19 Basco to Aldovino v. COMELEC.doc

7/28/2019 19 Basco to Aldovino v. COMELEC.doc

1/12

Alyssa Carmelli P. Castillo (06-49685)

Prof. Ma. Gisella N. Dizon-Reyes

Law 154 Local Government, III-C

March 13, 2013

Basco v. PAGCOR (May 14, 1991)

(A repeat case, digest previously submitted.)

Nature: Petition to declare the PAGCOR Charter null and void.

Ponente: Paras, J.

Facts:

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January

1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also

dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain

gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial

jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally

conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist."

Having provided good revenue to the government, P.D. 1399

was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this

objective. Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was

created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate

and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing

franchise or permitted by law.

PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction over the country

and its repealing clause provides for the repeal of any statute

inconsistent with it.

The petitioners filed this case therefore assailing the

constitutionality of the PAGCOR Charter invoking several

arguments.

Issues:

1. Do the petitioners have standing to sue?2. Does PD 1869 violate the principle of local autonomy for

providing for a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to

impose taxes and legal fees (see Section 13 (2) of PD 1869)?

3. Does PD 1869 violate the EPC?

4. Is it not contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory

Government away from monopolies and crony economy and

toward free enterprise and privatization"?

5. Does it violate Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family)

and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice)

of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV

of the 1987 Constitution?

Held/ Ratio:

1. Yes, also considering the transcendental importance of the

issues raised.

2. No.

a. The City of Manila being a mere municipal corporation

does not have the inherent power to tax.

b. It is a mere creation of Congress which powers may be

given or withdrawn by the latter.

c. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on

gambling has already been revoked. As early as 1975, the

power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant

of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No

771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.

d. Local governments have no power to tax

instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a

government owned or controlled corporation with an origina

charter, PD 1869. Being that, it should really be exempt from

taxes, per the doctrine of the "supremacy" of the nationa

government over the local government.

e. On the argument regarding the violation of the principle

of local autonomy in Section 5, Article X of the 1987

Constitution, it must be noted that the Congress can always

impose limitations on such power. The principle of loca

autonomy in the 1987 Constitution only means

decentralization.

3. No, no prohibition for legislature to establish classes based

on reasonable distinctions.

4. That is a political question. On monopoly, however, such is

not entirely prohibited by the Constitution but may be

regulated.

5. These are mere statement of priniciples, not self-executory.

Judgment: Dismissed.

Padilla, J., dissentinting:

Gambling is reprehensible whether it be by the

government or by private institutions.


2/12

Ganzon v. CA (August 5, 1991)

(A repeat case, digest previously submitted.)

Nature: Petition to review CA decision.

Ponente: Sarmiento, J.

Facts:

The petitioners in this case are the Mayor of Iloilo City

(Rodolfo T. Ganzon) and a member of the Sangguniang

Panglunsod (Mary Ann Rivera Artieda) thereof. The Mayor in

this case was facing ten administrative charges filed by various

individuals relating to the Mayor's alleged abuse of authority,

oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral

conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution and

arbitrary detention.

According to the records of the CA, in the hearings

scheduled for this case, the Mayor, for several times, asked for

postponements, which were denied by the hearing officer, and

so his counsel proceeded with the cross-examination of

witnesses. Finding probable grounds, the hearing officers

issued a preventive suspension order against the Mayor for a

period of 60 days from August 11, 1988 until October 11, 1988.

A second preventive suspension for another 60 days was

supposed to be given the Mayor from October 11, 1988, which

was however restrained by the Mayor by the issuance of a writ

of preliminary injunction by the RTC. On May 3, 1990,

however, the Secretary of DILG issued another preventive

suspension order against the Mayor and designating in the

meantime the Vice Mayor to take over his seat. This third order

led the Mayor to file a case for prohibition with the CA. The

same was however dismissed by the CA. The case of the

Mayor is then certified to the SC with the petition of Artieda.

The SC issues a TRO.

Issues:

1. Was the Mayor deprived due process by the Secretary of

DILG?

2. Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be

provided by law" (in the 1935 Constitution, X, Section 10,

compared to the 1987 Constitution, X, Section 4) intend to

divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend,

discipline, and/or remove local officials?

3. Did the Constitutuion repeal Sections 62 (notice of hearing)

and 63 (preventive suspension) of the LGC?

