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Day 1 - Session 1 Introduc3on to CEQ
A Primer Nora Lus3g
Tulane University, CGD, IAD
LearningEventontheCommitmenttoEquityMethodology
CEQIns9tuteandTheWorldBankWashington,DCJuly11-13,2016
Learning Event
• Day1:• MethodologytoproduceaCEQAssessment• Illustra9onwithcountryresults• MasterWorkbook
• Days2:• Statasessions
• Day3:• Statasessions• Checkingprotocol
hNps://goo.gl/ZWG9uW
Day 1 - Session 1: Outline
• CommitmenttoEquityIns9tute:scopeofwork• CEQAssessment:methodologicalhighlights• CEQAssessments:aglanceatresults• CEQIns9tuteServices&Partnerships
4
CEQ Ins3tute
Commitment to Equity Ins3tute (CEQ Ins3tute)
Objec&ve:Tomeasuretheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertyincountriesacrosstheworld
• Research-basedpolicytools• CEQDataCenteronFiscalRedistribu9on• CEQAdvisoryandTrainingServices• BridgestoPolicy
Ø TwograntsfromBill&MelindaGatesFounda9onUS5.5millionfor2014-2020
Ø www.commitmentoequity.org6
CEQ Ins3tute: Core Staff
• Director:NoraLus9g• DirectorofPolicyArea:LudovicoFeoli• AssociateDirectors:MaynorCabrera,JonJellema,EstuardoMoranandStephenYounger• DataCenterDirector:SeanHiggins• Communica&onsDirector:CarlosMar9ndelCampo• ResearchAssociates:RodrigoAranda,KorayCaglayan,EnriquedelaRosa,AliEnami
Inaddi9on:• AdvisoryBoard• NonresidentResearchAssociates(morethan40worldwide)
7
Commitment to Equity Ins3tute
• Workingoncloseto40countries;coversaroundtwothirdsoftheworldpopula9on• Collabora9veeffortsandpartnershipswithmul9pleorganiza9ons:ADB,AfDB,CAF,ERF,IDB,IMF,ICEFI,OECD,Oxfam,UNDP,WorldBank• U9lizedbygovernments• Publica9ons:Handbook,WorkingPaperseries,scholarlypublica9onsinpeer-reviewedjournals,bookchapters,editedvolume(inprogress),blogsandpolicybriefs• Websitewww.commitmentoequity.org
8
9www.commitmentoequity.org
**CEQ Assessment**
CEQ Assessment: Tools § CEQHandbook2016:Lus9g,Nora,editor.CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEs6ma6ngtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.TulaneUniversity.Fall2016.
Astep-by-stepguidetoapplyingincidenceanalysistoassesstheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertywithcountrystudiestoillustrate.
§ MasterWorkbook(MWB)
Excelspreadsheetthathousesdetailedbackgroundinforma9onandresultsfromtheCEQanalysisusedasinputsforpolicydiscussions,academicpapersandpolicyreports.Itcontainsinternallinkstoproducesummarytablesautoma9cally.
§ CEQStataPackageAsuiteofuser-wriNenStatacommands(i.e.Adofiles)thatautomatestheproduc9onofresultsandinputstheseresultsdirectlyintheMasterWorkbook.Thissokwareinnova9onverysignificantlyreducestheprobabilityofcommilngerrorsinthe“copy-and-paste”processandsavesanenormousamountof9mecomparedtobefore.
§ CheckingProtocol11
CEQ Assessments & World Bank • CanbeusedinPovertyAssessmentsandPublicExpenditureReviews.• AssesshowmuchthefiscalsysteminspecificcountriesishelpingachievetheWB’stwingoalsofpovertyreduc9onandsharedprosperity.• GovernmentsareaNractedbytheideaofassessingthedistribu9onalimpactoftheirfiscalsystemand/orpolicyreforms.Helpsengagementanddialogue;openspossibilityofnewlendingprograms.• BoNomline:TheCEQAssessmentscanhelptheWBopera9onalizethepovertyreduc9onandsharedprosperitytalk.
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CEQ Assessment
Methodological Highlights
Nora Lus3g (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Es3ma3ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University, Fall 2016. Presentsastep-by-stepguidetoapplyingincidenceanalysistoassesstheimpactoffiscalpolicyoninequalityandpovertywithcountrystudiestoillustrate.
Thehandbookhasthreeparts.
PartI
§ PresentsthemethodologydevelopedbytheCommitmenttoEquity(CEQ)Ins9tuteatTulaneUniversity.Itexplainshowtaxes,subsidies,andsocialspendingshouldbeallocatedandsuggestses9ma9onprocedureswheninforma9onontaxesandtransfersisnotavailableinthehouseholdsurvey.
§ Describestheindicatorsthatareusedtoassessthedistribu9veimpactandeffec9venessoffiscalpolicy,anddiscussestheiranaly9calunderpinning.
§ Chapters2,3,4and5,inpar9cular,presentastep-bystepguidetocomple9ngtheMasterWorkbookofResults.
§ Chapters6and7discussthetheore9calunderpinningoffiscalredistribu9on.
