Macondo BlowoutLessons Learned

for Prevention and Mitigation

Lars Herbst, P.E.

BSEE Gulf of Mexico Regional Director

05 October 2017“To promote safety, protect the

environment and conserve resources offshore through vigorous regulatory

oversight and enforcement.”

➢Lookback at Incident and Causes

➢BSEE Response: Prevention

➢BSEE Response: Mitigation

➢Forward Looking

Topics

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What’s your why?

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Joint Investigation Team

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JIT Reports - USCG

• Fire

• Evacuation / Search and Rescue

• Flooding and Sinking

• Safety Systems (Personnel and Process)

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JIT Reports - BSSE

• Well Design, Cementing, and Flow Path

• Temporary Abandonment, Kick Detection, and Emergency Response

• Ignition Source and Explosion

• BOP Stack

• Compliance with Regulations and Company Policies

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Everything Was There?

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So what went wrong?

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Conclusion

The blowout at the Macondo well on April 20, 2010, was the result of a series of decisions that increased risk coupled with a number of actions that failed to fully consider or mitigate those risks.

While it is not possible to discern which precise combination of these decisions and actions set the blowout in motion, it is clear that increased vigilance and awareness by BP, Transocean and Halliburton personnel at critical junctures during operations at the Macondo well would have reduced the likelihood of the blowout occurring.

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Conclusion

BP’s failure to appropriately analyze and evaluate risks associated with the Macondo well in connection with its decision making during the days leading up to the blowout was a contributing cause of the blowout.

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Conclusion

BP’s failure to inform the parties operating on its behalf of all known risks associated with Macondo well operations was a contributing cause of the blowout and kick detection.

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Conclusion

The Deepwater Horizon crew’s (BP and Transocean) collective misinterpretation of the negative tests was a cause of the well control failure.

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Conclusion

BP Drilling Engineer’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies noted by BP’s well site leader was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

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Conclusion

The failure of BP’s well site leaders and the Transocean Deepwater Horizon rig crew to recognize the risks associated with these multiple problems that occurred between April 19 and April 20 was a possible contributing cause of the blowout.

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Conclusion

The Deepwater Horizon crew’s inability to accurately monitor pit levels while conducting simultaneous operations during the critical negative test was a contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

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Conclusion

The failure of the Deepwater Horizon crew (including BP, Transocean, and Sperry‐Sun personnel) to detect the influx of hydrocarbons until hydrocarbons were above the BOP stack was a cause of the well control failure.

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Conclusion

The Deepwater Horizon crew’s hesitance to shut‐in the BOP immediately was a possible contributing cause of the well control failure.

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Conclusion

The overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

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Conclusion

The failure of the personnel on the Deepwater Horizon bridge, monitoring the gas alarms, to notify the Deepwater Horizon crew in the engine control room about the alarms so that they could take actions to shut down the engines was a contributing cause of the response failure.

Bly Report – Vapor Dispersion at 240 Seconds

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Conclusion

The rig crew’s failure to initiate the emergency disconnect system until after the hydrocarbons were had risen above the BOP stack was a possible contributing cause of the response failure.

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“ Bow-tie” Diagram of Hazards and Barriers

• Deepwater Horizon tragedy

• Other well control incidents

• Revised and new industry standards

• Codification of decades of BSEE policies

Prevention - Need for the well control regulations?

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• Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010• Drilling safety rule- August 2012• Completion of API Standard 53 –

November 2012• Publication of proposed Well Control Rule – April

2015• Final Well Control Rule published – April 29, 2016• Well Control Rule effective – July 28, 2016, with

implementation staged over several years

Development Process

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Drilling Safety Rule – Wellbore Integrity

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• Best cement practices – API RP 65-Part 2• Certification by PE that casing & cement program is fit for

purpose • Two independent tested barriers across each flow path

during completion (PE certification)• Proper installation, sealing and locking of casing & liner• BSEE approval before displacing fluids• Enhanced deep water well control training

