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The politics of education reform in Chile: When
ideology trumps evidence
Gregory ElacquaPrepared for the Research Seminar in Comparative Politics
February 10, 2008
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1 Introduction
Since the return of democracy in Chile in 1990, education reforms have focused on improving
quality and equity through curricular reform, increased investment in teachers salaries,
school construction, longer school days, and the provision of computers and Internet in all
schools (Cox, 2003). Most experts agree that these investments increased coverage, especially
for low-income children, improved the quality of school facilities, provided many children with
the opportunity to spend more hours a day at school (OECD, 2004), and increased parent
satisfaction with the quality of their childrens schools (e.g. Fundacion Futuro, 2005).
Despite these positive outcomes, and a fourfold increase in spending in inflation adjusted
terms since 1990, there has not been significant improvement in the average quality of learn-
ing. Student achievement in Chile is among the highest in Latin America, but still lags
significantly behind a number of emerging countries in Asia and Eastern Europe, as demon-
strated by the poor results achieved on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS), the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and the In-
ternational Civic Education Study (CIVIC). National test scores have also been stagnant
since 1997, and large test score gaps persist both among socioeconomic groups and between
public and private schools. Schools are also stratified by socioeconomic status. Students
attending private schools, on average, come from families that have much higher incomes
and that are headed by parents with substantially more schooling than students enrolled in
public schools. 1
These factors converged to motivate one of the largest protests in Chilean history that is
widely known as the march of the penguins - in reference to the protesters school uniforms.
The protest began in May 2006, less than three months after President Michelle Bachelet
took office. More than 600,000 students walked out of class and occupied hundreds of schools
all over Chile, demanding the overhaul of the education system. The student movement had
widespread popular support among university students, the teachers union, the workers
union, and average citizens.2
1For an analysis of the quality and equity of Chiles education system see Contreras and Elacqua (2005)and Mizala and Romaguera (2006).
2Public support for the protests was nearly universal with almost 90 percent of Chileans polled sayingthat they supported the student movement (El Mercurio, 2006a).
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The student demands included more teachers and improved school construction, the elim-
ination of fees for the national college entrance exam, and free student public transportation
fares. With prices of copper, Chiles chief export, at record highs, and government reserves
with several years of budget surpluses, the students maintained that the government could
afford to invest more in education.3
President Bachelet responded to the students demands by offering an emergency spend-
ing bill of close to USD 135 million a year that covered free student transportation passes,
a waiver of university exam fees for the poorest students, and the renovation of over 1,200
public schools. The offer was rejected by students, who, in addition to the additional re-
sources, demanded the L.O.C.Es (Ley Organica Constitucional de Ensenanza) reform. The
L.O.C.E was a Pinochet-era constitutional education law that decentralized schooling in
Chile, making it possible for almost anyone to open a school4 and receive government fund-
ing without having to conform to any standard of quality. The students main objection was
that for-profit schools were allowed to compete with non-profit schools and public schools
for students (El Mercurio, 2006b).
Education in Chile occurs in a mixed market with 53 percent of students enrolled in
public schools, 25 percent in for-profit voucher schools, 15 percent in non-profit (religious
and secular) voucher schools, and 7 percent in private non-voucher schools. The position
taken by the students and others opposed to funding for-profits is the belief that for-profit
providers cannot be trusted to place the interests of children ahead of profitability (OEI,
2007). Skeptics have countered that for-profit schools have stronger incentives to reduce
costs, and more importantly, to innovate, leading to both higher quality and greater efficiency
in education (Tironi, 2006). Neither of these arguments, however, is based on any data in
Chile on the quality of education provided by the different types of private schools (for-profit
or non-profit).
There is also a persistent scholarly debate on this topic. Researchers have developed
a number of theories as to why non-profit organizations might outperform for-profit firms
3A common slogan on student banners read Copper sky high and education in the gutter (Rohter,2006).
4The only formal requirement to open a school in Chile is to have a high school diploma (Montt et al.,2006).
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in mixed industries. One view is that for-profit firms have incentives to take advantage of
customers by providing inferior services buyers cannot evaluate (Hausmann, 1987). Under
these circumstances, economic theory predicts that non-profit providers will come into exis-
tence to provide high quality services to poorly informed customers who seek a trustworthy
organization (Weisbrod, 1988). A second viewpoint is that non-profits are better positioned
to provide under-satisfied demands, such as the provision of goods to disadvantaged popula-
tions, than for-profit firms because they may rely on donations of money or volunteer time
to finance the provision of these goods, while for-profits must satisfy a market survival test
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996).
These claimed advantages have not gone unchallenged. Critics argue that the ambition
of profit fosters efficient decision making by for-profit firms. In contrast, non-profit organi-
zations are insulated from competitive pressures and thus have little incentive to manage
their firms efficiently (Glaeser and Schleifer, 2001). For instance, because non-profits cannot
distribute profits to owners, critics assert that their managers have less incentive to minimize
costs and may, for example, pay themselves excessive salaries.
Other critics suggest that there are likely no systematic differences in the objectives of
for-profit and nonprofit suppliers. Non-profits may engage in profit making activities and,
conversely, for-profit firms may have a deep commitment for the services they produce. Mis-
sion driven firms may find the constraints placed on non-profit organizations too restrictive,
and profit maximizing firms may find it more advantageous to choose non-profit forms, due
to tax exemptions, for example (Weisbrod, 1998).
Empirical studies generally corroborate the theoretical predictions of higher quality in
the non-profit sector. For instance, Lukesetich et al. (2000) show that non-profit nursing
homes spend more per-patient on nursing care and less on administrative expenses than for-
profit homes. Ford and Kasserman (2000) find that non-profit kidney dialysis clinics provide
significantly longer treatment than for-profit dialysis clinics. Similarly, non-profit hospitals
provide more uncompensated care than for-profits (Schlesinger et al., 1987). In studies
of prisons, Hart et al. (1997) find that for-profit prisons hire lower quality prison guards
than non-profits. The empirical studies of day care centers also show systematic quality
differences between non-profit and for-profit centers. Non-profits rank higher along input
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measures such as child-staff ratios and staff experience, while for-profits generally provide
lower quality services for similar fees (Morris and Helburn, 2000).
Much of the existing empirical research in education treats private schools as an aggre-
gate category and no studies in Chile, and very few studies in other countries, have examined
whether performance differs across for-profit and non-profit schools. The evidence on this
point is limited because there are so few schooling systems that provide public funding to
private schools. While different combinations of private and public provision (funding and
management) are observed in many countries, most schools continue to be funded and oper-
ated primarily by the government (OECD, 2006), and non-profit status is usually required
for private educational institutions (James, 1993).5 This suggests that the positions taken
by proponents and critics of the proposal to cease funding for-profit voucher schools have
not been informed by any evidence in Chile or elsewhere on the relative performance of these
schools.
