1. 5 Foreword - Victor Andrusiv 7 Forecast Limits to
Sustainability: Scenarios for the World and Ukraine in 2017 Yuriy
Romanenko Global Politics 39 Risk Scenarios for Russia Pavlo
Shchelin 46 Growing imbalances in the EU and consequences for
Ukraine Nadiya Koval 56 Destabilization of the Middle East Abu Ali
Hassen 65 Erdogan's Authoritarian Modernization and Turkey's
Growing Regional Influence Nadiya Koval 71 Ukraine and South
Caucasus: New Realities Karen Madoyan Domestic Policy 78
Development Scenarios for Minsk-2 in 2017 Igor Tyshkevish 88 Gas
and Oil in 2017. Key Trends for Ukraine Igor Tyshkevish Economy 97
Economy of Ukraine: 2016 Overall Results and Forecast for 2017
Anatoliy Amelin, Yana Lavryk and Olga Khomenko Law Enforcement and
Judicial System 116 Development of the Ukrainian Judicial System in
2017 Oleksandr Yevseyev 126 Challenges in Law Enforcement Area -
2017 Denys Monastyrskyi 142 Memorandum of the UIF Founders 3
2. 4
3. FOREWORD Victor Andrusiv Executive Director of the Ukrainian
Institute for the Future The year 2016 proved unpredictable and
presented a series of unexpected events that brought the world
further into turbulence. Brexit and Donald Trumps victory were the
least predictable events and their effects have yet to be fully
analyzed and assessed. Looking back at the past year, it is safe to
state two new realities: global transformations gained new speed
and forecasting has become an even more thankless task. What will
2017 bring? We try to answer this question in the publication you
are holding in your hands. Considering the unpredictability of the
previous year, we abstained from providing final conclusions in our
forecast. Instead, we offer key scenarios for what might happen in
2017. Scenario fo- recasting allows readers to see the logic of
behavior of po- litical players according to their conditions. Over
the next year everyone will be able to understand which scenario
arises for the world overall and Ukraine in particular by the
results of specific events. For instance, the victory of a can-
didate with pro-Russian rhetoric in the presidential elec- tions in
France will lead to cancellation of sanctions against Russia and
reduced support for Ukraine, which in turn will affect developments
in our country. The main message of our forecast is that 2017 will
be a stress test. This applies both to the world and Ukraine. It is
about the stability of the existing system of relationships and
approaches to solving issues such as Brexit, Donald Trump,
elections in France and Germany, conflict in Syria, ISIS, and the
aggressive behavior of Russia these and other developments pose a
serious challenge to the fun- ctioning of the EU and NATO. Some of
these changes sug- gest a transformation Euro-Atlantic relations,
however, can it be possible to preserve the unity of values that
Europe and the US have demonstrated for over 100 years? For
Ukraine, 2017 will be a real test of stability. Although, as long
as the war in Donbas and occupation of Crimea are ta- king place,
each new year is another challenge for us. Ho- wever, the next year
will become a real challenge to our independence and
sustainability. Since the Revolution of Dignity we have managed to
muddle through crises thanks to significant support from the West,
and without its help it would be extremely difficult to maintain
overall stability. Our forecast shows that in 2017 the
international situation is extremely unfavorable for Ukraine.
Therefore we will have to rely mainly on our own strength in the
face of a formi- dable and insatiable enemy. The stability of
Ukraine in 2017 primarily depends on the ability to overcome
internal challenges. The world looks at the ability of the
Ukrainian government to carry out effec- tive reforms and defeat
corruption with increasing distrust, and this only strengthens
those voices calling to achieve a quick compromise with Russia on
the conflict in Donbas and Crimea. Against this background external
financial aid can decline, which currently remains significant
despite the first shoots of economic growth. But the biggest
challenge of next year may be early parliamentary elections. Our
fo- recast shows that reformatting of the government is in line not
only with the interests of certain domestic political pla- yers,
but also with outside ones. Overall, the forecast prepared by the
Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIF) is a highly comprehensive
work, which co- vers a wide range of political and economic spheres
glo- bally. In this publication you will find a thorough analysis
of the situation in the Middle East, domestic political risks in
Russia, growing authoritarianism in Turkey, proliferation of
conflicts in the South Caucasus, scenarios for Minsk-2 im-
plementation, construction of gas pipelines bypassing 5
4. Ukraine, analysis and forecast of key economic indicators,
law enforcement and judiciary reforms. This will help you capture
the widest possible picture of the coming year and to plan or make
decisions in an appropriate manner. In conclusion, I would like to
thank those people without whom our forecast had no chance to be
born. First of all these are UIF founders: Ihor Liski, Anatoly
Amelin, Oleksiy Skrypnyk, Anton Gerashchenko, Taras Berezovets, and
Yuri Romanenko. It is through their expertise and fina- ncial
support you have an opportunity to learn about the challenges and
aspirations of 2017. I also wish to thank Denis Semenov and Andriy
Zablocki, who reviewed the early ideas of key scenarios and gave
their critical comments and remarks. 6
5. Considering the possible scenarios for Ukraine in 2017, we
need to determine the underlying factors that determine the course
of processes in the country and the world. It is impossible to
understand the prospects of Ukraine outside the global context
because our country is deeply integrated into the global system.
Moreover, the severe economic cri- sis has dramatically increased
Ukraines dependence on foreign aid, which in turn enables external
donors to dictate terms of such aid, based on their own interests.
7 LIMITS TO SUSTAINABILITY: SCENARIOS FOR THE WORLD AND UKRAINE IN
2017 Yuriy Romanenko Program Director: International and Domestic
Policy, Ukrainian Institute for the Future Factors determining the
stability of the state system of Ukraine in 2017 1. Legitimacy 2.
Resources 3. External support through various types of aid Note:
external legitimacy does not imply external support. For instance,
falling legitimacy of the current political regime in 2016 in the
US and Europe did not prevent providing external support, i.e.
credits and technical assistance External Internal USA Europe
Russia China other players Elites Masses Resources may be developed
unequally, and lack of economic resources can be compensated by
organization or ideology, increasing operational efficiency of what
is available. Or vice versa, poor organization may be offset by
significant economic resources spent on power block. Example of
such a country is Russia Economic Power Organizational Ideological
Therefore, in order to show the logic of certain scenarios in
Ukraine, we must first outline the key factors that deter- mine the
balance of the state system in Ukraine. We identify three key
factors setting the framework of sce- narios for Ukraine:
6. 1.Legitimacy // http://iphras.ru/elib/1641.html 2. Rapallo
Treaty //
https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%B4%
D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96%D1%80_(1922) 3. Economic resources //
http://abc.informbureau.com/html/yeiiiiexaneea_danodnu.html 8 For
Ukraine it is crucial to have external legitimacy from the United
States, Russia, Europe, China, and to a lesser ex- tent from
regional players such as Turkey, India, Japan and others. Second
key factor: Resources. We divide resources into several types:
economic, power, organizational, and ideological. Economic
resources are a set of tangible and intangible factors and means to
ensure the smooth functioning of social production and
reproduction. There are the following types: natural (raw
materials, geographic); labor (human capital); capital (physical
capital); working capital; financial capital; entrepreneurial
skills; intellectual potential, etc3 . Power resources are a set of
various tools that a political regime can use to protect its
interests. Organizational resources are systems for reporting,
plan- ning, control, and informal relationships within a social or-
ganization, aimed at the most efficient use of economic and other
resources. Ideological resources are a system of ideas that define
the relationships within a particular society and political regime
as well as its relations with the outside world. These types of
resources form a set of resources that de- fine the internal
stability of the political regime. One type of resources can offset
the other type. First factor: Legitimacy. The legitimacy (from the
Latin: Legitimus agreed with the law, legal, lawful) legitimacy of
the regime, politicians and leaders, reflecting features that
derive not only from for- mal laws and decrees, but from social
consent and ac- ceptance of them as legitimate, i.e., matching the
values of citizens. Legitimacy is a long-term agreement of the ma-
jority to accept the reign of a certain class, hierarchies, and
power as legitimate1 . Legitimacy is divided into internal and
external. In turn, internal legitimacy can be divided into the
legiti- macy of the political regime in terms of the masses and
legitimacy in terms of elites. A political regime can be highly
legitimate in the eyes of the masses, but low in the eyes of the
elites, and vice versa. Simultaneously, high or low legitimacy in
the eyes of the elites and the masses is one of the criteria for
high or low stability of a political regime. External legitimacy
reflects the legitimacy of the political regime in the eyes of
foreign actors. Example: The Soviet Union initially had low
external but high internal legitimacy. The Soviets were trying to
constantly expand external legitimacy, making deft diplomatic ma-
neuvers, as in the case of the Rapallo Treaty in 19222 , which
established diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Weimar
Germany.
