in turn resulted in denunciationfrom the Catholic Church. But perhaps the whole issuecould have been avoided if Kathafine had not filedcoantercharges against her husband, saving Parnell from theembarrassment of the divorce court. Some may condemnhim for conducting a love affair with a married woman, butit must be remembered that lie truly loved her and foundhappiness in her company. He clearly did not rain a healthymarriage, for it was ailing long before he met Kitty.However frustrating to Parnell, Aunt Ben's fortune, CaptainO'Shca's opportunism, and the curse of divorce allcompelled her to remain manied.
The cede of morality in Victorian England condemnedpublic exposure of exWamadtal affairs. Yet, are today'sstandards of morality for public figures much different from
Scandal Strikes Charles Stewart Parnell: The Fall of the Irish Leader - 7
those of the Victorian era? We still believe that our politicalleaders should be moral leaders because their private livesfigure into our public trusL just as parnell's private loveaffair affected how Englishmen thought about the feasibilityof Home Rule. Although we can point to actions (orinactions) that could have prevented public discovery of
Parnell' s immorality, once the scandal was revealed to theworld, his chance of survival in a society steeped in rigidvalues was slim. His love affair with O'Shea canbe seen as equaling that of Anthony and Cleopal (26) andhis downfall can be seen as more of a tragedy thanShakespeare ever could have imagined.
Endnotes
1 Fr aels Stewa LeLmad Lyons, The Fall of Parnell, 1890-91(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 32.
2 Quoted in Richard Barry O'Brien, The Life of Charles Stewartparnell, 1846-1891 (London: Smith, Eldex, and Co., 1898; reprint, Newyork: Greenwood Press, 1969), voL 2, 161.
14 ]bid., 249.
15 ]bi&, 276,254.
16 Ibi&, 271,
17 Hasllp, 380, 382; Lyons, 109.
3 Lyons, 309,
4 Joan Haslip, parnell: A Biography (New York: Frederick A.
Stokes Company, 1934), 154.
5 ]bi&, 368.
6 ]bid., 372-373.
7 ]bid 192-193; Lyons, 54.
8 Quoted in O'Bri n, 240.
9 Haslip, 376, 366.
10 Lyons, 80,
11 Quoted in O'Bfi m, 270.
12 Quoted in Hasllp, 384; Lyons, 66.
13 Quoted in O'Bfien. 248.
18 Lyons, 105.
19 Quoted in Emmet Larl6n, The Roman Catholic Church inIreland and the Fall ofparnall (Chapel Hill, NC: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1979), 218.
20 Quo d in Ibid,, 224.
21 Quoted in Ibld., 229.
22 Lyons, 81.
23 Quotgd in O'Bfim, 253.
24 Lyons, 82.
25 Jnies Abels, The parnell Tragedy (New york: Macmillan,1966), 385; A.N. Wilson, Eminent Victorians lew york: W.W. Norten
and Co., 1989), 127.
26 Abels, 103.
Bibliography
Ahals, Iuins. The parnell Tragedy. New york: Macmillan, 1966.
Barker, Michael, Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction ofPolicy inBritah1885-94. New york: Harper and RowPublishers, 1975.
L ddn, Emmet. The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and the Fall ofparnell. Chapel Hill NC: Ulfivershy of Noah C lina Pr ,
1979.
Lyons. Francis Smwart Lel a& Charles Stewart Parnell. New york:Oxford University press, 1977.
Foster, Robert Fitmoy. Charles Stewart Parnell: The Man and HisFandly. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The H vester Press Limited,
1976.
• The Fall ofparnell, 1890-91• Toronto: Uniwnfity of To.into
Press, 1960.
Harmmond, J.L and M,R D. Fool Gladstone and ldoeralism. England:
English Universities Press, lad., 1952.
O'Btien, Richar Bany. The l.dare of Charles Stewart parnell, 1846-1891.VOf 2. London Smith Elder, mad Co., 1898; re[nint, New York:Gre mwood Press, 1969.
Ha tip, Joam parnell: A Biography. New york: Frederick A. Stokes Co.,
1934.
Wilson, AN. Eminent Victorians. New york: W.W. Norto and Co,,
1989.
Hurst, Michael parnell and Irish Nationalism. Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1968.
Fritz Fischer: The "Traitor" from Hamburgby Barry Jackisch
Comprehending modem German history has never been aneasy task, especially ff one happens to be German. Formany years, a divided Germany served as a constantreminder of the mistakes of the past and left its citizens toanswer the painful question: "How did it happen?" Incontributing his own answer to this question, a Hamburghistorian named Fritz Fischer caused a revolution inGmnan historiography and initiated a heated debate thatWanscended academic discussion, calling into question thevery tolerance of West German democracy. Using three ofFischer's most important wurks: Germany'sAimsln TheFirst World War, War Of Illusions, and From KaiserreichTo Third Reich, tiffs examination will demonstrate howFritz Fischer's stmcmrallst interpretations, coupled with hisunwavering commitment to revisionism, devasta d manyof the long-cherished precepts of conservative, Nco-Rankean German historiography.
Fritz Fischer was bern on 5 March, 1908, inLudwigsstadt, Germany. His father, Max, and his mother,Emilie, raised him in a conservative, Lutheran environment.From 1926-28, Fischer attended the University of Erlangenand than moved on to the University of Berlin where hereceived his doctorate in Theology (1934) and completedhis education with a Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1937.While mill at the University of Berlin, Fritz Fischer servedas an assistant professor of church history (1934-39) andwas eventually promoted to assistant professor of history(1934-42). From 1942-73, Fischer taught at the Universityof Hamburg and has remained in Hamburg since hisretirement. Fischer was also directly influenced by theSecond World War in his capacity as a reserve and active-duty member of the German Luftwaffe (1939-45). He waseventually captured by the American army and detained as aprisoner of war from 1945-47. Fritz Fischer has sewed .as avisiting professor and guest lectmer in nnmerons coantnesand has received threc honorary doctorates and several other
prestigious awards. (1)After reading through such an impressive resume, one
might ask how such a"well decorated" scholar could be soharshly criticized, even called a "traitor," (2) by severalprominent members of the German historical community.All of these accusations were directed towards Fischer for
his role in the debate centering on German responsibility furWorld War One and his assertion that a continuity existedbetween the policies and attitudes of Wilhelmine Germanyand those of the Third Reich. In order to gain a clearunderstanding of this debate, the most important in post-World War Two German historiography, an examination of"pre-Fischer" German attitudes concerning the role of thehistorian and his craft must be presented. With tiffsbackground, the tnily revolutionary nature of Fritz Fischer'sassertions can be best realized.
In an examination of medom German historio phy,John A. Moses states that:
Nineteenth-centmy Gurman historiography was sointimately bound up with the movement fornational unity that it became virtually the 'scienceof the national mate'....Before 1870 they[histodansl spoke of Prussia' s vocation to uniteGermany whereas afterwards they preachedGermany's vocation to assert herself on the worldstage....Thus a doclrine of state veneration becamethe hall-mark of most significant Germanhistoriography. (3)
Indeed, dining the nineteenth century and into the twentieth,German historians had maintained a strong connection tonationalist political tendencies and found a basis fur theirphilosophy in Germany's profound influence on thedevelopment of historiography. This justification of theirdiscipline was firmly rooted in the theory and tradition ofLeopold yon Ranke.
The Neo-Rankean school, which took hold afterunification in 1871, adhered quite closely to many Rankeanideals regarding the nation-state and the primacy of foreignpolicy. Prominent historians such as Gerhard Ritter believedthat all history which followed Runke's example wasessentially political in nature (4) and therefore required aconcentrated focus on the nation-state as an individualentity possessing unique features that could be readilyrecognized in re ionships with other stronger or weaker"entities." In effect, a nation's own identity was greatlyinfluenced by its position in the overall "iater-enthy"
Fritz Fischer: The "Traitor" fromHamburg • 9
conflicL If a nation were to grow and prosper in thisenvironment, it had to expand its own "moral energy" (5)and push towards an ever greater role in the balance of
power.For the Neo-Rankeans, this theory was embodied in the
growing conflict among the great European powers aroundthe turn of the century. Many Neo-Rankeans felt thatGermany was being denied its rightful position as a trueworld power and believed that unless Germany asserteditself against the imperialist intentions of countries such asBritain and Russia, Germany would soon lose any chance ofwielding meaningful inmrantional power. In a very x'ealsense, it seemed that Germany was being forced to assert.itself in order to preserve its existence against the aggresswedrives of its perceived adversaries. The Neo-Rankeans fullysupported Germany's "noble quest," characterized by the"Sonderweg" (6) development of German culture, tobecome an "equal among firsts" (7) in the European powerstructore. It was exactly this belief that caused many leadingGerman historians, even after the Treaty of Versailles hadbeen signed, to excuse Germany's actions in the First WorldWar as essentially defensive, thus preserving the image ofthe Wilhelmine period as a noble, honorable stage inGerman cultmul and political developmenL
The attention directed towards the "noble" qualifies ofGerman culture and politics during the Wilhelmine periodbecame decidedly more focused in post-World War TwoGerman historiography. Many of the conservative, Neo-Rankean historians, even though they were not partymembem, survived the Nazi period with their academiccareers still quite intact. In an attempt to understand thenighunare of the Third Reich, and in part to reconcile theirown roles in Nazi culture, many Neo-Rankean historiansbegan to explain Adolf Hitler and the Nazis as distinetly"an-German", a gigantic political "accident" that certainlyhad nothing to do with the true and honorable German spiritembodied in the "noble quest" that characl'a'izedWilheimine Germany. As Ritter explains:
First and Second World Wars, for Germany had been drivenby drastically different pressures in each case.
Although he was well aware of the conservativeapologist theory in German liistoriography regardingGermany's responsibility for the two World Wars, FritzFischer's early academic pursuits focused on the dominantrole of Protestantism in Prussian culture. (9) In 1953however, the West German government released a wealthof Imperial German documents that included a great deal ofpreviously classified information dealing, with governmentpolicy before and during the First World War. This newinformation greatly interested a new generation of Germanhistorians, particularly Fritz Fischer, for its potentialsignificance in reassessing Germany's participation in theFirst World War. A short time later, a weli known Marburghistorian named Ludwig Dehio published a book called:Germany And World Politics In The Twentieth Century.This work was significant for its acceptance of German warguilt and its departure from the idealized images of theconservative historiographical establishment. As Dehio
asserts:
But even though others may have different hopesfor the future, the prerequisite for any reallycreative German response after the period of thetwo World Wars is the unconditional recognitionof the terrible role that we have played. We werelast, and the most daemonic, power to exeremehegemony over the declining old continent ofEurope. (10)
...Hitlerism was something radically new inGerman history, appearing just as unexpectedlyand unpredictably as fascism did in Italy andbolshevisan in Russia....it is a mistake to claim thatHitler's rise to power was "inevitable"... (8)
Strongly influenced by new oppermnities for areevaltmfion of Germany's past, and impressed withDehio's assertion concerning German war guilt, (11) FritzFischer began the immense task of carefully researching thenewly released government documents in order to gain aclear understanding'of German involvement in the FirstWorld War. This time-cousuming process resulted in therevolutionary work entitled Germany's Aims In The FirstWorld War, which was published in 1961. (12)
Reflecting on the controversy spalked by Germany'sAims, (13) Fritz Fischer observes that:
In short, conservative Neo-Rankean historiography hadsupported Imperial Germany's struggle to safeguard itsposition as an "equal" world power. It defended Germany'shonor after the First World War by absolving Germany ofany significant responsibility for its role in the hostilities,while preserving the veracity of the "Sonderweg" theory.After the Second World War, the virtue of WilhelmineGeaTnany was brought to bear against the detestable an-German nature of the Third Reich in an attempt to conWastand condemn the Nazi legacy. For the Neo-Rankean school,there could be no conlSnnity between German policy in the
For German historians the pre-Hitler era was aperiod that has been treated sufficiently, and thereseemed no cause to reopen the debate. The softpillow on which satisfied and conservativeGermans had hoped to sleep was rudely removedfrom under their heads. (14)
This "soft pillow" was indeed removed as Fischer'$revisionism assaulted two critical assumptions ofconservative, Neo-Rankean theory. First, Fischer assertedthat Germany was indeed responsible for the First WorldWar and that the German government was quite prepared toutilize the conflict to promote its own imperialistic
"grasp"
10 ° The Wittenberg History Journal
for world power. (15) Second, Fischer stunned theconservative German establishment with the statement thathis book served as, "...a contribution to the problem ofcontinuity in German history from the First to the SecondWorld War." (16)
In Germany's Aims, Fischer indicates that the ages ofimperialism did not end in 1914, but reached a "climax" inGermany's expansionist plans to create a gigantic,,Mittelemopa,, empire &aninated by Imperial Germany. (17)The "September Program" (18) of 1914, which carefullyoutlined this grandiose scheme, is of crucial importance forFischer, as is the political program of its author, GermanChancellor Theobald yon Bethmaun HoUweg. But in animportant departure from the Nco-Rankean emphasis onforeign policy, Fischer examines the impact of powerfuldomestic forces on governmental decisions and viewsBethmann Hollweg as ultimately subservient to the greater
political pressure of his time.With the benefit of a thorough knowledge of the newly
released government documents, Fischer Waee theimperialistic ambitions of the German government, formedprimarily by the policies of Bethmann Hollweg, from theJuly crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of the FirstWorld War to the very end at Versailles. Throughout,Fischer shows that the "September Program" anti itsconcept of a German dominated "Mitteleumpa" remained aprime influence on German war planning even as Germanyfaced the prospect of a long and cosily conflict. Accordingto Fxscher, Germany did not haphazardly "fall" mto the FirstWorld War. Instead, it waS driven into the conflictoriginally by Bethmann Hollweg's political ambitions(heavily influenced by annexationist demands from Germanindustrialists) (19) and later, after Bethmaun Hollweg'sdismissal, by the almost dictatorial power of GeneralsHindenberg and Ludendorff and the military high command(the OHL) (20) in an attempt to achieve final Germanvicte*y and recognition as a dominant world power.