In the midst of a fierce debate in Congress and the media on the merits of the students
proposal, Bachelet ordered the creation of a presidential advisory panel with 81 members
to seek a national consensus on education reform. During the six months of talk, the body
evaluated the Chilean educational system and sought to reach a consensus on the structural
change in the system. But the talks collapsed in December 2006 when members of the social
block, which comprised of students, teachers, and parents, rejected the Advisory Councils
final report. Bachelet announced that her government would study the report and announce
a proposal.
Four months later, in March 2007, when Bachelet announced a reform of the L.O.C.E.
it was apparent that the social blocks demands were being heard. On Monday April 9,
the President met with the Minister of Education, a delegation of students, and various
congressman and senators to sign the legislation that would put an end to the L.O.C.E. and
create a new General Law of Education (Ministry of Education, 2007).
5Some researchers in the United States have made finer distinctions between private non-profit charterschools. For instance, recent research distinguishes between market-oriented and mission-oriented non-profit charter schools (Brown et al., 2005). Although they find differences between market-oriented schoolsand mission-oriented schools across different dimensions, the theoretical typology they use for distinguishingbetween non-profit charter schools limits their ability to disentangle the inter-institutional differences drivenby incentives and legal constraints placed on non-profit and for-profit schools.
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The key points of the law deal with reducing discrimination and selection in public and
private voucher schools, which is currently a widespread practice. Under the new law, no
school will be able to select students. The law also proposes to eliminate for-profit voucher
schools, so that only non-profit and public schools will be able to operate an educational
organization.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the merits of this proposal by examining whether or
not for-profit voucher schools are less effective, all else equal, than non-profit voucher schools
in Chile. Using a highly-detailed unique data set Ive constructed from the administrative
records of the Ministry of Education, I compare the achievement of eighth-graders in public
schools, for-profit and non-profit (religious and secular) voucher schools, and non-voucher
schools.
This is not the first paper to examine private voucher school performance in Chiles
national voucher program. Earlier work used aggregated school level data (Mizala and
Romaguera, 2000). More recently, researchers used student-level data and attempted to
control for selection bias (Anand et al., 2006; Sapelli and Vial, 2002; McEwan, 2001). Most
of these studies show a private school advantage over public schools, although the differences
are usually small.
This paper differs from earlier work by examining achievement across private voucher
schools according to their ownership type. I consider for-profit (independent and franchise)
voucher schools, non-profit (religious and secular) voucher schools, and private non-voucher
schools; prior researchers have used a single category to describe all private vouchers schools,
with the exception of McEwan (2001) who studied Catholic school achievement and Elacqua
et al. (forthcoming) who examined achievement across private voucher schools according to
their network size. The findings presented in this study demonstrate that, while differential
quality is found across private voucher school types (for-profit and non-profit), the differences
do not always comport with the positions on either side of the policy debate in Chile.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews some
background on Chiles school system and describes the school ownership types that will
serve as the key analytical categories. The next section sets forth the empirical strategy that
will be used to compare student achievement in public and private school types, and describes
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the data that will be used to implement it. The fourth section presents and interprets in the
empirical analysis. The final section concludes and discusses policy implications.
2 Background on Chile
During the 1980s, the school system in Chile experienced a sweeping reform program enacted
by the military government (1973-1990). First, the government decentralized the administra-
tion of schools, transferring responsibility for public school management from the Ministry
of Education to local municipalities. Second, the administration altered the financing of
public and most private schools. Public schools continued to be funded centrally, but mu-
nicipalities started to receive a per-pupil payment for every child attending their schools.
As a result, enrollment losses came to have a direct effect on their education budgets. Most
importantly, private schools that did not charge tuition began receiving the same per-pupil
payment as public schools.6 Tuition-charging private schools continued to operate without
public funding.
The essential features of this system have remained in place for over a quarter-century.
The only significant modification was in 1994, when the Ministry instituted a financing
scheme that allowed all private voucher schools to charge limited tuition (Montt et al.,
2006).The voucher and shared financing reforms sparked a massive redistribution of students
across private and public schools, as well as the creation of many new private schools. In
1981, 15 percent of Chilean K-12 students attended private schools that received some public
subsidy, and another 7 percent attended more elite, unsubsidized private schools. By 1990,
32.4 percent of students attended private voucher schools. By 2004, enrollment in such
schools had reached almost 40 percent of total enrollment. Most of these gains were at the
expense of public school enrollments. Adding in the 7.6 percent of students in elite privatenon-voucher schools, leaves only a slight majority of Chilean students in public schools (see
Figure 1).
Figure 1 Here
6Chiles voucher formula includes adjustments for rural schools and high schools, but is flat with respectto student socioeconomic characteristics.
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Most researchers generally use a single category to describe private voucher schools in
Chile. However, there is a great deal of variability in the private voucher sector. Prior to
the voucher reforms in 1981, most subsidized private schools were non-profit (Aedo, 2000).
When private subsidized schools began to receive the same per-pupil payment as the public
schools, a flood of mostly for-profit voucher schools entered the market. Table 1 shows how
primary and secondary school students are distributed across school types. Public schools
account for the majority (62 percent) of schools and enrollments (53 percent). For-profit
voucher schools account for 23 percent of schools and 25 percent of enrollments. Non-profit
voucher schools account for about 9 percent of schools and close to 15 percent of enrollments.
Non-voucher schools represent less than 8 percent of schools and enrollments.
Table 1 HereOver the period 1990 and 2004, the total number of for-profit schools increased by 36
percent, and total enrollment in for-profit schools increased by 62 percent (see Table 2).
For-profit schools have far outpaced growth rates of other school types. The total number
of public schools decreased by 4 percent and total enrollments in public schools increased
by only 3 percent. Non-profit voucher have consolidated of the years yielding a moderate
growth in the number of schools and enrollments (see table 2).
Table 2 Here
Table 3 provides basic descriptive information about the 4 school types. Non-profit
schools have, on average, more students per school than other schools. The data show that
public schools are more likely to serve low-income and rural students than all categories of
private schools. Table 3 also shows that for-profit voucher schools enroll a slightly higher
proportion of disadvantaged students than non-profit voucher schools and that students that
attend private non-voucher schools come from the most highly educated families. The data
also show that about half of private voucher schools (for-profit and non-profit) charge tuition.