7. 9 tem of Ukraine, lets focus on defining scenarios at the
global level, as Ukraines dependence on external factors makes it
extremely sensitive to a particular configuration that may arise in
2017. First, we must consider the motivation of leading players
whose interests influence the Ukrainian processes or are important
in terms of impact on the motivation of other geopolitical actors
who have interests in Ukraine. Motivations of key geopolitical
actors US: its motivation is of strategic defensive nature, but
tac- tically Washingtons steps might be offensive on a number of
regional geopolitical grounds. America is interested to maintain
its current status as the most powerful country in the world that
has a preferred position in the military, po- litical, financial,
economic and technological spheres. But the recent presidential
elections in the US have shown that America is experiencing
imperial strain, which is mostly the fatigue from multiple costs
for maintaining global hegemony. This led to the American white
middle class to support Trump, who pointed to the need of returning
to iso- lationism. What is the difference between the viewpoints on
foreign policy of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump? Democrats in
the US supported the need to preserve the global infrastructure (US
dominance) as a key element of their power and wealth. From this
point of view, Hillary Clin- tons position can be described as
global conservatism. Donald Trump made a program of radical
conservative iso- lationism, aimed to solve the problems of
restarting the US economy and a sharp reduction of expenditures on
foreign policy by rearrangement of them to allies4 . This does not
mean that Trumps foreign policy will be less active than his
predecessors. It is hardly possible, given the depend- Example 1:
The emergence of the state of Israel in 1948 was characterized by
the absence of strong economic and power resources, which were
offset by a strong presence of social organization and ideology
that helped to mobilize the social power of the Jewish people and
promptly turn Israel into a powerful state in economic, military,
and po- litical terms. Example 2: Modern Russia is an example of a
combination of vast economic and power resources with weak organi-
zational and powerful ideological resources. Although Rus- sia is
very inefficient in spending its economic resources due to
corruption and poor quality of public management, but the huge
amount of resources allows to compensate for the lack of
organization in order to maintain a high level of military and
political power and a sophisticated person- alized propaganda
machine (Ruskiy Mir, spiritual ties be- tween Church and state,
etc.) Resources are dynamic, and the balance between them can vary
in one direction or another. Third key factor: External Support.
External support for a political regime is a set of actions aimed
at ensuring its stability through economic, ideolog- ical,
organizational, and security resources. External support is
different than external legitimacy as a political regime can have
relatively low external legitimacy, but receive external support.
Ukraine is an example in 2016, when the external support of the
political regime of Petro Poroshenko by the US and Europe continued
despite a fall of credibility. Global Scenarios For 2017 Once we
have described (albeit in a very simplified manner) the key factors
determining the balance of the state sys-
8. 4. Trumps program for the first 100 days of presidency
https://www.facenews.ua/columns/2016/310207/ 10 calating a conflict
with the West as its critically dependent on access to the markets
of the US, EU and Japan with a trillion dollar turnover. In
addition, China has no control over global communications, so
cannot enter conflict with the US, as it will be immediately cut
off from markets and raw materials for its products. This threatens
collapse of Chinas economy and internal shocks. Therefore China
keeps a conservative and restrained policy in the regions where it
has no basic interests. Strategically Russia holds a defensive, but
tactically very aggressive policy. The Kremlins goals are in
maintaining control over its periphery, which includes Ukraine, to
en- sure security in case of a worsening of the global crisis and
internal turbulence. Russia considers the strengthening of the US
and Europe on its periphery as a potential threat. This is some
kind of psychological complex, resulting from Russian history when
an absence of external geographic boundaries led to the appearance
of conquerors. That is why Russia feels permanently claustrophobic.
Now the logic of Putins actions is intended to conclude a big deal
with the West that would guarantee the division of spheres of
influence and restoring economic exchange. The Kremlin must balance
its relations with the West, as Russia depends critically on access
to European markets. EU countries buy about 74% of Russian exports
of oil. How- ever the drop in oil prices has created a huge hole in
the Russian budget, which threatens to drive Russia into a debt
trap already in 2018-2019, if the situation does not change. So
this requires reconciliation with the United States and Europe,
which have sufficient tools to influence the price of oil and gas.
This is especially true in the context of Trumps promises to
dramatically increase oil and gas production in the US that can fix
oil prices at the relatively low level of about 40-60 dollars
despite OPECs efforts to increase the price by reducing production.
ence of the US on access to raw materials and markets for its
products, and simply for reasons of national security. But Trump
will drastically reduce expenditures in areas to be selected as
secondary. The European Union takes a defensive position in both
strategy and tactics. The fiscal crisis weakens its economic
strength and unity, while the problem of migrants increases
pressure on political regimes in a number of key EU coun- tries.
The Brexit vote in July 2016 became a vivid expression of this
trend, which can be strengthened during the French presidential
elections and parliamentary elections in Ger- many. Therefore
Europe is afraid of new risks that might lead to a loss of control
and unity of the EU. So most EU countries policies will be
conservative and aimed at over- coming the growing imbalances.
Thus, Europe falls into it- self, making its foreign policy more
and more passive. . China: strategically its foreign policy has an
offensive char- acter, but tactically Beijing may take a pause in a
number of regions, not to get into conflicts in which it is not
inter- ested. Theres a clear understanding in China that if
processes develop by linear logic, then in 20-30 years it will
become too large for its interests to be ignored by the US and
Europe. So China avoids conflicts that can change its model, which
is also under increasing pressure because of rising global
turbulence and conflict in relations with the US. It is known that
Trump outlined China as one of the key problems for the US, so the
Washington-Beijing relation- ship may be substantially revised
after several decades of improving cooperation, made possible after
the historic visit of Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970s. By this
logic, Bei- jing occasionally supports Russia which it uses to
intimi- date the West with a possible alliance with Moscow.
However, at this stage China is not really interested in es-
9. 11 We believe that in the following year there are three
basic global scenarios that provide a framework for maneuvers by
Kyiv, forming three basic conditions for internal scenar- ios in
Ukraine. Lets consider the global scenarios first: Scenario G1
Peacemaker Scenario G2 Pragmatic Scenario G3 Confrontation If Putin
manages to agree with the new US administration on key issues
(division of spheres of influence and with- drawal of conflict
issues from the agenda), it is possible that the US and Europe may
try to create a strategic al- liance that will focus on Asia as the
main competitor of the three Christian key blocs, and restrain the
Islamic bloc. On the contrary, Russia is extremely interested in
how to break the Euro-Atlantic ties between Europe and the US, if
it fails to normalize relations with Washington. Then the Kremlin
will seek to strengthen relations with key European states
(Germany, France, and Italy) using their real internal difficulties
or engineering such issues through a combina- tion of political,
military-political, and economic instru- ments. In summary, it is
easy to see that all the key global actors aim to maintain their
current against a backdrop of global instability, trying to shift
costs to others. Only China has a strategic offensive position, but
it is limited in its maneu- vers because of dependence on the West.
Russia, as the weakest player in this global Quartet, is in- clined
to play the most risky game, especially in relations with the US
and Europe. After raising the stakes, Putin is trying to strengthen
his bargaining position, compensating for a lack of other
resources. Putin plays a joker, going to bluff in order to enter
the most profitable bargaining posi- tion with the West and China,
but they both are well aware of Russian limitations. In this case
it is hard to say that todays key global players are really
interested in each others collapse because they are afraid of the
associated risks. The interests of other geopolitical actors are
important for Ukraine, but we will not consider them specifically
in this section for the sake of brevity and compactness of the re-
port.
10. Scenario G1 Peacemaker The Peacemaker scenario implies that
the US and Europe focus on domestic issues, reaching agreement with
Russia on key issues: the Middle East, Ukraine and Eastern Europe,
oil prices, sanctions, counter-terrorism, and the fight against
illegal migration. Finally, the parties can come to agreement on
strategic opposition to China. 12 "Peacemaker" scenario for 2017
Motives of players on Ukraine: Russia: change balance in Ukraine
EU: change balance US: change balance !!! Basic options for Ukraine
The threat of conflict in Ukraine because of DPR/LPR status, and
requirements from other regions on the same rights Sectoral and
Donbas sanctions are cancelled. Arrangements on oil prices.
Expansion of spheres of influence to the Middle East. Ukraine in
the Russia's sphere of influence. Possible arrangements on China.
"The Hawks" from Trump's surrounding are blocked The weakening of
NATO, the EU is beginning to create Defense Forces The weakening of
transatlantic trade Guarantees to Assad, Syria's transformation
into a federal or confederal republic. Joint struggle against ISIS
Struggle against ISIS together with Russia and the US Providing
financial aid for the reconstruction of Iraq and Syria No money No
lethal weapons The joint struggle against the ISIS, reformatting
Syria and Iraq, and distancing from Saudits Israel is a key partner
in the Middle East OSCE as a key element of stabilization in the
Donbas Technical aid for Donbas of $0.5-1.5 billion, visa-free
regime, credits Russia opens the market, reducing gas prices, and
freezes debts Minsk-2 in Moscow interpretation Package 1.
Predominate interests of the US and Europe Package 2. Predominate
interests of Russia and Europe Linking the economy to the political
forces in Ukraine that are loyal to Russia De facto Crimea remains
Russian, whereas de jure it is recognized for Ukraine by the US.
Attempt to reload Russian economy in spirit of Perestroika 2.0
Strengthening of trade after the cancellation of sanctions ! !
Marine Le Pen or Francois Fillon winning French presidency SPD
victory in Germany state elections and strengthening of the
"Alternative's" position The strengthening of Right Forces in
Europe Implementing Minsk-2 in full Constitutional Reform
Parlamenarly elections if reform's failed Reelection of president
whih does not fit in the new balance of powers UKRAINE MIDDLE EAST
RUSSIAUSA ISRAEL Relationships on the security line Relationships
on the economy line US Actions: Donald Trump directs his main
vector of efforts at domestic policy. With the Republican majority
in the Sen- ate and Congress, the White House launches large-scale
tax cuts, creates a legal framework for return of American business
to the US. Overall, Trump begins to implement key provisions of his
program. Along with Putin, Trump achieves a number of strategic
agreements on the Middle East and Ukraine. For the US, the main
thing is the first package: on the Middle East, where interests of
Washington and its allies dominate (first of all, Israel). For
Russia, the second package Is crucial: on Ukraine, where the
interests of Russia and Europe will pre- vail.