In Fiscber's explanation of Germany's defeat, thetheme of continuity (or the possibility of it) between the twoWorld Wars becomes quite clear. Fischer concentrates onthe widespread belief In the "stab in the back" (21) theory asthe prime agent that perpetuated the idea of Germansuperiority even after its defeat in the First World War. Healso blames the defensive war "myth" which preventedGermans from accepting the fact that Germany pursued waraims which, if reaiized, would have completely destroyedthe European balance of power. (22) Fischer concludes bystating that: °'
It waS evident that Fritz Fischer had shaken Germanhistoriography to its very foundations. The lines becamequickly drawn and in a relatively short pealed of time,historians both for and against Fischer's startling thesisissued their assessments of this work. A brief consideeationof some of the most intense assessments of Germany's Aimswill reveal the extent to which the conlroversy over thisbook affected the academic and political climate in WestGermany.
With his article, "A New War Guilt Thesis?" (24),Gerhard Ritter established himself as the most ardent criticof Fischer's work. Ritmr attacked Fischer on all runts,accusing him of misinterpreting information concerningGermany's role in the prewar balance of power to such anextent that Ritter denounced Fischer as being "blind" tohisrLrical facL (25) Ritter went even further and enlisted thehelp of the president of the German Historians Association,Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Together on 17 January, 1964,these two prominent Gmuan historians sent a secret letter tothe German Foreign Minister, asking him to cancel FritzFischer's upcoming lecture tom in the United States onbehalf of "all German historians." (26) Amazingly, Fischerwas denied permission (the official reason was lack offunding) until several prominent German historians inAmerica caught wind of the situation and filed a formalprotest. As Fritz Fischer finally began his lecture tour, hewaS welcomed at various American universities with this
similar introduction:
What Germany did or didn't do in 1914 is historyand not of immediate concern to us; but if theGermans in 1964 shun an open discussion of thesequestions, this is highly political and of greatconcern to us. (27)
Above all, in recent years of impotence andhumiliation imposed, aS the nation felt it, byVarseilles the two illusions of the stab in the backand the purely defensive war nurtmed a nmuingscore of resontment against the order of 1919 and afaith that Germany would again rise to the rank ofa world power. (23)
To be sure, there have also been many scholars whostrongly support Germany's Ahns and have come toFischer's defense. John Moses believes Fischer "...smasheda broad path through the entangled forest of Germanacademic historiography..." (28) and forced a criticalreassessment of the historian's task. Komad J usehblasted Fischer's conservative critics by describing them as"Emotionally incapable of admitting German guilt andmethodologically mired in Nco-Rankeanism....
"(29)
Considering both positive and negative responses, it isevident that Fischer's revisionist interpretations inGermany's Aims had a mily profound impaeL
In pursuing (and providing fmther support for) theprimary themes established in Germany's Aims, FritzFischer researched and completed a second work in 1969,entitled War OfllMsions. (30) This book examines thepowerful forces which drove Imperial Germany to itsparticipation in the First World War, and discusses thecontinuity between Bismarck's policies and those ofWilhelmine GermanY directly before the war.
Fritz Fischer: The "Traitor" fromHamburg. 11
A vigorous transition to an imperialistic policy willgive Germany the space it needs... Anunsuccessful war can do no more than setGermany back, although for a long time; Englandit can destroy. As victor England will for a whilebe rid of an awkward competitor, Germany willbecome what England is now, the world power. (3 I)
Fritz Fisher begins his book with this quotation from aGerman newspaper dated 17 May, 1913.02) This attitudeis the basis for Fischer's assertion that in the yearspreceding the First World War, German preparation for theinevitable conflict between European powers was based onthe "illusions" of German might and the almost neuroticdesire to secure a permanent position for German power onthe world stage. This book clearly conveys Fischer'sstmctaralist examination of the powerful influence ofdomestic pressures on German foreign policy anddemonstrates that even on the eve of the First World War,the German government was quite prepared to use aninternational conflict to vault the nation to its "rightfulplace" as a Weltmacht.
The "War Council" of 8 December, 1912 (33), is animportant piece of evidence in Fischer's indictment of themilitarism that characterized Wilhelmine German policyand indicates a continuity with the political attitudes of theBismarck era. This mcedng between Wilhelm II and five ofhis closet cabinet officials (including the army Chief ofStaff - Heimut von Moltke, and the Secretary of State forthe navy Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz) consisted ofan opea discussion about Germany's ability to wage war mthe near future. To yon Moltke' s dismay, Tirpitz requested abrief waiting period to fully prepare the German navy, butin the end, all present agreed on the necessity for argent warpreparations that would allow Germany to "defend" itselfwhen the time came. As yon Moltke put it, "I believe a warto be unavoidable: and the sooner the better." (34) Thisdiscussion concluded, however, that all elements of theGerman public would have to be mentally prevared for thewar if German aims were to have any hope for success. Inthis assertion, Fischer sees the crucial imlxxtance ofdomestic influence on official policy.
Fischer traces this process of domestic "preparation"throughcot much of his beok and devotes an entire chapter (35)to the close relatiouship between German induslly andgovernment. In this chapter, Fischer poims out that:
Fischer's contemporaries as Germany's Aims had been.That it received a smaller, more positive array of views andassessments was due in large part to the fact that the"bomb" had already been dropped in 1961. To a largeextent, many other German historians were much moreprepared to accept the idea of continuity in German policyfrom Bismarck to the First World War than the"unthinkable" continuity that Fischer suggested inGermany's Aims. However, in 1979, Fritz Fischer publisheda work that fused ideas taken from War of/!lusions andGermany's Aims with new insights regarding Germanhistory from 1871-1945.
The litll title itself, From Kaiserreich to Third Reich:Elements of Continuity in German History, 1871-1945, (37)indicates Fischer's belief that certain commoncharacteristics existed within German history during thisperiod. In his introduction to the English Wauslation, RogerFletcher gives an excellent appraisal of the essence of FritzFischer's thesis. Fletcher points out that, for Fischer, thebasic continuity in Gemian history from 1871-1945 "wagprovided by the agrarian-big business alliance" which intimes of crisis, "resorted to domestic repression and externalaggression." (38) Fischer consistently pursues lifts thesis byanalyzing its impact on Germany's changing politicalfortunes during this period. Most interesting is the finalchapter, "Tradition versus Democracy," in which Fischerdemonstrates that the indusuial/agric altural power elites didnot merely survive the F'tr st World War and the ianduring the Weimar period, but retained sufficient power toplay a dominant role hi Hitler's rise to power. (39)
Although Fischer does point out s veral critical facm(i.e. the violent nature of political repression and theHolocans0 that were unique to the Third Reich, heconcludes that:
...however singular the criminal and inhumanfeatmes of the Hitler dictatorship may have been,it would be an inadmissible mmcation of historicalreality to contemplate the 'Third Reich"exclusively from such a vantage point. What is noless necessary is analysis of the on-goingslructmv, s and enduring aims of the PmssoGerman Empire born in 186671 and destroyed in1945... (40)
The close contacts which existed between thearmy and the politicians, between the industrialand commercial leadership and the governmentmade the fear that Ger-many would not be allowedto exlYand universally accepted. The governmentwag now under increasingly strong pressure fromvarious interested groups. (36)
War of Illusions wag not so harshly received by
With all three of his major works, Fritz Fischer hasprofoundly altered the course of German histodography. I-is credited with replacing the historicising Rankean question"Wie es eigentlich gewesen?" (How it actnally wag) with"Wie es dazu kommen koante?" (how was it possible for itto come about). (41) For Fischer, the historian's task is toestablish fact and to clarify, as beat as he can, "theassumptions, conditions, decisions, and aetious" hi historywith the aid of rational judgment and solid historicalmethod. (42) It was with these "tools" of historicalinterpretation that Fritz Fischer carefully reexamined
12 o The Wittenberg Histray 3otwnul
modern German history in a slrncturalist, revisionist vein.The great uproar caused by his conclusions (particularlythose in Germany's Aims) was a powerfu! indication thatFischer had challenged the basic framework ofconservative, Neo-Rankean historiographical theory andhad deeply offended many older German historians whosecareers and academic integrity had been tied to the veryevents which Fischer called into question.
Fritz Fischer's bold revisionism opened up many newpossibilities for those who followed in his path. Manystudents of the "Fischer School," (43) most notably ImanuelGeiss, have pushed Fischer's ideas even further, developingnew, even more critical assessments of Gelmany's past.Fritz Fischer's work is irreplacable as much because of its
own impact as it is for the legacy that carded his ideas to theminds of a new generation of historians. As a historian anda German citizen, Fritz Fischer has submitted an essentialanswer to Germany's most complex question,
"How did it
happen?"
Fischer's work is an eloquent declaration that thehistorian's highest loyalty should not lie in anirrational dedication to patriotic sentiment butrather to humanity as a whole, a lesson whichcould be profitably taken to heart by many writersand teachers of history today, not all of whom byany means live in West Germany. (44)
Endnotes
1 Co,itemporary Autlmrs-4¢ew Revision Series, vol.2, "Fischer,
Fritz 1908-" (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983), 168q59. Fischerreceived honorary doctorates from: University of Sussex (1974),University of East Anglia (1981), and Oxford University (1983). He wasa visiting professor or lecturer in Austria, Belgitma, Canada, Demnark.England, France, Holland, JapmL poland, and Switzerland. Fischer alsote.eeived the Btmdesverdienslkreuz der Btmdesrelmbllk Deutschland in
1974.
13 From this point on, I will refer to this work as Germany's Aims.
14 Fritz Fischer. =Twenty-Five year Later:. Locking Back at the'Fischer Controversy' and its Consequences," Central European History
21. (September 1988), 209.
il!q
1992), 21.
2 Fritz trtscber, Hitler was kein Betriebsvafall (Munich: C.H. Beck,
15 The power of Fischer's original German title, (trans."Germany's Grasp for World Power") better reflects this assertion.
16 Fischer, Germany's, xxfi.
17 Ibid.
3 Jolm A. Moses, "The Crisis in West German Historiography:Origms and Trends," Historical Studies 13, (April 1969): 446.
18 See =Bethmann HoUweg's Sqaemher Prognmmae" in Fischer,
Germany's, 1034)6.
4 Ibid. 19Ib ,1 73.
5 Iohn A. Moses, The Politics oflllusion (London: George Prior
Publishers, 1975), 15.
6 The Sonderweg ( spocial course") development ofers to thebelief that Germany's cultural devdopment towards medemity wasindependent of, and superior to. Western democratic mad Marxist
aecompllsluneaat s.
20ib ,399 1.
21 Theory that blamed German =home from" mismanagement orcowardice for tmdennining German military victory on the Western
Front, particularly in 1918.
22 Fischer, Germany's, 637-38.
7 Dr. Hans-Heinz Kfill, Die Ranks-Renaissance (Berlin, 1962),
196, quoted in Moses, Politics. 24.
8 Gerhard Ritmr, The German problem, Colmnlms: Ohio State
Univerfit' I ss, 1965), 198.
9 Fritz Fischer, Mori z August yon Bethmann-Hollweg und tierProteatantlsmus: Religion, Rechts- wd Staatsgedanke (Berlin: EmilEbering Publisher. 1938), found in Contemporary Authora, 16&
23 Ibid., 638.
24 Gerhard Ritter, "Fine Ne e Krlegsschuldtheae?," Historlache
Zeitschr 194, (Jtme 1962).
25 Ibid., 655. Ritmr says: "Er sch at darer blind zu s in"(He seems, therefore, to be blind).
26 Fischer. "Twenty-Five years... ," 208.
10 Ludwig Dehio, Germany and Wodd Politios In TI TwentiethC ntury (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 37.
11 Fischer, Hitler. 18.
12 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aima In The First Worm War (Newyork: W.W. Norto and Co., 1967). The book was originally publishedin Gt nany undex the Fritz Fischer, Grigg nach d*r Weltmacht(Diissddoff: Droge VerbS, 1961).
27 Ibid.
28 Moses, Politics, xvi.
29 Konrad I-L larausch, =World Power or Tragic Fate? TheKtiegsschuldfrage as Historical Neurosis," Central E opean History 5,
(March 1972), 74.
Fritz Fischer: The "Traitor" from Hamburg o 13
Endnotes - conL
30 Fritz Fischer, War oflll ions (New ytnk: W.W, Noaon mad 38 Ibi&, 10.
Co., 1975). This book was originally published in Germany under the 39 Ibid., 81.title: Fritz Fischer, Krisg der Illusionen (1)iisseldoff: Droste Vertag,
1969). 40 Ibid. 98.
31 Ibid., front leaf. - " " 5341 Moses, TheCnsls..., 452- .
32Ibi 42 S Fischer, Hitler, 7. and FischBr, Germany's, xxi.
33Ibi ,161 9.
34Ibi&,16
State and Economy As parme"
35 Ibi& 439 58."i
43 AJ.P. Taylor, "Fritz Fischer and HIS SchooL" Journal of
Modern History 47, (1975).
44 Moses, Politics, 126-27.
361bi&.443.
37 Fritz Fischer, From Kaiserreich To Third Reich (London: Allenand Unwln Ltd., 1986). This book was originally tmblished in Germanyunder the rifle: Fritz Fischer, Bindn der Elhen 03iisseldorf: Droste
Vedag, 1979).
BibliographyContemporary Anthor - Vcw Revision Series. Detfiot:
Gale Research Co., 1983.