Table 3 Here
For-profit and non-profit voucher schools in Chile are diverse in membership. Table 4
describes the management and financing of public and non-voucher schools and six types
of private voucher schools (for-profit franchise, for-profit independent, Catholic, Protestant,
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and non-sectarian). Table 5 shows how primary and secondary school students are dis-
tributed across these seven school categories. For-profit franchises, which represent about 20
percent of all for-profit schools, are probably those that best fit the description of educational
privatization proponents (Chubb, 2001). Most of these schools were founded in the last 5
years. They are often controlled by a group of off-site owners, in some cases with private
shareholders, often have ties to other industries, and are characterized by networks of cam-
puses. These for-profit schools, which account for over 4 percent of schools and 7 percent
of enrollments, stand in varying degrees of contrast to for-profit independent schools, which
account for about 80 percent of all for-profit schools and 19 percent of total schools and 18
percent of enrollments. For-profit independent schools are especially small in size and scale,
suggesting that when these groups set out to establish a school, they are probably looking
to create a school that only provides services to children in the community. Many of these
schools were founded during the first decade of the reform, and anecdotal evidence suggests
that many of the owners are former public school teachers who were expelled by the military
government.7
Table 4 Here
Table 5 Here
Non-profit voucher schools, including Catholic, Protestant,8
and non-sectarian organiza-
tions,9 are more likely to be characterized by an academic and/or religious mission rather
than profit maximization. These schools, which are often subsidized by the Church or local
businesses, often have access to donated facilities and teachers willing to work for below-
market salaries, and thus are able to provide a range of services to students whose costs
exceed the voucher and tuition payments. Most non-profit schools are also characterized
by networks of campuses that are affiliated through religious congregations or foundations.
Catholic schools account for about 75 percent of non-profit schools and 7 percent of all7The National Private Voucher School Association (CONACEP) provided me with the descriptive in-
formation about for-profit voucher schools. I have also conducted a number of focus groups with a diversegroup of for-profit school owners.
8There are 4 private voucher schools of other religious orientations. These schools were dropped from thesample.
9Most of the non-sectarian non-profit schools are branches of foundations that were created for otherspecific tasks, such as the Aid Corporation for Children with Cancer. Some foundations were created bycommunity development groups such as the Rural Social Development Corporation.
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schools and 12 percent of total enrollments. Only about 3 percent of students in Chile are
enrolled in Protestant and non-sectarian voucher schools.10
3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I describe an empirical strategy for comparing public and private for-profit
and non-profit schools student achievement that will correct for selection bias.11 I hypothe-
size that student achievement, measured as student performance on standardized tests, can
be modeled as a function of student socioeconomic characteristics (family background, home
resources, and peer groups).12
Formally, I posit that linear models of the following form can explain student achievement:
Aij =Xijj+ ij (1)
where (Aij) is the test score of the ith student in the jth school type is a function of
independent variables that describe student and the students peer group demographics (Xij),
as well as a disturbance term (ij). In this analysis, I have one public school category, one
private non-voucher school category and 2 categories of private voucher schools (for-profit
and nonprofit).13 The sample is divided among school categories, as I estimate separate
regression coefficients for each sub-sample.
Using the estimates of, one can predict the achievement of a typical student in each
school category. The choice of this students characteristics is arbitrary, but I will use the
mean characteristics of for-profit school students (denoted as X) because I am interested in
comparing for-profit voucher and non-profit voucher school outcomes. Thus, the predicted
10The National Federation of Private Schools (FIDE) provided me with the descriptive information aboutnon-profit voucher schools. I have also conducted an interview with the National Catholic School Organiza-tion.
11Much of the debate around differences between public and private schools has revolved around statisticaltechniques that purport to control for student background characteristics and for potential selection onunobserved variables. See Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) for a critical review of different methods.
12I include peer group controls because a body of literature has documented the positive spillover effectsof having high-ability peers and the negative effects of being surrounded by disadvantaged students (Zimmerand Toma, 2000).
13For ease of exposition, I am using the two aggregate private voucher school categories to explain theempirical strategy. In the empirical analysis, I will also subdivide for-profit schools in two categories (franchiseand independent) and non-profits in three categories (Catholic, Protestant and nonsectarian).
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achievement of the average for-profit voucher school student in the jth school category is:
A= Xj (2)
To measure the difference in achievement between two school categories, I subtract one
prediction from another. The corresponding standard error can also be calculated.14 For
example, I may estimate the corrected difference between non-profit voucher schools (j= 2)
and for-profit voucher schools (j = 1). This provides an approximation of the expected
increase (or decrease) in test scores for the average for-profit voucher school student if she
were to attend a non-profit voucher school.
If the independent variables perfectly account for student and peer demographics, then
the strategy outlined above yields unbiased estimates. More likely is that some variables
are imperfectly measured or omitted from the regressions. For instance, non-profit voucher
schools may be able to select more qualified students, on average, than their for-profit voucher
school counterparts (school choice bias). Similarly, the average student attending a non-
profit voucher school may be more likely to have other attributes (such as having parents who
place a higher value on education) than the average student attending a for-profit voucher
school (parental choice bias).
For these reasons, a simple comparison of student outcomes in for-profit and non-profit
voucher schools is unlikely to give unbiased estimates of the impact of non-profit schools
on student achievement. Prior research has often applied variants of two-stage procedures
developed by Heckman (1979) in an attempt to diminish the parental choice selection bias.
15 This analysis usually consists of a single equation model in which the dependent variable
is the probability of choosing a school (e.g. for-profit or non-profit) and the independent
variables are factors that are believed to influence the choice. These methods presume that
a choice is made between only two schooling alternatives.
In the Chilean context, there are four school categories available to students.16 Lee (1983)
14For the standard errors, I used the following formula X(Vj +Vforprof it)X)1
2 where Vforprofit is theestimate variance covariance matrix from the for-profit regression andV is the comparison groups regression(Murnane et al., 1985).
15In order be able to control for school choice bias, information on school selection practices would berequired. This information is currently not available in Chile.
16In the second part of the empirical analysis I subdivide voucher schools into 5 categories, so there willbe seven school categories available to parents in that selection model.
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has developed a two-stage selection bias procedure for cases where choice is among several
alternatives.
Consider the following model:
Mij =Tijj+ uij(j = 1, 2, 3, 4) (3)
where Mij is a latent variable and Tij is a vector of variables determining school choice for
student i in school type j. Let Mbe a polychotomous variable that can take values 1 to 4
(M=j if the jth school type is chosen). A student attends the jth school type(M=j) iff:
Mj > MaxM
p (p= 1, 2, 3, 4, p=j ) (4)
Given assumptions about the error term uij , equation (3) can be estimated as a multi-
nomial logit (Maddala, 1983). Lee (1983) demonstrates how estimates from the multinomial
logit can be used to construct a selectivity term for each observation ( ij), which then be-
comes an explanatory variable in the student achievement regressions:
Aij =Xijj+ ijj+ ij (5)
wherej is an additional parameter to be estimated. The variable (ij) is equivalent to the
inverse Mills ratio in the common two-step correction proposed by Heckman (1979). It is
defined as:
ij = (1(ij))
ij(6)
Where (.) is the standard normal density, (.) is the normal distribution function, and
ij is the estimated probability (derived from the multinomial logit) that the ith student
chooses the jth school type.
