Day 1 - Session 1 Introducon to CEQ A Primer Nora …...2017/08/01  · Fiscal Policy on Inequality...

Day 1 - Session 1 Introduc3on to CEQ

A Primer Nora Lus3g

Tulane University, CGD, IAD

LearningEventontheCommitmenttoEquityMethodology

CEQIns9tuteandTheWorldBankWashington,DCJuly11-13,2016

Learning Event

• Day1:•  MethodologytoproduceaCEQAssessment•  Illustra9onwithcountryresults•  MasterWorkbook

• Days2:•  Statasessions

• Day3:•  Statasessions•  Checkingprotocol

hNps://goo.gl/ZWG9uW

Day 1 - Session 1: Outline

• CommitmenttoEquityIns9tute:scopeofwork• CEQAssessment:methodologicalhighlights• CEQAssessments:aglanceatresults• CEQIns9tuteServices&Partnerships

4

CEQ Ins3tute

Commitment to Equity Ins3tute (CEQ Ins3tute)

Objec&ve:Tomeasuretheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertyincountriesacrosstheworld

•  Research-basedpolicytools•  CEQDataCenteronFiscalRedistribu9on•  CEQAdvisoryandTrainingServices•  BridgestoPolicy

Ø TwograntsfromBill&MelindaGatesFounda9onUS5.5millionfor2014-2020

Ø www.commitmentoequity.org6

CEQ Ins3tute: Core Staff

• Director:NoraLus9g• DirectorofPolicyArea:LudovicoFeoli• AssociateDirectors:MaynorCabrera,JonJellema,EstuardoMoranandStephenYounger• DataCenterDirector:SeanHiggins•  Communica&onsDirector:CarlosMar9ndelCampo•  ResearchAssociates:RodrigoAranda,KorayCaglayan,EnriquedelaRosa,AliEnami

Inaddi9on:• AdvisoryBoard• NonresidentResearchAssociates(morethan40worldwide)

7

Commitment to Equity Ins3tute

• Workingoncloseto40countries;coversaroundtwothirdsoftheworldpopula9on•  Collabora9veeffortsandpartnershipswithmul9pleorganiza9ons:ADB,AfDB,CAF,ERF,IDB,IMF,ICEFI,OECD,Oxfam,UNDP,WorldBank•  U9lizedbygovernments•  Publica9ons:Handbook,WorkingPaperseries,scholarlypublica9onsinpeer-reviewedjournals,bookchapters,editedvolume(inprogress),blogsandpolicybriefs• Websitewww.commitmentoequity.org

8

9www.commitmentoequity.org

**CEQ Assessment**

CEQ Assessment: Tools §  CEQHandbook2016:Lus9g,Nora,editor.CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEs6ma6ngtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.TulaneUniversity.Fall2016.

Astep-by-stepguidetoapplyingincidenceanalysistoassesstheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertywithcountrystudiestoillustrate.

§  MasterWorkbook(MWB)

Excelspreadsheetthathousesdetailedbackgroundinforma9onandresultsfromtheCEQanalysisusedasinputsforpolicydiscussions,academicpapersandpolicyreports.Itcontainsinternallinkstoproducesummarytablesautoma9cally.

§  CEQStataPackageAsuiteofuser-wriNenStatacommands(i.e.Adofiles)thatautomatestheproduc9onofresultsandinputstheseresultsdirectlyintheMasterWorkbook.Thissokwareinnova9onverysignificantlyreducestheprobabilityofcommilngerrorsinthe“copy-and-paste”processandsavesanenormousamountof9mecomparedtobefore.

§  CheckingProtocol11

CEQ Assessments & World Bank •  CanbeusedinPovertyAssessmentsandPublicExpenditureReviews.•  AssesshowmuchthefiscalsysteminspecificcountriesishelpingachievetheWB’stwingoalsofpovertyreduc9onandsharedprosperity.•  GovernmentsareaNractedbytheideaofassessingthedistribu9onalimpactoftheirfiscalsystemand/orpolicyreforms.Helpsengagementanddialogue;openspossibilityofnewlendingprograms.•  BoNomline:TheCEQAssessmentscanhelptheWBopera9onalizethepovertyreduc9onandsharedprosperitytalk.

12

CEQ Assessment

Methodological Highlights

Nora Lus3g (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Es3ma3ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University, Fall 2016. Presentsastep-by-stepguidetoapplyingincidenceanalysistoassesstheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertywithcountrystudiestoillustrate.

Thehandbookhasthreeparts.

PartI

§  PresentsthemethodologydevelopedbytheCommitmenttoEquity(CEQ)Ins9tuteatTulaneUniversity.Itexplainshowtaxes,subsidies,andsocialspendingshouldbeallocatedandsuggestses9ma9onprocedureswheninforma9onontaxesandtransfersisnotavailableinthehouseholdsurvey.

§  Describestheindicatorsthatareusedtoassessthedistribu9veimpactandeffec9venessoffiscalpolicy,anddiscussestheiranaly9calunderpinning.

§  Chapters2,3,4and5,inpar9cular,presentastep-bystepguidetocomple9ngtheMasterWorkbookofResults.

§  Chapters6and7discussthetheore9calunderpinningoffiscalredistribu9on.

