01 - Rawls' Political Liberalism (Van de Putte)

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Rawls’ Political Liberalism. Foundations and Principles 1

André Van de Putte

I. Pluralism and Reasonable Pluralismas Context

Since the publication of A Theory of Justice ,Rawls has not ceased to reflect on the range andsignificance of his theory. Political Liberalismpresents the (provisional?) results of his ongoingconsiderations. 2 Rawls situates political liberal-ism within the issue of religious pluralism. Ac-cording to him, political liberalism began whenthe conflict between religions and conceptions of truth was taken seriously rather than in the effortsto limit the absolute power of princes (xxiv-vi) . Heendeavours to find an answer to the question howan honest society of persons can be viable whenthere is deep division on matters of religion.What can society’s foundation be when social

unity can no longer ground itself in a consensuson truth, on a general and comprehensive reli-gious doctrine? 3

With this, however, the context of politicalliberalism is only partly outlined. According toRawls, this context is determined in part by theacceptance of an epistemological datum whichcaused the solution proposed by the Enlighten-ment for the problem of pluralism to fail. Indeed,it is apparently impossible to rationally devise asecular, comprehensive doctrine which would

adequately convince everyone and thereby be-come the foundation of society. The “burdens of judgement,” the many hazards involved in the useof reason, imply that different people will deter-mine what they consider to be the relevant facts,values and arguments in different ways (xviii; 55f.)

People make judgements about moral truths, “allthings considered: that is, taking into consider-ation what they see as all relevant moral andpolitical values and all relevant facts ( as eachdoctrine determines )” (xx, italics mine). What

results is that comprehensive doctrines, which canonly exercise their power of conviction amongthose who share the same principles or points of departure, can no longer be measured by thesame standard.

Rawls’ formulation of the problem, therefore,is determined more by reasonable pluralism thanby pluralism as such (63-66; 144; 179) . The ‘dis-sensus’ which defines the problem of politicalliberalism is not primarily rooted in self-interest,irrationality and bad faith. Rather, it is a ‘dis-sensus’ between reasonable people who, evenafter painstaking and rational reflection, cannotreach a consensus on the truth. In Rawls’ opinion,such reasonable pluralism is not a passing contin-gency of history. Instead, it is the normal resultof human reason operating within the framework

of the free institutions which developed in theconstitutional regimes after the wars of religion(xvi; xxiv; 36-37) . Rawls is well aware, of course,that much division has its roots in bad faith, etc.(55) . The phenomenon of violence, which hastraditionally played an important role in politicalphilosophy, does not, however, define the prob-lem at issue in his ideal theory. It is the task of the non-ideal theory to determine how one mustdeal with those who choose violence. It is for thisreason that Rawls only cursorily suggests that

societies should contain irrational, comprehensivedoctrines in order to prevent them from under-mining the unity and justice of the society inquestion (xvii; 64, n. 19) .

It is a fact, nevertheless, that, even in societieswhere the people are not violent and unreason-able, comprehensive doctrines are still too diverseto be able to serve as public frames of reference.As a result, the ideal of a political community, acommunity united around one and the same com-prehensive doctrine, has become the definitive

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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 107



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political utopia (37f.; 63; 146) . Only an aggressiveand sectarian use of the powers of state would beable to realise such an ideal in the societies whichhave emerged since the wars of religion (10; 154) .Consequently, after the state ceased to be confes-sional, it meant that it could not be philosophicaleither (154) .4

This does not mean that for Rawls people areindifferent with regard to the search for the goodor the meaningful. What is definitive for theproblem of political liberalism is the principlethat people do affirm a particular comprehensivedoctrine and conception of the good and take itseriously (12; 100; 150) . It is precisely because theydo so that they cannot endure the idea that acomprehensive doctrine would be forced uponthem by the state (63-65) . Reasonable pluralism,therefore, does not imply the disappearance of comprehensive doctrines. 5 It is true that they canno longer constitute the core of public politicalculture, but they find their place in the back-ground culture of civil society, in the social and

private worlds of human persons (14) .6

II. The Idea of a Political Conception of Justice

1. A Problem of Modernity

For Rawls, however, a society is not possiblewithout a publicly shared conviction on a numberof substantial values. Every society needs a pub-lic basis of justification, a “framework of deliber-ation” (368) for settling fundamental political

problems. In every society, for that matter, indi-viduals allow for (conflicting) rights and claims.Every society in one way or another must solvethe problem of interpersonal comparisons anddetermine which of the citizens’ claims to re-sources, rights and freedoms have weight andwhich do not (209) . A public understanding isnecessary, a sort of political philosophy that notonly determines which claims the citizens canvalidate but also why such claims can be validat-ed (179) . In a traditional political community , the

current comprehensive conception of the goodfunctions as such a public philosophy. A commu-nity in which there is a consensus on the ex-istence and recognisability of a cosmic order, anatural law, has a criterion of validity and inval-idity at its immediate disposal whereby the claimsof its members can be evaluated. Insofar as themores of such a community are understood as theexpressions of the aforementioned natural law,the tradition will present itself de facto as such acriterion. In a pluralistic society, however, noparticular conception of the good can function asa criterion of evaluation. Nevertheless, manycomprehensive doctrines demand the right toexist in such a society and the citizens’ claims areextremely diverse. That is why one of the mostsignificant problems which confronted modernityconsisted in finding a publicly shared understand-ing of what the “needs” and “good” of humanpersons might be, and the way in which this goodought to be justly shared. 7 It had to determinewhich comprehensive doctrines it could tolerate

as acceptable (195) and at the same time establishthe limits of its tolerance and pluralism. Severalsolutions seemed possible: postpone the evalua-tion of “revealed preferences” and try to combineand co-ordinate them in a purely procedural man-ner or try, as in Utilitarianism, to unite around arather rudimentary and abstract understanding of the human person. We should understand Rawls’political liberalism as yet another solution for thisproblem of modernity.

2. The Political Character of the Conception of Justice

The conflicts between comprehensive doctrinesconfront modern society with a practical problem:society needs to find a foundation which can be justified for all and which can meet with theapproval of people who are deeply divided onmatters of conviction. Such conflicts “set thestage for the idea of reasonable justification as apractical and not as an epistemological or meta-

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physical problem.” (44) . Since no comprehensivedoctrine can ever meet with the approval of all,then, according to Rawls, only something from adifferent order, a political conception of justice,can continue to function as the foundation of society. A political conception of justice differsfrom a comprehensive doctrine in “scope” or “therange of subjects to which [it] applies” as well asin content (13; 175) . It retreats to the limited do-main of the political by: 1) restricting its applica-bility to the basic structure of the society; and 2)presenting itself as autonomous and therefore notpresuming the acceptance of any particular com-prehensive doctrine. At the same time, however,it tries to establish itself on fundamental ideaswhich are implicitly present in the public politicalculture of a democratic society and contain noth-ing which might provoke controversies withcomprehensive doctrines. 8 Unlike the principlesof comprehensive doctrines, a political conceptionof justice is not generally applicable to everysphere of life (e.g. on the internal organisation of

churches and associations), nor does it imply acomprehensive conception of everything that is of value in human life: ideals of personal life andcharacter, or of family, friendship and other rela-tionships. 9 Yet insofar as it asserts the ideals,principles and norms which express politicalvalues, it is a moral conception (12) .

3. The Substantial Character of the Political Conception of Justice

In Rawls’ vision, then, the political conception of justice is not merely procedural, but substantial(192) . It must create the possibility for distinguish-ing between the (valid) needs and (subjective)desires of persons as citizens, while at the sametime excluding certain comprehensive doctrines asunacceptable. Its neutrality does not rest in thefact that it refers exclusively to neutral proceduralvalues such as impartiality, consistency in appli-cation, provision of equal opportunity to theparties involved to plead their case etc., nor that

it has no particular conception of the good be-yond the instrumental (191) . It is not a proceduralregulation which understands people’s varioussubjective desires to be ‘revealed preferences’,taking them for what they are and endeavouringonly to co-ordinate and arbitrate their fulfilment.Rather, its neutrality lies in the fact that it doesnot attempt to disseminate or give preference toany particular comprehensive doctrine; 10 that itdoes not ground itself in a particular comprehen-sive doctrine and that it avoids implying elementswhich are controversial and which would beconsidered as untrue by reasonable comprehen-sive doctrines (xix-xx; xxviii) . By restricting itspoints of departure to those which everyone canshare as reasonable, it endeavours to find a com-mon ground which is more than a “procedurallyneutral ground.” 11 As a substantial conception, itgives expression to pure political values, to theideal of citizenship, and affirms the superiority of certain (political) virtues (194) . It is precisely forthis reason that Rawls ascribes the right to edu-

cate individuals to the state. It is true, however,that such an education is political, i.e. an educa-tion in political virtues which can be shared byfree and equal citizens. 12 Education in humanperfection, as it is interpreted by various religionsand comprehensive doctrines, continues to bereserved to the churches and organisations con-cerned. The state is only entitled to educate peo-ple in citizenship. 13 The state can only step in“to strengthen the forms of thought and feelingthat sustain fair social coperation between its

citizens regarded as free and equal.” (195) . At thesame time, its educational task does not turn itinto a political community which in turn educatesits members in human perfection.

