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1
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER PROJECT STABILITY ENHANCEMENT (IPPSE) SYSTEM
Presentation to
WECC Remedial Action Scheme Reliability Subcommittee
April 30, 2010Ontario HiltonOntario, CA
2
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER PROJECT STABILITY ENHANCEMENT (IPPSE) SYSTEM
Presented by: Ken Silver-Electrical Service Manager (Manager of
Energy Control and Extra High Voltage Stations ) Travis Smith-Assistant Manager (Manager of
Intermountain Converter Station) Brian Cast–Electrical Engineer (Grid Operation and
Energy Prescheduling Supervisor ) Ken Lindquist – System Protection Engineer
Attendees: Ken Silver, Mukhlesur Bhuiyan, Travis Smith, Tom
Snyder, Brian Cast, Saif Mogri, Ken Lindquist, Carlos Garay and John Hu
Chuck Wu (On Phone)
3
Agenda
1. System Overview – Ken Silver2. Performance and Operational History – Travis
Smith3. System Studies – Ken Lindquist4. System Design – Travis Smith5. Arming Function – Brian Cast6. Operation and Monitoring – Brian Cast7. Operating Procedures for Abnormal Conditions -
Ken Silver8. Commissioning, Maintenance, and Testing – Travis
Smith9. Conclusions – Travis Smith
4
1. System Overview
5
1. System Overview
The Purpose of Intermountain Power Project Stability Enhancement (IPPSE) is to ensure WECC system stability after outages to the Intermountain Power Project DC system (IPPDC). This is achieved by arming predetermined remedial actions prior to the occurrence of a disturbance associated with the IPPDC.
Due to IPPDC system upgrade from 1920MW to 2400MW, the IPPSE is submitted for review.
6
1. System Overview
Remedial Actions Required:The Intermountain Power Project (IPP) Contingency Arming System (CAS)has been implemented to mitigate IPPDC disturbances by tripping one or twoIPP generating units. The IPP CAS has been in operation since 1986. Thedesign and operations of this RAS has been reported to WECC on April 1986with a report entitled “Intermountain Power Project Contingency ArmingSystem: One Unit Operation” and on August 1992, with a report entitled“Intermountain Power Project Contingency Arming System: Non-Credibilityof Remedial Action Scheme Failure.”
Formal Operating Procedure:The IPP CAS consists of arming-charts where real-time power output of theIPP generating units and the IPPDC line flows are used to select the no-unit,one-unit or two-unit arming of remedial actions. The IPP CAS and associatedoperating procedures are included with the LADWP’s Energy Control CenterEnergy Management System (ECC-EMS) computers.
7
1. System Overview IPP DC Upgrade Project
8
1. System Overview Intermountain Power Project System
9
1. System Overview System Map
10
1. System Overview Intermountain One-line Diagram
One Line Diagram: Adelanto
11
2. Performance and Operational History
12
2. Performance and Operational History
The existing IPPSE was installed May 10, 1986
A design criteria of one operational failure in 3 years was used.
How have we done ?
13
2. Performance and Operational History
In 24 years there have been 28 actions. Seventeen of which occurred prior to August 1992.
There have been 6 failures 5 of which occurred prior to August 1992.
The system did not achieve its goal from 1986 to 1992. However from 1992 to the present, the system has achieved its goals.
14
2. Performance and Operational History
What Changed in 1992?
A problem with the Monopolar Out signal was discovered and corrected.
A design change was initiated to allow for 1 restart in Monopolar Operation.
15
2. Performance and Operational History
Success
After the modifications, the system operated correctly.
16
3. System Study
17
3. Study Process Summary
Co-ordinate with Impacted System Operators (PacifiCorp) in preparing study plan and study conditions.
Determine Impact on the WECC System. Determine Maximum “IPP Net Import”
Capability. Determine Generation Tripping delay times. Determine IPP Contingency Arming Scheme
(CAS) Operational Nomograms.