Nora Lus3g (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University, Fall 2016. PartII§  Presentsapplica9onsoftheCEQframeworktomiddleandlowincomecountries:Argen9na,China,Colombia,ElSalvador,Iran,Tunisia,andUganda

§  Simula9onsofpolicyreformsforGhanaandTanzania

§  Cross-countryanalysisPartIII

§  IncludestheMasterWorkbookofResultswhichhousesdetailedbackgroundinforma9onandresultsfromtheCEQanalysisusedasinputsforpolicydiscussions,academicpapersandpolicyreports.

§  Containsuser-wriNensokwaretocompletetheMasterWorkbookofResults.

§  Guidelinesfortheimplementa9onofCEQAssessments,includingathoroughprotocolofqualitycontrol.

Handbook chapters covered today …

Chapter3-Alloca9ngTaxesandTransfers,Construc9ngIncomeConcepts,andComple9ngSec9onCofCEQMasterWorkbook(SeanHigginsandNoraLus9g)

Chapter4-Construc9ngConsumableIncomewithIndirectEffectsofIndirectTaxesandSubsidies(GabrielaInchausteandJonJellema)

Chapter5-ProducingIndicatorsandResults,andComple9ngSec9onsDandEofCEQMasterWorkbook(SeanHigginsandNoraLus9g)

Chapter6-Analy9calFounda9ons:MeasuringtheRedistribu9veImpactofTaxesandTransfers(AliEnami,NoraLus9gandRodrigoAranda)

Chapter14-MeasuringtheEffec9venessofTaxesandTransfersinFigh9ngPovertyandReducingInequalityinIran(AliEnami)

hNps://goo.gl/ZWG9uW

CEQ Assessment: Method

•  Comprehensivestandardfiscalincidenceanalysisofcurrentsystems•  Harmonizeddefini9onsandmethodologicalapproachestofacilitatecross-countrycomparisons•  Usesincome/consump9onpercapitaasthewelfareindicator•  Allocatorsvary=>fulltransparencyinthemethodusedforeachcategory,taxshikingassump9ons,taxevasion•  Secondarysourcesareusedtoaminimum

17

CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Incidence Analysis

Yh=Ih-∑iTiSih+∑jBjSjh

18

IncomeaXertaxes

andtransfers

Incomebeforetaxesandtransfers

Taxes Transfers

Shareoftaxipaidbyunit

h

Shareoftransferj

receivedbyunith

CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Interven3ons

•  Currentlyincluded:•  Directtaxes(mainlypersonalincometaxandpayrolltaxes)•  Directcashtransfers•  Non-cashdirecttransferssuchasschooluniformsandbreakfast

•  Contribu9onstopensionsandsocialinsurancesystems•  Indirecttaxesonconsump9on•  Indirectsubsidies•  In-kindtransferssuchasspendingoneduca9onandhealth

• Workingon:•  Corporatetaxes

19

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

CONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQ Assessment:IncomeConcepts

20

HigginsandLus9g.“AAlloca9ngTaxesandTransfers,Construc9ng Income Concepts, and Comple9ngSec9on C of CEQ Master Workbook” in Lus9g(editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guideto Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy onInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversity,Fall2016.

Fiscal Incidence in CEQ Assessments

§ Accoun9ngapproach•  nobehavioralresponses•  nogeneralequilibriumeffectsand•  nointertemporaleffects•  butitincorporatesassump9onstoobtaineconomicincidence(notstatutory)

§ Point-in-9me§ Mainlyaverageincidence;afewcaseswithmarginalincidence

21

Alloca3on Methods

§ DirectIden9fica9oninmicrodata§ However,resultsmustbechecked:howrealis9carethey?

§  Ifinforma9onnotdirectlyavailableinmicrodata,then:§  Simula9on§  Imputa9on§  Inference§ Predic9on§ Alternatesurvey§  Secondarysources

22

Tax Shi]ing Assump3ons

•  Economicburdenofdirectpersonalincometaxesisbornebytherecipientofincome

•  Burdenofpayrollandsocialsecuritytaxesisassumedtofallen9relyonworkers

•  Consump9ontaxesareassumedtobeshikedforwardtoconsumers.

•  Theseassump9onsarestrongbecausetheyimplythatlaborsupplyisperfectlyinelas9candthatconsumershaveperfectlyinelas9cdemand

•  Inprac9ce,theyprovideareasonableapproxima9on(withimportantexcep9onssuchaswhenexaminingeffectofVATreforms),andtheyarecommonlyused

23

Tax Evasion Assump3ons: Case Specific

§  Incometaxesandcontribu9onstoSS:§  Individualswhodonotpar9cipateinthe

contributorysocialsecuritysystemareassumednottopaythem

§ Consump9ontaxes

§  Placeofpurchase:informalmarketsareassumednottochargethem

§  Somecountryteamsassumedsmalltownsinruralareasdonottopaythem

24

Mone3zing in-kind transfers

§  Incidenceofpublicspendingoneduca9onandhealthfollowedso-called“benefitorexpenditureincidence”orthe“governmentcost”approach.

§  Inessence,weuseperbeneficiaryinputcostsobtainedfromadministra9vedata(andscalethemdown)asthemeasureofaveragebenefits.

§  Thisapproachamountstoaskingthefollowingques9on:Ø  Howmuchwouldtheincomeofahouseholdhaveto

beincreasedifithadtopayforthefreeorsubsidizedpublicserviceatthefullcosttothegovernment?

