10068058compilation legis dept.docx

8/22/2019 10068058compilation legis dept.docx

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Consti law legis dept

1. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro(G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919)Section 1.cd

Ponente: Malcolm, J.

Facts:

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted

resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian

inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to

take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied

public lands. It is resolved that under section

2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares

of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on NaujanLake be selected as a site for the permanent

settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further,

Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this

reservation providing that said homestead

applications are previously recommended by the

provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the

Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans

in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the

Mangyans east of the Baco River including

those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi'splace in Calapan, were ordered to take up their

habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.

Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to

comply with this order shall upon conviction be

imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in

accordance with section 2759 of the revised

Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of

Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures

for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro

as well as the protection of public forests inwhich they roam, and to introduce civilized

customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his

rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the

reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be

punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being

illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial

officials of that province. Rubi and his

companions are said to be held on the

reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,

against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be

held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in

the prison at Calapan for having run away form

the reservation.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the

Administrative Code deprive a person of his

liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the

Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:

The Court held that section 2145 of the

Administrative Code does not deprive a person

of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him

the equal protection of the laws, and that

confinement in reservations in accordance with

said section does not constitute slavery and

involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the

opinion that section 2145 of the AdministrativeCode is a legitimate exertion of the police power.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917

is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts

for the advancement of the non-Christian people

of the province; and (2) the only successfully

method for educating the Manguianes was to

oblige them to live in a permanent settlement.

The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) Theprotection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection

of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the

necessity of introducing civilized customs among

the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is

unduly interfered without when the degree of

civilization of the Manguianes is considered.


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They are restrained for their own good and the

general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is

restraint by law for the good of the individual and

for the greater good of the peace and order of

society and the general well-being. No man cando exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken

away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully

imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

corpus can, therefore, not issue.

2. Antipolo Realty vs. National Housing

GR no.50444, August 31, 1987

FACTS:

Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot.

No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights

Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty

Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando

transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private

respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure

of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision

project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages

pertaining to the period up to, and including, the

month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly

installment payments falling due thereafter. On

October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo

Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson

advising that the required improvements in the

subdivision had already been completed, and

requesting resumption of payment of the

monthly installments on Lot No. 15.

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-

October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to

pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo

Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to

Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment

payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr.

Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty

before public respondent NHA.

After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9

March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the

Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motionfor Reconsideration asserting that the

jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's

complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not

in the NHA.

The motion for reconsideration was denied by

respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction

to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence,

this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction

over the present controversy.

HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC.

It is by now commonplace learning that many

administrative agencies exercise and perform

adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a

limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial

or quasi-judicial authority to administrative

agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction,

basically because the need for special

competence and experience has been

recognized as essential in the resolution of

questions of complex or specialized character

and because of a companion recognition that

the dockets of our regular courts have remained

crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of

judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an

administrative agency may exercise is defined in

the enabling act of such agency. In other words,

the extent to which an administrative entity mayexercise such powers depends largely, if not

wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating

or empowering such agency. In the exercise of

such powers, the agency concerned must

commonly interpret and apply contracts and

determine the rights of private parties under

such contracts.


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Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known

as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'

Decree", states that National Housing Authority.

The National Housing Authority shall have

exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estatetrade and business in accordance with the

provisions of this decree. Presidential Decree

No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-

judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory

authority to the NHA in the following manner:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to

regulate the real estate trade and business and

in addition to its powers provided for in

Presidential Decree No. 957, the National

Housing Authority shall have exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the

following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims

filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit

buyer against the project owner, developer,

dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations filed by

buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units

against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or

salesman.

The need for and therefore the scope of the

regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are

indicated in the second and third preambular

paragraphs of the statute. There is no question

that under Presidential Decree No. 957, theNHA was legally empowered to determine and

protect the rights of contracting parties under the

law administered by it and under the respective

agreements, as well as to ensure that their

obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

4. Atitiw V. Zamora G.R. No. 143374En Banc,J. TingaCase Digest by: Gino Angelo P. Yanga

Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitutionordains the creation of autonomous regions inMuslim Mindanao and in the Cordillerasmandating the Congress to enact organic actspursuant to section 18 of article X of theConstitution. Thus, by virtue of the residualpowers of President Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then thecongress enacted R.A 6766, an act providingfor organic act for the cordil lera autonomousregion, a plebiscite was cast but was notapprove by the people. The court declared thatE.O 220 to be still in force and effect untilproperly repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the

General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000)which includes the assailed special provisions,then issued an E.O 270 to extend theimplementation of the winding up of operationsof the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O328.The petitioners seek the declaration ofnullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions ofRA 870 (GAA2000) directing that theappropriation for the CAR shall be spent to windup its activities and pay the separation andretirement benefits of all the affected membersand employees.

Issue:1. Whether the assailed special provisions in RA8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional.

2.Whether the Philippine Government, throughCongress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO220.

3.Whether the Republic should be ordered tohonor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220

Ruling:In relation to article VI section 25(2) andsection 26 the court said that xxx an

appropriations bill covers a broader range ofsubject matter and therefore includes moredetails compared to an ordinary bill. The title ofan appropriations bill cannot be any broader asit is since it is not feasible to come out with a titlethat embraces all the details included in anappropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; itfollows the standard that a provision in anappropriations bill must relate specifically to


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some particular appropriations. On the otherhand, the contention that Congress cannotamend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is nosuch thing as an irrepealable law. And nothingcould prevent the Congress from amending orrepealing the E.O. 220 because it is no differentfrom any other law. The last issue, the courtruled that, the concept of separations of powerspresupposes mutual respect. Therefore, theimplementation of E.O. 220 is an executiveprerogative while the sourcing of funds is withinthe powers of the legislature. In the absence ofany grave abuse of discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of either the Executive or theLegislative in respect to policies concerningCAR.