Held/Ratio:

1. No, the allegations of the Mayor regarding the Secretary's

bias against him are not proven. As to the postponements, the

same is a matter of discretion.

2. No, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its

right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by

existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against

local officials.

a. The omission of the phrase only underscores the LG's

local autonomy from Congress, but it does not deprive the

latter of all authority, especially concerning discipline against

the LG.

Note that the grant of local autonomy is not self-executing, that

despite it, the LG is placed under the supervision of the

Executive, and that it authorizes the Congress to include local

government code provisions for the removal of officers,

meaning that the Congress still exercises powers over it.

b. Neither Lacson, Hebron, nor Mondano categorically

banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary

authority because she did not exercise control powers, but

because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

3. No, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms

and one may stand with the other. However, it bothers the

Court that due to the fact that the Mayor is facing 10

administrative charges, then he may be suspended for 600

days, which would effectively suspend him from office when he

is a duly elected official. The vacancy may not prove well for a

local government.

Judgment: The suspensions are affirmed but the Mayor may

not serve anymore suspensions. Suspension against Artieda

affirmed.

City of Cebu v. National Waterworks and Sewerage

Authority (NAWASA) (April 20, 1960)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of CFI decision.

Ponente: Barrera, J.

Facts:

On December 27, 1910, the Act No. 2009 was passed by


3/12

the the Philippine Legislature authorizing the Municipality of

Cebu to insurance indebtedness of $125,000.00 and to issue

bonds covering this amount of indebtedness in gold coin of the

US, for the purpose of providing funds for the construction of

sewer and drainage facilities, to secure a sufficient supply of

water and necessary buildings for primary schools, and for

other purposes. The bonds were exempt from taxes.

Pursuant to Act No. 2009, the Municipality of Cebu floated

the bond issue and invested part of the proceeds of the sale

thereof in the construction of a waterworks system to supply

water to its inhabitants. This came to be known as the Osmea

Waterworks System. Since then, the system has been

supplying the inhabitants of the Municipality with water

originally taken from the Buhisan basin, which is within

government reservation.

On October 20, 1936, the City of Cebu was created as a

political body corporate which absorbs the former Municipality

of Cebu. It was given the power to maintain waterworks for the

supply of water to its inhabitants, along with other powers

incidental to this, among others. Through this, the OWS

continued its operations.

On November 16, 1948, the PSC granted the City a CPC

to maintain the operation of the OWS, subject to terms and

conditions.

On December 11, 1950, the City filed with the DANR an

application for the use of water from the natural spring in a

private land belonging to the late Dr. Pio Valencia in Hagubiao,

Consolacion, Cebu, to meet the water needs of the increased

population. This was approved.

On June 17, 1955, NAWASA was created. Pursuant to its

charter RA 1383, it shall own and/or have jurisdiction,

supervision and control over all territory now embraced by theMetropolitan Water District as well as all areas now served by

existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and

drainage systems within the boundaries of cities,

municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines

including those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills

Sections of the Bureau of Public Works. It may also acquire

property for this purpose. The Act also provides for the transfer

of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in

cities, municipalities, and municipal districts, to NAWASA.

To prevent the NAWASA from taking over OWS, the City

filed a petition for declaratory relief with the CFI of Cebu

against NAWASA. NAWASA argued that the OWS was subject

to the control and operation of the National Government, hence

the transfer of it to NAWASA is valid. And even granting that

the OWS belongs to the City, RA 1383 provides for the

payment of just compensation.

The CFI ruled that RA 1383 is unconstitutional as it

transfers the OWS to NAWASA without just compensation.

Hence, this petition by NAWASA.

Issue: Is RA 1383 unconstitutional for transferring ownership o

the OWS to NAWASA without just compensation?

Held: Yes.

Ratio:

1. As held in City of Baguio v. the NAWASA, RA 1383, insofar

as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing

for an effective payment of just compensation, violates our

Constitution.

2. All the properties and assets of the Osmea Waterworks

System are transferred to the defendant NAWASA in exchange

for an equal value of the latter's assets. But what these assets

consist of, nothing concrete presently appears. All that is

provided in Section 8 is that NAWASA acquires all the assets

and liabilities of all government-owned waterworks and

sewerage systems in the country. It is an equal value of these

unliquidated assets and liabilities that is supposed to be given

to plaintiff-appellee as payment of its System. Such, certainly,

is not a compensation that satisfies the Constitutional

provisions.