11. Agreements on the Middle East between the US and Rus- sia
would include the definition of the state system in Syria after the
war, which will turn into a federation or a con- federation, where
key players will fix control over their re- sponsibilities. Key
ethno-confessional groups Syria will receive a particular type of
autonomy. Turkey will control the buffer area in northern Syria to
prevent the expansion of Kurdish influence. Assad receives
guarantees of immu- nity in exchange for joint action against the
Islamic State. Washington and Moscow also may agree to coordinate
counteracting ISIS. It is clear that in this case the role of Is-
rael will increase. Having a close relationship with Wash- ington
and Moscow, Israel will use new opportunities for strengthening its
security in the fight against terrorism and Islamic radicals. Most
likely this scenario will cool down US relations with Saudi Arabia.
Trump is unlikely to follow the line of foreign policy of Barack
Obama, who blocked lawsuits by US citi- zens against Saudi Arabia,
whose citizens were involved in the 9/11 attacks. In this scenario,
Trump will follow the logic he outlined dur- ing the election
campaign: optimization of foreign policy expenditures supporting
allies in the region5 . Therefore, the new administration will pay
less attention to NATO, pushing Europe to spend more for security,
or will try to keep NATO demanding increased funding from European
security pro- grams. This process is already being seen6 . The EU
Actions: Europe remains in deep crisis, which is linked to the
strengthening of Eurosceptic position after Brexit. In the
presidential elections in France in April 2017 Francois Fillon or
Marine Le Pen will win, which will strengthen Russias position in
the negotiations on Ukraine. The Social Democratic Party of Germany
will win the au- tumn parliamentary elections in Germany under
strengthening position of pro-Russian ArD Alternatives, which will
also strengthen Russias positions. The weaken- ing of the EU will
be accompanied by the intensification of dialogue between Moscow
and national governments. Re- sults of the December referendum in
Italy show that the probability of incoming political forces
supporting cancel- lation of sanctions against Russia is very high7
. Europe will participate in the Trumps deal with Putin as one of
the key players of package deals. The EU will support granting
financial aid to Syria for restoration after the war. However, the
position of Europe in this area will depend di- rectly on what
territory will remain under Assad, as well as the issue of the
postwar Syrian regime. Europeans have al- ready warned that if
Moscow keeps supporting Assad, then restoration of Syria is to be
at Russias cost8 . 13 5 Trump promises to stop the intervention
policy //
http://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BF-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%89%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82-
%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C-
%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D1%83-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86
%D0%B8%D0%B9/a-36673698 6. The EU will dramatically increase
defense spending //
http://ru.golos.ua/suspilstvo/evrosoyuz_rezko_uvelichit_rashodyi_na_oboronu__smi_
7. Battle for Europe. Referendum in Italy //
http://hvylya.net/analytics/geopolitics/bitva-za-yevropu-referendum-v-italiyi.html
8. Russia should foot Syria reconstruction bill, European leaders
say // https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/russia-should-
foot-syria-reconstruction-bill-european-leaders-say
12. Europeans will also participate in an anti-ISIS coalition,
as it directly meets their interests to combat Islamist terror- ism
in Europe itself. This will require strengthening of the EU defense
structures. This trend will gain strength against the backdrop of
France and Germanys attempts to create self-defense forces that
will satisfy Trumps logic, who would welcome more independent
actions of European partners in their area of responsibility, be it
the Maghreb or Eastern Europe. Besides, Trumps protectionism may
lead to declining trade between the US and the EU. However, this is
unlikely to happen quickly (even during 2017) because it takes time
for business to respond to new conditions. Such approaches in
relations between the US and Europe will determine the format of
the agreement with Russia on Ukraine. Putin will demand concessions
on Ukraine after his own concessions on the Middle East. That is
how US-European deals with Russia will seem in the case of the
Peacemaker scenario. The US and Europe will agree to shift the
Crimean issue beyond the conflict be- tween Russia and Ukraine. De
facto, Crimea will be recog- nized as Russian, whereas de jure it
remains Ukrainian. Sanctions for the annexation of Crimea will
remain, but sectoral sanctions imposed after the Donbas conflict
will be canceled as soon as the Minsk agreement is imple- mented.
Putin will try to promote Minsk-2 on his own terms, but may soften
his stance on secondary issues. In this format, Rus- sia will
promise the West to take part of the costs associ- ated with the
restoration of Donbas. In addition, Russia will take on the
commitment to open its market for Ukraine to eliminate the threat
of economic collapse in Ukraine. How- ever, Russia will probably
tie these steps to changing of po- litical regime in Kyiv, so that
political forces that would support such a course could obtain
carte blanche. In this case Russia will probably agree to a number
of economic concessions for Ukraine (cancellation of sanctions on
Ukrainian products, reduced gas prices, deferred credit and so on).
Withdrawal of most sanctions on Russia will help to inten- sify its
economic relations with Europe, which will help to stabilize the
economy of Russia, and thats what Putin seeks. Basic options for
Ukraine in case of this scenario: First, Ukraine will not receive
financial aid from the US. Un- like the Democrats, Donald Trump
will demand thorough undertaking of obligations by Ukraine. The
initiative to pro- vide credit guarantees to Ukraine came
personally from Vice President Joseph Biden. In 2017 Ukraine will
be deprived of this resource that adversely affects the ability to
main- tain a positive trade balance in the following year9 . We re-
mind that in 2016 it remained positive due to support from the US,
which provided credit guarantees. Second, Ukraine will not receive
lethal weapons from the United States, and financial aid in the
amount of 350 million dollars for the Armed Forces in 2017 may be
reduced. Third, Ukraine could receive technical assistance from the
EU to restore Donbas in the amount of 0.5-1.5 billion USD. In
addition, perhaps, a visa-free regime with the EU and As- sociation
Agreement will get started. Ukraine may count on credit support
from the European countries. It is un- likely to be large, but it
may be enough for the Ukrainian economy to maintain a quasi-stable
state of stagnation. Fourth, the conditions for reformatting the
post-Maidan political regime emerge in Ukraine, because implementa-
14 9. http://ubr.ua/finances/macroeconomics-ukraine/platejnyi-bal-
ans-ukrainy-sveden-s-proficitom-452630
13. tion of agreements between the US, Europe and Russia to
resolve the crisis in the Donbas requires appropriate ac- tions
from the President, Government and Parliament. The US, Europe and
Russia demand the following steps to be done by Ukraine: 1. To
implement Minsk-2 in full. 2. Preliminarily to carry out
constitutional reform. 3. To conduct parliamentary elections if
reform is impossi- ble within the existing parliament. 4. To
conduct presidential elections if antagonistic relations with the
new Verkhovna Rada arise (we will consider this scenario below). 5.
The OSCE will play a key role in mediating de-escalation of the
situation in the Donbas. This logic is directly tied to the
motivation of the big three key players in this scenario: Russia is
interested in the full reformatting of the post- Maidan balance of
power in Ukraine, stopping Ukraine from implementing agreements
with foreign partners. Europe is interested in changing the balance
of power in Ukraine, if the agreement with Russia will not be
executed. For this it may limit the aid that could be very
necessary for Ukraine next year. That is why former US Ambassador
to Ukraine Steven Pifer called on Ukraine not to leave the
Minsk-210 . The US will not interfere; especially not provide any
sup- port, if Russia and Europe will keep pressing on Ukraine for
meeting the conditions necessary for a big deal. Thus, Ukraine will
appear in circumstances where it would be forced to fulfil an
agreement which is not supported by a significant part of the elite
and the population. However, Ukraines critical dependence on
external support remains. It follows that there are emerging
conditions for a sharp escalation of the conflict in Ukraine on the
implementation of Minsk-2 or the consequences of such
implementation when other regions may require extension of their
powers for the occupied territories of Donbas. Well consider vari-
ations of the situation within internal scenarios below. 15 10.
Steven Pifer about Ukraine and Minsk-2//
https://politeka.net/375508-chto-budet-s-ukrainoy-v-sluchae-
otkaza-ot-minskikh-soglasheniy/
14. Scenario G2 Pragmatic This scenario follows logically from
the Scenario G1 in case the original agreement between the US and
Russia has not worked for months because they cannot be im-
plemented at lower levels. 16 Scenario "Pragmatic" 2017 Motives of
players on Ukraine: Russia: change balance in Ukraine EU: wait /
change US: wait / act carefully !!! Basic options for Ukraine
Military coup attept in the form of martial law Return to Scenario
A Confrontation under Scenario C Sanctions remain in its current
form. Increased oil and gas production in the US makes the price
pressure on Russia. After successful negotiations at the primary
level, the parties may not proceed to implement because of the
conflict of interest of 2-3 level players. Stalemates as a result.