Iggers, Georg G. The German Conception of History. Midc town:Wesleyan University Press. 1968.
Dchlo, Ludwig. Germany And Worm Politics In The Twentieth Century.New York: AVmd A, Knopf, 1959.
Jarausch. Konrad. The Enigmatic Chancellor. New Haven: y I
University Press, 1973•
Dorpala, Andreas. "Hi tofiogrephy As History: The Work Of GerhardRitter." The Journal of Modern History 34 (March 1962): 1-18.
• "From Hider To Himaarck: 'Third Reich" and Kaiserreinh InRex nt Historiography. part IL " The Historical Journal 26
(1983): 999-1020.
• Germany's Aims in the First Worm War. New york: W.W.
Noaon and Co., 1967.
Fischer, Fritz. From Kalserrich to Third Reich. London: All andUnwin, 1986.
Evans. RJ.. "From Hider To Bismarck: "Third R ich' and Kaiserreieh InRecent Historiography. part L" The Historical Journal 26
(1983): 485-97.
• "The Illusion of IAmited War. Chancellor Bethmann-------Hollweg % C d lated Risk, July 1914." Central European
History 2 (March 1969), 48-76.
• "World Power or Tragic Fat7 The IOiegssehuldfrag¢ MHistoricalNeurosis." Central European History 5 (March 1972),
72-92.
Joll ]runes. "The 1914 Debate Con ntms." past and prevent 34 (July
1966), 100-13..
• The Origins Of The First World War. New york: Longman
Inc., 1984.
Kehr, Ekhart. Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy.Beskeley: University of Califotin Fress, 1977.
• Hitler was kein Bntrisbstmfall. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992.
"Twen Five years Later:. Looking Bad at the 'Fischer
• ty-Controversy' mid Bs Consequences." Central European History
21 (September 1988), 207-23.
• War of Illusions. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975.
Geiss, ImammL July 1914. New york: Charles Scri aer" s Sons, 1967.
Illllgruber, Andt-r s. Germany And The Two Worm Wars. Cambridge:Harvard Univerfity Fiess, 1981.
• • • • •. . • • .Moraine*n, Hans. =Historical Scholarship m TrnnstUon. Th S atton m
the Federal Retmblin of Germany." Danddus 100 (Spring 1971),
485-508.
Momm n, Wolfgang. "DomesUc Factor6 m German Feemgn policyb om 1914." Central European History 6 (March 1973), 3-44.
Mc es, John A,. "The Crisi in West German HiJaoringraphy:Origins and Trends." Historinal Studies 13 (A1ptfl 1969), 445-49.
• The Politics Of Illusion. London: George prior PublishrL
1975.
14 - The Wittenberg History Journal
Bibliography - conL
Riner, G rhard. "Fine Neae Krlegsschuldthes¢?." Historische Zeitschr
194 (Iu e 1962), 646458.
• Tl e German Problem. Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1965.
• Zur Fis aer-Kontroverse." Historische Zeitschr 200 (June
1965), 783-90.
Scheskewitz, Jurgen. ed. Gesch[chtsschreibung-Epochen, Methoden,Ges altung. Dfisseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1968.
Taylor, AJ.P.. "Fritz Flsc'aer And His School," Journal of Modern
History 47 (1975), 120-21L
,i
L:L
The 1969 CBS Walkout: The Means Justified the Endby Ma/yk/ Bacon
On Thursday, December 5, 1968, two Black s dents fromAntioch University enlered North Residence Hall on theWittenberg campus to pick up their dates for the evening. Aresident, assuming that they were intruders, notified thehousemother, who, unable to check the sitantion herself,told the resident to contact campus secmity officers. After averbal exchange with the stlungers, the officers called thecity police. When they arrived at the dormitory, the policeofficers questioned a Black Wittenberg student who wasusing the lounge phone in Noah at the time because theofficers were told that that particular student had beeninvolved in the original confrontation between secm'ity andthe Antioch students. The Wittenberg student denied anyguilt in the matter;, however, perhaps because police officersoften deal with people who profess innocence, theWittenberg student was taken to police headquarters withthe Antioch students. The Wittenberg student was RonaldWoods, a popular senior. (1) What occurred within a weekafter his arrest would shock the very conservativeWittenberg faculty, the students, and, most of all, theadministration. The university's administration would beforced to change the way the um'versity had previously beenoperated. Furthermore, the results of the arrest of RonaldWoods would bring the concerns of the Black students atWittenberg into the spotlight for a very dramatic twomonths.
Within days after the atre Black students stagedfit-ins to protest Woods' arrest; the sit-ius were held inRecitation Hall, the campus administrative building.Eventually, the ch ges against Woods and the Antiochstodents were dropped at the request of the um'versity.However, the sit-ius and the incident as a whole made theBlack students more aware of the racist conditions thatexisted at the university. They felt compelled to makechanges in university policies which were subtly racist. Thiscompelling force led the Black students to create a list ofdemands which they felt would remove these discriminatorypolicies. The thirteen demands covered a variety of areas:
be raised to 12 percent of the student body, with50 percent of these coming from the inner city, andunder financial aid from Wittenberg; 3) a similar12 percent quota of Black faculty members; 4) aninorease in Black managerial, clerical, andstenographic staff members; 5) a Black couuselol;6) more Black oriented courses in everydepartment; 7) holidays on Martin Luther King'sassassination date and Malcolm X's birthday;8) Black cheerleaders; 9) separate Black facilitiesfor meetings, socializing, and learning;10) increased exchange programs with schools ofall-Black student bodies; 11) immediateacceptance of two Black students who haveapplied for entry; 12) allow madent con bufionstoward Upward Bound scholarship aid; 13) arecruiter for Black students. (2)
The black students referred to themselves as the ConcernedBlack Students (CBS) and signed the letter containing thedemands as such. CBS said that unless the administrationmet the demands by January 13, 1969, the students wouldleave the campus..
At the time, the university was in the midst of a searchfor anew president. To temporarily fill the gap, a committeeconsisting of Dean A.O. Pinister, who served as thechairman, Vice President Reek, and Vice.President/Treastwar Roland C. Matth handled all administrativematters. The demands were presented to the universityofficials only a few days before the beginning of theChristmas breaL This meant that the adminisWatuts had todeal with the ramifieatious of the CBS demands while thestudent body enjoyed its vacation. In a memo to directors,parents, alumni, pastors, friends, and members of thecampus community, dated December 9, 1968, theadministrative committee stated:
1) that Wittenberg issue a statement deploringracism on campus and vowing not to tolerate suchracism; 2) that the level number of Black students
While some of the steps requested by ConcernedBlack Students may at first appear impossible ofachievement, at least within the time stipulated,they should -- and we are sure they will --receive full consideration with a view toward
16 • The Wittenberg History Journal
doing as much as possible as soon as possible. (3)
iiJ
However, in an article in the Torch, student DougPinkerton reported, "Dr. Reck and Dr. Pfinster both...expressed little hope that any of the demands could actuallybe met by the CBS-set deadline of January 13, 1969." (4)
The adminiswative committee tried to obtain as muchbackground information on each of the demands aspossible. On December 12, 1968, Manfred Holck, Jr., thedirector of personnel, issued a memorandum to theadministrative committee regarding Item IV of thedemands. The memo stated that, "...as of December 10,1968...of approximately 200 full-time non-academicpersonnel, 64 are black (32%)." (5) Student Senate began toinvestigate the demand both for a Black cheerleader and fora provision allowing students to contribute to the UpwardBound scholarship, which earlier had been started by theuniversity to educate individuals of different educationalbackgrounds. (6)
The first demand, the Wittenberg-issued statementdeploring racism, seemed very confusing to theadministrative committee. As white men, they appear tohave had some difficulty understanding how racism couldbe a part of the Wittenberg campus. Pedaaps they believedracism to mean only overt discrimination and acts againstpeople of a particular race, instead of the more subtlediscrimination that is also a widespread problem. Amemorandum from Vico-Presideut Reck to Dean A.O.Pfinster dated December 23, 1968, epitomizes theconfusions of the administration: "...before any statement isattempted I think that we should "demand' specifics; ...whatare the white racist simafious which allegedly exist oncampus.?" (7) His ignorance to this situation illastrates notonly naivet6 but also gives a hint of sincedty, in that herezlly did not seem to understand how racism could, anddid, exist at Wittenberg. Even though this naive sincerityseemed genuine throughout the entire resolution process,the administrative committee still seemed fearful, oruncertain, of what conceding to the deznands would mean.They may have felt that a concession to the demands wouldmean a drastic change in the day-to-day activities of theum'versity.
On Thesday, JannarY 14, 1969, one day afler thedeadline for the recognition of the demands, a final meetingto attempt to reach an agreement between the administrativecommittee and CBS failed. In reaction, the Black studentswalked, with suitcase in hands, from Recitation Hall to theStudent Center, where they packed into cars and headed tothe Afro-American Institute at Antioch University inYellow Springs, Ohio. The students pledged to remain thereuntil an agreement was re, bed. The 37 Black studentstaking part in the walkout represented nearly 85% of thetotal Black student population.
Parents, faculty, and students had mixed reactions tothe demands and to the walkout. To support the CBSprotest, 15 students at the Hamma Divinity School began to
boycott their own classes. (8) Faculty, staff, and studentsheld several formal and informal discussions ound thecampus to discuss the complexities of racial ismes. Ananonymous letter to the editor of the Torch flom a parentstated, "If the demands of the CB$ were met by thecommittee, the quality of education now offered atWittenberg could be endangered. I'm all for racial equality,but not for racial preference." The parent further stated,
"If
you or your parents have not responded to theAdministrative Committee on the demands of the CBS, youshould do so fight away." (9) In another letter to the editor,parent Russell Leasure said, "What is demanded by CBS isillegal, immoral, and unwise, and should be denied andquickly." (10) In response to this unfavorable reaction,another Torch letter by Wittenberg student, Lois Sehrag,
responded:
The letter from the aforementioned unknownparent suggested we might adopt an AmericanLegion sponsored slogan' America: Love Her orLeave Her.' I suggesL..we adopt...'America
(Wittenberg): Fix It or Forget It.'...we sho .uldcommend the CBS for the mature manner mwhich they have met the unsatisfactory answers to
their demands. (11)
How did other people react to the CBS demands? In asurvey conducted by the administrative committee, sixty°one percent of Wittenberg students and seventy-two percentof Wittenberg faculty felt that the number of Black studentsshould be increased. (12) Overall, those closest toWittenberg, i.e. the students and faculty, expressed the mostconcern for the plight of the Blacks at Wittenberg, probablybecause Wittenberg students and faculty had personalrelationships with the Black students; these personalrelationships helped foster a sympathy and concern for theBlack students.
The Black students returned to the campas onSaturday, January 18, 1969. (13) This was so eventful thatthe editors of the Torch released an extra edition to makethe announcement public. They rcmnmd after serious talksbetween the administrative committee and CBS. Thoughnot all of the demands had been met, one action of tilecommittee proved to be key in persuading the students'return: the administrative committee invited the Civil RightsOffice of the Department of Henlth,Education, and Welfare(HEW) to evaluate Wittenberg's civil rights position.
A press release issued January 19, 1969, by Tracy H.Norris, Wittenberg's Director of Publicity, outlined some ofthe agreements reachedby the committee and the students.In response to the CBS denmnd for an increase in thenumber of Black students to twelve percent of the studentbody within a three yexff period, the faculty recommendedthat the uulversity search for Blacks who would not reqdirefinancial aid. They further suggested that the universityexpand the search for motivated Black students less
The 1969 CBS Walkout: The Means Justified the End. 17
academically prepared who need financial and supplementalassistance. In addition, they suggested that a Black personadvise the Black students and a ist in the recnfitment ofBlack students and that one of the then-present admissionsstaff members concentrate on this recruiting of Blacks. Thefaculty also encouraged the admissions stalt to make morevisits to integrated high schools in large, mid-western cities,the East, and the Deep South and also encouraged morevisits to major junior colleges to seek Black transferstudents. A policy of waiving the $15 application fee fordisadvantaged students was also suggested. (!4)
In response to the demand regarding the increase ofBlack faculty, the faculty executive committeerecommended that department chairpersons contactpredomiuanfly Black institutions for possible candidatesamong graduate students or the current staff. The committeeencouraged depar ent chairs to consider individuals whohave had excellent undergraduate academic records andwho bad the potential to be effective teachers. They alsosuggested that departments expand joint appointments andexchanges between Wittenberg faculty members and Blackfaculty at other institutions. (15)
How were the other demands of CBS met? In responseto the seventh demand, the press release staled that theuniversity administration would not officially close theschool to commemorate the anniversaries of Martin LutherKing's assassination or Malcolm X's birthday because theuniversity officials did not recognize the birth or death ofany other national or religious leaders with a school closing.(16) It is interesting to note that the administrationrecognized X and ICing in the category of "national orreligions leaders." In response to the demand for separateBlack facilities for meetings, socializing, and learning,students also conceived the idea of a Black Culture House,providing that the facility be available to all Wittenbergstudents and be eated as an extension of the StudentUnion. (17)
With these demands addressed, the impending studyfrom the Civil Rights office of the HEW promised, andfurther study of the remaining demands gamranteed, theBlack students felt that their demands had been met, andthey returned to the campus.