6. AGUSTIN vs EDU

88 SCRA 195

FACTS: This was an original action in the

Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an

owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035

already properly equipped when it came out

from the assembly lines with blinking lights

which could serve as an early warning device in

case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of

Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the

Implementing rules and regulations inAdministrative Order No 1 issued by Land

transportation Commission.Respondent Land

Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu

issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to

Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It

required the use of early Warning Devices

(EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that

the letter of instructions, as well as the

implementing rules and regulations were

unlawful and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were

considered valid and constitutional?

HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of

Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the

implementing rules and regulations were valid

and constitutional as a valid measure of police

power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs

and signals and the United Nations Organization

was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for

the installation of road safety signs and

devices.It cannot be disputed then that this

Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution

possesses relevance,between the International

law and municipal law in applying the rule

municipal law prevails.

Petition is DISMISSED.

7. October 30, 1981

Free Telephone Workers Union v Minister of

Labor

GR# L- 58184

Petitioner:

Free Telephone Workers Union

Respondent:

Minister of Labor

Ponente:

Fernando, C.J.:

Facts:

On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of

strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor

practices stating the following grounds: "1)

Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a

Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminations and

suspensions of our officers and members as a

result of the implementation of said Code of

Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation of call sick

leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence

Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with

corresponding suspensions, in violation of our

Collective Bargaining Agreement." After which


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came, on September 15, 1981, thenotification to

the Ministry that there was compliance with the

two-thirds strike vote and other formal

requirements of the law and Implementing

Rules. Several conciliation meetings called by

the Ministry followed, with the petitioner

manifesting its willingness to have a revised

Code of Conduct that would be fair to all

concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile

the Code of Conduct being imposed be

suspended-a position that failed to meet the

approval of private respondent. Subsequently,

on September 25, 1981, the respondent certified

the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations

Commission for compulsory arbitration and

enjoined any strike at the private respondent's

establishment. The labor dispute was set for

hearing by respondent National Labor Relations

Commission on September 28, 1981. There was

in the main an admission of the above relevant

facts by public respondents. Private respondent,

following the lead of petitioner labor union,

explained its side on the controversy regarding

the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as

alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting

in what it deemed indefinite preventivesuspension-apparently the principal cause of the

labor dispute. The very next day after the filing

of the petition, this Court issued the following

resolution: "Considering the allegations

contained, the issues raised and the arguments

adduced in the petition for Certiorari with prayer

for a restraining order, the Court Resolved to (a)

require the respondents to file an [answer], not a

motion to dismiss, on or before Wednesday,

October 7, 1981; and (b) [Set] this case forhearing on Thursday, October 8, 1981 at 11:00

o'clock in the morning." After the parties were

duly heard, Solicitor General Estelito P.

Mendoza appearing for the public respondents,

the case was considered ripe for decision.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation to the

MOLE?

Held:

No. The Delegation to the MOLE of the power to

assume jurisdiction in the labor dispute was

likely to affect the national interest or to certify

the same to the NLRC for arbitration does not

constitute an undue delegation of legislative

powers.

The allegation that there is undue delegation of

legislative powers cannot stand the test of

scrutiny. The power which he would deny the

Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for

petitioner labor union within the competence of

the President, who in its opinion can best

determine national interests, but only when a

strike is in progress. Such admission is qualified

by the assumption that the President "can make

law," an assertion which need not be passed

upon in this petition. What possesses

significance for the purpose of this litigation is

that it is the President who "shall have control ofthe ministries." It may happen, therefore, that a

single person may occupy a dual position of

Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent,

however, that what is involved is the execution

or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an

official of the executive branch of the

government. The adoption of certain aspects of

a parliamentary system in the amended

Constitution does not alter its essentially

presidential character. Article VII on thepresidency starts with this provision: "The

President shall be the head of state and chief

executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its

last section is an even more emphatic

affirmation that it is a presidential system that

obtains in our government.


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8. CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion inautomatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion fordebt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriatedunder RA 6831, otherwise known as the GeneralApproriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,while the appropriations for the DECS amount toP27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debtservice is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic ActNumbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), byPD No. 1177, entitled Revising the BudgetProcess in Order to Institutionalize the

Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, andby PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengtheningthe Guarantee and Payment Positions of theRepublic of the Philippines on its ContingentLiabilities Arising out of Relent and GuaranteedLoans by Appropriating Funds For ThePurpose.

The petitioners were questioning theconstitutionality of the automatic appropriationfor debt service, it being higher than the budgetfor education, therefore it is against Section 5(5),Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates

to assign the highest budgetary priority toeducation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation fordebt service is unconstitutional; it being higherthan the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5),Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is

mandated to assign the highest budgetarypriority to education, it does not thereby followthat the hands of Congress are so hamstrung asto deprive it the power to respond to theimperatives of the national interest and for theattainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power,guided only by its good judgment, to provide anappropriation, that can reasonably service our

enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honorand to protect the credit standing of the country.More especially, the very survival of oureconomy is at stake. Thus, if in the processCongress appropriated an amount for debtservice bigger than the share allocated toeducation, the Court finds and so holds that saidappropriation cannot be thereby assailed asunconstitutional

Guingona, JR v Carague, Supreme Court of

the Philippines - G.R. No. 94571, 22 April

1991

Guingona, JR v Carague, Supreme Court ofthe Philippines - G.R. No. 94571, 22 April1991