"The Hawks" from Trump's surrounding are gaining power Negotiations
on the relations format Washington reinforces its European allies
in NATO, while France and Germany are stagnating Further support of
Assad, expanding Russian military contingent in Syria, attempts to
strengthen relations with Iraq, periodic aggravation with the US
and other enemies of Assad Supporting insurgents and Iraqi Kurds,
attempt to negotiate with Turkey on refugees No money Lethal weapon
for Ukraine before the year's end. Arming the opponents of Assad
and ISIS, support for Israel and other allies in the Middle East
OSCE acts as a weak observer, as it is now Minimal aid. Visa-free
regime is delayed, and the Association with the EU goes bad Market
is closed for Ukraine Periodic escalation in the Donbas as on
fall'16 and even more Time is a key factor: the longer is the
uncertainty for Russia, the less resources for its economy. So
Putin'd rush in order to enter the negotiations with the most
powerful position. Russia's stake will be on rolling the situation
in Ukraine combined with the escalation in the Donbass, and support
any forces playing for destabilization Alain Juppe or Francois
Fillon winning French presidency Merkel's possible winning of the
elections in Germany with a slight advantage The deepening crisis
in the EU, strengthen- ing of the right forces and populists Lack
of resources Parlamentarly elections as a way to let off the steam
Inability to reform because of parliament conflicts "Neither war,
nor peace" situation as in 2016 UKRAINE EU MIDDLE EARTH RUSSIAUSA
Relationships on the security line Relationships on the economy
line This primarily relates to the situation in the Middle East,
where huge numbers of people and social groups are in- volved in
the war in Syria and Iraq. And also its very often that interests
of a regional or global player stand behind a particular group. By
this logic, agreements between the US, Europe and Russia on the
Middle East will not result in Saudi Arabia or Qatar stopping
support for rebels in Syria, based on their concerns about the
growing influence of Iran in the region. Moreover, if under the
Trump adminis- tration relations between the US and Saudis will
become cooler, their motivation to support anti-Assad groups might
even increase. Basically, it would be the same situation as
agreements be- tween the US and Russia on Aleppo in 2016. As
everyone could see, agreements were quickly violated by both sides
in Syria and the war continued with renewed vigor.
15. Exactly the same situation emerges in Ukraine, where any
attempts to push Minsk-2 in the new edition of a Munich conspiracy,
would lead to polarization of Ukrainian society and influence
groups among the elite, as we can conclude considering Scenario G1.
There will be a stalemate on both sites (the Middle East and
Ukraine), which can be overcome with a limited escalation by
Russia. The factor of time becomes crucial for Russia because sta-
bilization funds are exhausted and the search for resources for
saving the stability of the regime in Russia becomes vital. Russia
has already made doubled cuts in funding of defense within its
three-year budget until 202011 . That is why Putin should hurry up
to make an agreement with the West, such as considered in the
Scenario G1. For this pur- pose, he will use the context of
parliamentary elections in Germany (elections in France have
already been completed before the G2 scenario starts), so to force
Europe to agree- ment through pressure on its weak. We cannot
exclude a possibility of new wave of refugees from Syria to Europe,
which weakened the position of Angela Merkel in the con- text of
parliamentary elections in Germany. Obviously, this will be
preceded by heavy clashes in Syria that will provoke this wave of
refugees. However Turkey, pursuing their in- terests in the
negotiations with the European Union, can contribute to the
displacement of another wave of the refugees to southern Europe.
But a key role in achieving Putins goals is still to be played by
Ukraine, where he will apply the tools of destabilization of the
political system together with escalation of the sit- uation in the
Donbas. Russia will also maintain its economic blockade of Ukraine
and perhaps even expand it. Before the Kremlin achieves the goal of
reformatting the post-Maidan balance of power in Ukrainian
politics, the re- alization of its plans for a big deal with the
West will be dif- ficult. Thus, the situation will remain as
neither war nor peace, as in the years of 2015-2016. But, provoking
an es- calation in the Middle East and Ukraine, Putin risks
strengthening the position of Hawks in Donald Trumps administration
as well as in the Senate and the US Con- gress. Hawks will stand
aside at the first stage, when Trump will enter the Oval Office and
try to implement plans on improving relations with Russia. However,
with delay in implementation of scenario G1, their influence will
increase and the US stance will be strengthened. US actions: By
this logic, US actions under Scenario G2 will look like the
following. Sanctions on Russia will remain. Eu- rope will also keep
theirs in summer 2017. Trump will boost production of oil and gas
or keep prices at current levels, or not allow them to rise too
high after OPEC decided to reduce oil production on 30 November
201612 . In relations with Europe the US will strengthen the
security of its allies in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with
Ger- many and France stagnating against the backdrop of nu- merous
challenges. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries may receive
additional assistance from the US e.g. loans for upgrading their
armies, and redeployment of additional small contingents of the US
Army in these coun- tries. There is no doubt that the UK will
actively support such steps. 17 11. Demilitarization of the budget
http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-10-31/4_6848_budget.html 12. OPEC
decided to cut oil production. //
16. In the Middle East the US will contribute to initiatives of
its allies, especially Israel. Washington may also renew arms
supplies to the rebels in Syria, and continue air strikes on ISIS,
helping to strengthen the multifarious anti-ISIS coali- tion in
Iraq. At the same time the US will not support Ukraine financially,
but by the end of 2017 Ukraine can get lethal weapons. This
likelihood will increase as far as Russia amplifies efforts to
undermine the situation in Donbas, which will strengthen the
positions and arguments of Republican Hawks. The EU Actions: G2
scenario in Europe will be enabled by Alain Juppes win in elections
in France; Juppe holds a much tougher stance than Francois Fillon,
not to mention na- tionalist Marine Le Pen. In Germany under this
scenario an uncertain victory of An- gela Merkel is possible,
however with little advantage. Merkel will not have a stable
position forcing her to com- promise with other political forces in
Germany. The irony is the fact that Merkel will actually become a
key player of the Euro-Atlantic camp in Europe in conditions when
its rather instable after Trump has won. Europes relations with
Russia in the G2 scenario will be unstable. Sanctions against
Russia, as we have already mentioned above, will remain at least
before early 2017. However, some European countries begin to
restore economic relations with Russia bypassing sanctions. In the
Middle East, Europe will try to negotiate with Turkey to prevent a
new destabilizing wave of refugees. Support for the rebels will be
renewed in case of further escalation in Syria. Europe will also
support efforts to neutralize ISIS. Europe will provide minimal aid
to Ukraine. The visa-free regime with the EU will be delayed until
the determination of the political architecture in France and
Germany after the elections. Association with the EU will also work
intermittently. Motivations of key players regarding Ukraine will
look like as follows: Russia: change the balance of power in
Ukraine as soon as possible by instruments of destabilization of
the political situation. Large-scale conflict is unlikely. Europe:
will wait until the situation changes for the better. Support for
Ukraine is minimal. USA: will wait, keeping an eye on situation,
however provid- ing limited assistance in case of escalation in the
Donbas. Hence the basic options for Ukraine under G2 scenario for
2017 are as follows: First, the lack of resources to cover all the
payments. This will contribute to undermining the state in the face
of ris- ing mass discontent and conflict of interest between dif-
ferent groups of elites. Second, this implies the need for early
elections to the Verkhovna Rada to release accumulated social
pressure. But this is a risky step that may weaken the position of
President Poroshenko and start the process of redistribu- tion of
spheres of influence by a new parliamentary coali- tion. As a
result, the inability to conduct any reforms will remain until the
conflict is resolved. This is a stalemate. Third, understanding
that the elections to the Verkhovna Rada lead to stalemate
therefore deepens the crisis and creates the motivation to try new
tactics by the President, through the introduction of martial law
against the back- ground of escalation in the Donbas, and for his
opponents through organizing street protests or a coup using the
se- curity forces. These options we will consider further into the
interior scenarios. 18
17. Based on the above, the conclusion is that after escala-
tions in Ukraine and the Middle East within the G2 scenario, the
big three, i.e. US, Europe, Russia, will reach a cross- roads where
they would either have to return to the sce- nario G1, or move to
the scenario G3, which is the scenario of confrontation. Scenario
G3 Confrontation The big three entering in the scenario of
confrontation is unlikely in 2017, since its deployment takes time,
but it log- ically follows the scenarios G1 and G2, so the
probability of its realization in late 2017 with the transfer in
2018. 19 Scenario "Confrontation" 2017 Basic options for Ukraine
Motives of players on Ukraine: Russia: change balance in Ukraine
EU: save current regime US: save current regime !!! Alternative:
return to scenarios 1 and 2 Deployment of LNG terminals, decreasing
dependence on Russian gas Reformatting of NATO, transition to
flexible alliances with the Eastern Europe countries Confrontation,
increasing military presence in Syria, repetition of incidents as
in Turkey in November 2016 Confrontation refugees Financial and
other aid Lethal weapons Confrontation, support for allies with
weapons and finance Lethal weapons from Britain, Poland and Romania
Technical and, possibly, financial support Blocking the economic
relations Aggravation that goes into a new wave of invading Ukraine
Russia's stake on the collapse of the political regime in Ukraine
under the sharp increase of the pressure (power, economic) EU
disintegration Dividing into the "healthy core (Germany + Benelux)
+ crisis South + crisis East looking for support from the US and UK
The collapse of the existing model due to lack of resources
Transition to the authoritarian regime. Martial law Support with
weapons the threat of war Russian invasion to the Baltic States in
the format of "little green men" to demonstrate NATO's inability to
perform paragraph 5 of the Agreement. Conflict between the US and
old Europe Sanctions Fixing a new status quo after escalation - as
Korea in 1953 Return to scenarios A and B Consolidation of the EU
to external challenges Strengthening Euro-Atlantic polictics.