18
3. System Condition Studied IPP DC Upgrade
19
3. Utah South Conditions
Stressed TOT2 to Path RatingTOT2C
TOT2B
20
3. “Net IPP Import” Sensitivity(Post-Transient Power Flow)
Voltage Deviation at ABAJO 66kV Bus
-0.110
-0.100
-0.090
-0.080
-0.070
-0.060
-0.050
-0.040
-0.030
-0.020
-0.010
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Net IPP Import (MW)
Vo
ltag
e D
evia
tio
n (
Ab
ajo
69k
V u
nd
er C
on
tin
gen
cy)
(pu
)
Threek-Peak-Sigurd Out
IPP Bipole Out Full RAS
WECC N-2 Criteria
Line Loading of Sigurd - Three Peak 345kV Line
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Net IPP Import (MW)
Sig
ura
d-T
hre
ePea
k L
ine
Flo
w (
Am
s)
Huntington-Pinot-SpanishFork DLO
IPP Bipole Out - Full RAS
Line Emergency Rating
* IPP DC Will Operate with Maximum “Net IPP Import” of 600MW – Limited by Line Overload
21
3. Determine Delay Generation Tripping
Accommodate possible DC restart sequence after a DC fault;
To lessen the stress by possibly using a less stressful turbine or boiler trip.
DC Fault Restart 1st 2nd 3rd
Deionization Time (ms) 225 325 425
Deionization Time (cycles) 13.5 19.5 25.5
Cumulative (cycles) 13.5 33 58.5
Simulate CAS time (cycles) (trip unit)
18 40 70
Generator Tripping
Methods
Time to 0 Output
Comments
Electrical Trip < 10 CyclesMost Stressful on
boilers and turbines
Boiler Trip~ 42 Second
s
15 second Delay 20 seconds to
100MW, 6 second to
breaker Open
Turbine Trip~ 23 Second
s
15 second delay, 2 seconds to
100MW, 6 seconds to
breaker Open
22
3. Stability Plot for Loss of Bipole with Restart (for DC Fault Only)
(Worst Stressed Condition)Trip 1 Unit after First Restart Failed and Second Unit after the Second Restart FailedTrip Both Units after First Restart Failed
* CAS Will Trip Units after 1 Restart Attempt Failed
23
3. Stability Plot for Loss of Bipole with Delayed CAS Generation Tripping for Lower IPP DC Schedule
IPP DC Schedule 1500MW IPP DC Schedule 1400MW
* CAS Will Delay Generation Tripping for IPP DC Schedule 1400MW or Less
24
3. Delayed CAS Generation Tripping for Loss of 1 Pole
Short Term Overload Capability of IPP DC
25
3. Delayed CAS Generation Tripping for Loss of 1 Pole (IPP AC Fault Trip 1 Unit + MWC
Generations)Delayed Tripping
* CAS Will Delay Generation Tripping for Loss of 1 Pole
Fast TrippingNo RAS
26
3. IPP CAS Generation Tripping Level Operating Nomogram for Bipole Operation for the Loss of
Bipole
IPP STS Operating Nomogram(For Loss of Bipole in Bipolar Operation)
(Studied Cases Marked)
1908
1907
1830
1796 1795
1758
1758
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
IPP + MWC Gen (MW)
ST
S D
C S
ched
ule
(MW
)
(Nomogram Limit) Trip all Gen - 1 RS
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen - 1RS
Trip MWC Only - Delayed
NoRAS
0 Import Line
Trip All Gen - Studied
Trip All Gen - Studied
Trip 1 Unit + MWC gen - Studied
No RAS - Studied
Unreliable Operating Region
Limited by Post-transient Sigurd-Three Peaks Flow (A) (Limit 1800A)
IPP STS Operating Nomogram(For Loss of Bipole in Bipolar Operation)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400IPP + MWC Gen (MW)
ST
S D
C S
ched
ule
(M
W)
(Nomogram Limit) Trip all Gen - 1 RS
Trip all Gen - Delayed
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen - 1RS
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen - Delayed
Trip MWC Only - Delayed
NoRAS
Linear (0 Import Line)
Unreliable Operating Region
27
3. IPP CAS Generation Tripping Level Operating Nomogram for Bipole Operation for the Loss of
1 Pole
IPP STS Operating Nomogram(For Loss of 1 Pole in Bipolar Operation)
(Studied Cases Marked)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
IPP + MWC Gen (MW)
STS
DC
Sch
edul
e (M
W)
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen- Delayed
Trip MWC Only - Delayed
No Ras
0 Import Line
Trip 1 Unit + MWC - Studied
Trip MWC - Studied
NoRas - Studied