3. NAWASA cannot argue that the OWS is not a patrimonialproperty of Cebu but one for public use, hence within the

control of the legislature. It must be noted that only those of the

general public who pay the required rental or charge

authorized and collected by the System, do make use of water.

In other words, the System serves all who pay the charges. It

is open to the public (in the sense, it is public service), but

upon the payment only of a certain rental (which makes it

proprietary.)


4/12

4. The term "public works for public service" in NCC 424 must

be interpreted, following the principle of ejusdem generis, in

the concept of the preceding words "provincial roads, city

streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters

and promenades" which are used freely by all without

distinction. Hence, if the public works is not such free public

service, it is not within the purview the first paragraph, but of

the second paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently,

patrimonial in character.

5. The transfer cannot also be justified under the police power

of the state for the same is not without limitations, one of which

is the payment of just compensation. No exercise of the police

power can disregard the constitutional guarantees in respect to

the taking of private property, due process and equal protection

of the laws and it should not override the demands of natural

justice

Judgment: CFI affirmed.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

(March 28, 1968)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of CFI decision.

Ponente: Bengzon, J.P., J.

Facts:

Prior to becoming a chartered city, the Municipality of

Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then

Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, CA 39 was

approved converting the Municpality into Zamboanga City and

providing therein as well that the Province must abandon the

properties located in the City to the City subject to payment of

price fixed by the Auditor General. The properties are

composed of some 50 lots and buildings used for different

purposes.

In 1945, the capital of the Province was moved to

Dipolog. On June 16, 1948, RA 286 was approved creating the

municipality of Molave and making it the capital of the

Province.

On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the

AG fixed the value of the properties to be left by the province to

the City = P1,294,244.00.

On June 6, 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the

Province into two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del

Sur. The law also provides that the properties and obligations

of the province shall be divided between the two.

On January 11, 1955, the AG apportioned the assets and

obligations of the Province between the two: 54.39% for

Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.

Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of

P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in

question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.

On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of

the President, issued a ruling holding that ZDN had vested

right as owner of the properties mentioned in CA 39, and is

entitled to its price. This revoked the previous Cabinet

Resolution conveying all the 50 assets to the City for P1.00

when the seat of the province was transferred to Dipolog.

The SF authorized the CIR to deduct 25% of the regular

IRA of the City for 3 quarters from 1960-61. The deductions

were then credited to ZDN, in partial payment of the

P764,220.05 due it.

On June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved which

provides that all the assets belonging to the former Province

within the City are transferred to the City for free! And so, the

SF ordered the CIR to stop making the deductions and to

return to the City the deductions already made. The City

admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039,

P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.

On March 5, 1962, a petition for declaratory relief with

WMPI was filed by ZDN against the City, the SF, and the CIR

with the CFI. The petition argues that RA 3039 is

unconstitutional for depriving ZDN of its property without dueprocess of la.

The CFI issued a WPI. Later, it ruled that RA 3039 is

unconstitutional. Hence this petition.

Issue: Is RA 3039 transferring the properties of the former

province to the City for free unconstitutional?

Held: It depends upon the properties involved.


5/12

Ratio:

1. If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning

municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity,

the property is public and Congress has absolute control over

it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary

capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute

control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due

process and payment of just compensation.

2. The properties must then be assessed on the basis of NCC

423 and 424.

a. Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots

used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and

leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites a

total of 24 lots since these were held by the former

Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and

therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress.

b. But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive

Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the

26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they

are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes.

3. Hence, Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from

the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26

properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to

computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as

contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the

Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.

Judgment: CFI set aside.

1. The City must return to ZDN the amount that ZDN returned

to it = P43,030.11

2. The City must pay ZDN its 54.39% share of the 26

patrimonial properties of the province.

Magatajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.(July 20, 1994)

Nature: Petition to review on certiorari the CA decision.

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:

In 1992, due to the success of its casino operations,

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to CDO. It then

leased part of the building of Pryce for the opening of a casino

that coming Christmas season.

On December 7, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

CDO created an ordinance entitled " AN ORDINANCE

PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND

CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY

ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE

USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE

OPERATION OF CASINO." Later, or on January 4, 1993,

another ordinance was passed, entitled " AN ORDINANCE

PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND

PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR."