Merkel stays UKRAINE EU MIDDLE EAST RUSSIAUSA 1. 2. BALTICS
Relationships on the security line Relationships on the economy
line
18. Implementation of this scenario is possible, if all the
par- ties cannot come to a major agreement in terms of lim- ited
escalation in areas 1 (Middle East) and 2 (Ukraine). As we have
already mentioned, limited resources make Vladimir Putin raise the
stakes against the United States and Europe, while possessing the
initiative. Trumps course for isolation and criticism of NATO could
push Putin to make a symbolic strike on NATO, particularly, on the
Alliances ability to fulfill Article 5 on providing assistance to
its mem- bers. This means that Russia will go for provocation in
the Baltics with invasion using little green men (Russian unmarked
troops). This option does not include the seizure of the Baltic by
the Russian army, but the main goal is to show NATOs organizational
failure in terms of responding to the call. Appearance of little
green men in Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia in a popular uprising or
mass riots would threaten state control in these countries, and put
NATO to- gether with the EU and the United States before a prob-
lem of how to react. It is important for Vladimir Putin to provoke
a conflict between the US and Europe for reaction to the situation.
There is no doubt that many European countries will try to find
exactly the same arguments for the invasion of Baltic States, as in
the case of Ukraine. Give us the arguments, its not the Russian
army invading, but the rebellion of the local Russian-speaking
population, lets try to negotiate with Russia, it is entitled to
represent its interest in the region these and other similar
reasons in Berlin, Rome, Paris, Madrid, and other European capitals
would waste time when a decision must be made very quickly. An
important element of this scenario is that the invasion of Baltic
countries will be accompanied by increasing es- calation in Donbas
and the Middle East. In Donbas, Russia may try to organize an
attack on Ukraine from occupied territories using heavy weapons to
reach the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions,
and possibly more. Nor can we exclude that Putin can preliminarily
redeploy additional troops to Syria, for another aggravation that
could lead to a repetition of dangerous incidents such as the
destruction of a Russian Su-24 by the Turkish Air Force. For Putin
the Baltics are not as important as the Middle East, so the logic
of a strike is to offer exchange two sites (the Baltic and ME)
which are more important for the US and Europe, for one Ukraine and
then return to scenario G1. In this situation the reaction of the
US and Donald Trump is crucial. The US response to this challenge
will determine the fate of the entire global infrastructure of
America, which is based on its strength. Trump may not respond to
calls for help from NATO, as Barack Obama did, when Turkey shot
down the Russian Su-24 in November 2015, and the result- ing
conflict with Russia further prompted Recep Erdogan into tactical
rapprochement with Russia. If this situation is repeated on a
larger scale in the Baltic countries, this would break trust in
Washington and NATO may simply fall apart. The US will lose its
status of first among equals and the world will slide to
multi-state conflict, as in the Con- gress of Vienna in the XIX
century, after the Napoleonic wars. There will be a very dangerous
situation, because the same logic led the German strategists in
1914 and Adolf Hitler in 1939. In 1914, Germany believed that
Britain would not support Belgium following the German invasion.
But Britain did. 20
19. In 1939, Hitler thought that France and Britain will
refrain from declaring war on the Third Reich after the invasion of
Poland, hoping to repeat the Czechoslovak scenario. These hopes
also fell apart, and Germany lost. Therefore, logic will push the
US government to respond to the challenge. But, due to the presence
of nuclear weapons on both sides, the tactic is to localize the
conflict before full-frontal collision. US Actions: increased
sanctions with a possible shutdown of the SWIFT system, as well as
the introduction of an oil embargo against Russia. By the way, it
could play very much in favor of the United States because rising
oil prices may help the United States to make sales due to the
disap- pearance of supplies from Russia. Hawks will get the top
positions in the United States. The US will reformat NATO, with a
significant expansion of mil- itary assistance to Eastern Europe,
to where additional contingents of troops are to be redeployed
(primarily Poland and Romania). Special Forces from the United
States and Britain are likely to be deployed in the Baltic States
to counter the green men. In the economic sphere, the United States
will accelerate the construction of LNG-terminals network in Europe
to re- duce its dependence on gas supplies from the east, and
increase the role of US energy companies in the EU. Washington
would also support its allies in the Middle East and will introduce
additional restrictions against Bashar Assads regime in Syria, not
excluding sea and air block- ades. The situation will encourage the
US to ensure the rap- prochement with Turkey so to stop Ankaras
drift towards rapprochement with Russia, which became noticeable in
summer 2016. It is important that in this case Ukraine has good
chances to get both lethal weapons and financial aid from the US.
EU Actions: In confrontation with Russia, the implications for
Europe can develop in two ways. First: Europe is consolidated
against an external threat. In- creased defense expenditures
reinvigorate NATO. The Euro- Atlantic camp would strengthen its
positions in the political arena of Europe. The EU supports tough
economic sanc- tions against Russia. Also the EU provides financial
and pos- sibly even military and political support to Ukraine and
EU allies in the Middle East. The second means actually
disintegration of the EU into a healthy core (Germany + Benelux +
possibly, France + some Nordic countries) + Eastern Europe in
security crisis supported by the US and UK + economically failed
South of credit lovers (Greece Italy, Spain, and Portugal)). In
this case, Europe will be a case of integration at different
speeds. Each country will determine its stance towards Russia,
because some countries will support tough sanc- tions, but others
will avoid harsh maneuvers. Motives of players on Ukraine in the G3
scenario: Russia: elimination of existing political regime in
Ukraine through a massive escalation. Europe: full or partial
support for current regime in Ukraine (Poland, UK, Sweden, etc.) or
non-intervention policy (Italy, Greece, France and possibly
Germany). US: support for existing regime in Ukraine as an element
of containment for Russia. For Ukraine, the G3 scenario will have
the most serious con- sequences, because Russia actually will not
bet on sup- 21
20. pression, but on the collapse of the political regime as
soon as possible. Therefore, there is a risk that the combination
of three basic factors: fiscal crisis, geopolitical pressure, and
social discontent could destroy the Ukrainian state at an early
stage when Western aid has not yet to come up in the re- quired
amount. Basic options for Ukraine under this scenario: 1. The
collapse of existing model due to lack of resources to maintain
sustainability - Poland 1939 version 2. Transition to a more
authoritarian regime in terms of ex- ternal aggression, when the
country will be able to survive through the mobilization of
domestic resources and strong external support. This is a version
of South Korea in 1950- 1953. The scenario of confrontation has two
possible endings: 1. Upgrade the new status quo in the region and
in the world, due to the fact that Russia is rapidly weakened
through tough economic sanctions and will be forced to make
concessions. 2. Return to scenarios G1, G2 after a brief
confrontation. Scenarios for Ukraine in 2017 As we have mentioned
above, external factors will have a decisive influence on the
situation in Ukraine in 2017. The critical dependence of Ukraine on
external aid and the threat of escalation by Russia make our
country a hostage to the actions of other players. But this does
not mean that Ukraine should obediently do what Washington and
Moscow order. You will find this from our further consid- erations.
We believe that there are three basic scenarios for Ukraine in
2017: 1. Stability. 2. Controlled destabilization. 3.
Uncontrollable destabilization. Before we begin to describe them,
we should get back to the three factors determining balance in the
state system, which we covered at the beginning of the report.
Those three factors are legitimacy, resources, external support.
Now we will organize them into a chart for ease of under- standing
which configuration is crucial for a particular sce- nario.
Scenarios definition Stability: Scenario is possible if the
internal and external legitimacy is positive or negative. Resources
are plenty or little. External support is present. Political regime
is very persistent if all indicators are pos- itive in all factors
in the table above (1.1 + 1.2 + 2 + 3 +). An example of this is the
political regime is Norway or Switzer- land. The second version of
a stable regime is when it has a neg- ative internal but positive
external legitimacy, also with powerful mechanisms of compensation
such as significant resources and external support. An example of
this politi- cal regime is Ukraine in times of Yushchenko from 2006
to 2008. The third version of a stable regime is when it has high
in- ternal legitimacy but low external, with the presence of sig-
nificant resources base and lack of external support. This is the
Soviet Union in the 20s of the last century or todays Russia under
Putin. 22
21. 23 Factors Stability Controlled destabilization
Uncontrolled destabilization 1 Internal legitimacy 1 External
legitimacy Positive + or negative Positive or negative Negative,
low Positive or negative, low Negative, low Negative, low 2
Resources Present + Not enough + or absent + Absent 3 External
support Present + Minimal + or Absent Very stable regime 1+ 1+ 2+
3+ Stable 1 1+ 2+3+ 1 + 1- 2+3- 1 + 1+ 2-3+ Scenarios of the
situation in Ukraine in 2017 The fourth version of a stable regime
is under the pres- ence of positive internal and external
legitimacy with a lack of resources but with strong external
support. This is South Korea during the war in 1950-1953 or
Singapore after gain- ing independence. Controlled destabilization:
Internal legitimacy is low. Exter- nal legitimacy is slightly
positive with a tendency to decline or be even negative with a
number of geopolitical partners. Resources are not enough so
dependence on external sup- port increases greatly. Therefore,
foreign players are able to dictate the terms of obtaining aid. The
absence of ex- ternal support or lack of it leads to the collapse
of the state and transition to scenario 3 (uncontrolled
destabilization). This was a path of the Tsarist Russia in 1917.