Even after the students returned to campus, the• administration continued to take their demands seriously.For example, a memo from Dean A.O. pfinster to Dr.Hensinkveld, dated January 30, 1969, stated that ablackcounselor-advisor, Miss Mabel Jackson [now Dr. Jackson],a professor at Wittenberg, had been appointed, a decisionagreed upon by beth the administrative committee and theCBS. Miss Jackson's appointment would be temporarypending a larger search for someone who could devote moretime to the position and all that it would entail. (18)
Within two months after the walkout, the Civil Rightsoffice of HEW issued the following recommendations aftertheir study of the Wittenberg campus:
1) that the university should make its equalopportunity policy available to prespcetivestudents, students, and the general public; 2) thatthe university should be careful that it abide to itspolicy of assigning rooms without reg d to race,color, or national origin; 3) that all off-campashousing be available without regard to race, color,or national origin; 4) that the university ensure thatstudent organizations do not discriminate on thebasis of race, color, or national origin; 5) that theuniversity create a Human Relations Council toinvestigate allegations of discrimination. (19)
The actual demands and the walk-oat process werevery effective. The Black students were organized in theiractions, and this showed their deep concem. Theyspecifically laid out their demands and gave the university adeadline. This gave a sense of immediacy to their smiggleand required the university's attention. Their form of protestwas also peaceful; this showed the maturity of the studentsand the respect which they had for their colleagues andeducators. For these reasons, the CBS walk-out was a
SUttee.All of the Concerned Black Students' demands had not
been met, but they did capttwe the attention of thecommunity, if only for a brief two months. The effcets,however, of those very dramatic two months have beenlong-lasting. Today, the Concemad Black Students build onthe foundations laid by the past members in uying toconquer acism and to promote a true sense of communityat Wittenberg.
EPILOGUEThe January 31, 1974, edition of the Torch included a full-page article, entitled "1969 CBS demands, 1974 Universityresponse." The article outlined how the university hadresponded to the demands in the five years that had passedsince the walkout. A statement was issued deploring racism.The number of Black students enrolled at Wittenbergtotaled 144 in the 1973-1974 academic year, as opposed to45 in the 1968-1969 academic year, with 126 receivingsome sort of financial aid. Black faculty bad been addedwhere appropriate, but the number of faculty totaled 138,which was down from 155 in the 1968-69 school ye . Thenumber of Black, full-time faculty had risen from two in1968-69 to three. Although non-academic employment hadbeen reduced from 34% since 1968-69, minority positionshad risen from 16.5% in 1968-69 to 21 A% in 1974. Theposition of Black counselor was created in the winter of1969, and Mrs. Margaret Coleman filled the position in thefall of the same year. In 1969, Black students onlyrecognized 4 courses that recognized the Black experience;by 1974, that number had ipled. The demand for holidaysto commemorate the birth of Malcolm X and thaass siuafion of Martin Luther King, Jr. was later rescinded.
18 - The Wittenberg History 1oornal
The 1968-69 Student Senate created a new policy to selectcheerleaders. There were no Black cheerleaders in the 1973football squad because no Black students Med out, andthere was a single applicant for the 1973-74 basketballsquad, but she was denied. Prior to this article's press timein 1974, however, Blacks had been represented on eachsquad. The Black Culture House was established in thewinter term of 1969 and was viewed as an extension of theStudent Center. Because of a lack of interest on campus, the
demand for educational exchanges with all-Black studentbodies was tabled pending increased student interest. Thedemand regarding the acceptance of the two Black studentswho had applied for admission was resolved in 1969 whenboth students rescinded their applications. The UpwardBound Scholarship fund was renamed the WittenbergCommunity Scholarship fund. Since 1968, 20% of finanehlaid moneys have been earmaflced for Black students. (20)
1 M anorandum from Dean A.O. ITmster to Wiucnberg faculty
r garddng the CBS de,hands, 9 ber 1968.
2Dou plakeaon ,,Administrteion Smdfies CB S Demmads-..,'*gWittenberg Torch, 17 January 1969, 1.
3 Meanorandum from Wittenberg's Admlnistrative Committee to
Dire ors, pstrents, Alinrad, pastors, Friends, mad Members of theCampus Community regarding "What s happertmg at Wittenberg?," 9
Dec nber 1968.
4 PLnker t on, 1.
5 Mvmorandum from Manfted Holck, Jr. to the Administralive
Conmaittee regarding Item IV of the CBS demands, 11 De.eember 1968.
6 =Senate to study two CBS dvrnands," Wittenberg Torch, 17
January 1969, 1.
7 Meanorandum from W.E. Reck to Dean A.O. pfinster regarding
an admlrfistrative response to Item I of the CBS dsanands, 23 ber
1968.
8 "Hamma BoycOa Underway," Sun, 16 Jmatmry 1969, 1,4.
9 "paxuat eacs," Wittenberg Torch, 17 January 1969, 2.
10 Russell Leagure, =Finn ttgly," Wittenberg Torch, 17 January
1969, 2.
Endnotes11 Lois Schrsg, =F;.x or forget," W iUenberg Torch, 24 Januaty
1969,2.
12 Memorandum from Dean A.O. pfinster to Wittenberg faculty
regarding the CBS demands, 9 I)eccmber 1968.
13 "Black students end walkout," Wittenberg Torch, 20 January
1969, 1.
14 press elease submitmd by Tracy H. NorriS, Wiv aberg Directorof Publicity, regarding the CBS and university agremacnt, 19 January
1969.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Meanorandum from Dean A.O. PILaster to Dr. H sinkveld
regarding the CBS domands, 30 January 1969.
19 Billy Barron, =A History of the Concerned Black at Witten-berg,"intemship peper, 11 October 1991, 16.
• • =, " er20,1969CBSd rnands, 1974 Urttversaty response, Watenb g
Torch. 31 January 1974, 6.
BibliographyBar.n, Billy. =A History Blacks at Wiuenberg:' internship paper,
I 1 October 1991.
=Black smden end walkcet," Wittenberg Torch, 20 Janvary 1969, 1.
"Hamma Boyee Underway," Sun, 16 January 1969, i,4.
Lecture, Russell =Finn reply." Wittenberg Torch, 17 January 1969.2.
=parrot re.a o" Wittenberg Torch. 17 January 1969, 2.
Pinkerton, Doug, =Admlrdslxafion Sto es CBS D nands...," Wittenberg
Torch, 17 January 1969, 1.
Schrag, Lois. =Fix or forget," Wittenberg Torch, 24 Ianuaty 1969,2.
=Senate to study two C.B.S. demands," Wittenberg Torch,
17 January 1992, I.
Me noranda and stat nents from the fomaer university Vice-preside ,
W.E, Re k' s files.
=1969 CBS derasnds, 1974 UoJversity re.SlXmS¢,'* Wittenberg Torch. 31
Janua 1974, 6.
Education in Occupied Japanby Laura Sponsetler
When Japan surrendered to Allied Forces on August 15,1945, it was a country in shreds. Cities and industries hadbeen bombed to rubble. The Japanese people wereexhausted and starving, drained after years under atotalitarian regime that used potatoes to concoct airplanefuel while the masses went hungry. Their world had beenturned upside-down. The Emperor, the supreme symbol ofthe state and the focal point of worship, had surrendered toforeign troops. In the face of such devastation, theOccupation forces had a formidable task in trying to rebuildshattered Japan.
The Japanese educational system was no different fromthe rest of the social and political stmctttre in Japan: it wasin tatters. The ravages of war had brought 18 millionstudents, a half million teachers, and 40,000 institutions oflearning to a standstill. (1) The schools were in ruins.
The objectives of the Occupation weredemocratization, demilitarization, and reconslraction.Obviously, rebuilding the education system would play anintegral part in achieving these aims. During the six and ahalf years of the Occupation, the Americans diligentlysought to reform Japanese education. However, a significantnumber of their reforms did not endure, as"during the1950's, the original orientation of early postwar educationdisappeared from most schools." (2) Many of theeducational reforms instituted by the American Occupationdid not last, but the underlying aim of democratization ofthe Japanese educational system was ultimately realized.
The intentions of the Americans in remaking Japaneseeducation were benevolenL The Constitution of 1946(written bY an American committee and translated intoJapanese) slates that "the central aim of education is delinedas bringing up self-reliant members of a peaceful anddemcx.-aatic community with a respect for human values."(3) A member of the Education Division of SCAP wrotethat education in Japan "...must somehow be Wansformedfrom a system adapted to a totalitarian society into onewhich could operate to serve its useful function in a society
as yet was to attempt to become democratic in nature:'(4) The goal was to do away with dements that had allowedJapan to be a militaristic nmehine and to introduce elements
what would encourage democracy.
Kazoo Kawai wrote that "the general assumption,among Japanese as well as among foreigners, is whatprewar system of education in Japan had been a notononsinstrument for propagating a reactionary andullranafionalistic point of view and that a revolutionaryreform of the education system was necessary beforedemocracy could make much headway." (5) What wasJapan's prewar system of education? A brief examination ofthe recent history of Japanese education will facilitate anunderstanding of the situation faced by the AmericanOccupiers as they at'rived in Japan.
In the Tokugawa period (1603-1867), Confucianismwas the focal point of studies, but its influence was indecline by the end of the eighteenth centmT. (6) As westominfluences in Japan increased, it became evident whateducational change was necessary. Modem education inJapan began as a result of the Meiji restoration. Educationwas seen as a key tool for the westernization andmodernization of the country, and the system that wasestablished remained essentially the same until the end ofthe Pacific War in 1945. The Imperial Ministry ofEducation was founded in 1871, and a Fundamental Codeof Education was issued in 1872, for the first time inJapanese history outlining a comprehensive national schoolsystem. (7) The goal was modernization of Japan throughthe education of the citizenry, and an important ideal was"schools for the whole citizenryY (8) A system of six yearsof compulsory education was instituted fox both girls and
boys.The Meiji educational reforms were initially made
using westexn schools as models, but reforms were adaptedand the system ultimately developed as a reflecrion ofJapanese tradition. (9) One of the most important results ofthis was that"the aims and functions of education weredefined in terms of imperatives of the new state." (10) Thismeant that from the very beginning, modem Japaneseeducation emphasized "the subordination of the individualto the stateY (11) This tenet undergirded the educationalsystem from the Meiji restoration to the end of World WarII. The purpose of education was not to fully develop theindividual personality but rather to produce a useful servant
of the state. (12)
20 o The Wittenberg History Journal
It was during the Meiji restoration that shushin, or"moral cultivation," was first introduced. Teachers were"required to make moral education primary...to advance the
national character of Japan by combining westernknowledge and techniques with Oriental morality." (13)The Imperial Rescript on Education, proclaimed in 1890,provided an official statement on how to include morals in
education. (14)The basic educationa! system established by the Meiji
Restoration remained until 1945. The educational themes ofindividual subordination to the state and moral education asdecreed by the state facilitated the development of thetotalitarian ulimnationulism winch characterized Japan as itslipped down a militaristic slope toward the destruction ofWorld War IL The guiding principle of the wartimeeducation system was the trinity of "Shintoism,gnvemment, and education." (15) In 1937, the Ministry ofEducation published Kokutai no Hongi, "the CardinalPrinciples of the National Entity," outlining the ideology ofreligious nationalism. (16) Ultranationalism waspromulgated through the cult of state Shinto, winchincluded unswerving worship of the emperor. Primaryschools were renamed "national schools" and provided"basic waining of the people in conformity with the moralprinciples of the Japanese Empire." (17) Of course,education in Japan grew less and less effective as the warprogressed, with disruptions increasing exponentially as wartore the country apart. By 1945, the educational system hadbasically ceased to function.
