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Macondo BlowoutLessons Learned
for Prevention and Mitigation
Lars Herbst, P.E.
BSEE Gulf of Mexico Regional Director
05 October 2017“To promote safety, protect the
environment and conserve resources offshore through vigorous regulatory
oversight and enforcement.”
➢Lookback at Incident and Causes
➢BSEE Response: Prevention
➢BSEE Response: Mitigation
➢Forward Looking
Topics
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What’s your why?
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Joint Investigation Team
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JIT Reports - USCG
• Fire
• Evacuation / Search and Rescue
• Flooding and Sinking
• Safety Systems (Personnel and Process)
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JIT Reports - BSSE
• Well Design, Cementing, and Flow Path
• Temporary Abandonment, Kick Detection, and Emergency Response
• Ignition Source and Explosion
• BOP Stack
• Compliance with Regulations and Company Policies
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Everything Was There?
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So what went wrong?
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Conclusion
The blowout at the Macondo well on April 20, 2010, was the result of a series of decisions that increased risk coupled with a number of actions that failed to fully consider or mitigate those risks.
While it is not possible to discern which precise combination of these decisions and actions set the blowout in motion, it is clear that increased vigilance and awareness by BP, Transocean and Halliburton personnel at critical junctures during operations at the Macondo well would have reduced the likelihood of the blowout occurring.
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Conclusion
BP’s failure to appropriately analyze and evaluate risks associated with the Macondo well in connection with its decision making during the days leading up to the blowout was a contributing cause of the blowout.
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Conclusion
BP’s failure to inform the parties operating on its behalf of all known risks associated with Macondo well operations was a contributing cause of the blowout and kick detection.
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Conclusion
The Deepwater Horizon crew’s (BP and Transocean) collective misinterpretation of the negative tests was a cause of the well control failure.
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Conclusion
BP Drilling Engineer’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies noted by BP’s well site leader was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.
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Conclusion
The failure of BP’s well site leaders and the Transocean Deepwater Horizon rig crew to recognize the risks associated with these multiple problems that occurred between April 19 and April 20 was a possible contributing cause of the blowout.
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Conclusion
The Deepwater Horizon crew’s inability to accurately monitor pit levels while conducting simultaneous operations during the critical negative test was a contributing cause of the kick detection failure.
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Conclusion
The failure of the Deepwater Horizon crew (including BP, Transocean, and Sperry‐Sun personnel) to detect the influx of hydrocarbons until hydrocarbons were above the BOP stack was a cause of the well control failure.
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Conclusion
The Deepwater Horizon crew’s hesitance to shut‐in the BOP immediately was a possible contributing cause of the well control failure.
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Conclusion
The overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.
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Conclusion
The failure of the personnel on the Deepwater Horizon bridge, monitoring the gas alarms, to notify the Deepwater Horizon crew in the engine control room about the alarms so that they could take actions to shut down the engines was a contributing cause of the response failure.
Bly Report – Vapor Dispersion at 240 Seconds
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Conclusion
The rig crew’s failure to initiate the emergency disconnect system until after the hydrocarbons were had risen above the BOP stack was a possible contributing cause of the response failure.
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“ Bow-tie” Diagram of Hazards and Barriers
• Deepwater Horizon tragedy
• Other well control incidents
• Revised and new industry standards
• Codification of decades of BSEE policies
Prevention - Need for the well control regulations?