Keywords: Resource allocation, budgetarycontraints, availability, national court,

constitutional law, PhilippinesA group of senators in the Philippineschallenged the constitutionality of the budgetaryallocation of P86 billion for debt servicing whichcompared to P27 billion for education. TheConstitution of the Philippines obliges thegovernment to assign the highest budgetarypriority to education.The Court found that education had constitutedthe highest allocation apart from debt servicingwhich was necessary to safeguard thecreditworthiness of the country and the survivalof its ecomomy.In making its decision, the Court stated;There can be no question as to the patriotismand good motive of petitioners in filing thispetition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail onthe constitutional and legal issues raised. As towhether or not the country should honor itsinternational debt, more especially the enormousamount that had been incurred by the pastadministration, which appears to be the ultimateobjective of the petition, is not an issue that ispresented or proposed to be addressed by theCourt. Indeed, it is more of a political decisionfor Congress and the Executive to determine inthe exercise of their wisdom and sound

discretion.The application was unsuccessful.

9. Araneta v Gatmaitan G.R. Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957

Ponente: Felix, J.


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Facts:

The League of Municipal Mayors of

municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between

the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines

Norte, manifested in a resolution that theycondemn the operation of trawls in the said area

and resolving to petition the President of the

Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel

Bay. In another resolution, the same League of

Mayors prayed that the President ban the

operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area.

In response to the pleas, the President issued

EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San

Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66

apparently in answer to a resolution of the

Provincial Board of Camaries Sur

recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing

during the typhoon season only. Subsequently,

EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22

Thereafter a group of Otter trawl operators filed

a complaint for injunction praying that the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

and director of Fisheries be enjoined from

enforcing said executive order and to declare

the same null and void. The Court held that until

the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment,

it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay byexecutive proclamation and held that the Eos 22

and 66 are invald.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the President has

authority to issue Eos 22, 66 and 80

2. Whether or not the said EOs were valid

as it was not in the exercise of

legislative powers unduly delegated to

the President.

Held:

1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the

fisheries law, the restriction and banning

of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters

come within the powers of the Secreatry

of agriculture and Natural Resources.

However, as the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources exercises its

functions subject to the general

supervision and control of the President

of the Philippines, the President can

exercise the same power and authority

through executive orders, regulations,

decrees and proclamations upon

recommendation of the Secretary

concerned. Hence, Eos 22,66 and 80

restricting and banning of trawl fishing

from San Miguel Bay are valid and

issued by authority or law.

2. Yes. For the protection of fry or fish

eggs and small immature fishes,

Congress intended with thepromulgation og the Fisheries Act, to

prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing

device like trawl nets that could

endanger and deplete our supply of

seafood, and to that end authorized the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources to provide by regulations and

such restriction as he deemed

necessary in order to preserve the

aquatic resources of the land. When the

President, in response to the clamor of

the people and authorities of Camarines

Sur issues EO 80 absolutely prohibiting

fishing by means of trawls in all waters

comprised within the san Miguel Bay, he

did nothing but show an anxious regard

for the welfare of the inhabitants of said

coastal province and dispose of issues

of general concern which were in

consonance and strict conformity with

the law.

***Copied from SBC LAW AY 09-10***

1 1 . G e r o c h i v s D O E G r . 1 5 9 7 9 6

J u l y 1 7 , 2 0 0 7


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F a c t s :

RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power

Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which

sought to impose a universal charge on all end-

users of electricity for the purpose of funding

NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and tookeffect in 2001. Petitioners contest the

constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the

imposition of the universal charge on all end-

users is oppressive and confiscatory and

amounts to taxation without representation for

not giving the consumers a chance to be heard

and represented.

Issue:

Whether or not the universal charge is a tax

Ruling of the Court:

No. The assailed universal charge is not a tax,

but an exaction in the exercise of the States

police power. That public welfare is promoted

may be collected from Sec 2 of the EPIRA which

enumerates the policies of the State regarding

electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund

feature of the universal charge reasonably

serves and assures the attainment and

perpetuity of the purposes for which the

universal charge is imposed.

11)ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OFENERGY (DOE )G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007Ponente: NACHURA, J.

: FACTS

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng

Bayan(KB), and Environmentalist Consumers

Network, Inc. (ECN)(petitioners), come before

this Court in this original action praying that

Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136,otherwise

known as the Electric Power Industry Reform

Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal

Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and

Regulations (IRR)which

seeks to implement the said imposition, be

declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray

that the Universal Charge imposed upon the

consumers be refunded and that a preliminary

injunction and/or temporary restraining order

(TRO) be issued directing the respondents to

refrain from implementing, charging, and

collecting the said charge. Congress enacted

the EPIRA on June8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it

took effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent

National Power Corporation-Strategic Power

Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with

respondent Energy Regulatory Commission

(ERC) a petition for the availment from the

Universal Charge of its share for MissionaryElectrification

. On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition

with ERC, praying that the proposed share from

theUniversal Charge for the Environmental

charge be approved for withdrawal from the

Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by

respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities

Management Group (PSALM) for the

rehabilitation and management of watershed

areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued

an Order provisionally approving the computed

amount as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the

Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification

and authorizing the National Transmission

Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution

Utilities to collectthe same from its end-users on

a monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-

SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsiderationasking

the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the

Decision. On April 2, 2003, ERC authorized the

NPC to draw upto P70,000,000.00 from PSALMfor its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget

subject to the availability of funds for the

Environmental Fund component of the Universal

Charge.

On the basis of the said ERC decisions,

respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.

(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P.Gerochi


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and all other end-users with the Universal

Charge as reflected in their respective electric

bills starting from the month of July 2003.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of

law and its IRR which sought to implement the

same are unconstitutional on the following

grounds:

1)The universal charge provided for under Sec.