In the fwst days after surrender, before Americaneducation personnel had even had time to arrive onJapanese soil, the Japanese Ministry of Edacation seized theinitiative in beginning educational reform. Without ordersfrom American personnel, it cancelled all orders anddirectives which had been issued to foster militarism andulwanationalism. (18) For example, military officersuntrained in education had been assigned to teach in thesehools during the war, thus providing a link betweeneducation and the military. Five days before GeneralDouglas M teArthur arrived in Japan, Ministry of EducationOrder #20 purged these officers. (19)
The arrival of the Occupation Forces marked thebeginning of a complete overhaul of the Japanese educationsystem. Educational reforms oectared in two stages. Phaseone was punitive, with "Reform by Directive," andencompassed the period from September 1945 to March1946. (20) During this first stage of reform, efforts wereprimarily directed at purging the system of undesirableelements and formulating make-shift plans for the schoolyear slated to begin in April of 1946. (21) Educationpolicies during this stage were under the auspices of theAmerican military. Specifically, policies were implementedby the Education Division, winch was part of the CivilInformation and Education Section, one of several sectionswithin the General Headqumters of the Supreme Commandfor the Allied Powers. (22) The Education Division was
composed of educators who were either serving in or hiredby the military and who were without extensive Japanese
experience .(23)Four important Directives were issued during this first
stage of reform. SCAP issued a Basic Directive ofEducation on OCL 22, 1945, ordering the Japanesegovernment to remake the schools and providing theideological basis for the entire educational reform program.Elements in education that contributed to militarism andultranationalism were to be abolished, while elementsconducive to education in a democratic society were to beintroduced. Only personnel and curricula winch supportedthose aims were to be utilized. The system was to bedecentralized, breaking up the concenteation of power heldby the Ministry of Education. (24) The other Directivesininated a progonn for screening personnel, abolished stateShinto in education, and suspended all coarses ingeography, Japanese instory, and shushin. (25) Thesuspension of these courses was due to the necessity ofusing wartime textbooks, with objectionable materialdeleted, until new texts could be manufactured. TheAmericans felt that there was so much proinbited materia!in the geography, history, and shushin textbooks that theminuscule amounts of text that remained were unusable(26)
The second stage of Occupation reform, from March of1946 to April of 1952, was elmracterized by constructivemeasures, with an overall tone of guidance and assistance.(27) Reforms in this phase were promulgated by a civilianbody: the United States Education Mission. The EducationMission was a group of nationally known civilian Americaneducation leaders who spent the month of March 1946 inJapan. It operated independently of the Education Divisionand other Occupation agencies. (28) Basically, theEducation Mission sought an ideal system that emphasizeddecentralization of educational control and the developmentof individual growth. (29) It made proposals comprising sixcategories: the aims and content of Japanese education,language reform, the administration of education, teachingand the education of teachers, adult education, and inghereducation. (30)
An important component of reforms of this period wasthe idea of popularization of education. As Article 3 of theFundamental Law of Education (1947) stated, "the peopleshall all be given equal opportunities of receivingeducation..." (31) This was in direct contrast with the dualsllucture of the prewar system of education, which usedrigid tracking to separate elite and mass education. (32)With the introdaction of democratic ideals after World War/I came the adoption of a "single track" as opposed to theprevious multi-wack system. (33) Besides the reorganizationinto a single wack, the popularization of education was alsoacineved through the raising of the age at which studentswere permitted to leave school, the emphasis on equal co-edncation, and adult education programs. (34)
Education changed dramatically in the last half of the1940's due to five education laws enacted as a result of the
i
Education in Occupied Japan ° 21
U.S. Education Mission's recommendations. TheFundamental Law of Education has already beenmentioned. Also of extreme importance was the 1948School Board Law, which imposed an unfamiliar pattern ofdecentralization on the Japanese system with theestablishment of popularly elected local school boards. (35)
To summarize, a plethora of reforms resulted from theEducation Mission's recommendations. The whole systemof education was reorganized, with a move to a single wack,6-3-3-4 system and with the extension of compulsoryeducation to nine years. (36) The number of universitieswas also vastly increased, with a greater emphasis onbroader humanistic education. (37) Schools were made co-educational and women were given access to institutions ofhigher learning. (38) Development of the concept of theindividual was encouraged through introduction of aflexible system encouraging student im'fiative instead oflearning by rote. Decentralization was achieved with thecreation of local school boards. (39) One reform which wasnot adopted was the proposed reform of the Japanesewritten language. Very few of the American O upiersknew Japanese, and the exlreme divergence of the languagefrom western norms led to recommendations for ilssimplification. Specifically, the Americans wanted toromanize the written system of kanji. However, theJapanese resisted such a radical despeiling of their cuinwalheritage. (40)
The end of the American Occupation marked thebeginning of a new phase in Japanese education, as thejapanese reacted to American Iefoms by "'re-reforming " (41)Many educational reforms barely outlasted the O upalion,and "the shift from the U.$. pattern of education practicetoward a more Japanese pattern was completed within
fifteen years." (42)The process of reversal began even before the
Occupation ended in April 1952. In April of 1951, PresidentTruman removed General Douglas MaeArthor from hisposition as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. (43)The new SCAP, General Matthew Ridgeway, had a verydifferent focus. One source described him as "primarilyconcerned with Kore&..[he] knew and cared little about theAmerican reforms in Japan." (44) In this new atmosphere,Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigem reported nodifficulty in persuading him to allow the Japanesegovernment to consider revision of laws. In August 1951,the subsequently<xeated Ordinance Review Committeerecommended adminisWafive streamlining, entailing theabolition of bourds of education in cities with populationsunder 150,000. (45)
In 1956, the New School Board Law effectivelyabolished the Education Mission's much-vaunted programof decentralization. (46) In 1957, the MinisWy of Educationdecided to once again incorporate moral education into theelementary and middle school cttrricula. (47) In the latterhalf of the 1950's, the Ministry continued to revise schoolcurricula, with "a definite departure from the early postwar,
experience-centered education and a shift to a moretraditional, subject-centered education with focus on thecontinuity of Japanese culture and structured iastmctiorL.." (48)By the end of the 1950's, them was a new orientationtoward a greater degree of uniformity, state control,traditional subject-centered roaching, and behavioral
conditioning. (49)With so many reforms jettisoned so quickly, the
question may well be asked: were the educational refcamsof the American Occupation a failure? Certainly manyAmerican observers had a very negative view of the fate ofJapanese education. In the early 1950's, one Americanwrote that "little remained of the highly lauded innovationsand reforms. Launched amid fanfares of publicity andpromises, most of them had been repealed or...distorted andignored." (50) However, such pessimism was largelymistaken, for several reasons.
First of all, the changes in education instituted by theJapanese after the Occupation must be seen as part of auamml process of making the "transplanted" damocraticeducation take root in Japanese soil. They did not signal thefailure of democurey and a return to totaliladan, ultra-nationalistic tendeucies. Instead, Japanese reversal of manyof the Occupation reforms was necessary and naturalbecause of their basic incompatibility with Japanese cd.tme.The Americans knew very little about the Japanese soctetythat they were wying to reform, and therefore, many of theiractions were characterized by a dearth of culturalsensitivity. For example, one American, defending theproposed reform of the Japanese language, wrote that
"there
is no poasib ty of demneraey flourSdfing in a land withsuch an outlandish method of speaking and writing." (51)
Kazuo Kawai, the editor of the Japan Times for veralyears after World War U (52), wrote that"SCAP ecaxecflydiagnosed the defects of the old system of Japaneseeducation and strenuously sought to remedy them byintroducing the chief features of American education." (53)An example is provided by the American emphasis ondecentralization. The Americans, from one of the mosteducationally decentralized countries in the world, sought m,impose their system on a country winch had no suchwadition. A centralized system is not autoroatieallyanathema to democracy. France, a modern, democraticnation, has a completely contmlized system of edneatiun.(54) The system of local school boards simply did not workin Japan. This reform often had the undesirable result oftaking control from competent, experienced bmeaacraficprofessionals in the Ministry of Education and giving it topetty, venal, corrupt local bosses. (55) It did not work inJapan, and it was eliminated after the Occopadoo ended.
Another example of areform in nsitive to the realitiesof Japanese society was the attempt to replace shushin,moral education, with social studies. Social studiesrepresented completely unfamiliar territory fur Japaneseeducators. They had never taught history and geography insuch an integrated form, and there was a re.suiting shortage
22 - The Wittenberg History Journal
of qualified teachers. Also, in the 1950's, the Japanese feltthat their youth were not receiving adequate moraleducation. A widespread feeling was that the war haddestroyed the religious foundations of Japan, and that youngpeople were being swallowed up in a resulting moralvacuum. Symptomatic of this was a rise in juvenile crimerates after World War II. (56) The reinstatement of moraleducation, made mandatory in 1962, did not mean a returnto martial, nllranafionalisfic values, but rather supportedideas of respect and harmony. The name of the lessons waschanged from shushing with its strong militaristic overtones,
to dotoku. (57)Benjamin C. Duke wrote of two trends that were
discernible in Japanese education in 1964. First, thepreviously discussed Japanese reforms of American reformsillustrate an inexorable movement in an ideologicallyconservative direction. Second, and very important inevaluating the effectiveness of American educationalreform, are liberal democratic influences implanted by theAmericans that did last, with tremendous effect on Japaneseeducation and society. (58) Ultimately, the .American effortto popnlafiz Japanese education had a very rmportanteffesL Resdts are most noticeable at the higher levels ofeducation. In 1935, only 39.7% of the Japanese populationcompleted secondary school. In 1947, that figure had risento 61.7%, and by 1955, 78%. Only 3% of the populationattained the level of higher education in 1935, compared to5.8% in 1947, and 8.8% in 1955. (59) During and after theAmerican Occupation, more people were reaching higherlevels of education. Occupation reforms also opened the
doors of education to women, "symbolizing a new era ofeducational opportunity." (60) The system that wasestablished is today characterizezL especially at theuniversity level, by academic, political, and social freedom.
(61) In a final evaluation of the results of AmericanOccupational reforms, one must look at the original goals ofthe Occupation. In an initial policy statement, the UnitedStates stated that it sought to "insure that Japan will notagain become a menace to the peace and security of theworld." (62) Arguably, the intent of the democratic systemas expressed in the 1947 Basic Law of Education lives onbeyond the reforms. (63) Japan is now a peaceful,democratic nation. Even when the prohibition on rearmingwas lifted, Japan "chose not to modify its pacifist way oflife." (64) In the words of Herbert Passin,
...in a large sense, the Occupation did accomplishits broad objectives...to transform Japan from amilitaristic, ultranationalistic, fascist, imperial stateinto a peacefully inclined, democratic, andeconomically healthy nation that would neveragain be a threat to the peace and security of theworld. (65)
The American Occupation instituted numerous reforms inits attempt to reshape Japanese education after World War1I. Due to incompatibility with Japanese culture, many ofthe specific reforms did not last, but the spirit of deraocracy
endured.
Endnotes
1 Joseph C, Tralnor, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan(Tokyo: Mesei University press, 1983),
2 Nobao K. Shimahara, Adaptation and Education in Japan (New
york: ptaeger Publishers, 1979), 67.
30uain* of Educatinn in Japan (Tokyo: Int rnatlonal CulturalRelations Division, Government of Japan, July 1972), 1.
4 Tralnor, viii.
5 Ka ao Kawai, Japan's Armrican Interlude (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1960), 183.
11 lbld.
12 Kawai, 185.
13 Tokiomi, 54.
14 Ibid., 56.
15 Makoto Aso and ]kuo Amano, Education and Japan'sModernization (Tokyo: Japan Times, Ltd., 19831, 56.
16 Trainor, 86.
17 Am, 57.
6 Shimshara, 46, 18 Trainor, 19.
7 Ibi&, 47.
8 Kaigo Tokiomi, Japanese Educatian: Its past and present
(Tokyo: Kokusal Btmka Shir&oki, 1968), 50.
9 Ibid., 52,
10 Shimaham, 44.
19 Ibid., 20.
20 Ronald S. Anderson, Education in Japan: A Century of ModernDevelopment (Washingtan: U.S. Department of Health. Education, and
Welfare, 1975), 63.
21 Trainor, 74.
Education in Occupied Japan ° 23
22 ibid., vi.
23 Kawai, 188.
24 Trainor, 31.
25 ibid., 35.
26 ibid., 37.
27 Anderson, 64.
28 Trainor, 68,
29 Shimahara, 62.
30 lbid., 64.
Endnotes = cont.44 ibid., 110.
45 Robert E. Ward and olo yoshikaza, eds., Democratizkag
Japan: tlnz Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1987.), 277.
46 Shimahara, 71.
47 lbid., 68.
48 ibid., 67.
49 ibld.,74.
50 Harcy Emerson Wfldes, Typhoon in Tokyo: the Occupation andits Aftermath (New york: Octagon Books, 1978), 337.
51 Trainor, 298.
31 Education in Japan 1971: A Graphic Presentation (Tokyo:Ministry of Edueati a: Goverranent of Japan, 1971), 9.
32 Shimahara, 58,
33 Outline, 1,
34 Tetsuya Kobayashi, Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan
(Great Britain: Pergam m Press, 1976), 48.
35 Shimahara, 63.
36 Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (WesttxnCor .: Greenwood Press, 1948), 60.
37 Anderson, 75,
38ibi&, 64.
39 Martin, 61.
40 Trainor, 299.
4l Aso, 69.
42 Shimahara, 62.
43 Herbert p sln, "The Oec pation e Reflections;'Daeda/u.€ (Summer 1990): 108.
52 passin, 120.
53 Kawal, 195.
54 passin, 23.
55 Anderson, 69.
56 Ben C. DtLke, "The Irony of Japanese postwar Education,
Comparative Education Review (February 1963), 214.
57 Ben C. Dake, =American Educational Reform in Japan Twdveyears Later," Harvard Educational Review 34(4) (Fall 1964), 526.
58 ibid., 525.
59 Education in Japan 1971: A Graphic Preseatatio, 16.
60 Tralnor, 62.
61 Duke, 532.
62 passin, 110,
63 Duke, 532.
64 Makato Ioldbe, "Japan Meet the Umted St teB for the SecondTmae," Daeda/us (Summer 1990), 105,
65 passin, 124,
BibliographyAndersc , Romdd S. Education in Japan: A Century of Mndern
Development, Washington: U.S, Department of Heath,
Education, and Welfare, 1975.
-- "The Irony of Japanese Postwar Education." Comparative
Education Review (February 1963): 212-7.
Aao, Makoto & Amano, ]kuo. Education and Japan's Mndernlzation.
Tokyo: Jap Timea, Ltd., 1983.
Education in Japan 1971: A Graphic Presentation. Tokyo: Mir try ofEducaticta, GoverrLment of Japan, 1971.
Duke, Ben C. "American Education Refomaa in Japan Twelve yearsLater." Harvard Educational Review 34(4)(Fall 1964): 525-36.
H II, Robert King. Education for a New Japan. WeatIm , Corm.:
Gre.enwood Press, 1988.
24. The Wittenberg History Journal
Bibliography - cont.• - *v j/
passin. Herbert."T'neOccupan SomeRefec a°ns- Danda/ ,Horio, Tgaxthisa. Educational Thoug/d and Ideology in Modern Japan: Summer 1990, 106-125,
State Authority and Intdinctual Freedom. Tc 'yo: University of
Tokyo Press, 1988.
Ioka'be, Makoto, "Inpma Meets the Umted States for the Second Time,"
Danda/us, Summer 1990, 91-106.
Shimahara, Nobuo IC Adaptation and Education in Japan. New york:Praeger Publishers, 1979,
KawFd, Kazao. Japan's American Interlude, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960.
Tokiomi K tigo. Japanese Education: Its past and Present. Tokyo:Kokusai Banka Shinkoki, 1968.
Kobayashi, Tetsuya. Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan. Great
Britain: Perga aon press, 1976.
Michio, Nagal. Higher Education in Japan: lt Take-off and Crash.Tokyo: Univetslty of Tokyo Press, 1971.
Outline of Education in Japan. Tokyo: International Cultural RelationsDivision, Government of Japan, July 1972.
Martin, Edwin M The Allied Occupation of Japan. Westport, Corm.:
Greenwood Press, 1948.