4. Political Liberalism and Comprehensive Liberalism

Political liberalism with its political conception of justice should not, therefore, be confused withcomprehensive liberalism which expounds auton-

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omy and self-realisation as the ideals of humanperfection. It has to be distinguished from theliberalism of Mill, Hume, Kant, Dworkin andRaz, but also from the liberalism of A Theory of Justice in which the distinction between politicaland comprehensive liberalism has not yet beenmade (xv-xvi; xxvi-xxvii) . Rawls reinterprets “justiceas fairness” as a purely political conception of justice. The fact that the political conception of justice must obtain the support of several (reason-able) comprehensive doctrines implies that itcannot put itself forward as a rival on their terrain(xviii-xxi; xxviii) . As a result, it will not be able topresent itself as (metaphysically or religiously)true, but rather as a specification of the reason-able at the level of content (94) .

By distinguishing his political liberalism fromcomprehensive liberalism, Rawls, who labels hispolitical philosophy as the defence of reasonablefaith in the possibility of a just constitutionalregime (101; 172) , is able to defend the institutionsof such a society without being obliged to accept

a comprehensive liberal ethos (199-200) . Further-more, political liberalism demands that the sup-porters of comprehensive liberalism should toler-ate different life styles, which they might haverejected on the basis of their comprehensive liber-alism, but which have not gone beyond theboundaries of tolerance as defined by politicalliberalism. The supporters of comprehensiveliberalism are not permitted to impose their par-ticular understanding of autonomy, self-realisationand tolerance on everyone. Should they do so,

they would be behaving in an unreasonable wayand, as would be the case with any “fundamental-ist” in his or her efforts to establish a (liberal) political community , would become guilty of sectarian use of the powers of state. As a result,the existence and stability of a well-ordered,politically liberal society places heavy demandson its citizens. 14 While they continue to affirmthe truth and superiority of their particular com-prehensive doctrine, they have to be prepared tomoderate themselves and rely on the political

conception of justice when it comes to fundamen-tal political questions.

III. The Idea of the Reasonable

While political communities present themselvesunder the banner of ‘the true’, pluralist societiescan only present themselves under the banner of ‘the reasonable’. 15 The turn towards the reason-able is rooted neither in scepticism, as if thehuman person were incapable of truth, nor inindifference, as if truth were unimportant. It hasits roots, rather, in the ethical incentive to main-tain societal organisational principles where fun-damental political matters are concerned, princi-ples which can be accepted by everyone as rea-sonable or, at the very least, not dismissed asunreasonable. 16 Since there is no longer a com-prehensive doctrine, which, politically speaking,refers to an external, transcendent authority or toa natural order, the citizens, now free becausethey are no longer bound to a point of view “ex-

ternal to their own point of view,” 17 are left withno other option than to develop, by mutual agree-ment, a foundation for social living which every-one can accept as reasonable. In a pluralist world,society can no longer appear to be answerable tosome sort of divine command or natural order(22f.) Its order can only appear as the result of afair agreement between individuals who, proceed-ing from their motivation to live together, ap-proach each other as reasonable, rational, free andequal individuals who, under such an agreement,

allow themselves to be led by their commonpractical reason (97-98) .

This fact is sufficient grounds for Rawls toreturn to the idea of the social contract and topresent 18 the conception of justice as the resultof a procedure of construction in which fairly andsymmetrically balanced, rational parties, motivat-ed by their desire to find a free and transparentground of consensus in political life and repre-senting free, equal, reasonable and rational per-sons, come to an agreement acceptable by all, on

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a conception of justice for a well-defined object,namely the basic structure and regime of a demo-cratic society together with the related rights andobligations of the citizens. Rawls does not claimthat this constructivist method is universallyapplicable as a way of representing all moralvalues (125-26) . As an example of ‘pure procedural justice’, however, the original position is especial-ly suitable for modelling the situation of citizenswho (can) no longer see themselves as bound toalready given principles of justice and who canonly resort to their own reason for defining fairterms of cooperation. Those who would like touse this method for different situations will haveto adapt the procedure’s lay-out in each and everycase to the nature and goal of the object forwhich principles are being sought (262) .

The point of the idea of the reasonable is,therefore, that once we accept the fact of reason-able pluralism, the idea itself becomes moresuitable as a foundation for the public justifica-tion of a constitutional regime than the idea of

moral truth. For that matter, it creates the possi-bility of reaching a consensus in a manner nolonger realisable by the concept of the truth. (94;

129) . All of this does not exclude the possibilitythat individuals or groups might consider a politi-cal conception true from the perspective of theircomprehensive doctrine (126-29; 151-53) . To speak of the truth of the political conception is, how-ever, to speak from within a comprehensive doc-trine (95-96; 126) . Even a political conception can-not present itself as true

IV. Political Justice and the Basic Structure of Society

As has been already pointed out, a political con-ception is political primarily because it is onlyapplicable to the basic structure of society. InRawls’ opinion, there is a close relationship be-tween the idea that the basic structure is “the firstsubject of justice” on the one hand, and the wayin which the constructivist procedure and a politi-

cal conception ought to be conceived on the other(271f.) . Since this problem pertains to Rawls’method, we will not explore it further at thispoint, but limit ourselves instead to a number of remarks concerning his understanding of the basicstructure of society.

In the first place, Rawls cannot be accused of misunderstanding the social character of beinghuman (xxix) .19 The individual does not have aprior identity, nor does he or she choose a societyfrom the outside (40-41; 221f.) . For this reason, thequestion which the parties in the original positionmust answer is not whether or not they intend toestablish a political society but, rather, how thatsociety can be reasonably ordered, knowing thatthose whose interests they promote are indissolu-bly bound to the society in which they will growinto the persons they are going to be (68; 263f) .The alternatives with which the parties in theoriginal position are confronted are not “opportu-nities to join other societies, but instead a list of conceptions of justice to regulate the basic struc-

ture of one’s own society.” (277) .The basic structure of a society is the ordering

of the fundamental political, social and economicinstitutions which form a unified system of socialcooperation which exists through time. The basicstructure thus creates the framework of society. Itassigns fundamental rights and obligations, andshapes the division of advantages, and thereby theinequalities which arise from social cooperation,(11-12; 258) . When the principles which regulatethe basic structure have regulative primacy over

other principles which apply, for example, to theinternal life of groups and families and to person-al life, then it is because and to the extent thatthe basic structure provides the framework inwhich the life of such groups and persons islived. This regulative primacy does not mean thatthe principles themselves have priority within thegroups in question, but rather that such groupsmust respect the principles of the framework within which they operate in the way they organ-ise themselves and pursue their goals (257-59) .

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In order to understand the conception of thebasic structure one needs to consider the fact thatfor Rawls, a society is characterised by a signifi-cant component of ‘pure procedural justice’. Thebasic structure is “the framework for a self-suffi-cient scheme of cooperation for all the essentialpurposes of human life, which purposes areserved by the variety of associations and groupswithin this framework.” (301) . This implies thatfree interactions between individuals are thosewhich will ultimately define the distribution of goods. Agreements, such as the establishment of an association, come about, however, within thebasic structure from which it is impossible toescape and by which they are ultimately defined.At the same time, such agreements, and the distri-bution which results from them, can only be justi-fied if the basic structure is itself justified. It isthe basic structure, after all, which determinesbackground justice as a whole. For Rawls, inter-personal relations can be just in themselves whilethe situation is nevertheless unjust from the social

perspective (266) . Rawls thus distinguishes be-tween two types of social rules: (1) those whichdefine the social background while they also de-fine the mechanisms which attempt to correct theunavoidable tendency to depart from background justice, and (2) those which directly govern trans-actions between individuals and groups, guardagainst violence, and ensure the absence of fraud.The first set of rules intends “to secure just back-ground conditions against which the actions of individuals and associations take place,” (266)

while the second set is directly applicable to indi-viduals and groups and ought to be followed inprivate transactions (268-69; 284; 288) .

Rawls’ liberalism, therefore, is not a laissez- faire liberalism which believes in the spontaneousharmonising effects of an ‘invisible hand’. On thecontrary, Rawls sees the opposite type of ‘invisi-ble hand’ at work: Even if everyone acted with-out deceit or violence, the countless variety of separate interactions would still lead, via a varietyof unfamiliar paths, to an erosion of background

justice. With the passage of time, certain individ-uals would face disadvantage, reduced freedomand inequality (267; 284) . In this sense, the basicstructure defines the life and lot of the individualin a fundamental way. From the point of viewthat individuals are free and equal, a perspectivewe will discuss below, the lot of the individualappears as an historical contingency. The politicalconception then formulates principles in order todeal with these contingencies from the perspec-tive of freedom and equality so that a voluntaryand harmonious society, free of resentment andhumiliation, might be given a chance. 20 WhileRawls favours a self-regulating society, in as faras it is possible, politics continues nonetheless tobe a necessity, and not only as a means to guar-antee the safety of individuals and overcome theirtendency towards unfairness and aggressive be-haviour (284) . Politics must also continue to guar-antee background justice. Towards such a politi-cal intervention in the basic structure, the politicalconception of justice formulates a structural ideal

in the light of which institutional processes needto be limited and the accumulated results of indi-vidual transactions continuously adapted (285) .21

V. The Political Conception of Justice as Public Reason

1. The Limited Bearing of the Political Conception of Justice

As a conception for the basic structure of society,

Rawls’ political conception of justice does notcontain guidelines for every sort of political,economic and social question with which lawgiv-ers might find themselves confronted (156; 230) . Itlimits itself, rather, to the two elements he distin-guishes in the basic structure itself: the constitu-tional essentials and questions of fundamental justice. Only in deliberations on questions such asthese are the citizens obliged to let themselves beled by the political conception as if by a consti-tutional guideline (44; 137-38) . They are free to

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decide on other political issues from the stand-point of their comprehensive doctrines, engagingin political power plays and political compromise(214f.; 230; 246) . Rawls clearly does not excludecomprehensive doctrines from the political de-bate. An (overlapping) consensus on the politicalconception of justice must withdraw the mostfundamental and urgent questions from the politi-cal game of the majorities, thereby providing thepossibility of a free and voluntary society. Rawlsconsiders a more comprehensive consensus un-necessary. As long as a consensus exists on theconstitutional essentials and fundamental ques-tions of justice, the basic trust or ‘civic friend-ship’ between citizens will be maintained and thevirtues of cooperation promoted. A clash betweencomprehensive doctrines on other matters will notdestroy the society because its citizens can atleast have faith in the fact that the fundamentalframework of the society is based upon principlesaccepted as reasonable by all (86; 163; 253; 284; 362-

63) .