34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented

under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law

is a tax which is to be collected from all electric

end-users and self-generating entities. The

power to tax is strictly a legislative function and

as such, the delegation of said power to any

executive or administrative agency like the ERCis unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited

authority. The assailed provision clearly provides

that the Universal Charge is to be determined,

fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving

to the latter complete discretionary legislative

authority.

2)The ERC is also empowered to approve and

determine where the funds collected should be

used.

3)The imposition of the Universal Charge on all

end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and

amounts to taxation without representation as

the consumers were not given a chance to be

heard and represented.

Respondent

PSALM through the Office of the Government

Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and RespondentsDepartment of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC,

through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

contends:

1) Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide

income for public purposes, the assailed

Universal Charge is levied for a specific

regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the

viability of the country's electric power industry.

2) It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its

inherent police power. On this premise, PSALM

submits thatthere is no undue delegation of

legislative power to the ERC since the latter

merely exercisesa limited authority or discretion

as to the execution and implementation of the

provisions of the EPIRA.

3)UniversalCharge does not possess the

essential characteristics of a tax, that its

imposition would redoundto the benefit of the

electric power industry and not to the public, and

that its rate is uniformly levied onelectricity end-

users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on

the individual taxpayer's ability to pay.

4)Imposition of the Universal Chargeis not

oppressive and confiscatorysince it is an

exercise of the police power of the State and it

complies with the requirements of due process.

PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and

remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary

Electrification andEnvironmental Fund

components of the Universal Charge, pursuant

to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in

ERCCase Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-

165.Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under

Sec. 46[24]of the EPIRA, whichimposes fines

and penalties for any violation of its provisions or

its IRR.

ISSUE

1)Whether or not, the Universal Charge

imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax

2)Whether or not there is undue delegation of

legislative power to tax on the part of theERC.HELD

1st

ISSUE

The conservative and pivotal distinction between

these two powers rests in the purpose for which

the charge is made. If generation of revenue is


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the primary purpose and regulation is merely

incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if

regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that

revenue is incidentally raised does not make the

imposition a tax. In exacting the assailed

Universal Charge through

Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power,

particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.

Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which

enumerates the purposes for which the

Universal Charge is imposed.

From the aforementioned purposes, it can be

gleaned that the assailed Universal Chargeis not

a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the

State's police power. Public welfare is surely

promoted.

2nd

ISSUE

There is no undue delegation of legislative

power to the ERC. The principle of separation of

powers ordains that each of the three branches

of government has exclusive cognizance of and

is supreme in matters falling within its own

constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical

corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers

is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as

expressed in the Latin maxim potestas

delegation delegari potest (what has been

delegated cannot be delegated). This is based

on the ethical principle that such delegated

power constitutes not only a right but a duty to

be performed by the delegate through the

instrumentality of his own judgment and not

through the intervening mind of another.

In the face of the increasing complexity of

modern life, delegation of legislative power to

various specialized administrative agencies isallowed as an exception to this principle. Given

the volume and variety of interactions in todays

society, it is doubtful if the legislature can

promulgate laws that will deal adequately with

and respond promptly to the minutiae of

everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to

administrative bodies - the principal agencies

tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields

- the authority to promulgate rules and

regulations to implement a given statute and

effectuate its policies. All that is required for the

valid exercise of this power of subordinate

legislation is that the regulation be germane to

the objects and purposes of the law and that the

regulation be not in contradiction to, but

inconformity with, the standards prescribed by

the law. These requirements are denominated

as the completeness test and the sufficient

standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in

all its terms and conditions when it leaves the

legislature such that when it reaches the

delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to

enforce it. The second test mandates adequate

guidelines or limitations in the law to determinethe boundaries of the delegate's authority and

prevent the delegation from running riot. The

Court finds that the EPIRA, read and

appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34

thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and

conditions, and that it contains sufficient

standards.

1st

test

- Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely

provides that within one (1) year from the

effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be

determined, fixed and approved by the ERC,

shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and

therefore, does not state the specific amount to

be paid as Universal Charge, the amount

nevertheless is made certain by the legislative

parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover,

contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC

does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the

determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the

law is complete and passes the first test for validdelegation of legislative power.

2nd

test

- Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among

others, to ensure the total electrification of the

country and the quality, reliability, security and

affordability of the supply of electric power

[59]and watershed rehabilitation and

management[60] meet the requirements for valid


11/22

delegation, as they provide the limitations on the

ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are

sufficient standards. From the foregoing

disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no

undue delegation of legislative power to the

ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum

the contention in the Complaint that the

imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-

users is oppressive and confiscatory, and

amounts to taxation without representation.

Hence, such contention is deemed waived or

abandoned

Moreover, the determination of whether or not a

tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an

issue which essentially involves questions offact, and thus, this Court is precluded from

reviewing the same

.Finally, every law has in its favor the

presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its

nullification, there must be a clear and

unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not

one that is doubtful, speculative, or

argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to

overcome this presumption in favor of the

EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the

Constitution which would warrant a

pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and

Rule18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

12. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 November 3,

2008

FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the

constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug

testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2)

students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3)

officers and employees of public and private

offices; and (4) persons charged before the

prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable

penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years

and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized

drug testing shall be done by any government

forensic laboratories or by any of the drug

testing laboratories accredited and monitored by

the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test

results. The drug testing shall employ, among

others, two (2) testing methods, the screening

test which will determine the positive result as

well as the type of drug used and the

confirmatory test which will confirm a positive

screening test. x x x The following shall be

subjected to undergo drug testing:(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.

Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,

pursuant to the related rules and regulations as

contained in the school's student handbook and

with notice to the parents, undergo a random

drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private

offices. Officers and employees of public and

private offices, whether domestic or overseas,

shall be subjected to undergo a random drug

test as contained in the company's work rules

and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing

the risk in the workplace. Any officer or

employee found positive for use of dangerous

drugs shall be dealt with administratively which

shall be a ground for suspension or termination,

subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the

Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil

Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's

office with a criminal offense having an

imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less

than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergoa mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether

appointed or elected both in the national or local

government shall undergo a mandatory drug

test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC

Resolution No. 6486.


12/22

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an

additional qualification for candidates for

senator?

2. Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), and (f)

of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

Ruling of the Court:

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No.

161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.

6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also

PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos.

157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.

36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL,but declaring its Sec. 36(f)

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus

permanently enjoined all the concerned

agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and

(g) of RA 9165.]

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC

Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional

qualification for candidates for senator; NO,

Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing

qualifications for candidates for senator in

addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of

RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486

illegally impose an additional qualification on

candidates for senator. He points out that,

subject to the provisions on nuisance

candidates, a candidate for senator needs only

to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,

Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship,

(2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and

(5) residency. Beyond these stated qualificationrequirements, candidates for senator need not

possess any other qualification to run for senator

and be voted upon and elected as member of

the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend

or otherwise modify these qualification

standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or

weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or

alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly,

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby

declared as, unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be

implemented by the assailed COMELEC

resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification

requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI

of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)

unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to

be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a

pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of

candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a

condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if

proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The

COMELEC resolution completes the chain with

the proviso that [n]o person elected to anypublic office shall enter upon the duties of his

office until he has undergone mandatory drug

test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing

COMELEC Resolution add another qualification

layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the

minimum, requires for membership in the

Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up

under the challenged provision is to be hurdled

before or after election is really of no moment,

as getting elected would be of little value if one

cannot assume office for non-compliance with

the drug-testing requirement.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA

9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES,

paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As to paragraph (c), covering students of

secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School

District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education ofIndependent School District No. 92 of

Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the

Court deduced and applied the following

principles: (1) schools and their administrators

stand in loco parentis with respect to their

students; (2) minor students have contextually

fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the

custody and supervision of their parents,


13/22

guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in

loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the

health and well-being of their students and may

adopt such measures as may reasonably be

necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)

schools have the right to impose conditions on

applicants for admission that are fair, just, and

non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of

Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so

holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring

mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug

testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it

is within the prerogative of educational

institutions to require, as a condition for

admission, compliance with reasonable school

rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to

fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and

employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the

Constitution is couched and as has been

held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the

validity of a government search or intrusion. And

whether a search at issue hews to the

reasonableness standard is judged by the

balancing of the government-mandated intrusion

on the individual's privacy interest against the

promotion of some compelling state interest. In

the criminal context, reasonableness requires

showing of probable cause to be personally

determined by a judge. Given that the drug-

testing policy for employeesand students for

that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of

administrative search needing what was referred

to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary

procedures, the probable-cause standard is notrequired or even practicable. Be that as it may,

the review should focus on the reasonableness

of the challenged administrative search in

question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of

reasonableness is the nature of the privacy

interest upon which the drug testing, which

effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2,

Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case,

the office or workplace serves as the backdrop

for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the

employees and the reasonableness of drug

testing requirement. The employees' privacy

interest in an office is to a large extent

circumscribed by the company's work policies,

the collective bargaining agreement, if any,

entered into by management and the bargaining

unit, and the inherent right of the employer to

maintain discipline and efficiency in the

workplace. Their privacy expectation in a

regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;

and a degree of impingement upon such privacy

has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor isthe character of the intrusion authorized by the

challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is

the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set

forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the

enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly

drawn" or "narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the

affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its

implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as

couched, contain provisions specifically directed

towards preventing a situation that would unduly

embarrass the employees or place them under a

humiliating experience. While every officer and

employee in a private establishment is under the

law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a

possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really

singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal

is to discourage drug use by not telling in

advance anyone when and who is to be tested.

And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165

itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing

ingredient by providing that the employeesconcerned shall be subjected to random drug

test as contained in the companys work rules

and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing

the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be

undertaken under conditions calculated to

protect as much as possible the employee's


14/22

privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the

test, the law specifies that the procedure shall

employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening

test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to

ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness

of the results. But the more important

consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be

conducted by trained professionals in access-

controlled laboratories monitored by the

Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard

against results tampering and to ensure an

accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR

issued by the DOH provides that access to the

drug results shall be on the need to know

basis; that the drug test result and the records

shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual

accepted practices to protect the confidentiality

of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does notoblige the employer concerned to report to the

prosecuting agencies any information or

evidence relating to the violation of

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs

Act received as a result of the operation of the

drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into

the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is

accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly

against embarrassing leakages of test results,

and is relatively minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,

the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of

the employees, the compelling state concern

likely to be met by the search, and the well-

defined limits set forth in the law to properly

guide authorities in the conduct of the random

testing, we hold that the challenged drug test

requirement is, under the limited context of the

case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector,

government officials and employees also laborunder reasonable supervision and restrictions

imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws

on public officers, all enacted to promote a high

standard of ethics in the public service. And if

RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for

private employees, the more reason that it

should pass the test for civil servants, who, by

constitutional command, are required to be

accountable at all times to the people and to

serve them with utmost responsibility and

efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged

before the prosecutors office with a crime with

an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not

less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and

(d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid

justification for mandatory drug testing for

persons accused of crimes. In the case of

students, the constitutional viability of the

mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug

testing for students emanates primarily from the

waiver by the students of their right to privacy

when they seek entry to the school, and fromtheir voluntarily submitting their persons to the

parental authority of school authorities. In the

case of private and public employees, the

constitutional soundness of the mandatory,

random, and suspicionless drug

testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the

drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case

of persons charged before the public

prosecutor's office with criminal offenses

punishable with 6 years and 1 day

imprisonment. The operative concepts in the

mandatory drug testing are randomness and

suspicionless. In the case of persons charged

with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a

mandatory drug testing can never be random or

suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and

being suspicionless are antithetical to their being

made defendants in a criminal complaint. They

are not randomly picked; neither are they

beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of

committing a crime are charged, they aresingled out and are impleaded against their will.