Pryce then assailed the Ordinances with the CA. It was

later joined by PAGCOR. The CA invalidated the ordinances fo

being unconstitutional.

Issue: Are the Ordinances valid?

Held: No.

Ratio:

1. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling

is not illegal per se. The Congress may prescribe ways of

dealing with it.

2. The tests of a valid ordinance:

a. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

b. It must not be unfair or oppressive.

c. It must not be partial or discriminatory.

d. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

e. It must be general and consistent with public policy.

f. It must not be unreasonable.

3. Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local

government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of

chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance

which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. Using

the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be

interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words

with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since

the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited

games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only

illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of


6/12

chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

4. The Ordinances contravene the PAGCOR Charter and this

cannot be done.

5. The LGC did not expressly repeal the PAGCOR Charter and

implied repeals are not favored.

6. The power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games

of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the

territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired.

P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government

Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent

or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.

Judgment: CA affirmed.

Padilla, J., concurring:

The Justice agrees that an ordinance cannot repeal a statute

such as the PAGCOR Charter but he reiterates that gambling

in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-

establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is

generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.

The national government (through PAGCOR) should re-

examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling

casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is

abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much

against it, and again the question must be seriously

deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from

the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino

sense of values?

Davide, J., concurring:

1. Pryce should have filed its petition with the RTC and not with

the CA. The CA could have dismissed the same for violation of

the principle of hierarchy of courts.

2. The issue that arose here is whether in granting localgovernments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above

powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro

tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general

authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere

in the Philippines is concerned. The ordinances cannot repeal

P.D. No. 1869.

3. The CA erred in holding that the ordinances are

unconstitutional, they merely contravene a statute. And even

so, they can be reconciled by holding the ordinances

inapplicable to PAGCOR.

4. PAGCOR must listen to the call of the people of CDO.

Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority

(December 11, 1991)

Nature: Petitions to declare Ordinance No. 7, s. 1998 of

Mandaluyong and Ordinance No. 11, s. 1991 of the MMA

invalid.

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:

On July 13, 1990, the Court rendered a decision on

Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District v. Hon.

Arsenio Gonong, holding that the confiscation of the license

plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations is not a penalty

that may be imposed by the MMC under PD 1605 and was

permitted only under the conditions laid down in LOI 43 in the

case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was

also held that the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic

violations was also not directly prescribed by the decree. No

MR was filed. On August 6, 1990, the decision became final

and executory.

On several dates then, from October 17, 1990 to April 29,

1991, the Court received 4 letter-complaints from different

people, alleging that contrary to the above decision, their

driver's licenses and/or plate were confiscated by traffic

enforcers in QC, Mandaluyong, and Makati.

When the defendants were required to file theircomments, they alleged different legal bases:

1. Allan Martinez of Mandaluyong alleged that the confiscation

of the driver's license and the removal of plates are authorized

by Ordinance No. 7, series of 1998, of Mandaluyong, on the

basis of the police power of LGUs under LGC Section 16.

2. As to A.V. Manuel of the Western Traffic District of the PNP,

he alleged that the confiscation was on the basis of a

memorandum dated February 27, 1991 of the WTD-PNP.

3. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP however


7/12

denied ever giving the authority to confiscate license plates of

illegally-parked vehicles and that he abides by the Gonong

decision.

4. Pat. R.J. Tano-an argued that the Gonong decision

prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the

confiscation of driver's licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority

issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to

detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/

unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or

obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution as

regards the MMA Ordinance No. 11 since it appears to be

contrary to the Gonong decision. The Court then required the

MMA and the Solicitor General to comment.

The MMA defended the validity of the ordinance based on

EO 392, Section 2, which provides for its power to deliver basic

services and promulgate rules for that purpose. Also, the MMA

argued that the Godong decision was premised on the lack of

legal basis authorizing the confiscation, with the Ordinance, the

deficiency was addressed.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, thinks that the

ordinance was null and void for it represented an invalid

exercise of legislative power, violating the provisions of PD

1605 which does not authorize the removal of license plates

and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in

MM.

On October 24, 1991, the SG submitted a motion

requesting the early resolution of the case.

The MMA alleged on the other hand that the validity of a

law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and notcollaterally.

Issue:

1. Was there valid delegation of legislative power in the cases

of Ordinance No. 7 of Mandaluyong and Ordinance No. 11 of

the MMA?