2. The Ideal of Public Reason

The political conception of justice formulatesprinciples which specify the constitutional rightsand obligations within the principal institutionsand regulate background justice so that the advan-tages resulting from the contribution of eachindividual will, in the long run, be fairly distrib-uted (16) . At the same time it indicates the virtuesand obligations which are necessary in order to

regulate the behaviour of citizens towards oneanother (11-12) . The political conception as suchformulates a principle of legitimacy that deter-mines the rules according to which citizens, as abody, can exercise justifiable force against oneanother (137, n. 5) . Since it is not enough to simplyformulate principles of justice for the basic struc-ture, it also formulates an ideal of public reason(212f) . Because such principles must also be ap-plied, the political conception of justice mustformulate guidelines on what can be considered a

valid application: guidelines for public inquiry,principles of reasoning, rules of evidence whichcitizens are obliged to follow when deciding onthe utilisation of substantive principles in lawsand policies (224) .

In a similar manner to the political conceptionin the strict sense and its principle of legitimacy,the values of public reason must be the subject of an agreement accepted by free and equal citizensas reasonable (137) . All three dimensions are‘companion parts’ of one single agreement in theoriginal position. It would be considered unrea-sonable if all three were enforced according tothe criteria of a comprehensive doctrine, criteriawhich would be experienced as obscure and eso-teric (225-26) . The ideal of public reason also de-mands that in making decisions on fundamentalpolitical questions one holds to the criteria andprocedures of common sense and, where neces-sary, to those of science, insofar as the latter arenot controversial. Only when this precondition issatisfied can a shared public basis of justification

exist and the political conception be complete(225) .

3. Public Reason and the Ideal of a Transparent Society

What Rawls is implying with respect to his idealof a well-ordered society now becomes clear. Heenvisages a society in which both the principlesand their application are in the public view andcan be accepted by all as reasonable, i.e. a society

characterised by absolute transparency. He doesnot envisage a society which can only operate if its principles or their application remain hiddenand unexpressed, the very existence and socialorganisation of which citizens can only accept onthe grounds of ideological illusions and delusions(68-69) . Rawls’ ideal society is one in which themembers can and are willing to give public rea-sons for what they say and do with regard tofundamental political questions. This ‘logondidonai’ translates into Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’,

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without which a well-ordered society cannotexist. 22 It demands that citizens adhere to thepolitical conception of justice and respect thelimits of public reason. In other words, it requiresthat citizens follow a specific form of publicdiscourse and argumentation. 23 It is only byadhering to the limits of public reason with re-spect to fundamental questions that citizens canhonour the moral ideal of citizenship and exercisepower over one another in a legitimate manner.As such, the criteria and methods of public rea-son are associated with “the nature (the aim andpoint)” of a democratic society, just as the non-public reasons of associations and churches pointto the “nature (the aim and point)” of the associa-tions and churches in question (220-21) .24

An important implication of Rawls’ concep-tion of public reason and of his understanding of the duty of civility is that he assumes that citizensin a constitutional democratic regime are “offi-cers.” Just as officers (law givers, members of theexecutive and judicial authorities) are obliged to

let themselves be led by publicly accepted andacceptable rules, so must citizens allow them-selves to be led by the political conception of justice and public reason. Citizens exercise powerover one another. Consequently, for Rawls, vot-ing cannot be a private or personal matter inwhich one casts one’s vote according to one’spreferences and interests, one’s “dislikes andhatreds,” or what one considers right and truefrom the perspective of one’s own comprehensivedoctrine (219-220) .

The ideal of public reason does not imply,however, that only one, single, reasonable answeris possible for every fundamental political ques-tion. There is a certain indeterminability in theprinciples of justice and in public reason. Wherea variety of interests and social positions are atwork, political values can be weighted or com-bined in a variety of ways. 25 There is no reason,for that matter, why the ‘burdens of judgement’would not play a role in specifying the politicalconception thereby preventing complete agree-

ment (121) . The point of the idea of a well-or-dered society is not that citizens have to reach thesame conclusion, but that they have to appear inpublic as interpreting the same political concep-tion. It is sufficient that citizens can honestlyconsider their vision of a certain problem to begrounded in political values which they can ex-pect everyone to accept. In a society which hon-ours public reason, therefore, it might be neces-sary to vote at certain moments. A well-orderedsociety need not necessarily be characterised by arigid and deadening unanimity. For Rawls, how-ever, the indeterminability of public reason is nota sufficient argument for dismissing public reasonaltogether and simply thinking and acting out of the non-public reason of a comprehensive doc-trine (240-41) . Even if the ideal of public reasondoes not lead to complete unanimity, it still has adisciplining effect on public discussion (226-27) . Itforces those who participate in the discussion torefer to the principles which they can expecteveryone to accept as reasonable, thereby evading

the raw power politics of majority rule. 26

VI. The Idea of a Well-ordered Society

1. The ‘Full Publicity Condition’ of the PoliticalConception of Justice

In Rawls’ vision, a well-ordered society is asociety which is publicly regulated by a concep-tion of justice. In such a society, citizens publiclyaccept this conception for the entire basic struc-

ture. Moreover, the conception of justice, togetherwith its full justification, is essentially public (66-

67) . This fully public justification bears referenceto the set of arguments developed by Rawls inelaborating justice as fairness; why he operates ashe does and not otherwise. 27 Rawls admits thatit is perhaps too much to suggest that such a full justification should become public knowledge,since most people have little interest in reflection.For this reason it might be sufficient if it wereavailable to the public so that whenever individu-

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als wish to reflect, the full justification would bepresent in the public culture. The reason Rawlsemphasises this strong point, nevertheless, isbecause it corresponds to the idea of a publicconception for reasonable and rational citizenswho are free and equal and clarifies one of theideals which stimulate his thought. For Rawls,citizens as “enlightened” persons ought to under-stand the organisation and principles of society aslinked in a clearly defined way with a conceptionof society and person, and should act and want toact out of this political philosophy, based uponthe insight that the principles in question arethose which can be accepted as reasonable in theoriginal position.

A well-ordered society, then, is not only regu-lated by the two principles of justice, but by afull conception of justice. Such a conception doesnot only secure the minimum conditions for ef-fective social cooperation by restraining individ-ual and group egoism, nor is it simply embodiedin the institutions, but rather, in and through the

realisation of a fully public conception of justice,it presents the individual with a fully articulatedideal of citizenship, thereby stirring his or herdesire to embody the ideal (11; 43) .28 Only whenthe ‘full publicity condition’ is fulfilled can thepolitical conception perform an educational role(71) .

2. The Full Autonomy of Citizens

When citizens take this ideal upon themselves

and consciously act out of this awareness, theyrealise their full autonomy (68) . Rawls’ concept of ‘full autonomy’ is reminiscent of Kant’s conceptof autonomy: submission to the universal law of reason which one imposes on oneself as a reason-able being. There remains something of a differ-ence, however. The ideal of autonomy for Rawlsis still a (limited) political ideal and not an ethicalone: it is the autonomy of the individual as acitizen who consciously and freely desires to livein society with others according to principles

which everyone can accept as reasonable (77-81;

98-99) . Citizens realise their autonomy when theyconsciously act out of principles of justice whichspecify the fair terms of cooperation which theywould impose on themselves if they were partici-pants in the original position (77-78) .

3. The Goal of a Well-ordered Society

In a well-ordered society, citizens share and ac-cept a conception of justice. When they all con-sciously adopt this conception, they share a goal,“not to mention other ends,” to support just insti-tutions and give each other justice (201-02) ; tofurnish one another with fundamental freedomsand rights as well as the “all-purpose means”(income and the social foundations for self-re-spect) which ensure that everyone has the oppor-tunity to adequately develop his or her moralcapabilities and follow his or her conception of the good. This is not a goal, however, in thesense of comprehensive doctrines because it does

not stretch beyond the society itself nor transformit into a political community . According to Rawls,a well-ordered society is to be strictly distin-guished from a political community , as well asfrom, more broadly, associations, precisely be-cause it does not have a final goal in the sensethat persons or associations have goals, i.e. goalswhich have a place in comprehensive doctrines,goals which give the community its raison d’être .As a consequence, a democratic society has nogrounds for offering different membership entitle-

ments to its constituents depending on the esti-mated value of their potential contribution to thesociety and its goal (276) . Associations can dothis, certainly in a well-ordered society in whichthe framework of the basic structure guaranteesthe political equality and freedom of its citizens.When democratic societies sometimes formulategoals in the preambula of their constitutions,these should only be of the sort that are institutedor authorised by the principles of justice and fallunder public reason (177; 232) .

