Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special ProgramsAdministration

49 CFR Part 193[Docket OPSO-46]

Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities; NewFederal Safety Standards

AGENCY: Materials TransportationBureau (MTB), DOT.ACTION: Final rlile.

SUMMARY: This final rule establishes aset of comprehensive safety standardsgoverning the design (including siteselection) and construction of liquefiednatural gas (LNG] facilities used in thetransportation of natural gas by pipelinein or affecting interstate or foreigncommerce. Because of the graveconsequences that could result from-amajor accident at a facility, presentregulations are considered inadequate.DATE: Effective date of this final rule isMarch 15, 1980, except for § § 193.2119and 193.2329 which will be madeeffective at a subsequent date.FOR FURTHER INFORMATION cONITAC'.Walter Dennis, 202-426-2392.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: LNG ismethane gas that has been cooled toabout minus 260 degrees Fahrenheitwhere it occupies V6ooth of its originalvolume. LNG is hazardous because of itscold temperature, flammability, anddispersion characteristics upon release.Upon exposure to ambient temperatures,LNG vaporizes rapidly and the vapormay remain close to the ground anddisperse into the atmosphere in the formof a cloud. The vapor can causeasphyxiation and is flammable inconcentrations in air between 5 and 15percent.

These standards cover LNG facilitiesused to liquefy natural or synthetic gasor to transfer, store, or vaporize LNG inconjunction with the transportation ofgas by pipeline in or affecting interstateor foreign commerce..Part 193 prescribesan acceptable level of public safetyconsidering the hazards of LNG and thepotential causes and consequences ofaccidents and the'steps that may betaken to safeguard against them. Part193 provides for employee safety only tothe extent that it is affected by measuresrequired for public safety.

BackgroundThe existing Federal safety standards

governing LNG facilities used in thetransportation of natural gas by pipelineare contained in § 192.12 of Title 49 ofthe Code of Federal Regulations. Thesestandards were adopted by Amendment-192-10, issued on October 10, 1972 (37

FR 21638]. The amendment adopted asthe Federal LNG safety standards theNational Fire Protection Association(NFPA] Standard 59A (1971 edition), aswell as the other applicablerequirements of Part 192. Subsequently,the 1972 edition of NFPA 59A wasadopted (41 FR 13590).. In the preamble of Amendment 192-

10, it was stated that the NFPA standardwis adopted only as an interim measurewhile federally developed regulationsspecifically applicable to LNG facilitieswere being developed. MTB believesthat there is a need for federally .developed regulations for LNG facilitiesbecause the present referencedstandards are not written in enforceableterms and do not adequately cover allsafety problems respecting an LNG"facility.

The need for comprehensive newFederal LNG facility safety standardsarises because of the seriousness ofpotential hazards from LNG facilitiescoupled with the anticipated increase ofLNG facility construction to meet thenation's energy needs, and thedeveloping variations in the design offacilities near population centers, orareas of greatest energy demand. TheCongress, the General AccountingOffice; the Federal Energy RegulatoryCommission and other Federal, State,and local agencies; nongovernmentorganizations; representatives ofindustry; and the public in general haveexpressed concern over the adequacy ofpresent referenced standards to providefor public safety.

The extent of congressional concernregarding the inadequacy of the presentstandards and the need for thegovernment to issue expeditiouslyfederally developed LNG regulations isevidenced by the recent amendments tothe Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of1968 (the Act] under Pub. L. 96-129(November 30, 1979). Under thoseamendments, the Department is nowrequired to establish expeditiouslyregulations for the siting, design,construction, initial inspection, andinitial testing of any new-LNG facility.

A report issued on July 31, 1978, by theGeneral Accounting Office titled"Liquefied Energy Gases" (EMD 78-28)highlights some of the safety concerns inthe transportation and storage of LNG.Foremost among these are (1) protectionof persons.and property near an LNGfacility from thermal radiation (heat]caused by ignition of a major spill ofLNG, (2] protection of persons andproperty near an LNG facility fromdispersion and delayed ignition of anatural gas cloud arising from a majorspill of LNG, and (3] reduction of thepotential for a catastrophic spill of LNG.

In 1974, the Department's Office ofPipeline Safety contracted for a study byArthur D. Little, Inc., (ADL) to providesafety information on LNG facliltles,The ADL report, titled "Technology andCurrent Practices for Processing,Transferring, and Storing LiquefiedNatural Gas," included a comparativeanalysis of national, State, local,industrial, and professional societycodes, standards, practices, andregulations relating to LNG facilities.Copies of the report (NTIS No. PB.-241048] are available from the NationalTechnical Information Service, U.S.Department of Commerce, Springfield,Virginia 22151, telephone (703) 557-4050,in paper for $7.75 and in microfiche for$3.00. A copy is also available forreview in the docket.

The study identified and analyzedmany areas of public concern about theoperation of LNG facilities. It alsoaddressed many practices and functionswhere special precautions are needed toprotect persons and property. MTBbelieves that the results of the ADLstudy are consistent with currentinformation obtained from othersources. The ADL report found thatNFPA 59A was the basis for practicallyall national, State, and local codes forLNG facilities. MTB agrees with thisconclusion and has used the NFPA 59A,in pert, as a basis for these proposedregulations.

Regulatory ProceedingIn April 1977, MTB issued an Advance

Notice of Proposed Rulemakihg(ANPRM) (42 FR 20776, April 21,1977)inviting public participation at an earlystage in the rulemaking process foradoption of new Federal safetystandards in 49 CFR Part 193. TheANPRM contained a comprehensive sotof-draft regulations which were intendedto serve as a basis for public commentandparticipation in identification ofLNG safety problems and thedevelopment of appropriate regulatorysolutions to these problems, consideringall reasonable alternatives.Subsequently, a correction waspublished at 42 FR 24758; and a thirdnotice (42 FR 42235, August 22, 1978)extended the comment period toDecember 1, 1978, and set forth abibliography of resource information.

Comments were solicited on safetyproblems and on environmental andeconomic issues; and persons wereasked to support their comments withrationale and documentation, and whereappropriate, to propose alternativeregulations that would provide anacceptable level of safety. MTB alsoencouraged comments on the annualand aggregate costs, benefits, and other

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anticipated impacts associated witheach of the draft regulations and allalternatives which commenters mightsuggest.

Comments were received on theANPRM from 135 different commenters.Most of the comments were fromindustry associations or LNG operators,but a few government agencies, Inonindustry-related organizations, andindividuals also commented. Thesecomments were reviewed in preparing anotice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

In February 1979, MTB issued anNPRM (44 FR 8142, February 8,1979)based on Subparts A through K of theANPRM, together with a DraftEvaluation of the costs, benefits, andother impacts associated with theproposed rules. These subparts provideda broad coverage of closely relatedproposed standards for the siting,design, and construction of newfacilities and parts of existing facilitiesthat are replaced, relocated, orsignificantly altered. They formed thebasis for this final rule. While noconflicts or inconsistencies are expectedbetween these final rules and futurerules to be included in Part 193 onoperation, maintenance, security, andfire protection, if any suchinconsistencies are discovered as aresult of the NPRM recently issued onthose subjects, they will be resolved inthat proceeding before final rules areadded to Part 193.

Comments were received on theNPRM from about 100 differentcommenters. Similar to the commentsreceived on the ANPRM, most of thecomments were from industryassociations or LNG operators, butgovernment agencies, nonindustry-related organizations, and individualsalso commented.

Several commenters to the NPRMreiterated positions taken on theANPRM, especially with regard to thepresent referenced NFPA 59Astandards. They argued that MTBshould continue to adopt the NFPA 59Astandards as the Federal standardsbecause the LNG industry has anenviable safety record using thesestandards. The MTB is still notpersuaded by this argument andcontinues to see the need fordevelopment of new, more stringentFederal safety standards for LNGfacilities. As set forth in the preamble tothe NPRM, the hazard from acatastrophic spill of LNG is verysignificant as shown by the spill of LNGin Cleveland on October 20,1944, thatkilled 130 persons and injured 225 more.In addition, the leak of LNG in thefacility in Cove Point. Maryland, onOctober 6,1979. that killed one person

and injured another person could havehad more catastrophic effects. Also, ofprimary consideration in MTB's notcontinuing to rely solely on the NFPA59A standards as the Federal standardsis the recent amendment to the Actrequiring the establishment of FederalLNG facility standards. Researchconducted by various governmentagencies and industry groups on thermalradiation and vapor cloud dispersionhas also clearly indicated the significantpotential hazards that would occur ifLNG escapes. Also, as indicated in theNPRM and the A. D. Little study, MTBhas identified many deficiencies in thecurrent standards which should becorrected to mitigate the potential for amajor spill of LNG and provide anacceptable level of safety. Nevertheless,MTB has adopted portions of NFPA 59Ato the extent appropriate. However,because of the difference in format andthe need for regulatory language tofacilitate enforcement, only a fewsections of NFPA 59A have beenincorporated by reference in theregulations as presented in the 59ACode, while other sections of NFPA 59Ahave been restated for their adoption asPart 193 sections.

The NFPA 59A has recently beenupdated by a 1979 edition thatsignificantly strengthens many of thesiting, design, and constructionstandards. This edition has beenadopted as the referenced edition for thesections of the 59A Code incorporatedby reference in the Part 193 regulations.

In response to many commenters tothe NPRM, MTB has in a few casesestablished different standards for LNGfacilities of small size having a capacityof 70,000 gallons or less. The MTBvisited one manufacturer of small LNGstorage tanks used in satellite facilitiesto discuss the need for differentstandards for small facilities. Because ofthe small size of such tanks, somestandards are not necessary for suchtanks. In addition, such tanks arenormally shop fabricated subject to rigidquality control. The MTB has alsorecognized the need for continuingtechnological development of LNGfacilities by not being overly rigid andpermitting alternative complianceapproaches for specific safety problems.The MTB has generally stated theproposed requirements in performanceterms, using specific requirements wheredeemed necessary, and also referencingseveral industry consensus standardswhere appropriate.

Part 193 is adopted under the NaturalGas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, asamended by Pub. L. 96-129. Whilealmost all existing or planned LNG

facilities involve the supply or deliveryof natural gas by pipeline, it may benecessary in the future to broaden thescope of these regulations to cover LNGfacilities which are not used in thepipeline transportation of gas.

Although the recordkeepingrequirements proposed in the NPRM(§ 193.219 and 193.1037) have beenincorporated in this final rule (§ 193.2119and § 193.2329), the effective date ofthose requirements is deferred endingtheir coordination and clearance by theOffice of Management and Budget(0161B under the Federal Reports Act of1948. Similarly, MTB is deferring theeffective date of provisions of standardsincorporated by reference in this finalrule which call for the keeping ofrecords. After completion of the OMBcoordination and clearance process,MTB will publish notice of the date anygiven recordkeeping requirementbecomes effective.

Coordination with the U.S. Coast GuardThe U.S. Coast Guard (USCG] and

MTB executed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU] with respect to adivision of regulatory responsibilities forwaterfront LNG facilities adjoining thenavigable waters of the United States.This MOU. which became effective onFebruary 7,1978, was published in theFederal Register on July 14,1978, (43 FR30381) and again on February 8.1979, aspart of MTB's NPRM for this final rule.Under the MOU. the USCG isresponsible for developing waterfrontfacility regulations with respect to fireprotection, fire prevention, security, andall other matters between the vessel andthe last manifold (or valve) immediatelybefore the receiving tank The USCG.isconcurrently developing regulations forthe storage and handling of hazardousmaterials, including LNG, at waterfrontfacilities. On April 10,1978, USCGissued an ANPRM on GeneralWaterfront Facilities Requirements (43FR 15107), and on August 3,1978, issued-an ANPRM on Waterfront LNGFacilities Requirements (43 FR 34362]. Inaccordance with the MOU, MTB andUSCG are coordinating their regulatoryactivities in this area to precludeproblems involving overlappingjurisdiction. The scope of Part 193(§ 193.2001) has been written to reflectthe MOU's jurisdictional delineationsregarding all matters between a vesseland tank, and matters relating tosecurity and fire protection will becovered separately in final rules onthose topics.

This final rule does not identify whichwaterfront LNG facilities are subject tothe regulatory authority of USCG underthe MOU, nor does this final rule use the

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term "waterfront LNG facilities."Nonetheless, all LNG facilities, whetherat waterfronts or not, are subject to the-authority of the Department ofTransportation. The applicability ofUSCG's or MTB's exercise of thatauthority with respect to security andfire protection at waterfront facilitieswill be resolved in the rulemakingsbeing pursued by those agenciesregarding the operation andmaintenance of LNG facilities. WhileMTB's February 1979 NPRM on thesiting, design, and construction of LNGfacilities and USCG's ANPRM onwaterfront LNG facilities proposed adefinition of "waterfront LNG facility,"the comments received on that'definition have prompted MTB andUSCG to seek public comment on arevised definition. The MTB hasproposed the revised definition of"waterfront LNG facility" in its NPRM,on LNG facility operation andmaintenance. The USCG will proposethe same definition in an NPRM onwaterfront facilities to be issued shortly.This future USCG NPRM on LNGwaterfront facilities will also proposeidentical standards for fire prevention,fire protection, and security standards,as well as operations and maintenance(except where differences are warrantedbecause of waterfront facilitycharacteristics) to the standardsproposed in MTB's operation and.,maintenance notice. 1,

These final regulations are in a formatconsistent with that planned to be usedby USCG in its pending NPRM thatcovers all waterfront facilities. Usingthis format in Part 193 will facilitate useof Part 193 and the pending USCGregulations by the regulated industry.Most of the sections in these final rulesessentially follow in ?rder similar .sections in the February 1979 NPRM, butare identified by a new numberingsystem. The subpart headings used inthe February 1979 NPRM of this .regulatory proceeding are used assubheadings under the new revisedsubparts. The following table shows therelation between the section numbeis inthe February 1979 NPRM. and the sectionnumbers in this final rule. .

Final nMle NPRM Section title

193.2001 193.1 Scope..2003 .2 Semisoid Facilities.2005 .3 Appicabiity..2007 .5 Definitions.2009 .7 Rules of Regulatory

Construction..2011 .10 Reporting. ,.2013 .11 Incorporation by

I reference..2015 .. Petitions for finding or

aproal.193.2051 .101 Scope.

.2055 .105 General.

Final rule " NPRM Section tite

.2057 .107 Thermal RadiationProtection.

.2059 .109 Flammable Vapor/Gas' ,Dispersion Protection.

.2061 .111 Seismic Investigation andDesign.

.2063 .113 Flooding.2065, .115 Soil Characteristics..2067 .117 Wind Forces..2069 .119 Oiier Severe Weather

and Natural Conditions..2071 .121 Adjacent Activities..2073 .123 Separation of

Components,193.2101193.201/193.301/

-193.401/193.501/193.601 Scope.

.2103., .23 General.

.2105 .205 Extreme Temperatures,Normal Operations.

.2107 .207 Extreme Temperatures.' Emergency Conditions.

.2109 .209 lntatlon.

.2111 .211 Co!d Boxes..2113 .213 Ping.

.. 2116 .215 ConcetaSubect toCryogenicTemperatures.

.2117 .217 Combustile Materials.

.2119 .219 Records.

.2101 .301 Scope.

.2121 .303 General.

.2703 .304 PersomneL

.2123 .305 Valves.

.2125 .917 Automatec Shutoff Valves.

.2127 .307 Piping.

.2129 .309 Piping Attachments andSuppo6t

.131 .311 Building Design..2133 .313 Buildings. Ventilation..2135 .317 Expansion or Contraction,.2137 .319 Frost Heave..2139 .321 lce and Snow.,.2141 .323 Electrical Systems..2143 .325 Lghtning..2145 32 Boiler and Pressure

Vessels..2147 .329 Combustion Engines and

Turbines..2149 .403 Impoundment Required..2151 .405 General Design

Characteristics..2163 .407 Classes of Impounding

- Systems..2155 .409 Structural Requirements..2157 410 Coatings and Coverings..2159 .413 Floors..2161 .415 kes, General..2163 .417 Vapor Banters..2165 .419 D'ke D1mensions.

-.21A7 .421 Covered Systems..2169 .423 Gas Leak Detection..2171 427 Sump Basin..2173 .431 Water Removal..2175 .433 Shared ImpoundmenL

.435 P ping..2179 .437 Impoundment Capacity,

GeneraL.2181 .439 Impoundment Capacity,

LNG Storage Tanks..2183 .441' Impoundment Capacity,

Equipment and,- Transfer Facirties.

.2185 .443 Impoundment Capacity.Parking Areas, PortableVessels.

.445 Flow Capacity in Class IIIImpoundment Systems.

.447 Sung Basin Capacity..2187 .503 General..2189 .505 Loading Forces...2191 .507 Stratification..2193 .509 Movement and Stress..2195 .511 Penetrations..2197- .513 Internal Design Pressure..2199 .515 External Design Pressure..221 .519 Internal Temperature..2203 .521 Foundation..2205 .523 Frost Heave..227 .525 Insulation, Storage Tank..2209 ,527 Instrun entation for LNG

Storage Tanks..2211 .529 Metal Storage Tanks..2213 .531 Concre'e Storage Tanks..2215 .533 Thermal Barriers.

Final rule NPRM Section tiO

.2217 .535 Support Systen ..2219 .537 Internal Piping..2221 .539 Marking..2223 .603 Gcnerai.

. . .. 605 Emergency Shuldown,Control Systern.

.2227 .607 Backflow.

.2439 .609 Overfilling.

.222 .611 Cargo Transfer SystertrJ

.2231 .615 Cargo Transfer Ate.,

.2233 ,617 Shutoff va'ven.193.2301 193.1001 Scope.

.2303 .1002 Construction Accoplance

.2305 .1009 Ouar.fleatlon ofPersonnel

.2307 .1011 Inspection.

.2309 .1014 Inspection end TestngMethods

.2311 .1015 Cleanup.

.2313 .1017 PipeWerlng.

.2315 .1019 Piping Connoctior2317 .1023 Retesting,.2319 .1025 Strength Test..2321 .1027 Nonde3tct1vo tests..2323 .1029 Leak Tests..2325 .1031 Testing Control Systerm.2327 .1033 Strogo Tank Tests..2329 .1037 Construction Records..2439 .919 Emergency Shultdown

Control System.2441 .921 Control Cr.ef,.2443 .925 Failsafe Control..2445 .927 Sources of Power

193.2401193.701/,193.8011/193.901 Scope.

.2403 .703 Genere2405 .705 Vapoltzer Des gn.2407 .711 Opefational Control.2409 .713 Shutotf Va,%le.2411 .715 Relief Devices..2413 .719 Combustion Air lntaks..2415 .803 GeneraL.2417 .805 Incoming Gm.2419 .809 Backtlow..241 .811 Cold Boxes..2423 .813 Alt In Gas.2427 .903 General.2429 .905 Relie Devices.2431 .907 Vents..2433 .909 Sons!ng Devices.2435 .911 Warning Devices..2437 .915 Pump and Ceran etT uso

.2439 .919

.2445 .921.925.927

193.2701 . Scope..2703 .304 Design and FerIcaor.2705 .1009 Construction, lnstOation,

Inspecton and Testing.o

Final Evaluation ReviewThe Department has a Final

Evaluation available in the Docketregarding an impact analysis of thecosts and benefits of alternativepotential regulations affecting the siting,design, and construction of newliquefied natural gas facilities. For thisFinal Evaluation, the NFPA Standard59A (1975 edition) was used as thebaseline'regulaiory standard againstwhich the incremental facility costs,safety benefits, employment,environmental effects, and effects onconsumers of these final regulationswere measured. The other alternativepotential regulations evaluated were: (a)Recommendations made in the GeneralAccountingiOffice Report EMD-78-28,and (b) the Advance Notice of ProposedRulemaking issued by MTB on April 21,1977.

. Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

The Final Evaluation indicates that awide range of benefits are associatedwith reducing or minimizing severaltypes of potential LNG facilityaccidents. These benefits may rangefrom saving several lives and injuriesand preventing, or otherwise avoiding,an aggregate of $1.5 million in damagewhich would be incurred with a 10 cubicmeter spill of LNG as a remotely locatedsatellite facility, to saving severalthousand lives and injuries, andpreventing several billion dollarsdamage associated with minimizing thepossibility of a catastrophic spill andignition of a large LNG storage facility ina densely populated area.

Despite the very large savings thatwould result from preventing a majoraccident at an LNG facility, costlymeasures which reduce the likelihood ofaccidents are not justified by.conventional theoretical cost benefitanalysis because of the extremely lowprobability of a major accidentoccurring. The limited number of LNGfacility accidents requires thatprobability estimates of accidents bebased on theoretical analysis of factorswhich might lead to their occurrence.There is large inherent uncertaintyassociated with such estimates, andhence of cost-benefit values derivedfrom them. In light of such uncertainties,prudence dictates an extra measure ofcaution where there is potential for acatastrophic accident. Such cautionshould be weighed along with otherconsiderations when judging the needfor safety measures that can reduce thelikelihood of a catastrophic LNGaccident, even when these measuresmay not be justified based on atheoretical risk analysis technique.

When compared to the baselineregulatory standard, the regulationscontain eight sections which have beendetermined to have a major incrementalcost (or more than $50,000 per section)with only minor benefits because of thelow probability of the occurrence of anaccident: § 193.2057, Thermal RadiationProtection; § 193.2059, Flammable VaporGas Dispersion Protection; § 193.2061,Seismic Investigation and Design;§ 193.2063, Flooding; § 193.2067, WindForces; § 193.2169, Gas Leak Detection;§ 193.2195,,Penetrations; and § 193.2321.Nondestructive Tests.

The eight costly sections will add anaverage annual cost of from $200,000 to$1.1 million to the cost of a facility,depending on the types of facilities built.For the entire regulation (all sections)annualized costs per facility will beincreased to from $270,000 to $1.4million per year. This additional cost isover and above that for a facility built to

the baseline regulatory standardprescribed in NFPA-59A (1975 edition).It should be recognized that manyfacilities would be built to a higherstandard that that of NFPA-59A (1975edition), so the above costs represent anupper limit on costs imposed by thesesections.

Total annualized costs of these finalrules, to build from 6 to 64 facilities,including the eight costly sections, asmeasured against the baselineregulatory standard, NFPA-59A (1975edition) range from $8.4 million to $17.4million yearly over a 20-year period.

The Final Evaluation also includes acomparison of the cost of these finalruleb with the recently published currentedition of NFPA-59A (1979 edition), inwhich the total annualized costs rangefrom $6.2 million to $12.4 million.

Considering the uncertainties inherentin risk analysis, the cost of theseadditional safety measures is notextreme, and the potential for thepossible loss of thousands of lives andbillions of dollars of property damage inthe event of a major accident, MTBbelieves that a cost/benefit conclusionbased on risk assessment alone shouldnot be the exclusive determinant ofwhat is necessary for public safety. Theregulations are intended to prevent acatastrophic spill and the possible lossof thousands of lives and several billiondollars of property damage that mightotherwise occur in a populated area.

After a careful review of the benefits.the annualized costs, and theuncertainties in predicting accidentrisks, MTB believes that the benefitsoutweigh the costs and that these eightsections are warranted as an investmentin public safety.

These eight sections essentiallyparallel the views of the TechnicalPipeline Safety Standards Committee(TPSSC) which provided MTB valuabletechnical assistance. A furtherdiscussion of the costs and benefits ofthe costly sections is discussed hereafterin the discussion related to thosesections.

Discussion of RegulationsIn accordance with Section 4 of the

Act, the TPSSC met in Boston,Massachusetts, on June 12-15,1979, toreview the technical feasibility,reasonableness, and practicability of theregulations proposed in the NPRM. Acopy of their report and minority viewsare available in the docket and may beobtained by writing to the DocketBranch, Materials TransportationBureau, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,Washington. D.C. 20590. A discussion ofany rejections of the views of the TPSSCtakes place hereafter in the discussion

related to those particular sections ofthese final rules.

Using the new section numbers, thefollowing portion of the preamblediscusses the comments made to eachparticular section in the NPRM, as wellas any revisions made to those proposedstandards.

Subpart A-GeneralThis subpart sets forth the

applicability and other general featuresof the standards, and defines the typesof LNG facilities subject to Part 193. Theapplicability of Part 193 as it relates tonew and existing facilities is prescribed,and special terms or terms not used inthe ordinary sense are defined.Regulatory expressions and theapplication and availability ofreferenced documents are explained.Also, the requirement to report leaksand spills at LNG facilities inaccordance with Part 191 is clarified.

Scope of part. Jurisdictional aspectspertaining to waterfront facilitieselicited the most response to the "Scopeof part' § 193.2001. Many commentersproposed that the MOU between USCGand MTB be directly referenced. Somefurther advocated that the language inthe MOU be included. The modificationswere proposed because of a concernthat failure to include all matterscovered by theMOU might result inmisunderstanding about the respectiveareas of responsibility.

As discussedpreviously, USCG isdeveloping regulations to providestandards for safety, security, andenvironmental protection in thetransportation, transfer, handling, andstorage of liquefied natural gas atwaterfront facilities. It intends for theseregulations to become an integral part ofits revised general waterfront facilityregulations. MTB and USCG arecoordinating their regulatory activitiesin this area to preclude problemsinvolving overlapping jurisdiction inconsonance with the MOU.

Specifically, at a waterfront facility,under the MOU, the USCG isresponsible for facility site selection asit relates to management of vessel trafficin and around the facility; fireprevention and fire protectionequipment, systems, and methods foruse at a facility; security of a facility,and all other matters pertaining to thefacility between the vessel and the lastmanifold (or valve) immediately beforethe receiving tanks.

Conversely, MTB is responsible underthe MOU with USCG for facility sitingsafety except for vessel traffic matters,and all other matters pertaining to thefacility beyond (and including) the lastmanifold (or v.ilve) immediately before

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the receiving tanks, except for those..matters pertaining to fire prevention andprotectiofi, and to facility security.