2. Was there a valid exercise of the delegated power?

Held/Ratio:

1. Yes. The requisites for a valid delegation are: 1) the

completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the

presence of a sufficient standard. Both are complied with in

this case.

2. Yes.

a. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:

1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must

not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or

discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5)

must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and

consistent with public policy.

b. As per PD 1605 and as held in the Gonong decision,

the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's

licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila

are not sanctioned. In fact, Section 5 of the law prohibits the

confiscation of a driver's license but prescribes only the

issuance of a traffic citation ticket imposing a fine.

c. Municipal enactments must conform with the law

because their power to legislate is merely subordinate to the

legislature.

d. The measures in question do not merely add to the

requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the

decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so

doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect

partially repeal the law.

e. Without legislative action, PD 1605 remains effective

and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of

motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI

43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in

Metropolitan Manila.

Judgment: Ordinances declared void and law enforcement

authorities prohibited to enforce it.

MERALCO v. City of Manila (April 28, 1956)

Nature: Petition to review on certiorari the CFI decision.

Ponente: Bengzon, J.

Facts:

MERALCO operates 7 steam boilers of more than 100

horse power each generating electricity in the City of Manila.

As fees for the inspection of its boilers by inspectors of the

Department of labor under regulations promulgated by the


8/12

Secretary of Labor pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 104, as

amended by Commonwealth Act No. 696, plaintiff paid the

National Government P2,390 in 1946, P2,044.10 in 1947,

P2,826.50 in 1948, and P3,326, in 1949.

Also, upon the City's demand, MERALCO also paid, but

under protest, to the city, the sum of P3,524 on January 24,

1949, and P1,506 on February 11, 1949, or a total of P4,630,

as fees for inspection of the same boilers by the office of the

City Engineer, pursuant to the provisions of Title 15, Chapter

117, of the Revised Ordinances. This ordinance was approved

pursuant to the Manila Chapter (1917) authorizing the

Municipal Board to tax . . steam boilers and to regulate . . .

steam engines and boilers and provide for the inspection

thereof and for a reasonable fee for such inspection.

MERALCO however filed a claim to recover the amounts

paid to the City arguing that Commonwealth Act No. 104

(1936) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 696 (1945)

repealed the above portions of the Manila Charter, because

these two enactment direct that for inspection of boilers and

pressures vessels, the Secretary of Labor . . . shall fix and

collect reasonable inspection fees (Section 3)."

The CFI dismissed the complaint finding no repeal by

implication.

Issue: Is there a repeal of the City's power to tax under the

Revised Ordinances by the enactment of CA 104 (1936), as

amended by CA 696 (1945)?

Held: No.

Ratio:

1. The Citys power to tax steam boilers could not have been

affected by the Department of Labors power to regulate or

inspect them: one is taxation, the other regulation.2. The power of inspection of the Secretary of Labor does not

necessarily conflict with that of the Secretary of Labor does not

necessarily conflict with that of the City authorities, because

the former has particular relation to the safety of laborers and

employees (section 1) of industrial enterprises, whereas that

of the City of Manila is not limited to such purpose, but is

related to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City,

particularly of the neighborhood wherein the boilers are

located. (Smoke, noise, vibration, fire hazards etc.) Different

purposes are served by the two inspections.

3. The allegation of MERALCO that the inspection fees

charged are excessive is without merit as the charges against

the steam boilers are based on both the power to tax and the

power to impose license fees which renders justifiable the

amount charged.

Judgment: CFI affirmed.

LLDA v. CA (December 7, 1995)

Nature: Petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction.

Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts:

RA 4850 was enacted creating the Laguna Lake

Development Authority, supposed to promote environmental

protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable

development, to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid

declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and

balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding

provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the

context of the national and regional plans and policies for

social and economic development.

PD 813 was then promulgated by former President

Ferdinand Marcos amending certain sections of RA 4850 to

address issues of the expansion of MM, the prospective uses

of the lake for municipal-water supply, irrigation, fisheries, etc.,

and the inflow of polluted water, among others. With the

amendment, the LLDA was given exclusive jurisdiction to issue

new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or

activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation,

construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish

corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for

lake quality control and management and to collect necessary

fees for said activities and projects. It was also authorized tocollect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for

all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries,

recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation,

irrigation, and waste disposal purpose.