In general, the independent variables that influence student achievement (Xij) in equation
(1) are quite similar to those which influence school choice (Tij) in equation (3). Demographicmeasures, among others, belong in both equations. In the subsequent empirical analysis,
however, it is necessary that one or more variables be included inTij that are excluded from
Xij, in order to identify the model. The key empirical problem in implementing a two-stage
model is in distinguishing the non-profit school effect (or the for-profit school effect) from
the effect of other variables that are not observed. A variable (or variables) is needed that
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affects the probability of attending a non-profit voucher school and that is not correlated
with the error term in the outcomes equation.
In related studies in the United States researchers have assumed that the supply of
Catholic schools is a determinant of Catholic school choice, but is not correlated with stu-
dent achievement (Neal, 1997). Following Neal (1997), I hypothesize that an individuals
probability of choosing a given school type is affected by the number of schools per square
kilometer of each type in her municipality.17 All else equal, students are more likely to
choose schooling alternatives that are more densely concentrated in their municipalities.18
It is assumed, however, that school densities are not correlated with student achievement.19
3.1 Data
The previous models are estimated with student data from Chiles national standardized
test, (Sistema de Medicion de la Calidad de la Educacion-SIMCE), which assesses students
in grades 4, 8, and 10 in language, mathematics, history and geography, and natural sciences
in odd years.20 In 2004, SIMCE evaluated 251,642 eighth graders. Students test scores are
complemented with parent and teacher questionnaires, which include socioeconomic and en-
vironmental information regarding the students, their families, their peers, and their schools.
Table 6 provides definitions of the dependent and independent variables used in the analy-
sis. The dependent variables SPANISH and MATH were originally expressed as the number
of items correct on the test, although I standardized these variables to a mean of 0 and a
17Municipalities are recognized neighborhoods in Chile around which many municipal services are orga-nized.
18Municipalities are recognized neighborhoods in Chile around which many municipal services are orga-nized. Municipalities are important in how people think about neighborhoods and how municipal servicesare organizedthat is, they have both a social reality in terms of defining neighborhoods and a political realityin terms of defining public services (e.g. Valenzuela, 1997). Over 80 percent of primary school students go toschool in their home municipality. Thus, the density measure provides a good proxy for local neighborhoodschooling options.
19
I attempt to corroborate this assumption in the subsequent analysis. See appendix 2 and 3. A reader ofa previous draft of this paper pointed out that if student achievement is low in these schools, demand maydecline, which could eventually affect supply. While there is no evidence on the supply of schools to supportor refute this concern, previous research on the demand side in Chile does suggest that parental decisionsare more influenced by student demographics than actual school quality (Elacqua et al., 2006).
20For additional information on the SIMCE test, see www.simce.cl. SIMCE employs an Item ResponseTheory Methodology.
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standard deviation of 1.21
Several independent variables characterize student demographics. These include the
students gender (FEMALE), years of parental schooling (MTHSCH and FTHSCH), self-
reported household income (INCOME), the number of non-school related books in the stu-
dents home (BOOKS1-BOOKS6, expressed as a series of dummy variables). I imputed
missing parent education information using student peer characteristics. A set of dummy
variables (MTHMISS and FTHMISS) is included to identify those observations with imputed
data.
I calculated student peer information by averaging individual student information over
all the students in a given classroom. AVMTHSCH and AVFTHSCH provide measures of
the average parental schooling, while AVINCOME is the average household income in each
classroom.
I also introduce a variable to indicate the relative isolation of the school (RURAL) and the
total number of students enrolled at the school (SCHOOLSIZE). Although not reported in
the subsequent analysis, I also included regional dummy variables - relative to the Metropoli-
tan Region - in the regressions to account for differences across regions. To approximate the
number of neighborhood schooling options a family confronts, I include a measure of the
number of schools in each category per square kilometer in each municipality (SCHOOL-
SKM2).
Table 6 Here
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the 251,642 students that comprise the sample,
divided by school category. The distribution across school categories in the sample is similar
to the universe of enrollments (see tables 1 and 5). According to table 7, 50 percent of
students attend public schools, 28 percent of students are enrolled in for-profit voucher
schools, 16 percent attend non-profit voucher schools, and about 7 percent of families send21There is no unambiguous definition of what constitutes small or large differences across school types. The
standard deviation is the most commonly used measure of variability in education research. In a standardnormal distribution, approximately 68 percent of the cases lie between -1 and +1 standard deviations aboveor below the mean. Two standard deviations above and below the mean contain roughly 95 percent. Thus,if a student begins with a test score that is extremely low (relative to most individuals), an increase of fourstandard deviations would allow her to outperform the majority of students. Of course, in most studieseffects are much smaller. For instance, in this study, effects are some fraction of a standard deviation.
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their children to non-voucher schools. The data presented in Table 7 also shows that most of
the for-profit school students attend independent schools that do not belong to a franchise
and most of the non-profit students are enrolled in Catholic schools.
On average, most schools are urban, though a larger proportion of public schools (20
percent) are rural compared to all categories of private schools (less than 6 percent). For-
profit franchise and Catholic schools have the largest average number of students per school.
In general, private school parents have higher levels of education, books in the household,
and income. Parents in non-voucher schools followed by Catholic schools have the highest
levels of these indicators.
Table 7 Here
4 Empirical Results
A summary of the results for private and public school coefficients is provided in Table
8.22 Table 8 presents the results when a broad set of control variables and corrections for
selection bias are made. The table is divided into two panels. The top panel summarizes
the results for Spanish, while the bottom presents the results for mathematics. The first
row displays the unadjusted difference in test scores between non-profit, public, non-voucher
and for-profit voucher schools, which is the omitted reference category. The subsequent rows
present the differences after accounting for individual and peer attributes and selection bias.
The first column displays the for-profit-non-profit school test score gap. The subsequent
columns present the for-profit-public school achievement gap and the for-profit-non-voucher
school test score gap.
The simple uncorrected estimates show that the Spanish and mathematics achievement
of students that attend for-profit schools is substantially lower, on average, than that of
non-profit school students and higher than that of public school students. The first row also
indicates a large non-voucher-for-profit test score gap.
After controlling for student and peer attributes and selection bias,23 I still find a sig-
22See appendix 1 for the multinomial logit model and the achievement regressions with the selectivitycorrection. In the interest of space, Ive only included the results for the first model. The regression outputfor the second model that I present below are available upon request.