Nora Lus3g (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University, Fall 2016. PartII§ Presentsapplica9onsoftheCEQframeworktomiddleandlowincomecountries:Argen9na,China,Colombia,ElSalvador,Iran,Tunisia,andUganda
§ Simula9onsofpolicyreformsforGhanaandTanzania
§ Cross-countryanalysisPartIII
§ IncludestheMasterWorkbookofResultswhichhousesdetailedbackgroundinforma9onandresultsfromtheCEQanalysisusedasinputsforpolicydiscussions,academicpapersandpolicyreports.
§ Containsuser-wriNensokwaretocompletetheMasterWorkbookofResults.
§ Guidelinesfortheimplementa9onofCEQAssessments,includingathoroughprotocolofqualitycontrol.
Handbook chapters covered today …
Chapter3-Alloca9ngTaxesandTransfers,Construc9ngIncomeConcepts,andComple9ngSec9onCofCEQMasterWorkbook(SeanHigginsandNoraLus9g)
Chapter4-Construc9ngConsumableIncomewithIndirectEffectsofIndirectTaxesandSubsidies(GabrielaInchausteandJonJellema)
Chapter5-ProducingIndicatorsandResults,andComple9ngSec9onsDandEofCEQMasterWorkbook(SeanHigginsandNoraLus9g)
Chapter6-Analy9calFounda9ons:MeasuringtheRedistribu9veImpactofTaxesandTransfers(AliEnami,NoraLus9gandRodrigoAranda)
Chapter14-MeasuringtheEffec9venessofTaxesandTransfersinFigh9ngPovertyandReducingInequalityinIran(AliEnami)
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CEQ Assessment: Method
• Comprehensivestandardfiscalincidenceanalysisofcurrentsystems• Harmonizeddefini9onsandmethodologicalapproachestofacilitatecross-countrycomparisons• Usesincome/consump9onpercapitaasthewelfareindicator• Allocatorsvary=>fulltransparencyinthemethodusedforeachcategory,taxshikingassump9ons,taxevasion• Secondarysourcesareusedtoaminimum
17
CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Incidence Analysis
Yh=Ih-∑iTiSih+∑jBjSjh
18
IncomeaXertaxes
andtransfers
Incomebeforetaxesandtransfers
Taxes Transfers
Shareoftaxipaidbyunit
h
Shareoftransferj
receivedbyunith
CEQ Assessment: Fiscal Interven3ons
• Currentlyincluded:• Directtaxes(mainlypersonalincometaxandpayrolltaxes)• Directcashtransfers• Non-cashdirecttransferssuchasschooluniformsandbreakfast
• Contribu9onstopensionsandsocialinsurancesystems• Indirecttaxesonconsump9on• Indirectsubsidies• In-kindtransferssuchasspendingoneduca9onandhealth
• Workingon:• Corporatetaxes
19
MARKETINCOME
DISPOSABLEINCOME
PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES
PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES
CONSUMABLEINCOME
PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH
FINALINCOME
CEQ Assessment:IncomeConcepts
20
HigginsandLus9g.“AAlloca9ngTaxesandTransfers,Construc9ng Income Concepts, and Comple9ngSec9on C of CEQ Master Workbook” in Lus9g(editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guideto Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy onInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversity,Fall2016.
Fiscal Incidence in CEQ Assessments
§ Accoun9ngapproach• nobehavioralresponses• nogeneralequilibriumeffectsand• nointertemporaleffects• butitincorporatesassump9onstoobtaineconomicincidence(notstatutory)
§ Point-in-9me§ Mainlyaverageincidence;afewcaseswithmarginalincidence
21
Alloca3on Methods
§ DirectIden9fica9oninmicrodata§ However,resultsmustbechecked:howrealis9carethey?
§ Ifinforma9onnotdirectlyavailableinmicrodata,then:§ Simula9on§ Imputa9on§ Inference§ Predic9on§ Alternatesurvey§ Secondarysources
22
Tax Shi]ing Assump3ons
• Economicburdenofdirectpersonalincometaxesisbornebytherecipientofincome
• Burdenofpayrollandsocialsecuritytaxesisassumedtofallen9relyonworkers
• Consump9ontaxesareassumedtobeshikedforwardtoconsumers.
• Theseassump9onsarestrongbecausetheyimplythatlaborsupplyisperfectlyinelas9candthatconsumershaveperfectlyinelas9cdemand
• Inprac9ce,theyprovideareasonableapproxima9on(withimportantexcep9onssuchaswhenexaminingeffectofVATreforms),andtheyarecommonlyused
23
Tax Evasion Assump3ons: Case Specific
§ Incometaxesandcontribu9onstoSS:§ Individualswhodonotpar9cipateinthe
contributorysocialsecuritysystemareassumednottopaythem
§ Consump9ontaxes
§ Placeofpurchase:informalmarketsareassumednottochargethem
§ Somecountryteamsassumedsmalltownsinruralareasdonottopaythem
24
Mone3zing in-kind transfers
§ Incidenceofpublicspendingoneduca9onandhealthfollowedso-called“benefitorexpenditureincidence”orthe“governmentcost”approach.