The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of

being haled before the prosecutors office and

peaceably submitting themselves to drug

testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily

consent to the procedure, let alone waive their

right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug

testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to


15/22

harness a medical test as a tool for criminal

prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of

RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate

a persons right to privacy guaranteed under

Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the

accused persons are veritably forced to

incriminate themselves.

17. Conference v POEA

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA

166 SCRA 533

POEA: Cases under the Jurisdiction of POEA

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V

Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an

accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His

widow sued for damages under Executive Order

No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the

POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel,

argued that the complaint was cognizable not by

the POEA but by the Social Security System and

should have been filed against the State

Insurance Fund.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction

and after considering the position papers of the

parties ruled in favor of the complainant.

The decision is challenged by the petitioner on

the principal ground that the POEA had no

jurisdiction over the case as the husband was

not an overseas worker.

Issue:

Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held:

The Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration was created under Executive

Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to

promote and monitor the overseas employment

of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced

the National Seamen Board created earlier

under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974.

Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order,

the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive

jurisdiction over all cases, including money

claims, involving employee-employer relations

arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract

involving Filipino contract workers, including

seamen."

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits

and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made

by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum

Circular No. 2, which became effective on

February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a

standard contract to be adopted by both foreign

and domestic shipping companies in the hiring

of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

But the petitioner questions the validity of

Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of

the principle of non-delegation of legislative

power. It contends that no authority had been

given the POEA to promulgate the said

regulation; and even with such authorization, the

regulation represents an exercise of legislative

discretion which, under the principle, is not

subject to delegation.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative

regulation. The model contract prescribed

thereby has been applied in a significant number

of the cases without challenge by the employer.

The power of the POEA (and before it the

National Seamen Board) in requiring the model

contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient

standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of

the said authority. That standard is discoverable

in the executive order itself which, in creating the

Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration, mandated it to protect the rightsof overseas Filipino workers to "fair and

equitable employment practices."

14. People v. Rosenthal & Osmena (Crim1)


16/22

People v. Rosenthal & Osmena

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v.

Jacob Rosenthal & Nicasio Osmena,

defendants-appellants

En Banc

Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Keywords: void of vagueness, equal protection,

undue delegation of legislative authority

Date: June 12, 1939

Ponente: Justice Laurel

Facts:

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were

founders and shareholders of the O.R.O.

OilCompany. The main objects and purposes of

the company are to mine, refine, market, buy

and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil

products.

Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by

the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to

individuals without first obtaining the

corresponding written permit or license from theInsular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines.

This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No.

2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.

o Section 2 of said law provides that every

person, partnership, association, or corporation

attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines

speculative securities of any kind or character

whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously

with the Insular Treasurer thevariousdocumentsandpapers enumerated

therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-

pesos.

o Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that

whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine

Islands is satisfied, either with or without

theexaminationherein provided, that any

person, partnership, association or corporation

is entitled to the right to offer its securities as

above defined and provided for sale in the

Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person,

partnership, association or corporation a

certificate or permit reciting that such person,

partnership, association or corporation has

complied with the provisions of this act, and that

such person, partnership, association or

corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to

order the securities named in said certificate or

permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall

furthermore have authority, whenever in his

judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel

said certificate or permit, and that an appeal

from thedecisionof the Insular Treasurer may

be had within theperiodof thirty days to the

Secretary of Finance.

The shares are said to

be speculative because their value materially

depended upon a promise of future promotion

and development of the oil business, rather than

on actual tangible assets.

On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that

Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds:

o 1) That it constitutes undue delegation of

legislative authority to the Insular treasurer

o 2) that it does not afford equal protection

before the law

o 3) that it is vague and ambiguous

Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in any of

the three grounds

Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all

grounds alleged by the appellants.

Ratio:

That it constitutes undue delegation of

legislative authority to the Insular treasurer
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17/22

The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the

Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision

regarding the issuance or cancellation of a

certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to

be issued under the Act must recite that the

person ,partnership, association or corporation

applying therefor has complied with the

provisions of this Act, and this requirement,

construed in relation to the other provisions of

the law, means that a certificate or permit shall

be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the

provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with.

Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular

Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is

expressly conditioned upon a finding that such

cancellation is in the public interest. In view of

the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect

the public against speculative schemes whichhave no more basis than so many feet of blue

sky and against the sale of stock infly-by-night

concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines,

and other like fraudulent exploitations, we hold

that public interest in this case is a sufficient

standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in

reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the

issuance or cancellation of certificates or

permits.

Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the

Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, itcannot be contended that the Treasurer can act

and decide without any restraining influence.

The theory of the separation of powers is

designed by its originators to secure action and

at the same time to forestall over action which

necessarily results from undue concentration of

powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and

prevent despotism. Thereby, the rule of law

was established which narrows the range of

governmental action and makes it subject to

control by certain legal devices. As a corollary,

we find the rule prohibiting delegation of

legislative authority, and from the earliest time

American legal authorities have proceeded on

the theory that legislative power must be

exercised by the legislative alone. It is

frankness, however, to confess that as one

delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements,

he finds a great deal of confusion.

the maxim delegatus non potest delegare or

delegata potestas non potest delegare has

beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of

modern governments, giving rise to theadoption, within certain limits, of the principle of

subordinate legislation, in practically all

modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the

limit and extent of the authority. While courts

have undertaken to laydown general principles,

the safest is to decide each case according to its

peculiar environment, having in mind the

wholesome legislative purpose intended to be

achieved.

Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of

law in this state that by legislative act a

commission or board may be empowered to

ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding

of which may depend the right to continue in the

practice of a profession or a regulated business.

that it does not afford equal protection

before the law

o Another ground relied upon by appellants in

contending that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutionalis that it denies equal protection of the laws

because the law discriminates between an

owner who sells his securities in a single

transaction and one who disposes of them in

repeated and successive transactions.

o Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co: "Prominent among

such discriminations are . . . between an owner

who sells his securities in a single transaction

and one who disposes of them in successive

transactions; . . . " If a class is deemed to

present a conspicuous example of what the

legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th

Amendment allows it to be dealt with although

otherwise and merely logically not

distinguishable from others not embraced in the

law

that it is vague and ambiguous


18/22

o People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad. An Act

will be declared void and inoperative on the

ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon

a showing that the defect is such that the courts

are unable to determine, with any reasonable

degree of certainty, what the legislature

intended.

o In this connection we cannot pretermit

reference to the rule that legislation should not

be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if

susceptible of any reasonable construction that

will support and give it effect. An Act will not be

declared inoperative and ineffectual on the

ground that it furnishes no adequate means to

secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men

of common sense and reason can devise and

provide the means, and all the instrumentalities

necessary for its execution are within the reach

of those intrusted therewith.

Judgement of lower court is affirmed, with

modifications that the fines are reduced.

Rosenthal: from P500 -> P200 in each

case

Osmena: from P1000 -> P500, from

P2000 -> P1000

Subsidiary imprisonment for both in case

of insolvency, and costs.

***Copied from

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v-rosenthal-osmena_23.html

15 and 17. Conference (Eastern Shipping Lines)v. POEA166 SCRA 533 (1988)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation ofLegislative Power

EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation

Tests for Valid Delegation of LegislativePower

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, waskilled in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widowfiled a complaint for damages against theEastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, basedon Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by thelatter which stipulated death benefits and burialexpenses for the family of an overseas worker.Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity ofthe memorandum circular. Nevertheless, thePOEA assumed jurisdiction and decided thecase.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance ofMemorandum Circular No. 2 is aviolation of non-delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation ofpowers.

In questioning the validity of thememorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Linescontended that POEA was given no authority topromulgate the regulation, and even with suchauthorization, the regulation represents anexercise of legislative discretion which, underthe principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers;exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to thesubstantive contents of the law cannot bedelegated. What can be delegated is thediscretion to determine how the law may beenforced, not what the law shall be. Theascertainment of the latter subject is aprerogative of the legislature. This prerogativecannot be abdicated or surrendered by thelegislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of LegislativePower

There are two accepted tests to determinewhether or not there is a valid delegation oflegislative power, viz, the completeness test andthe sufficient standard test. Under the first test,the law must be complete in all its terms and
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conditions when it leaves the legislature suchthat when it reaches the delegate the only thinghe will have to do is to enforce it. Under thesufficient standard test, there must be adequateguidelines or stations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegates authority andprevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a totaltransference of legislative authority to thedelegate, who is not allowed to step into theshoes of the legislature and exercise a poweressentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power hasbecome the rule and its non-delegation theexception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of thetask of government and the growing inability ofthe legislature to cope directly with the myriadproblems demanding its attention. The growth ofsociety has ramified its activities and createdpeculiar and sophisticated problems that thelegislature cannot be expected to reasonablycomprehend. Specialization even in legislationhas become necessary. Too many of theproblems attendant upon present-dayundertakings, the legislature may not have thecompetence to provide the required direct andefficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These

solutions may, however, be expected from itsdelegates, who are supposed to be experts inthe particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation oflegislative powers in general are particularlyapplicable to administrative bodies. With theproliferation of specialized activities and theirattendant peculiar problems, the nationallegislature has found it more and morenecessary to entrust to administrative agencies

the authority to issue rules to carry out thegeneral provisions of the statute. This is calledthe power of subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies mayimplement the broad policies laid down in statuteby filling in the detailswhich the Congress maynot have the opportunity or competence toprovide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is onesuch administrative regulation.

16. Tablarin v Gutierrez

GR#78164

Petitioners:

Teresita Tablarin et al.

Respondents:

Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez

Ponente:

Feliciano, J.:

Facts:

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary ofEducation, Culture and Sports, the Board ofMedical Education and the Center forEducational Measurement from enforcingSection 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiringthe taking and passing of the NMAT as acondition for securing certificates of eligibility foradmission, from proceeding with acceptingapplications for taking the NMAT and from

administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26April 1987 and in the future. The trial courtdenied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMATwas conducted and administered as previouslyscheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by RepublicActs Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectivesin the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act providesfor and shall govern (a) the standardization andregulation of medical education; (b) theexamination for registration of physicians; and(c) the supervision, control and regulation of thepractice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created aBoard of Medical Education. Its functions asspecified in Section 5 of the statute include thefollowing:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements foradmission into a recognized college of medicine;


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x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification foradmission to a medical school and keep aregister of those issued said certificate; and tocollect from said applicants the amount oftwenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the

operating fund of the Board of MedicalEducation;

Section 7 prescribes certain minimumrequirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. The medicalcollege may admit any student who has notbeen convicted by any court of competentjurisdiction of any offense involving moralturpitude and who presents (a) a record ofcompletion of a bachelor's degree in science orarts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to amedical school from the Board of Medical