In response to these objectionsregarding the definition of "'waterfrontLNG facility," the'term has been deletedin § 193.2001. Appropriate delineation ofthe limits of MTB's responsibilitiesunder the MOU over fire protection andsecurity will be set forth in the scope of.those topics in MTB's rulemaking .covering operation and maintenance ofLNG facilities.

Several commenters'also proposed-anaddition to § 193.2001(b) exemptingtanks with a capacity of 70,000 gallonsor less. In some instances, theexemption was recommended only if theaggregate capacity would not exceed140,000 gallons. The commenters feltsuch a proposal could be justifiedbecause tanks having a capacity up to70,000 gallons can be shop fabricated,making this size subject to greater"quality control. Also, the commentersargued that NFPA 59A was moreappropriate for small containers.

The MTB has recognized the'need forestablishing'appropriate regulationswhich would take into consideration thewide difference in size, type, andcharacteristics of LNG facilities. As aconsequence, care has been taken in anumber of instances, modifyin3grequirements according to-the size andtype of a facility, so as notto be overlyburdensome to a small plant. Forexample, §,193.2061, "Seismicinvestigation and design,"includesprovisions that greatly reduce thestringency of requirements for facilitiesof the size range suggested bycommenters. In other standards,requirements vary according to eitherthe extent of the hazard or facility size.This feature is exemplified by theexclusion zones required for thermal -radiation and vapor dispersion wherebythe exclusion distance would depend onsize and characteristics of the facility,and by requirements for separation offacilities which are dependent on size.

The MTh has not adopted therecommendations to exempt tanks notexceeding 70,000 gallons capacity fromthe applicability of Part 193, since spills,even from small tanks, could also resultin significant hazards.

A few commenters stronglyrecommended that the term "minimumstandards" be used in lieu of"standards" so that it is clear that thestandards may be exceeded, and to bein accord with the language of the , -Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.This proposal has not been adoptedbecause such a term appears to imply,that the standards are marginally ,adequate-and must be supplemented.

Therefore, this sections remains-unchanged.

In accordance with Ptb. L 96-129amendments to the Act, structures andequipment used as LNG facilities thatare located in navigablewaters (asdefined by 16 U.S.C. 796(8)) are nolonger subject to.the Act. It was theintent of Congress that such facilities beregulated under the Port and WaterwaysSafety Act. Therefore, a new provisionis added to § 193.2001 to exemptfacilities in navigable waters from thescope of Part 193. Likewise, under thisprovision facilities located offshore.would not fall under Part 193. Section193.2003 addresses facilities handlingsemisolid natural gas in accordancewith another Pub. L 96-129 amendmentto the Act that extended the definitionof LNG to include natural gas in asemisolid state.

Section 193.2005, covering theapplicability of these final regulations,has been substantially revised inconformance with Sec. 6 of the amendedAct that establishes the applicability ofthese regulations to existing LNGfacilities. The final regulationsgoverning the siting, design, andconstruction (including initial inspectionand testing) of an LNG facility will notapply to LNG facilities underconstruction before the date ofpublic'ation of these regulations or'toLNG facilities for which an applicationfor approval of the siting, construction,or operation was filed before March 1,1978, with the Department of Energy(DOE) (or any predecessor organizationof DOE) or the appropriate State or localagency in the case of any facility notsubject to the jurisdiction of DOE. (Thesiting, design, and construction of thesefacilities is governed by 49 CFR 192.12.)However, any subse4uent-replacement,relocation, or significant alteration ofsuch facilities must comply with Part 193requirements for siting, design, andconstruction, except that the sitingrequirements apply only to relocation ofLNG storage tanks and to anyreplacement or alteration of an LNGstorage tank that increases the storagecapacity of the original facility.-It wasdecided not to apply the siting'standardsto existing facilities other than storagetanks because of the high costs andimpacts involved with facilities of lessersafety significance. This limitation of theapplicability of siting requirements toexisting facilities is consistent with thenew provisions of Section 6 of the Actwhich precludes the imposition of sitingstandards on replacements made atcertain existing facilities. The MTB doesnot consider replacements to includeconstruction that results in increased

storage capacity. Such construction aswell as movement of a tank to a newsite is more akin to construction of anew facility to which Congress Intendedthe new rules to apply. In addition,againconsistent with Section 6 of theAct, any subsequent relocation,replacement, or significant alteration ofexisting facilities could be designed,installed, or constructed In accordancewith the original specifications or analternative manner found acceptable bythe Director, if Part 193 design,installation, and constructionrequirements would make the replaced,relocated, or altered faciliiyincompatible with other facilities orwould be impracticable.

Definitions. Changes to variousdefinitions in § 193.2007 were . ,recommended by many commenters.Definitions for additional terms Werealso proposed. Only words not used Inthe ordinary dictionary sense and wordsthat are necessary to apply the rules aredefined. Some words have been deletedas a result of changes in the text of therules. Revisions with appropriateeditorial modifications have been madeas a result of changes in the text; Inresponse to comments; to clarify themeaning; or otherwise, to make thedefinition more concise. Although therehas been no change in the meaningintended, the definition of "cargotransfer systeni" has been changed Inorder to define the term independentlyfrom connected "transfer piping." It hasalso been made more concise by.eliminating unnecessary verbiage, andthe term "associated area" has beendeleted in accordance with commentsfrom the TPSSC. Where area is relevantto compliance, the term is used In thefinal rules.

The term "critical component" hasbeen deleted. The TPSSC, as well asmost commenters, stated that the termwas iiot clearly defined and notdistinguishable from the word"component." These Tegulations nowuse the term "component" and, In somecases, general descriptive terminologyrefers to the specific components thatmay be more hazardous. The term"critical process" has also been deletedbecause it appears unnecessary.

In accordahce with the views of theTPSSC and other comments, whichrequested deletion of the term"impermeable" from the definition of theword "dike," MTB has deleted the termtogether with other terms that are designfeatures since such provisions are moreappropriately covered by designstandards,

Many commenters, together with theTPSSC, objected to the proposed,definition of "hazardous fluid." In the

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NPRM, "hazardous fluid" was definedby reference to Parts 172 and 173 of 49CFR which include many materials thatwould not be hazardous in an LNGfacility. Commenters felt that a"hazardous fluid" should be definedonly as a flammable gas or liquid. TheMTB has included toxicity also as ameasure of safety since minutequantities could be injurious to thepublic, or if plant operators are affected,an unsafe operating condition couldresult.

A definition for "hazardous liquid"has been added since it is used both inthe definition of "hazardous fluid" andin the body of the text. The TPSSC hadsuggested that the term be defined as "ahazardous fluid in the liquid state."However, the final definitions appear tobe clear and more.concise.

Objections to the definition of "LNGfacility" were primarily based onuncertainty about the delineationbetween LNG facilities and other gaspipeline facilities. Accordingly, the termhas been revised. The new definitionidentifies facilities dedicated to LNG byutilizing the definition of "pipelinefacility" in the Act to describe thenature of facilities that are included. It isimportant to note that "pipeline facility"is used to define the term "LNG facility"in accordance with Pub. L. 96-129amendments to the Act, so that the term"LNG facility" applies to any part of anoverall related series of facilities usedfor the transportation or storage of LNG,or for conversion (liquefaction,solidification, or vaporization) of LNG.An entire series of related LNG facilitiesis defined as an "LNG plant."

The term "maximum allowableoperating pressure" (MAOP) has beenchanged to "maximum allowableworking pressure" (MAWP]. TheTPSSC, along with some commenters,objected to the definition of MAOPbecause no basis for determination wasset forth in the design portion of Part193. Some commenters felt the termshould be changed to "maximumallowable working pressure" (MAWP) .or defined in accordance with consensusstandards. The MTB had recognized thepotential difficulties in establishingMAOP for this part in the manner usedby Part 192 as a result of the designportion and operating portion of Part 193being issued separately. In veiw of this,and because MAWP is a moreappropriate term for plant type facilities,MTB has used the term "maximumallowable working pressure" in the textof the regulations consistent with theuse of the term in the referenced designcodes.

Although the intent of "normaloperation" remains essentially the same,

it has been made more concise bydescribing "other criteria" as that"required by this parL" This changeessentially is in accord with therecommendations by the TPSSC andsome commenters. In effect, as long as afacility is performing within theprescribed criteria of Part 193, itsoperation may be considered to benormal, thereby giving a broaderunderstanding of the term.

The definition of the term "transferpiping" is changed to refer to a systemof piping and not to individualcomponents in such a system. Also, thephrase "and associated area" is deletedin accordance 'rith a recommendationfrom the TPSSC, because there is nogeneral need for it in the standards, andit is not physically a part of the piping.Where appropriate, it has beenincorporated in the applicable section.The word "supports" has beeneliminated also, and treated separatelywhere appropriate in the sectionconcerned. In addition, the definitionhas been revised to resolve potentialdifficulties with the term "containers"by designating the individualcomponents that describe the limits oftransfer piping. In this respect, the term"other than pipeline facilities" pertainsto facilities such as those that might useLNG for cryogenic purposes, such asfreezing, in a process not involving thetransportation of gas.

Reporting. One comment advised thatthe extent of "leaks and spills" as usedin § 193.2011 should be described. TheMTB feels this is unnecessary, since theoperator must report leaks and spills inaccordance with the requirementsprescribed in 49 CFR Part 191. However,MTB recognizes that LNG facilities arenot effectively covered by the presentreporting forms under Part 191, so MTBplans to develop reporting formsappropriate for LNG facilities. MTB Isalso contemplating establishingreporting requirements for abnormaloperations, which could serve as asource of information for the design ofnew LNG facilities. Until new forms aredeveloped, however, informationapplicable to leaks or spills of gas orLNG at LNG facilities must be reportedto the maximum extent possible on theexisting forms prescribed by Part 191.

Incorporation by reference. Withrespect to § 193.2013. one commenterproposed that wording be changed toreference editions that are current at thetime of plant design because MTB hasnot routinely updated the editions ofincorporated documents. Only currenteditions, it was said, reflect theconsensus of the originating

organizations and establish "goodengineering practice."

The MTB has not adopted thisrecommendation, because it would beboth an abrogation of responsibility byMTB and contrary to the AdministrativeProcedures Act and implementingregulations of the Federal Register.Documents referenced in Part 193 areset out in Appendix A and theapplicable edition is referenced. Laterpublished editions will be reviewed byMTB and, if warranted, proposed forinclusion in Appendix A as part of ourcurrent program for keeping referenceddocuments up to date.

Subpart B-Site Related DesfgnRequirements

The criteria for site related designrequirements that must be considered inthe planning and selection of a site areset forth in this section. Also, provisionsto assure that the site will haveaccessibility and sufficient size formobility around components in theevent of an emergency are included.Public response to the notice on thissubpart was more extensive than for allother subparts combined.

Scope. Only nine commentersresponded to § 193.2051 in the notice.These comments were used informulating the "Applicability" sectionin Subpart A. The extent to which sitingrequirements would be imposed onreplacements and alterations of existingfacilities was the major issue. Somecommenters proposed that, for existingfacilities, the Subpart B sitingrequirements be applied only to actionsthat result in an increase in LNG storagecapacity. Others argued that safetyimprovements would be inhibited ifmodifications or repairs had to complywith siting requirements andemphasized the need for flexibility topermit repairs and modifications.

To illustrate the commenters'objections, studies relating to thermalradiation, vapor dispersion. seismicity,and other site-related features wereviewed as unreasonable for thereplacement of components. Suchstudies were viewed as appropriate forexisting facilities only where.either anexpansion in LNG storage or relocationof an existing facility to a new site isinvolved.

As reflected in § 193.2005, after muchdeliberation, MTB determined that theapplicability of site related requirementsto replacements of existing facilitiesshould be limited to replacements thatincrease storage capacity. Consideringthe greater cost expected for compliancewith site-related requirements atexisting facilities, safety would be bestservedwhere new standards are made

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to apply to conditions that impose thegreatest potential hazards. This positionalso appeared to b e in general accordwith the public comments. However, thePipeline Safety Act of 1979 (Pub. L 96-129) makes this matter,'and the allegedconflict with the 1968 Act regardingexisting facilities, somewhat of a mootissue. Consistent with the Act, asamended by Pub. L. 96-129, and as setforth in § 193.2005, Applicability,replacements of an existing facilitywould be exempt from the sitingstandards if application for approvalwas filed with appropriate Federal orlocal agencies before March 1, 1978.This exemption policy also is applied toall LNG facilities under constructionbefore Part 193 is published.

Objections to use of the term "criticalcomponent" in the scope section wereexpressed also. In particular, theobjection by the TPSSC "concerns theapplicability to existing criticalcomponents which are not clearlydefined." As discussed earlier, the termhas been deleted.

This section lists the components orLNG facilities to which this subpartapplies. The list of components whichwas set forth in § 193.111 and § 193.113in the NPRM has now been incorporatedin § 193.2051 to apply to all sections inthis subpart and has been revised inaccordance with a few comments. Thosecomments argued that only "emergencyshutdown control systems" should beincluded because there are many."shutdown control systems" that are notcritically important to the safe operationof an LNG facility during the occurrenceof an earthquake. In addition, as,proposed by these same commenters,the fire control system should bedesigned to withstand an earthquakebecause an operable fire control systemis essential to the safety of an LNGfacility during an earthquake.

Acceptable site. Consistent withviews expressed previously,commenters and the TPSSC againobjected to the term "criticalcomponent" in § 193.103 in the NPRM.

The use of this term has beendiscussed under earlier sections, and theterm has been eliminated from theserules. Further, in the case of this section,it was found to be-a duplication of§ 193.2055, and therefore, this sectionhas been deleted.

General. Among approximately 12commenters who uniformly respondedto sections of this subpart, about half,felt that § 193.2055 as proposed in theNPRM-was acceptable. This section,prescribes generally that a site must besuitable for design of leak and spillprotection and ease of access. TheTPSSC conditionally found this section

to be feasible, reasonable, andpracticable, if the words "and otherhazardous liquids" are removed. Sixcommenters, all representing theregulated industry, objected to this term.The term "flammable refrigerants" wasproposed as a replacement by fivecommenters. They.argued thatregulations should apply only to spills ofliquids stored in large volumes. Onecommenter, however, felt that coverageshould be expanded by using the term"hazardous fluids" because a largevapor leak could be dangerous.

Four of the former five also argued'that the definition in the NPRM madethe term "hazardous liquids" too broad.This appeared to be the reason for the"TPSSC's objection.

The recommendation by the TPSSCwhich would subject only LNG to theregulation has not been adoptedbecause ' the-exmption of otherhazardous fluids, potentially morehazardous under certain conditions,clearly is not in the interest of safety.Even the regulated industry did not seekexemption for hazardous liquids otherthan LNG.

The MTB also has rejected changingthe term to "flammable refrigerants"since the exclusion of other flammablefluids, merely because they ate not usedas refrigerants, is clearly unjustifiedfrom a safety viewpoint. For example,where propane used as a refrigerant inthe liquefaction process at a small peak-shaving plant would be subject to theregulation, it would be inconsistent toexempt possibly larger-potential spills orleaks of propane at a baseload orsatellite facility,osimply because it isused as a fu6l or heat transfer medium.Also, where the storage volumes aresmall, associated safety considerationsnormally will be subsumed by therequirements for the larger storage ofLNG. Accordingly, design to minimizeoffsite leak and spill hazards from smallstorage volumes should not impose asignificant burden on facility design. TheMTB believes that this aspect, togetherwith the change in definitions ofhazardous liquids and fluids, willassuage concerns of these commenters,as well as the TPSSC.

The MTB believes that withoutadequate provisions,-a large gas orvapor leak could be dangerous. Forexample, discharge from relief vents orstacks or damage from external causes,such as impacttfrom falling objects tocontainers or piping, could present anunnecessary hazard unless location orprotection is properly planned.Accordingly, MTB has adopted theproposal to assure that the site canaccommodate design to mitigate hazards

from leaks and spills of both LNG and"other hazardous fluids."A change in the wording "persons and

property" to either "the public" or"offsite persons and property" wasproposed by six commenters. Thechange was needed to assure anunderstanding that only the offsitepublic and not plant personnel arereferenced, according to five responding.Four of the five also argued thatotherwise the intent of the NPRM"Supplementary Information" would becontradicted.

On Page 8142 of the NPRM, under"Supplementary Information," It statesthat, "In most cases, Part 193 wouldprovide for employee safety only to theextent that it is affected by measuresrequired for public safety." While suchstandards as exclusion zones for.thermal radiation and vapor dispersionare intended to provide offslteprotection, some standards such asemployee training provide protection toemployees as well as the offslte public.In addition, requirements for ease ofaccess to provide for evacuation clearlyapply more directly to employee safety.This is consistent with wording In the"Supplementary Information" whichindicates that in some cases provisionsare intended for employee safety.

Partly in accordance with therecommendation, MTB has revised thewording to "persons and offsiteproperty" to more clearly show that,within reasonable limits, considerationshould be given also to employee safetyin the plant layout design.

A recommendation that the phrase "to-the facility" be added after the words"ease of access" was made by fourcommenters. Two of these commentersargued that clarification was needed toshow that a means of getting people andequipment to the facility during anemergency is required, while the othertwo felt the addition was important toshow that facility access rather than siteaccess is the issue. One othercommenter proposed that therequirement for "ease of access" bedeleted. Since the function of the accessis explicitly described in the text, MTBbelieves the proposed addition wouldonly serve to confuse the meaning.Accordingly, the original wording hasbeen retained without change.

An editorial change to show moreclearly that one function of therequirement for ease of access Is toprovide for personnel evacuation, withor without assistance from others, wasmade in accordance with one comment.Other comments involved exclusionsbased on the MOU between USCG andMTB, and objections to the word"determine." Both matters are discussed

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under Subpart A, and no changes aremade in these respects.

Thermal radiation protection.Because of the extensive response to§ 193.2057, most comments will bediscussed by subsection. As a generalcomment, however, two commenters feltthat detailed fire modeling should not beincluded in Part 193. Formal hearings,they argued, would assure acceptabledesign, and therefore, only flux levels,prescribed in performance language,should be set forth in this section. Whileformal hearings have not beenestablished, flux levels are prescribed inthe last subsection, and use of the modelproposed in the NPRM has been deleted.

The format of § 193.2057(a) has beenset forth in two parts, (a](1) and (a)(2),for clarity. With respect to (a)(2), threecommenters advocated that therequirement for grading and drainage tobe treated as an impounding space bedeleted. Most commenters, however,appeared to find the provisionacceptable. Essentially, the variousreasons for the opposition were that: thespill amount and fire duration will besmall because of automatic shutdown;thermal radiation hazards would beminimal; grading and drainage is mostappropriate near boundaries; spilldisposal by grading and drainage wouldmeet the requirements; an operatorchoosing to design more protection (bygrading and drainage) would bepenalized.

Within an exclusion zone, theexposure time to reach limits of humantolerance to heat radiation from a fireare very short. Therefore, even if theperiod of the fire and thermal radiationis short, the public would be subject topotential harm or injury. Additional

-protection distance is alsoneededwhere grading and drainage or otherimpoundment for small spills is locatednear boundaries. In most instances, theexclusion zone required for majorimpounding systems could extendbeyond zones needed for small spills.Therefore, with a well engineeredlayout, there would be minimal or noadditional cost to provide a thermalexclusion zone for grading and drainage.However, if additional protection isneeded, even for small spills, thedistance must be provided. Accordingly,MTB has retained this regulation.

Deletion of § 193.2057(b),"Measurement of exclusion zone," wasproposed indirectly as a result ofalternate proposals by sevencommenters. One commenter proposeda "spherical" model which will bediscussed further under-paragraph{c) ofthis section. If adopted, this paragraphwould not apply because the model wasbased on a different geometry of

measurement. However, this modelexcluded wind effect on the fire pattern'(tilt) which was said to be offset by thecooling effect of wind on the target.Considering the lack of precision inmodeling thermal radiation, this modelappears to have much merit, particularlyfor application in safety standards.However, since it was verified only bycorrelation with another more complexmodel, rather than with test data and Itdid not provide a method ofmeasurement which could account fortopographical variations, this commentwas not adopted.

The six other commenters wouldreplace this paragraph by the use ofperformance language and publichearings, by performance language inconjunction with the simple point sourceequation of the form d=(f) V A, or bythe simple point source equation withoutprescribing a method of measurement toaccount for the geometry of the firepattern relative to the target. Aspects ofsome of these proposals have beenadopted and will be discussed under theappropriate subsections. However, themethod of measurement set forth inparagraph (b), with some modification.has been retained in order to assure auniform method of measurement whichincludes some provisions for windeffects and geometry of the fire relativeto the target.

One other commenter recommendedonly that the diagram in this paragraphbe deleted, arguing that because themethod does not consider flame height,structures at higher elevations would besubject to higher thermal flux since theflame would rise. This apparently Is amisunderstanding, since the diagram Isintended to account specifically for thetarget elevation and the relativegeometry due to flame height and otherparameters.

Modification of the diagram to showthat calculations are correct was alsosuggested. This was said by onecommenter to be needed in order toassure accurate calculations. While thediagram does not show a sampleexclusion zone, samples of the exclusiondistance "d," which defines theboundary of an exclusion, are depicted.An elevation view, which cannotillustrate the exclusion zone, isnecessary to explain the method ofmeasurement and thereby assure thatcalculations will be accurate.Consequently, this suggestion has notbeen adopted. However, the diagramhas been modified in accordance withcertain comments, changes in otherparagraphs, and to better assure acorrect understanding.

Also relating to the diagram, arecommendation to locate point (T3 at

the edge rather than the center of atarget was made by one commenter.This location was said to be moreappropriate to define exclusion zones,particularly because targets may be verylarge. The MTV intended for point [M" tobe a point on the target closest to point(P) and has modified both the diagramand the language accordingly.

According to one commenter, a thirdpoint to Identify geometric planesreferenced in the diagram was said to benecessary because three or more pointsare necessary to identify such planes.The plane in question was referenced inthe final rule to describe [PT) and (PD).Where a plane is unbounded anddescribed as vertical, it may be speciallydescribed by two points only. Thereference has been deleted in the rulebecause it was used only fo clarify andIs unnecessary. However, these lattertwo comments bring attention to apossible ambiguity in the NPRMdiagram, which does not give an upperlimit to the angular elevation of line(P .As a result, incident flux mighthave exceeded the intended level since[PT) was free to rotate around an axisthrough (P) and orthogonal with thevertical plane (of the NPRM). Thus, ahigh structure could theoretically bepositioned above the thermal envelope.The MTB has been aware of the need tocorrect this mathematical anomaly, andthe diagram has been modified byincluding the necessary upper limitL

The methods prescribed fordetermining both (0) and [L) were anissue of major concern to severalcommenters. To determine (0). an angleto account for flame tilt and potentialformation of some vapor before ignitionoccurs, the NPRM prescribed equation-4 in American Gas Association

(AGA) report IS-3-1. Some commentersindicated preference for equation F-14(or Thomas's equation) from the reportIS-3-1, arguing that it is more realisticand predicts less tilt except at lowerwind speeds, or that equation F-14should be used for an emissive flux of45,000 BTU/ft.' hour. One commentersubmitted comparative data illustratingthe wide divergence between flame tiltdetermined by an IS-3-1 method and hisown calculations. Similarly, manyrecommendations were made to alterthe method for determining (L), adimension to account for flame length.The NPRM prescribed equation G-7 orG-8 from IS-3-1. Some commentersadvocated the use of equation F-13 (orG-5) because it predicts that the ratio L/D will decrease as D (the flame basediameter) increases, while G-7 and G-8predict the reverse and are thereforemore conservative. Others argued that

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F-13 should be used if an emissive fluxof 45,000 BTU/ft. 2 hour is prescribed.One commenter noted that F-13represents the average rather than-maximum flame length. Anothercommenter said that F-13 predicts (L)with reasonable accuracy if the correctboiling rate is used, and another statedthat a recent report uses an L/D ratio of3. The report doesn't mentioncorrelations-from equations in IS-3-1.

With respect to both (0) and (L),several commenters recommendedallowing the use of any of the equationsgiven in IS-3-1. A number ofcommenters advocated that E specificmethod not be prescribed, and that therules provide for alternate models topermit the use of improvements intechnology as more is learned aboutemissive power, flame tilt, flame lengthratio (L/D), burning rates, and otherflame characteristics. -

Optional use of differentmethodologies giving different results asxecommended by some tommenters isnot appropriate for a standard toestablish consistent and uniform levelsof safety. The proposal to referencereport IS-3-1 in general has not beenadopted. Also, because of theuncertainties evidenced by the

- conflicting methods, results, andviewpoints, rigorous m6deling with theinformation currently available is -unjustified. The MTB agrees that modelsshould permit the use of additional andmore valid information when it becomesavailable. Accordingly the regulationhas been modified by deleting referenceto any specific model and permitting theestablishment of 0 and L in accordancewith the use of alternate models that areapproved by the Director.

The MTB believes that optional fixedvalues of (0) and (L) are needed in orderto provide d simplified method whichwill assure a conservatively safeekclusion zone. Such fixed values willpreclude extensive data compilation,calculation, and probabilisticdeterminations that could be neededotherwise. This approach is needed untilmore rigorous models can be verified bytest. More specifically, it is intended foruse when rigorous methods areunjustified because of expense or lack ofwind data, and some alternative isneeded. The regulation has beenmodified accordingly. A value of(0]=45° for optional use is provided asoriginally set forth in the ANPRM. It isbased on the limited data in IS-:3-1,since data for fires'of larger size areunavailable. Also, to a limited extent, itis intended to provide for the formation.of some combustible vapor beforeignition occurs. The value for (L) is

based on an (L/D) ratio of 3. This isconsistent with the recent reportmentioned by one commenter and theunsteady state of LNG fires, particularlyat the time of ignition if some vapor hasformed.

Other modifications in § 193.2057(b)are made to provide greater clarity.