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It is evident once again that Rawls envisagesthe political society as a framework. People, forhim, only contribute to associations within thebasic structure and not to the society itself, withconsequence that, for the society, the value of citizens always remains equal (80-81; 279-80) . With-out the conceptions of the good which peoplecarry, which inspire them to associate with oneanother with a particular project in mind, the justsocial institutions of a well-ordered society wouldhave no point (334) . In this sense, the well-orderedsociety does not offer a meaning for life. It en-sures justice and considers the protection of itsmembers’ conceptions of the good, and the devel-opment of a capacity for a sense of justice and aconception of the good, as conditions of thegood, but not as the good itself.

As we have already noted, however, the mem-bers of a well-ordered society do have a commongoal, albeit in a different sense, namely the goalof establishing a just framework. This is enoughto make a well-ordered society into more than

simply an aggregate of individuals who onlycooperate for their own advantage. It is enough tomake it into more than merely a “private society”which would be nothing more than a means orresource for individual advantage without pos-sessing its own significance or good (Nozick). 29

VII. The Reasonableness and Rationality of Persons

As explained above, a pluralistic society presents

itself as marked by the reasonable through itseffort to find a foundation acceptable to all.Rawls’ idea of the reasonable, of which the polit-ical conception of justice, in terms of content, isthe specification, is a complex idea (94) . It ex-presses itself in the two aspects of the reasonablewith the addition of the principles of practicalreason and the conceptions of society, person andthe publicity of the political conception (or of awell-ordered society) which are themselves ideasof practical reason and specify the framework

within which the principles of practical reason areapplied (xx; 94; 104) .

1. The Two Aspects of Reasonablenessas Virtues of Persons

Reasonableness, for Rawls, is a virtue of personsengaged in social cooperation with their equals(48) . It is not an epistemological idea, but rather aparticular form of moral sensibility that is givenexpression in the desire to cooperate fairly withothers according to fair terms of cooperationwhich they can accept as reasonable. It is not thesum total of moral sensibility, but simply a partof it, one which reflects the idea of fair socialcooperation and the ideal of a democratic citizen-ship embracing the idea of public reason (51; 62) .

Reasonableness is an essential component of Rawls’ conception of persons, one which is itself part of the idea of the reasonable, although it isalso given distinct mention in the aforesaid ideaof the reasonable. As I hope to show, the reason

for this lies in the fact that reasonableness doesnot only refer to a characteristic of persons asRawls understands them, but at the same timepoints to the moral motivation out of which thepolitical conception is constructed.

Thus for Rawls, reasonableness entails twoaspects. In the first place, it embraces a readinessto propose general justifiable principles andnorms as fair terms of cooperation, and then toadhere to them where it is certain that others willdo the same. Reasonableness, then, is not altru-

ism: “Reasonable persons, [...] are not moved bythe general good as such but desire for its ownsake a social world in which they, as free andequal, can cooperate with others in terms all canaccept.” (50) . The second aspect of reasonablenesscomes to the fore in a readiness to accept the‘burdens of judgement’ and thereby accept thatwhat one can justify as reasonable for others islimited. Reasonableness as such is the acceptanceof reasonable pluralism. What characterises areasonable person is the fact that he or she can

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affirm his or her comprehensive doctrine as true(reasonable) while understanding it, nevertheless,as one among many, thereby recognising thatpersonal truth can have no claims on others be-yond those which they ascribe to it, free fromimposition by political force. As such, reasonable-ness is tolerance understood as virtue; it is apositive disposition rather than a pragmatic self-resignation to what one considers untrue butcannot change. It is not submission to the brutalforces of the unreasonable. Such resignationwould produce nothing more than a modus viven-di , certainly not a well-ordered society in whichindividuals consciously choose to live accordingto rules recognised by all as reasonable.

This ‘will to reasonableness’, with both its as-pects, is the driving moral motivation of Rawls’political liberalism and as such constitutes thefirst element of the idea of the reasonable. Itmight be suggested that Rawls does nothing morethan respond to the question of the political im-plications of this will to live with others who do

not share our comprehensive doctrine for theordering of society’s basic structure. Such a dis-position, however, would be insufficient to cometo a specification of the reasonable in terms of content. It is for this reason that the idea of thereasonable embraces different substantial andempirical elements which must help determine thepurpose to which this ideal of citizenship obligescitizens.

2. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation

Reasonableness, as has already been suggested,refers to Rawls’ idea of society as a fair systemof cooperation. While this idea is the “fundamen-tal organising idea” of Rawls’ theory, it should beunderstood together with two “companion funda-mental ideas”: the idea of the person as a citizen,which will be developed below, and the idea of awell-ordered society, which has already beendiscussed (14f; 35) .

Rawls contrasts the idea of a society as a

system of fair cooperation with that of a societyunderstood as a socially co-ordinated activity,efficiently organised towards a particular goal, bysome authority or another. In so doing, he wantsto emphasise the fact that, in his conception,society is a system of cooperation existing in andthrough the express will of its citizens. The ideaof such a society includes, therefore, the idea of fair terms of cooperation, of honest, publiclyrecognised rules which the participants can acceptand consider to be “properly” regulative of theirbehaviour (16) . The concept is thus one of a soci-ety in which citizens cooperate voluntarily with-out resentment because they experience it asfairly organised, i.e. as giving expression to theidea of reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity,which has always had an important role to play inthe tradition of social contract thinking, expressesthe idea that fairness consists in mutual and actu-al recognition and respect.

The phrase ‘fair system of cooperation’ mightperhaps give rise to the suggestion that we are

dealing with the idea of society as a “purposiveassociation” (42, n. 44) . But as has already beenshown, in Rawls’ vision society does not have agoal, being merely the framework within whichindividuals, together or alone, endeavour to real-ise their conception of the good. Rawls’ idea of society, therefore, does not only embrace the ideaof fair cooperation, but also that of rational ad-vantage, the good which those engaged in theprocess of cooperation endeavour to obtain forthemselves. The point of interest in the concept

of a fair scheme of cooperation is not the goalrealised in the process of cooperation. Rather, itis the quality with which citizens cooperate andthe outcome of their cooperation, namely “a justbasic structure ... realising principles of justiceand providing citizens with the all-purpose meansto meet their needs as citizens.” (42, n. 44) . I t isimportant, therefore, to be on one’s guard againsta utilitarian understanding of fair cooperation andmutuality. They do not denote a “mutual benefitssociety” in which mutuality is understood as

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mutuality of self-interest, as if citizens were toextract mutual advantage from one another’spresence. Such a mutuality of achievements is notwhat Rawls intends. On the contrary, he proposesa mutuality in which the members of society con-cede the status of citizen to one another, ascribingmutual rights and means, as well as imposingobligations on one another.

3. Persons as Reasonable and Rational

In his concept of society, then, Rawls presents theidea of a community of citizens , each having theirown personal life project, goals and expectations,yet at the same time prepared to recognise oneanother, conceding to one another the necessarymeans and space to realise their personal goodinsofar as this does not come into conflict withthe fair rules of social cooperation (16; 177) .

Such an idea of society implies a particularidea of ‘person’. It would hardly be convincing if one could not imagine persons as having the

capacity for a “sense of justice,” a capacity for aconception of the good, and as actually possess-ing a conception of the good (52) . On the basis of the first capacity, Rawls ascribes reasonablenessto persons; on the basis of the second capacity,he ascribes rationality.

The idea of the reasonableness of persons hasalready been sufficiently clarified. It remainsnecessary, however, to say something more aboutthe rationality of persons. Rawls’ conception of society includes, as indicated above, the idea that

persons, at least intuitively, possess a life project,a personal conception of the good in light of which they organise their lives. To say that per-sons are rational is to say that whatever their goalmight be, they will (normally) strive towards it inan intelligent manner (48-49, n. 1) . Thus, among thepoints of departure of political liberalism is thefact that human life and the fulfilment of funda-mental human needs and goals are, on the whole,good, and that rationality is a good (“goodness asrationality” 176-68 ) and as such a fundamental

principle of political and social organisation.Rationality is, therefore, the capacity of actors

to deliberate on the best way to achieve their goal(good) and/or the best arrangement of their goals.Unlike reasonableness, which always turns onetowards others, rationality is not public. Whilereasonableness lies within one’s capacity to intel-ligently apply the reasonable principles of practi-cal reason (the principles of fairness, justice,truthfulness, tolerance, faithfulness etc.), rationali-ty lies within one’s capacity to understand therational principles of practical reason (the princi-ples of efficiency, selecting the most probablealternative, etc.) (83) . Such rationality, however,does not denote egoism. The conception of thegood, as has been explained, can include all kindsof affections for persons and groups wherebytheir good is identified with one’s own good (51) .

4. The Relationship between Reasonableness and Rationality in Political Liberalism

For Rawls, rationality and reasonableness are twodistinct and independent, yet complementary,characteristics of persons. Their combinationdetermines the form in which the problem of justice presents itself to us. Persons have thecapacity to have a sense of justice, but simulta-neously live oriented towards their own personalconceptions of the good. Of course, if peoplewere always altruistic, the problem of justicewould not arise, or if it did it would arise in adifferent form. At the same time, if people were

only characterised by rationality, they would lack any orientation towards fair cooperation.