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• Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010• Drilling safety rule- August 2012• Completion of API Standard 53 –
November 2012• Publication of proposed Well Control Rule – April
2015• Final Well Control Rule published – April 29, 2016• Well Control Rule effective – July 28, 2016, with
implementation staged over several years
Development Process
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Drilling Safety Rule – Wellbore Integrity
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• Best cement practices – API RP 65-Part 2• Certification by PE that casing & cement program is fit for
purpose • Two independent tested barriers across each flow path
during completion (PE certification)• Proper installation, sealing and locking of casing & liner• BSEE approval before displacing fluids• Enhanced deep water well control training
• Documentation & schematics for all control systems• I3P verification that B/S rams cuts DP at MASP• Subsea BOP equipped w/ ROV intervention• Maintain ROV & trained crew on all floating rigs• Auto-shear and deadman on all DP rigs• Documentation of subsea BOP Inspection & Maintenance
procedures per API RP 53• ROV intervention testing on subsea BOP stump test • Function test of auto-shear and deadman during subsea
BOP stump test • Deadman test during initial seafloor test
Drilling Safety Rule – Well Control Equipment & Procedures
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• Incorporation of industry standards as baseline• Performance criteria for Blowout Preventers (BOPs)• Establish criteria for maintenance and repair of BOP
equipment• Safe drilling practices and procedures• Real time monitoring requirements• Formal third party certification program• Downhole equipment
Summary of Content of Well Control Rule-Effective July 28, 2016
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Final Rule Effective Dates
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April 20, 2010 • Macondo Well Blowout
APRIL 21, 2010
• ROV intervention on BOP
April 22, 2010 • Horizon Rig Sinks
April 23, 2010 • Hydrocarbon flow at two locations subsea
April 27,2010 • Two Relief Well Permits are approved
May 5, 2010 • Capping valve placed on drillpipe
May 6, 2010 • Coffer dam attempted
May 15, 2010 • Riser insertion tube installed
May 26, 2010 • Top Kill Attempted
June 4, 2010 • Top hat installed w production to vessels
July 13, 2010 • Containment cap installed to stop flow
August 3, 2010
• Static kill attempt successful
September 19, 2010
• Cement permanently seals well
EARLY STAGES OF SOURCE CONTROL
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TOP KILL ATTEMPTED
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TOP HAT INSTALLED, PRODUCTION FLOWS TO VESSELS ON SURFACE
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CAPPING STACK INSTALLED TO STOP FLOW
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• Public Forums addressed various aspects of containment
• Issued Notice to Lessees to clarify regulations regarding containment
• Worked closely with Containment Organizations to meet expectations
Post Response
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MWCC Capping Stack
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HWCG Capping Stack
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Well Containment Screening Tool
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BSEE evaluates each deep water well design to determine which of the following categories a well falls into:
A.) Can the well be Shut in with full well bore integrity
B.) If well bore integrity cannot be demonstrated and it is determined that a casing shoe will breakdown causing underground flow, it can be demonstrated that the underground flow would not broach the seafloor?
C.) If well bore integrity is not capable of being achieved or if a shut in will result in an underground flow that broaches the seafloor, containment can only be approved if an operator can demonstrate cap, flow, and collection capability.
Well Containment Screening Tool
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Well Containment Screening Tool
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• Have capping stack and flowback capability and all support equipment to deploy. This must be analyzed on a well by well basis for both pressure and flow rate capacity
• Operator must have capability to prepare a a well or BOP stack to receive a capping stack. This means subsea debris removal ( shears and saws ) equipment must be available.
• Have Temporary flowback plan utilizing a subsea divert method such as a “top hat”
Lessons Learned Summary - [Mitigation]
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• Proper hazard analysis is critical to a safe and successful containment effort.
• Simulated ops planning is also critical to completing containment.
• Equipment to deploy subsea dispersant is necessary to protect the safety of workers at surface that are conducting direct vertical access work and other support vessels.
Lessons Learned Summary
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Forward Looking [Mitigation]
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• Continue to conduct drills on incident command structure and responsibilities. Ensure decision makers are clearly identified within the individual responsibility parties and the Federal Government. Ensure that they have the proper technical background, are not swayed by outside influences, and are fully supported all the way up the chain of command on both sides.
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Success to Failure –
Success Complacency Failure
Are they really that far apart?
More than 50 BSEE employees worked directly on the response and source control efforts involved with the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill. Countless other BSEE staff supported their co-workers and kept the everyday work of the agency continuing, which was crucial to the United States’ energy security.
We are, and will remain, proud of the hard work that was accomplished through this time of extraordinary challenge.
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Questions?
“To promote safety, protect the environment and conserve resources offshore through vigorous regulatory
oversight and enforcement.”
BSEE Website: www.bsee.gov
@BSEEgov
BSEEgov
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
BSEEgov
https://www.facebook.com/BSEEgov/
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