25

Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions

•  DeferredIncome?

•  GovernmentTransfer?

26

Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Deferred Income

•  In“actuarially”fairsystems:•  Contribu9onsarenotataxbutareaformofforcedsavings•  Pensionsarenottransfersbutdeferredincome•  However,thereusuallyisredistribu9onwithinthesystemfrom:•  Highearnerstolowearners•  Fromworkerswhocontributebutdon’treachtherequiredminimumofyearsasac9vecontributorstoworkerswhodo

Ø Verydifficulttomeasurewithinforma9onintypicalhouseholdsurveys

27

Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Pensions are part of labor contract

•  Insystemswherepensionsofpublicsectoremployeesarepartofthelaborcontractinacompe99vemarket:•  Contribu9onsarenotataxbutforcedsavings•  Pensionsarenottransfersbutdeferredincome,regardlessofwhetherthesystemisactuariallyfairornotbecausepensionsoverandabovethecapitalizedcontribu9onsarepartofremunera9ons

•  Heretherealsomightbesomeredistribu9onwithinthesystemfrom:•  Highearnerstolowearners•  Fromworkerswhocontributebutdon’treachtherequiredminimumofyearsasac9vecontributorstoworkerswhodo

Ø Verydifficulttomeasurewithinforma9onintypicalhouseholdsurveys

28

Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Transfer

•  Insystemsthatarenotactuariallyfair:•  Contribu9onsareatax•  Pensionsaretransfers•  Thereisredistribu9onwithinthesystemfrom:

•  Highearnerstolowearners•  Fromworkerswhocontributebutdon’treachtherequiredminimumofyearsinthelaborforcetoworkerswhodo

•  ANDfromtaxpayersingeneraltothepensioners

29

Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Transfer

However,whatisthesizeofthe“subsidy”?•  Correct/ideal:Thedifferencebetweenwhatpeoplewouldhavereceivedbasedoncontribu9onsandwhattheyactuallyreceiveØ Householdsurveysdonotusuallyhavetheinforma9ontocalculatethis

•  Inprac9ce:incomefromcontributorypensionsaretreatedasagovernmenttransfer

•  Amorerealis9calterna9ve:considerthedeficitoftheSocialSecuritysystemasthesizeofthesubsidyandallocateittoindividualsbasedonthedistribu9onofpensionincome

Ø  Deficitsthatarepartoftransi9onfromonesystemtoanotherwillexaggeratetheimpact 30

Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions in CEQ:

Twoextremescenarios:• Deferredincomeinactuariallyfairsystems:pensionsincludedinpre-fiscalincomeandcontribu9onstreatedasmandatorysavings

• Governmenttransfer:pensionsincludedamongdirecttransfersandcontribu9onstreatedasadirecttax

31Lus9g&Higgins(2013)

Scenarios and Robustness Checks

§ Benchmarkscenario§  Sensi9vityto:•  Changingtheoriginalincomebywhichhhareranked:e.g.,marketincomepluscontributorypensionsanddisposableincome•  Usingconsump9onvs.income•  Percapitavs.equivalizedincomeorconsump9on•  Differentassump9onsonscaling-downorup•  Differentassump9onsontake-upoftransfersandtaxshikingandevasion•  Alterna9vevalua9onsofin-kindservices•  Othersensi9vityscenarios:country-specific

32Lus9g&Higgins(2013)

CEQ Assessments A Glance at Results

Lus3g. “Fiscal Redistribu3on in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Chapter 8 in Lus3g (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.

Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income) 1.Argen&na(2012-13;I):Rossignolo,D.2016.“Taxes,Expenditures,PovertyandIncomeDistribu9oninArgen9na.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.45,CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.(forthcoming).

Rossignolo,D.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Argen9na,February29.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

2.Armenia(2011;I):Younger,StephenD.,andArtsviKhachatryan.forthcoming.“FiscalIncidenceinArmenia,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Younger,S.andA.Khachatryan.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Armenia,May31.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

3.Bolivia(2009;I):PazArauco,Verónica,GeorgeGrayMolina,WilsonJiménezPozo,andErnestoYáñezAguilar.2014.“ExplainingLowRedistribu9veImpactinBolivia.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September22,2014).

PazArauco,V.,G.Gray-Molina,W.JimenezandE.Yañez.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Bolivia,September22,CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

4.Brazil(2008-09;I):Higgins,SeanandClaudineyPereira.2014.“TheEffectsofBrazil’sTaxa9onandSocialSpendingontheDistribu9onofHouseholdIncome.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(November4,2014).

Higgins,S.andC.Pereira.2016CEQMasterWorkbook:Brazil,January4.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

5.Chile(2013,I):Marynez-Aguilar,S.,A.FuchsandE.Or9z-Juarez.2016.“TheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPovertyinChile.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.46,CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandWorldBank.(forthcoming).

Marynez-Aguilar,S.andE.Or9z-Juarez.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Chile,inprogress.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandWorldBank.

6.Colombia(2010,I):Lus9g,NoraandMarcelaMelendez.2015.“TheImpactofTaxesandTransfersonInequalityandPovertyinColombia”.CEQWorkingPaperNo24,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.Forthcoming.

Melendez,M.andV.Marynez.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Colombia,December17.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank.