In consideration of the manycomments about § 193.2057(c),concerning the computation of exclusiondistance, this subsection has beensignificantly revised. With respect toparagraph (c)(1), the method ofdetermining the assumed emissive areaof the flame "A" was clearly the-principal issue. Commenters arguedvari6usly that the bottom and back; thebottom and top; or the bottom, top, andhalf of the side area of the flame shouldnot be included:Three commenters said"A" should be the fuel surface area, butwould retain the emissive power for aflame. Two contended that the proposeddetermination of "A" defies the mostsimple concepts of physics and laws ofnature. A variety of other adversecomments also were made with.regardto "A".

The MTB believes that the descriptionfor "A" given in the NPRM (ascorrected is reasonable. The formula G-9 on page G-27 of the report IS-3-1uses the total emissive power of theflame. This is determined most directlyby using the product of flame surfacearea and emissive power per unit offlame area, since data giving the fractionof total combustion energy radiated tothe surroundings is not well established.Because the model is a point source,emissive power is radiated in alldirections, requiring consideration of theentire surface of the assumed flamecylinder. The MTB concedes that somequestion may exist about the use of thebottom of the flame cylinder. However,because thermal radiation data andpredictive methods are uncertain, theentire assumed cylinder area was usedto assure reasonable conservatism. Forthese reasons, and because of othermodifications to be discussed, none ofthe recommendations has been adopted.

Taking an opposite position, onecommenter, who recognized the familiarpoint source equation, expressedagreement with the logic of determining"A" according to the NPRM. Using theentire surface area of an assumed flamecylinder, "A', as the surface of a sphere,a new and simple "spherical" modelwas derived from the resultinggeometry. Comparisons with sampleresults of a more sophisticated modelshowed relatively close correlation.Considering the range of accuracy inradiation modeling, the commenterrecommended that the "spherical"

model be used in place of both models(paragraph (c)(1) and (c)(2)).in theNPRM. The MTB believes therecommendation may have merit.However, the spheribal model has notbeen correlated with actual test data.Because of this and for reasons morefully discussed.under § 193.2005(b), MTBhas not adopted this recommendation.

The NPRM formula in paragraph (c)(1)was also criticized by some commentorsas being inconsistent with detailedsophisticated techniques or incorrect,defying the laws of nature. Othersexpressed the view that the formula hasgood far field correlation, but isinappropriate for near field application.The formula is a rearranged expressionof the'point source equation (G-9) frompage G-27 of IS-3-1. It has the limitationof an overly simplified formula, but wasconsidered appropriate for applicationas an optional simplified approach ifadequate conservatism was provided,particularly in view of the uncertaintiesassociated with thermal radiation data.However, as discussed below, it doesnot appear in the final rules.

The emissive flux of 45,000 BTU/ft.2

hour, prescribed for use with themethods of both paragraph (c)(1) and(c)(2), also was found unacceptable by anumber of commenters. For the mostpart, objections were based on the useof a higher emissive flux level than theflux level used with the prescribedmodel as it appeared on IS-3-1. The fluxlevel of 45,000 BTU/ft.2 hour wasselected by the MTB due to the widescatter in emissive flux data, and thelack of such data for large fires wheresome evidence indicates that flux couldbe even higher. The MTB does not agreethat the prescribed flux made the modelinvalid. As noted by one commenter, asintended, its use merely increased theexclusion distance. However, concernsexpressed'are nullified, since a specificflux is not prescribed in the final rule.

The simple point source equation ofthe form "d"={f)V A was recommendedbya number of commenters. Two ofthese commenters felt this simpleequation should replace the moresophisticated method in paragraph (c)(2)also. By using appropriate (f) values, thismodel was said to assure adequateconservatism, and to account for fire,tilt, and down wind flux increase. Itsrelative simplicity was viewed as adesirable feature.

Many commenters objected to themore sophisticated specific modelprescribed in paragraph (c)(2) In theNPRM. In line with recommendationsregarding paragraph (b), somecommenters said~the rule should bechanged to permit the use of eithermodel in IS-3-1. In addition, provision

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to permit the use of future alternatemodels was strongly recommended. Thisprovision, it was reasoned, would permituse of improved technology a's more islearned about thermal radiation andflame characteristics. Some contendedthat a specified model would limitamendments to requirements, while theelimination of a specified model wouldencourage further research anddevelopment.

The nature of the comments clearlyillustrates that uncertainties and lack ofagreement exist among commentersregarding thermal radiation modeling.The degree of precision in predictabilityhas not been established, particularlyfor large fires, since there has been noverification testing in the necessary sizerange and scaling effects are not yetknown. In consideration-of theseproblems, MTB has adopted therecommendations of many commentersto provide for alternate models to beused as future technical data with aknown degree of reliability aredeveloped. Accordingly, § 193.2057(c)(2)provides for the use of a mathematicalmodel to determine exclusion distancelength which meets prescribed criteriaand receives approval by the Director.

Also, considering the lack of reliablethermal radiation data, lack of precision,and corresponding range of differencesin predictive results from currentsophisticated models, the MIB has.adopted the recommendation of anumber of commenters to use the simplepoint source equation of the formd= (f)(A)os, as originallyproposed in theANPRM. This equation in§ 193.2057(c](1), used in conjunctionwith values of (f) in paragraph (d) of thissection, provides a simple means ofassuring adequate protection distancefor public safety until sophisticatedtechniques for establishing reliablethermal radiation data are developed.Also, it would-continue to apply wheremore sophisticated techniques areunjustified.

The MTB believes these modificationsagree with the intent of the TPSSC whofelt the NPRM formulas were notreasonable for establishing exclusiondistance and questioned the availabilityof the proposed model.-To establish the limiting values for

incident radiant flux in § 193.2057(d),according to the characteristics of offsitetargets, (f) values corresponding toprescribed flux levels have beenincluded for use with the point sourceequation in paragraph (c)(1). The level offlux permissible on some targets hasbeen also slightly modified. In theNPRM, a flux of 1,600 BTU/fLt.2hour wasproposed as the level for humanexposure in ourdoor areas. In response

to the NPRM, one commenter felt theflux levels were too low, contendingthey were based on total, instantaneous.and immediately ignited spills. The MTBbelieves this argument is not validbecause technical reports on this subjectdo not support these arguments. Areduction in the 1,600 BTU/ft2 hour fluxlevel was proposed by four commentersThe flux range of 450 to 500 BTU/L 2

hour was viewed as appropriate by twocommenters, based on the argument thatUSCG Standards (CG 446-3 VoL IIICHRIS) considers 450 BTU/fL2 hour tobe the safe limit for people. A copy ofthe referenced information was enclosedin the comment. A second enclosurefrom the same document gaveinformation to show that an intensity of1,500 BTU/ft.2 hour required protectiveclothing. The USCG, which formerly hadsupported higher flux levels based onNFPA 59A, now agrees with the fluxlevels set forth in this standard. Thereferenced document is not a standard.but a guide applying to indefinitely longperiods of exposure and does not applyto circumstances where persons wouldseek shelter or depart. Some, noting that500 BTU/fL2 hour was only slightly morethat thermal radiation from the sun,argued that such a low flux would beexcessively costly and would permit thecontinuation of normal activities whichcould impede emergency movement. Themajority commenting recommendedretention of the proposed 1.600 BTU/fL:=

hour flux leveL At that ilux level,according to some comments andtechnical reports, exposure time for painis 15 to 20 seconds and about 30 secondsfor injury. During this period, a healthyperson could increase his protectiondistance by 300 to 600 feet and therebyreduce the flux level and increase theallowable time of exposure. Also,clothing, partial shielding from nearbyobjects or topography, or alteringposition to change the area of the bodyexposed will afford additional time tomove out of range or find shelter. Thecooling effect of the wind will increasethe time further, and if the wind speed islow, greater distance will have beenprovided because the distancemeasurement under § 193.2057(b) isbased on tilt at higher wind speeds. Astudy by Dr. R. 0. Parker concludes thatthermal radiation becomes hazardous topersonnel at Z000 BTU/fL2 hour, whichwould allow a solar level of 350 plus1,650 BTU/fL2 hour from other sources.Therefore, in consideration of thefactors described and in accordancewith the views of the majority ofcommenters, MTB believes thatestablishing a permissible flux level of450 to 500 BTU/fL2 hour Is unjustified,

and the proposed 1.60 BTUft.- hourflux level is retained in the final rule.

Also, numerous commenters felt thatthe term "outdoor assembly" should bemore specifically defined in describingthe target. Some felt that some beachareas would present major difficulties,particularly if casual access was to be aconsideration, and where thelaws ofsome States preclude private ownership.The respective target has been redefinedto areas occupied by 20 or more personsduring normal use in order to be bothmore definitive and preclude some ofthe problems foreseen. Mostimportantly, It is made consistent withthe definition of outdoor assemblyestablished and used in Part 12

Four commenters advocated a uniformflux level at the boundary. One whodidnot recommend a specific level Eflt itwas unsound to use variable 1lux levelsbecause the purchase of]andmay benecessary to provide for future landchanges. A single uniform flux of 1,600BTU/fL2hour was proposed by twocommenters. One expressed the viewthat escape time is not adequatebecause the level of 4,000 BTU/ft 2 hourallows only 5 tp 7 seconds beforesecond degree bums are experienced.Shelter, it was said, could not be foundin such a short time. Without givingjustification, the fourth commenterproposed a single uniform flux level of2,800 BTU/ft hour.

The concept of single uniform fluxlevels has notbeen adopted becauseMTB believes the level of protectionshould be established according to thedegree of protection needed in orderthat the level of safety will be uniform,and to reduce unwarranted costs. Whileland purchases may be necessary toprovide for future change, the zoningconcept in the definition of exclusionzone was specifically intended toprovide relief in this regard. In additionto control by a government agency.purchased land could be put to use invarious ways that conform to theregulations. Reduction in thermalradiation flux levels due to wind coolingeffects, clothing, running away, etc., asdiscussed with respect to persons inoutdoor areas, applies equally to targetareas subject to a flux levelof4,ooo"BTU/ft.' hour. Also, areas of this typewould have nearby shelter, and sameshelter from trees, bushes, or otherstructures would be likely. In addition,persons in these areas would be eithersheltered indoors, or away from the areaa large percentage of the time.

Several commenters proposed anincrease from a flux levelof 4,000 to5,000 or 6,700 BTU/ft.2 hour. This wasbased on tests of a variety of woodsshowing ignition did not occur at this

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flux level. This recommendation wouldreduce exposure time to a critically lowlevel where persons may be present orneed time for escape. However, therecommendation has been adopted inpart by more of a realistic categorizationdiscussed below.-

In response tp a comment that theterms "frequently occupied" and"exceptional value" lack specificity andcould be misinterpreted, thecharacteristics defining offsite-targetareas subject to a flux level of not morethan 4,000 BTU/ft.2 hour have beenrestated. The new definition divides theproposed offsite target (2) into twoparts, (2) and (3). Both categories applyto buildings. Category (2) applies tobuildings based on human occupancyand clearly shows that residences areincluded. Also, for consistency with Part192 and other sections of Part 193, theterm "frequently occupied" is redefinedas "being occupied by 20 or morepersons during normal use."

In category (3], the buildings areidentified according to their fire-resistant properties and their usage. Themeaning of "exceptional value" hasbeen restricted to specific historic merit.The feature of durable shielding hasbeen added so that flux levels will below enough to permit escape or theremoval of objects if shielding for theduration of a fire is not adequate.

Conversely, a new category (4) forflux levels of 6,700 BTU/ft.2 hour alsoapplies to buildings based on propertiesfor protection from thermal radiation inconjunction with the same usesspecified for category (3). The MTBsolicits comments on the establishmentof this flux level for this new category(4), rather than 10,000 BTU/fi.2 asproposed in the NPRM.

Under category (5) (formerly category(4) in the NPRI), applying-to publicstreets, highways, and mainilines ofrailroads, one commenter recommendedretention of the 4,000 BTU/ft.2 hour fluxlevel for public streets, but proposed anincrease to 10,000 BTU/ft. 2 hour forhighways and mainlines of railroads.Another commenter proposed anincrease to 10,000, while a thirdrecommended 6,700 BTU/ft.2 hour as theappropriate level. Two other -

commenters indicated that the flux levelshould be increased, but did notrecommend a specific level. It wasargued that high mobility of highwaysand railroads affords protection, and theability to close transportation corridorsprevents long term danger. Some saidthat vehicles and their speed wouldprovide protection to the 10,000 BTU/ft.2

hour flux level, while one felt theseconditions justified the 6,700 BTU/ft.2

hour thermal flux.

Although commenters disagree on thespecifiq flux levels that are appropriate,the MTB believes the argumentspresented have merit. Speed andmobility certainly afford someprotection by permitting faster esdape.Also, even if a flux of 6,700 BTU/ft.2

hour allows only 3 seconds for escape,as mentioned by one commenter, all themitigating factors, such as coolingeffects of wind discussed previously inregard to outdoor assembly, are equallyapplicable in this case. In addition, eventhe glass areas of vehicles provide someshielding. Based on theseconsiderations, the MTB believes thatan increase to an incident flux of 6,700BTU/ft. 2 hour is appropriate, and hasmodified the requirement accordingly.

Under category (6], formerly category(4) in the NPRM, which permits a 10,000BTU/ft.2 hour flux level, a revision hasbeen made to include the property line -of the facility, if a structure is not thelimiting feature. Consensus standards inexistence for a number of years haveimposed a similar restriction. Also,former category (5) of the-NPRM has

- been deleted by incorporating "otherstructures made of cellulose, metal, or.masonry materials" within category (6)of the final rule, in concurrence with- twocommenters. Where structures do not

.'have the use features described undercategories (3) and (4) and would notcause additional hazards if exposed to

'high levels of thermal radiation, there isno justification for imposing flux levelsbelow 10,000 BTU/ft.2 hour.

The Final Evaluation shows that§ 193.2057 would have a major costimpact on construction of a new LNGfacility as compared to the baselineregulatory standard, NFPA 59A (1975edition], because of additional land areathat would have to be acquired.-However, there are various options thatan*operator may choose to lessen thecost impact of this regulation, such as:

(1) Selection of a site which minimizesthe need for construction of additi6nalpipelines so that the combined cost ofland and pipelines is not high. .

(2) Choosing a site where, because ofthe nature of the surrounding area, thethermal flux permitted under thisregulation would not require theacquisition of additional land.

(3) Locating a facility where localmeteorological conditions would resultin lower exclusion distances.

(4) Utilization of alternative plantdesigns to reduce the exclusion -distances. For example, the use of eithera Class 1 impounding system,(§ 193.2153), cavern storage, or a largernumber of small tanks would minimizethe necessary exclusion distance.

The need to provide an exclusiondistance toprotect the public from thethermal radiation of a large fire on theLNG facility Is of utmost Importance Inassuring the proper selection of such afacility.

Providing an adequate thermalradiation exclusion distance, which wasone of the principal deficiencies In theNFPA 59A (1979 edition), will protectpeople who live or work near the facilityby providing iufficient separation fromthe heat of burning LNG at the site. Thecurrent NFPA 59A (1975 edition)significantly strengthens the earlierNFPA 59A edition and approaches theexclusion distances established by thisregulation. A discussion of the currentNFPA 59A standard for thermalradiation exclusion distance is alsodiscussed in the Final Evaluation.

Flammable vapor-gas dispersionprotection. Most commenters agreedwith the original language of§ 193.2059(a). However, revisions havebeen made in § 193.2059(a) to make thelanguage consistent, where appropriate,with § 193.2057. In response tocomments, the term "frequentlyoccupied" has been defined as"occupied by 20 or more persons duringnormal use." This should alleviate theconcerns of one commenter whosuggested using the term "regularorganized outdoor assembly." hi thesame way, the term "exceptional value"Is now based on "historic uniqueness"that is specifically described. The basisfor these expressions is more fullyexplained under § 193.2057. A change tobase the criteria for an exclusion zoneon the percent of area covered by aplume was proposed by one commenterwho claimed that isoplethis are verynarrow. This proposal has not beenadopted, since much remains to belearned about dispersion and gravityspread particularly when windvelocities are low and could result Inlarge upwind and lateral dispersion.

Agreement with § 193.2059(b),wasexpressed by most commenters also,One commenter recommended a changeto require that dispersion distance bedetermined by horizontal measurementrather than following ground contour.No explanation in support of thisproposal was given. While vapordispersion characteristics are stilluncertain, some work currently Inprogress for the Department of Energyindicates that changes in elevationwould tend to diffuse the vapor.Considering the range of accuracyexpected with current dispersionmodels, the difference in distanceshould not be significant. Since usinghorizontal measurement, when

Federal Register I Vol. 45, No. 29 1 Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

preferred, would always meet distancerequirements of following the groundcontours, the MTB has not adopted thisproposal.

Responsd to § 193.2059[c) was veryextensive. The principal issue was thecommenter's argument that provisionsshould be made to permit the use of newdispersion models when additionaltechnical information is developed.Fifteen comxnenters suggested variousmethods by which this might beaccomplished. Although MTB believesthat present models may beconservative, diverse assumptions andresults coupled with the lack ofverification testing at appropriate scalecause much uncertainty. Accordingly,the MTB has included a provision forthe use of models which meet specificcriteria, including approval by theDirector.

Commenters were critical of mostcurrent models. AGA IS-3-1 modelswere said to be based on questionabledata and inappropriate because of beingbased on a sudden spill. One commenterstrongly favored the models SLICE andSIGMET, but these models includecertain assumptions and representdepartures in principal and results.Although the MTB believes that thesemodels may ultimately prove to be quitevalid, verification is needed to justifythe resulting reduction in conservatism.The model proposed in the NPRM wasalso widely criticized. Its ability toprovide for only continuous spills, ratherthan sudden spills and spills of finiteduration was viewed as a particularlimitation. However, one commentercontended that it could be used if themethod is modified to allow for finitespills. Commenters who criticized theNPRM model most extensively alsorecommend that the rule continue toreference that model for optional use.The MTB believes that modificationswill allow for finite spills, but even ifdistance is based on a continuous spill,results will not be significantly different.Accordingly, the NPRM model isreferenced in the final rule for optionalapplication.

The TPSSC found this regulationunreasonable because part (c) requiresuse of a single questionable formula.without allowance for mitigatingmeasures. The MTB believes thatallowing the use of a model submittedby the operator for approval by theDirector should satisfy the concernsexpressed by the TPSSC.

A requirement to determine thedispersion distance for eachimpoundment met with objections fromtwo commenters who argued that theimpounding system needing the longerdistance would control. Other

commenters advocated retention of thefeature. Since it is necessary todetermine the dispersion distance inorder to know which impounding systemcontrols, the requirement has beenretained.

A recommendation by 2 commentersto change the gas concentration from 2.5percent to a range between 2.5 percentand 5 percent according to atmosphericstability has not been adopted becausethere are insufficient data to justify thechange. Also, the IS-3-1 reportsuggested that 2 percent may be a moreappropriate level.

The weather conditions underparagraph (c)(2) have been changedfrom a 95 percent level ofnonexceedance to a 90 percent level, inaccordance with a number ofrecommendations, since weather datashows the wind to be clam at least 5percent of the time in most locations. Inaddition, optional weather parametershave been provided for use with somemodels in order to provide forlocationswhere data are unavailable or to permitan operation to proceed withcalcuations without extensive datacompilation.

Section 193.2059(d] has undergonemajor revision. Numerous commentswere made indicating a need forclarification ofintent and oftenproviding constructive suggestionswhich have been incorporated in themodification. Other changes were madebecause of changes in § 193.2061 on.allowable seismic design. The TPSSCfound the proposed regulation to beunreasonable because the Committeebelieved the prescribed vaporizationrate was intended to exceed thecombined discharge of LNG and flashvapor from the failed piping. Thismisunderstanding arose because of theterm "LNG' before the word dischargein the second line of paragraph (d)(1)[i)of the NPRM. The adopted paragraph(d}(1)(i) restates the vaporization rate toshow more clearly that it is the sum ofvapor formed by flashing and fromboiling due to heat transfer from contactsurfaces. Also, the spill duration for toptransfer and for side or bottompenetrations is spelled out. Provisionsfor an alternate model for determiningsurface contact conditions that meetsprescribed criteria is included.consistent with the provision for othermodels.

Section 193.109(d)(2) of the NPRMproposed that vapor dispersion resultingfrom a prescribed tank failure be basedon local seismic conditions and othersurrounding conditions. In view ofchanges made in allowable seismicdesign, consideration of high seismicactivity become less of a concern. Also,

other provisions in the new standards,such as design of diking in the vicinity ofairports, address hazards from the othersurrounding conditions. Therefore, thisparagraph has been deleted in itsentirety. Objections by the TPSSC to the0.4g seismic acceleration criteria and thecredibility of the spill condition arethereby eliminated. In paragraph (d)(2).the safety factor of (2) on impoundmentinsulation has been eliminated in thefinal rules. Rather, performancereliability is predicated on testing andproper design installation andmaintenance of the insulation.

The concept ofplannedignition assetforth in § 193.2059(e) was found to beunacceptable by the TPSSC because ofdangers to plant personnel A largenumber of commenters also expressedopposition to planned ignition. It wasargued that plant insurance would bedifficult to acquire and that a minor spillcould become a distinct hazard. Onecommenter expressed the view that theconcept is controversial and repugnantat first thought, but adds that in theevent of offsite dispersion. it maysafeguard abutters with limitedadditional risk on site since offsiteignition would be likely anyway. TheMTB has revised this requirementbasedon the significant number of commenterswho are opposed to an ignition option.The revision permits the operator toprepare a plan for controlling the spreadof LNG beyond the facility site.Methods, including igniting the LNGvapors, could be included in theplan.The operator can exercise the option onhow the LNG will be controlledfomspreading if a vapor dispersionexclusion zone is not practical toprovide.

The Final Evaluation shows that§ 193.2059 would have amajor costimpact on the construction of an LNGfacility as compared to the baselineregulatory standard, amounting to about60 percent of the costs of the eight costlysections. Since the Draft Evaluationshows that the bulk of the cost would bedue to land acquisition, most of thefactors discussed under § 193.2057 onhow land costs might be mitigated areequally applicable to § 193.2059. Evenassuming a low'probability of anaccident that would cause flammablevapors to disperse beyond the plant site,MTB believes that the added costs arejustified by the potentially disastrouseffects that would result from theignition of an LNG vapor cloud in apopulated area.

The current NFPA 59A (1979 edition)strengthens the earlierNFPA 59Aedition. A discussion of the currentNFPA 59A standard for vapor cloud

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dispersion -distance is also discussed in -

the Final Evaluation.Seismic investigation and design.

Section 193.2061 establishes siteinvestigation requirements for groundmotion caused by earthquakes to protectagainst the catastrophic failure ofcertain LNG facilities (see § 193.2051). Inregions having a higher expectancy ofearthquakes, these facilities would haveto'be designed to withstand, withoutloss of structural or functional integrity,the most critical earthquake motionwhich is ascertained probabilistically ifsuch data are sufficient, ordeterministically when availableearthquake data are insufficient toprovide probabilistic estimates. Inregions having a lower expectancy ofearthquakes, these facilities would bedesigned to withstand, without loss offunctional or structural integrity, theforces in the Uniform Building Code,Vol. I, 1976 edition.

The geotechnical investigation forfacilities in regions having a higherexpectancy of earthquakes must includefactors which would affect the seismicdesign of the facility. Factors such asfaults, quaternary activity of thosefaults, tectonic structures, static anddynamic properties of soils, ,earthquakes, hydrologic regime, andpotential for liquefaction'must beincluded in the geotechnidalinvestigation..Under paragraph (f0, LNGstorage tanks would be prohibited inlocations having a potential for veryhigh fault displacement, earthquakepotential, or liquefaction.

Most of the commenters objected toparts of this proposed rule, most of theobjections focusing on the proposedrequirements mandating a probabilisticdetermination of the expectancy of anearthquake 'and the prohibiting of anLNG facility in certain locations: Most ofthe comments were general in naturewithout going into detail with regard tospecific requirements. A fewcommenters did comment substantivelywith regard to the technical feasibility ofeach specific requirement. Some of thesecommenters relied on opinions byrecognized experts in the design andconstruction of'structures in seismicareas to prepare those comments.,

On April 24 and 25,1979, MTB held aconference in Washington, D.C., withrepresentatives of Western LNGAssociates, Inc., Bixby Ranch, AmericanGas Association, Hollister Ranch, andvarious representatives of operatorshaving LNG facilities to 'discuss theseismic requirements proposed in§ 193.111. The proposed requirements in§ § 193.107, 193.109,'and 193.117, andSubpart E were also discussed, but notto as great an extent as the proposed

seismic requirements. This meetingserved to meaningfully discuss theproposed seismic requirements withpeople vitally interested in the seismicproposals, including eminent recognizedexperts in seismic investigations anddesign. This conference proved helpful

,in providing MTB the opportunity togather information and discuss theproposed seismic requirements.

A few commenters to this proposaladvocated that the seismic designrequirements of the NRC be adopted. Onthe other hand, a few commentersadvocated that the Uniform BuildingCode (UBC) designmethod is adequate,a nd therefore, should be used in thedesign of LNG facilities. While theprobability of an earthquake occurringat a site does not depend on whether thesite is for an LNG or nuclear facility, thenature of the hazard differs according tothe type of facility. For instance, therelease of LNG in an accident would nothave the long term contaminating effectsof escaping radioactivity, nor is the areaaffected by an LNG spill as widespreadas the area affected by the wind-blownradioactivity of a nuclear release.Therefore, these differences should bereflected in different design standards.

Further, the requirements for nuclear.plants use two levels of designs forearthquakes, one level at which thenuclear facility would continue tooperate while another level at which thenuclear facility would be safely shutdown and maintained in a shutdownmode. The MTB does not believe thattwo levels of design are appropriate forLNG facilities-because hazards oftencannot be reducedby shutdown, andhas established a requirement that-certain facilities must be designed andbuilt to'the critical ground mbtionwithout loss of functional or structuralintegrity.