23Point estimates of the selectivity coefficients (lambda), while not precisely estimated, are generally
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nificant and positive, but small, non-profit school Spanish (0.104 standard deviations) and
mathematics (.094 standard deviations) effect. However, the corrected test score estimates
indicate that there remains only a very small and significant difference in Spanish achieve-
ment between for-profit and public and for-profit and non-voucher schools. There is no sig-
nificant difference in mathematic achievement between for-profit and public and non-voucher
schools.
Table 8 Here
These results provide evidence of the effectiveness of non-profit voucher schools, but no
evidence on the difference in quality between public and for-profit schools. However, for-
profit schools and non-profit schools, as I discussed above, are a heterogeneous lot. The
data presented in table 5 show that 80 percent of for-profit schools are independent andmany are run by former teachers. In contrast, franchise schools, which account for about
20 percent of this sector, are often controlled by a group of off-site entrepreneurs that and
are characterized by networks of campuses. In addition, non-profit schools are composed of
Catholic, Protestant and non-sectarian schools with very different educational missions. It
is essential to separate Catholic schools from other schools because previous research has
demonstrated that Catholic schools, all else equal, usually outperform public schools and
other private schools (McEwan, 2001; Bryk et al., 1993). By doing so, we avoid confoundingthe effect of attending a non-profit school with the effect of a Catholic school.
Here I examine whether some types of for-profit and non-profit schools are more effective
than others. Table 9 summarizes the results separating for-profit and non-profit schools
by ownership type. As in the prior analysis, unadjusted estimates suggest that students in
for-profit independent schools have higher Spanish and mathematics achievement than pub-
lic school students and significantly lower achievement than non-voucher school students.
suggestive of negative selection, although it is only statistically significant for non-voucher schools. Seeappendix 2 and 3. I find similar results (available upon request) in the model that subdivides for-profit andnon-profit schools by ownership type. Even so, the results do not provide enough evidence to convincinglyreject the null hypothesis of selection bias, especially in the case of Catholic and non-voucher schools. Apossible solution would be to find a more complete set of instrumental variables, that is covariates that arecorrelated with school choice and uncorrelated with test scores, to diminish the amount of collinearity thelambda introduces to the achievement regressions. This would allow one to estimate coefficients of Catholicand non-voucher schools with greater precision. Unfortunately, instrumental variables with these propertiesare not easy to identify in Chile.
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For-profit students that attend schools that belong to a franchise score, on average, 0.1 stan-
dard deviation higher than for-profit independent students. Raw differences are even higher
between Catholic and for-profit independent students (.29 standard deviations) and non-
sectarian students (.21 standard deviations). There is no significant unadjusted difference in
Spanish or mathematic achievement between Protestant and for-profit independent schools.
After controlling for student and peer attributes and selection bias, we still find a sig-
nificant and even more substantial positive for-profit franchise school (0.22 standard devi-
ations), Catholic school (0.19 standard deviations), and non-sectarian school (.84 standard
deviations) Spanish achievement effect.24 However, the corrected test score estimates in-
dicate that there is no significant difference in Spanish achievement between Protestant,
public, non-voucher and for-profit independent schools. The results in table 9 also demon-
strate that for-profit franchise schools and Catholic schools have a considerable advantage
in mathematics (0.17 standard deviations) over for-profit independent schools, once student
and peer attributes and selection bias are controlled for. In addition, there is a substantial
non-sectarian school mathematics effect. There is no significant difference in mathematic
achievement between for-profit independent, public, and non-voucher schools. It appears
that Protestant schools produce slightly lower mathematics test scores than for-profit inde-
pendent schools after accounting for confounding independent variables.
Table 9 Here
Are the magnitudes of these Catholic, non-sectarian, and for-profit franchise effects sub-
stantial? Research in the United States has found that Catholic schools have an effect size
of around .10 standard deviations (Neal, 1997), which some have argued is not noteworthy
(Levin, 1998). I find that Catholic schools and for-profit schools that belong to a franchise
have even more substantial effect sizes, over .17 of a standard deviation.25 Finally, I find
a lack of any consistent difference between student achievement in public, Protestant and24With the exception of the non-sectarian schools, accounting for selection reduces or does not change a
school sectors advantage or disadvantage relative to for-profit independent schools. As indicated in table8, the effect of non-sectarian schools becomes very large after controlling for selection bias. It is likely thatcollinearity induced by the selectivity term, together with the fairly small sample size, led to movements inthe coefficient estimates.
25Non-sectarian non-profit voucher schools have even larger effect sizes, nearly one standard deviation.However, as I mentioned in the previous footnote, these effect sizes need to interpreted with caution.
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for-profit independent schools. In some cases it also appears that Protestant schools produce
slightly lower achievement than for-profit independent schools.
5 Conclusion
There has been a vigorous policy debate in Chile on the performance of for-profit and non-
profit schools. Some argue that for-profit schools cannot be trusted to place the interest of
students over profitability. Buried in this position is the belief that for-profits would cut
quality in the process of cutting costs (Levin, 2002). Skeptics have countered that for-profit
schools have incentives to reduce costs and to innovate, leading to both higher quality and
greater efficiency in education (Tironi, 2006; Hoxby, 2003). Neither of these arguments,
however, is based on any empirical evidence on the differential performance across school
types.
To gain insight into this debate, Ive examined the Chilean school system where vouchers
have been implemented on a large scale and where for-profit and non-profit school supply has
increased. This paper compares the academic achievement of eighth-grade students across
for-profit, non-profit, public, and non-voucher schools. I have also subdivided for-profit and
non-profit schools by ownership type: for-profit independent, for-profit franchise, Catholic,
Protestant, and non-sectarian voucher schools. What I find is a mixed story. Controllingfor individual and peer characteristics and selection bias, the results suggest that a for-profit
school student achieves slightly lower than a comparable student in a non-profit school.
There is no consistent difference in student achievement in for-profit and public schools.
However, an average student in a for-profit independent school performs significantly lower
than a similar student enrolled in a Catholic, non-sectarian, and for-profit franchise school.
The results also show that there is no important difference in achievement between public
and for-profit independent schools. There is also not a statistically significant difference inSpanish test scores between for-profit independent and Protestant schools. In mathematics,
it appears that Protestant voucher schools have slightly lower achievement than for-profit
independent schools.
The Catholic school effect is consistent with previous research in the United States (Neal,
1997). Researchers have argued that Catholic schools foster an environment in which rigorous
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academic work is pursued within a supportive and caring environment (Bryk et al., 1993).
The positive for-profit franchise effect is also consistent with previous research in Chile
(Elacqua et al., forthcoming). Some of the reasons that may explain the for-profit franchise
advantage include the benefits of scale of educational inputs (Chubb, 2001). In addition,
some researchers have argued that being embedded in a larger organization reduces and
facilitates the flow of information (such as research on best practices) between the schools
in a franchise (McMeekin, 2003).26 The evidence on low-quality Protestant schools is also
consistent with some research in the United States, which has found that these schools
dedicate more of their resources for preparing its students for the Kingdom of Heaven than
on academic activities (Peshkin, 1986).