35

Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income) 7.CostaRica(2010;I):Sauma,JuanandDiegoTrejos.2014.“Socialpublicspending,taxes,redistribu9onofincome,andpovertyinCostaRica.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.18,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.

Sauma,P.andJ.D.Trejos.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:CostaRica,February.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

8.DominicanRepublic(2006-07,I):Aristy-Escuder,J.,M.Cabrera,B.Moreno-DodsonandM.E.Sánchez-Maryn.2016.“Fiscalpolicyandredistribu9onintheDominicanRepublic.”CEQWorkingPaperNo37,CEQIns9tute.(forthcoming).Note:budgetarydatawasfor2013.

Aristy-Escuder,J.,M.Cabrera,B.Moreno-DodsonandM.E.Sánchez-Maryn.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:DominicanRepublic,May10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

9.Ecuador(2011-12,I):LlerenaPinto,FreddyPaul,MaríaChris9naLlerenaPinto,RobertoCarlosSaáDaza,andMaríaAndreaLlerenaPinto.“SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistribu9oninEcuador.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.28,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.

Llerena,F.,M.C.Llerena,M.A.LlerenaandR.Saá.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Ecuador,November7.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

10.ElSalvador(2011;I):Beneke,M.andJ.A.Oliva.2015.CEQMasterWorbook:Elsalvador,July10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandIns9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

11.Ethiopia(2011;C):Hill,Ruth,GabrielaInchauste,NoraLus9g,EyasuTsehayeandTassewWoldehanna.forthcoming.“AFiscalIncidenceAnalysisforEthiopia,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Hill,R.,E.TsehayeandT.Woldehanna.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Ethiopia,September28.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

36

Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income) 12.EuropeanUnion(2011,I):EUROMODsta9s9csonDistribu9onandDecomposi9onofDisposableIncome,accessedathNp://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/sta9s9cs/usingEUROMODversionno.G2.0.

13.Georgia(2013;I):Cancho,CesarandElenaBondarenko.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinGeorgia,"in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Cancho,C.andE.Bondarenko.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Georgia,December31.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

14.Ghana(2012-13;C):Younger,S.,E.Osei-AssibeyandF.Oppong.2015.“FiscalIncidenceinGhana.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.35,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversity,IthacaCollege,UniversityofGhanaandWorldBank.

Younger,S.,E.Osei-AssibeyandF.Oppong.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Ghana,February10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

15.Guatemala(2011;I):Cabrera,MandH.E.Morán.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Guatemala,May6.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity,Ins9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

16.Honduras(2011;I):Castañeda,R.andI.Espino.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Honduras,August18.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity,Ins9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

Castañeda,R.andI.Espino.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Honduras,August18.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity,Ins9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.

17.Indonesia(2012;C):A|ar,Rythia,JonJellema,andMathewWai-Poi.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinIndonesia,”in:Inchauste,GabrielaandNoraLus9g(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Jellema,J.,M.Wai_PoiandR.A|ar.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Indonesia,February26.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

37

Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income)

18.Jordan(2010-11;C):Alam,ShammaA.,GabrielaInchauste,andUmarSerajuddin.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinJordan,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).

Abdel-Halim,M.,S.AdeebAlam,Y.Mansur,U.SerajuddinandP.Verme.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Jordan,March8.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

19.Mexico(2010;C&I):ScoN,John.2014.“Redistribu9veImpactandEfficiencyofMexico’sFiscalSystem.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September2013).

ScoN,J.2013.CEQMasterWorkbook:Mexico,September2.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

20.Peru(2009;I):Jaramillo,Miguel.2014.“TheIncidenceofSocialSpendingandTaxesinPeru.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(May1,2013).

Jaramillo,M.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Peru,August7.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

21.Russia(2010;I):Lopez-Calva,LuisF.,NoraLus9g,MikhailMatytsin,andDariaPopova.forthcoming.“WhoBenefitsfromFiscalRedistribu9oninRussia?,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Malytsin,M.andD.Popova.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Russia,March17.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

38

Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income)

22.SouthAfrica(2010-11;I):Inchauste,Gabriela,NoraLus9g,MashekwaMaboshe,CatrionaPurfieldandIngridWollard.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinSouthAfrica,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Inchauste,G.,N.Lus9g,M.Maboshe,C.Purfield,I.WoolardandP.Zikhali.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:SouthAfrica,March6.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

23.SriLanka(2010;C):Aruna9lake,Nisha,GabrielaInchausteandNoraLus9g.forthcoming.“TheIncidenceofTaxesandSpendinginSriLanka,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).

Aruna9lake,N.,C.Gomez,N.PereraandK.ANygalle.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:SriLanka,March10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.

24.Tanzania(2011-12;C):Younger,Stephen,FloraMyamba,andKennethMdadila.2016.“FiscalIncidenceinTanzania.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.36,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversity,IthacaCollegeandREPOA.

Younger,S.,F.Myamba,andK.Mdadila.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Tanzania,June1st.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

25.Tunisia(2010,C):Shimeles,Abebe,AhmedMoummi,NizarJouiniandNoraLus9g.2016.“FiscalIncidenceandPovertyReduc9on:EvidencefromTunisia,”CEQWorkingPaperNo.38,CommitmenttoEquityIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.(forthcoming).