MTB does not believe that LNGfacilities should be designed.to thestandards in UBC in regions having ahigher expectancy of earthquakes. TheUBC does not take into considerationthe function of the structures, such aqthe hazardous nature of an LNG facilitynor does it consider the large area thatwould be affected by a catastrophic spillof LNG. A large number of commentersrecognized the inadequacies ofdesigning an LNG facility to fhastandards in UBC,

Because of the revisions to thissection, it has been reorganized into !Ldifferent format for clarity. The newformal more clearly defines therequirements, in sequence, that must beconducted in the seismic investigationand design.

As suggested by a commenter,§ 193.2061(a) which applies'to sites in

Zone 0 or I of the Seismic Risk Map ofthe U.S., UBC, requires a study of faults,hydrologic regime, and soil conditions tolearn if there is evidence indicating apotential for surface faulting or soilliquefaction at the proposed site.

Section 193.2061(b)(1) sets forth theseismic loads to which facilities at thehigher risk sites must be designed andbuilt to withstand, without loss ofstructural or functional lntegrity, LNGfacilities in Puerto Rico, Zone 2, 3, or 4or at a site in Zones 0 and I determinedto have a potential for surface faultingor soil liquefaction fall under thisrequirement.

Section 193.2061(b)(2) establishes theUBC as seismic design requirements forLNG facilities not subject to paragraph(b)(1), This part of the regblation hasbeen revised in accordance withcomments that the UBC does notdesignate horizontal or vertical seismicacceleration as proposed in the NPRM,but instead the UBC sets forth lateralforces.

A number of commenters suggestedthat the extent of the factors Involved Ina geotechnical investigation to,determine seismic design loads shouldbe set out in the regulation in order toassure an adequate and consistent ,seismic investigation. A listing of factorswas originally suggested in the draftproposals in the ANPRM of thisregulatory proceeding, but was omittedin the NPRM to avoid duplication of theproposed general requirement toconduct a geotechnical investigation.However, because commenters showeda need to specify the extent of theseismic investigation, MTB has includeda few details of what an investigationshould include in the final rule. Thesedetails are based on commenters'proposed criteria for conducting thegeotechnical investigation. Thesecriteria have been summarized andincluded in § 193.2061(c).

In keeping with practically all of thecomments on this section that there arenot sufficient earthquake data in mostparts of the country to make a,determination of the critical groundmotion solely on a probabilistic basis,MTB'has provided an option Inparagraph (d) that the most criticalground motion may also be ascertaineddeterministically when availableearthquake data are insufficient toprovide probabilistic estimates, Duringthe course of this rulemaking, MTB hasconcluded that there are regions in thecountry that, in the future, probably willhave sufficient earthquake data todetermine critical ground motion on a

-probabilistic basis with a yearlyprobability of exceedence of 10- 4 or lessas proposed in the NPRM. The MTB

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 1 Rules and Regulations

believes that a probabilisticdetermination of critical ground motionis the preferable approach because ifderived from adequate data, it willestablish a common basis of seismicdesign for all LNG facilities.

The criteria in § 193.2061(e) that mustbe investigated in determining criticalground motion are in accordance withthe views of commenters that proposedsuch a requirement. Including thisrequirement, according to thesecommenters, is necessary to assure acommon basis for determining criticalground motion. The MTB agrees and hasadopted this suggestion. Some of thecriteria have been revised to assure thatthere is definitiveness in the terms, inorder to assure a consistentdetermination of critical ground motion.A revision has been made to thecommenters' proposal with regard tocritical ground motion by establishingthat the vertical design response spectraare equal to the horizontal designresponse spectra within 10 miles of theearthquake source. This requirement isconsistent with earthquake data thatindicate that the vertical and horizontalresponse spectra are essentially similarat distances of 10 miles or less from theearthquake source.

Section 193.2061(f) prohibits an LNGstorage tank from being located incertain areas of high seismic activity.This regulation differs from thatproposed in the NPRM in order toestablish both a magnitude as well asthe frequency for seismic activity. Mostcommenters argued that LNG facilitiesshould not be prohibited at any location,arguing that designers could design anLNG storage tank to accommodatealmost any seismic force. During theconference on April 24 and 25,1979, inwhich the proposed seismicrequirements were discussed, somewitnesses argued that the storage tankcould effectively withstand horizontal orvertical displacement of a fault directlyunder the LNG tank. However, one.witness disagreed with that argument,saying that a design to withstand thehorizontal or vertical displacement of afault directly under the LNG tank hasnot undergone the test of a realearthquake displacement. Thesubstantive written comments on theseproposed prohibited areas argue thatareas of severe seismic activity shouldnot be prohibited, but an approval bythe Director should be required in theseareas. These comments categorizedifferent ranges of fault displacementand the type of-foundation constructionrequired in these areas.

The MTB is not convinced that LNGstorage tanks should not be prohibited

in areas of very high seismic activity.The MTB believes that theconsequences of a very severeearthquake are so significant that it Isnot in the public interest to permitconstruction of an LNG storage tank inthese'areas. The MTB believes thatbecause LNG storage tanks have notexperienced very severe earthquakes,there has not been substantiation ofarguments by commenters that suchearthquake forces can be handled byappropriate design. Therefore, 1vITB hasretained the prohibitions of LNG storagetanks in areas having high probability ofsevere seismic activity. So, withappropriate revisions, MTB hasprohibited as LNG facility sites thoselocations that some commentersproposed should require MTB approval.As for any MTB safety rule, the Directorwould evaluate a petition for waiver ofthese prohibitions if an operatordemonstrates why they should not befollowed and how the public would beprotected by deviating from them. Withregard to the-requirement in the NPRMprohibiting LNG storage tanks in areasof severe seismic activity, the 1-miledistance from a fault has been retainedbecause faults cannot be defined moreprecisely when consideringuncertainties in the nature of a fault. Inaddition, the probability of a splay froma fault would make the area of hazarddifficult to define; however, theproposed prohibition has been modifiedto consider recency of movement andamount of movement in any way similarto that proposed by a commenter. Therecency of movement is based on thedetermination of movement withinQuaternary time rather than over thelast 35,000 years, as proposed by thecommenter, because MTB believes that

*the last 35,000 years is not a sufficientlylong period to assure prediction ofsubsequent seismic activity. Theprohibiting of an LNG storage tankwhere the estimated design horizontalacceleration at the foundation exceeds0.8g is adopted because such a load iscause for questioning the selection of asite that would be subjected to suchsevere seismic activity. In accordancewith various commenters, theprohibition regarding liquefactionrecognizes that the potential for such aphenomenon can be mitigated.

Section 193.2061(g) has not beenchanged from the NPRM because therewere no substantive comments on thissection.

The TPSSC stated that the concept ofthe seismic investigations as proposedin the NPRM is appropriate, but, asproposed, was neither reasonable norpracticable. They recommended that

MTB review the testimony of Mr. JamesDevine, U.S. Geological Survey, at themeeting. The MTB has used Mr.Devine's testimony, as well as utilizingMr. Devine, in developing this final rule.

The Final Evaluation shows that§ 193.2061 would have a major costimpact on construction of an LNGfacility as compared to the baselineregulatory standard because of the moredetailed seismic investigation and morestringent seismic design requirements,such as the added cost of structuralsteel, concrete, and earthwork. Whilethe Final Evaluation concludes that theoccurrence of an earthquake is unlikely,MTB believes that the consequences ofa major earthquake are so devastating,as illustrated by damage to structuresfrom previous earthquakes, that LNGfacilities must be designed to preventthe failure of various components fromsuch an occurrence. The requirement forseismic investigation for design in thecurrent NFPA 59A (1979 edition) is notvery different from the requirementestablished by this regulation. Adiscussion of the current NFPA 59Astandard for seismic design is alsodiscussed in the FinalEvaluation.

Flooding. The principal concern ofseveral who commented on § 193.2063related to the risk of flooding against.which protection would be required.Three suggested that the level of risk bechanged to a more stringent level, suchas the 500-year floodplane used in theguidelines of the Water ResourcesCouncil. While ?MB believes that risklevels should be uniform, data relatingto different environmental phenomenahave not been uniformly determined. Inthe case of flooding. many differentevents are involved and combined todescribe the worst event e4ected basedon a 100-year interval. Based on present-data, however, the MTB is notconvinced that a change to impose morestringent risk levels is necessary.Accordingly, the wording proposed inthe NPRM has been retained in the finalrules.

The TPSSC felt that a clarificationwas needed to show that everyfoundation need not be protectedagainst flooding. Another clarificationshowing that the operator is notresponsible for a power supply overwhich the operator has no control wasrecommended by the committee. Asdiscussed above, the components andfoundations to which § 193.2063 appliesare listed in the scope (§ 193.2051) ofSubpart B. Another provision in§ 193.2051 shows that responsibility forprotection of power supplies applies toeither normal or auxiliary power

-facilities associated with facilities to

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which Subpart B applies. Only LNG-facilities-used for power supply areintended to be covered, not facilitiesbeyond the operator's control. -

The Final Evaluation identifies§ 193.2063 as a major cost item due tothe cost of additional concrete andearthwork needed to protect the facilityagainst the occurrence of a flood. TheFinal Evaluation concludes, that theoccurrence of a flood is unlikely.However, if a flood does occur;MTBbelieves-that its consequences wouldresult in significant damages-andperhaps a catastrophic failure if thefoundation of an LNG storage tank orother significant component isundermined. The MTB believes thatmajor benefits would accrue throughprevention ofsuch a catastrophicfailure7.

Soil characteristics. Most commentersand the TPSSC agreed with the.proposed language of § 193.2065(a). Onecommenter recommendea use of theNuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC)regulatory guide 1.132 as.abaseline toassure. a thorough investigation. Anothercommenter felt that a requirement for a.determination of the dynamic propertiesof the soil should be added. The MTB.does not consider the NRC guide to bean appropriate baseline for LNGfacilities in view of the wide'range insize and complexity of LNG facilities aswell as the difference in-nature of thehazards between ar LNG and a nuclearfacility. Also, the proposed rule includedrequirements relating to a soil's dynamicproperties. Therefore. § -193.2065(a) isunchanged.

Approval of § 193.2065(b) wasindicated by most commenter. also. Onecommenter, however, felt modificationswere needed to allow for conditionsother than natural soil properties on thebasis that soil can be improved by-technical means. Although the proposaldid not intend to.preclude the use ofengineering techniques to improvenatural soil conditions, the final ruleclarifies this point by use of the terms(,naturally occurring or designated" todescribe the soil characteristics thatmust be provided at a site. The TPSSCrecommended that the term "rollover"'be" deleted as a dynamic load becauseother rules require its control. AlthoughMTB prescribes measures for the controlof rollover, because such a possibilitycan occur due to human error,occurrence of the phenomenon is.nottotally precluded. Because rolloverwould result in vibration aid otherdynamic loading, the rule has beenretained as proposed.

Windforces. Most commenters andthe TPSSC approved § 193.2067(a).However, based on recommendations

by commenters.and consistent withoverall modifications to eliminate the'term "critical component," paragraph (a)has been substantiallyrearranged andmodified. In § 193.117(a), the term"critical component" has beeneliminated by defining the componentssubject to the requirements according tothe hazards which must be considered.Specific conditions thit must beevaluated and accommodated by designare prescribed based on specificcomments. Two commentersrecommended-that the rules includerequirements to design for (1) the directdrag and lift forces of winds and (2) thepressure differential across dividingportions of a partial or total enclosure.These commenters plus two othercommenters advocated the inclusion ofimpact forceg and partial penetrationfrom wind borne missiles. Anothercommenter proposed that pressuregradients due to tornadoes beaddressed. This proposal falls into them6re generally described conditiondescribed in proposal (2) above. TheMTB agrees that these recommendeddesign considerations should bespecifically designated and paragraph(a) has been modified accordingly.

With respect to § 193.2067(b), both thedesign wind speed and the method fordetermining wind speed were theprimary issues. Several commentersproposed that the rules permit bothprobabilistic and deterministic methodsfor establishing wind speed in a mannersimilar to the alternate proceduresproposed for seismic design. Thisproposal was not accepted becauseMTB does not know of previouspractices of establishing wind speeddeterministically. A change to increasethe probability of occurrence to 10 - 3 or"more was also advocated. The MTBbelieves that because damage anduncertainties-associated with highwinds, such as tornadoes, arecomparable with seismic effects, the -proposed probability should be retained.However, a requirement to determine-wind speed based on the probability ofnonexceedance has been prescribed inaccordance with recommendations bynine commenters. The MTB agreed withthis recommendation, since setting afixed wind speed is analogous to setting'earthquake intensity based solely on theprobability of occurrence. Therefore,under the-final rules, the most critical,combination of velocity and durationmust be established probabilisticallywhen the data for such a determinationare available. However, because thesedata are not uniformly availablethroughout the country, the rules setforthan alternatefixed velocity to be

used when a probabilistic determinationis not possible. Many commentersobjected to the 250 miles per hour designwindspeed specified in the NPRM, Onthe basis thata study by one expertindicated that 98 percent of tornadoeshave velocities below 150 miles perhour, a commenter argued that 200 milesper hour is a more realistic and lesscostly wind speed to use. Anothercommenter recommended a 210 mile perhour speed if local data is unavailablebecause only 2.3 percent of tornadoeshave velocities above 207 miles per hourand 62 percent have speeds of 112 milesper hour or less. Other commentersmade similar arguments. Onecommenter said that less than I percentof tornadoes have winds exceeding 250miles per hour, and another commenterstated that Nevada had neverexperienced winds as high as 250 milesper hour. The TPSSC found the proposedstandard to be unacceptable, stating the250 mile per hour speed should bereduced because it is excessive. TheMTB recognizes that there is a lack ofvalid wind speed data for tornadoes.Even data on the occurrence oftornadoes is not wholly reliable sincemany tornadoes have not been reported,and velocities are frequentlyunmeasured. The MTB is aware thatrecent reports have contended thattornado wind speeds are less thanpreviously thought to be. In accordancewith this understanding anddocumented recommendations, thedesign wind speed has been revisedfrom 250 to 200 miles per hour, which isto be used only if local wind data areinadequate, and a lower speed would beallowed if justified and approved by theDirector.

A revision to reference ANSI A 50.1rather than UBC for wind loadingIapplicable to small shop fabricated'tanks was recommended by sixcommenters. The UBC standard wassaid to be less current and notapplicable to critical structures. Fourother commenters also proposed that thereference to UBC be changed, but didnot suggest an alternative. The MTBrecognizes that UBC is not intended forhighly critical structures and expectsthat future editions of U3C may indicatethis limitation. Therefore, in accordancewith recommendations by commenters,the related reference has been revised.

The Final Evaluation identifies193.2067 as a major cost Item as

compared to the baseline regulatorystandard because of the design for highwind loads and the low probability ofoccurrence of such wind loads, TheMTB believes that the provision for the

- high wind.load design Is necessary to

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

mitigate the catastrophic failure of anLNG storage tank from such winds.Previous failures of structures due toexcessive wind loads clearly illustratethe severe consequences of such afailure. The need to protect against theconsequences of a failure of the tank isvery important to properly protect thepublic who live or work near the facility.The design for wind loads in the currentNFPA 59A (1979 edition] approaches thedesign established by this regulation. Adiscussion of the current NFPA 59Astandard for wind load design is alsodiscussed in the Final Evaluation.

Other severe weather and naturalconditions. The majority of commenterssupported § 193.2069 withoutmodification. One commenter proposedto change the words "a hazard,"appearing in § 193.2069(b), to "theoccurrence of an uncontrollableemergency." Otherwise, a definition ofhazard was said to be necessary. Also,the TPSSC reported that the word"hazard" does not express the intent.The MTB agrees that the word "hazard"was inappropriate. Changes in thisrespect have been made to othersections based on response anddiscussion of the NPRM. Accordingly,the wording has been revised to "anemergency."

Adjacent activities. A revision to,§ 193.2071(a) changes the words"persons and property" to "persons andoffsite property" and deletes thequalifying phrase "located off the site."This makes the language consistent withother sections.

In § 193.2071(b), the word "safety" hasbeen added to describe "controlsystems," based on onerecommendation, since it is clearly notthe'intent of MTB to impose regulatoryburdens of LNG facilities that are notsafety-related.

Separation of components. Although§ 193.123(b) in the NPRM was supportedby many commenters, some, however,felt that the intended provisionsregarding spill and collapse hazardswere adequately covered by 59A asreferenced in § 193.2073(b). The TPSSCheld a similar view, calling for thewording to be clarified so as to expressthe intent described in the transcript ofthe hearings. Concern was expressedalso that it could be interpreted to meanthat exclusion distances required bySubpart B for thermal radiation andvapor dispersion must be providedwithin the plant. The MTB agrees thatthe requirement is not necessary andcould cause confusion. Therefore, it hasbeen deleted in § 193.2073.

Subpart C-DesignMaterials. Several commenters to

§ 193.2103, General, pointed out thatevery component need not be qualifiedunder Subpart B and thus the Subpart Benvironmental forces should not applyto every component under the terms of§ 193.2103. In view of the change in thescope of Subpart B, the wording of§ 193.2103 has been clarified to statethat Subpart B design requirements arenot to be applied to components unlessapplicable under that subpart. Thewords "within design limits" wereadded after "compatible" in§ 193.2103(b) for purposes of clarity.

Section 193.2107(a), Extremetemperatures, has been rewritten tobetter express the intent. Based on thecomments of the TPSSC and others,§ 193.2107(c) has been revised torecognize that emergency response maybe provided to delay failure to allowadequate time for other measures to betaken. It was pointed out that theproposed "two hours" criterion isadequate in some instances andinadequate in others.

The MTB finds that the subject of§ 193.2109, Insulation, and terminologyassociated with it, are presently in astate of flux. Section 193.209 of theANPRM used the term "which do notsupport combustion." Based on a largenumber of comments by operators andassociations, this was changed to "self-extinguishing" as a more generallyaccepted term by these commenters.This was reiterated by their commentson the NPRM.

However, this brought forth commentsfrcm the Federal Trade Commission(FTC) and from several insulationmanufacturers, who had not previouslyresponded, calling attention to the orderand decision of the FTC datedNovember 4,1974, which prohibits theuse of publication of such terms as "non-burning," "self-extinguishing," "non-combustible," or any term of likemeaning to describe the burningcharacteristics of cellular plasticproducts. Presumably this prohibitiondoes not necessarily extend to otherforms of insulation.

One commenter pointed out that theThermal Insulation ManufacturersAssociation is working towards theestablishment of a standardized pipe

-insulation fire test which would indicateactual fire performance. It wasrecommended this test be used inspecifying fire performance when itbecomes available. The MTB is willingto consider this suggestion at that time.

It is MTB's position that insulation orcoverings other than cellular plasticproducts can be used and can be

rightfully termed "noncombustible:"This term is therefore being used in thispart until such time as other agencies orthe industry develops new criteria.

It is significant that the draft of NFPA59A-1979 uses this term in paragraph4113.

There were many other varyingcomments in regard to insulation in§ 193.2109. The requirement that thecovering must have a melting pointabove 1500" F has been deleted, as MTBagrees this would preclude use of othermaterials other than steel which wouldbe adequate in many cases. Mostcommenters argued that the 1500' Frequirement was unnecessarilyrestrictive. The need to withstand theforce of fire hose streams has also beendeleted as this is only one possiblesource of impact loading, and it may bequestionable whether it would bepractical to withstand the force ofstreams developed by modemfirefighting equipment.

The TPSSC agreed with the intent of§ 193.2111 dealing with cold boxes, butfelt the wording was ambiguous. Thishas been changed for clarification.

The revised definition of "hazardousfluids" should meet the many objectionsto the use of that term in § 193.2113dealing with piping.

The MTB agrees withthe commenterson § 193.2117, Combustible materials,that "is impractical" better expressesthe intent rather than "not commerciallyavailable."

Records are required by § 193.2119 aswell as elsewhere in this part arerequired by MTB to verify compliancewith these regulations. It is not believedthis is a burden, as this information isavailable during the design andconstruction of a facility, and should beretained.

Design of Components and Buildbings

Section 193.304 of the NPRM is now§ 193.2703 of the new Subpart H-Personnel Qualifications and Training.

Particularly based on therecommendation of the TPSSC. theseveral sections of this part pertainingto valves have been reorganized.Section 193.2123 pertains to the designof all types of valves used in an LNGfacility. Section 193.2123(a) and (b) havebeen added; they are taken fromparagraphs 6130 and 6131 of NFPA 59A,the interim standard now in effect inPart 192. The ban on use of cast,malleable, and ductile iron valves inparagraph 6132 is covered by § 193.2113of this part. Section 193.617(d) of theNPRM has been revised and is now§ 193.2123(e), as this does pertain todesign.

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Section 193.917 of the NPRM is nowtitled "automatic shutoff valves" and is'now § 193.2125, as it lists specific designrequirements for such valves.

Valves for specific requirementsassociated with equipment are coveredin the appropriate subparts:

Section 193.2127 has been revised to.correct the seemingly contradictory orconflicting requirements in (d) and (e) ofthe NPRM. A number of commentersoffered similar requirements which havebeen adopted.

As suggested by the TPSSC, the word"pipe" has been changed to "piping" in§ 193.2129 and elsewhere in theseregulations where the word "piping" ismore appropriate. Section 193.2129(a) ofthe NPRM has been deleted, as it wasnot the intent that all pipe supportscomply with extreme temperaturerequirements.

Section 193.2131, Building design, ha'sbeen rewritten to incorporate paragraph220 of NFPA 59A, as being moremeaningful, yet providing the originalintent.

In § 193.2133, Buildings, ventilation,"15 percent" has been changed to "25percent" in (a](2] and (3), based on theconsensus of comments and therecommendation of the TPSSC. Thisbecomes consistent with other sectionsof this part.

The word "determine" was changedto "consider" in § 193.2135, as MIBagrees that calculations involved in arigorous investigation are not requiredfor many components.

The alternative inspectionrequirement.in § 193.2137 in respect tofrost heave has been modified to permitthe operator to use a method andschedule to detect changes in elevationas included in the maintenanceprocedures required by this part.

The requirement for lightning rods andarrestors has been deleted in § 193.2143,as it is agreed that proper electricalgrounding is adequate to protectpersonnel and components in an LNGfacility.

The title of § 193.2145 has beenchanged to "Boilers and'pressurevessels" as this section does pertain toboth subjects.

Regarding § 193.2149, the majority ofthe commenters and the TPSSC objectedto the mandatory requirement for animpounding system for transfer lines inexcess of 4 inches in diameter and forcargo transfer systems. This was inresponse to the MTB request in thepreamble of the NPRM for comments asto a diameter break point for transferlines. It was pointed out that the manyfactors involved, such as diameter,pressaire, length, or location prebludedthe establishment of such a break point.

Accordingly, MTB now mandates animpoundment system for storage tanks,but uses performance language in§ 193.2149(b), allowing an operator touse grading or drainage or, wherenecessary, an impounding system,depending on site-related conditions, forthe listed components.

Commenters and the TPSSC statedthat in § 193.2151, the term "under theworst predictable spill conditions" wasan undefinable term, and not practicalor reasonable. Accordingly, this termhas been deleted.

In spite of the justification presentedin the preamble of the NPRM,commenters, including the TPSSC,objected to classification of impoundingsystems in § 193.2153. The MTB believesthis is required for use in other sectionsof this part. Section 193.2153(a), Class 1,has been revised to permit a 24-inchspace between the system and thecomponent served. This may be done forconstruction or maintenance reasons,yet meets the objectives of a Class 1system.

Section 193.2155(c) has been revisedto indicate that this requirement appliesonly to large airports serving large -aircraft as defined in 14 CFR Part 1.1.

In § 193.2157, as elsewhere, "self-extinguishing" has been replaced by"noncombustible." Section 193.2117(c) isnow applicable only when the insulationis used to maintain the functionalintegrity of an impouiding system.

Section 193.2159(d)-has been revisedto eliminate mandated changes, as itwas pointed out other methods may beused to minimize the wetted floor area.

In spite of repeated comments andviews of the TPSSC, MTB stands by itsposition e~pressed in the NPRM thatdike penetrations be prohibited. It is feltit is in the interest of safety to prohibitthem, and that furthermore they arealready prohibited by a number ofexisting local ordinances.

The MTB agrees that "detain" is amore appropriate word that "entrain" in§ 193.2163, and has made this change.

As suggested, "membranous covering"has been replaced by "flammablenonmetallic membrane" in § 193.2167b).This is now consistent with.§ 193.2187(b). -

Section 193.2169 ip essentially thesame as proposed in the NPRM. Therewere few comments to this section.

The Final Evaluation shows that§ 193.2169 would have a major costimpact because of the instrumentationthat would have to be provided to detectleaks. The MTB believes that the addedcosts are justified by the early warningthat would be provided should a leakoccur. Even witha minor leak, theextreme cold df LNG could produce

excessive localized thermal stresses insurfaces contacted. Resulting crackscould damage the structural integrity ofa component making it susceptible to apossible catastrophic failure. Inaddition, with current design of highdikes located closely adjaceit to acomponent, a small leak of either LNGor cold gas could result in a combustiblemixture forming between a componentand its diking. The current NFPA 59A(1979 edition) has revised this standardso that it is very similar to § 193.2169. Adiscussion of the current NFPA 59Astandard for gas leak detection Is alsodiscussed in the Final Evaluation.

In § 193.2171, a sump basin is requiredonly for collection of water. A smallspill of LNG would probably evaporatebefore reaching the sump basin, and if itreached the sump basin, it wouldevaporate from that location.Commenters and the TPSSC felt othermeans could be used to contain smallspills of LNG, if necessary. There didnot appear to be any objections to asump basin for water: and therefore, thisrequirement has been retained.