What for us is more important than the afore-mentioned complementarity is the fact that rea-sonableness has priority over rationality, or inother words, right has priority over good (25, n. 28;

cf. also 339-40; 367) . On the basis of his or her rea-sonableness, a person is prepared to submit his orher pursuit of the good to the fair rules of coop-eration. 30 The priority itself expresses the under-lying moral motive which constitutes Rawls’

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point of departure. 31 The priority of the reason-able, however, does not mean that the rationalshould be derived from the reasonable. Suchwould lead us into conflict with the independenceof both. What it does suggest is that the concep-tion of justice has its roots in the will to reason-ableness which finds its ground within itself andcannot be deduced from rationality. 32 As withKant, there can be no question for Rawls of adeduction of morality. Morality, 33 in this casereasonableness, can only depart from itself in itsendeavour to discover what it contains. The anal-ogy, however, should not mislead us. WhereRawls is concerned it is not the moral will assuch which constitutes the moral point of depar-ture of the political conception but rather the (po-litical) will to achieve fair cooperation in a situa-tion of reasonable pluralism and to arrange com-munal political life according to terms which oth-ers cannot reject as unreasonable (124) .

Some have tried to demonstrate that a deduc-tion of justice (reasonableness) from the rational

can be found in Rawl’s A Theory of Justice . Thisbook, no doubt, contains a number of suggestionsin this sense, especially in its use of rationalchoice theory (53, n. 7) . Even then, however, anattentive reader would have noticed that, whilethe parties in the original position do indeed em-body the aspect of rationality, the aspect of rea-sonableness is present from the very beginning(thus not deduced) in the limitations to which theoriginal position submits rational deliberations,namely, the reasonable conditions of symmetry

and equality, the restriction on information andabove all the procedure and line of thought as awhole (53; 104) . In the original position, reason-ableness and rationality are modelled in two dif-ferent places. One should not forget, for that mat-ter, that the original position is a “device of rep-resentation” and is not a description of moralreality as such. One cannot, then, point to Rawls’description of the parties in the original positionin order to conclude that Rawls understands thehuman person as purely rational. In reality, he

understands the human person to be reasonableand rational at the same time (104) , as having boththe capacity to form a sense of justice and thecapacity to form a conception of the good.

VIII. The Freedom and Equality of Persons

Rawls attempts to discover what the will to rea-sonableness, “the conception-dependent desire toact in ways worthy of a reasonable and equalcitizen,” implies politically. Such a moral inten-tion is not yet capable in itself of leading to aspecification of the reasonable in terms of itscontent. As has already been noted, it is for thisreason that the idea of the reasonable embracesthe aforementioned reasonable and rational princi-ples of practical reason, as well as the ideas of person, society and the public role of the politicalconception (or of a well-ordered society). Wehave not yet examined the origin and range of these ideas, however, nor have we explored free-dom and equality which, next to reasonableness

and rationality, characterise Rawls’ vision of persons.

1. The Political Character of the Ideas of Person and Society

As indicated earlier, the political conception of justice presents itself as autonomous, not as theapplication of a comprehensive doctrine to thepolitical. On the contrary, it presents itself asrooted in the fundamental political ideas which

have emerged slowly and largely implicitly with-in the public political culture of the democraticsocieties which came into existence after the warsof religion. 34 In starting out from these ideas,the political conception of justice connects withideas which citizens of a democratic society havein common, in spite of their ideological differ-ences, ideas which can form the basis of an(overlapping) consensus. The autonomous charac-ter of the conception does not mean, therefore,that it is an a priori conception with its origin in

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practical reason alone. Rawls’ political liberalismsituates itself within the liberal tradition andthereby associates itself with the educated com-mon sense of that tradition.

This applies both for the ideas of society andwell-ordered society, as well as for the idea of persons as moral beings characterised by reason-ableness, rationality, and a capacity to develop asense of justice and a conception of the good.Two important characteristics of Rawls’ under-standing of the person have yet to be mentioned:freedom and equality. An examination of boththese ideas will give us the opportunity to stresssomething that applies to all the ideas we have just listed, namely that they are all ‘politicalideas’, i.e. normative concepts (18, n. 20) whichdevelop in a liberal political culture, ideas whichdo not belong to a comprehensive doctrine but dobelong to a conception of social and political justice (28) . They show how citizens should (havebegun to) consider themselves, each other andsociety in a pluralistic world. The role of the

conceptions of person and society in a conceptionof political justice is distinct from their role in apersonal or associational ideal or in a religiousway of life. Just as a pluralistic society can nolonger base itself on a comprehensive doctrine, itis equally unable to base itself on the conceptionsof society and person which form part of suchphilosophical or religious ideals. Should suchconceptions obtain a political form nonetheless,they would threaten the very possibility of a freeand willing cooperation between persons with

different conceptions of the good (369) . All thosewho did not share such conceptions would nolonger recognise themselves in such a society andwould ultimately be excluded by it as second-class citizens.

The fact that such ideas are political ideasmeans that the conception of the person is aspecification of the ancient concept of person 35

under the influence of the idea of society as a fairsystem of cooperation. According to the ancientconcept, a person is someone who is able to be a

citizen, to participate and play a role in sociallife, and to exercise rights and obligations in sodoing (18; 179) . The characteristics which specifythe conception of person, for Rawls, are notrooted in a comprehensive, metaphysical-philo-sophical understanding of the person, even less ina scientific description of human nature. They arepolitical characteristics which only reveal thoseaspects of persons which are significant from theperspective of the idea of society understood as afair system of cooperation. They reveal whatmust be presumed with regard to persons in orderfor them to cooperate in the system of fair coop-eration, namely, the capacity to adhere to thereasonable rules of cooperation and the capacityto rationally follow one’s personal conception of the good (20) .

In a similar sense, freedom and equality arecharacteristics of a political conception of theperson. They bear a special significance withinRawls’ theory because the idea of searching for abasis of justification is related in a very particular

way with the concept of citizens as free and equalpersons. Indeed, Rawls never tires in pointing outthat the principles of justice (must) give expres-sion to that which is implied in the idea of theequality and freedom of persons (9 et passim) .

2. Freedom and Equality as Political Ideas

The (political) ideas of freedom and equality arerelated to the will to achieve a fair society inspite of ideological conflicts. We have already

pointed out that the search for such an agreementpresumes that citizens do not consider themselvesbound to prior and exterior principles of justice.In this sense citizens conceive of themselves andeach other as free. For Rawls, however, this doesnot imply a metaphysical position on the humanperson, as if he or she could ever choose a con-ception of the good in complete license and livehis or her life thereby (221-23) .36 Rather, themeaning of freedom is purely political, that is, a(political) assumption which it is necessary to

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make in this situation. The “freedom” of personsexpresses the fact that they are politically free toform, revise and aspire to a conception of thegood, and to deliberate and reach agreementswith others in accord with such a conceptioninsofar as they submit to reasonable constraints. Itexpresses nothing other than the political recogni-tion of the fact that conceptions of the goodbelong to the non-public sphere, and do so insuch a way that one can accept and reject themwithout losing one’s public identity. It reveals,moreover, that persons are entitled to makeclaims on society because they are citizens. Theyare not obliged to justify such claims by pointingto the comprehensive doctrines to which theyadhere, or to the duties and roles they fulfil insociety, or to their membership in certain groups(32-33) . The conception of freedom ultimatelyincludes the idea that persons are not indentifiedby weakness of character, but rather that they canbear responsibility for their conception of thegood and can adapt it to what they can reason-

ably expect on the basis of the conception of justice. Indeed, without such an assumption, theidea of a (well-ordered) society would be mean-ingless.

Persons are conceived as equal in the samepolitical sense. One of the points of departure of the political conception is that persons equallyposses the two moral capacities, as well as all theother capacities which make it possible for themto be normal and cooperative members of society.In fact, it is these very characteristics which

define persons as partners in the system of faircooperation and qualify them as subjects of social justice. 37 Here too it is not being suggested thatfrom the perspective of a comprehensive stand-point or a conception of the good one cannotpoint to inequalities between persons, only thatthey are politically irrelevant and can vanishunder the “veil of ignorance” (79-80) . Even if one’s personal comprehensive doctrine shoulddeny equality, one would still be obliged to meetthe representatives of other doctrines as one’s

equals if one desired to reach an agreement withthem.

IX. Higher-order Interests and Primary Social Goods

The conception of the person is a political con-ception because it only takes into account thosecharacteristics which are important for their statusas citizens and for the determination of theirrights and obligations within the basic structure.It is only as such persons that individuals in theoriginal position are represented by the parties.The argumentation for the principles in the origi-nal position is thus based on a well-defined con-ception of person and society, and not merelyconsiderations of rational advantage alone(299) .38 It is indeed the case that the parties inthe original position, limited as they are by theconstraints of symmetry and by the veil of igno-rance, rationally endeavour to defend the interestsor good of their clients. The interests in question,

however, do not propose to encompass all theinterests or the comprehensive interest of suchpersons, only their higher-order interests, theirinterest as citizens, as normal, cooperative mem-bers of society understood as a fair system of cooperation. For persons understood in this way,it is important that they be given opportunities tofollow their (permissible) conception of the goodand to develop their capacity to have a sense of justice and a concept of the good. Their capacityto become fully-fledged members of society de-

pends in fact on their fulfilment of these higher-order interests. These interests alone are rationallydefended by the parties in the original position.