Shimeles,A.,A.Moummi,N.JouiniandN.Lus9g.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Tunisia,October1.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandAfricanDevelopmentBank.

26.UnitedStates(2011,I):Higgins,Sean,NoraLus9g,WhitneyRubleandTimothySmeeding(2015),“ComparingtheIncidenceofTaxesandSocialSpendinginBrazilandtheUnitedStates”,ReviewofIncomeandWealth,forthcoming.

27.Uruguay(2009;I):Bucheli,Marisa,NoraLus9g,MáximoRossi,andFlorenciaAmábile.2014.“SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistribu9oninUruguay.”In:Lus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(August18,2014)

Bucheli,M.,N.Lus9g,M.RossiandF.Amábile.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Uruguay,August18.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.

39

Household surveys by country, year

1.   Argen&na(2012-13;I):EncuestaNacionaldeGastodelosHogares2012-2013

2.   Armenia(2011;I):IntegratedLivingCondi9onsSurvey2011

3.   Bolivia(2009;I):EncuestadeHogares2009

4.   Brazil(2008-09;I):PesquisadeOrçamentosFamiliares2008-2009

5.   Chile(2013,I):EncuestadeCaracterizaciónSocial2013

6.   Colombia(2010,I):EncuestaNacionaldeCalidaddeVida2010

7.   CostaRica(2010;I):EncuestaNacionaldeHogares2010

8.   DominicanRepublic(2006-07;I):EncuestaNacionaldeIngresosyGastosdeLosHogares2006-2007

9.   Ecuador(2011-12,I):EncuestaNacionaldeIngresosyGastosdelosHogaresUrbanoyRural,2011-2012

10.   ElSalvador(2011;I):EncuestadeHogaresDePropositosMul9ples2011

11.   EuropeanUnion:seeEUROMODsta9s9csonDistribu9onandDecomposi9onofDisposableIncome, hNp://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/sta9s9cs

12.   Ethiopia(2010-11;C):HouseholdConsump9onExpeditureSurvey2010-2011andWelfareMonitoringSurvey2011G

13.   Georgia(2013;I):IntegratedHouseholdSurvey2013

14.   Ghana(2012-13;C):LivingStandardsSurvey2012-2013

15.   Guatemala(2011;I):EncuestaNacionaldeCondicionesdeVida2011

Note:TheleNers"I"and"C"indicatethatthestudyusedincomeorconsump9ondata,respec9vely.

40

Household surveys by country, year

16.   Honduras(2011;I):EncuestaPermanentedeHogaresdePropósitosMúl9ples2011

17.   Indonesia(2012;C):SurveiSosial-EkonomiNasional2012

18.   Jordan(2010-11;C):HouseholdExpenditureandIncomeSurvey2010-2011

19.   Mexico(2010;C&I):EncuestaNacionaldeIngresoyGastodelosHogares2010

20.   Peru(2009;I):EncuestaNacionaldeHogares2009

21.   Russia(2010;I):RussianLongitudinalMonitoringSurveyofHigherSchoolofEconomics2010

22.   SouthAfrica(2010-11;I):IncomeandExpenditureSurvey2010-2011

23.   SriLanka(2009-10;C):HouseholdIncomeandExpenditureSurvey2009-2010

24.   Tanzania(2011-12;C):HouseholdBudgetSurvey2011-2012

25.   Tunisia(2010;C):Na9onalSurveyofConsump9onandHouseholdLivingStandards2010

26.   UnitedStates(2011,I):CurrentPopula9onSurvey2011

27.   Uruguay(2009;I):EncuestaCon9nuadeHogares2009

Note:TheleNers"I"and"C"indicatethatthestudyusedincomeorconsump9ondata,respec9vely.

41

•  Empiricalresultsfor25(ofwhich10fromCEQ-WBprojects)countriesbasedonfiscalincidencestudiesfromtheCommitmenttoEquityIns9tuteforaround2010•  Twolow-incomecountries:Ethiopia(Hilletal.,2016)andTanzania(Youngeretal.,2016)

•  Ninelowermiddle-incomecountries:Armenia(YoungerandKhachatryan,2016),Bolivia(Paz-Araucoetal.,2014),ElSalvador(Beneke,Lus9gandOliva,2014),Georgia(CanchoandBondarenko,2016),Ghana(Youngeretal.,2015),Guatemala(Cabrera,Lus9gandMoran,2015),Honduras(CastañedaandEspino,2015),Indonesia(A|aretal.,2016),andSriLanka(Aruna9lakeetal.,2016)

•  Elevenuppermiddle-incomecountries:Brazil(HigginsandPereira,2014),Colombia(Lus9gandMelendez,2016),CostaRica(SaumaandTrejos,2014),DominicanRepublic(Aristy-Escuderetal.,2016),Ecuador(Llerenaetal.,2015),Jordan(Alametal.,2016),Mexico(ScoN,2014),Peru(Jaramillo,2014),Russia(Lopez-Calvaetal.,2016),SouthAfrica(Inchausteetal.,2016),andTunisia(Shimelesetal.,2016)

•  Twohigh-incomecountries:Chile(Mar9nez-Aguilaretal.,2016),andUruguay(Buchelietal.,2014).

