The Post-War World Part 1

The Cold War Part 1

The Soviet Empire Emerges

Europe’s New Master

The Second World War Ends

Formation of the Soviet Empire

Czechoslovakia Caught Between The East and West

Yugoslavia – The Anomaly

The Cold War Begins

Early Concerns About Soviet Expansion

Confrontation on the Periphery

British Withdrawal & the Truman Doctrine

With the end of the Second World War, the nations of Europe were divided into two separate groups: those liberated by the forces of the Western Allies, and those 'liberated' by the armies of the Soviet Union. This resulted in the transformation of Eastern Europe from liberated territories to members of the Soviet 'Satellite Empire'.

As Hitler's Empire collapsed around him, the power vacuum in Europe was rapidly being filled by the two powers who had done the most to defeat Nazi tyranny.

From the west the armies of the Anglo-American democracies pushed into Germany, while from the east the Soviet juggernaut smashed through the last, desperate German resistance.

While the fate of postwar Europe had been much discussed, in the end the various nations of the continent would adopt the political and economic systems of the occupying armies. Those liberated by the Western Allies would establish or re-establish democratic rule and capitalism, while those overrun by the Red Army would become communist states allied to the Soviet Union.

While it seems there was no master plan to establish a communist empire in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did wish to establish a buffer zone to forestall future aggression from Central Europe.

His main area of concern focused on three countries: Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The fate of Poland was particularly sad, for even though Britain and its allies had gone to war in 1939 to defend Polish independence, they were powerless to prevent the occupying Soviets from imposing their own political system there.

While the prewar Polish government had managed to escape to London early in the war, and later established relations with Britain's erstwhile ally the Soviet Union, the revelation of the Katyn Massacre caused relations to be broken off between the two.

Moreover, the destruction of the London government's military forces in Poland (the Home Army) meant that they had effectively no influence on Polish soil.

While Stalin pledged to allow free elections in Poland, he never intended to allow an unfriendly regime to assume power, and widespread electoral fraud ensured a communist victory.

Polish Constitution (in Russian)

Romania and Bulgaria shared a similar fate, as these two nations were seen as essential to Soviet national interests.

Romania like Poland had prewar border disputes with the USSR

Likewise, Bulgaria lay along the Russian route to the strategically vital Turkish Straits.

Both saw communist parties assume power while at the same time neutralizing other parties or absorbing ideologically sympathetic ones.

Czechoslovakia represented something of an anomaly, as both communists and non-communists shared political power in a spirit of cooperation.

The country's President Edvard Beneš had maintained cordial relations with the Soviets in the prewar years, and maintained something of an informal agreement with Stalin: if the country was left alone to conduct its political and economic affairs, it would not oppose Soviet foreign policies.

Edvard Beneš

In this way Czechoslovakia was to be something of a Central European Finland, which enjoyed a similar arrangement with its old Soviet foe. However, even though all Soviet forces withdrew from Czechoslovakia by the end of 1945, they were not done meddling in Czech affairs.

When East-West relations began to degrade in 1948, the Soviets criticised the Czech communists for not having seized power, and let it be known that they would be willing to lend military aid to accomplish this.

The Czech communist party leader Klement Gottwald then began placing communist supporters in places of state power, and eventually managed to usurp power when President Benes resigned in June 1948. In this way Czechoslovakia went from multiparty democracy to one-party state.

Klement Gottwald

Unlike every other state in Eastern Europe during the Second World War, Yugoslavia had largely liberated itself via the indigenous partisan movement, led by the dedicated communist Josip Broz (popularly known as Tito).

Likewise, Tito had regional ambitions for Yugoslavia, envisioning a pan-Balkan federation dominated by his country and including Albania, Bulgaria, and parts of northern Greece.

While Stalin at first supported Tito, with Tito loyally following Stalin's lead, the Soviet leader eventually grew wary of Tito's increasingly independent regime. The Soviets proceeded to put pressure on Yugoslavia due to that nation's perceived lack of deference, but this ultimately backfired.

Tito was an orthodox communist in domestic matters, but turned to the West for economic support in response to Soviet pressure, which the West was more than happy to provide. In this way, Yugoslavia left the Soviet Bloc, and pursued its own policies as an independent communist nation not beholden to anyone.

Yugoslavia's impact on the international scene was relatively modest, one result of its actions was to increase Stalin's paranoia regarding other possible political defections by the Soviet satellites, leading to a campaign to uproot suspected 'Titos' who likewise might pursue an independent path to socialism.

As the influence of the Soviet Union increased in the nations surrounding it, the Western democracies began to consider an appropriate reaction. This era saw continuing attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence, as well as the beginning of the U.S. and its allies perception and reactions to Soviet policies.

While the Allies had tacitly accepted the idea of a series of buffer states in Eastern Europe, the U.S. at this time began to view this not so much as a defensive measure, but as a staging ground for the expansion of Soviet control into Western Europe.

This was prompted in part by a speech given by Stalin in early 1946 where references to wartime allies were replaced by ominous warnings of the coming clash between communism and capitalism.