A-more acceptable parameter hasbeen established to define the dveragopredictable collection rate of water froma storm in § 193.2173. The majority ofcommenters stated that the watercollection rate as required in the NPRMwas unreasonable and would requireexcessively large pumps. The proposedmandatory requirement for automatic'operation of sump pumps has also beendeleted. The TPSSC felt the requirementfor sump pumps was unreasonable as itrestricted alternate methods of waterremoval, although It did not suggestwhat such methods could be.

Section 193.435 in the NPRM has beendeleted and included in § 193.2107.

The TPSSC stated that § 193.2179(a)was impossible to understand andtechnically inappropriate. In respofise,MTB has deleted paragraph (a) in theNPRM, but has retained paragraph (b)dealing with capacities fordisplacement.

Section 193.2181 coveringimpoundment capacity of impoundmentsystems is unchanged except for theaddition of (b), which clarifies the statusof covered impoundment systems, TheMTB still believes the discussion of thissection in thepreamble of the NPRM isstill valid and'need not be repeatedhere.

Section 193.2103, Impoundmentcapacity; equipment and transfersystems, and § 193.2185, Impounding,capacity; parking areas, portablevessels, have been modified to beconsistent with the revision of§ 193.2149.

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The section in the NPRM, § 193.445,has been deleted, as MTB agrees therequirements are actually covered inother sections of this subpart.

Likewise, § 193.447 of the NPRM hasbeen deleted,-since it serves no purposewith the deletion of § 193.429 of theANPRM covering spill removal,regarding which MTB recognized thatthe many problems involved overodethe potential benefits. As impoundmentsystems are designed for containment,sump basins within them serve nopurpose.

LNG Storage TanksSection 193.2189(d) dealing with

loading forces was revised to beconsistent with other standards, such asparagraph 4-12.7 of NFPA 59A, statingthe minimum density of LNG tabeassumed. Some commenters felt thissection was unnecessary, as the loadingforces listed were covered by referencedstandards. The MTB feels it is well toinclude them as given in this subpart.

Section 193.2191, Stratification, hasbeen changed by replacing "by" with"such as." This would permit use ofother satisfactory mitigating measures.

Section 193.2193, Movement andstress, has been retained. There were noobjections, although, like § 193.2189,commenters pointed out therequirements were covered byreferenced standards.

Section 193.2195, Penetrations, hasbeen revised substantially. Practicallyall commenters objected to the proposedprohibition of penetratfons below theliquid level They pointed out many prosand cons for top and bottomconnections. Although top connectionswere viewed as perhaps inherentlysafer, it was argued they pose otherproblems: submerged pumps in the tank,which would require means ofwithdrawaLwith associated hazards topersonnel, the tank structure and roofwould require strengthening; the roofcould be exposed to spills; a greaternumber of pumps would be required dueto pump design limitations; and highvoltage power would have to beprovided for pump motors. Mostcommenters, including the TPSSC,stated that side penetrations could bedesigned to be at least as strong as thetank shell or stronger. Some commentersand the TPSSC felt such connectionsshould be permitted if suitable safetyprecauti6ns were provided.

Accordingly, MTB now requires tanksto be designed with penetrations inaccordance with API 620, includingAppendix Q, providing an analysis ismade of all contributing forces, and thatan internal shutoff valve be provided onall penetrations below the liquid level.

Paragraph (d) has been added toestablish separate design requirementsfor penetrations of LNG storage tankshaving a capacity of 70,000 gallons orless because of the special design andquality control of such tanks.

Because of the requirement that aninternal shutoff valve be provided on allpenetrations below the liquid level, theFinal Evaluation shows that § 193.2057would have a major cost impact ascompared to the baseline regulatorystandard, NFPA 59A (1975 edition). TheMTB believes that because penetrationsbelow the liquid level in the storage tankexpose the facility to a high risk offailure, an internal shutoff valve is anecessary requirement to protect againstsuch an event. The cost of an internalshutoff valve when compared to theconsequences of a spill through thebottom penetration of an LNG storagetank is clearly seen to be justified.

Section 1932197, Internal designpressure, drew many comments, largelydue to misunderstanding of the intentand the wording of the section. The MTBrecognizes that consideration must begiven to vapor handling equipment.relief devices or other mitigatingmeasures to establish the internaldesign pressure. The section has beenmodified to clearly recognize this. Also,the operator must now "establish"rather than "determine" the designpressure. Paragraph (b](2) no longerstates any cause for rollover.

Section 193.2199, External designpressure, presented the same problemsas § 193.2197 and has likewise beenrevised to clarify the intent.

Most commenters on § 193.2201.Internal temperature, could notunderstand why such a very accuratedetermination of internal temperaturewas necessary. The MTB concurs withthe TPSSC that the LNG tank and tankcomponents be designed for the lowesttemperature which can be attained.

In § 193.2203. Foundations, the secondsentence of (a) has been deleted, as thisis only one design consideration out ofmany. Paragraph (cJ has also beendeleted, as it is redundant with§ 193.2063.

The redundant instrumentationrequirements for all instrumentationhave been revised in § 193.2209.Paragraph (a)(S) has been revised to"abnormal temperature in tankstructure" rather than "excessivethermal stress in tank structure" as it isquestionable whether thermocouplescould provide stress values. Here alsothe different instrumentation requiredfor tanks with a capacity of 70,000gallons or less is now recognized in (b).

As stated in the preamble to theNPRM, MTB agrees with most of the

commenters that § 193.2213wasinadequate in respect to design ofconcrete tanks and that section 42 ofNFPA-59A should be used. After reviewof this section, MTB concurred. Thisrevision drew little comment. However,at the TPSSC meeting, the question wasraised and considerable discussionensued in respect to several referencesin NFPA-59A concerning their validityand which could have possible legaleffects. To date, MTB has been unableto substantiate these claims. It is alsosignificant that in NFPA-59A-1979,these references have been retained.

Section 193.535(d), involving supportsystems, now permits an airspacebetween the tank bottom or itsfoundation, If designed to withstandforces caused by the ignition of acombustible vaporcioud in this space.The MTB believes such a design wouldprovide adequate safety. Onecommenter presented a detailedimdependent study showing such adesign is feasible.

Paragraph (b) of § 193.2219, Internalpiping, has been deleted asMTB agreesthat the availability of internal excessflow valves for LNG is questionable atthis time, and they could provide a falsesense of security, as in most cases onlya complete rupture of a line would makethem operable.

Design of Transfer Systems§ 193.2223(c), the term "cryogenic

temperatures," has been changed to "intransfer systems for LNG or flammablerefrigerants" for clarity. Paragraph d)has also been revised, asrecognizes that a cooling medium mustbe used to precool piping prior to normaloperation of transfering cold fluids.

Section 193.2225 has been deletedbecause it is redundant with similarrequirements in other sections.

As previously stated, all sectionsdealing with valves have beenreorganized so that they morespecifically apply to the subpart inwhich they appear. This is the case in§ 193.2233, which deals with shutoff -valves in transfer systems.

Subpart D-ConstructionSection 193.2305, Procedures, now has

more appropriate wording in (a] becauseof the deletion of the term "criticalprocess."

Although no commenters objected tothe intent, the TPSSC stated it wasunreasonable that this requirement beapplicable to all components, andshould apply only to those componentswhich affect safety. The MIB feels thatan operator would have writtenspecifications, procedures, anddrawings, as appropriate, for all

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components in any case, and cannotforesee any undue hardship because ofthis requirement. /

Section 193.1009 ;n the NPRM, dealingwith qualification of personnel, is now§ 193.2705 in Subpart H-PersdnnelQualifications and Training.

Section 193.2307(c), Inspection, hasbeen revised for clarity and to usegenerally accepted terminology.

Section 193.2313(f), Welding, has beendeleted because a requirement forcapture and disposal of contaminantswould have been redundant with othersections of this part. This was suggestedby TPSSC and commenters.

Because of several comments on§ 193.2315(a)(2), joining of copper pipingby brazing is permitted only innonflammable service. It was pointedout that such joints will fail rapidly ifexposed to fire. In (b), 0.63 was changedto 0.003 to correct a typographical error.Section 193.2315(d) has been revised torequire that compression:type couplingsmust meet the requirements of ANSIB31.3. The MTB is satisfied that theserequirements provide for safe use ofsuch couplings under the conditionsestablished in that standard. Paragraphs(e) and (f), taken from paragraphs 6-3.1.1 and 6-3.2.4 of NFPA 59A, havebeen added to afford a greater degree ofsafety.

In § -193.2319, Strength tests, MTBrecognizes that pneumatic testing isrequired for certain LNG facility pipingand that such testing has been carriedout as accepted practice at lower levels -than that required for hydrostatic testingbecause of possible hazards to propertyand personnel. Paragraph 1b) has beenrevised accordingly and should beconsistent with the suggestions of thecommenters and the TPSSC. Paragraphs(a)(3) and (4) have been deleted, asthese forces are provided for in design,and strength tests for weight of ice orsnow and environmental forces such asseismic or wind cannot be practicallyaccomplished.

Section 193.2321, Nondestructive tests,is virtually unchanged, despite thecomments to the ANPRM and NPRM.The MTB believes the required testingprovides for safer installations, and hasexpressed its views in detail in thepreamble of the NPRM. The TPSSCconsidered this section to be feasible,reasonable, and practical as written.Paragraph (d) .was modified and (e) wasadded to recognize and differentiatebetween the aptlicable codes for lowand high pressure tanks.

The Final Evaluation shows that§ 193.2321 would have a major costimpact as compared to the baselineregulatory standard, NFPA 59A (1975edition). The MTB believes that the

additional testing, which would be doneby personnel already at the site, can bejustified because of the importance ofassuring that piping welds be sound andnot affecthe integrity of the pipe. TheMTB believes that it is vitally importantthat all piping welds be tested, ratherthan 30 percent as set forth in thebaseline regulatory standard. Thecurrent NFPA 59A (1979 edition) hasrevised this standard so that it is similarto § 193.2321. A discussion of the currentNFPA 59A standard for nondestructivetests is also discussed in the FinalEvaluation.

The MTB has revised § 193.2327,Storage tank tests, so as not to requirethat an LNG tank be filled with water toits maximum liquid level. As themaximum density of LNG is less thanhalf that 6f water, a tank and its.foundation would have to be designed tocarry the weight of water involved forthe duration of the test and not for theweights involved for the rest of the lifeof the tank. Many of the commentspointed out other factors such asoverloading and possible long-rangefailure of the insulation under the tank,and possible need for piling offoundation to carry the weight of water.The TPSSC states such a test would notbe reasonable or practical, as it wouldnot achieve objectives expressed bystaff. Most commenters objected to thepreamble statement in the NPRM thatoverstressing of materials andfoundation should mitigate the onerousaspects of this test, stating that fewoperators would risk such overstressing.It was also pointed out that the 100percent radiographic testing of all welds,as well as other tests normally carriedout, would ensure the integrity of theupper portion of the tank, which issubject to low stress levels in any case.

The MTB has therefore revised§ 193.2327, requiring tests be inaccordance with API 620, Appendix Q,for tank§ with internal design pressuresof not more than 15 psig; and in

-accordance with Section VIII of theASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.It must be pointed out that, inaccordance with API 620, if groundbearing or the foundation providessufficient support, the storage tankwould have to befilled with water to the-limits of that support.

Subpart E-EquipmentVaporization Equipment. Consistent

with the revisions of other sections ofthis part, MAOP has been replaced byMAWP in § 193.2405. " -

In § 193.2407, Operational control,some of the monitoring devices requiredin (a) weie not feasible or needed, suchas'inlet and outlet temperature of

heating medium fluids. The paragraphhas been revised to require onlypertinent information. Gas leaving thevaporizer is now termed vaporized gas,to distinguish It from natural gas whichmay be used as the heating medium.

Section 193.2411, Relief devices, hasbeen revised to reference § 193,2429 Inits entirety as It is now written.

Liquefaction EquipmentThe MTB agrees that § 193.807,

Contaminants. hi the NPRM, is anoperating problem not related to safety,and consequently this section las beandeleted.

Some commenters stated that§ 193.2421, Cold boxes, did not recognizethat some cold boxes operate ilth agaseous atmosphere rather than air orinert gas. The MTB has revised thissection to provide requirements for thedifferent atmospheres which may bemaintained in a cold box.

Control SystemsBased on the opinions of commenters

and the TPSSC, MTP agrees that allsignal lines installed for control systemsneed not be routed separately, asrequired by § 193.2427(d). Such separaterouting is now required only on thoselines.that can affect the operation of acomponent that does not fail safe.

Section 193.2429, Relief devices, nowconsolidates all requirements in respectto relief devices, pressure and vacuum,and is referenced in sections where suchrequirements are applicable. A numberof changes have been made, such as therequirement that introduction of airunder excess vacuum conditions mustnot create a flammable mixture, TheMTB recognizes that such introductionof air through a vacuum relief wouldprobably create such a mixture at theinterface of the LNG vapor and air, butthat (1) there would be no source ofignition and (2) such admission wouldprevent a possible catastrophic failure.

The MTB believes this, with otherchanges made, retains the basic intentof the section, yet resolves the problemscommenters and the TPSSC had withthe original wording.

Section 193.917 ofthe NPRM, Shutoffvalves, more properly dealt with, and 1snow § 193.2125, automatic shutoffvalves. An automatic shutoff valvewould include the valve controller. Thiswould meet the TPSSC objection thatthe controller (and the valve) be fail-safe, rather than the valve itself.

Section 193.2439 deals only withemergency shutdown control systems,rather than all systems, many dealingwith operations having no connectionwith safety. The TPSSC and othercommenters stated that § 193.605 of the

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No, 29 [Monday, February 11, 1980 /Rules and Regulations3

NPRM was unnecessary, and urged that-the appropriate requirements should'beincorporated in I 198.243g. This hasbeen done. It was pointed out thatparagraph (a]4) of the NPR, requiringshutdown based on the failure of acomponent, would be a requirement thatis too general and-undefined. The new(a)(5) more properly states theconditions. Also, as suggested by theTPSSC, 25 percent in (a)(41 has beenchanged to 40 percent to be consistentwith the requirement in § 193.2439(a](4).

Based on the recommendation of theTPSSC and others, § 193.2445 has beenrevised to require two sources of powerfor emergency lighting, not all lighting.This is defined in the National ElectricalCode as "illumination essential fursafety to life and property."

Subpart H-Personnel Qualificationsand Training

This new subpart is a result of thecoordination betweer MTB and USCGin developing a common numberingsystem for the two agencies' regulationswhich would make both sets ofregulations easier for the public tounderstand.

All sections pertaining to personnelqualifications and training will beconsolidated in this subpart.

At present, only two sections areincluded, § 193.2703, dealing withdesign, and § 193.2705, dealing withconstruction. Others will be added asthe balance of Part 193 is adopted.

The wording suggested by the TPSSCis being used in § 193.2703 as moreproperly expressing the intent

Section 193.1009(b) of the NPRM hasbeen deleted, as MTB agrees withcommenters and-the TpSSG that use ofqualification tests for all activities isunwarranted.

Acknowledgements: Valuabletechnical assistance has been providedin the development of this regulatoryproceeding by Mr. MichaelAnuskiewicz, consultant. Albany, NewYork. n addition, Mr. James Devine,Deputy Director, Office of EarthquakeStudies of the U.S. Geological Survey,and Mr. James Cooper, StructuralResearch Engineer, Federal HighwayAdministration, have assisted in thedevelopment of the requirements forseismic investigation for design. Staffmembers of the Federal EnergyRegulatory Commission were ofconsiderable assistance in conductingsome studies for the Final Evaluation ortthe consequences of a spill with regardto the requirements on vapor clouddispersion and thermal radiation.Additionally, MTB personnel haveconferred with operators, constructorsof LNG facilities, and other technical

branches of government, and haveresearched and studied many technicalreports, codes, and data.

Of particular assistance in thepreparation of these rules were thecomments and report provided by theTPSSC as a result of a meeting held onJune 12-15, 1979; in Boston,Massachusetts. Also, a conference heldon April 24 and 25, 1979, in Washington,D.C., with various industry and publicrepresentatives to discuss the proposedseismic, vapor dispersion, thermalradiation, and wind force requirementswas of considerable assistance to vTB.Finally, MTB thanks all of thecommenters for the information andcomments that were used in shapingthese final rules.

Issued in Washigton. D.C.. o January 30,1980.L D. Santman,Director, Materials Transportation Bureau.

Title 49, Code of Federal Regulationsis amended by adding a new Part 193 toread as follows:

PART 193-LIQUEFIED NATURALGASFACILITIES- FEDERAL SAFETYSTANDARDS

Subpart A-GeneralSec.193.2001 Scope ofpart.193.2003 Semisolid facilities.193.2005 Applicability.193.2007 Definitions.193.2009 Rules of regulatory construction.193.2011 Reporting.193.2013 Incorporation.by reference.193.2015 Petition for finding or approval.

Subpart B.-Site Related DesignRequirements193.2051 Scope.193.2055 General.193.2057 Thermal radiation protection.193.2059 Flammable vapor-gas dispersion

protection.193.2061 Seismic investigation and design

forces.193.2063 Flooding.193.2065 Soil characteristics.193.2067 Wind forces.193.209 Other severe weather and natural

conditions.193.207- Adjacent activities.193.2073 Separation of facilitie&

Subpart C-Design193.2101 Scope.

Materials193.2103 General.193.2105 Extreme temperatures; normal

operations.193.2107 Extreme temperatures, emergency

conditions.193.2109 Insulation.193.2111 Cold boxes.193.2113 Piping.193.2115 Concrete subject to cryogenic

temperatures.

sec.193.2117 Combustible materials.1932119 Records.

Design of Components and Buildings

193212119321231932125193.2127193.21291932131193.21331932135193213719321391932141193214319321451932147

General.Valves.Automatic shutoffvalves.Piping.Piping attachments and supports.Building design.Buildings; ventilation.Expansion or contractionFrost heave.Ice and snow.Electrical systems.UghtnTgBoilers andpressure vessel.Combustion engines and turbines.

Impoundment Design and Capacity1932149 Impoundment required.1932151 General design characteristics.1932153 Classes of impounding systems.1932155 Structural requirements.1932157 Coatings and coverings.1932159 Floors.1932161 Dikes, general.1932163 Vapor barriers-1932165 Dike dimensions.1932167 Covered systems.1932169 Gas leak detection.1932171 Sump basins1932173 Water removal.1932175 Shared impoundment1932179 Impoundment capacity, general.1932151 Impoundment capacity, LNG

storage tanks.1932183 Impoundment capacity: equipment

and transfer facilities.1932185 Impoundment capacity-, parking

areas, portable vessels.

LNG Storage Tanks1932187 General.1932189 Loading forces.1932191 Stratification.1932193 Movement and stress.1932195 Penetrations.1932197 Internal design pressure.1932199 External design pressure.193.2201 Internal temperature.193.2203 Foundation.193.22M5 Frost heave.193220, - Insulation.1932M9 Instrumentation for LNG storage

tanks.1932211 Metal storage tanks.193.2213 Concrete storage tanks193.2215 Thermal barriers.193.2217 Support system.193.2219 Internal piping.193.2221 Marking.

Design of Transfer Systems193.2223 GeneraL193.2227 Backflow.193.2229 Cargo transfer systems.193.2231 Cargo transfer area.193.2233 Shutoffvalves.

Subpart D-Constructforr193.2301 Scope.193.2303 Construction acceptance.193.2305 Procedures.193.2307 Inspectionm1932309 Inspection and testingmethods193.2311 Cleanup.

• I

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9204 'Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 J Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

* Sec.193.2313193.2315193.2317193.2319193.2321193.2323193.2325193.2327193.2329

Pipe welding.Pipifig connectiohs.Retesting.Strength tests.Nondestructive testsLeak tests.Testing control systeStorage tank tests.Construction records

Subpart E-Equipment193.2401 Scope.

Vaporization Equipment

193.2403 Gineral.193.2405 Vaporizer desi193.2407 Operational co193.2409 Shutoff valves.193.2411 Relief devices.193.2413 Combustion ai

gn.

ntrol.

r intal

Liquefaction Equipment

193.2415 General.193.2417 Control of incoming193.2419 Backflow.193.2421 Cold boxes.193.2423 Air in gas.193.2425 Equipment supports.

Control Systems

193.2427 General.193.2429 Relief devices.193.2431 Vents.193.2433 Sensing devices.193.2435 Warning devices.193.2437 Pump and compress193.2439 Emergency shutdow

systems..193.2441 Control center.193.2443 Failsafe control.193.2445 Sourdes of power.

Subpart F [Reserved)Subpart G [Reserved]

Subpart H-Personnel QualificTraining193.2701 -Scope.193.2703 Design and fabricati193.2705 Construction, installs

inspection, and testing.

Appendix A to Part 193-Incopby Reference

I. List of organizations and adcI. Documents Incorporated by

AuthQrity: 49 U.S.C. 1671 et s1.53, Appendix A of Part 1, andof Part 106.

Subpart A-General

§ 193.2001 Scope of parL

(a) This part prescribes sastandards for LNG facilitiestransportation of gas by pipsubject to the Natural Gas ISafety Act of 1968 and Partchapter.

(b) This part does not app(1) LNG facilities used by

consumers of LNG or natur

- (2) LNG facilities used in the course ofnatural gas treatment or hydrocarbonextraction which do not store LNG.

(3) In the-case of a marine cargotransfer system and associated facilities,any matter peitaining to the system orfacilifies between the marine vessel and

eros. the last manifold (or in the absence of aS.- manifold, the last valve) located

immediately before a storage tank.(4) Any LNG facility located in

navigable waters (as defined in Section3(8) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.796(8)).

§ i93.2003 Semisolid facilities.An LNG facility used in the

transportation or storage of LING in aces. semisolid state need not comply with

any requirement of this part which theDirector finds impractical orunnecessary because of the semisolid

gas. state of LNG. In making such a finding,the Director may impose appropriatealternative safety conditions.§ 193.2005 Applicability

(a) New or amended standards in thispart governing the siting, design,installation, or construction of an LNGfacility and related personnelqualifications and training do not applyto-

or control. (1) LNG facilities under constructionn control before the date such standards are

published; or(2) LNG facilities for which an

application for approval of the siting,construction, or operation was file~dbefore March 1, 1978, with theDepartment of Energy (or anypredecessor organization of that

:ations and Department) or the appropriate State orlocal agency in the case of any facilitynot subject to the jurisdiction of the

on. Department of Energy under the Naturalation, Gas Act (not including any facility the

construction of which began afterNovember 29, 1979, not pursuant to such

oration an approval).(b) If an LNG facility listed in

Iresses. paragraph (a) of this section is replaced,Reference relocated, or significantly altered after

February11, 1980, the replacement,eq.; 49 CFR relocated facility, or significantly alteredAppendix A facility must comply with the applicable

requirements of this part governingsiting, design, installation, andconstruction, except that--

(1) The siting requirements apply onlyto relocations of LNG storage tanks and

* to any replacement or significantused in the alteration of LNG storage tanks thateline that is increases the storage capacity of thePipeline original facility; and192 of this (2) To-the extent compliance with the

design, installation, and constructionily to- requirements would make the ieplaced;ultimate relocated, or altered facilityal gas.

incompatible with other facilities orwould otherwise be impracticable, thereplaced, relocated, ox. significantlyaltered facilitymay be designed,installed, or constructed in accordancewith the original specifications for thefacility, or in a manner that the Directorfinds acceptable.

(c) The siting, design, Installation, andconstruction of an LNG facility that isunder construction before February 11,1980, or that is listed in paragraph (a)(2)of this section must meet the applicablerequirements of § 192.12 of this chapter.

§ 193.2007 Definitions.As used in this part-"Ambient vaporizer" means a

vaporizer which derives heat fromnaturally occurring heat sources, such asthe atmosphere, sea water, surfacewaters, or geothermal waters.

"Cargo transfer system" means acomponent, or system of componentsfunctioning as a unit, used exclusivelyfor transferring hazardous fluids In bulkbetween a tank car, tank truck, ormarine vessel and a storage tank,

"Component" means an LNG facilityfor controlling, processing, or containinghazardous fluids or to provide safety.

"Container" means a component otherthan piping that contains a hazardousfluid.

"Control system" means a component,or system of components functioning asa unit, including control valves andsensing, warning, relief, shutdown, andother control devices, which is activatedeither manually or automatically toestablish or maintain the performance of

-another component. '"Controllable emergency" means an

emergency where reasonable andprudent action can prevent harm topeopld or property.

"Design pressure" means the pressureused In the design of components for thepurpose of determining the minimumpermissible thickness or physicalcharacteristics of its various parts.When applicable, static head shall beincluded in the design pressure todetermine the thickness of any specificpart.

"Determine"'means make anappropriate investigation using scientificmethods, reach a decision based onsound engineering judgment, and beable to demonstrate the basis of thedecision.

"Dike" means the perimeter of animpounding space forming a barrier toprevent liquid from flowing in anunintended direction.

"Director" means Director of theMaterials Transportation Bureau or anyperson to whom authority in the matterconcerned has been delegated.

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

"Emergency" means a deviation fromnormal operation, a structural failure, orsevere environmental conditions thatprobably would cause harm to people orproperty.

"Exclusion zone" means an areasurrounding an LNG facility in which anoperator or government agency legallycontrols all activities in accordance with§ 193.2057 and § 193.2059 for as long asthe facility is in operation.

"Fail-safe" means a design featurewhich will maintain or result in a safecondition in the event of malfunction orfailure of a power supply, component, orcontrol device.

"g" means the standard accelerationof gravity of 9.806 metre per second 2

(32.17 feet per second2)."Gas," except when designated as

inert, means natural gas, otherflammable gas, or gas which is toxic orcorrosive.

"Hazardous fluid" means gas orhazardous liquid.

"Hazardous liquid" means LNG or aliquid that is flammable or toxic.

"Heated vaporizer" means a vaporizerwhich derives heat from other thannaturally occurring heat sources.

"Impounding space" means a volumeof space formed by dikes and floorswhich is designed to confine a spill ofhazardous liquid.