•  Oneunclassified:Argen&na(Rossignolo,2016)

42

Forthecurrent2017fiscalyear,low-incomeeconomiesaredefinedasthosewithaGNIpercapita,calculatedusingtheWorldBankAtlasmethod,of$1,025orlessin2015;lowermiddle-incomeeconomiesarethosewithaGNIpercapitabetween$1,026and$4,035;uppermiddle-incomeeconomiesarethosewithaGNIpercapitabetween$4,036and$12,475;high-incomeeconomiesarethosewithaGNIpercapitaof$12,476ormore.(onsultedonJuly13,2016)

FISCALREDISTRIBUTION

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

CONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQ Assessment:IncomeConcepts

44

HigginsandLus9g.“AAlloca9ngTaxesandTransfers,Construc9ng Income Concepts, and Comple9ngSec9on C of CEQ Master Workbook” in Lus9g(editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guideto Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy onInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversity,Fall2016.

Inequality

46

0.25

0.35

0.45

0.55

0.65

0.75

0.85

Marketincomepluspensions Disposableincome Consumableincome Finalincome

GiniCoefficient

Argen&na(2012) Armenia(2011) Bolivia(2009)Brazil(2009) Chile(2013) Colombia(2010)CostaRica(2010) DominicanRepublic(2013) Ecuador(2011)ElSalvador(2011) Ethiopia(2011) Georgia(2013)Ghana(2013) Guatemala(2011) Honduras(2011)Indonesia(2012) Jordan(2010) Mexico(2010)Peru(2009) Russia(2010) SouthAfrica(2010)SriLanka(2010) Tanzania(2011) Tunisia(2010)Uruguay(2009)

Marketincome(pluscontributorypensions)

Disposableincome Consumableincome

Finalincome

Fiscal Policy and Inequality – Contributory pensions as deferred income

Source:Lus9g(2016)

Redistribu3ve effect (Change in Gini points: market income plus pensions and market income to disposable income, circa 2010)

47Source:Lus9g(2016)

0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.800.90

-0.20-0.18-0.16-0.14-0.12-0.10-0.08-0.06-0.04-0.020.00

Red

istribu&

veeffe

ct-m

arketincom

etodispo

sable

(rankedbyredistribu&veeffect(leXhandscale);Ginicoefficientsrighthandscale)

Contributorypensionsasdeferredincome Contributorypensionsasdirecttransfer

Ginimarketincomepluspensions Ginimarketincome

More social spending, more redistribu3on

48Source:Lus9g(2016)

ARG

ARM BOL

BRA

CHLCOL

CRI

DOMECU

SLV

GHAGTM HND

IND JOR

MEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZA

TUN

URYy=0.9253x***-0.0287*

(7.05)(-1.99)R²=0.6933

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

0.20

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

Redistrib

u&veeffe

ct

Socialspending

ETH

49

More unequal, more redistribu3on Consistent with Meltzer-Richard Median Voter Theorem - No “Robin Hood Paradox”

Source:Lus9g(2016)

ARG

ARM

BOL

BRACHI

COL

CRIDOMECU

SLVETH

GEO

GHA GTM

HNDINDJOR

MEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZATUN

URY

y=0.0952x*-0.0184(1.76)(-0.70)

R²=0.1183

0.00

0.04

0.08

0.12

0.16

0.20

0.20 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.80

Red

istribu&

veeffe

ct

Ginimarketincomepluspensions

In sum…

•  InNOcountry,inequalityincreasesasaresultoftaxes,subsidiesandsocialspending

Ø Fiscalpolicyisalwaysequalizing

Ø Themoreunequal,themorefiscalredistribu9on

50

Poverty

•  Fiscalpolicycanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing(intermsofthepoor’sabilitytoconsumeprivategoodsandservices):Ø 1.25/dayline:Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Tanzania

Ø 2.50/dayline:Armenia,Bolivia,Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Honduras,SriLanka,Tanzania

Ø 4/dayline:alloftheaboveplusArgen9na,Brazil,CostaRicaandTunisia

•  Thisworrisomeresultstemsmainlyfromconsump9ontaxes

52

53Source:Lus9g(2016)

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduc3on (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line $1.25 / day

2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)

-0.2%-1.7%-3.3%-8.3%-10.3%-11.5%-16.1%-16.5%-18.0%-18.5%

-24.9%-31.8%-33.9%-34.6%

-44.9%-45.5%-45.9%-50.6%-56.4%

-69.6%-69.8%-70.7%

-88.2%-97.0%

-36.2%

17.8%13.3%

4.2%2.4%

-12.7%

-8.8%-2.3%

-14.1%-14.1%

-24.6%

-7.5%-15.7%

-35.0%

-53.8%

-37.8%

-22.7%

-53.8%

-36.2%-42.7%

-76.4%

-66.2%

-54.2%

-82.0%-82.6%

-29.4%

-120%

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

(rankedbypovertyreduc&onin%;povertyline$1.252005PPP/day)

Market income plus pensions to disposable income Market income plus pensions to consumable income

54Source:Lus9g(2016)

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduc3on (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line $2.50 / day

2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)