Education; (c) a certificate of good moralcharacter issued by two former professors in thecollege of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibitany college of medicine from establishing, inaddition to the preceding, other entrancerequirements that may be deemed admissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the thenMinister of Education, Culture and Sports anddated 23 August 1985, established a uniformadmission test called the National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) as an additionalrequirement for issuance of a certificate ofeligibility for admission into medical schools ofthe Philippines, beginning with the school year1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2.The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as aninstrument toward upgrading the selection ofapplicants for admission into the medicalschools and its calculated to improve the qualityof medical education in the country. The cutoffscore for the successful applicants, based onthe scores on the NMAT, shall be determinedevery year by the Board of Medical Educationafter consultation with the Association ofPhilippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of

each applicant, together with the otheradmission requirements as presently called forunder existing rules, shall serve as a basis forthe issuance of the prescribed certificate ofeligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of RepublicAct No. 2382, as amended, and MECS OrderNo. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held:

Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMATand requiring certain minimum scores therein asa condition for admission to medical schools inthe Philippines, do not constitute anunconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, isthe pervasive and non-waivable power andauthority of the sovereign to secure and promoteall the important interests and needs in aword, the public order of the generalcommunity. An important component of that

public order is the health and physical safetyand well being of the population, the securing ofwhich no one can deny is a legitimate objectiveof governmental effort and regulation. Perhapsthe only issue that needs some consideration iswhether there is some reasonable relationbetween the prescribing of passing the NMAT asa condition for admission to medical school onthe one hand, and the securing of the health andsafety of the general community, on the otherhand. This question is perhaps most usefullyapproached by recalling that the regulation ofthe practice of medicine in all its branches haslong been recognized as a reasonable methodof protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates therationale of regulation of this type: theimprovement of the professional and technicalquality of the graduates of medical schools, byupgrading the quality of those admitted to thestudent body of the medical schools. Thatupgrading is sought by selectivity in the processof admission, selectivity consisting, among otherthings, of limiting admission to those who exhibitin the required degree the aptitude for medicalstudies and eventually for medical practice. The

need to maintain, and the difficulties ofmaintaining, high standards in our professionalschools in general, and medical schools inparticular, in the current stage of our social andeconomic development, are widely known. Webelieve that the government is entitled toprescribe an admission test like the NMAT as ameans for achieving its stated objective of"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality


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of medical education in the country. We areentitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonablyrelated to the securing of the ultimate end oflegislation and regulation in this area. That end,it is useful to recall, is the protection of the publicfrom the potentially deadly effects ofincompetence and ignorance in those whowould undertake to treat our bodies and mindsfor disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari isDISMISSED and the Order of the respondenttrial court denying the petition for a writ ofpreliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioners.

17. Conference v POEA

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA

166 SCRA 533

POEA: Cases under the Jurisdiction of POEA

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V

Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an

accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His

widow sued for damages under Executive Order

No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the

POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel,

argued that the complaint was cognizable not by

the POEA but by the Social Security System and

should have been filed against the State

Insurance Fund.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction

and after considering the position papers of the

parties ruled in favor of the complainant.

The decision is challenged by the petitioner on

the principal ground that the POEA had no

jurisdiction over the case as the husband was

not an overseas worker.

Issue:

Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held:

The Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration was created under Executive

Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to

promote and monitor the overseas employment

of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced

the National Seamen Board created earlier

under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974.

Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order,

the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive

jurisdiction over all cases, including money

claims, involving employee-employer relations

arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract

involving Filipino contract workers, including

seamen."

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits

and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made

by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum

Circular No. 2, which became effective on

February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed astandard contract to be adopted by both foreign

and domestic shipping companies in the hiring

of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

But the petitioner questions the validity of

Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of

the principle of non-delegation of legislative

power. It contends that no authority had been

given the POEA to promulgate the said

regulation; and even with such authorization, the

regulation represents an exercise of legislative

discretion which, under the principle, is not

subject to delegation.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative

regulation. The model contract prescribed

thereby has been applied in a significant number

of the cases without challenge by the employer.

The power of the POEA (and before it the

National Seamen Board) in requiring the model

contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient

standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of

the said authority. That standard is discoverablein the executive order itself which, in creating the

Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration, mandated it to protect the rights

of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and

equitable employment practices."


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20. ABAKADA vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 168056.

September 1, 2005) Section 1. cd

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J

FACTS:

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners

ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a

petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005

questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5

and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106,

107 and 108, respectively, of the National

Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4

imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and

properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on

importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a

10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of

properties. These questioned provisions contain

a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President,

upon recommendation of the Secretary of

Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective

January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have

been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is

unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article

VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of

legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec

28(2) of the Constitution.

3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due

process and equal protection under Article III

Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. Since there is no question that the revenue

bill exclusively originated in the House of

Representatives, the Senate was acting within

its constitutional power to introduce

amendments to the House bill when it included

provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending

corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise

and franchise taxes.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative

power but only of the discretion as to the

execution of a law. This is constitutionally

permissible. Congress does not abdicate its

functions or unduly delegate power when it

describes what job must be done, who must do

it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our

complex economy that is frequently the only way

in which the legislative process can go forward.

3. The power of the State to make reasonable

and natural classifications for the purposes of

taxation has long been established. Whether itrelates to the subject of taxation, the kind of

property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts

to be raised, the methods of assessment,

valuation and collection, the States power is

entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the

judiciary will not interfere with such power

absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,

discrimination, or arbitrariness.

Documents

10068058compilation legis dept.docx