• Documentation & schematics for all control systems• I3P verification that B/S rams cuts DP at MASP• Subsea BOP equipped w/ ROV intervention• Maintain ROV & trained crew on all floating rigs• Auto-shear and deadman on all DP rigs• Documentation of subsea BOP Inspection & Maintenance

procedures per API RP 53• ROV intervention testing on subsea BOP stump test • Function test of auto-shear and deadman during subsea

BOP stump test • Deadman test during initial seafloor test

Drilling Safety Rule – Well Control Equipment & Procedures

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• Incorporation of industry standards as baseline• Performance criteria for Blowout Preventers (BOPs)• Establish criteria for maintenance and repair of BOP

equipment• Safe drilling practices and procedures• Real time monitoring requirements• Formal third party certification program• Downhole equipment

Summary of Content of Well Control Rule-Effective July 28, 2016

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Final Rule Effective Dates

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April 20, 2010 • Macondo Well Blowout

APRIL 21, 2010

• ROV intervention on BOP

April 22, 2010 • Horizon Rig Sinks

April 23, 2010 • Hydrocarbon flow at two locations subsea

April 27,2010 • Two Relief Well Permits are approved

May 5, 2010 • Capping valve placed on drillpipe

May 6, 2010 • Coffer dam attempted

May 15, 2010 • Riser insertion tube installed

May 26, 2010 • Top Kill Attempted

June 4, 2010 • Top hat installed w production to vessels

July 13, 2010 • Containment cap installed to stop flow

August 3, 2010

• Static kill attempt successful

September 19, 2010

• Cement permanently seals well

EARLY STAGES OF SOURCE CONTROL

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TOP KILL ATTEMPTED

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TOP HAT INSTALLED, PRODUCTION FLOWS TO VESSELS ON SURFACE

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CAPPING STACK INSTALLED TO STOP FLOW

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• Public Forums addressed various aspects of containment

• Issued Notice to Lessees to clarify regulations regarding containment

• Worked closely with Containment Organizations to meet expectations

Post Response

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MWCC Capping Stack

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HWCG Capping Stack

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Well Containment Screening Tool

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BSEE evaluates each deep water well design to determine which of the following categories a well falls into:

A.) Can the well be Shut in with full well bore integrity

B.) If well bore integrity cannot be demonstrated and it is determined that a casing shoe will breakdown causing underground flow, it can be demonstrated that the underground flow would not broach the seafloor?

C.) If well bore integrity is not capable of being achieved or if a shut in will result in an underground flow that broaches the seafloor, containment can only be approved if an operator can demonstrate cap, flow, and collection capability.

Well Containment Screening Tool

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Well Containment Screening Tool

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• Have capping stack and flowback capability and all support equipment to deploy. This must be analyzed on a well by well basis for both pressure and flow rate capacity

• Operator must have capability to prepare a a well or BOP stack to receive a capping stack. This means subsea debris removal ( shears and saws ) equipment must be available.

• Have Temporary flowback plan utilizing a subsea divert method such as a “top hat”

Lessons Learned Summary - [Mitigation]

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• Proper hazard analysis is critical to a safe and successful containment effort.

• Simulated ops planning is also critical to completing containment.

• Equipment to deploy subsea dispersant is necessary to protect the safety of workers at surface that are conducting direct vertical access work and other support vessels.

Lessons Learned Summary

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Forward Looking [Mitigation]

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• Continue to conduct drills on incident command structure and responsibilities. Ensure decision makers are clearly identified within the individual responsibility parties and the Federal Government. Ensure that they have the proper technical background, are not swayed by outside influences, and are fully supported all the way up the chain of command on both sides.

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Success to Failure –

Success Complacency Failure

Are they really that far apart?

More than 50 BSEE employees worked directly on the response and source control efforts involved with the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill. Countless other BSEE staff supported their co-workers and kept the everyday work of the agency continuing, which was crucial to the United States’ energy security.

We are, and will remain, proud of the hard work that was accomplished through this time of extraordinary challenge.

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Questions?

“To promote safety, protect the environment and conserve resources offshore through vigorous regulatory

oversight and enforcement.”

BSEE Website: www.bsee.gov

@BSEEgov

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Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement

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https://www.facebook.com/BSEEgov/

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