START Follow-on UpdateSTART Follow-on Update

November 30, 2009

Steven PiferCenter on the United States and Europe

Foreign Policy StudiesThe Brookings Institution

spifer@brookings.edu

November 30, 2009

Steven PiferCenter on the United States and Europe

Foreign Policy StudiesThe Brookings Institution

spifer@brookings.edu

Background: 1991 START TreatyBackground: 1991 START Treaty

• No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• No more than 154 heavy ICBMs

• No more than 6000 warheads• No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs• No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs• No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs

• Detailed verification measures• Expires December 5, 2009

• No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• No more than 154 heavy ICBMs

• No more than 6000 warheads• No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs• No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs• No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs

• Detailed verification measures• Expires December 5, 2009

Background: 2002 SORT TreatyBackground: 2002 SORT Treaty

• No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads

• No limits on SNDVs• No verification measures• Expires December 31, 2012

• No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads

• No limits on SNDVs• No verification measures• Expires December 31, 2012

Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009

Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009

• SORT count at/near 2200 warheads• Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs

capable of carrying 5916 warheads:550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 160096 Trident I SLBMs 576336 Trident II SLBMs 268847 B-1 bombers 4718 B-2 bombers 18141 B-52 bombers 987

• SORT count at/near 2200 warheads• Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs

capable of carrying 5916 warheads:550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 160096 Trident I SLBMs 576336 Trident II SLBMs 268847 B-1 bombers 4718 B-2 bombers 18141 B-52 bombers 987

Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009

• SORT count unknown• Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs

capable of carrying 3897 warheads:465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001

268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288

76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608

• SORT count unknown• Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs

capable of carrying 3897 warheads:465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001

268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288

76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608

July Joint UnderstandingJuly Joint Understanding

• Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100• Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty

• New treaty to contain provisions on:• Counting rules• Elimination and verification (based on START,

simplified and less costly as appropriate)• Interrelationship between offense and defense• Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs

• Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100• Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty

• New treaty to contain provisions on:• Counting rules• Elimination and verification (based on START,

simplified and less costly as appropriate)• Interrelationship between offense and defense• Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs

START Follow-on TreatySTART Follow-on Treaty

• Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT

• Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations• Missile defense• SNDV limit• Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs• Verification

• Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT

• Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations• Missile defense• SNDV limit• Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs• Verification

Missile DefenseMissile Defense

• Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between

strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”

• Russians sought to restrict missile defense• US position: missile defense not a subject

for START follow-on negotiation

• Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between

strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”

• Russians sought to restrict missile defense• US position: missile defense not a subject

for START follow-on negotiation

SNDV LimitSNDV Limit• Large gap between July Russian proposal

(500) and US proposal (1100)• Reasons for higher US proposal:

• SNDVs converted to conventional roles• “Phantom” systems• Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US

plans to download missiles

• Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100)

• Reasons for higher US proposal: • SNDVs converted to conventional roles• “Phantom” systems• Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US

plans to download missiles

Conventional SystemsConventional Systems

• US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles• B-1 bombers• Four Trident SSGNs

• How to assure no nuclear role?

• US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles• B-1 bombers• Four Trident SSGNs

• How to assure no nuclear role?

“Phantom” Systems“Phantom” Systems

• SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules

• US “phantoms” include:• B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB• MX ICBM silos• Some Minuteman III silos

• SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules

• US “phantoms” include:• B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB• MX ICBM silos• Some Minuteman III silos

“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s

“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo

Eliminated Minuteman SiloEliminated Minuteman Silo

Closing SNDV LimitClosing SNDV Limit

• Possible ways to address:• Verification measures to confirm conventional

systems have only conventional role• Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on

less demanding elimination requirement

• Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems

• Possible ways to address:• Verification measures to confirm conventional

systems have only conventional role• Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on

less demanding elimination requirement

• Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems

Upload PotentialUpload Potential

• Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles• Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three

warheads will have five empty warhead slots

• The dog that’s not barking?• May be issue for next round

• Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles• Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three

warheads will have five empty warhead slots

• The dog that’s not barking?• May be issue for next round

Conventional WarheadsConventional Warheads

• US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads

• Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems

• US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads

• Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems

Counting and VerificationCounting and Verification• Possible warhead counting regimes

• Type attribution rule (START)• Actual load counting -- US plans to vary

number of warheads on Trident SLBMs

• Simplifying verification measures• Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and

loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems

• Possible warhead counting regimes• Type attribution rule (START)• Actual load counting -- US plans to vary

number of warheads on Trident SLBMs

• Simplifying verification measures• Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and

loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems

PrognosisPrognosis

• Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong

on both sides• Both presidents strongly endorse treaty

• Question = when will treaty be completed?

• Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong

on both sides• Both presidents strongly endorse treaty

• Question = when will treaty be completed?