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START Follow-on UpdateSTART Follow-on Update
November 30, 2009
Steven PiferCenter on the United States and Europe
Foreign Policy StudiesThe Brookings Institution
spifer@brookings.edu
November 30, 2009
Steven PiferCenter on the United States and Europe
Foreign Policy StudiesThe Brookings Institution
spifer@brookings.edu
Background: 1991 START TreatyBackground: 1991 START Treaty
• No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• No more than 154 heavy ICBMs
• No more than 6000 warheads• No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs• No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs• No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs
• Detailed verification measures• Expires December 5, 2009
• No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• No more than 154 heavy ICBMs
• No more than 6000 warheads• No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs• No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs• No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs
• Detailed verification measures• Expires December 5, 2009
Background: 2002 SORT TreatyBackground: 2002 SORT Treaty
• No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads
• No limits on SNDVs• No verification measures• Expires December 31, 2012
• No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads
• No limits on SNDVs• No verification measures• Expires December 31, 2012
Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009
Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009
• SORT count at/near 2200 warheads• Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs
capable of carrying 5916 warheads:550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 160096 Trident I SLBMs 576336 Trident II SLBMs 268847 B-1 bombers 4718 B-2 bombers 18141 B-52 bombers 987
• SORT count at/near 2200 warheads• Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs
capable of carrying 5916 warheads:550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 160096 Trident I SLBMs 576336 Trident II SLBMs 268847 B-1 bombers 4718 B-2 bombers 18141 B-52 bombers 987
Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009
• SORT count unknown• Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs
capable of carrying 3897 warheads:465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001
268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288
76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608
• SORT count unknown• Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs
capable of carrying 3897 warheads:465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001
268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288
76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608
July Joint UnderstandingJuly Joint Understanding
• Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100• Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty
• New treaty to contain provisions on:• Counting rules• Elimination and verification (based on START,
simplified and less costly as appropriate)• Interrelationship between offense and defense• Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs
• Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100• Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty
• New treaty to contain provisions on:• Counting rules• Elimination and verification (based on START,
simplified and less costly as appropriate)• Interrelationship between offense and defense• Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs
START Follow-on TreatySTART Follow-on Treaty
• Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT
• Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations• Missile defense• SNDV limit• Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs• Verification
• Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT
• Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations• Missile defense• SNDV limit• Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs• Verification
Missile DefenseMissile Defense
• Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”
• Russians sought to restrict missile defense• US position: missile defense not a subject
for START follow-on negotiation
• Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”
• Russians sought to restrict missile defense• US position: missile defense not a subject
for START follow-on negotiation
SNDV LimitSNDV Limit• Large gap between July Russian proposal
(500) and US proposal (1100)• Reasons for higher US proposal:
• SNDVs converted to conventional roles• “Phantom” systems• Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US
plans to download missiles
• Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100)
• Reasons for higher US proposal: • SNDVs converted to conventional roles• “Phantom” systems• Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US
plans to download missiles
Conventional SystemsConventional Systems
• US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles• B-1 bombers• Four Trident SSGNs
• How to assure no nuclear role?
• US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles• B-1 bombers• Four Trident SSGNs
• How to assure no nuclear role?
“Phantom” Systems“Phantom” Systems
• SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules
• US “phantoms” include:• B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB• MX ICBM silos• Some Minuteman III silos
• SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules
• US “phantoms” include:• B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB• MX ICBM silos• Some Minuteman III silos
“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s
“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo
Eliminated Minuteman SiloEliminated Minuteman Silo
Closing SNDV LimitClosing SNDV Limit
• Possible ways to address:• Verification measures to confirm conventional
systems have only conventional role• Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on
less demanding elimination requirement
• Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems
• Possible ways to address:• Verification measures to confirm conventional
systems have only conventional role• Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on
less demanding elimination requirement
• Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems
Upload PotentialUpload Potential
• Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles• Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three
warheads will have five empty warhead slots
• The dog that’s not barking?• May be issue for next round
• Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles• Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three
warheads will have five empty warhead slots
• The dog that’s not barking?• May be issue for next round
Conventional WarheadsConventional Warheads
• US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads
• Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems
• US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads
• Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems
Counting and VerificationCounting and Verification• Possible warhead counting regimes
• Type attribution rule (START)• Actual load counting -- US plans to vary
number of warheads on Trident SLBMs
• Simplifying verification measures• Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and
loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems
• Possible warhead counting regimes• Type attribution rule (START)• Actual load counting -- US plans to vary
number of warheads on Trident SLBMs
• Simplifying verification measures• Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and
loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems
PrognosisPrognosis
• Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong
on both sides• Both presidents strongly endorse treaty
• Question = when will treaty be completed?
• Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong
on both sides• Both presidents strongly endorse treaty
• Question = when will treaty be completed?
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