1.5% 1.1% 0.9%

-1.0%-1.8%-2.8%-3.3%-6.5%

-7.0%-7.3%-7.7%-8.3%-10.1%-10.4%-14.9%

-21.4%-22.0%-24.0%-27.8%-28.5%

-35.9%-40.6%

-58.4%-61.0%

-71.4%

-18.7%

9.1%5.7% 3.1%

-2.9%

1.1%5.5%

0.5%

-0.2%

-9.0%-4.4%

11.4%

-25.2%

-0.8%

3.3%

-15.1%-10.6%

-4.7%

-34.8%

-22.2%

-35.1%-29.1%

-23.3%

-51.8%

-35.4%

-51.1%

-12.6%

-80%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%(rankedbypovertyreduc&onin%;povertyline$2.502005PPP/day)

Marketincomepluspensionstodisposableincome Marketincomepluspensionstoconsumableincome

55Source:Lus9g(2016)

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduc3on (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line $4.00 / day

2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)

4.3%2.0%1.0%0.7%0.4%

-0.1%-0.2%-0.4%

-1.7%-2.1%-2.7%-2.7%-2.9%-4.7%-5.6%-6.2%

-8.0%-8.5%

-12.9%-13.9%

-26.8%

-41.0%-41.2%-42.0%

-9.0%

0.0%2.7%6.6%

2.8%

13.7%

1.0%1.9%

-0.8%

4.1% 4.9%

-2.3%

3.8%0.4%1.9%

-8.4%

4.4%

-3.5%-0.3%

8.1%

-15.6%

2.8%

-12.5%

1.6%

-24.2%-21.8%

-1.2%

0.0%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%(rankedbypovertyreduc&onin%;povertyline$4.002005PPP/day)

Marketincomepluspensionstodisposableincome Marketincomepluspensionstoconsumableincome

Analyzingtheimpactontradi9onalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleading

Ø Fiscalsystemscanshowareduc9oninpovertyandyetasubstan9alshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers

56

HigginsandLus9g(2016)Canapoverty-reducingandprogressivetaxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor?JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75,2016

57

HigginsandLus9g.2016.Canapovertyreducingandprogressivetaxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor?JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75,2016

Fiscal Impoverishment (Market to Consumable Income)

58HigginsandLus9g(2016)

Country(surveyyear)

Marketincomeplus

pensionsPoverty

headcount(%)

Changeinpovertyheadcoun

t(p.p.)

Market

incomepluspensionsinequality(Gini)

Reynolds-Smolensky

Changeininequality(▲Gini)

Fiscally

impoverishedas%of

popula&on

Fiscally

Impoverishedas%

ofconsumableincomepoor

PanelA:Upper-middleincomecountries,usingapovertylineof$2.52005PPPperday

Brazil(2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9

Chile(2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2

Ecuador(2011) 10.8 -3.8 47.8 3.5 -3.3 0.2 3.2

Mexico(2012) 13.3 -1.2 54.4 3.8 -2.5 4.0 32.7

Peru(2011) 13.8 -0.2 45.9 0.9 -0.8 3.2 23.8

Russia(2010) 4.3 -1.3 39.7 3.9 -2.6 1.1 34.4

SouthAfrica(2010) 49.3 -5.2 77.1 8.3 -7.7 5.9 13.3

Tunisia(2010) 7.8 -0.1 44.7 8.0 -6.9 3.0 38.5

Brazil(2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9

Chile(2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2

Country(surveyyear)

Marketincomeplus

pensionsPoverty

headcount(%)

Changeinpovertyheadcoun

t(p.p.)

Marketincomeplus

pensionsinequality(Gini)

Reynolds-Smolensky

Changeininequality(▲Gini)

Fiscally

impoverishedas%of

popula&on

Fiscally

Impoverishedas%

ofconsumableincomepoor

PanelB:Lower-middleincomecountries,usingapovertylineof$1.252005PPPperday

Armenia(2011) 21.4 -9.6 47.4 12.9 -9.3 6.2 52.3

Bolivia(2009) 10.9 -0.5 50.3 0.6 -0.3 6.6 63.2

DominicanRepublic(2013) 6.8 -0.9 50.2 2.2 -2.2 1.0 16.3

ElSalvador(2011) 4.3 -0.7 44.0 2.2 -2.1 1.0 27.0

Ethiopia(2011) 31.9 2.3 32.2 2.3 -2.0 28.5 83.2

Ghana(2013) 6.0 0.7 43.7 1.6 -1.4 5.1 76.6

Guatemala(2010) 12.0 -0.8 49.0 1.4 -1.2 7.0 62.2

Indonesia(2012) 12.0 -1.5 39.8 1.1 -0.8 4.1 39.2

SriLanka(2010) 5.0 -0.7 37.1 1.3 -1.1 1.6 36.4

Tanzania(2011) 43.7 7.9 38.2 4.1 -3.8 50.9 98.6

59

Fiscal Impoverishment (Market to Consumable Income)

HigginsandLus9g(2016)

•  Fikeenoftheeighteencountrieswithareduc9oninpovertyandinequalityduetothetaxandtransfersystemexperiencedvariousdegreesoffiscalimpoverishment.•  Intencountries—Armenia,Bolivia,Brazil,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,SriLanka,andTunisia—betweenone-quarterandtwo-thirdsofthepost-fiscpoorlostincometothefiscalsystem.•  Inthethreecountrieswheretheheadcountra9orose(Ethiopia,GhanaandTanzania),thepropor9onofthepoorwhowereimpoverishedbythefiscalsystemisstaggering(above75%).•  InArmenia,Ethiopia,Indonesia,Tunisia,andRussia,between25%and50%ares9llfiscallyimpoverishedwhenthemone9zedvalueofeduca9onandhealthservicesareincludedastransfers