"Impounding system" includes animpounding space, including dikes andfloors for conducting the flow of spilledhazardous liquids to an impoundingspace.

"Liquefied natural gas" or "LNG"means natural gas or synthetic gashaving methane (CI-L) as its majorconstituent which has been changed to aliquid or semisolid.

"LNG facility" means a pipeline"facility that is used irf the process ofliquefying or solidfying natural gas orsynthetic gas or transferring, storing, orvaporizing liquefied natural gas.

"LNG'plant" means an LNG facility orsystem of LNG facilities functioning as aunit.

"M3 " means a volumetric unit whichis one cubic metre, 6.2898 barrels,35.3147 fL, or 264.1720 U.S. gallons, eachvolume being considered as equal to theother.

"Maximum allowable workingpressure" means the maximum gagepressure permissible at the top of theequipment, containers or pressurevessels while operating at designtemperature.

"Normal operation" meansfunctioning within ranges of pressure,temperature, flow, or other operatingcriteria required by this part.

"Operator" means a person who ownsor operates an LNG facility.

"Person" means any individual, firm,joint venture, partnership, corportation,association, state, municipality,cooperative association, or joint stockassociation and includes any trustee,receiver, assignee, or personalrepresentative thereof.

"Pipeline facility" means new andexisting piping, rights-of-way, and anyequipment, facility, or building used inthe transportation of gas or in thetreatment of gas during the course oftransportation.

"Piping" means pipe, tubing, hoses,fittings, valves, pumps, connections,safety devices or related components forcontaining the flow of hazardous fluids.

"Storage tank" means a container forstoring a hazardous fluid, including anunderground cavern.

"Transfer piping" means a system ofpermanent and temporary piping usedfor transferring hazardous fluidsbetween any of the following:liquefaction process facilities, storagetanks, vaporizers, compressors, cargotransfer systems, and facilities otherthan pipeline facilities.

'Transer system" includes transferpiping and cargo transfer system.

"Vaporization" means an addition ofthermal energy changing a liquid orsemisolid to a vapor or gaseous state.

"Vaporizer" means a heat transferfacility designed to introduce thermalenergy in a controlled manner forchanging a liquid or semisolid to a vaporor gaseous state.

§ 193.2009 Rules of regulatoryconstruction.

(a) As used in this part-(1) "Includes" means including but not

limited to;(2) "May" means is permitted to or is

authorized to;(3) "May not" means is not permitted

to or is not authorized to; and(4) "Shall" or "must" is used in the

mandatory and imperative sense.(b) In this part-

.(1) Words importing the singularinclude the plural: and

(2) Words importing the plural includethe singular.

§ 193.2011 Reporting.Leaks and spills of LNG must be

reported in accordance with therequirements of Part 191 of this chapter.

§ 193.2013 Incorporation by reference.(a) There are incorporated by

reference in this Part all materialsreferred to in this Part that are not setforth in full. The incorporated materialsare deemed published under 5 U.S.C.552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51 and are part ofthis regulation as though set forth in full.

All incorporated materials are listed inAppendix A to this Part 193 with theapplicable editions in parenthesesfollowing the title of the referencedmaterial. Only the latest listed editionapplies, except that an earlier listededition may be followed with respect tocomponents which are designed.manufactured, or installed inaccordance with the earlier editionbefore the latest edition is adopted,unless otherwise provided in this part.The incorporated materials are subjectto change, but any change will beannounced by publication in the FederalRegister before it becomes effective.

(b) All incorporated materials areavailable for inspection in the MaterialsTransportation Bureau, U.S. Departmentof Transportation, 400 Seventh Street,SW., Washington, D.C. 20590, ancl at theOffice of the Federal Register Library.1100 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C. Inaddition, copies of the incorporatedmaterials are available from therespective organizations listed inAppendix A to this Part 193.

(c) Incorporated by referenceprovisions approved by the Director ofthe Federal Register, February 4.1980.

§ 193.2015 Petitions for finding orapproval.

Where a rule in this part authorizesthe Director to make a finding orapproval, any operator may petition theDirector to make such finding orapproval. Petitions must be sent to theDirector, Material TransportationBureau, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,Washington, D.C. 20590, and be receivedat least 90 days before the operatorrequests that the finding or approval bemade. Each petition must refer to therule.authorizing the action sought andcontain information or arguments thatjustify the action. Unless otherwisespecified, no public proceeding is heldon a petition before it is granted ordenied. The Director notifies thepetitioner of the disposition of eachpetition.Subpart B-Site-Related Design

Requirements

§ 193.2051 Scope.This subpart prescribes site-related

requirements for the design of thefollowing LNG facilities: containers andtheir impounding systems, transfersystems and their impounding systems,emergency shutdown control systems,fire control systems, and associatedfoundations, support systems, andnormal or auxiliary power facilitiesnecessary to maintain safety.

9205

9206 -Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 .1 Monday, February 1L -1980 j1 Rules and Regulations

193,2055 General.An LNG facility must be located at a

site of suitable -size, topography, andconfiguration-so that the facility can bedesigned to minimize the hazards topersoxis and offsite property resultingfrom leaks and.spills .of LNG an'd otherhazardousluids at the site. In selectinga site, each operator shaHl determine allsite-related characteristics which couldjeopardize the integrity and security ofthe facility. A site must provide ease ofaccess so thatpersonnel. equipment.and materials from offsite locations canreach the site for fire'fighting orcontrollingspill associated hazards orfor evacuation ofpersonnel.

§ 193.2057 Thermal radiation protection.(a).Thermalaxclusion zone. Each

LNG container and LNG transfersystemmust have a thermal exclusion zone inaccordance with the following:

[1) Within the thermal exclusion zone,the impounding system may not belocated closer to targets listed inparagraph (d) of 1hfis section than theexclusion distance "'d" determined

according to thi-sseCtion. unless the'target is an LNGlIacility of the operator.1 (2) If grading anddrainage are.msedunder § 193.2149fb). operators mustcomply with'theaequirements of thissection by assuming thespace neededfor drainage and olectionof spilledliquid is an impoundingsystem.

fb) Measurment. The -exclusiondistance "d" is measuredazlong the line(PT), assbownin the followingimpoundmentadigram, where thefollowing apply:o (1) Tis a pointon the target halis

closest lto(IP).f2) D is a point closest to M on the

lop inside edge of he innermost dike.13) 0 is one of the following angles.

with the vertical, to account for flametilt and potential preignition vaporformation:

fi) An assumed angle o11B=45% orIiji An angle determined in

accordance with a mathematical mnidelthat meets The criteria ofparagraA h(c)[2) of this section, using he maximumwind speed hat is exceeded less than 5percent of the time-based on recordeddata for the area..

-(4) L is one of the following lengths toaccounLfor flame .heightb

1i) Anassumed lengthof,(L)=6A/r5 where (A) is the horizontal area

across the impounding space measuredat the lowest point along the top Insideedge of the-dike;,or

ii A length determined Inaccordancowith a mathematical model-that meetsthe criteria of paragraph I(c)(2) of thissection, using appropriate parametersconsistent with the time period-that atarget could be subjected to exposurbbefore harm would resulL

(5) PD is a line of length (L) or less,lying at angle 0 in the vertical plane thatintersects points {DJ and IT).

(6). PT is a line lying In the verticalplane of line (PD), that:

i) Is perpendicular to line (PD) when(PD) is less 'than(L);or

(ii) Has an angular elevation notabove the horizontal at (P) when (PD)equals (L);

(7) P is the point where (PTr and (PD)intersect.

72>a-\

IMPOUNDMENTT

PLAN

- 'Pia oPrstr yTN,

0 =.90' o. 1tOr~,(jivn-)-H0P.ZOF4TAL)

IMPOUNDMENT & TPOPOGRAP1Y

F- LEVATfION> PAOF|IE

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

(c) Exclusion distancelength of an exclusion di:impounding space may nthe distance "d" determihaccordance-with one of t

(1) d=(f)(A] ° ' , whereA=the largest horizon

the impounding space melowest point along the tothe dike.

f=values for targets prparagraph (d) of this sect

(2) .Determine "d" frommathematical model forradiation and other apprcharacteristics which assincident thermal flux leve(d) of this section are notmodel must:

(i) Use atmospheric cotif applicable, result inlondistances than other atmconditions occurring at leof the time based on recothe site area;

(ii) Have been evaluateby testing at a scale, conseffects, appropriate for thapplication;

(iii) Have been submittDirector for approval; widata as necessary to demvalidity, and

(iv) Have received appDirector.

(d) Limiting values forradiant flux on offsite taimaximum incident radiaioffsite target from burninin an impounding space nto the distances in paragsection using the followin"(f)" or "Incident Flux":

Offsite target

(1) Outdoor areas occupied by 20or more persons duing normaluse, such as beaches, play-grounds, outdoor theaters, otherrecreation ares or other placesof public assembl

(2) Buildings that are used for resi-denoes, or occupied by 20 ormore persons during normaluse_

(3) Buildings made of cetlutosicmaterials or are not fire resis-tant or do not provide durableshielding from thermal radiationthat (@ Have exceptional value,or contain objects of exception-al value based on historiuniqueness described in Feder.al, State, or local registers; 0Contain explosive, fammable.or lo~dc materials in hazardousquantites; or (i) Could result inadditional hazard If eposed tohigh levels of thermal radiation-

length. Thestance for eachot be less thanned inhe following:

tal area acrosseasured at thep inside edge of

escribed in

Ofsite target (0 Incident ourElt.'hour

(4) Structures that are fie rea,-tant and provide &abge ahield-log from thermal radellon thethave the chacteistics d-scroed in subivoons (3)through (3)(Xi) above - (1.1) 5,700

(S) Public st"ets h~ighas andmarkno of rak&eds- . (1.1) 6.700

(6) Other structures, or V clser to(P), the properly lne 01 the fa.city (0.8) 1.000

Ion. § 193.2059 Flammable vapor-gas* a dispersion protection.hermal (a) Dispersion exclusion zone. Exceptopriate fire as provided by paragraph (e) of thisures that the section, each LNG container and LNG

els in paragraph transfer system must have a dispersiont exceeded. The exclusion zone with a boundary

described by the minimum dispersion

nditions which, distance computed in accordance withthis section. The follcwing areiger exclusion prohibited in a dispersion exclusion

ospheric zone unless it is an LNG facility of theeast 95 percent operator.

irded data for (1) Outdoor areas occupied by 20 or

more persons during normal use, such ased and verified beaches, playgrounds, outdoor theaters,sidering scaling other recreation areas, or other places ofhe range of public assembly.

(2) Buildings that are:ed to the (i) Used for residences;th supportive (ii) Occupied by 20 or more personstonstrate during normal use;

(iii) Contain explosive, flammable, ortoxic materials in hazardous quantities;

royal by the (iv) Have exceptional value or containobjects of exceptional value based on

incident historic uniqueness described ingets. The Federal, State, or local registers; ornt flux at an (v) Could result in additional hazard ifg of a total spill exposed to a vapor-gas cloud.nust be limited (b) Measuring dispersion distance.aph (c) of this The dispersion distance is measuredg values of radially from the inside edge of an

impounding system along the groundcontour to the exclusion zone boundary.

(0 Incident f (c) Computing dispersion distance. Aat/='o minimum dispersion distance must be

computed for the impounding system. Ifgrading and drainage are used under§ 193.2149(b), operators must complywith the requirements of this section by

(3) 1,6W assuming the space needed for drainageand collection of spilled liquid is animpounding system. Dispersion distance

(1.6) - 4.000 must be determined in accordanceowiththe following dispersion parameters,using applicable parts of themathematical model in Appendix B ofthe report, "Evaluation of LNGVaporControl Methods," 1974, or a model forvapor dispersion which meets therequirements of subdivisions (ii) through(iv) in § 193.2057(c)(2):

(1) Average gas concentration in1.) 4.o0 air = 2.5 percent.

(2) Dispersion conditions are a

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9208 Federal Register /'Vol: 45; No. 29 [ Mbnday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

combination of those which result in "longer predicted downwind dispersiondistances than other .weather conditionsat the site at least 90 percent of the time,based on U.S. Government weatherdata, or as an alternative where themodel used gives longer distances atlower wind speeds, Category Fatmosphere, wind speed -, 4.5 miles perhour, relative humidity eqdials 50.0percent, and atmospherictemperatures = 0.0 C.

(3) Dispersion coordinates y, z, and H,where applicable, = 0.

(d) Vaporization design rate. Incomputing dispersion distance underparagraph (c) of this section, thefollowing applies:

(1) Vaporization results from the spillcaused by an assumed rupture of asingle 'transfer pipe (or multiple pipesthat lack provisions to prevent parallelflow) which has the greatest overallflow capacity, discharging at maximumpotential capacity, in accordance withthe following conditions:

(i) The rate of vaporization is not lessthan the sum of flash vaporization andvaporization from boiling by heattransfer from contact surfaces during thEtime necessary for spill detection,instrument response, and sequencedshutdown by thb automatic shutdownsystem, but not less than 10 minutes,plus, in the case of side or bottompenetrations, any additional timenecessary for the differential headacting on the opening to reach zero.

(ii) In determining variations in •vaporization rate due to surface contactthe time necessary td wet 100 percent ofthe impounding floor area shall bedetermined by equation C-9 in thereport "Evaluation of LNG VaporControl Methods," 1974, or an alternatemodel which meets the requirements ofsubdivisions (ii) through (iv) in§ 193.2057(c)(2).

(iii) After spill flow is terminated, therate of vaporization is vaporization ofthe remaining spillage, if any, fromboiling by heat transfer from contactsurfaces that are reducing in area andtemperature as a function of time.

(iv) Vapor detention space is all spaceprovided for liquid impoundment andvapor detention outside the componentserved, less the volume occupied by thespilled liquid at the time the vaporescapes the vapor detention space.

(2) The boiling rate of LNG on whichdispersion distance is based isdetermined using the weighted averagevalue of the thermal properties of thecontact surfaces in the impoundingspace determined from-eight

representative experimental tests on thematerials involved. If surfaces areinsulated, the insulation must -bedesigned, installed. and maintained sothat it'will retain 1is performance

,characteristics under spillconditions.fe) Planned-vaporc ntrol. An ING

facility need not haven dispersionexclusion zone if The flirector finds -that'compliance with paragraph 1a) ofthis.section would -be impractical .and theoperator prepares and follows a plan forcontrolling LNG'vapor that is foundacceptable by the Director.'The planmust include circumstances =nderwl ichLNG-vaparis confrolled'to preclude zthedispersion a fa -eaie -on ixture fromthe LING facility rnderall predictableenvironmental conditions that couldadrersely affect contro'l. The reliabilityof 1&e method of control must bedemonstrated by tesUig or experiencewith ING spills.

§ 193.2061 'SesmicInvestigafionanddesign iorces.

fa) Except !or shop f'bicatedstorage'tanks of70',ODDgallons or less capacitymounled within 2 feet of the ground, ifan' NG faciity is lcaed t aslte inZone 0 or 1 of the "SeismicRiskMap odfthe United States" UIBC, each operatorshall .determine, based onaazsudy offatilts,luydrologic regime, and soilconditions, whethera polential exists atthe site for surface lanlting or soilJiguelaction.

[(b Subject to paragraph 'i of :thissection, ING facilities must bedesignedand built lo e itshtana, 3ithout lass o' tructiinal ir'mnctionalintE.grity. Tefollowing selsmicdesign forces., as.applicable

(1j For LNG facilities (other 'than shopfabricated storage tanks of,7o,0o0gallons or less capatymounted within21eetoft eground) locatedata.siteliPuerto Rico inZone 2,;3, or4 of the"Seismic Risk Map of the BnitedStates,-"or ata site Oetermined underparagraph t[a) of This section to haveapotential for surface faulting or soilliquefaction, the forces that couldxeasonably be expected to occur-at ,theJouniationof the facility dueto 'the mostcritical grounfdmotion. motionitmplificaion, permanent aifferentialground 'displacement, soil aiguefaction,dnd-symmetric and assymmretricreaction forces xesulting fromhydrodynamic pressure and motion ofcontained liguid in interaction with the"facility struclure.

(f2) Forall otherLNG facilities, thetotal lateral 'forces etf orth in U BC,Volume 1corespondingi-o -thezone of

the "Seismic Risk Map of the UnitedStates" in which the facility is located,and a vertical force equal tothe totallateral force.

(cj Each operator ofan LNG facility towhich paragraph fb)[I) of this sectionapplies shall determine .the seismicdesign forces on the basis of a detailed,geolechnical investigation and inaccordance -with paragraphs (d) znd'(eof this section.'The investigation mustinclude each of the following items thatcould reasonably be expected to affectthe site and be sufficient in scope toidentify all hazards that couldreasonably be expected lo affect thefacility design:

[1) dentification and valuation .offaults. Quaternary activity of hosefaults, tectonic structures, static anddynamic properties of materialsunderlying the site, and, as applicable,tectonicprovinces 'within '100 miles ofthe site;

'2j) Identification and evaluation of tllhistorically reported earthquakes whichcould affect the determination under thissection-of the most critical groundmotion or differential displacementatthe site when correlated with particularfaults, tectonic structures, and lectonicprovinces, as applicable,and

(3) Jdentification and evaluation of thehydrologic regime and the potential ofliquefaction-induced 'soil failures.

(d) The most critical ground motionmust be determined in accordance Withparagraph (e) of this section either.,

(1) Probabilistically. when tfieavailable earthquake data are-uffkicentto show that the yearly probability ofiexceedance of most 'critical groundmotion is 10-4or less: or

12] Deterministically. when theavailable earthquake data areinsuTficient to 'provide probabilisticestimates, with the o'bjectilve oTdetermining a most critical groundmotion with a -yearly probability of.exceedance of 10-4 or less.

(e) The determination of most criticalground motion, consideringlocal-andregional seismological conditions, imustbe made by using the following-

()1 A regionally appropriateattenuation relationsbip. assuming Ihatearthquakes occur at a location on a'fault, tectonic-strclure, or leclonicprovince, as applicable which wouldcause the most critical seismicmovement at the site, except ,that whereepicenters of historically Meportedearthquakes cannot be xeasonablyrelated to known faults ur leclonicstructures, but are recognized as beingwithin a specific tertonic province

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 29 /. Monday, February 1 1980 Rules and Regulations 9=

which is Within 100 miles of the site,assume 6 those earthquakes occurwithin their respctive provinces at asou cloet to the site,

(2) hoizotaldesign responsespectrum determined from the meanplus =e andard deviation of a free-field huontal elastic respomze spectrawhose spectral plitudes areconsistent with values expected for themost critica grond modtioz

(3) A vertical design resposespetu thatIs either two-tltirdsaf theamplitude of the horizontalre aspect l -rum atall frequencies orequafto le hurzontal lesign resposespectrum where the site is locatedwithin 20 mjks f & earlhqFaesource.

(f) AaNG str age tank may not belocated at a site where Umnsttgatinunder paragraph (c) of this sectionshws that-

(1) The estimated differentialQuaternary fault dlsplacement within Imile of thetatk foundation exoeeds ODinches;

(2) The estimated desgn horizontalacceleration exac OBg at the tankfoundation or

(3) The potetial for soil liquefactioncannotb abeammodated by deslgn andconstruc in accordance withparagraph (b)(1) of this section.

(g Each container which does nothave a s flly liquid-tight covermust have affcient freeboard with anappropriate configuration to prevent theescape of liquid due to sloshing, waveaction, and vertlca liquid displacementcaused by seismic action.

(a) opeha-erator shall detrmilne theefftsdf o ong n an LNG faitysite based on the worst occurrence in a100-year pez The determination musttake into acc

ft)'Vblume =d velocity of the

(2) Tsuai(local, regional, and

(3) Potential f ailure of dams-,(4) Preditabn land developments

whir-% would affect maciff accumulationof water-and

15) Tidal action.(b) The efCm of flooding determined

une e pah (a) ! this asection mustbe a--cmmodated by locaticn or designand construction, as appl=.able, toreusnuably assurs;

(1) The Vtuctural or functionalintegrity of LNG facilities; and

(2) Access from outside the LNGfacility a movement of personnel andequipment about the LNG facility sitefor the coatrol of fire and otheremergence&

§ 193.2065 Soll charactt(a) Seil nvestigations Including

borings and other appropriate tests mustbemade at the site of each 1MG facilityto deteraie bearing capacity,settlement characteritics, potential forerosion, and other soil characteristlasapplicable to the Integrity of the facility,

(b) The naturallyocc ' aordesigned soil characterlstics at eachLNG facility site must p loadbearing capacities, using appropriatesafety factors, which can support thefollowing loads without excessivelateral or vertical movement that causesa loss of the functional or structuralintegty of the facility involved:

[1) Stat iloading caused by thefacility and is contents and anyhydrostatic testing of the facilty, and

(2) Dynamic loadlnr caused bymovement of contents of the facilityduring normal operation, ncludingf flow,sloshing, and rfl ovear.

§193.20?W in forces(a) LNG facilities must be designed to

withstand without loss of struchral orfunctional integri

(1) The direct efect of wind forcs,(2) The pressure dtentlal between

the interior and exterior mlfa confining,or partially confining, Srue and

(3) Impact fore-and 1 Dtentialpenetrations by wind borne missiles,

(b) The wind fores at te locatin ofthe specific facility must be based onone of the following:

(1) For shop fabricated containers ofLNG or other hamrdous fluids with acapacity of not more than 70,00 gallos,applicable wind load data in ANS A531, 1972 edition,

(2) For all other LNG faciliies-(I) Where adequate wind data are

available, the most critical combinationof wind velocity and duration withrespect to the effect on a structurehaving a probability of exceedance In a50-year period of 0.5 peret ,rless; ,or

(fl) Where adequate ind data areunavailable, an assumed sustained windvelocity of not less than = miles perhour, unless the Director finds a lowervelocity Is justified by adequatesupportive data.

§1932M6 Othersevere wathr ndenat ons.

(a) In addition to the requirements of§J 193.2M9320, 193.2%65, and193.2%07, each operator shall detelinefrom histoaal records and engineeringstudies the worst effec of ther weatherand natural conditions wThich maypredictably occur at an ING facility site.

(b) The factlity mst be located anddesigned so that such severe conditionscannot reasonably be expected to result

in an emergency involving the factorslisted in I 193.2003(b),

(a) Each operator shall determine thatpresent and reasonably foreseeableactivities adjacent to an LNG facilitysite that could adversely affect theoperation of the LNG facility or thesafety of persons or offsite property, ifdamage to the facility occurs,

(b) An LNG facility must not helocated where present or prjectdoffsite actiAties would be reasonablyexpected to-

(1) Adversely affect the operation ofany of Its safety control system

(2) Cause failure of the facty: W(3) Cause the facility nut t meet te

requirements of this part,

Each LNG facffity site must beenough to provide for minimumseparations between facilities andbetween facifties and the site boundryto-

(a) Permit movement of personnelmaintenance aqulI;ent. and emergencyequipment around the facility and

bi Comply with distances specified inSections z-2 throuh 2-27 of NFPA59A

Subpart C-Design

M132101 Scope.This subpart prescribes r ir

for the selection and qualification ofmaterials for components, and for thedesign and installation or constructionof components and buildings. includingseparate requirements for Impoundigsystems, LNG storage ta andtransfer systems.

Materials

§193.2103 Genera,Materials for all components must

be-(a) Able to maintain their strutu

integrity under all design loadings,including applicable environmentaldesign forces under Subpart B of thispart;

[b) Physically, chemically, andthermaly compatible within designlimits with any fluid or other materialswith which they are in contat and

(c) Qualified in accordaace with theapplicable requirements of this subpart.

§ 193.2105 Extreme noperations.

Each operator shall-(a) Determine the range of

temperatures to which components wbe subjected during normal operations,including required testing, initial startup,

9210 Federal Register / VQ. 45, No. 29 /[Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

cooldown operations, and shutdownconditions; and

b) Use component materials thatmeet the design standards of this partfor strength, ductility, and otherproperties throughout the-entire range oftemperatures to'which the componentwill be subjected in normal operations.§ 193.2107 Extreme temperatures,emergency conditions.

(a) Each operator shall determine theeffects on components not normallyexposed to extreme cold (including acomponent's foundation or supportsystem) of contact by LNG or coldrefrigerant that could result from error, aspill, or other emergency determined asrequired by this part.

(b) Each operator shall determine theeffects on components (including theirfoundations or support systems) of theextreme heat which could result from anLNG or other hazardous fluid fire.

(c) Where the exposure determinedunder paragraph (a) or (b) of this sectioncould result in a failure that wouldworsen the emergency, the componentor its foundation or support system, asappropriate, must be:

(1) Made of material or constructed tobe suitable for the extreme temperatureto which it cold be subjected; or

(2) Protected by insultation or othermeans that will delay failure due toextreme temperature in order to allowadequate time tb take emergencyresponses.

(d) If a material that has lowresistance to flame temperatures is usedin any component containing ahazardous fluid, the material must beprotected so that any heat resulting froma controllable emergency does not causethe release of fluid that would result inan uncontrollable emergency.

§ 193.2109 Insulation.

During normal operations, insulationmaterials must-

(a) Maintain insulating values;(b) Withstand thermal and

mechanical design loads; and(c) Be cbvered with a material that is

noncombustible in the installed state, isnot subject to ultraviolet decay, and thatcan withstand the forces of windaccording to ANSI A58.1 andanticipated loading which could occur in'a controllable emergency.

§ 193.2111 Cold-boxes.

All cold boxes must be made ofnoncombustible material and theinsulation must be made of materialswhich are noncombustible in theinstalled condition.

§ 193.2113 PipIng.(a) Piping made of cast iron, malleable

iron, or ductile iron may not be used tocarry any cryogepic or hazardous fluids.

(b) Piping materials intended fornormal use at temperatures below-28.9* C (-200 F) or for use under§ 193.2107(c)(1) must be qualified bytesting in accordance with ANSI B 31.3'to comply with § 193.2103(b).

§ 193.2115 Concrete subject to cryogenictemperatures.