However, with external support domestic players from ruling class
retain room for maneuver and impose their will on weaker social
groups. Such a political regime is beneficial for foreign players
only, because it has to take into account their in- terests to the
detriment of the national ones. Examples are the Latin American
regimes in 60-80s. Domestic players can reduce external dependence
through reforms to enhance the legitimacy and internal resource
base. It makes a political regime more stable and creates
conditions for transition to scenario 1. Uncontrollable
destabilization: All the factors are negative. Such a political
regime is illegitimate in the eyes of the peo- ple and foreign
players; it has exhausted resource capa- bilities and has no
external support. In fact a collapse of the state undergoes because
of internal or external con- flict, or because of their
combination. American macro-so- ciologist Randall Collins describes
the collapse as a result
22. 14. Sergiy Datsyuk. "The essence of the current political
crisis" http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/datsuk/56b9c58c2ec90/
15. Vitaly Kulik Oligarchic Consensus and Cartel Party
http://glavred.info/avtorskie_kolonki/oligarhicheskiy-konsensus-i-kartelnaya-
partiya-373091.html of a combination of fiscal crisis, when the
state is unable to perform basic functions. It coincides with the
geopo- litical complications followed by uprisings. This is
Austria- Hungary in 1918, the modern Somalia, Ottoman Empire in
1918, Hetmanat of Pavlo Skoropadsky in Ukraine in 1918, Directorate
of Ukraine in 1919. Now, having given the scenarios description,
lets get to consideration of their probability in 2017 in Ukraine.
Scenario 1. Stability To implement a scenario of stability in 2017,
Ukraine lacks several key factors. First, we see the low
credibility of the key state institutions, which keeps declining.
None of the political players have ratings above 12-15%, and most
fluctuate around 4-7%. Ratings of ruling parties either already
have fallen to zero (Narodnyi Front), or decreased to 10% (Petro
Poroshenko Bloc). Secondly, we see a decrease in the legitimacy of
the ruling coalition in the face of Ukraines Western partners who
are tired of corruption scandals and minor successes in re- forming
the state system. Now it is approaching a critical point and can be
shaken by a new wave of corruption scan- dals and economic problems
in Ukraine. Third, there is exhaustion of the resource base of the
Ukrainian Second Republic, when after three years of ob- jective
factors Ukraine has lost half of export earnings (falling commodity
prices of Ukrainian exports) and sub- jective factors (war with
Russia, which caused a collapse in trade and rising costs for
defense that reached 5% of GDP) costs only increased instability of
the economy. It deepens with populism which resulted in adoption of
doubled mini- mum wages however it does not meet the real
possibili- ties of the economy. In 2016, Ukraine managed to achieve
a positive trade balance only through IMF credits and credit
guarantees from the US. However, in 2017 the possibility of
obtaining credits is yet smaller because of the election re- sults
in the US, France, and Germany. Fourth: as we said above, the
probability of external support from the US and Europe will
decrease due to the changes in key administrations of the Western
countries. However, this support is directly tied to the ability of
Ukraine to re- main relevant in the wake of agreements between the
new US president Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. However, the
attempt to implement the Minsk-2 in line with Putins proposals will
result in problems for Petro Poroshenko in domestic politics, so he
will try to delay a decision. This calls the international aid into
question reducing the stability of the Ukrainian economy. The
President of Ukraine can bet on an attempt to conduct the
liquidation of one or two busi- ness groups to gain access to their
resources under the banner of justice. No doubt, this can lead to
increased in- ternal legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, but can
ruin a wobbly post-Maidan oligarchic consensus14 , which brought
Petro Poroshenko to the presidency15 . Oligarchs will receive the
motivation to fight the president, which can quickly throw the
country into chaos of destabilization in the ab- sence of external
support for Poroshenko. Therefore, a stabilization scenario seems
unlikely in 2017. There are no internal or external conditions for
it. So we estimate its probability at 5-10%. 24
23. 25 Scenario 2. Controlled Destabilization This scenario
implies an active search by external and in- ternal players of such
a configuration that will protect their interests to greatest
extent. In this case, entering this sce- nario, most players
believe that they will have control over the situation or will
receive it on exit. This scenario implies a motivation for change
in the conditions of resource base exhaustion. So this scenario has
the greatest chance to be implemented in 2017. First we need to
look at the motivation of political forces. We took all
parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties that have hypothetical
chances to get into Parliament in case of possible re-election.
Political forces Motivation for maintenance or change the balance
of powers Petro Poroshenko Bloc Peoples Front Fatherland
Self-Reliance Opposition Bloc Radical Party Freedom Mikheil
Saakashvili Party UKROP Democratic Alliance Revival Peoples Will
Parliamentary Group Rabinovich and Murayev Party Civic Position of
Anatoliy Grytsenko Maintenance Maintenance Change Maintenance
Partly change (Lyovochkin, Firtash), partly maintenance (Akhmetov)
Rather maintenance Change Change Rather change Change Maintenance
Maintenance Change Change These political forces can be easily
divided by two key fea- tures: representation in Parliament and
risen / fallen rat- ing, and immediately it becomes clear why they
have such motivation.
24. Political forces in the left column have falling ratings
and are thus afraid of losing, but have control over the govern-
ment institutions or are satisfied with the current position
because of a fear that a change in balance would be not in their
favor. Political forces in the right column are gaining ratings or
hope that rebalancing expands their influence. So situational
alliances are formed arising from the moti- vation to keep / change
balance. Thus the political forces in the left column can change
their position and flow to the right. For example, if in 2017 Petro
Poroshenko under pressure from the US, Europe and Rus- sia will try
to make changes to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding Minsk-2,
Self-Reliance can move into tougher opposition. The Radical Party
will also carefully monitor the changing balance, to avoid being in
the camp of losers. Today the Radical Party plays in conjunction
with the Petro Poroshenko Bloc against Tymoshenko, but tomorrow the
situation may change to the opposite. Thus, the political processes
are affected by three groups of subjects with their own
motivations: external, internal and masses. Masses are influenced
by political organiza- tions, but in times of crisis, when we see
the fall of the le- gitimacy of state institutions and political
parties, the masses can act spontaneously and bring additional
chaos to the game of political players. Motivation for maintenance
Motivation for change Faction in the Parliament (number of
representatives) Rating Petro Poroshenko Bloc: 143 Peoples Front:
81 Self-Reliance: 26 Radical Party: 21 Peoples Will Parliamentary
Group: 19 Revival: 24 RatingFaction in the Parliament (number of
representatives) 10-12% decreasing 2% absent 6-7% stable 6-7%
stable majoritarian conglomerate Ratnig absent, majoritarian
positions Opposition Bloc: 43 Fatherland: 21 Freedom: 4-5 UKROP:
15-20 people i n the influence area but no fraction Democratic
Alliance, no fraction Mikheil Saakashvili Party, no fraction
Rabinovich and Murayev Party: 2 Civic Position of Anatoliy
Grytsenko, no fraction 7-10% increasing 10-14% increasing 3-4%
varies Minimal 0,6 to 1% 6 to 7% 3 to 7% 2% to 4% 26
25. nounced the availability of recordings of conversations
with President Poroshenko, which allegedly contain the facts of
corruption, de facto there is a Black Swan which later can match
the Kuchma tape scandal in 2000-2001. We do not know what
information these records contain and whether they exist at all,
but Onishcenko has said that he passed the records to US law
enforcement agencies. In addition, we cannot exclude that the
records also have been passed to the Russian security services,
given the fact that On- ishchenko visited Moscow recently. In any
case, if On- ishchenko really passed any records to a third party,
then Poroshenko could be blackmailed to perform the global
agreement between the US and Russia within the G1 sce- nario. But
the President is well aware that if he fulfils Minsk-2, then hed
face strong criticism from his opponents inside the country, and
this situation may lead to loss of control. He can appeal to
Washington and Berlin that Minsk-2 can- not be fulfilled because of
lack of configuration in Parlia- ment for changing the
Constitution. But then external partners may force Poroshenko go
for early parliamentary elections so to create a new parliamentary
coalition that will take responsibility for Minsk-2. Chances for
early elections to the Verkhovna Rada are in- creasing against the
emerging black swans like the tragic incident in Knjazhichi on
December 4, when five policemen were killed in a shootout between
police units caused by an error. Immediately the opposition demand
to dismiss Arsen Avakov, Head of the Interior Ministry. But it is
difficult for the President to make such a step because Avakovs
resigna- tion may lead to the collapse of coalition. Poroshenko
can- not replace Avakov with an equivalent player from the Peoples
Front. Furthermore, even if the decision was taken, it would be
extremely difficult to push it through Par- liament, as other
factions and deputy groups will start bar- gaining on preferences
for themselves. If this crisis is superimposed on the tape scandal
with Onishchenko or Therefore, within a controlled destabilization
scenario we see three basic variants which, in turn, include
sub-vari- ants: Variant : Early parliamentary elections Variant B:
Mass protests Variant : Military coup Variant : Early Parliamentary
Elections The survey made by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future
in 21-28 November, 2016, shows that 23.9% of Ukrainians be- lieve
that 2017 will be marked with early parliamentary elec- tions.