RA 7160 was then enacted providing in Section 149

thereof that

"(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant

fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental


9/12

fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of

this Section," among others.

Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to

establish fishpens and fishcages due to their belief that the

LGC already impliedly repealed the powers of the LLDA under

RA 4850, as amended by PD 813. Permits were easily issued

and the LLDA was alarmed. The LLDA then issued notice to

the public reminding everyone that registration with them is

necessary and lack of it renders the fishpens, fishcages and

aquacultures in the area as illegal. Their owners were then

given 1 month on or before October 27, 1993 to show cause

before the implements are demolished. After 1 month, notices

were again given by the LLDA for the operators to demolish

their implements in the area.

The affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against

the LLDA with the RTC. The LLDA filed a MD. The RTC denied

the MDs and TROs were issued against the LLDA. The LLDA

then filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with

the SC. The SC referred it to the CA. The CA dismissed the

petitions.

Issue: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake

Development Authority or the towns and municipalities

comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the

Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of

permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Held: The LGC does not necessarily repeal RA 4850, as

amended by PD 813 giving the LLDA water rights authority

over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

Ratio:

1. An express repeal was not made by the LGC and the statute

does not reveal any intention of the legislature to do so.

2. The LLDA is also a special law and it must prevail over a

general statute such as the LGC. The special law is to be

taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of

special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

3. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the

Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational

safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication

that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its

mission.

4. The Court agrees with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna

Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any

other single body of water has its own unique natural

ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8) majo

river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into

the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the

boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of

Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon

provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem

that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are

to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development.

This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one

which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to

ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and

balance."

5. The power of the local government units to issue fishing

privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. On the

other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for

fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the

purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the

Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927)

and for lake quality control and management.

6. It has also already been ruled that the LLDA is a regulatory

and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the

Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a

"cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it

may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

Judgment: Petitions granted. TROs declared void.

Paras, J., concurring:

To reconcile the two laws, the Justice says that "while the

exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects oractivities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their

regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority,

once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be

subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue

purposes of the local government units concerned."


10/12

The Sangguniang Bayan of Barangay Don Mariano

Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya v. Martinez (March 3,

2008)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of RTC decision.

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts:

On November 5, 2004, Martinez, the incumbent Punong

Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos was

administratively-charged with Dishonesty and Graft and

Corruption with the SB of Bayombong. Martinez failed to file an

Answer to this, hence the SB declared him in default. He was

then put under preventive suspension for 60 days or until

August 8, 2005.

On July 28, 2005, the SB found Martinez guilty and

imposed a penalty of dismissal upon him. This decision was

conveyed to the Municipal Mayor Severino Bagasao for

implementation. On August 3, 2005, the Mayor issued a

Memorandum stating that the SB is without power to dismiss

Martinez; yet, it remains valid until reversed and he may

execute it. In the meantime, he put Martinez under preventive

suspension.

On August 26, 2005, Martinez filed a special civil action

for certiorari with a prayer for TRO with WPI before the RTC,

questioning the validity of the SB-imposed penalty against himand the Mayor's Memorandum. The RTC ruled in favor of

Martinez and declared the SB decision and the Mayor's

Memorandum void, pursuant to LGC Section 60. The SB's MR

was denied, hence this petition.

The SB argues that it is with power to dismiss an elective

official subject to its jurisdiction, and the courts are only tasked

to issue the order of dismissal AFTER the SB's finding that the

dismissal is warranted.

Issue: May the SB remove Martinez, an elective official, from

office?

Held: No.

Ratio:

1. LGC Section 60 particularly states that an elective official

may only be removed by courts. The intention of the framers to

restrict such power is supported by the record of the

deliberations. Hence, in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en

banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is

without any power to remove elected officials, since the power

is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided

for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government

Code. It even invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules

and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of

1991, providing that the disciplining authority may also impose

that penalty.

2. To interpret the provision as the petitioner interprets it would

defeat the intent of the framers of delegating the power to the

proper courts. It will also demote the power of the courts to

mere implementing authorities of the SB or SP. It is a clear

violation of the principle of separation of powers and would

strip the courts of their power of review granted under the

Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1 (2).

3. Hence, per LGC Section 61, an administrative complaint

against an elective official must be filed with the SP or the SB,

but the latter cannot impose the penalty of dismissal. If the

alleged acts of the elective official is so grave as to merit

dismissal, it must be filed with the RTC. But unless a case

reached the RTC, the most extreme penalty that the SP or SB

may impose is suspension.