The significance of the primary social goodsought to be situated within this context. Rawlsintroduces them in order to solve a problem pre-sented by the introduction of the veil of igno-rance in the original position (75-76) . The partiesdo not know the conception of the good of thosewho provide their mandate, and even the realisa-tion that they are interested in developing their

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capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good remains formal. The question remainshow the parties can come to a rational agreementon specific principles that are better than theother available alternatives in order to protect theinterests of the people they represent.

The introduction of the idea of primary goodsresolves this problem. The parties evaluate alter-native conceptions of justice by examining howgood they are at guaranteeing the primary socialgoods that are considered essential for the realisa-tion of higher-order interests. In order to identifythe goods in question, Rawls asks himself whichsocial background conditions and all-purposemeans are necessary in order to develop andexercise the two moral capacities and to effective-ly realise conceptions of the good which differfrom one another at the level of content. Such anindex of goods does not only point to the idea of goodness as rationality, but also and above all tothe political idea of the person as a free and equalcitizen. It reveals what citizens need when they

are understood as such persons and as fully coop-erative members of society over an entire lifetime. In order to define this index, Rawls has toappeal to certain (empirical) insights into the“basic facts of social life and the conditions of human growth and nurture” (177-78) and assume,at the same time, that there is a certain similaritybetween citizens’ conceptions of the good, i.e.that their conceptions of the good, no matter howvaried, demand more or less the same primarygoods (fundamental rights, freedoms and chances

together with the same all-purpose means such asincome and the social bases of self-respect).

These very goods provide the solution to thepractical political problem of interpersonal com-parisons discussed earlier. They offer a “prac-ticable public basis of interpersonal comparisonsbased on objective features of citizens’ socialcircumstances open to view.” (181) . Such are thegoods which everyone can reasonably consider tobe definitive of what can be understood as thefulfilment of the fundamental needs of persons as

citizens, as being of advantage to everyone ascitizens. As a part of the political conception of justice, the theory of primary goods suggests thatclaims to such goods are the only appropriateclaims (178-79) . It likewise suggests why this is so,why “strong feelings and aspirations”, for exam-ple, are not grounds for the appropriateness of theclaims (190) . According to Rawls, moreover, suchan index of goods would respect the limits of the“practicable” and satisfy the “constraints of sim-plicity and availability of information” which arealways important in matters of politics (182) .

Thus, even the conception of what is good andadvantageous for all is political, i.e. not a concep-tion belonging to a comprehensive doctrine. Theindex of primary goods cannot be understood as acompromise or the striking of a fair balancebetween what the various actual comprehensivedoctrines consider to be good, any more than thepolitical conception of justice (39-40) . “Thethought is not that primary goods are fair tocomprehensive conceptions of the good associated

with such doctrines, by striking a fair balanceamong them, but rather fair to free and equalcitizens as those persons who have these concep-tions,” (40) . In a similar way to the political con-ception of justice, the notion and the index of primary goods is elaborated as “free-standing.”One arrives at it “from within” (40) , taking theideas of person and society as points of departure.The primary goods, then, do not define the funda-mental values of human life (188) . They specifyinstead what persons as citizens need when ques-

tions of justice arise. They are a “construct”elaborated within a political conception of justiceand not within a comprehensive doctrine. Thethought is that this construct offers the best avail-able standard of justice for competing claims, onewhich is generally acceptable to citizens (188) .Here too it is Rawls’ hope that to the extent thatsuch ideas belong to the political culture of dem-ocratic societies and are shared by many, the ideaand the index of primary goods might become thefocus of an overlapping consensus.

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X. Political Ideas as Ideas of Practical Reason

In presenting the political ideas of society andperson, Rawls not only affirms that they devel-oped historically in the public political culture of democratic societies, he also indicates that theyare ideas of practical reason (39-40) . How thenshould this simultaneous appeal to history andreason be understood?

It has been established that in a pluralist con-text individuals can no longer depend upon anavailable comprehensive doctrine of the truth.Freely motivated by their will to reasonableness,they must determine for themselves what they seeas reasonable. All they can rely upon is theirreason, which for Rawls as well as Kant is “self-originating” and “self-authenticating” 39 and thusthe only authority qualified to say what is reason-able (100; 120, n. 26) . The reasonable and rationalprinciples which practical reason finds withinitself are, nevertheless, insufficient to reach con-clusions. It still needs the conceptions of society

and person etc. which, according to Rawls, reasondevelops as a complement to the reasonable andrational principles of practical reason. Theseprinciples reach expression in the thinking and judging of persons who apply them in social andpolitical practice when they pattern their inten-tions and actions towards other people. As such,they include clues as to the nature of the agentswho use them in practical argumentation and thenature of the practical problems and questions towhich the principles of practical reason are appli-

cable (107) . It is in this sense that the conceptionsof society and person are conceptions of practicalreason. 40 They are constituted as they are be-cause of their relationship with the (reasonableand rational) practical principles of reason. Onehas to assume that persons who engage in practi-cal reason with others can be reasonable andrational, as well as free and equal. These ideasfurnish the idea of the reasonable with the mini-mal substance necessary to specify it at the levelof content within a conception of justice. Without

such ideas, the principles of practical reason haveno point (108-110) . Only by starting out from anamalgamation of the principles of practical reasonwith the appropriate conceptions of person, soci-ety and well-ordered society, and not from practi-cal reason as such, 41 can Rawls discover whatpeople must commit themselves to (at the level of content) if they desire to be reasonable in a situa-tion of reasonable pluralism (107; 115-16) .

Since the ideas in question have their origin inpractical reason, they are abstract and stylisedwhen compared with similar ideas from compre-hensive doctrines. They are not comprehensivedescriptions of the nature of the human personand society. Rather, they are normative ideas (18,

n. 20) which, because of their point of departure,emphasise certain aspects of society and person,and ignore others. They are abstract (idealised) inthe sense that a perfect competitive market and ageneral economic equilibrium are abstract propo-sitions of reason (46) . As noted above, it is theirprofound conflicts on questions of truth that have

forced people to divert into the domain of thereasonable and thus the domain of abstraction.Such abstraction is not an end in itself, but ratherthe only way to pursue a substantial public dis-cussion when more particular, shared insights areabsent.

For Rawls, a pluralistic society can exist with-out a comprehensive and inclusive doctrine. Itcannot, however, do without abstract ideas andconceptions if it wants to achieve more than aprocedural consensus. Consensus can only be

found in ideas which abstract from everythingthat might constitute the basis of a controversyand impose themselves as reasonable on commonpractical reason. Yet for Rawls, abstraction doesnot imply inclusivity or comprehensiveness. Theself-same conflicts which evoke the abstractionprevent it at the same time from becoming inclu-sive or comprehensive. This sheds a particularlight on the way in which a political conceptionof justice functions as the foundation of societyand as public reason in a pluralistic society. It is

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not a meta-doctrine understood as an even morecomprehensive doctrine which, from its positionof higher truth, can put all constituent truths intheir place (xviii; 60-61; 174) . It can only function asthe foundation of society by establishing itself inthe distinct domain of the political. In this contextone might ask oneself whether it is not implied inRawls’ thinking that the (historical) move towardsreason at the beginning of modern times simulta-neously signified the constitution of the politicalas a distinct (no longer comprehensive) sphere of reality, having its own object and being dominat-ed by its own specific (political) criteria.

When Rawls proposes that the conceptions of society and person are ideas of practical reasonwhile belonging, at the same time, to the politicalculture of democratic societies, he is really sug-gesting that over the course of their history thesesocieties developed such ideas as implications of their efforts to discover a reasonable foundationfor society. According to Rawls, the citizens of democratic societies started to share these ideas,

at least implicitly, when they endeavoured toreach a mutual agreement via political discussion.Rawls puts himself forward as the one who madethese implicit ideas explicit and, at the same time,as the one who pointed out and articulated theirinternal cohesion and origin in practical reason.This leads us to a number of considerations con-cerning the status and method of Rawls’ theory.Since such an interesting topic would demand acompletely separate study I will limit myself hereto a few general remarks.

XI. Rawls’ Method

At the beginning of this study, the context whichwas definitive for Rawls’ presentation of theproblem was sketched. One element of that con-text, however, has yet to be discussed, namely thefact that the public political culture of a demo-cratic society is itself characterised by profoundconflicts. Such a society does not have a clearinsight into itself and is particularly ignorant as to

how it must solve the conflict between liberty andequality, between the liberty of the ancients andthe liberty of the moderns (4-5; 9; 46; 338; 368-69) .Rawls’ plan is to resolve the impasse by showinghow social institutions should be arranged if theyare to conform to the freedom and equality of moral persons (338) . To this end, he endeavours tospecify a standpoint out of which the principlesof “justice as fairness” can emerge as more ap-propriate than others for the realisation within thebasic structure of the idea of citizenship of freeand equal persons and thus as better correspond-ing to the implicit ideas shared by all (5).

