00a Stonehill vs Diokno

8/13/2019 00a Stonehill vs Diokno

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Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the MoncadoDoctrine

Facts:Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges(respondent) issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants againstpetitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officersto search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officerswarehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession of thepersonal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzledand proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or themeans of committing the offense, which is described in the application asviolation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal RevenueCode and the Revised Penal Code.Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending finaldisposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against theprosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized orany copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision berendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the samenull and void.

Petitioners contentions are:(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and

things to be seized;(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned

petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to

the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordancewith law

Respondents-prosecutors contentions

(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued inaccordance with law;

(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'consent; and

(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence againstherein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of theaforementioned searches and seizures.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar aspaper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

Issues:1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail thelegality of search warrants issued against the corporation of which they wereofficers.2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of ageneral search warrants.3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardlessof the illegality of its seizure.

Held:IOfficers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, thingswere seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail

the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuancethereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respectivepersonalities, separate and distinct from the personality of hereinpetitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest ofeach of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold thereinmay be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can becontested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, andthat the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal andcannot be availed of by third parties.Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidenceagainst them of the documents, papers and things seized from the officesand premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to objectto the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to thecorporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by

the corporate officers in proceedings against them in theirindividual capacity.

IIThe Constitution provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, andeffects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, andno warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant andthe witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,namely:(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause , to be determined bythe judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central BanLaws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised PenalCode." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in saidapplications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committedwere abstract . As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issuedthe warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the samepresupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party againstwhom it is sought has performed particular acts, or

committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicileand the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of thewhims caprice or passion of peace officers.

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fi t toamend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in itscounterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shallnot issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense .Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specificoffense."

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitionerspersons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegalcontravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to beseized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its majorobjective the elimination of general warrants.

IIIMost common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling andeventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction againstunreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent assuch, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the onlypractical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times theaction of trespass against the offending official may have been protectionenough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself

controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong willthat wrong be repressed .

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to thespirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches andseizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competentevidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime bythe party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason whythe applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamentallaw. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then itis not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of thecommission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of theabsence of evidence to establish a probable cause.


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The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as itis hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made areillegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, inconnection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in saidresidences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writsprayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effectsso seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that theaforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as itis hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writsprayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seizedin the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in thesame Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Stonehill vs. Diokno.Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and thecorporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of Central BankLaws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the RevisedPenal Code, to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing anypeace officer to search petitioners persons and/or premises of their offices,warehouses and/or residences for: books of accounts, financial records,vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit

journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing allbusiness transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets andprofit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) .

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups:(1) those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, &(2) those found in petitioners residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do notdescribe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2)cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) thewarrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementionedpetitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches andseizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers andcash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent- prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs Peoples Court ruling: evenif the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, thedocuments, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence againstpetitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncadodoctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail thevalidity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus theyhave no cause of action (only the officers or board members of saidcorporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalitiesdistinct from petitioners personalities), the 3 war rants issued to searchpetitioners residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches andseizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and

seizure. It provides:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined bythe judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed aviolation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue(Code) and Revised Penal Code. As no specific violation has been alleged, itwas impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found theexistence of probable cause , for the same presupposes the introduction ofcompetent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed orcommitted violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy,

of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central BankLaws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised PenalCode, as alleged in the aforementioned applications withoutreference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. Generalwarrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitionerstransactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that soughtthese effects to be searched and seized: Books of accounts, financialrecords, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing allbusiness transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets andrelated profit and loss statements .

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing theconstitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, inthe language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters and privatedocuments can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against acitizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of novalue , and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well bestricken from the Constitution . The efforts of the courts and their officials tobring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to beaided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years ofendeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in thefundamental law of the land.

Stonehill vs. DioknoStonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have

committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of thisallegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and theircorporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences,and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of ac counts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and otherdocuments and/or papers showing all business transactions includingdisbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements andBobbins (cigarette wrappers).

The documents, papers, and things seized under the allegedauthority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups,namely:(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporationsand(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and thingsto be seized;(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementionedpetitioners in deportation cases filed against them;(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to thecourts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defectsof said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and that, in anyevent, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short,

the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.

HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized howeverthat Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issuedagainst their corporation for Stonehill is not the proper party hence has nocause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of thecorporation. The constitution protects the peoples right againstunreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issuebut upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner setforth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe thethings to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrantwas issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation ofCentral Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and


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Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged insaid applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offensecommitted were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judgeswho issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, forthe same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the partyagainst whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committedspecific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As amatter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specificacts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of thehighest order, to convict anybody of a violat ion of Central Bank Laws, Tariffand Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, asalleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to anydeterminate provision of said laws or codes.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application forthe contested search warrants was compounded by the description thereinmade of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactionsincluding disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and lossstatements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure ofrecords pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless ofwhether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned theseizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations,whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of theBill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as

well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of generalwarrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of theaccused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARLBECK Petitioners ,vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSELUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau ofInvestigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANAand MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGEAMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First

Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,Municipal Court of Quezon City, Respondents .

CONCEPCION, C.J.: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the marginhereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges -hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, atotal of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or thecorporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer,to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of thefollowing personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documentsand/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursementsreceipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette

wrappers).

as the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits ofthe offense, or used or intended to be used as the means of committingthe offense, which is described in the appli cations adverted to above asviolation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue(Code) and the Revised Penal Code.