4. Also, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remediesdoes not apply to bar Martinez's petition with the SB (as

allegedly, a case must be first filed with the SP). There are

exceptions to this such as where the challenged administrative

act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and

where the question or questions involved are essentially

judicial. Moreover, this involves a purely legal question--the

SB's jurisdiction to impose a penalty of dismissal.

Judgment: RTC affirmed.


11/12

Aldovino v. COMELEC (December 23, 2009)

Nature: Petition for review of COMELEC decision.

Ponente: Brion, J.

Facts:

Wilfrido Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3

consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-

2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005, or during his

third term, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for

90 days in relation to a criminal case he was charged with. The

SC subsequently lifted the suspension order and Asilo

resumed his official duties.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed a CoC for the same

position. Simon Aldovino, Jr., Danilo Faller, and Ferdinand

Talabong filed for the cancellation of Asilo's CoC on the ground

that he had already served 3 consecutive terms prior to 2007,

hence disqualified under Article X, Section 8, of the 1987

Constitution and LGC Section 43 (b).

The COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Asilo

holding that the 3-term limit ruled does not apply as he was not

able to fully-serve his 3rd term due to the preventive

suspension issued against him by the Sandiganbayan. The

COMELEC en banc affirmed this decision, hence this petition.

Issue: Did the preventive suspension of an elective official

interrupt the 3-term limit rule? Is it considered voluntary

renunciation of office as per LGC Section 43 (b)?

Held: No.

Ratio:

1. The formulation of the 1987 Constitution, Article X, Section 8and of LGC Section 43 (b) no more than three consecutive

terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an

inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to

"serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the

meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the service

that a public official may render.

2. From the long line of jurisprudence reviewed by the Court, it

concluded that loss of office by operation of law, being

involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term,

as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability

or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,

even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective

interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of

title to office or at least an effective break from holding office;

the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from

exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by

law.

3. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official

is barred from performing the functions of his office and does

not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and

lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only

results upon an eventual f inding of guilt or liability.

4. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule

demands that preventive suspension should not be considered

an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office

beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be

a term interruption because the suspended official continues to

stay in office although he is barred from exercising the

functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension

period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity

in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the

lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

5. In brief, the Court held that preventive suspension may not

be considered a voluntary renunciation of office as it is actually

involuntary on the part of the elective official. Nonetheless, the

preventive suspension may not be considered an interruption

of office that will render the 3-term limit rule inapplicable.

Preventive suspension, although it bars the elective official

from performing his duties, does not terminate the stay of the

elective official in his position--he continues to be in office

though absent.

Judgment: Petition granted. COMELEC reversed.

Leonardo-De Castro, J., concurring:

The Justice agrees that preventive suspension,

regardless of the outcome of the case, should not be

considered an interruption of office as to qualify the elective

official to run for the 4th term.

However, she disagrees with the proposition that the

suspended public official should be allowed to run for a fourth


12/12

time and if convicted, he should be considered to have

voluntarily renounced his fourth term. My reason is that the

crime was committed not during his fourth term but during his

previous term. The renunciation should refer to the term during

which the crime was committed. The commission of the crime

is tantamount to his voluntary renunciation of the term he was

then serving, and not any future term. Besides, the electorate

should not be placed in an uncertain situation wherein they will

be allowed to vote for a fourth term a candidate who may later

on be convicted and removed from office by a judgment in a

case where he was previously preventively suspended.

Hermosisima, J., concurring:

Though, "voluntary renunciation," the term that the law

uses simply means resignation from or abandonment of office.

The elected official who voluntarily resigns or abandons his

duties freely renounces the powers, rights, and privileges of his

position. The opposite of "voluntary renunciation" in this

context would be "removal from office," a sanction imposed by

some duly authorized person or body, not an initiative of or a

choice freely made by the elected official. Should "removal

from office" be the test, therefore, for determining interruption

of service that will warrant an exception to the three-term limit

rule?

Apparently not, since an elected official could be removed

from office through recall (a judgment by the electorates that

he is unfit to continue serving in office), criminal conviction by

final judgment, and administrative dismissal. Surely, the

Constitution could not have intended to reward those removed

in this way with the opportunity to skip the three-year bar.

Documents

19 Basco to Aldovino v. COMELEC.doc