Concrete intended for normal use at-cryogenic temperatures or for use under§ 193.2107(c](1) may not be usedunless-

fit) Materials, measurements, mixing,placing, prestressing, and poststressingof concrete meets generally acceptedengineering practices;

(b) Metallic reinforcing, prestressingwire, structural and nonstructuralmembers used in concrete'areacceptable in the installed condition forthe temperature and stress levelsencountered at design loadingconditions; and.

(c) Tests for the compressive strength,the coefficient of contraction, anacceptable thermal gradient, and, ifapplicable, acceptable surface loadingto prevent detrimental spalling areperformed on 'the concrete at the lowesttemnperature for which the concrete isdesigned or similar test data on theseproperties are available.

§ 193.2117 Combustible materials.Combustible materials are not

permitted for the construction ofbuildings, plant equipment, and thefoundations and supports of buildingsand plant equipment in areas whereignition of the mateinal would worsen anemergency. However, limitedcombustible materials may be-usedwhen the use of noncombustiblematerials is impractical.

§ 193.2119 Records

Each operator shall keep a record ofall materials for components, buildings,foundations, and support systems, as'necessary to verify that materialproperties meet the requirements of thispart. These records must be maintainedfor the life of the item concerned.

Design of Components and Buildings

§ 193.2121 *General.

Components, including their"foundations and support systems, must-be designed, fabricated, and installed towithstand, without loss of functional orstructural integrity, predictable loadingsnot including environmental designforces under Subpart B of this partunless applicable under that subpart.

§ 193.2123 Valves.(a) Each valve, including control

valves and relief valves, mu~t bedesigned, manufactured,'and tested tocomply with ANSI B31.3 or ANSI B31.5or ANSI B31.8 or API Standard OD, ifdesign conditions fall within their scope,

(b) Extended bonnet valves must beused for service temperatures below-45.o- C (-SO' F).

(c) Valves used for cryogenic liquidservice must be designed to operate inthe position in which they are installed,

(d) Powered local and remoteoperation must be provided for valvesthat would be difficult or excessivelytime-consuming to manually operateduring a controllable emergency,

(e) Valves must be designed andinstalled so that an excessive load onthe, piping system does not render thevalve inoperable.

§-193.2125 Automatic shutoff valves,Each automatic shutoff valve or

combination of valves must-(a) Have a fail-safe design;(b) Operate to stop fluid flow which

would endanger the operationalintegrity of plant equipment; and

(c) Close at a rate to avoid fluidhammer which would endanger theoperating integrity of a component,

§ 193.2127 Piping.(a) Piping must be designed,

manufactured, and tested to complywith ANSI B 31.3.

(b) All cryogenic and hazardous fluidpiping must have connections tofacilitate blowdown and purge asrequired by this part.

(c) Each cryogenic or hazardous fluidpiping system that is aboveground mustbe identified by color coding, painting,or labeling.

(d) Seamless pipe or pipe with alongitudinal joint efficienty of 1.0determined in accordance with ANSIB31.3, or pipe with a design pressureless than two-thirds of the mill-prooftest pressure or subsequent shop or fieldhydrostatic test pressure must be usedfor process and transfer piping handlingcryogenic or other hazardous fluids witha service temperature below -22 ° F(-30 C).

(e) For longitudinal or spiral weldpiping handling LNG or cryogenic fluids,the heat affected zone must comply with§ 323.2.2 of ANSI B31.3.

[f) Threaded piping used in hazardousfluid service must be at least Schedule80.

§ 193.2129 Piping attachments andsupports.

Piping attachments and supports forLNG or refrigerant piping must be

Federal Register I Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday. February 11, 1980 / "Rules and Regulations

designed to preventexcessive heattransfer wih can result inaeitherunintentional restraint of piping1eausedby ice formations or the embrittlementof supporting steel.

§ 193.2131 Buildingdesign.( a) Each btiliding or structural

enclosure in which potentiallyhazardous quanrlfies of flammablematerials are handled must be designedand constructed to minimize firehazards.

(bluildings or structural nclosuresin which hazardous or cryogenic fluidsare bandled hall be 6 light-weight.noncombustible construction withnonload-bearinps walls.

1c) If rooms containing such fluids arelocated within or attacbed to buildingsin which such fluids are not handled.i.e., control rooms, shops. etc., Thecommon walls sialt be limited to notmore than two in nrmber, shall bedesigned to wdihstand a static pressureof at least 4800 Pa 1100psi), have no '.doors or o-her comunnuating o'penings,and shafl havea fir Tesistance Tating of,at least 1 hour.

§ 193.2133 B."dings ventlation.

1a) Eachbunding in wbich-polentiallyhazardous rjuantities of flammablefluids arebandled must be ventilated tominimize the possibility, during normaloperation, olhazardous accumulation ofa filammable Sas and air mixtur,hazardous products of combustion, andother hazardous vapors in enclosed

process areas by one ofTe followingmeans:t1) A continuously operating

mechanical venhIllon system;(2) A comlibination gravity ventilation

system and normally off mechanicalventilation system which is activated bysuitable flammable gas detectors ataconcentration notexceeding 25 percentof the lower lammable limit of the;gas;

(3) a dual rate mechanical ventilationsystem with the Iigh xate activated bysuitable flammable gas detectors at aconcentration mot exceeding 25 percentof the lower fammable limit of the gas;or

(14 A grav ty ventilation systemcomposed of a combnation -of wallopenings, roof ventilators, and, if thereare basements ordepressed floor levels,a supplemental mechanical-ventilationsystem.

(b) The ventilation rale must be atleast 1 cubic foot per minute of air persquare foot of floor area. If vaporsheavier than airzcan be present, theventwilatzon must be proportionedaccording to the area of each level.

§ 193.2135 Expanlon contractlon.Each operator shall consider the

amount of contraction and'expansion ofeach oomponent during operaming -and,environmental thermal cycling andshall-

(a) Provide components that operatewithout detrimental stress or restrictionotmovement, within eah componentand between components. caused bycontraction and expansion and

[b) Prevent ice buildup fromdetrimentally restricting the movementof components caused by contractionand expansion.

§ 193.2137 Pxostheave.1a) Each operator shall-1) Determine which omponenls and

their foundations could be endangeredby frost heave from ambienttemperatures or operating temperaturesof the component;and '

12) roide protection againt frostheave which might impair teirstructural integrity.

(b) For each component andfoundation determined under paragraph(a) of this section. instrumentalion mustbe installed to warn ofT otentialstructural impairment due to frostbeave,unless the operator includes in themaintenance procedures Tequired bythis part, a method and schedule ofinspection that will detect changes inthe elevation.

§ 1932139 Ice and snow.fa) Components must be designed to

support the weightofice and snowwhich could normally collect or form onthem.

(b) Each operator shall provideprotection for components Tram fallingice or snow which may accumulateonstructures.

(c) Valves and moving componentsmust not become inoyeralive due to iceformation on the componenL

§ 193.2141 Flectcalaystem(a) Each operator shall select and

install electrical equipment azd'wiingfor components in accordance withNFPA-70 and. where applicable Section7-62 of NFPA-6-A.

Nb) Electrical grounding nnd bondingmust be in accordance Yfith Section 7-7.1.1 of NFPA-59A.

(c) Protective measures for stray orimpressed currents must be provided inaccordance -withSection7-.3 oINFPA-59A.

§ 193.2143 LUghtning.Each operator shall installproper

grounds as necessary to minimize thehazard to plant personnel andcomponents, including all electricalcircuits, as a result of lightning.

§193.2145 Bolers and pressure vesselBoilers must be des gned and

fabricated naccordancewith Section Ior Secilon IV of the ASMEBoiler andPressure Vessel Code. Ofierpressurevessels subject lo that Codemust hedesigned and fabricated in accrdiacewith Division I orf sion of SectioaVII1.

§ 193.2147 CombusUonengbmeadturbines.

Combustion engines and gas turbinesmust be installed in accordance withNFPA-37.

Impoundment Design and Capacity

§ 193.2149 Impoundment requked.(a) An impounding system must be

provided for storage tanks to contain apotential spill of LNG or otherhazardous liquid.

(b) Grading or drainage oranImpounding system must be provided toensure that accidental spills or leaksfrorq the following components andareas do not endanger components oradjoining property orente navigablewaterways:

(1) Liquefaction and otherprocessequipment;

(2) Vaporizers;(3) Transfer systems;14) Parking areas for tank cars or aak

trucks; and(5) Areas forloading. unloading, or

storing portable containers and dewarvessels.

(c) Impounding systeni TorLNIG mstbe designed and constructed inaccordance with this subpart.Impounding systems intended forcontainment othazardous liquids otherthan LNG must meet the requiremens ofNFPA-30.

§ 193.2151 General design-cbaract~escs.(a] An impounding system mustave

a configuration or design lwih. to themaximum extent pssible. will preventliquid from escaping impoundmentbyleakage, splash from collapse ofastructure or part tereoL momentum andlow surface frition, foaming. failure ofpressurizedTjppmg. and accidentalpumping.

b) The basic form of an impoundingsystem maybe excavation, a naturalgeological formation.'manufactureddikingsuch asberms orwalls..or anycombination thereof.

§ 193.2153 Classes of kmpoundingsystems.

(a) For the purpose of lis partimpounding systems are classified asfollows:.

Class 1. Asystem wlfich surroands thecomponent served with theinnersuelace of

Sm

9212 Federal Register /,Vql. 45.Nlo. 29 ./ Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

the dike constructed against or within 24inches of the component served.[ Class 2. A system which surrounds thecomponent or area served with the dikelocated a distance away from the componentor at the periphery of the area.

Class 3. A system which conducts a spillby dikes and floors.to a remote impoundingspace which does not surround thecomponent or area served.

(b) In the case of an impoundingsystem consisting of a combination ofclasses, requirements of this partregarding a single class apply accordingto the percentage of impoundmiientprovided by each class.

§ 193.2155 Structural requirements.(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this

section,, the structur&I parts of animpounding system must be designedand constructed to prevent impairmentof the system's performance reliabilityand structural integrity as a result of thfollowing:

(1) The imposed loading from-(i) Full hydrostatic head of impounded

LNG;(ii) Hydrodynamic action, including

the effect of any material injected intothe system for spill control;

(iii) The impingement of the trajectoryof an LNG jet discharged at anypredictable angle; and

(iv) Anticipated hydraulic forces froma credible opening in the component, oritem served, assuming that the dischargepressur6 equals design pressure.

(2) The erosive action from a spill,including jetting of spilling LNG, and.any other anticipated erosive actionincluding surface water runoff, iceformation, dislodgement of ice'formation, and snow removal.

(3) The .effect of the temperature, anythermal gradient, and any otheranticipated degradation resulting fromsudden or localized contact with LNG.

(4) Exposure to fire from impoundedLNG or from sources bther thanimpounded LNG.

(5] If applicable, the potential impactand loading on the dike due to-.

(i) Collapse of the component or itemserved or adjacent components; and

(ii) If the LNG facility adjoins theright-of-way of any highway or railroad,collision by or explosion of a train, tankcar, or tank truck that could reasonablybe expected to cause the most severeloading.

(b) For spills from LNG storage tankswith Class 2 or 3 impounding systems,imposed loading and surging flowcharacteristics must be based on acredible release of the tank contents.

(c) If an LNG storage tank is locatedwithin a horizontal distance of 6,100 m.(20,000 ft.) from the nearest-point of the

nearest runway serving large aircraftasdefined in 14 CFR Part 1.1, a Class I impounding system must be used whichis designed to withstand collision by, orexplosion of, the heaviest aircraft whichcan take off or land at the airport.

§ 193.2157 Coatings and coverings.Insulation, sealants, or other coatings

and coverings which are part of animpounding system-

(a) Must be noncombustible in aninstalled condition when exposed to anLNG fire resulting from a spill thatcovers the floor of the impounding-space;

(b) Must withstand exposure to firefrom sources determined as required bythis part, other than impounded LNG, fora period of time until fire protective orfire extinguishing action is taken; and

(c) When used for the purpose ofmaintaining the functional integrity ofan impounding system, must be capableof withstanding sudden exposure toLNG without loss of such integrity.

§ 193.2159 Floors.Floors of Class 2 and Class 3

impounding systems must to the extentfeasible-

(a) Slope away from the component oritem impounded and to a sump basininstalled under § 193.2171;

(b) Slope away from the nearestadjacent component;

(c) Drain surface waters from the floorat rates based on a storm of 10-yearfrequency and 1-hour duration and othernatural water sources; and

(d) Be designed to minimize thewetted floor area.

§ 193.2161 Dikes, general.(a) Penetrations in dikes to

accommodate piping or any otherpurpose are prohibited.

(b) An outer wall of a componentserved by an impounding system maynot be used as a dike except for aconcrete wall designed to comply withthe requirements of § 193.2155(c) orequivalent 'design impact loading.

§ 193.2163 'Vapor barriers.If vapor barriers are installed in

meeting the requirements of § 193.2059,they must be designed and constructedto detain LNG vapor.

§ 193.2165 Dike dimensions.In addition to dike dimensions needed

to comply with bther requirements ofthii-subpart, to minimize the possibilitythat a trajectory of accidentallydischarged liquid would pass over thetop of a dike, the distance from the innerwall of the component or vessel servedto the. closest inside edge of the top ofthe dike must at least equal the vertical

distance from the maximum liquid levelimpounded to the inside edge of the topof the dike,.

§ 193.2167 Covered systems.(a) A covered impounding system Is

prohibited unless It is-(1) Sealed from the atmosphere and

filled with an inert gas; or(2) Permanently interconnected with

the vapor space of the componentserved.

(b) Flammable nonmetallicmembranous covering is prohibited in acovered system.

(c) For systems to which paragraph(a)(1) of this section applies,instrumentation and controls must beprovided to-

(1) Maintain pressures at a safe level;and

(2) Monitor gas concentrations Inaccordance with § 193.2169,

(d) Dikes must have adequatestructural strength to assure that theycam withstand impact from a collapsedcover and all anticipated conditions.which could c&use a failure of theimpounding space cover.

§ 193.2169 Gas leak detection.Appropriate areas within an

impounding system where collection orpassage of LNG or LNG vapor could beexpected must be equipped with hensingand warning devices to monitorcontinuously for the presence of LNG orLNG vapor and to warn before LNG gosconcentration levels exceed 25 percentof the lower flammable limit.

§ 193.2171 Sump basins.Except for Class I impounding

systems, a sump basin must be locatedin each impounding system forcollection of water.

§ 193.2173 Water removal.(a) Except for Class 1 systems,

impounding systems must have sumppumps and piping running over the diketo remove water collecting In the sumpbasin.

(b) The water removal system musthave adequate capacity to remove waterat rates which equal the maximumpredictable collection rate from a stormof 10-year frequency and 1-hourduration, and other natural causes.

(c) Sump pumps for water removalmust-

(1) Be operated as necessary to keepthe impounding space as dry aspractical; and

(2) If sinmp pumps are designed forautomatic operation, have redundantautomatic shutdown controls to preventoperation when LNG is present.

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

§ f93.2175 Shared Impoundment.When an impounding system serves

more than one component, tank car,tank truck, or dewar vessel, a meansmust be provided to prevent lowtemperature or fire resulting fromleakage from any one of the itemsserved causing any other item to leak. If§ 193.2059(a) applies, the means mustnot result in a vapor dispersion distancewhich exceeds the exclusion zone.

§ 193.2179 Impoundment capacity;,general.

In addition to capacities otherwiserequired by this subpart, an impoundingsystem must have sufficient volumetriccapacity to provide for-

(a) Displacement by the component,tank car, tank truck, container, or dewarvessel served; and(b Where applicable, displacement

which could occur when a higherdensity substance than the liquid to beimpounded enters the system,considering all relevant means ofassuring capacity.

§ 193.2181 Impoundment capacity, LNGstorage tanks.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph(b) of this section, each impoundingsystem serving an LNG storage tankmust have a minimum volumetric liquidimpoundment capacity as follows:

System Cap&Nunber of Classoctype in

tanks in system of system pecent of LNGtaks ma~mum

1 __ class1 11opercent.Classes 2 and 3 150 ipen.

MorethanI Classes2and3 100 pecmtof&I tanks or150 percent of-r'ast tank.whevr is

(b) For purposes of this section. acovered impounding system serving asingle LNG storage tank may have acapacity of 110 percent of the LNGtank's maximum liquid capacity if it Iscovered by a roof that is separate andindependent from the LNG storage tank.

§ 193.2183 Impoundment capacity;,equipment and transfer systems.

If an impounding system serves acomponent under § 193.2149(b) (1H43), itmust have a minimum volumetric liquidimpoundment capacity equal to the sumof-

(a) One-hundred percent of thevolume of liquid that could be containedin the component and, where applicable,tank car or tank truck served; and

(b) The maximum volume of liquidwhich could discharge into theimpounding space from any single

failure of equipment or piping during thetime period necessary for spill detection.instrument response, and sequencedshutdown by the automatic shutdownsystem under § 193.2439.

§ 193.2185 Impoundment capacity;parking areas, portable containers.

Each impounding system serving anarea listed under § 193.2149(b) (4) or (5)must have a minimum volumetric liquidimpoundment capacity which complieswith the requirements of § 193.2181,

- assuming each tank car, tank truck,portable container, or dewar vessel tobe a storage tank

LNG Storage Tanks

§ 193.2187 General(a) LNG storage tanks must comply,

with the requirements of this subpartand the other applicable requirements ofthis part.

(b) A flammable nonmetallicmembrane liner may not be used as aninner container in a storage tank.§ 193.2189 Loading forces.

Each part of an LNG storage tankmust be designed to withstand withoutloss of functional or structural integrityany predictable combination of forceswhich would result in the highest stressto the part, including the following:

(a] Internal design pressuredetermined under § 193.2197.

(b) External design pressuredetermined under § 193.2199.

(c) Weight of the structure.(d) Weight of liquid to be stored,

except that in no case will the densityassumed be less than 29.3 pounds percubic foot (470 kilograms per cubicmeter).

(e) Loads due to testing required by§ 193.2327.

(1) Nonuniform reaction forces on thefoundation due to predictable settlingand other movement.

(g) Superimposed forces from piping.stairways, and other connectedappurtenances.

(h) Predictable snow and Ice loads.(i) The loading of internal insulation

on the inner container and outer shelldue to compaction and movement of thecontainer and shell over the design lifeof the insulation.

(0) In the case of vacuum Insulation,the forces due to the vacuum.

(k) In the case of a positive pressurepurge, the forces due to the maximumpositive pressure of the purge gas.

§ 193.2191 Stratification.LNG storage tanks with a capacity of

5,000 barrels or more must be equippedwith means to mitigate a potential forrollover and overpressure such as:

(a) Selective filling at the top andbottom of the tank,

(b) Circulating liquid from the bottomto the top of the same tank; oi

(c) Transferring liquid selectively fromthe bottom of the tank to the bottom ortop of any adjacent storage tank.

§ 193.2193 Movement and stress.(a) Each operator shall determine for

normal operations of each LNG storagetank-

(1) The amount and pattern of.predictable movement of components,including transfer piping, and thefoundation. which could result fromthermal cycling, loading forces, andambient air changes; and

(2) For a storage tank with an innercontainer, the predictable movement ofthe inner container and the outer shell inrelation to each other.

(b] Storage tanks must be designed toprovide adequate allowance for stressdue to movement determined underparagraph (a) of this section, includingprovisions that-

(1) Backfill does not cause excessivestresses on the tank structure due toexpansion of the storage tank duringwarmup;

(2) Insulation does not settle to adamaging degree or unsafe conditionduring thermal cycling: and

(3) Expansion bends and otherexpansion or contraction devices areadequate to prevent excessive stress ontank penetrations, especially duringcooldown from ambient temperatures.

§193.2195 Penetrations.(a) All penetrations in an LNG storage

tank must be designed in accordancewith API 620, including Appendix Q.

(b) The loadirigs on all penetrationsmust be determined by an analysis of allcontributing forces, including those fromtank thermal movements, connectingpiping thermal movements, hydraulicforces, applicable wind and earthquakeforces, and the forces resulting fromsettlement or movement of the tankfoundation or pipe supports.

(c) All penetrations in an LNG storagetank below the design liquid level mustbe fitted with an internal shutoff valvewhich is designed and installed so thatany failure of the nozzle penetrating thetank will be outside the tank.

(d) The requirements of paragraphs (a)and (c) of this section do not apply toshop fabricated tanks of 70,000 gallonsor less capacity. All penetrations in suchtanks must be dedigned and installed inaccordance with the applicableprovisions of Section VIIL Division 1 ofthe ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode.

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9214 Federal Register /- Vol. 45,:No. 29 -/ Monday, February 11, 1980 J Rules and Regulations

§ 193.2197 Internal design pressure.(a) Each operator shall establish the

internal design pressure at the top ofeach LNG storage tank, including a *, fsuitable margin above the maximum.allowable working pressure.

(b) The internal design pressure of astorage tank may not be lower than thehighest pressure in the vapor spaceresulting from each of the following-events or combination thereof thatpredictably might occur, givingconsideration to vapor handlingequipment, relief devices in accordancewith § 193.2429, and any other mitigatinmeasures:

(1) Filling the tank with LNGincludinjeffects of increased vaporization ratedue to superheat-and sensible heat ofthe added liquid;

(2) Rollover.(3) Fall in barometric pressure, using

the worst combination of amount of falland rate of fall which might predictablyoccur,

(4) Loss of effective insulation thatmay result from an adjacent fire, leak ofliquid into the intertank space, or otherpredictable accident; and

(5) Flash vaporization resulting frompump recirculation.

§ 193.2199 External design pressure.(a) Each operator shall establish the

external design pressure at the top ofeach LNG storage tank, including asuitable margin below the minimumallowable working pressure.

(b) The external design pressure maynot be higher than the lowest vaporpressure in the vapor space resultingfrom each of the following events orcombinations thereof that predictablymight occur, giving Consideration to. gasmakeup systems,. vacuum relief devicesin accordance with § 193.2429, and anyother mitigating measures.

(1) Withdrawing liquid from the tank;(2) Withdrawing gas from. the tank;(3).Adding subcooled LNG to the tank

and,(4) Rise in barometric pressure, based

on the worst combination of amount ofrise and rate of rise which predictablymight occur.

§ 193.2201 Internal temperature.The liquid container of each LNG

storage tank and all tank parts used incontact with LNG or its cold vapor shallbe designed for the lowest bulk liquidtemperature which can be attained inthe LNG storage tank.

§ 193.2203 Foundation.(a) Each LNG storage tank must have

a stable foundation designed inaccordance with generally acceptedstructural engineering practices.

(b),Each foundation must supportdesign loading forces withoutdetrimental settling that could impairthe structural integrity of the tank.

§ 193.2205 Frost heave.If the protection provided for LNG

storage tank foundations from frostheave under § 193.2137(a) includesheating the foundation area-

(a] Ad instrumentation and alarm.system must be provided to warn ofmalfunction of the heating system; and

(b] A means to correct theg malfunction must be provided.

§ 193.2207 Insulation.(a) Insulation on the outside of the

outer shell of an LNG storage tank maynot be used to maintain stored LNG atan operating temperature during normaloperation.

(b) Insulation between an innercontainer and the outer shell of an LNGstorage tank must-

(1) Be compatible with the containedliquid and its vapor;

(2) In its installed condition, benoncombustible; and

(3) Not significantly lose insulatingpioperties by melting, settling. o othermeans due to a fire resulting from a spillthat covers the floor of the impoundingspace around the tank.

§ 1934209 Instrumentation for LNGstorage tanks.

(a) Each LNG storage tank having acapacity over 70,000 gallons must beequipped with a sufficient number ofsensing devices and personnel warningdevices, as prescribed, which operatecontinuously while the tank is inoperation to assure that each of thefollowing conditions is not a potentialhazard to the structural integrity or"safety of the tank:

condition Instrumentation

(1) Amount of lquid inthe tank.

Redundant liquid level gages andrecorders with high level alarms,and a minimum of one independenthigh level alarm.

(2) Vapo" pressure Redundant gages and recorders witwithin the tank. high and lowpressure alarms.

(3) Temperatures at Temperature indicating and recordinrepresentaliva devices with alarm.critical points In thefoundalion.

(4) Temperature of Temperature recorders.contained liquid atvarious verticalintervals.

(5) Abnormal Thermocofples located attemperature In tank representative critical points withstructure. recorders.

(6) Excessive relative Linear and rotational movementmovement of Inner Indicators located between Innercontainer and outer, container and outer shell withshelL recorders.

Ih

91

(b) LNG storage tanks with a capacityof 70,000 gallons or'less must beequipped with the following:

(1) LNG liquid trycocks, wenattended during the filling operation.

(2) Pressure gages and recorders withhigh pressure alarm.

(3) Differential pressure liquid levelgage.

(c) Each storage tank must bedesigned as appropriate to provide forcompliance with the inspectionrequirements of this part.

§ 193.2211 Metal storage tanks.(a) Metal storage tanks with internal

design pressures of not more than 15psig must be designed and constructedin adcordance with API Standard 020and, where applicable, Appendix Q ofthat standard.

-(b)Metal storage tanks with Internaldesign pressures above 15 psig must bedesigned in accordance with theapplicable division of Section VIII of theASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

§ 193.2"213 Concrete storage tanks.Concrete storage tanks must be

designed and constructed in accordancewith Section 4-3 of NFPA-59A,

§ 193.2215 Thermal barrers.Thermal barriers must be provided

between piping and an outer shell whennecessary to prevent the outer shellfrom being exposed during normaloperation to temperatures lower than itsdesign temperature.

§193.2217 Support system.(a) Saddles and legs must be designed

in accordance with generally acceptedstructural engineering practices, takinginto account loads during transportation,erection loads, and thermal loads.

(b) Storage tank stress concentrationsfroi support systems must beminimized by distribution of loads usingpads, load rings, or other means.