Trainor, Joseph C, Educational Reform in Occupied Japan. Tokyo:
Mesei University Press, 1983.
Ward, Robert E. & yos kaa, Sakamoto, ed. Democratizing Japan: theAllied Occupation. Honolulu: Univecity of Hawaii press, 1987.
Wildes, Harry Emerson. Typhoon in Tokyo: the Occt aion and ltsAJ erma/b- New York: Octagon Books, 1978.
John C. Calhoun's -A Disquisition on Governmentby John Bennen
In his book A Disquisition on Govermnent, John C. Calhounspells out his beliefs about what government is and how itshould be organized. Calhoun believes that government iscreated by men in order to "protect and preserve society,"although he sees a great risk in the domination of thatsociety by the majority. (1) Therefore, he proposes the ideaof the "concurrent majority" in government, in which
"each
division or interest" in society is given a veto in thegovernment in order to protect its rights fromencroachment. (2) In many ways Calhoun's writing harksback to earlier republican thinkers who distrusted thedomination of the majority, ranging from Aristotle toThomas Jefferson and George Mason.
John Caldwell Calhoun was bern on March 18, 1782,in the farm country of southwestern South Carolina to afamily of Scottish-Irish farmers. During his youth, therewas great upheaval in his home state due to the westwardspread of slave labor from the coastal regions of SouthCarolina because of the spread of cotton planting. (3) SouthCarolina at this time was dominated by white planters wholived in the coastal regions and who were successful at thestate's Constitutioanl Convention of 1790 in:
he shared the commonly-held Southern belief that "theSouthern economy without the slave would coliapseY (5)During his lime in the Serial, be opposed abolitionistefforts to pressure Congress into enacting legislation onslavery in the territories and in the District of Columbia. (6)Calhoun viewed this as an incredible threat to the Union,not only because it represented the domination of themajority in government, but also because he viewed slaveryas the "corner-stone of our republican edifice." (7)
Calhoun's defense of slavery rests mainly on racialgrounds. He felt that not everyone possessed the "virtuerequired for citizenship in a republican government," which
hoed earlier republican thinking that virtuous men wereneeded for government to function properly. (8) Clearly, hefelt riot blacks were incapable of earning the "reward" ofliberty; therefore they were to work in order that others(namely whites) could fully "enjoy liberty." (9)
Despite his motives for defending slavery, Calhoun stillclearly wrote the Disquisition in order to protect the rightsof political minority groups. The vehicle by which Calhounhoped to aecomplish this was the so-ealled "concurrentmajority7 The conctment majority proposal was designedby Calhoun to:
...insisting that taxable property includingslaves be used as a base along with populationfor representation in the state legislature. (4)
The farmers of the interior region were thus clearlydisadvantaged, because slavery was nowhere near asextensive in their region as it was in the coastal areas. JohnC. Calhoun thus spent much of his childhood listening to hisfather gue about how unfair the political situation in SouthCarolina was, as it was a state in which just one-fifth of thewhite population dominated the political landscape. Thesediscussions undoubtedly had an effect on the youngerCalhoun, as he could see the effects of injustice in thegovernment, for the dominant coastal planters were blamedfor much of the lack of development in the interior.
Calhoun wrote his Disquisition in part to defendslavery, which he felt was threatened by the influence ofabolitionist forces in the govornmenL He further viewed thisas a great threat to the entire social structure of the South, as
...give to each division or interest, through itsappropriate organ, either a concmaent voice inmaking and executing the laws, or a veto on theirexecution. (10)
This desire for the protection of political minorities comesin part from the long-held fear of the Founding Fathers thatrepublican government would ultimately be "subverted" bythe effects of one faction or group gaining power and usingthat power to dominate the political minorities. (11) Unlikeothur political thinkers such as James Madison, who felt thatthe sheer size of the United States would be sufficient inpreventing the majority from invading "the rights of othercitizens," Calhoun felt it was vital to construct a systemwhich would ensure this, rather than to leave events to
chance. 02)Calhoun sought support for his plan for conctmmnt
majority in government through use of historical precedents,
26 o The Wittenberg History Journal
estx ially the governmental system of the Roman Republic.Calhoun viewed the Roman Republic as having beendominated by the patricians after the fall of the monarchy.After a long period of oppression by the patricians, the
• , . , ded "conce ions flomplebeians finally rose up and dornanthe ruling elite." (13) Ultimately, the plebeians were able to
gain a veto "over all actions of government-" (14) Clearly,
this example serves Calhoun's case well, as it helps to provethat the idea of concmaent majority in government not onlyis a good idea but also is feasible; it has worked in the pastand could possibly work in the future.
Another historical precedent which Calhoun founduseful was one from his own home state of South Carolina.In 1808, while Calhoun was serving in the state legislature,a compromise was worked out giving the two sections ofthe state (the coastal and interior regions) effective vetOeSover the actions of each other. This was done through a"system of apportionment and representation" which gaveeach region control of one house of the legislature. (15) Thisnot only protected each region of the state flom dominationby the other but also gave the state an
"unusual degree of
harmony." (16) South Carolina thus gave Calhoun aglowing example of how one state adopted the system ofconcurrent majority in government with a happyconclusion, despite the fact that it governed only 275,(D0
white men.Calhoun's deske to protect minority rights can also be
seen in his views on nullification, the doctrine in which astate may veto a federal law on its territorY. He saw it as a"way out short of secession" on occasion when the federalgovernment was overstepping its bounds. (17) Calhounspoke out in support of nullification during the Crisis of1832, when the lenders of South Carolina felt that they were"being extorted by an unjust tariff," and moved to nullify"the tariff in South Carolina. (18) Calhoun mdy believed inthe preservation of the Union and looked upon nullificationand the concuaent majority as ways to preserve it from the
threat of majority domination.A major component of this system was the necessity of
virtuous men in the government- This is consistent with thepolitical beliefs of earli republican thinkers, who alsofocused on the necessity of virtue in the government toprotect the rights of the people. Indeed, Calhoun has often
been described as an "eighteenth-centmy republican" for hisbelief that a constitutional system had to be created in orderto "make virtue a necessity:' (19) Clearly, virtuous menwould be required in a system in which every faction had aveto in the govemmenL for if the leaders were unable to setaside their own seff-interesL then the government would beunable to perform its duties; this would ultimately result inava hy, which Calhoun feared as being "the worst of all
evils." (20)In conclusion, John C. Calhoun's A Disquisition on
Government represents an attempt not only to protect theinstitution of slavery in the American South but also tocreate a political theory which could be applied to everyonein American society. Concurrent majority was an attempt to"'wanscend sectional preoccupations,' which were becomingincreasingly impoaant in a society which was rapidlydividing over the issue of siax, ery. (21) Although he hasbeen accused of "endeavoring intentionally to incense theNorth and the South against each other; Calhoun feltthroughout his life that he was acting in accordance with his"imperious dutY towards the South and towards the Union."(22) perhaps in the end it is best to describe Calhoun ascontinuing the work of the Founding Fathers in building asystem of government which would protect the rights of allcitizens, even though Calhoun's work was in part a defenseof a system we find reprehensible today, instead of anattempt to expand the "'realm of liberty to include those to
whom freedom was denied." (23)John C. Calhoun in Iris A Disqdsition on Governmem
above all else was trying to develop the "constitutionalmechanisms that would insure the perpematiofi of thoserepublican values" he so cherished, although in the end thesystem he created was incapable of bridging the gulf whichhad already develolxxl in the United States over slavery. (24)One can also question whether such a system could evertidy function in a society as vast and diverse as that of theUnited States, as one of the main examples Calhoun held upfor comament majority, South Carolina and the Compromise °f1808, entailed less than 300,000 white men, hardlyrepresentative of the tme nature of society, either then ornow. Perhaps the best way to protect the rights of politicalminorities is to ensure that all members of society continueto use the vote as the only true way to protect their rights°
Endnotes5 Charles M. Wil e,, John C Calho Sectionalist, 1840-1850
1 John C Calhoun, A Disquisition on Gove.rmmnt, eaited, with animmxlucdon, by C. Gordon Poa (New york: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 7.
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Metril, 1951), 50.
6 Nivva, 307.
2 Ibld.,7.
3 John I tven, John C. Calhoun and th* price of Union: A
Biography (Baton Rouge and London: Loulsi aa State University press,
1988), 11-12.
7 I. william Harris, "Last of the Clasdcal Republlemas: AnInterpretation of Jolm C. Calhotm." Civil War History 30 (S eptemb,r
1984):263.
4 Ibid., 11.
8 Ibid., 262.
John C. Calhoun's -A Disquisition on Government • 27
9 Ibid,, 262-263.
10 Calhoun, 20.
11 Lacy K. Ford, Recoveriog the Republic: Calhoun, SouthCarolina. and the Conc rr t Majority," South Carolina Historical
Magazine (1988): 150.
12 James Madison, FederMist Paler Number 20, quoted in TheAn rican Intellectual Tradition, edited by David A. Hollioger andCharles Capper (New york and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
184.
r, • , w13 Ford, RecovermgtheRelmblin..., 154.
14 Ibi&, 154.
15 Ibid., 154.
16 Ford, =Recovering the Republic...," 155.
17 Margaret L. Coit, ed,, John C. Calhoun (F glewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentic-Hall, 1970), 32.
18 Ibid., 33.
19 Lacy K. Ford, "Republican Ideology in a Slave Society; ThaPolitical Economy of John C. Calhoun," Journal of So hern History(August 1988): 410 11.
20 Harris, 265.
21 Robert A. Garson, "I lave " as political Theo : TheExamples of John C. Calh an mad George Fitzhugh," South Atlantic
Quarterly (Spring 1985): 199.
22 H. Von Hoist, John C. Calhow (Boston: Houghtcal
1582 and 1889), 124.
t4 " . W23Ford' RecovenngtheRelmblic..., 159.
24 Ibid.. 155.
BibliographyCalhoun, John C. A Disquisition on Government and Sdections from the
Discourse. E ted, with an Introducfitm by C. Gordon post. New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955.
Garzon, Robert A. "Proslavery as politica! Thnoty: The Exan,,pI ofJohn C. Calhoun and George Vazhogb," South AtlanticQuarterly. VoL 84 (Sp6ng 19g5): 197-212.
Coil, Margaret L, ed. John C. Calhoun. Eoglewood Cliffs, NJ.:Prenficg-
Hall, 1970.
Harris, L Wtliiarn. =Last of the Clasfieal Republicans: An Intentionof John C. Calhoun." Civil War History. VoL 30
(Septeanber 1984): 255-267.
Ford, Lacy ]L "Recovering the Repubfic: Calhoun, South Carolina, andthe Concurrent Majority:' South Carolina Historical Magazine.Vol. 89, no,3 (1988): 146-15%
Niven. John. John C. Calhoun and the Price of Unlon: A Biography.Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Urdveraity Press, 1988.
• "Republican Ideology in a Slave Sodety: The politicalEconomy of 3ohn C. Calhoun." Journal of SouZhern History.
Vol. LIV, no. 3 (August 1988): 405424.
Von Hoist, H. John C. Calhotm. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1882 and1889.
Wiltsa, Clmdes M. John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist, I M0-1850.Indianapolis: Bobbs-MertilL 1951.
How the Shah Won: The CIA's Role in theIranian Coup of 1953
by Pame/a Ehresrnan
The official version waS quite simple: on August 19, 1953,the Iranian Shah Pahlavi replaced Mohammed Mossadeghwith General Fazlollah Zahedi as Prime Minister of Iran.However, the actual events of that restless summer in Iranwere much more devious, much more conspiratorial. TheShah's move to oust Mossadegh was not his alone, and itwas not accomplished by a simple royal decision, butinstead by plotting and covert action. In addition to theIranians who supported the Shah, Western influence playeda critical role in organizing and implementing the overthrowof Mohammed Mossadegh. British intelligence, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and especially the U.S. CentralIntelligence Agency represented the Western powers who
participated in planning the coup.The conflict that culminated in the coup of 1953 began
with unrest over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).An agreement signed in 1933 gave the British-dominatedAIOC an oil concession in Iran for sixty years -- until1993. The royalties that the Iranian government receivedfrom this concession comprised UP to thirty percent of Iran'snational income and sixty percent of its foreign exchange,
yet-- and this was the sensitive point for most Iranians--
the AIOC earned ten times what it paid to lran. (1) Clearly,Iron felt exploited by the British, who controlled Iran'smajor ie.,sonlv .
The Shah, recognizing that the AIOC operated inBritish, not Iranian, interests, proposed to remedy thesituation as a component of his Seven Ye Economic Plan.(2) Advocating the nationalization of the oil industrybecame "politically correct" in Iran dating the early 1950s.In i950, a petroleum analyst for the U.S. State Departmentsummed UP the mood in Iran: "AIOC and the British aregenuinely hated in lran; approval of AIOC is treated aspolitical suicide." (3) Apparently, his analysis was correct,forin 1951 Prime Minister Razmara spoke in opposition tonationalizing the oil industry and four days later wasassassinated. Negotiations with the AIOC for a fairer shareof its profits were failing, and one prime minister afteranother, all struggling with the issue of nationalizing oil,.proved too unpopular with the Iranian people to remain moffice. Out of this chaos, Mohammed Mossadegh arose.