Unreliable Operating Region
Limited by Post-transient Voltage
Deviation of 5% at Abajo 69kV bus
IPP STS Operating Nomogram(For Loss of 1 Pole in Bipolar Operation)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
IPP + MWC Gen (MW)
STS
DC
Sch
edul
e (M
W)
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen- Delayed
Trip MWC Only - Delayed
No Ras
Linear (0 Import Line)
Unreliable Operating Region
28
3. IPP CAS Generation Tripping Level Operating Nomogram for Mono-pole Operation for the Loss of
1 Pole
IPP STS Operating Nomogram(For Loss of Pole in Mono-polar Operation)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400IPP + MWC Gen (MW)
ST
S D
C S
ched
ule
(M
W)
Trip 2 unit + MWC gen - Delayed
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen - Delayed
Trip MWC Only - Delayed
NoRAS
Linear (0 Import Line)
Unreliable Operating Region
IPP STS Operating Nomogram(For Loss of Pole in Mono-polar Operation)
(Studied Cases Marked)
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
IPP + MWC Gen (MW)
ST
S D
C S
ched
ule
(M
W)
Trip 2 unit + MWC gen - Delayed
Trip 1 unit + MWC gen - Delayed
Trip MWC Only - Delayed
No Ras
0 Import Line
Trip 2 units VDev -Studied
Trip 1 Unit - Thermal Limit Studied
Trip 1 Unit - VDev Limit Studied
No RAS - Studied
Unreliable Operating Region
Limited by Post-transient Sigurd-Three Peaks Flow (A) (Limit 1800A) and Voltage deviation 5% at Abajo
29
3. Study Summary
IPP DC limited to net AC Import capability of 600MW under maximum Utah South export conditions
CAS will Trip Units after 1 Restart Attempt Failed CAS will Delay Generation Tripping for IPP DC
Schedule 1400MW or Less CAS will Delay Generation Tripping for Loss of 1
Pole - Limited by Voltage Deviations
30
4. System Design
31
4. System Design
Design Philosophy
1. Meet the System Studies Guidelines2. Insure Redundancy3. Reduce the Hardware4. Centralize the Logic
32
4. System Design
Following the guidelines established by the system studies were the driving force in the design of the IPPSE.
All parameters of the studies have been met which also allowed for a simpler more efficient design.
Only 1 operational failure in 3 years is allowed.
33
4. System Design
34
4. System Design
The Bipole Controls are a completely redundant
Mach 2 Control System designed by ABB. All protection actions are routed through this
control system. The IPPSE Logic is fully contained in this system
thus reducing the system hardware requirements. All remedial outputs are generated from this
control system.
35
4. System Design The remedials from the IPPSE Logic
have been simplified into two outputs.
Monopolar Out Bipolar Out
Based on these two signals and the Nomograms, all IPPSE actions are appropriately taken.
36
4. System Design
Generator Trip Remedials
Electrical Trip (86 Lockout)
Turbine Trip
Boiler Trip
37
4. System Design
IPP Digital Microwave System
Original analog system installed 1985
System was replaced with Harris Stratex (now Aviat Networks) digital microwave radios in 2004
LADWP operated and maintained
38
4. System Design IPP Microwave Power Redundancy Propane Back up Generators 24 VDC Power Plants
39
4. System Design
IPP Microwave One Line
40
5. Arming Function
41
5. Arming Function
Overview:
Arming is automated by an application running in LADWP’s energy management system.
Nomograms, called “charts”, specify the arming level.
Each chart has a series of curves that provide arming levels as a function of IPP net generation (including Milford generation) and the DC line flow.
The application selects charts based on monitored power system conditions and the specific trigger being armed.
42
5. Arming Function
Charts:
One curve per remedial action.
Arming is a function of net gen vs. DC flow.
Top-most curve provides DC flow limit.
Added remedial actions will require an increase in the number of curves per chart.