(c) For a storage tank with an Innercohtainer, support systems must bedesigned to-

(1) Minimize thermal stressesimparted to the inner container andouter shel from expansion andcontraction; and

(2) Sustain the maximum applicableloading from shipping and operatingconditions.

(d) LNG storage tanks with an airspace beneath the tank bottom or i1 •foundation must be designed towithstand without loss of functional orstructural integrity, the forces caused bythe ignition of a combustible vaporcloud in this space.

§ 193.2219 Internal piping.Piping connected to an inner container

that is located in the space between theinner container and outer shell must bedesigned fornot less than the pressure

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

rating of the inner container. The pipingmust contain expansion loops wherenecessary to protect against thermal an(other secondary stresses created byoperation of the tank. Bellows may notbe used within the space between theinner container and outer shell.

§ 193.2221 Marking.(a) Each operator shall install and

maintain a name plate in an accessible.place on each storage tank and mark itin accordance with the applicable codeor standard incorporated by reference ir§ § 193.2211 or 193.2213.

(b) Each penetration in a storage tankmust be marked indicating the functionof the penetration.

(c) Marking required by this sectionmust not be obscured by frosting.Design -of Transfer Systems

§ 193.2223 General.(a) Transfer systems must comply

with the requirements of this subpartand other applicable requirements ofthis part.

(b) The design of transfer systemsmust provide for stress due to thefrequency of thermal cycling andintermittent use to which the transfersystem may be subjected.

(c) Slip type expansion joints areprohibited and packing-type joints maynot be used in transfer systems for LNGor flammable refrigerants.

(d) A suitable means must beprovided to precool the piping in amanner that prevents excessive stressprior to normal transfer of cold fluids.

(e) Stresses due to thermal andhydraulic shock in the piping systemmust be determined and accommodatedby design to avoid damage to piping.

§ 193.2227 Backflow.(a) Each transfer system must operate

with a means to-(1) Prevent backflow of liquid from a

receiving container, tank car, or tanktruck from causing a hazardouscondition; and

(2) Maintain one-way flow wherenecessary for the integrity or safeoperation of the LNG facility.

(b) The means provided underparagraph (a)(1] of this section must belocated as close as practical to the pointof connection of the transfer system andthe receiving container, tank car, or tanktruck.

§ 193.2229 Cargo transfer systems.(a] Each cargo transfer system must

have-(1) A means of safely depressurizing

and venting that system beforedisconnection;

(2) A means to provide for safe vapordisplacement during transfer,

(3) Transfer piping, pumps, andcompressors located or protected bysuitable barriers so that they are safefrom damage by tank car or tank truckmovements;

(4) A signal light at each controllocation or remotely located pumps orcompressors used for transfer whichindicates whether the pump orcompressor is off or in operation; and

(5) A means of communicationbetween loading or unloading areas andother areas in which personnel areassociated with the transfer operations.

(b) Hoses and arms for cargo transfersystems must be designed as follows-

(1) The design must accommodateoperating pressures and temperaturesencountered during the transfers;

(2) Hoses must have a burstingpressure of not less than five times theoperating pressure.

(3) Arms must meet the requirementsof ANSI B31.3.

(4) Adequate support must beprovided, taking into account iceformation.

(5) Couplings must be designed for thefrequency of any coupling or uncoupling.

§ 193.2231 Cargo transfer area.The transfer area of a cargo transfer

system must be designed-(a) To accommodate tank cars and

tank trucks without excessivemaneuvering; and

(b) To permit tank trucks to enter orexit the transfer area without backing.

§ 193.2233 Shutoff valves.(a) Shutoff valves on transfer systems

must be located-(1) On each liquid supply line, or

common line to multiple supply lines, toa storage tank, or to a cargo transfersystem;

(2) On each vapor or liquid return linefrom multiple return lines, used in acargo transfer.system;

(3) At the connection of a transfersystem with a pipeline subject to Part192 of this chapter and

(4] To provide for proper operationand maintenance of each transfersystem.

(b) Transfer system shutoff valvesthat are designated for operation in theemergency procedures must bemanually operable at the valve andpower operable at the valve and at aremote location at least 50 feet from thevalve.

Subpart D-Construction

§ 193.2301 Scope.This subpart prescribes requirements

for the construction or installation ofcomponents.

§ 193.2303 Construction acceptance.

No person may place in service anycomponent until it passes all applicableinspections and tests prescribed by thissubpart.

§ 193.2305 Procedures.

(a) In performing construction,installation, inspection, or testing, anoperator must follow writtenspecifications, procedures, anddrawings, as appropriate, that areconsistent with this part, taking intoaccount relevant mechanical, chemical,and thermal properties, componentfunctions, and environmental effectsthat are involved.

(b) All procedures, including any fieldrevisions, must be substantiated bytesting or experience to produce acomponent that is reliable and complieswith the design and installationrequirements of this part.

§ 193.2307 Inspection.

(a) All construction, installation, andtesting activities must be inspected asfrequently as necessary in accordancewith a written plan to assure that-

(1) Activities are in compliance withall applicable requirements of thissubpart; and

(2) Components comply with theapplicable material, design, fabrication,installation, and constructionrequirements of this part.

(b) In addition to the requirements ofparagraph (a) of this section. theconstruction of concrete storage tanksmust be inspected in accordance withACI-311-75.

Cc) Each operator shall have a qualityassurance inspection program to verifythat components comply with theirdesign specifications and drawings,including any field design changes,before they are placed in service.

§ 193.2309 Inspection and testingmethods

Except as otherwise provided by thissubpart, each operator shall determine,commensurate with the hazard thatwould result from failure of thecomponent concerned:the scope andnature of-

(a) Inspections and tests required bythis subpart; and

(b) Inspection and testing proceduresrequired by § 193.2305.

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§ 193.2311 Cleanup.. After construction or installation, asthe case may be, all components mustbe cleaned to remove all detrimentalcontaminants which could cause ahazard during operation, including thefollowing:

(a) All flux residues used in brazing orsoldering must be removed from thejoints and the base metal'to preventcorrosive solutions from being formed.

(b) All solvent type cleaners must betested to ensure that they Will notdamage equipment integrity orreliability.

(c) Incompatible chemicals must beremoved.

(d) All contanjinants must be capturedand disposed of in a manner that doesnot reduce the effectiveness of corrosionprotection and monitoring provided asrequired by this part.

§ 193.2313 Pipe welding.(a) Each operator shall provide the

following for welding on pressurizedpiping for LNG and other-hazardous,fluids:

(1) Welding procedures and weldersqualified in accordance with Section IXof the ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode or API 1104, as applicable;

(2) When welding materials that arequalified by impact tes.ting, weldingprocedures selected to minimizedegradation of low temperatureproperties of the pipe material; and

(3) When welding attachments to pipe,procedures and techniques selected tominimize the danger of burn-throughsand stress intensification

(b) Oxygen fuel gas welding is notpermitted on flammable fluid pipingwith a service temperature below-20°C (-22-F).

(c) Marking materials for identifyingwelds on pipe must be compatible withthe basic pipe material.

(d) Surfaces of components that areless than 6.35 mm (0.25 in.) thick maynot be field die stamped.- (e) Where die stamping is permitted,any identification marks must be madewith a die having blunt edges tominimize stress concentratioh.

§ 193.2315 Piping connections.(a) Piping more than 2 inches nominal

diameter must be joined by welding,except that-

(1) Threaded or flanged connectionsmay be used where necessary forspecial connections, includingconnections for material transitions,instrument connections, testing, andmaintenance;

(2) Copper piping in nonflana-able-service may be joined by silver brazing,and

(3) Material transitions may be madeby any joining technique proven reliableunder § 193.2305(b).

(b) If socket fittings are used, aclearance of 1.6 to 3.2mm (0.063 to 0.126in.) between the pipe end and thebottom of the socket recess must beprovided and appropriate measurementreference marks made on the piping-forthe purpose of inspection.

(c) Threaded joints must be-(1) Free of stress from external

loading; and(2) Seal welded, or sealed by other

means which have been tested. andproven reliable.

(d) Compression type couplings mustmeet the requirements 6f ANSI B31.3.

(e) Care shall be taken to ensure thetightness of all bolted connections.Spring washers or other such devices'designed to compensate for thecontiaction and expansion of boltedconnections during operating cyclesshall be used where required.

(f) The selection of gasket materialshall include the consideration of fire.

193.2317 Retestlng.After testing required by this subpart

is completed on a component to containa hazardous fluid, the component mustbe retested whenever-

(a) Penetration welding other than tie-in welding is performed; or

(b) The structural integrity of thecomponent is disturbed.

§ 193.2319 Strength tests.(a) A strength test must be performed

on each piping system and container todetermine whether the componentiscapable of performing its designfunction, taking into account-

_ (l) The maximum allowable workingpressure; ,

(2) The maximum weight of productwhich the component may contain orsupport;

(b) For piping, the test required byparagraph (a) of this section mustinclude a-pressure test conducted in

* accordance with Section 337 of ANSIB31.3, except that test pressures must bebased on the design pressure. Carbonand low alloy steel piping must bepressure tested above their nil ductilitytransition temperature.

(c) All shells and internal parts of heatexchangers to which Section VIII,Division 1, or Division 2 of the ASMEBoiler ana Pressure Vessel Code, appliesmust be pressure tested, inspected, andstamped in accordance therewith.

§ 193.2321 Nondestructive tests.(a) The following percentages of each

day's circumferentially welded pipejoints for hazardous fluid piping,

selected at random, must benondestructively tested over the entirecircumference to indicate any defectswhich could adversely affect theintegrity of the weld or pipe:

Weld typo Ciyogenlc Other Test methodppin

Butt weld mor 100 20 Radiographlc othan 2 Ilches ultrasonic.In nominatlsize.

Butt welds Z 100 30 Radiographic, ultrasonic,Inches or less iquld penettant, orIn nominal magnetic paicle,size.

Fillet and socket 100 30 Uquid ponottant orwelds. magnetic pailtclo.

(b) Evaluation of weld tests and repairof defects must be in accordance withthe requirements of ANSI B31.3 or API1104, as applicable.

(c) Where longitudinally or spiralwelded pipe is used in transfer systems,100 percent of the seam weld must beexamined by radiographic or ultrasonicinspection.

(d) The butt welds in metal shells ofstorage tanks with internal designpressure of not more than 15 psig mustbe radlographically tested in accordancewith Section 0.7.8, API 620, Appendix Q,except that for hydraulic load bearingshells with curved surfaces that aresubject to cryogenic temperatures, 100percent of both longitudinal (ormeridional) and circumferential or (orlatitudinal) welds must beradiographically tested.

(e) The butt welds in metal shells ofstorage tanks with internal designpressure above 15 psig must beradiographically tested in accordancewith Section IX of the ASME Boiler andPressure Vessel Code, except that forhydraulic load bearing shells withcurved surfaces that are subject to'cryogenic temperatures, 100 percent ofboth longitudinal (or meridional) andcircumferential (or latitudinal) weldsmust be radiographically tested.

§ 193.2323 Leak tests.

(a) Each container and piping systemmust be initially tested to assure that thecomponent will contain the product forwhich it is designed without leakage.

(b) Shop fabricated containers and allflammable fluid piping must be leak-tested to a minimum of the designpressure after installation but beforeplacing it in service.

(c) For a storage tank with vacuuminsulation, the inner container, outershell, and all internal piping must betested for vacuum leaks in accordancewith an appropriate procedure.

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§ 193.2325 Testing control systems.

Each control system must be testedbefore being placed in service to assurethat it has been installed properly andwill function as required by this parL

§ 193.2327 Storage tank tests.

(a) In addition to other applicablerequirements of this subpart, storagetanks for cryogenic fluids with internaldesign pressures of not more than 15psig must be tested in accordance withSections Q8 and Q9 of API 620,Appendix Q, as applicable.

(b) Metal storage tanks for cryogenicfluids with internal design pressuresabove 15 psig must be tested inaccordance with the applicable divisionof Section VIII of the ASME Boiler andPressure Vessel Code.

(c) Reference measurements must bemade with appropriate preciseinstruments to assure that the tank isgas tight and lateral and verticalmovement of the storage tank does notexceed prpdetermined designtolerances.

§ 193.2329 Construction records.

For the service life of the componentconcerned, each operator shall retainappropriate records of the following:

(a) Specifications, procedures, anddrawings prepared for compliance with§ 193.2305; and

(b) Results of tests, inspections, andthe quality assurance program requiredby this subpart.

Subpart E-Equipment

§ 193.2401 Scope.This subpart prescribes requirements

for the design, fabrication, andinstallation of vaporization equipment,liquefaction equipment. and controlsystems.

Vaporization Equipment

§ 193.2403 General.

Vaporizers must comply with therequirements of this subpart and theother applicable requirements of thispart.

§ 193.2405 Vaporizer deslgn.

(a] Vaporizers must be designed andfabricated in accordance withapplicable provisions of Section VIILDivision 1 of the-ASME Boiler andPressure Vessel Code.

(b) Each vaporizer must be designedfor the maximum allowable workingpressure at least equal to the maximumdischarge pressure of the pump orpressurized container system supplyingit, whichever is greater.

§ 193.2407 Operational control(a) Vaporizers must be equipped with

devices which monitor the inlet pressureof the LNG, the outlet temperature, andthe pressure of the vaporized gas, andthe inlet pressure of the heating mediumfluids.

(b) Manifolded vaporizers must beequipped with:

(1) Two inlet valves in series toprevent LNG from entering an idlevaporizer, and

(2) A means to remove LNG or gaswhich accumulates between the valves.

§ 193.2409 Shutoff valves.(a) A shutoff valve must be located on

transfer piping supplying LNG to avaporizer. The shutoff valve must belocated at a sufficient distance from thevaporizer to minimize potential fordamage from explosion or fire at thevaporizer. If the vaporizer is Installed ina building, the shutoff valve must belocated outside the building.

(b) A shutoff valve must be located oneach outlet of a vaporizer.

(c) For vaporizers designed to use aflammable intermediate fluid, a shutoffvalve must be located on the inlet andoutlet line of the intermediate fluidpiping system where they will beoperable during a controllableemergency involving the vaporizer.

§ 193:2411 Rellef devices.The capacity of pressure relief devices

required for vaporizers by § 193.2429 isgoverned by the following:

(a) For heated vaporizers, the capacitymust be at least 110 percent of ratednatural gas flow capacity withoutallowing the pressure to rise more than10 percent above the vaporizer'smaximum allowable working pressure.

(b) For ambient vaporizers, thecapacity must be at least 150 percent ofrated natural gas flow capacity withoutallowing the pressure to rise more than10 percent above the vaporizer'smaximum allowable working pressure.

§ 193.2413 Combustion air Intakes.(a) Combustion air intakes to

vaporizers must be equipped withsensing devices to detect the inductionof a flammable vapor.

(b) If a heated vaporizer or vaporizerheatefi is located in a building. thecombustion air intake must be locatedoutside the building.Liquefaction Equipment '

§ 193.2415 General.Liquefaction equipment must comply

with the requirements of this subpartand the other applicable requirements ofthis part.

§193.2417 Control of ncomag gam.A shutoff valve must be located on

piping delivering natural gas to eachliquefaction system.

§193.2419 Backflow.Each multiple parallel piping system

connected to liquefaction equipmentmust have devices to prevent backflowfrom causing a hazardous condition.

§ 193.2421 Cold boxes.(a) Each cold box in a liquefaction

system must be equipped with a meansof monitoring or detecting asappropriate, the concentration of naturalgas in the insulation space.

(b) If the insulation space in a coldbox is designed to operate with a gasrich atmosphere, additional natural gasmust be introduced when theconcentration of gas falls to 30 percent.

(c) If the insulation space of a coldbox is designed to operate with a gasfree atmosphere, additional air orinertgas, as appropriate, must be introducedwhen the concentration ofgas is 25percent of the lower flammable limit.

§193.2423 Alringas.Where incoming gas to liquefaction

equipment contains air, each operatorshall provide a means of preventing aflammable mixture from occurring underany operating condition.

Control Systems

§ 193.2427 General.(a) Control systems must comply with

the requirements of this subpart andother applicable requirements of thisparL

(b) Each control system must becapable of performing its designfunction under normal operatingconditions.

(c) Control systems must be designedand installed in a manner to permitmaintenance, including inspection ortesting, in accordance with this part.

(d) Local. remote, and redundantsignal lines installed for control systemsthat can affect the operation of acomponent that does not fail safe mustbe routed separately or in separateunderground conduits installed inaccordance with NFPA-70.

§ 193.2429 Relefldevices.(a) Each component containing a

hazardous fluid must be equipped with asystem of automatic relief devices whichwill release the contained fluid at a ratesufficient to prevent pressures fromexceeding 110 percent of the maximumallowable working pressure. Inestablishing relief capacity, eachoperator shall consider trapping of fluidbetween valves;, the maximum rates of

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9218" Federal. Register / Vol. 45, -No. 29 / Monday .February '11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

boiloff and expansion of fluid whichmay occur during normal operation,particularly cooldown; and controllableemergencies.

(b) A component in which internalvacuum conditions can occur must beequipped with a system of relief devicesor other control system to preventdevelopment in the component of avacuum that might create a hazardouscondition. Introductioh of gas into acomponent must not create a flammablemixture within the component.

(c) In addition to the control systemrequired by paragraphs (a) and (b) ofthis section-

(1) Each LNG Storage tank must beequipped with relief devices to assurethat design pressure and vacuum reliefcapacity is available duringmaintenance of the system; and

(2) A mandal means must be providedto relieve pressure and vacuum in anemergency.

(d) Relief devices must be installed ina manner to minimize the possibilitythat release of fluid could-

(1) Cause an emergency; or(2) Worsen a controllable emergency.(e) The means for adjusting the

setpoint pressure of all adjustable reliefdevices must be sealed.

(f) Relief devices which are installedto limit minimum or maximum pressuremay not be used to handle boiloff andflash gases during normal operation.

§ 193.2431 Vents.(a] Hazardous fluids may not be

relieved into the atmosphere of abuilding or other confined space.

(b) Boiloff vents for hazardous -fluidsmay not draw in air during operation.

§ 193.2433 Sensing devices.(a) Each operator shall determine the

appropriate location for and installsensing devices as necessary to-, (1) Monitor the operation of

components to detect a malfunctionwhich could cause a hazardduscondition if permitted to continue and

(2) Detect the presence of fire orcombustible gas in areas determined inaccordance with Section 500-4 of NFPA70 to have a potential for the presence oiflammable fluids.

(b) Buildings in which potentiallyhazardous quantities of flaaniblefluids are used or handled must becontinuously monitored by gas sensingdevices set to activate audible andvisual alarms in the building and at thecontrol center when the concentration othe fluid in air is not more than 25percent of the lower flammable limit.

§ 193.2435 Warning devices.Each operator shall install warning

devices in the control center to warn ofhazardous conditions detected by allsensing devices required by this part .Warnings must be given both audiblyand visibly and must be designed togain the attention of personnel.Warnings must indicate the location andnature of the existing or potentialhazard.

§ 193.2437 Pump and compressor control.(a) Each pump and compressor for

hazardous fluids must be equippedwith-

(1) A control system, operable locallyand remotely, to shut down the pump orcompressor in a controllable emergency;

(2) A signal light at the pump orcompressor and the remote controllocation which indicates whether thepump. or compressor is in operation oroff;

(3) Adequate Valving to ensure thatthe pump or compressor can be isolatedfor maintenance; and

(4) A check valve on each dischargeline where pumps or compressorsoperate in parallel.

(b) Pumps or compressors in a cargotransfer system must have shutdowncontrols at the loading or unloading areaand at the pump or compressor site.

§ 193.2439 Emergency shutdown controlsystems.

(a] Each transfer system, vaporizer,liquefaction system, and storage systemtank must be equipped with anemergency shutdown control system.The control must automatically actuatethe shutdown of the component(providing pressure relief as necessary)when any of the following occurs:

( (1) Temperatures of the component"exceed the limits determined under§ 193.2105;

(2) Pressure outside the limits of themaximun and minimuii designpressure;

43) Liquid inveceiving-vessel reachesthe design maximum liquid level;

(4) Gas concentrations in the area of-the component exceed'40 percent of thelower flammable limit; ,"

(5) A sudden excessive pressurechange or other condition indicating apotentially dangerous condition; and

(6) Presence of fire in area ofcomponent.

(b) For cargo transfer systems whereall transfer operatidns are.continuouslymanned and visually supervised byqualified personnel, actuation of theemergency shutdown control system

F may be manual after devices warn ofthe events listed in paragraph (a) of thissection.

(c) Except for components thatoperate unattended and are remote fromthe control center, a reasonable delaymay be programmed in emergencyshutdown control systems required bythis section between warning-andautomated shutdown to provide formanual response,

(d) Each LNG plant must have ashutdown control system to shut downall operations of the plant safely. Thesystem must be operable at-

(1) The control center; and(2) In the case of a plant where LNG

facilities other than the control centerare designed to operate unattended atthe site of these facilities.

§ 193.2441 Control center.Each LNG plant must have a control

center from which operations andwarning devices are monitored asrequired by this part. A control centermust have the following capabilities andcharacteristics-

(a) It must be located apart orprotected from other LNG facilities sothat it is operational during acontrollable emergency.

(b) Each remotely actuated controlsystem and each automatic shutdowncontrol system required by this partmust be operable from the controlcenter.

(c) Each control center must havepersonnel in continuous attendancewhile any of the components under itscontrol are in operation, unless thecontrol is being performed from anothercontrol center which has personnel incontinuous attendance.

(d) If more than one control center Islocated at an LNG Plant, each controlcenter must have more than one meansof communication with each othercenter.

(e) Each control center must have ameans of communicating a warning ofhazardous conditions to other locationswithin the plant frequented bypersonnel.

§ 193.2443 Fail-safe control.Control systems for components must

have a fail-safe design. A safe conditionmust be maintained until personnel takeappropriate action either to reactivatethe component served or to prevent ahazard from occurring.

§ 193.2445 Sources of power.(a) Electrical control systems, means

of communication, emergency lighting,and firefighting systems must have atleast two sources of power whichfunction so that failure of one sourcedoes not affect the capability of theother source. I I

Federal Register I Vol. 45, No. 29 / Monday, February 11, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

(b) Where auxiliary generators areused as a second source of electricalpower-

(1) They must be located apart orprotected from components so that theyare not unusable during a controllableemergency- and

(2) Fuel supply must be protected fromhazards.

Subpart F IReserved]

Subpart G [Reserved]

Subpart H-Personnel Qualificationsand Training

§ 193.2701 Scope.

This subpart prescribes requirementsfor personnel qualifications and training.

1 93.2703 Design and fabrication.For the design and fabrication of

components, each operator shall use-[a) With respect to design, persons

who~have demonstrated competence bytraining or experience in the design ofcomparable components.

(b) With respect to fabrication.persons who have demonstratedcompetence-by training or experience inthe fabrication of comparablecomponents.

§193.2705 Construction, Installation,Inspection, and testing..

(a) Supervisors and other personnelutilized for construction, installation.inspection. or testing must havedemonstrated their capability to performsatisfactorily the assigned finction byappropriate training in the methods andequipment to be used or relatedexperience and accomplishments.-1b) Each operator must periodically

determine whether inspectorsperforming duties under § 193.2307 aresatisfactorily performing their assignedfunction.

Appendix A to Part 193-Incorporationby Reference

L List pf Organizations and AddressesA. American Concrete Institute [ACI),

P.O. Box 19150, Redford Station, Detroit.Michigan 48219.

B. American Gas Association [AGA),1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington,Virginia 22209.

C. American National StandardsInstitute [ANSI), 1430 Broadway, NewYork, New York 10018.

D. American Petroleum Institute (API),2101 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C.20037.

E. American Society of MechanicalEngineers [ASME), United EngineeringCenter, 345 East 47th Street, New York,New York 10017.

F. Nationil Fire Protection -Association (NFPA), 470 AtlanticAvenue. Boston. Massachusetts 02210.

G. International Conference ofBailding Officials, 5360 South WorkmanHill Road. Whittier, California 9000LI. Documents Incorporated byReferenceA. American Concrete Institute (ACI)

1. ACI Standard 311-75-Recommended Practice for ConcreteInspection. (1975 edition).B. American Gas Association (AGA)

1. Evaluation of ING Vapor ControlMethods. (October 1974 edition).C. American National StandardsInstitute (ANSI)

1. ANSI A 58.1 Building CodeRequirements for Minimum DesignLoads in Buildings and Other Structures.D. American Petroleum Institute (API)

1. API 620-Recommended Rules forDesign and Construction of Large,Welded. Low Pressure Storage Tanks(6th edition, July 1977).

2. API 1104 Standard for WeldingPipelines and Related Facilities (14edition, 1977).

3. API 6D Specifications for PipelineValves (17 edition. 1977).E. American Society of MechanicalEngineers [AS.ME)

1. ANSI B31.3 Chemical and PlantPetroleum Refinery Piping (1976 edition).

2. ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode. Section 1 Power Boilers (1977edition).

3. ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode. Section 8 Division 1 (1977 edition).

4. ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode, Section 8 Division 2 AlternativeRules (1977 edition).

5. ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode, Section 9 Welding and BrazingQualifications [1977 edition).

6. ASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode, Section 4 Heating Boilers.

7. ANSI B31.5 Refrigera tion Piping(1974 edition).

8. ANSI 331.8 Gas Transmission andDistribution Piping Systems (1975

"editioTI).F. International Conference of BuildingOfficials

1. UBC. Uniform Building Code (1979edition).G. Nationql Fire Protection Association(NFPA)

1. NFPA No. 37 StationaryCombustion Engine and Gas Turbines(1979 edition).

2. NFPA No. 59A Storage andHandling of LNG (1979 edition).

3. NFPA No. 70 National Electric Code(1978 edition).

4. NFPA No. 30 Flammable Liquids.[iR Doc. 80-3717 Filed Z4 3:3 Pa iBILUNG CODE 4910-60

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