Rawls’ constructivism, and in particular theoriginal position as a “device of representation”and an “artifice of reason,” should be situated atthis point (27; 75) . In this original position Rawlsrepresents, in a model, all the relevant require-ments for correct practical reasoning in questionsof social justice in a pluralistic society (90; 102-03) .He models therein what the citizens of a liberalsociety consider to be fair conditions and accept-

able restrictions on motivations for parties, which,as representatives of reasonable and rational, freeand equal persons, are obliged to specify fairterms of cooperation. The material for the “layout” of Rawls’ model is provided by the abovementioned principles and ideas of practical reasonwhich citizens of democratic societies at leastimplicitly share. In this way, Rawls’ procedureopenly “simulates” all the relevant criteria of correct reasoning which are applicable to theprinciples and norms of political justice. 42

Of course, the correct explanation and ade-quate modelling of these ideas then becomesdecisive. In building and reviewing his model,Rawls must ask himself: whether citizens arefairly represented in the original position (thesymmetry and equality of the parties is importanthere); whether the parties are indeed rationallysolicitous of the essential interests of persons ascitizens (reference to higher-order interests and toprimary social goods is important here); andwhether the parties make choices on the basis of

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what citizens consider to be appropriate reasons(here the “veil of ignorance” prevents inappropri-ate reason from being called upon, given the goalof presenting persons as free and equal). Further-more, the review demands that we ask ourselveswhether a political society regulated by a politicalconception of justice would be stable “in thecorrect way” and above all that we ask ourselveswhether “on due reflection” we would be able toaccept the principles and consequences of such aconception of justice. In our review of the modelwe need to be in a position to say that a pluralis-tic society’s conception of justice, better than anyother, binds our “considered convictions” togetherat all levels of generality into one coherent vision(8-9; 45) .

The central idea of political constructivismremains that when we can confirm that the origi-nal position is being modelled in an adequatemanner, the principles of justice chosen by theparties can be considered as the most evidentspecification (at the level of content) of the idea

of the reasonable (xx) . The “persuasiveness” of the political conception is thus bound to the ex-tent to which the political ideas shared by all andthe “considered convictions” are presented in aconvincing way rather than to the sheer logicalpower of the deduction of a conclusion from thepremises (45; 242) .43

XII. Conclusion

We have already stated that Rawls situates his

political liberalism within the liberal tradition.The practical meaning of so doing now becomesclear. Rawls presents his theory as a resource forpublic reflection and self-clarification of thattradition (26) . He hopes thereby to bring the pro-

cess of reflection, which has occupied the liberaltradition for a considerable time, to some conclu-sion. One might also speak here of a hermeneuticturn in Rawls’ thought. His political philosophydoes not withdraw from the world, nor does itclaim to discover the truth by its own methods of reason, “apart from any tradition of politicalthought and practice.” (45) . Rawls recognises thatphilosophical argumentation on its own is proba-bly not in a position to lead to agreement (53) .For this reason he considers it more fruitful toseek out “bases of agreement” which are implicitin the public culture of democratic societies and,more particularly, in their underlying conceptionsof the person and of social cooperation. It isperhaps true that such “bases of agreement” areobscure and can be understood in a variety of ways. Rawls endeavours to show, however, pre-cisely how such concepts can be understood, andhow the notion of the original position can beused to connect them to certain principles of justice which themselves belong to the tradition

of moral philosophy (338-39) . Rawls is not seekingto give foundation to our moral insight; insteadhe sees the task of philosophy as consisting inshowing the “coherence” of these insights withother ideas, thereby bringing order to our convic-tions, from the most general to the most particu-lar (45; 123-25) . The original position plays a cen-tral role in this reflection. It must contribute toour attainment of an unimpeded vision of thedemands of justice, if society is conceived as ascheme of fair cooperation between free and

equal, reasonable and rational persons (26) . Car-ried by the fundamental ideas of the liberal tradi-tion, Rawls’ political philosophy must bring thistradition to unity and consensus.

Notes

1. This study is a revised and enlarged version of an article which originally appeared under the title Rawls’ politiek liberalisme. Enkele notities , in J. VERSTRAETEN , B. PATTYN (eds.), Ethiek en Politiek. Liber amicorum Mgr. Guido Maertens . Groot-Bijgaarden, Scoop/Overlegcentrum voor Christelijke Ethiek, KU Leuven, 1995, p. 106-124.

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2. J. RAWLS , Political Liberalism (John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, 4). New York, 1993. The page numbers inbrackets refer to this edition.3. For Rawls, the truth means the metaphysically or religiously grounded (153).4. One might think of a Marxist state dominated by a metaphysics of history or a Nationalist state dominated by the

pseudo-religion of the nation or the Volksgeist .5. In Rawls’ opinion, a comprehensive religious and/or philosophical doctrine is in principle “general” because “it

applies to a wide range of subjects (in the limit of all subjects)” and “comprehensive” because “it includes concep-tions of what is of value in human life” both personal and private. Rawls distinguishes between comprehensivedoctrines which are “fully comprehensive” and those which are “only partially comprehensive”. The former “coversall recognised values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought” while the latter is “ratherloosely articulated.” (13; 175). In addition, a comprehensive doctrine also implies a conception of the good. “Aconception of the good ... consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want torealise for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups and associations”whereby “the flourishing of the[se] persons and associations” also becomes a part of our conception of the good. “Aview of our relation to the world – religious, philosophical, moral – by reference to which the value and significanceof our ends and attachments are understood” is also adjoined to such a conception of the good. (See 19-20; 59-60;74; 81; 108).6. The public political culture consists of the entirety of the political institutions of a constitutional regime, the

public tradition of their interpretation, and the historical texts and documents upon which they base themselves (p.13-4). The “background culture” is that of civil society, of daily life with all its associations. It would be wrong,therefore, to consider this ‘private’ in the strict sense of the word. It is only ‘non-political’. (Cf. 220, n. 7).7. It would be wrong to imagine that political liberalism does not have a conception of the good. As we shall

explain shortly, it is a matter of a political conception of the good.8. In particular, two coercive characteristics determine the specificity of the political relationship. In the first place,

it concerns a relationship between individual persons as mediated by the basic structure of society. Individuals are

an inseparable part of such a society; they cannot escape it. Secondly, the relationship in question is characterised bythe assertion of a politically coercive force. In a constitutional, democratic regime, the power of free and equalcitizens as a collective body over the same citizens as individuals or members of groups constitutes such a force.9. (xxvii-xxix ; 13; 152, n. 17; 175). See also in this regard p. 257-65 wherein Rawls distinguishes his contract theory

at this level from utilitarianism, perfectionism and intuitionism. While for Rawls the primary structure constitutes thetouchstone of the principles of justice as fairness, the principles of utilitarianism, for example, are applicable toevery sphere of life. They can only lead to specificity in their application.10. (193) Rawls distinguishes “neutrality of aim” from “neutrality of effect” the latter of which he considers

impracticable. A liberal political conception of justice cannot be neutral in the sense that it would have no advanta-geous or disadvantageous effects on comprehensive doctrines and their ability to attract supporters. Should certainreasonable and valuable comprehensive doctrines disappear as a result of the liberalisation of society, this does notimply dishonesty towards them on the part of the prevailing political conception. As a matter of fact, it would beimpossible to maintain a comprehensive doctrine in a manner which is consistent with a democratic political

conception of justice (See 193-94; 197-200).11. It should be emphasised here that one would miss the point of Rawls’ idea of a political conception of justice if

one were to see it as a (fair) compromise, as a (fair) balancing of different actual comprehensive doctrines. Thiswould run counter to the “free-standing” character of the political conception of justice which has its own groundsin the political conceptions of society and person which we have yet to discuss.12. Insofar as they are valued for different reasons within specific comprehensive visions, Rawls does not exclude

the possibility that certain political virtues are, at the same time, non-political virtues (195 n. 29).13. See p. 199-200 where Rawls offers a more concrete articulation of the requirements the state can impose on the

education religious sects might want to provide their children.14. We cannot explore Rawls’ understanding of the problem of stability in this study. Rawls is not only in search of

a just foundation for cooperation between free and equal persons, the conception itself must be stable , i.e. havingthe support of people who simultaneously entertain a comprehensive doctrine. What lies at the heart of the problemis: 1) whether individuals in a well-ordered liberal society acquire an adequate sense of justice to conquer the

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tendency to injustice, and 2) whether an overlapping consensus is possible on such a conception of justice, i.e.whether individuals are in a position to include a political conception of justice in their comprehensive doctrine andthus give it their support.15. There are also comprehensive doctrines which present themselves as bearing the emblem of ‘the reasonable’ (eg.

Kant). ‘The reasonable’ in Rawls, however, should not be understood in the comprehensive sense, but rather in thelimited, politically constructivistic sense. ‘The reasonable’ is not advanced as the highest and ultimate value in lifeas such, but rather as the appropriate value for the political domain.16. As a comprehensive doctrine, scepticism would meet with resistance from other comprehensive doctrines and

therefore make an (overlapping) consensus impossible. For Rawls’ treatment of the problem of scepticism andindifference see p. 62-63; 150-54; 171-72.17. Rawls refers to the kind of freedom intended here as “rational autonomy.” It is only one aspect of freedom as

such and differs from “full autonomy.” (Cf. 72-77).18. The fact that we are dealing here with presentation distinguishes Rawls’ political constructivism from moral

constructivism (Kant) in which the order of moral and political values is understood as constituted by the principlesand conceptions of practical reason. Political constructivism distances itself from such a proposition because itconsiders it, as a metaphysical proposition, to be a hindrance to the establishment of an (overlapping) consensus of comprehensive doctrines. Should “justice as fairness” ever come to rely on the proposition that political values areconstituted by practical reason, then it would never find support from all those who are convinced of the existenceof an “independent order of moral values.” Here we find an example of the way in which Rawls — faithful to his‘precept of avoidance’ (29 n. 31) — endeavours to avoid taking sides in controversial philosophical issues. (On thistheme see 90-101)19. The fact that an individual is indissolubly bound to his or her society is essential for Rawls’ presentation of the

problem. If the parties in the original position had known that those whom they were representing were free to walk away from their society at any moment, and without difficulty, they would perhaps have reached a different agree-ment. In this regard, see Rawls’ treatment of the right of emigration (136 n. 4; 277).