From a policy perspective, perhaps the most interesting finding of this research is the
variation of student achievement within both the for-profit and non-profit sectors. These
findings suggest that policies oriented to eliminate for-profit schools and continue funding
non-profit (religious and non-sectarian) schools, as proposed in the General Education Act
President Bachelet signed and sent to Congress, is unlikely to improve educational outcomes.
It is highly unlikely that these mixed research findings will resolve the education policy
debate in Chile. As some scholars and practitioners have pointed out, nuanced research
findings are usually much harder to interpret and less likely to influence policy and public
understanding than straightforward ideological positions (Belfield and Levin, 2005). At a
recent conference that explored the reasons why research rarely influences policy, David
Driscoll, the Commissioner of Education of the state of Massachusetts, summarized the
terms of this debate: The exact science of ideology always trumps the inexact science of
research (Driscoll, 2007).
26It may also be the case that high achieving for-profit schools may be more likely to establish franchises (orto join a franchise) than low quality for-profit schools. In a competitive schooling environment, low qualityfor-profit schools may be unable to attract students and additional resources needed to expand operations.Data on the characteristics of for-profit school owners would improve our understanding of the complexdecisions involved in establishing a for-profit voucher school and expanding operations.
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Figure 1. Enrollment share in public and private schools, 19792004.
59.7%
52.6%
15.1%
43.1%39.9%
6.9% 6.7% 7.6%
78%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1981 1990 2004
Percentageoftotalprimaryand
secondaryenrollments
Public
Private voucher
Private non-voucher
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Table 1: Distribution of primary and secondary school students across school types, 2004Percent of schools Percent of enrollment
Public 62 52.6
For-profit voucher 23 24.9
Non-profit voucher 9.1 15
Private non-voucher 6 7.6
Total 100 100
Number of schools or students 9,427 3,215,405
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Table 2 The growth of private schooling in Chile, 1990-2004
Schooltype
School numbers Student enrollments
1990 2004Percentchange
1990 2004Percentchange
Public 6,072 5,843 -3.8% 1,642,414 1,689,720 2.9%
For-profit 1,592 2,167 36.1% 494,843 799,806 61.6%
Non-profit 700 856 22.3% 343,755 482,560 40.4%
Non-voucher
521 561 7.7% 198,602 243,319 22.5%
Total 8,885 9,427 6.1% 2,679,614 3,215,405 20%
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Table 3: Private schools by ownership type: Descriptive summary
School type NRural(%)
Averageschool
size
ChargeTuition
(%)
Mothers'years of
education
Vulnerablestudents
(%)**
Public 5,843 22% 290 18%* 8.1 39%
For-profit 2,167 6% 369 53% 10.1 18%
Non-profit 856 5% 564 50% 10.8 14%
Non-voucher 561 2% 434 100% 15 0%
*Only public high schools can charge fees. Elementary schools are required by law to be free.
**Only elementary school students (k-8)
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Table 4: A taxonomy of p ublic and pri vate schools in Chile
School Type Management Financing
*Contributions include services of personnel and monetary and in-kind donations.
Public Schools Departamento de Administracin dela Educacin Municipal; part ofmunicipal bureaucracy
National vouchers; municipalcontributors; Regional DevelopmentFund (infrastructure)
Municipal Corporation; quasi-autonomous from municipalbureaucracy
For-profitindependentvoucher
Individual entrepreneurs. National vouchers; tuition payments;parent-center fees
For-profit franchisevoucher
For-profit partnerships and firms(with private shareholders) thatbelong to a chain of schools and areoperated by the same legal schoolowner
National vouchers; tuition payments;parent-center fees
Catholic voucher Branches of Catholic church,including religious orders, parishes,archdiocese and religiousfoundations.
National vouchers; tuition payments;parent-center fees; churchcontributions*
Protestant voucher Protestant churches, includingMethodist, Baptist, Seventh-DayAdventist, Anglican, Lutheran, andPresbyterian churches.
National vouchers; tuition payments;parent-center fees; churchcontributions*
Nonsectarianvoucher
Foundations, universities,Community development groups(NGOs)
National vouchers; tuition payments;parent-center fees; foundationcontributions*
Private non-voucher
Catholic church; Protestantchurches; for-profit individuals andfirms; non-profit foundations.
Tuition payments; parent-centerfees; church and foundationcontributions*
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Table 5: Distribution of primary school students across 7 school categories, 2004Percent of schools Percent of enrollment
Public 62 52.6
For-profit franchise 4.2 6.7
For-profit independent 18.7 18.1
Non-profit Catholic 6.9 12
Non-profit Protestant 1.0 1.4
Non-profit nonsectarian 1.1 1.6
Private non-voucher 6 7.6
Total 100 100
Number of schools or students 9,424 3,215,006
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Table 6 Variable definitions
Variable Description
SPANISH Student score on the eighth-grade Spanish test (standardized to a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1)
MATH Student score on the eighth-grade mathematics test (standardized to a mean
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1)
FEMALE Dummy variable indicating whether student is female
MTHSCH Years of schooling of students mother
MTHMISS Dummy variable indicating whether MTHSCH is missing
FTHSCH Years of schooling of students father
FTHMISS Dummy variable indicating whether FTHSCH is missing
INCOME Monthly family income, divided by 100,000
BOOKS1-BOOKS6 Six dummy variables indicating the number of books in the family home,
ranging from 1 (5 or less) to 6 (more than 200). BOOKS2 is omitted in
regressions.
AVMTHSCH Average schooling of student mothers in classroom
AVFTHSCH Average schooling of student fathers in classroom
AVINCOME Average monthly household income of students in classroom
SCHOOLSIZE Total enrollment in school
SECPROPORTION Proportion of secondary students over total enrollment
RURAL Dummy variable indicating whether school is rural
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Table 7 Sample descriptive statistics
Note: Standard deviations are in brackets.