17.2% of respondents are confident about an early presidential
election in Ukraine. However, only 7.2% of Ukrainians believe in
the possibility of forced removal of President Poroshenko. An
interesting fact is that only 37.7% of Ukrainians believe that
Ukraine needs early parliamentary elections, while 45.4% consider
them unnecessary. Another 16.9% have not decided. Early
parliamentary elections are not favorable for the cur- rent
President Petro Poroshenko as well as for the ruling coalition. The
President understands that he will not have the same controlled
Parliament reelected, as it is today. All the opinion polls show
that only 7-9 political parties can get seats in the Parliament
after early parliamentary elections. The President understands that
the new Parliament is likely to be more antagonistic to him. So he
will delay approval of a decision on fresh elections to Parliament
as much as possible. However, Petro Poroshenko, who is currently
the strongest player in Ukrainian politics, begins to feel more and
more pressure from internal and external players. Ratings of
Poroshenko and his party are gradually reduced, and after fugitive
MP and gas oligarch Oleksandr Onishchenko an- 27
26. ble government, not able to make quick strategic and tac-
tical decisions. As a result, we observe constant bargaining that
enhances stalemate. After 3-4 months it will be obvious for
internal and exter- nal players that the system does not work and
in the sec- ond half of 2017 we come to a new round of political
crisis, not only on the issue of parliaments incapacity, but also
of the Presidents toxicity. This situation will resemble events in
Ukraine in 1993-1994. Then there will be another bifurca- tion: 1.
To carry out early parliamentary and (or) presidential elections in
early 2018. 2. Military coup attempt from the either side. For
example, the President may introduce martial law, using the escala-
tion in the East as a reason. More details in the variants C1 and
C2. 3. There will conditions for the conclusion of a new social
contract through a pact between elites, as happened in Tunisia
2013. In this case, the Constitutional Assembly (Con- stitutional
Convention) is announced and a technocratic government is
established for the transition period. 2. Parliament &
Government against the President As a result of early elections to
the Verkhovna Rada, an anti-presidential majority is formed,
creating their own government. So it may become a repetition of the
situa- tion in 2007, when Tymoshenko headed the government. In this
case, there is a possibility that she will do it again. However, it
is unlikely that this coalition will be very stable because it is
doubtful that two political forces could gain more than 20% of
votes. If this miracle happens, then the Prime Minister and the
government will feel more confi- dent. But if not, it will be
difficult for them to push through other corruption-scandal story,
then the President is in a very weak position. If he will bend once
on Avakov, he will be forced to concede on other issues and, as a
result, lose control in the Parliament. This, again, makes the
prospect of early elections to the Verkhovna Rada more and more
possible. This example demonstrates that in conditions when the
state system of Ukraine is extremely unbalanced, one un-
predictable event may ruin the delicate balance between key
political groups, so the power struggle escalates. Therefore, in a
situation of growing pressure from internal and external players
and dissatisfied masses (lets not for- get of the people),
Poroshenko can come to the conclusion that parliamentary elections
are a lesser evil than further delaying the situation. This option
is already possible in the spring of 2017. Early parliamentary
elections may lead to two results of elec- tions to the Verkhovna
Rada. Lets designate them as vari- ants A1 and A2. 1. Going Short
Understanding how difficult it would be to get a majority in the
new Parliament, Petro Poroshenko goes short on posi- tions of all
the key opponents. An example is the situation with a rating of
Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyi, which turned critically low due to the
garbage scandal in summer 2016. In this scenario, the President
will try to reduce the rating of Yulia Tymoshenko and other
antagonists, using spoiler parties. By this logic Poroshenko, for
example, will benefit if Mikheil Saakashvili goes into opposition
and takes seg- ments of the protest electorate that could vote for
Ty- moshenko and other players who are trying to mobilize this
group. And it does not matter whether Saakashvili plays alone or
together with Poroshenko. If this strategy works, then Ukraine will
get a feeble parlia- ment with lots of small factions. Its going to
be an unsta- 28
27. Thus, the number of Ukrainians who see the threat of a so-
cial explosion in the country almost doubled. Therefore, the
conditions for social protests do really exist. This variant can be
realized if: 1. Poroshenko will not allow early elections to the
Verkhovna Rada in the face of the deteriorating political situation
and growing external pressure within global scenarios G1 or G2. 2.
The stalemate in variants A1-A2 occurs, when the Presi- dent will
block the actions of the opposition or antagonis- tic coalition.
Within this scenario repetition of the winter 2013-2014 situation
is possible, when street protests on Maidan led to the overthrow of
the Viktor Yanukovych regime. Although the government successfully
localized the protests launched by Tymoshenko, Rabinovich and
Murayev Party and other political forces whose interests coincide
on the third anniversary of Maidan, conditions for street protests
in Ukraine still have not disappeared. And given the black swans
(accidents, corruption scan- dals, Russian subversive activities,
etc.), which we have de- scribed above, the probability that
motivated players like Fatherland and Opposition Bloc would try to
use social discontent, begins to increase dramatically. The
algorithm of actions within this scenario looks some- thing like
the following. After some Event (public figure murder, brutal
violence against innocent, corruption scandal, infrastructure col-
lapse, or defeat in the east resulted from aggravation of the
situation within the global scenario G2 and G3) street protests
begin, and turning into a tough confrontation with their decisions.
Since Tymoshenko or another figure will at- tract smaller partners
with consequences for stability aris- ing from such a construction.
For example, if Tymoshenko heads the government, then she would
probably try to implement Minsk-2 because of the need for external
support. However, she would imme- diately face the position of the
President, who will insist on the fact that Ukraine should not
follow the conditions of- fered by the West and Russia. And this is
only one of the key issues. Therefore, we can confidently say that
in the A2 variant well see a hard conflict between the Cabinet of
Ministers, Pres- ident, and the Parliament. The result would be a
final drop in rating of the President, as happened to Yushchenko in
2007-2009. The stalemate will lead to the same bifurcation as the
variant A1. Variant . Mass Protests The survey made by the
Ukrainian Institute for the Future on 21-28 November, 2016, shows
that the country is experi- encing social tension that threatens a
social explosion. Thus, 39.2% of Ukrainians believe that there is a
high prob- ability for a social explosion in Ukraine. Another 29.1%
of re- spondents said that they see a low probability of such a
scenario. 21.0% of respondents believe that this version is
impossible today, and 10.1% are undecided. It should be noted that
there was a significant increase in the number of those who believe
that there is a high prob- ability of a social explosion in
Ukraine, compared with the survey of November 2016. In late May,
2016 only 22.4% of re- spondents saw a great threat of social
explosion, and 41.5% were confident that it has a low probability.
30% have been convinced that theres a zero threat of a social
explosion in Ukraine, and only 5.9% were undecided. 29
28. in the scheme that Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Party of Re-
gions were trying to implement in the spring and summer of 2009,
when they agreed on a broad coalition and divided zones of
influence for 25 years ahead. In this scheme, the Prime Ministers
post could be given to Serhiy Lyovochkin or Serhiy Taruta (as a
compromise), and Tymoshenko would claim the presidency, or vice
versa. In addition to considerable anxiety of the elite, Ty-
moshenkos problem is in her low legitimacy (and other key Ukrainian
politicians) in the eyes of the people. For exam- ple, our survey
of 21-28 November shows that she is now supported by only 8.4% of
Ukrainians, while Poroshenko gets 9.4%, i.e. they are almost equal.
If you consider the per- centage of respondents ready to come to
the elections, Ty- moshenko and Poroshenko could gain around
15-17%. Along with 23% undecided of respondents, 34.2% of
respondents said they would not actually come to the presidential
elec- tions! Another interesting point from the UIF November sur-
vey: 84.9% of Ukrainians do not believe that Tymoshenko lives on
deputys salary, as she stated in her e-declaration. So overcoming
the distrust of masses and elites may be- come the Achilles heel
for Yulia Tymoshenko. However, if the Ukrainian stakeholders could
not reach con- sensus on Tymoshenko and ways for overcoming the
crisis about her even under the pressure of external players, then
a bet on another figure can be played. This NoName figure is
currently unknown to the general public, and will pop up like a
Jack-in-the-box. It will be re- quired to have charisma and a high
potential for the legit- imacy during elections under the tacit
support of elites and external players or part them. If you look at
recent history, this is the scheme played by Leonid Kuchma, who has
turned himself from hardly known director of Pivdenmash factory
into a figure of the first order in 1992-1993. In our opinion, this
option would be the most logical in this situa- tion, both in terms
of external and internal players. MIA and SSU. If the situation
does not turn directly into the military scenario C1-C2, which well
consider further on, then the President loses control because
protesters seize the capital, and the Parliament is to reformat the
parlia- mentary majority which selects a new government and de-
prives the President of control over the military bloc. This would
be possible if the current President of Ukraine leaves or is
arrested, or resigns under pressure from external players. The last
option is a repetition of the situation in Ukraine in 2004 during
the first Maidan when Leonid Kuchma refused to continue the
struggle for power under pressure from the West, after receiving
guarantees of im- munity for himself and his family. Another
example is the resignation of Boris Yeltsin on 31 December 1999
under the pressure of inner circle due to his health problems. Then
the presidential elections take place, which are greatly influenced
by external players - the US, Russia, Eu- rope (especially
Germany). Their interference can dramat- ically exacerbate the
situation in the context of the presidential election against the
backdrop of global sce- narios G2 and G3. Growing tension can lead
to variants C1 and C2, i.e. attempts of a military coup against the
back- ground of a new wave of social protests or escalation in
eastern Ukraine. On the other hand, if they reach a consensus on
the status of Ukraine in geopolitical scenario G1, then they can
support a consolidated candidate. The key question in this
situation: which candidate will re- ceive support from both
external players and the domes- tic elite. At first glance, Yulia
Tymoshenko has a good chance and probably will receive support from
Russia and Germany for nonresistance to US. But Tymoshenko causes
huge fear in Ukrainian elites which know her indomitable character.