Mossudegh, age 78 in 1951, bad served thirty years in
the Majlis, Iran's lower house of Parliameut- BecauseMossadegh was popular and passionate aboutantionalizatJon, the Shah promised to support him if hewould nationalize the oil industry and raise the standard ofliving. (4) Mossudegh, therefore, became prime minister onApril 19, 1951, and Iran's policy toward the West shifted toreflect the general attitude of Iranians aS he lrmclaimed,
"It
is better to be independent and produce only one ton of oil ayear than to produce 32 million tons and be a slave toBritain." (5) In September 1951, he expelled all BritishAIOC employees from Irun, which threw the refinery plantsinto disarray and left 70,000 Iranian AIOC employeeswithout pay. After a continuing impasse in negotiationswith the AIOC, Mossedegh boldly broke relations withBritain and ordered the remaining British citizens out of hiscountry. After these two acts, the oil stopped flowing,causing Iran to lose the oil revenues on which it sodesperately dependexL The AIOC oil income, although lessthan Iran desired, was crucial to the country's economichealth. Time magazine interpreted Mossadegh's seeminglyself-defeating maneuvers as choosing "the ruin of Iran" over
surrender to the British. (6)America' s reaction to the AIOC-nationalization issue
was more sympathetic to Iran than to Britain. For example,when the British wanted to respond to Iraniannationalization with military force, the United Statesdissuaded them from action: Assistant Secretary of StateGeorge McGee believed that the British "were forcingnationalization on themselves" by acting so stubbornlywhen negotiating with Ion; in essence, he felt the AIOCshould have accepted fran's initial offer to share oil profitsevenly. (7) True, Mossudegh proved just as unyielding asthe British, but the United States tended to sympathize withhis slluggle against imperialism.
The Shah, meanwhile, had changed from beingsupportive of Prlme Minister Mossadegh to beingembarrassed by him. The Shah later wrote, "He spent hisentire tenure of office fighting the [AIOC] in an amateurfashion and regardless of the effects upon his country." TimShah further criticized the Prime Minister for his limitedgrasp of economics and for negotiating as though Iranian oilwere the only oil to which the British bad access. (8) Of
How the Shah Won: The CIA's Role in she Iranian Coup of 1953 "29
course, Britain found other sources of oil (Kuwait andVenezuela) and responded to Mossadegh's impudence byimposing a boycott on Iranian oil. By the end of 1951, theShah began to realize that Mossadegh may have done moreto harm than to help his country. The Shah also becamesuspicious of the growing support Mussadegh wasgarnering as the leader of a loose coalition of politicalgroups called the National Front, which (most significantlyfrom America's standpoint) included the communist Tudeh
party.In November 1952, frustrated representatives of the
AJOC approached Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA's chiefrepresentative in the Middle East, about overthrowing thePrime Minister of Iran because he was causing theircompany so much trouble. Expelled from Iran, the AJOCand British intelligence found they bad to rely on Americanintelligence for a successful coup. The British also proposedthat Roosevelt be the field commander for a joint operationto overthrow Mossadegh, and Roo velt accepted. He didnot believe, however, that the lime was fight to sell the planto the American government because President Truman wasstill in power. In Iris book Countercoup: The Struggle forControl oflran, Roosevelt wrote, "As I told my Britishcolleagues, we had, I felt sure, no chance to win approvalfrom the outgoing adminisUation of Truman and Acheson.
• • " n
"The new Republicans, however, might be qmte differe t-James Bill, an export in American-Iranian relations, a .gmesthat the conservative governments that came to power mBritain (under Winston Chorehill and Anthony Eden) and inAmerica (under Eisenhower and Duties)
"were more
susceptible to the argument of the oil industry and werecor derably mere patm id about the communist
" (9)
Despite its decision to participate in England's boycott ofIranian oil, the outgoing Truman administration hadofficially supported Mossadegh.
After Eisenhower took office, Mossadegh found that hefaced a new, tougher American policy toward Iran. In May1953, he appealed to America for more economic aid tosubstitute for Iran's loss of oil income. In his letter to thePresident, Mossadegh implied that he would tm-n to theSoviets for aid ff E'tsenhower refused him. Despite thethreat, Eisenhower did refuse him, advising that Iran shouldsettle with the AIOC and sell its oil to obtain the desperatelyneeded funds. But Eisenhower's covert response toMossudegh's request was Operation AJAX, the plan tooverthrow him, approved four days before Eisenhowerpenned his official reply to Mossadegh. (10)
Meeting to approve Operation AJAX were Ken'nitRoosevelt; John Foster Ddlles, the Secretary of State; hisbrother Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA; Loy Henderson,Ambassador to Iron; and other members of the StateDepamuent. As the field commander for AJAx, Roosevelthad devised a plan for the coup, which be presented at themeeting. Those in attendance sUe, ssed the communist threatto lran, stemming from the communist Tudeh party'ssupport for Mossadegh. Roosevelt told his small audience,
"Nattwally, the British have been primarily concerned withtheir oil problem, while our concern has been principally theSoviet threat to Iranian sovereignty," or what he later called"the obvious threat of Russian takeover." (11) John FosterDulles had become convinced that the Soviet Union soughtcontrol of Iron to fulfillits long held desire for a warm*water port. In the Cold War atmosphere of the early 1950s,most top officials in the U.S. government believed that thecommunists had aspirations for dominance in Iran andwould achieve them through Mossadegh.
Keffnit Roosevelt focused on three crucial points in hispresentation of Operation AJAX. First, the operation wouldinclude full cooperation of the Iranians, led by the Shahhimself. (At the time of the meeting, however, the Shah wasnot aware of Anglo-American intentions in his country.)Second, Roosevelt emphasized that "in a showdown that isclearly recognized as a showdown, the Iranian army and theIranian people will back the Shah. They will back himagainst Mossadegh, and most especially, against theRussians." (12) Creating a"clear showdown" would be therole of Operation AJAX. Third, he felt that the worst thatcould happen ff AJAX failed would be that communistswould take over Iron, the same as would occor ff Ametieadid nothing. Presented with this frightening picture ofimminent Soviet dominance in Iran, all in attendanceapproved Operation AJAX.
What was not discussed in the meeting, or at least wasnot reported as being discussed, was the issue of oil VernonWaiters, a chronicler of the CIA, notes that the Dullasbrothers had previously been palmers in a Wall Street lawfirm that represented the AIOC, and that Allen Dullesenthusiastically favored the joint operation in Iran butmaintained "a casual and noncommittal posture." James Billasserts, "There is little doubt that petroleum considerationswere involved in the American decision to assist in the[operation]... Y (13) Indeed, after Mossadegh wasreplaced, American.oil companies secured a forty percent
interest in Iranian oil.On the surface, though, and probably deep down for
many U.S. foreign policy makers, saving Iran fromcommunism was the only official reason for Americaninvolvement in the coup. Anthony Eden, Britain's foreignminister, claimed that Eisenhower "seemed obsessed by thefear of a Communist Iran," and was determined not to letIran become a second China. Likewise, Time reported thatthe consensus among Americans in Iran was that thecountry would soon welcome communLsm if it were lefralone. Gladys and Richard Harkness, the only jotu-nalists towhom the CIA leaked AJAX information, ex thetypical Cold War mindset when they wrote, "A Russianscore there would mean the emmbling of the democraeies'position in the Middle Easffrom Calm to BalcichistanY (14)Mass media during the early fifties took advantage of thisCold War rhetoric and incoaeetly identified Mossadegh'snationalist ideology as communistic.
Despite America's assumption that the Soviet Unign
30 o The Wittenberg History Journal
conlrolled Mossadegh through the Tudeh party, the USSRdid not want to become involved in Irma. As the KoreanWar came to a dose, Ru ia hoped to improve relationswith the United States, which meant avoiding confrontationin Iran. Although the Soviets had no plans to take over Irau,they did not refrain from holding wads talks withMossadegh's government. On August 8, 1953, Eisenhowerheard rumors of Soviet aid to Iran, which convinced him togive the final go-ahead to Operation AJAX. (15)
Another major development in the summer of 1953that contributed to the coup was Mossadegh's unmistakableencroachment upon the Shah's power. In July, Mossadeghattempted to pass legislation that would make himself theCommander in Chief of the Iranian army. The .Majlisrefused to pass the law, and the Shah, recogn mgMossadegh's threat to his monarchical control, replaced himwith a new prime minister. Immediately, violent protestsagainst the Shah's decision broke out on the streets ofTeheran, foreIng the Shah to reappoint Mossadegh. Theuprising proved that Mossadegh was a popular leader whotapped into a growing nationalist sentiment among themasses in Iron. This popular support for his brazen rivaldistressed the Shah, who did not yet know about OperationAJAX. After regaining power, Mossadegh enacted moreauthoritarinn measures by suspending the Majlis (inretaliation for denying him the Commander in Chiefposition), extending martial law, and restricting the press. Inhis account of the situation, Eisenhower wrote,
"The Shah,
however, decided not to conduct a military coup; instead heresolved to do what the Constitution permitted him to do--appoint Mossadegh's successor." (16) True, the Shah didappoint a new Prime Minister, but the method clearly wasnot authorized by the Iranian Constitution.
According to Kennit Roosevelt, Operation AJAXplanned four "lines of attack." First, the operation had towin the support of the religious right, and second, that of themilitary. Third, support had to be won for whomever theShah named as Mossadegh's replacement. The Shah'schoice was General Fazlollah Zahedi, a man the British hadtaken prisoner during World War Two because theysuspected he was pro-Nazi. Roosevelt assured the Britishthat he had every indication that Zahedi was now pro-British; they took his word for it, and both America andBritain backed Zahedi as Mossadegh's replacement. (17)
Operation AJAX's fourth objective was to have Iranianagents "distribute pamphlets, organize mobs, keep track ofthe opposition -- you name it, they'll do it." The key todriving Iranians to the pro-Shah side was convincing themthat Mossedegh was depending on tha USSR and alienatinglran from the West. Also, they had to persuade Iranians thatif Mossadegh extended his "personal regime.., there couldbe no continuing meaningful role for a monarch in Iron."
(18) Some members of the Mossadeghhed National Frontbecame convinced of these two points without any helpfrom the West. The loosely banded National Front included
both the religious, traditional middle-class and the liberal,modern middle-clnss, bound together because they bethopposed British imperialism and monarchicalauthoritarianism. As the communist Tudeh party becamlemore vocal in the National Front, the religions right, whichconsidered communism atheistic, abandoned the coalition.According to Bill, this caused a "serious blow" toMossadegh because it "effectively cut his connections withthe lower middle classes and the Iranian masses."Compennding the issue, as more religious groups left theNadenal Frent preclaiming "Be/ter Shah than the Ttgieh:' (19)Mossadegh was forced to rely even more on the Tudeh forsupport. Sepehr Zabih, author of The Communist Movementin Iran, asserts that "the Communist movement became, forall practical purposes, the backbone of support for thegovernment." (20) Mossadegh also found himself losing theloyalty of the liberal, non-Communist groups as theybecame disenchanted with his proposed oil-less economyand as he himself exhibited the same authoritarianism thatthe National Front had opposed in the Shah.
The Tudeh's growing role in the National Frontbecame the primary matter of concern for Americans.K nnit Roosevelt interpreted the party's rise to power as theSoviet's tactic of manipulating Mnssadegh and intimidatingAmerica. For his part, Mossadegh thought the Westexaggerated communist influence in order to alarm theImninn religious right (which was, in fact, one of theobjectives of Operation AJAX) and to justify U.S.intervention as part of the Cold War. However, an unportantpoint is that Mossadegh dislmstM the Tudeh just as theTudeh distrusted him; in short, they were not willing allies.A State Department intelligence report listed thirteen waysthat Todeh goals differed from those of Mossadegh'sNadonal Front. (21) Fm'thermore, Mossadegh, a landlordand a millionaire, was not a figure that communists couldeasily IasL The Tudeh embarrassed Mossadegh with theirovert anti-Americanism, demanding expulsion of Americanadvisors from lran and vandalizing American property.
Why, then, did Mossadegh not suppress the Tudehparty? First, he needed their support when many politicalgroups withdrew from the National Front. Second, asMossadegh's foreign minister Dr. Hossein Fatemiexplained, Mossadegh believed in "democratic liberalideals" and would not suppress any group, regardless of itsideology. Dr. Fatemi realized that although America viewedthis as a pro-Soviet policy, Iran was actually pursuing apolicy of non-alignment- (22) The Shah offered a thirdexplanation for the Tudeh-Messadegh alliance: Mossadeghbelieved he could outwit the Tudeh party. The Shah,however, predicted a reverse outcome -- that thecommunists would overpower Mossadegh. Zabih agxwathat Mossadegh underestimated the Tudeh" s appeal to themasses; at its peak the Tudeh clairoed 300,000sympathizers. In any case, Mossadegh accepted Tudehsupport, granting the party access to both governmentpropaganda and the army, alarming many Iranians, and
How the Shah Won: The CIA's Role in the Iranian Coup of 1953 31
leading to the downfall of Mossudegh. (23)When Roosevelt st rveyed the Iranian situation in
August, 1953, he doubted he could win support flora theacademics in Teheran -- they were firmly anti-Shah.Operation AJAX had tried to win the support of thereligions groups which were abandoning the National FmnLbut the religious right retreated, uncommitted to either side.In contrast, most of the almy (junior officers and enlistedmen) were still loyal to the monarchy, even thoughMossadegh had planted his own officers in key positions,especially General Riabi as the Chief of Staff. Therefore,since Roosevelt could not count on either the academy orthe right, AJAX's main thrust was mobilizing the majorityof the army against the prime minister. (24)
During secret meetings held in Iran, Roosevelt and theShah planned the coup. They decided that the Shah wouldsigh firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadegh andappointing Zabedi in his place. Then, the Shah would fly tohis residence on the Caspian Sea as the Wausitlon took placeand would return once Zabedi had successfully takenpower. In practice, however, a delay occurred in deliveringthe firmans because of communication problems betweenIranian and American agents. The delay providedMossadegh with enough time to uncover the plot. WhenColonel Nassiry, the officer charged with delivering thefirmans, reached Mnssadegh's residence, General Riabi wasalready there to arrest him. After Nassiry was imprisoned,Mossadegh announced over the radio that rome royalistofficers (never mentioning the Shah) had attempted a coupand had failed. When news of the failed coup reached theShah, he fled to Rome.