20. (271; 303) Rawls explicitly suggests that such contingencies only appear as contingencies from within the“Kantian” conception of the person as free and equal. In this way, he sees his liberalism as a further realisation andexpansion of the implications of a purely political, constitutional recognition of the freedom and equality of allindividuals towards the basic structure (265; 271). He points out, moreover, that the goal is not to eliminate allcontingencies from social life. Some remain unavoidable (273).21. (259; 281) It is a question, therefore, of a structural ideal which does not impose a defined pattern of distribu-

tion (283-84).22. It should be noted that for Rawls, the recognition of public reason is a moral demand and not a legal one (213;

253). It only applies, moreover, when citizens enter the public forum, exercise force over one another and makedecisions (e.g. via ballots) on constitutional essentials and fundamental questions of justice. It does not apply in the“background culture” where individuals are free to evaluate matters from the perspective of their comprehensivedoctrines (215; 221).23. Rawls does not exclude the possibility that it might sometimes be necessary to affirm certain aspects of one’s

own comprehensive doctrine in public discussion, even if one is dealing with fundamental political matters (152-53;cf. also 247f).24. Note the reference here to Rawls’ particular understanding of the nature of things. In order to understand Rawls’

method, one needs to be aware of this perspective just as one needs to allow for the frequent use of terms such as“appropriate” and “fitting.”25. (226; 237; 240) From this perspective one can also read Rawls’ considerations on the specificity of the overlap-

ping consensus and the width of the range of liberal conceptions defining it (167-68).26. Rawls’ thought is clearly influenced here by the constitutionalism which characterises the political establishment

in the United States of America, particularly the role played therein by the Supreme Court. For Rawls, the SupremeCourt, as guardian of the foundations of the republic, is the exemplar of public reason (215-18). This does notprevent him, however, from emphasising the difference between the ideal of public reason as it applies to citizens,the judicial and executive authority, and the Supreme Court (230-40).

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27. It is important, especially with an eye to further explanation, that we clearly distinguish the three standpoints tobe found in Rawls’ theory: that of the parties in the original position, that of the citizens in a well-ordered societyand that of Rawls, i.e. “we, you and me who are elaborating justice as fairness and examining it as a politicalconception of justice.” (28). Any incapacity to make this distinction can only lead to serious misunderstanding. Thefirst two are part of Rawls’ theory and are specified by “us” on the basis of fundamental ideas taken from thepolitical culture. The difference between them lies in the idea that a well-ordered society of citizens can really exist.It is the expression of the ideal implicit in the political culture. The standpoint of the parties, on the other hand, isartificial, just like the original position as a whole. It is a model set up “by you and me” in elaborating justice asfairness. The nature of the parties thus depends entirely on “us.” The rational autonomy of the parties, therefore, farfrom being a complete description of the nature of the citizens, is an abstraction. The standpoint of “you and me” isdeterminative for the development and evaluation of justice as fairness. It is at this level that the test of reflectiveequilibrium takes place: how well the vision as a whole articulates our considered convictions at all levels of generality (i.e. both our broadly implicit ideas of society and person and our more specific moral convictions onconcrete cases). In order to arrive at a well-tuned “justice as fairness”, “due examination” together with continual“adjustment and revision” are necessary until one achieves a reflective equilibrium.28. On the basis of his “moral psychology,” Rawls assumes that whenever individuals grow up in circumstances of

reasonableness, they will also develop a desire to behave reasonably themselves. Perhaps Rawls has not givenenough attention to the darker side of the human psyche. Should his moral psychology appear to be at fault, itbecomes obvious that his apology for the possibility of a constitutional regime must encounter difficulties as well.29. 40f.; 146,n. 13; 201-02. For the comparison with Nozick see 262-65.30. The priority of the reasonable over the rational is manifest throughout Rawls’ entire theory. On every level of

the “four-stages sequence,” “the reasonable frames and subordinates the rational.” This takes place, in the first place,at the level of the original position where the parties are subjected to “reasonable constraints”. Secondly, it occurs atthe constitutional, legislative and juridical levels respectively. On the constitutional level, the rational considerationsof the parties are restricted by the principles of justice. On the legislative level they are restricted by the sameprinciples together with the constitution. On the juridical level they are restricted by the conception of justice, theprinciples of the constitution and the laws (338-39).31. “The point is though that in setting out justice as fairness we rely on the kind of motivation Scanlon takes as

basic.” (emphasis mine) Here Rawls connects both aspects of the reasonable with Scanlon’s ‘principle of moralmotivation’ (49-50, n. 2) which denotes “a basic desire to justify our actions to others on grounds that they couldnot reasonably reject” or, in other words, “the conception-dependent desire to act, in ways worthy of a reasonableand equal citizen.” (85, n. 33). The two aspects of the reasonable are two connected expressions of this desire. “Toaccept the connection between the two aspects of the reasonable and Scanlon’s principle is to include this form of motivation in the concept of the reasonable from which justice as fairness starts.” (49, n. 2). We should examineRawls’ distinction between three sorts of desire from this perspective together with his rejection of the Humeantheory of motivation (81-86; cf. also 104-07).32. “The disposition to be reasonable is neither derived from nor opposed to the rational but it is incompatible with

egoism and it is related to the disposition to act morally.” (48-49, n. 1); Cf. also 306, n. 21.

33. Rawls frequently relies on Kant. His Kantianism, however, reveals unusual characteristics which we cannotdelve into here. In Political Liberalism he even proposes that his purpose is to detach Kant’s doctrine from its“background in transcendental idealism” (285).34. (13; 195; 223). For Rawls, it is common fact, distinctive of democratic societies, that when they have worked

well over a long period of time, certain fundamental ideas develop, at least implicitly, in their political culture whichprovide an appropriate point of departure for the political conception of justice of a constitutional regime (38, n. 41).35. The difference between concept and conception can already be found in A Theory of Justice (p. 3f). A concept

is the meaning of a term. A (particular) conception also embraces the principles necessary to apply it. Rawls offersthe following example: the concept of justice applied to an institution means that the institution in question, amongother things, does not make arbitrary distinctions between persons in granting fundamental rights. A conception, onthe other hand, also includes the principles and criteria for deciding which distinctions are arbitrary.

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36. Some have suggested that in spite of this Rawls does use a particular metaphysical conception of the humanperson, namely the conception that no metaphysical doctrine is necessary in order to infer political principles of justice or alternatively that the conception of the person he uses embraces a particular metaphysical position in anycase. In response to these criticisms Rawls follows his well-known “precept of avoidance.” He does not deny thatthe critique might be correct but notes: 1) that there is no generally accepted understanding of what a metaphysicaldoctrine is, and 2) that should he in fact be using a particular metaphysical doctrine of the person, such a doctrinewould be so general that it would not run counter to other metaphysical doctrines and would thereby avoid beingdrawn into the controversies which traditionally divide philosophy.37. Of course, this leaves open the question as to the demands of justice with respect to human beings who are

insufficiently endowed with the characteristics of reasonableness and freedom and who are not mutual partners inthe process of cooperation, or with respect to animals and the rest of nature which are unable to be partners in theprocess of cooperation. What is said will have to make it quite clear that Rawls treats such persons, beings andthings as mere “problems of extension.” (See xxvii-xix; 12; 20f; 182f; 244f).38. In an analogous way, Rawls proposes that his conception of a constitution is not founded primarily on principles

of justice, nor on “basic (or natural) rights, but rather on the conceptions of person and society (339).39. Compare with what has already been said concerning the deduction of morality.40. By way of comparison: conceptions of person and society also exist in hierarchical (traditional) societies but

they are not in this instance ideas of practical reason. They do not possess the form demanded by practical reasonnor do they define the context in the way practical reason does. They respond to the question of the nature of socialcooperation from within a comprehensive doctrine and envisage persons, as defined by their comprehensive doctrine,as different and unequal, not as free and equal (109-110).41. “There is no such thing as the point of view of practical reason as such.” (115-16).42. Rawls’ terminology requires some attention here. He not only refers to “simulating” (27), “modelling” (103-4)

and “lay out” (103), he also uses the theatrical metaphor of “role playing” (27) while at the same time emphasisingthe visualisation of the data: “all the relevant criteria are open to view” (102), or further “The initial situation is an

attempt to represent and to unify the formal and general elements of our moral thought in a manageable and vividconstruction in order to use these elements to determine which first principles of justice are the most reasonable.”(275).43. One must understand Rawls’ distinction between “the order of deduction” and “the order of support” from this

perspective (242, n. 32).

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01 - Rawls' Political Liberalism (Van de Putte)