She may appear in a large conspiracy of the elite, for example
30
29. Specifically, only 17.9% of Ukrainians believe that the ma-
jority of the population would support a military coup, and another
22.6% believe that such an option would receive support of a half
the population. 36.5% of respondents be- lieve that a military coup
would be supported only by a mi- nority of Ukrainians; 8.6% - no
one would support the coup, and 14.4% did not decide. These figures
correlate with responses to another ques- tion: Whether you agree
that today Ukraine needs a dicta- torship with a tough leader as a
head of the state. This idea is supported by 34.5% of respondents,
whereas 48.8% of re- spondents are against this, and 16.6%
hesitated to answer. No less interesting is that Ukrainians do not
change their position, even with the caveat that dictatorship can
bring prosperity. In particular, they were asked the following
question: Do you support a military dictatorship if it will provide
real growth of living standards, fight corruption, and stability?
An affirmative answer was given by only 32.4% of Ukrainians, and
negative by 50.7%, 16.9% unde- cided. These results may cause
cautious optimism, despite the fact that over one third of
Ukrainians would support a dic- tatorship, but a majority still
supports the democratic de- velopment of the country. However, if
we take a look at the dynamics, we see dis- turbing trends. In the
May survey of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future the number of
respondents believing that majority of Ukrainians would support a
military coup was almost twice lower 9.8%. In spring another 19.4%
(22.6% in November 2016) of Ukrainians were sure that a military
coup would be supported by half of the population, 39.1% believed
that the coup would be supported by minority (36.5% in November).
Finally, in May 21.5% were sure that no one would support a coup,
(8.6% in November). 10.2% in May and 14.4% in November were
undecided. Finally, the third alternative to early presidential
elections is variant B, where a well-known figure serves as a com-
promise within an unstable balance of power. This is the version of
Yuriy Yekhanurov as Prime Minister in 2005-2006. In this case the
president has no support in Parliament, and therefore much depends
on the balance of power in it. However, this does not mean that the
presidency would be given to a weak figure because, having gained
real power, the new president can reveal his ambitions. In the
words of political scientist Dmitro Vydrin, the presidency is a
boxing glove, which can be stretched by the hand which puts it on.
By this logic, no matter who gets the presidency, he (or she, in
the case of Tymoshenko) will try to conduct parliamen- tary
elections (demanded by external players in order to complete an
agreement on Ukraine within the scenario G1), as Petro Poroshenko
did in autumn 2014. Thus a strong president may still try to
conduct a referendum on the new Constitution of Ukraine during
parliamentary re-elections. However, the order of amendments to the
Constitution of Ukraine will be prescribed in accordance with the
agree- ments reached between the US, Russia and Europe, if by the
time relations between the major players will remain within the
scenario G1. Thus, this variant comes in close connection with
scenar- ios G1 (Peacemaker) or G2 (Pragmatic). Variant . Military
Coup Today, there is much talk about feelings that public order
could be demolished by force and dictatorship be estab- lished. The
radicalization of moods leads to demand for au- thoritarian action.
Our survey of 21-28 November 2016 showed that a desire for
dictatorship does exist, but the majority of Ukrainians still
believe that Ukraine should develop as a democratic state. 31
30. long conflict in Donbas and skepticism about the central
power but that clashes with rebels and the Russian army remains the
one factor that keeps the AFU in focus. Volunteer Battalions as a
possible military destabilizing fac- tor was largely reduced by
their inclusion into the Armed Forces or National Guard. So today
they are at a much greater level of controllability than in 2014.
Charismatic commanders of volunteer battalions such as former com-
mander of Right Sector Dmitry Yarosh and commander of the Azov
regiment Andriy Biletsky made it clear that they have chosen the
political path for changing the state, not violence. The rhetoric
of both indicates that in the current environment they consider an
attempted coup as a threat to national security. This raises the
question: who then has the real possibility to undertake a
military-driven version of destabilization? In our opinion, there
are not so many such players: 1. First, its the President of
Ukraine, which has the consti- tutional authority for the
imposition of martial law. In par- ticular, Article 10 of the Law
on the Martial Law Legal Regime, adopted by the Parliament on 12
May 2015, provides that during a period of martial law the powers
of the Pres- ident of Ukraine cannot be stopped or even limited. In
par- ticular, according to the new law, military and civil
authorities are entrusted to prohibit peaceful gatherings, to
introduce a curfew, restrict the movement of citizens, and ban
political parties. It is impossible to dismiss the Prime Minister
with Cabinet and dissolve the Parliament16 . So, after six months
there was a significant reduction in those who held a peaceful
position, and the number of Ukrainians who perceive the coup as an
acceptable way out of the situation dramatically increased. This is
another proof that the revolutionary situation, i.e. request for a
rad- ical renewal of the state system and changing of social re-
lations has not disappeared, but got deeper and is smoldering in
the depths of society, ready to explode at any moment. Lets
consider, under what circumstances the military sce- nario can be
implemented in Ukraine, by what forces, and if its possible in
2017. In our opinion it is important to note that today in Ukraine
there are no preconditions for the Egyptian revolution sce- nario
for 2013 or the coup in Chile in 1973. This requires the existence
of the army as an institution that reproduces it- self, but this
condition in todays Ukraine is missing. The Ukrainian army
increases its subjectivity, i.e. the military is beginning to
realize its specified mission and role in the functioning of the
state, but the process will still require at least several years.
Thus the Armed Forces have one of the highest levels of trust from
the Ukrainian people. As shown by the November survey of the
Ukrainian Institute of Fu- ture, the Ukrainian army is trusted by
39.9% of respondents, trust as much as dont trust 35.1%. 20.1% of
respondents do not trust the AFU. For comparison, the President of
Ukraine is trusted by only 9.7% of Ukrainians and 56.7% of them do
not trust him. For Parliament trust is only 5.2%. 58.1% of
respondents do not trust to the Cabinet of Minis- ters of Ukraine,
while 6.6% of them do trust it. However the army remains under the
political supervision of the President of Ukraine, and today there
is no reason to say that he may lose it. Poroshenko has direct
contact with many military commanders. First of all, with the most
com- bat-ready, so to maintain their loyalty. And it is not a
secret that on the forefront there is certain tiredness from the
16. Rada adopted a new law on the martial law regime
http://www.unian.net/politics/1077004-vr-prinyala-zakon-o-
pravovom-rejime-voennogo-polojeniya.html 32
31. 1. Effective control over the force unit, which fulfill the
or- ders. Loyalty of the army. 2. Quickly establishing control over
the regions, including through involvement of regional elites. 3.
Quick imprisonment of the odious members of the Yanukovych regime
or post-Maidan administration. 4. Strengthening internal legitimacy
from the masses who perceive punishment as an act of justice. 5.
Acceptance and support of such actions by external play- ers. In
this situation the crucial factor is the position of the United
States. Without legitimacy from the external players it would be
extremely difficult for the political regime to get the aid which
is urgently needed. Conducting a military coup in tandem with
Russia and with the tacit approval of the USA would lead to a split
of Ukraine and will transfer the situation into an uncontrolled
desta- bilization scenario, which well discuss further. Success of
this option for the incumbent president is in- creased in case of a
threat of confrontation with Russia within scenario G3. In the
absence of confrontation, the in- cumbent president has a limited
period of time to imple- ment this option because as support from
society and elites decreases, it will be difficult to ensure the
legitimacy of such action. It is logical that the likelihood of
this option will be higher by the end of 2017, when formats A1-A2-B
are exhausted. Or if there wont be any black swan as in the case of
Maidan or destruction of the Malaysian Boeing by Russian troops in
the summer of 2014. But there is one option when the military coup
attempt makes sense already in February-March 2017. This option may
be acceptable to the Russians at the moment when Donald Trump just
becomes president officially. At this point it is quite logical to
quickly try to overthrow the po- litical regime of Petro Poroshenko
using variant B tools (mass protests) followed by street clashes.
This variant is possible if it is quick and without Washington
interfering, It means that the President gets real levers of
holding power in case of a threat to his removal from office. Here
we should mention that the introduction of martial law by the
President should be approved by the Parliament within two days.
That means that the Head of State should have a majority in
Parliament, which would agree to support such a radical measure.
Otherwise, such a step may be considered as usurpation of power and
rapidly lead to fail- ure with the low legitimacy of the President
and limited re- source base. 2. Military coup within a scenario of
controlled destabiliza- tion can be started by a player or
coalition of players able to: a) concentrate sufficient number of
security forces for taking control of key state institutions in low
legitimacy; b) find resources to retain power at the first stage;
c) confi- dent of external support. Now lets consider two possible
versions for a military coup in Ukraine in 2017: Version 1:
Successful coup Version 2: Unsuccessful coup 1. Successful coup The
President introduces martial law in terms of either a threat of
losing power because of protests or loss of con- trol over
processes in the country in the situations de- scribed in the
variants A1-A2-B. This may be preceded by an escalation in Donbas,
real or provoked within scenarios G2-G3. In contrast, a subject
competing with the current govern- ment may attempt to take power
by force. The President or any other subject