The immediate response to Mossadegh'sannouncement was an anti-Shah demonstration by theTudeh party. The communists screamed anti-royalistslogans and destroyed statues of the Shah and his father.Controversy surrounds this demonstration: Rooseveltinsisted that the Soviets were behind it, yet Bill claims thatthe Soviets "at no time indicated any external support forthe Tudeh." And Mark Gasiorowski, author of "The 1953Coup d'Etat in lran," writes that it was not even the Tadehthat staged the demonstration on that day. He claims that theCIA paid a mob $50,000 to pretend they were the Tudeh to"provoke fears of a Tudeh takeover and thus rally supportfor Zabedi." (25) Whether or not the mob was under Sovietcontrol or was even under Tudeh control, thedemonsWations did serve to frighten many Iranians,convincing them that the Tudeh, and therefore Mossedegh,was the enemy.
After the first attempt at the coup had failexL Rooseveltbusied himself with improvising a new sWategy, relying onhis Iranian agents for help. Since Iranians did not know ofthe Shah's order to replace Mnssadegh, Roosevelt asked hisagents to copy the f'umans and distribute thera to keymilitary figures who they believed were anti-Mossadegh.One general pledged his support and began to march hisforces toward the city on Wednesday, August 19, 1953.
Also on that day, a pro-Shah mob congregated in Iran'scapital city. Although Roosevelt claimed he would not relyon mercenaries, both James Bill and Mark Gasiorowsldreport that he paid for the pro-Shah mob, which was quleldyjoined by unpaid Iranians who had been outraged by theTudeh uprising. (26) The mob began moving towardMossadegh's house. Meanwhile, Roosevelt collectedGeneral Zahedi from his hiding place and presented him tothe crowd, who at once carried him on their shoulders.When the mob reached Mnssadegh's, army forces stillloyalto the aged prime minister battled the crowd for nine hoursleaving 300 dead. As the pro-Shah mob broke through hisdefenses and ransacked his house, Mossadegh fled in hispajamas. The coup was complete. On Fa'iday, AuguSt 21,Mossadegh tamed himself in; the next day, the Shahreturned home to cheering crowds. The immediate result,then, of the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh wasthe restoration of the Shah's power as the monarch of Iran.
When analyzing the West's role in ousting Mossadegh,three positions can be argued: the coup occurred onlybecause of the West's intervention; the coup would haveoccurred regardlass of the West's intervention; or the coupoccurred becanse the West simply mobilized Iraniansalready willing to stage a coup, but not without foreignsupport. Gasiorowski advocates the fast position, arguingthat the "COup [was] unlikely without U.S. help," arsl"thecoup could not have tw.etmed at the time and in the mannit did without oonsiderate U.S. assislanceo'(27) He offers asevidence his belief flint the Iranian economy was recoveringin 1953 and that Mossadegh still could count onconsiderable support from the National Front, the ,and the military. Also, he asserts that the CIA played anundeniably essential role in the coup by planning, directing,and Financing Operation AJAX. (28)
Professor Amos Perlmutrer, author of the foreword toZabih' s book The Mossadegh Era, advocates the secondstance: "the CIA role in these climactic events was not verysignificant, despite some of the heavily unsubstantiatedclaims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt." (29) Hebelieves that Mossadegh would have been oveahrown byIranians for Iranian reasons, without any in rfereuce byOperation AJAX. The Shah, although he clearly knew ofthe CIA's role in restoring him to power, echoedPerlmutter's assertion: "I defy anylxxly to prove that theoverttn'n of Mossadegh was not basically the work of thecommon people of my country." (30)
James Bill maintains the third position in his analysis• of the U.S. role in lran from 1950-1953. He contends thatOperation AJAX simply mobilized anti-Mossadegh foseeaalready existing in Iran, but that the mobilization wascriticul because the Iranians headed the West's direction andsupport in this endeavor. (31) And although the man whowrote the foreword to his book underestimates America'srole, Zabih agrees with Bill on this poinL Zabih believesthat to blame just the West's intervention or just Iran'sdomestic problems "exclusively for the collapse of the
32 The Wittenberg History Journal
nationalist regime is to understate the complex interactionof external and internal political forces in this exa." (32)Because this interpretation takes into account beth Iranianstrengths and weaknesses, it is the most credible explanationfor the nature of the relationship between the United States
and lran in executing the coup.Whatever its true role in the Iranian coup, the CIA
operation did produce significant repercussions forAmerican foreign policy for the next thirty years. The coupmarked the first lime the United States used covert action tooverthrow a government in a thne of peace. Theoverwhelming success and low cost of the operationencouraged the CIA to use this type of action in the future.According to Bill, "The Iran escapade acted as a catalystthat bred other CIA interventions -- beginning withGuatemala in 1954." (33) When Kermit Roosevelt returnedto America to give a presentation on Operation AJAX, henoticed that John Foster Dulles' eyes were gleaming.Worried about DuUes' s reaction, Roosevelt ended his
presentation with a warning:
We were successful in this venture because ourassessment of the situation in Iran was correct...If we, the CIA, are ever going to try somethinglike this again, we must be absolutely sure that thepeople and the amay want what we want. If not,you had better give the job to the Marines. (34)
But they did not give the next job (Guatemala) to theMarines -- they offered it to Roosevelt, who turned itdown because he felt it did not meet his qualificationsfor a successful operation. Kermit's warning wentunheeded, and the CIA staged a coup in Guatemala andattempted coups in Cuba and Chile without success.Never again was there a domestic situation favoring acoup like there had been in Irun in 1953.
Iran's domestic situation, however, had changedradically by 1978. Eisenhower, who once had refused togive Ivan more aid when Mossadegh requested it, gave theShah an additional 45 million dollars after the 1953 coup.Unformnntely, America found itself supporting adictatorship, not a democracy. The Shah purged the Tudehparty, rigged the Majlis elections, arrested thousands ofpeople who had supported the National FmnL and enactedpress censorship. Mossadegh's government, according toGasiorowski, was "the last popular, demouratically orientedgovernment to hold office in Iran," as compared to the
Shah's authoritarian regime. (35) Up through JimmyCarter's presidency, the United States strongly supportedthe Shah, despite his dictatorship, thinking of him asAmerica's closest friend in the Middle East. Supporting theShah blinded the United States to the Iranian people'sgrowing antagonism toward beth the Shah and America.
This antagonism manifested itself in a revolutionaryreligious movement which thrived in Iran under theleadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini. It mainly attackedthe Shah, whom they felt was propped up by the Americans;in 1978, demonstrators shouted "Death to the AmericanShah!" Iranians knew of the CIA's involvement in the 1953coup and believed that the CIA would not hesitate tobecome involved once more if the Shah were againthreataned. The 1953 coup,"a short-term triumph [that] ledto a long term defeat for the United States" (36) contributedsignificantly to Iran's deep hatred of America and to theIranian Revolution of 1978-1979. Bill explains the linkbetween the coup and the revolutions: "The 1953intervention abetted the birth of revolutionary nationalismin Iran that would burst forth twenty-five years later in adeeply xenophobic and extremist form." Gasiorowski findsan even stronger connection between the 1953 coup and the1978-1979 revolution: "If Mosaddeq [sic] had not beenoverthrown, the revolution might not have occurred." (37)
The United States, not able to foresee the consequencesof its actions, participated in the 1953 coup for two reasons:communism and oil. Although Kermit Roosevelt told theShah that he would not be under any obligation in return forAmerican aid in restoring him to the throne, the UnitedStates obtained Iranian oil very cheaply after the coup. Also,British and American oil companies each came to own fortypercent of the newly formed National Iranian Oil Company.But more important than oil, the United States felt that ithad won a decisive victory in the Cold War by rescuing Ironfrom "the closing clutch of Moscow." (38) To the AmericangovernmenL assisting in the ov throw of the Iranian PrimeMinister restored stability and thwarted Soviet intentions inthe Middle East. To lran,U.S, involvement in the couphelped to mobilize a segment of its society in support of itsmonarchy. However, in doing so, the United Stateserroneously imposed Iran's domestic situation onto thelarger picture of the Cold War, resulting in Americansupport for an autocratic, unpopular, yet anti-communist
Shah.
How the Shah Won: The CIA 's Role in the Iranian Coup of 1953 ° 33
Endnotes
1 Dwight D, Eiseohower, Mandate For Change 1953-1956 (GardenCity, New york: Doubleday sad Company, 1963), 160; lohn Prados,President's Secret Wars: CIA and Peatagon Covert Op ratiom SinceWorld War I1 (New york: William Morrow and Company, 1986), 92.
20 Supchr Zabih, The Comnuu,dst Movement in lran (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966), 200,
21Roosevelt, l19;Bil193.
2 Ketmit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle For Control of
lran (New york: McGraw-HilL 1979), 70.
3 Richard Funkhauvm quoted in James A. Bill The Eagle and theLion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven,
Connecticut: yale University press, 1988), 62,
7 Bill, 73.
8 Mohammed Rega Shah PahlavL Mission For My Cozattry(London: Hutchinson, 1961), 91.
9 Roosevelt, 107; Bill, 73.
10prglos, 95.
11 Roosevelt, 11 mad 3.
12Ihi&,12,
13 Prados, 94; Bill 81.
14 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhawer and the Cold War (New York:Oxford Universky press, 1981), 74; "Man of the year," 21; Richard andGhdys Harkness, =The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday EveningPost, 6 November 1954, 66.
15 Avj h Y. yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolntionary Iran(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 20; Prados, 96,
16 Eisenhower, 163.
17 Roosevelt, 163 and 122. Mark Gasinrowsld, 0athor of "The1953 Coup d'Etet in Irma" (see note 25) tells a different story of howGeneral Zabedi was chosen to become Mossad gh's replacement- He
claims that it was the British who supported Zahedi, not the Shah,because Zabedl promised to implement an oil setflonent favorable to theBritish ff they would support him. The British, then, bed to convince theShah to support Zahedi, not the oilier way around. Gafiorowskclaimsthe Shah told Ambassador Henderson he would support Zabedi ff theUnited States mad Britain would give/ran "massive economic aid."
18 Ibid., 163 mad 126.
19 Bill 72; SUPChr Zabih, The Mossadesh Era (Clthmgu: Lake
View I ss, 1982), 128.
5 Quoted in Eismhower, 159.
6 "Man of the year," Time, 7 JanuaW 1952, 20.
4Roc evelt, 85.
22 Zabih, Mossadegh, 133. Dr, Fatemi had a point: iF, Dulinstended to think only in terms of "us and them," To him, ff a colmtly wexenot expressly for the United States, th a it must be for the Soviet Unitm.Mo sadegh truly was a nationalist, t ing to avoid dependence on either
st rpower.
23 See Eisenhower, 163 for the Shah's xplanation; Zabih,Mossadegh, 132; see Bill, 68 for statistics on Tudeh's sympathizers; seeZabiit, Mossadegh, 136 for Tudeh's use of army and prupagand
24 See Roosevelt, 109 for his opinism of academia; ibid., 93 foratate of the army; and ibid., 71 for his assessment of the rcliginm fight.The following summary of the events of the coup are from Rooseveh'sacc tmL His book has been criticized for inaccuracy, but I have notincluded any of his statements that have been challenged.
25 Ibid., 179; Bill 9; Mark Gasinrowsld, "The 1953 Coup d'Etet inIran," International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 (August 1987):
274.
26 Bill, 91; Gasiorowskl, 274, who claims l ermlt paid tim mob$10,0 0.
27 ibid., 278 and 277.
28 Widely varying accounts exist sB to the cost of OIg ation AJAX.Gasinrowski writes that it cost arotmd $60,000 and John Randagh,author of The Agency (New York: Simon mad Sohuter, 1986), esfimaumthe cost as $200,000. Jdm Prados, however, states that AJAX costbetween 10 million and 20 million dolhr , "far more than the $100,000or $200,000 originally estimated:" (97)
29 Amos pedmutter, foreword to The Mossade8 h Era, by SepehrZabih (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), vii.
30 Shah, 58.
31 Bill 93.
32 Zabth, Mossadegh, 126.
33 Bill 94,
34 Roosevelt, 210,
35 Gaaiorowsld, 261.
36 QuoW.d in Bill 86; Divine, 79.
37 Bill 84; Gasiolowsld, 261.
38 Harkness. 68.
34. The Wittenberg History Joul-nal
Bibliography
Ambrose, Stephen. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since1938.6th ed., New york: Penguin Books, 1991.
and Company, 1986.Ranelagh, John. The Agency. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of Amerlcan-lranionRelations. New Haven, Connecticut: yale University P ss,
1988.
Roosevelt, KermiL Cogntercow? : The Struggle For Control oflran. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Shah pahlavi, Mohammed Rez Mission For My Country. London:
Hutchinson 1961.
Divine, Rol rt A. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1981.Waiters, Vernon A. Silent Missions. Garden City, New York: Doublechy
and Company, 1978.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate For Change 1953-1956. Garden City,New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963.
Yoclfat, A eh Y. The Soviet Union and Revol lanary lran. New York:St. Martin's Press, 1984.
Gasiomwski, Marl "The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran." InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies. 19 (August 1987): 261-86. Zabth, Sepehr. The Cornmmtist Moveraent bt Iran. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1966.
Harkness, Richard and Gladys. "The Mysterious Doings of CIA."Saturday Evening Post, 6 November 1954, 66f08.
• The Mossadegh Era. Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982.
"Man of the Year." Time, 7 January 1952, 18-21.
Predos, John. Presldent' s Secret Wars: CIA and peata gon CovertOperations Since World War IL New York: William Morrow