43
5. Arming Function
Chart Sets:
There may be up to five triggers for remedial actions.
Each trigger has its own arming for remedial action.
Therefore, there is one chart per trigger.
The set of charts for the triggers is a “chart set”.
44
5. Arming Function
Chart Set Selection:
There are multiple chart sets to accommodate varying system conditions.
Chart sets are functionally organized into rows and columns.
Columns are selected based on monitored line flows.
Rows are selected based on line outages and IPP operating modes.
45
5. Arming Function
Chart Set Selection (cont’d):
Original design provided for 24 columns.
Although they no longer affect arming, three power flows are still monitored: Pacific AC Intertie, Arizona–California, and Utah South.
The system study indicates nomogram sensitivity to Utah South power flow, so use of multiple columns may become necessary.
46
5. Arming Function
Imports:
Chart shows a 600-MW import limit.
IPP AC lines have 1317-MW import capability.
Chart is worst-case scenario.
Other cases allow more imports.
47
5. Arming Function
Import Example:
A 72-MW on Sigurd–Three Peak may allow a 400-MW in imports.
This can be implemented via multiple columns or via dynamic shifting of affected curves.
48
5. Arming Function
Summary of Arming Function Changes:
Increase in the number of curves per chart due to increase in number of remedial actions.
Decrease in the number of charts per chart set due to decrease in the number of triggers.
Increase in the number of chart set columns and/or addition of dynamic curve adjustments due to varying AC import limits depending on Utah South flow.
49
6. Monitoring and Operation
50
6. Monitoring and Operation
Overview:
LADWP’s Energy Control Center (ECC) and IPP both have monitoring capability.
The arming application runs at the ECC, but either site can arm manually.
Except for automatic arming, the RAS operation occurs entirely at IPP, but is monitored by both sites.
The slides that follow show monitoring and operation as seen at the ECC.
51
6. Monitoring and Operation
The interface at the ECC includes the following displays:
Curves & DC Limits Columns & Charts Panel Status (i.e. RAS Status) AnnunciatorsThese displays are summarized and shown in the slides that follow.
52
6. Monitoring and Operation
Curves & DC Limits:
Shows summary data in upper-right corner.
Provides for viewing and update of curves and charts.
Shows remedial action selected for each active chart.
Shows DC limits from charts and other nomograms.
53
6. Monitoring and Operation
Curves & DC Limits Display
54
6. Monitoring and Operation
Changes to Curves & DC Limits:
System studies do not show a need for separate nomograms for DC limits from Utah North, Utah South, or Northeast/Southeast flows.
DC limit for power flows flow will be inherent in the contingency arming limit from the selected charts.
Dynamic offsets to curve data, when implemented, will be shown on this display.
55
6. Monitoring and Operation
Columns & Charts:
Shows power flows for chart set column selection.
Shows line status.
Shows plant operating mode.
Shows column and chart set selection in the summary data in the upper-right corner.
56
6. Monitoring and Operation
Columns & Charts Display
57
6. Monitoring and Operation
Changes to Columns & DC Charts:
Column selection is no longer influenced by Pacific AC Intertie and Arizona–California flows.
Additional columns may be needed to model the effects of Utah South flow on AC import capability.
58
6. Monitoring and Operation
Panel Status:
The RAS is currently implemented at IPP via redundant hardware systems called “panels”.
Each arming control point is wired to operate both panels from a single control operation.
Each panel independently reports its status.
Arming controls can be issued via the arming application or manually via SCADA control actions.
59
6. Monitoring and Operation
Panel Status (cont’d):
Provides a control and pair of state indications for each combination of trigger and remedial action that may be armed.
Provides for manual entry of an arming pattern when in MANUAL mode and shows the application-determined arming pattern when in AUTOMATIC mode.
Shows panel status values. Shows triggers actuated. When a trigger is
actuated, the RAS will execute any remedial actions armed for that trigger.
60
6. Monitoring and Operation
Panel Status Display
61
6. Monitoring and Operation
Changes to Panel Status:
The application currently implements the arming matrix by using an obscure feature to control multiple arming state points with a single control operation. (This is much quicker than using time-consuming discrete control actions for each arming state point.)