Sample Public
For-profit
independent
For-profit
franchise Catholic Protestant Nonsectarian Nonvoucher
SPANISH 0.000 -0.234 0.037 0.137 0.324 0.041 0.242 0.836
[1.000] [.964] [.98] [.983] [.924] [.982] [.985] [.796]
MATH 0.000 -233 0.034 0.15 0.28 0.028 0.275 0.896
[1.000] [.964] [.979] [.977] [.929] [.959] [.995] [.772]
Public 0.501
For-profitindependent
0.212
For-profit franchise 0.064
Catholic 0.126
Protestant 0.016
Nonsectarian 0.015
Nonvoucher 0.065
FEMALE 0.49 0.489 0.47 0.473 0.55 0.472 0.472 0.476
MTHSCH 10.756 9.44 11.34 11.064 12.117 11.365 11.4877 15.42
[3.424] [3.12] [3.1] [2.974] [2.913] [3.037] [3.11] [2.002]
MTHMISS 0.106 0.1033 0.112 0.104 0.088 0.112 0.099 0.132
FTHSCH 10.824 9.466 11.433 11.113 12.039 11.5 11.424 16
[3.548] [3.189] [3.172] [3.041] [3.036] [3.067] [3.357] [2.216]
FTHMISS 0.144 0.15 0.145 0.136 0.118 0.15 0.131 0.145
INCOME 3.42 2.2 3.546 3.147 3.91 3.288 3.854 11.597
3.259 1.632 2.83 2.337 3.005 2.372 3.242 3.418
BOOKS1 0.103 0.152 0.071 0.072 0.049 0.068 0.069 0.003
BOOKS2 0.443 0.523 0.411 0.419 0.375 0.451 0.386 0.097
BOOKS3 0.3 0.243 0.351 0.353 0.38 0.346 0.357 0.326
BOOKS4 0.091 0.054 0.106 0.101 0.121 0.085 0.112 0.239
BOOKS5 0.032 0.015 0.034 0.031 0.041 0.03 0.043 0.142
BOOKS6 0.031 0.013 0.027 0.024 0.033 0.021 0.034 0.193
RURAL 0.123 0.196 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.091 0.038 0.02
AVMTHSCH (peer) 10.765 9.437 11.349 11.05 12.15 11.385 11.482 15.623
[2.363] [1.59] [2.013] [1.775] [1.684] [1.775] [2.095] [.837]
AVFTHSCH (peer) 10.842 9.473 11.452 11.101 12.073 11.54 11.405 16.252
[2.496] [1.692] [2.05] [1.79] [1.792] [1.727] [2.284] [.943]
AVINCOME (peer) 3.411 2.191 3.533 3.142 3.9 3.281 3.833 11.6
[2.619] [.799[ [1.801] [1.285] [1.799] [1.17] [2.362] [1.573]
SCHOOLSIZE 763.331 673.369 696.26 1071.306 1053.257 688.28 866.29 828.341
[667.358] [436.452] [662.267] [1020.878] [1056.541] [446.32] [575.81] [515.759]
SECPROPORTION 0.111 0.036 0.153 0.133 0.202 0.141 0.184 0.321
N(students 251,642 126,092 53,365 16,166 31,783 3,931 3,738 16,567
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Table 8 Differences between non-profit voucher, public, and private non-voucher schools, with average characteristicsof for-profit voucher school students
Non-profitvoucher
Public PrivateNon-voucher
SPANISH
Unadjusted Difference 0.228 -0.294 0.776
[0.006] [0.005] [0.009]
Difference adjusted for:
Individual SES 0.138 -0.180 0.325
[0.028] [0.022] [0.050]
Individu al/peer SES 0.091 -0.056 0.076
[0.027] [0.023] [0.091]
Individual/peer SES/selectivity 0.104 -0.061 0.161
[0.037] [0.026] [0.100]
N 39,096 124,757 16,396
MATH
Unadjusted Difference 0.193 -0.294 0.835
[0.006] [0.005] [0.009]
Difference adjusted for:
Individual SES 0.119 -0.160 0.289
[0.030] [0.023] [0.053]
Individu al/peer SES 0.071 -0.034 -0.074
[0.029] [0.024] [0.097]
Individual/peer SES/selectivity 0.094 -0.050 0.036
[0.042] [0.028] [0.106]
N 39,107 124,533 16,395
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 9: Differences between for-profit franchise, Catholic, Protestant, Non-sectarian, Public, and non-voucherschools, with average characteristics of for-profit independent school students
For-profitfranchise
Catholic Protestant Non-sectarian
Public Non-voucher
SPANISH
Unadjusted Difference 0.099 0.287 0.004 0.206 -0.271 0.800
[0.009] [0.007] [0.017] [0.017] [0.005] [0.009]
Difference adjusted for :
Individual SES 0.210 0.219 0.007 0.217 -0.127 0.368
[0.041] [0.029] [0.090] [0.091] [0.022] [0.049
Individual/peer SES 0.200 0.159 0.013 0.282 0.006 0.122
[0.036] [0.028] [0.076] [0.072] [0.023] [0.089]
Individual/peer SES/selectivity 0.221 0.185 0.017 0.836 -0.004 0.194
[0.060] [0.036] [0.201] [0.156] [0.028] [0.094]
N 15,994 31,537 3,873 3,686 124,757 16,396
MATH
Unadjusted Difference 0.115 0.245 -0.006 0.242 -0.267 0.862
[0.009] [0.007] [0.017] [0.017] [0.005] [0.009]
Difference adjusted f or:
Individual SES 0.197 0.184 -0.066 0.280 -0.109 0.332
[0.044] [0.032] [0.087] [0.088] [0.023] [0.051]
Individual/peer SES 0.191 0.122 -0.061 0.343 0.026 -0.024
[0.039] [0.032] [0.081] [0.069] [0.025] [0.094]
Individual/peer SES/selectivity 0.173 0.164 -0.086 0.986 0.010 0.069
[0.062] [0.041] [0.272] [0.146] [0.030] [0.101]
N 15,992 31,548 3,866 3,693 124,533 16,395
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
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Appendix 1 A multinomial logit model of school choice
Public Non-profitNon-
voucher
FEMALE 0.06 0.26*** -0.01
[-1.59] [-5.18] [-0.07]
MTHSCH -0.01* 0.07*** 0.31***
[-2.32] [-11.13] [-18.41]
MTHMISS 0.02 -0.04 0.31
[-0.45] [-0.74] [-1.82]
FTHSCH -0.01* 0.02*** 0.25***
[-2.41] [-3.89] [-16.24]
FTHMISS 0.09** 0.01 0.25*
[-2.59] [-0.44] [-2.05]
INCOME -0.07*** 0.02* 0.45***
[-3.92] [-2.21] [-21.73]
BOOKS1 0.05 -0.11* -0.86***
[-1.65] [-2.51] [-3.80]
BOOKS2 -0.09*** 0.06** 0.19**
[-3.68] [-2.88] [-2.63]
BOOKS3 -0.12** 0.05 0.36***
[-3.11] [-1.54] [-4.44]