60

Lus9g.2016.“TheSDG’s,Domes9cResourceMobiliza9onandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMee9ng:“Strategiesforeradica9ngpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”BackgroundpaperforWorldDevelopmentReport2017GovernanceandtheLaw,June

Ø Extremecaremustbetakenwithemphasizingdomes9cresourcemobiliza9ontoachieveSDGs

Ø Mustassesstheimpactonthepooroftaxandsubsidyreforms,otherwiseonemaybetakingawayfromthepoormorethanistransferredtothem

Ø Impactonthepoorofincreasingtaxesrequirestheuseofadequateindicators;conven9onalmeasuresofinequalityandpovertycanbeawfullymisleading

Ø FiscalImpoverishmentIndexfulfillsalltherequirementstoobtainanaccurateassessmentoftheimpactoffiscalchangesonthepoor

61

Lus9g.2016.“TheSDG’s,Domes9cResourceMobiliza9onandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMee9ng:“Strategiesforeradica9ngpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”BackgroundpaperforWorldDevelopmentReport2017GovernanceandtheLaw,June

Main messages

1.  Analyzingthetaxsidewithoutthespendingside,orviceversa,canbemisleading

Ø Taxescanbeunequalizingbutspendingsoequalizingthattheunequalizingeffectoftaxesismorethancompensated

Ø Taxescanberegressivebutwhencombinedwithtransfersmakethesystemmoreequalizingthanwithouttheregressivetaxes

Ø Transferscanbeequalizingbutwhencombinedwithtaxes,post-fiscpovertycanbehigher

62

Main messages

2.  Analyzingtheimpactoninequalityonlycanbemisleading

Ø Fiscalsystemscanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing

63

Main messages

3.  Analyzingtheimpactontradi9onalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleading

Ø Fiscalsystemscanshowareduc9oninpovertyandyetasubstan9alshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers

64

How pro-poor is spending on educa3on

and health

Classifica3on •  Pro-poorandequalizing,percapitaspending

declineswithincome

•  Neutralinabsolutetermsandequalizing,samepercapitaforall

•  Equalizingbutnotpro-poor,percapitaspendingasashareofmarketincomedeclineswithincome

•  Unequalizing,percapitaspendingasashareofmarketincomeincreaseswithincome

Main results

Educa9onspendingonprimaryandsecondaryschoolingperpersontendstobepro-poororneutralinabsoluteterms…...withtheexcep9onofEthiopiawhere,althoughequalizing,percapitaspendingonsecondaryeduca9onincreaseswithincome

Ø Aremiddle-classesop9ngoutinmiddleandhighincomecountries?

Ter9aryeduca9onspendingisnotpro-poorbutitisequalizing(surprised?)exceptforEthiopia,Ghana,GuatemalaandTanzania,whereitisunequalizing

67Source:Lus9g(2016)

Main results

Healthspendingperpersontendstobepro-poororneutralinabsoluteterms…….exceptforElSalvador,Ethiopia,Guatemala,Indonesia,PeruandTanzaniawherealthoughnotunequalizingpercapitaspendingincreaseswithincome….…andforJordan,wheregovernmentspendingonhealthisunequalizing.

68Source:Lus9g(2016)

In conclusion…

•  FiscalsystemsarealwaysequalizingbutcanokenreducethepurchasingpowerofthepoorØ Warning:unintendedconsequenceofthedomes9cresourcemobiliza9onagendacanbemakingthepoorworseoff

•  Spendingoneduca9onandhealthisokenpro-poorandalmostuniversallyequalizingØ Warning:isthisfavorableresultbecausemiddle-classesandtherichareop9ngout?

•  ReassuringresultsØ Redistribu9veeffectincreaseswithsocialspendingØ SocialspendingasashareofGDPincreaseswithinequalityØ Themoreunequal,themoreredistribu9on

PARTNERSHIPS&COLLABORATION

CEQ Ins3tute can offer

Prepara&onofCEQAssessmentsinfullorcomponentsQualitycontrolofCEQAssessmentsTrainingworkshopsAdvisoryservicesforstaffandgovernments=>Cost-sharingarrangementsvarydependingonthecontribu&onsofpartneringorganiza&on

71

CEQ Ins3tute can offer

DetailedresultsonCEQAssessments

-TheMasterWorkbook(MWB)ofresultsbycountryforcountriesinwhichthepartneringorganiza9onhasnotpar9cipated

=>ForWB,thenumberiscloseto30countries:Argen9na,Bolivia,Brazil,China,Colombia,CostaRica,Ecuador,Egypt,ElSalvador(update),Ghana,Guatemala,Honduras,India,Iran,IvoryCoast,Mexico,Mozambique,Nicaragua,Panama,Peru,Tanzania,Togo,Tunisia,Uganda,Uruguay,Venezuela,andZambia

-Cross-countryMasterdatawhichservestocompareresultswithpeersandothers(CEQMasterdatacurrentlyhasresultsfor28countries)

=>Inexchange,thepartneringorganiza9oncontributestotheCEQDataCenterbysharingMWBoncountriesinwhichCEQIns9tutedidnotpar9cipate

72

Thankyou!

73