This set of arming state points to specify remedial actions for each trigger will be replaced with a single analog point for each trigger that specifies the remedial actions to execute.
The RAS implementation will be part of the DC control system.
62
6. Monitoring and Operation
Annunciator Displays:
The RAS trigger inputs are actually aggregations of multiple triggering inputs from relay and DC control systems.
For this reason, the RAS trigger inputs are in some places called “super triggers”.
The annunciator displays show each trigger input and identify the super triggers that it activates.
63
6. Monitoring and Operation
Annunciator Display 1
64
6. Monitoring and Operation
Annunciator Display 2
65
6. Monitoring and Operation
Annunciator Changes:
According to system studies, many of the triggering inputs will no longer require remedial actions.
Only triggering inputs for monopole and bipole blocks will continue to be relevant.
The number of super triggers needed will reduce from five to two.
The triggering inputs no longer requiring remedial action may be retained on the annunciator displays for reference.
66
6. Monitoring and Operation
Summary of Monitoring and Operation Changes:
The RAS function will be located in the DC control system.
Arming will be specified via analog arming levels rather than discrete digital states.
Arming may use real-time power flow to bias affected nomogram curves.
Additional remedial actions are being added. The inputs that affect remedial action arming and
execution are being updated according to study results.
67
7. Operating Procedure for
Abnormal System Conditions
68
7. Operating Procedures for Abnormal System Conditions
The RAS operates incorrectly (failure to operate or false operation)
As soon as the IPPSE has failed or operated improperly, generation and DC flows will be curtailed to a point where remedial action is not required. The condition will be maintained until repairs can be made or the RAS is proven to be stable.
69
7. Operating Procedures for Abnormal System Conditions
One part of a redundant RAS system is unavailable so that complete redundancy is no longer assured
Personnel will be dispatched immediately to work on the unavailable system to restore it to operational status as soon as possible. Curtailment is not required in this condition.
70
7. Operating Procedures for Abnormal System Conditions
When unscheduled, or unplanned and not coordinated, unavailability of the subject RAS (complete loss of RAS) impacts operation
Generation and DC flows will be curtailed to a point where RAS is not required or until such time as the RAS becomes available again.
71
7. Operating Procedures for Abnormal System Conditions
When a partial or total loss of input data required for arming decisions
All input data required for arming originates from Intermountain Converter Station (ICS) and Intermountain Generating Station (IGS). The ICS operator will manually set the proper arming as directed by the Energy Control Center (ECC). The ICS operator has the ability to determine and set proper arming independent of ECC.
72
8. Commissioning, Maintenance and Testing
73
8. Commissioning, Maintenance, and Testing
Commissioning Testing of the IPPSE Logic will begin
during the Factory Acceptance Tests in Sweden. This will begin in May 2010.
Commissioning of the new system will begin in October of 2010 when the first Mach 2 control comes on line.
The IPPSE system will be fully operational by Mid December 2010.
74
8. Commissioning, Maintenance, and Testing
Maintenance All critical components such as
communication links, test switches and computers are monitored by the new Alarm Reporting and Monitoring System (ARMS)
Emergency maintenance can be done on line without degrading the system. Only redundancy will be lost.
Scheduled Maintenance is every 2 years.
75
8. Commissioning, Maintenance, and Testing
Testing Testing will be “End to End”, from ECC to the
Generator and Milford Intermountain Line 1 Blocking Switches.
Each arming level in the Nomograms will be tested to assure that the proper remedial is sent to the blocking switch.
All intermediate signals, remedial outputs and trip signals will be recorded for analysis.
76
9. Conclusions
77
9. Conclusions
System Studies Guidelines
System studies were extensive and the results were incorporated into the system design.
All system hardware and software is monitored for correct operation.
78
9. Conclusions
Redundancy
All Protections, Control Systems, Communication Systems and Monitoring Systems are completely redundant.
79
9. Conclusions
Reduce and Simplify the Hardware
The input triggers have been reduced from 19 to 2.
The Nomograms have been reduced from 38 to 3.
80
9. Conclusions
Centralize the Logic
All IPPSE Logic is now contained in the HVDC Mach 2 control system.
81
Questions?