BOOKS4 0.02 0.08 0.31**
[-0.34] [-1.87] [-2.96]
BOOKS5 0.05 0.01 0.26
[-0.62] [-0.19] [-1.9]
RURAL 0.93*** 0.05 -1.89***
[-4.63] [-0.22] [-3.96]
SCHOOLSIZE 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00***
[-4.83] [-2.23] [-3.93]
SECPROPORTION -3.43*** 0.93* 8.99***
[-6.18] [-2.47] [-13.27]
DENSITY1 0.03 -0.04 0.02
[-1.2] [-1.87] [-0.45]
DENSITY1(2) 0 0 0
[-1.57] [-1.83] [-0.99]
DENSITY2 -0.02 0 0.01
[-1.10] [-0.25] [-0.24]
DENSITY2(2) 0 0 0
[-0.7] [-0.94] [-0.06]
DENSITY3 0 0.02 0.01
[-0.03] [-0.94] [-0.13]
DENSITY3(2) 0 0 0
[-1] [-0.69] [-0.08]
DENSITY4 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
[-1.17] [-0.88] [-0.3]
DENSITY4(2) 0 0 0
[-0.21] [-1.19] [-0.56]
CONSTANT 1.16*** -2.27*** -11.17***
[-3.55] [-8.17] [-16.62]
Pseudo R-squared 0.54 Number of observations : 205172Robust standard errors in brackets*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
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Appendix 2 Spanish achievement regressions with school densityPublic For-profit Non-
profitNon-
voucher
FEMALE 0.1288*** 0.1161*** 0.1087*** 0.1509***
[0.0064] [0.0094] [0.0128] [0.0158]
MTHSCH 0.0342*** 0.0303*** 0.0319*** 0.0324***
[0.0012] [0.0017] [0.0024] [0.0041]
MTHMISS -0.0859*** -0.0770*** -0.0233 -0.1066**
[0.0174] [0.0221] [0.0269] [0.0462]
FTHSCH 0.0288*** 0.0248*** 0.0229*** 0.0168***
[0.0011] [0.0017] [0.0022] [0.0036]
FTHMISS -0.0460*** -0.0801*** -0.0728*** -0.0233
[0.0114] [0.0164] [0.0203] [0.0334]
INCOME 0.0128*** 0.0061*** 0.0042* -0.0065*
[0.0029] [0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0033]
BOOK1 -0.0768*** -0.0523*** -0.0625*** 0.014
[0.0088] [0.0173] [0.0222] [0.1371]
BOOK2 0.1224*** 0.0986*** 0.1130*** 0.0838***
[0.0076] [0.0096] [0.0122] [0.0230]
BOOK3 0.1733*** 0.1667*** 0.1695*** 0.1589***
[0.0137] [0.0129] [0.0166] [0.0255]
BOOK4 0.2184*** 0.2333*** 0.2232*** 0.1716***
[0.0249] [0.0211] [0.0248] [0.0271]
BOOK5 0.2439*** 0.2523*** 0.1787*** 0.1992***
[0.0265] [0.0231] [0.0274] [0.0269]
RURAL 0.1924*** 0.0944* -0.0083 0.094
[0.0212] [0.0508] [0.0464] [0.0655]
SCHOOLSIZE 0 0.0001*** -0.0000* 0.0002***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
SECPROPORTION 0.0503 -0.1076* 0.0757 -0.0291
[0.0780] [0.0647] [0.0746] [0.1341]
AVMTHSCH 0.0682*** 0.0711*** 0.0774*** 0.0152
[0.0076] [0.0115] [0.0174] [0.0234]
AVFTHSCHO 0.0136* 0.0442*** 0.0320* 0.0403*
[0.0075] [0.0120] [0.0172] [0.0221]
AVINCOME 0.0334*** -0.0017 0.0045 0.003
[0.0128] [0.0127] [0.0127] [0.0100]
LAMBDA -0.0477 -0.026 -0.0077 -0.0796**
[0.0442] [0.0313] [0.0275] [0.0365]
CONSTANT -1.8667*** -1.9906*** -1.7850*** -1.1152***
[0.0554] [0.0903] [0.1506] [0.3104]
Number of Observations 100376 56690 33350 13697
R-squared 0.1133 0.1442 0.1399 0.0725
Robust standard errors in brackets*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%Regional dummies were also included in the regressions.
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Appendix 3 Mathematics achievement regressions with school densityPublic For-profit Non-profit Non-
voucher
FEMALE -0.0628*** -0.0839*** -0.0905*** -0.0267*
[0.0067] [0.0101] [0.0136] [0.0160]
MTHSCH 0.0350*** 0.0269*** 0.0297*** 0.0312***
[0.0012] [0.0017] [0.0023] [0.0043]
MTHMISS -0.1129*** -0.0927*** -0.044 -0.1497***
[0.0169] [0.0217] [0.0282] [0.0454]
FTHSCH 0.0270*** 0.0248*** 0.0199*** 0.0212***
[0.0011] [0.0017] [0.0023] [0.0037]
FTHMISS -0.0684*** -0.0609*** -0.1098*** -0.049
[0.0113] [0.0156] [0.0216] [0.0368]
INCOME 0.0134*** 0.0063*** 0.0082*** -0.004
[0.0029] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0030]
BOOK1 -0.0757*** -0.0636*** -0.0492** 0.080
[0.0085] [0.0173] [0.0240] [0.1474]
BOOK2 0.1202*** 0.1073*** 0.0972*** 0.0789***
[0.0077] [0.0093] [0.0114] [0.0220]
BOOK3 0.1705*** 0.1513*** 0.1488*** 0.1475***
[0.0136] [0.0131] [0.0165] [0.0242]
BOOK4 0.2009*** 0.2147*** 0.2180*** 0.1550***
[0.0240] [0.0215] [0.0256] [0.0257]
BOOK5 0.1843*** 0.2234*** 0.1655*** 0.1741***
[0.0284] [0.0233] [0.0276] [0.0257]
RURAL 0.1666*** 0.0900* -0.043 0.037
[0.0228] [0.0483] [0.0458] [0.1131]
SCHOOLSIZE 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 0.0002***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
SECPROPORTION 0.057 -0.1272* 0.139 -0.108
[0.0835] [0.0696] [0.0869] [0.1301]
AVMTHSCH 0.0681*** 0.0620*** 0.0794*** 0.010
[0.0082] [0.0128] [0.0196] [0.0242]
AVFTHSCHO 0.0173** 0.0497*** 0.019 0.0764***
[0.0083] [0.0126] [0.0192] [0.0235]
AVINCOME 0.0310** 0.012 0.016 0.001
[0.0139] [0.0135] [0.0138] [0.0116]
LAMBDA -0.075 -0.006 -0.023 -0.1055***
[0.0458] [0.0374] [0.0326] [0.0356]
CONSTANT -1.7689*** -1.8887*** -1.5496*** -1.4845***
[0.0577] [0.0970] [0.1643] [0.3507]
Number of Observations 100580.000 56881.000 33428.000 13728.000
R-squared 0.108 0.150 0.139 0.086
Robust standard errors in brackets*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%Regional dummies were also included in the regressions.