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, ascontravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia : (1)they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to beseized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches andseizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and

cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, saidpetitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending finaldisposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issuedrestraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representativesfrom using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in thedeportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaringthe same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents orrepresentatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cashmoneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued inaccordance with law;(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitionersconsent; and(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence againstherein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementionedsearches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunctionprayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, thewrit was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents andthings seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are

concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitionersherein. 7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authorityof the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause ofaction to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizuresmade in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations havetheir respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality ofherein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of theinterest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices theyhold therein may be . Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure canbe contested only by the party whose rights have been impairedthereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitionersherein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of thedocuments, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of thecorporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission ofsaid papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom theseized effects belong , and may not be invoked by the corporate officers inproceedings against them in their individual capacity. Indeed, it has beenheld:. . . that the Governments action in gaining possession of papers belonging tothe corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If thesepapers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one wereinvaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the otherdefendants . Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can beraised only by one whose rights have been invaded . Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful,

could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not beenseized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed ; nor could they claim forthemselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was withreference to the rights of another . Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. Ifollows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidencebased on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to thepersonal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property wastaken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786,789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the ( second group ) documents, papers and things seized inthe residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by thisCourt, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors fromusing them in evidence against petitioners herein.


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In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) importantquestions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants inquestion, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof,are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in thenegative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used inevidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in thenature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected uponthe authority there of are null and void. In this connection, theConstitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, andeffects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, andno warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the

judge after examination under oath or affirmation o f the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched, and the persons or things to be s eized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to bedetermined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contestedwarrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that thenatural and juridical person therein named had committed a violation ofCentral Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and

Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been allegedin said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offensecommitted were abstract . As a consequence, it was impossible for the

judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence ofprobable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction ofcompetent proof that the party against whom it is sought hasperformed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating agiven provision of our criminal laws . As a matter of fact, the applicationsinvolved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by hereinpetitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convictanybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code , as alleged in theaforementioned applications without reference to any determinateprovision of said laws orTo uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe outcompletely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in ourConstitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy ofcommunication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice orpassion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied bythe constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called generalwarrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keenpolitical strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely towrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with thedisputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 ofRule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, underthe Revised Rules of Court 15 that a search warrant shall not issue but uponprobable cause in connection with one specific offense . Not satisfied withthis qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that nosearch warrant shall issue for more than one specific offens e.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for thecontested search warrants was compounded by the description thereinmade of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papersshowing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets andrelated profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of recordspertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless ofwhether the transactions were legal or illegal . The warrants sanctioned theseizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementionedcorporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicitcommand of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized

be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective:the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures underconsideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thusseized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon maturedeliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the positiontaken in the Moncado case must be abandoned . Said position was in linewith the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowedto go free merely because the constable has blundered, upon the theorythat the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches andseizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidenceunlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for damages againstthe searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of thesearch warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegalsearch, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawfulseizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up thisapproach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that thisis the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction againstunreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent assuch, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the onlypractical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times theaction of trespass against the offending official may have been protection

enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itselfcontrols the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong willthat wrong be repressed .

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had alreadydeclared:If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidenceagainst a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaringhis rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value , and, so far asthose thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. Theefforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy asthey are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established byyears of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the

fundamental law of the land .

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequentdecisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisionsthereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra .):. . . Today we once again examine the Wolfs constitutional documentation of the rightof privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on ourbooks, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidencesecured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to allpersons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold thatall evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by thatsame authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendments right of privacy has been declaredenforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusionas it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just aswithout the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searchesand seizures would be a form of words, valueless and underserving ofmention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so

too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would beso ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit thisCourts high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty .At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicableto the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as wehave seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the FourthAmendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of itsprovisions. Even Wolf stoutly adhered to that proposition. The right towhen conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was notsusceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which itsprotection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under theBoyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantiveprotections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the


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exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insistedupon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the WolfCase. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf couldnot tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, theexclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reasonof the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality towithhold its privilege and enjoyment . Only last year the Court itselfrecognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to is to deter - tocompel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectivelyavailable way - by removing the incentive to disregard it . . . . The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy theentire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the peoplerest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the FourthAmendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secureagainst rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutionalin origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise .Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basicrights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to berevocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of lawenforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, foundedon reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which theConstitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to whichhonest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrityso necessary in the true administration of justice . (emphasis ours.)Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also,to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searchesand seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent

evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime bythe party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason whythe applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamentallaw. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then itis not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of thecommission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of theabsence of evidence to establish a probable cause.Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure anillegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures wouldsuffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed Byagents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minoritycould not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of thehandicap under which the minority usually but, understandably findsitself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of thefact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securingtheir conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party forwhose benefit the illegality had been committed.In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of thisCourt dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 ofCarmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should beincluded among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences ofherein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and KarlBeck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and othereffects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to includepersonal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under theirexclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have astanding under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the

United States.22

We note, however, that petitioners theory, regarding their allegedpossession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers andeffects, and t he alleged personal nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not intheir petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion forReconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In otherwords, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in saidpetitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to bereconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies ofalleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submittedin support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegationsinconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of saidpetitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of theaforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said

motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated inthe cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the viewstherein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem itnecessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matteropen for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be,as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,1962, are null and void ; that the searches and seizures therein made areillegal ; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in

connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in saidresidences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writsprayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effectsso seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that theaforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as itis hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writsprayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seizedin the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in thesame Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,concur.

Documents

00a Stonehill vs Diokno