As well, the Soviet Union refused to take part in the new international financial organizations created for the postwar world, denouncing them an tools of American economic imperialism.

In an attempt to explain this radical change in Soviet behaviour, the U.S. sought assessments from experts on the subject. One respondent was a middle-aged American diplomat who had been based for many years in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan.

George F. Kennan

In his famous 'Long Telegram' (over 8,000 words!) he explained the situation in a lucid and compelling way: essentially, that throughout history Russian leaders had needed external enemies to rally their diverse peoples and to justify their iron rule. With Germany and Japan vanquished, the only remaining rivals (the U.S. and U.K.) had to be converted from allies into potential enemies in order to justify the Soviet state's harsh rule.

Kennan's analysis had a powerful effect on the American government, and while it was kept secret for the time being, the basic themes were very publically exposed in a speech delivered by former Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

In his 'Sinews of Peace' address, Churchill claimed an Iron Curtain was descending across the continent, decrying Soviet actions and calling for Anglo-American alliance against this threat.

Although not speaking in an official manner, his prestige lent an air of authority to this address, and even before he spoke tensions between the Superpowers were on the rise.

One of the first places where East-West tensions flared up was in Iran.

A traditional zone of rivalry between the old Russian and British Empires, Iran had been occupied by the Soviets and British after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, in order to allow allied supplies to reach the hard pressed USSR.

However, while the British were content to turn power over to the new pro-western Shah of Iran, the Soviets began to encourage dissension in the northern provinces of Iran which it had occupied.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Emperor of Iran

Specifically targeted were the Azeri peoples who had long struggled against the dominance of Iran's Persian majority, and among whom the Soviets attempted to create the framework for a puppet state (utilizing the links between these Iranian Azeris and the many Azeris in the Soviet Union).

By April of 1946 the Soviets managed to wring two concessions from Iran in exchange for withdrawing its occupation forces after the war: autonomy for the Iranian's Azeri province, and the right to exploit the petroleum reserves in the north of the country.

However, shortly after the Soviets withdrew, the Iranians repudiated both agreements and reasserted control over their northern province. The Soviets had cautiously tested Western tolerance for their adventurism, and been badly stung: after Iran repudiated the agreements it aligned itself with the U.S., and remained a solid American ally for the next 3 decades.

Following this humiliating incident, the Soviets began to exert pressure on Turkey to allow for joint control of the Turkish Straits separating the Soviet dominated Black Sea from the Mediterranean Sea.

As well the Soviets demanded the annexation of Turkish provinces on the Soviet border.

When the Turks (naturally) rejected these demands, the Soviets massed forces on the Turkish border and began a menacing press campaign to intimidate the Turks. And while the allies had previously been sympathetic to the Soviet interests in the straits, they now saw it as an intolerable geostrategic threat to Western Europe.

In the summer of 1946 President Truman dispatched the most powerful aircraft carrier in the U.S. navy to bolster existing forces in the region and lend confidence to the Turks. While the war of words would continue, Turkey refused to budge on the issue of compromising its national sovereignty.

The final area of immediate postwar confrontation between the two wartime allies was across the Aegean from Turkey, in Greece.

There communists and non-communists clashed openly in the Greek Civil War.

While Stalin was ambivalent about this conflict, he tacitly allowed Yugoslavia to provide support to the communist rebels there. Personally, he doubted the Greek communists could win the war, and was distrustful of any communist movement that he could not directly control.

Great Britain had served as the traditional guardian of Greek independence, but was itself suffering heavily as its postwar economy remained stagnant and seemingly endless imperial engagements drained away its remaining strength and funds.

In early 1947 they declared the end of all economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey, and appealed to Washington to step into the void by aiding those two countries. By appealing to the patriotic sentiments of the American congress, the President pitched the relief of Greece and Turkey as the beginning of a new phase of American foreign policy and the defence of American national interests.

In March of 1947 the President delivered a stirring speech to congress, in which he outlined what would come to be known as the 'Truman Doctrine': essentially, that the U.S. would unconditionally support any country in the world threatened by external Soviet aggression or by indigenous communist insurgents.

The response of congress was swift: 400 million dollars in aid was given to Turkey and Greece, and American advisors and equipment began to flow into the Royal Greek Army, which crushed the communist insurgents and won the civil war.

With this new policy in mind, the U.S. government felt it needed to justify its stance against the Soviet Union, and did so with the release of an article titled 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' by a mysterious 'Mr. X' (in fact the newly promoted George Kennan).

Published in the popular and respected journal Foreign Affairs, the article spelled out how historical Russian paranoia and the messianic ideology of Marxism-Leninism would see the Soviets probing and testing the nations bordering the USSR for weaknesses, and attempting to subvert them to the communist cause and Soviet control.

To respond to this, the U.S. would have to extend economic, political, and military assistance to the countries in danger: when faced by a ring of strong, prosperous, stable states, the Soviet Union would be forced to accept the limits of its own power. The strategy spelled out here became known as 'Containment', and would face its greatest test in the economically devastated nations of Western Europe.