§ Inessence,weuseperbeneficiaryinputcostsobtainedfromadministra9vedata(andscalethemdown)asthemeasureofaveragebenefits.
§ Thisapproachamountstoaskingthefollowingques9on:Ø Howmuchwouldtheincomeofahouseholdhaveto
beincreasedifithadtopayforthefreeorsubsidizedpublicserviceatthefullcosttothegovernment?
25
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions
• DeferredIncome?
• GovernmentTransfer?
26
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Deferred Income
• In“actuarially”fairsystems:• Contribu9onsarenotataxbutareaformofforcedsavings• Pensionsarenottransfersbutdeferredincome• However,thereusuallyisredistribu9onwithinthesystemfrom:• Highearnerstolowearners• Fromworkerswhocontributebutdon’treachtherequiredminimumofyearsasac9vecontributorstoworkerswhodo
Ø Verydifficulttomeasurewithinforma9onintypicalhouseholdsurveys
27
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Pensions are part of labor contract
• Insystemswherepensionsofpublicsectoremployeesarepartofthelaborcontractinacompe99vemarket:• Contribu9onsarenotataxbutforcedsavings• Pensionsarenottransfersbutdeferredincome,regardlessofwhetherthesystemisactuariallyfairornotbecausepensionsoverandabovethecapitalizedcontribu9onsarepartofremunera9ons
• Heretherealsomightbesomeredistribu9onwithinthesystemfrom:• Highearnerstolowearners• Fromworkerswhocontributebutdon’treachtherequiredminimumofyearsasac9vecontributorstoworkerswhodo
Ø Verydifficulttomeasurewithinforma9onintypicalhouseholdsurveys
28
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Transfer
• Insystemsthatarenotactuariallyfair:• Contribu9onsareatax• Pensionsaretransfers• Thereisredistribu9onwithinthesystemfrom:
• Highearnerstolowearners• Fromworkerswhocontributebutdon’treachtherequiredminimumofyearsinthelaborforcetoworkerswhodo
• ANDfromtaxpayersingeneraltothepensioners
29
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions: Transfer
However,whatisthesizeofthe“subsidy”?• Correct/ideal:Thedifferencebetweenwhatpeoplewouldhavereceivedbasedoncontribu9onsandwhattheyactuallyreceiveØ Householdsurveysdonotusuallyhavetheinforma9ontocalculatethis
• Inprac9ce:incomefromcontributorypensionsaretreatedasagovernmenttransfer
• Amorerealis9calterna9ve:considerthedeficitoftheSocialSecuritysystemasthesizeofthesubsidyandallocateittoindividualsbasedonthedistribu9onofpensionincome
Ø Deficitsthatarepartoftransi9onfromonesystemtoanotherwillexaggeratetheimpact 30
Treatment of Contributory Social Insurance Pensions in CEQ:
Twoextremescenarios:• Deferredincomeinactuariallyfairsystems:pensionsincludedinpre-fiscalincomeandcontribu9onstreatedasmandatorysavings
• Governmenttransfer:pensionsincludedamongdirecttransfersandcontribu9onstreatedasadirecttax
31Lus9g&Higgins(2013)
Scenarios and Robustness Checks
§ Benchmarkscenario§ Sensi9vityto:• Changingtheoriginalincomebywhichhhareranked:e.g.,marketincomepluscontributorypensionsanddisposableincome• Usingconsump9onvs.income• Percapitavs.equivalizedincomeorconsump9on• Differentassump9onsonscaling-downorup• Differentassump9onsontake-upoftransfersandtaxshikingandevasion• Alterna9vevalua9onsofin-kindservices• Othersensi9vityscenarios:country-specific
32Lus9g&Higgins(2013)
CEQ Assessments A Glance at Results
Lus3g. “Fiscal Redistribu3on in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Chapter 8 in Lus3g (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.
Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income) 1.Argen&na(2012-13;I):Rossignolo,D.2016.“Taxes,Expenditures,PovertyandIncomeDistribu9oninArgen9na.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.45,CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.(forthcoming).
Rossignolo,D.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Argen9na,February29.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
2.Armenia(2011;I):Younger,StephenD.,andArtsviKhachatryan.forthcoming.“FiscalIncidenceinArmenia,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).
Younger,S.andA.Khachatryan.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Armenia,May31.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
3.Bolivia(2009;I):PazArauco,Verónica,GeorgeGrayMolina,WilsonJiménezPozo,andErnestoYáñezAguilar.2014.“ExplainingLowRedistribu9veImpactinBolivia.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September22,2014).
PazArauco,V.,G.Gray-Molina,W.JimenezandE.Yañez.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Bolivia,September22,CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
4.Brazil(2008-09;I):Higgins,SeanandClaudineyPereira.2014.“TheEffectsofBrazil’sTaxa9onandSocialSpendingontheDistribu9onofHouseholdIncome.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(November4,2014).
Higgins,S.andC.Pereira.2016CEQMasterWorkbook:Brazil,January4.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
5.Chile(2013,I):Marynez-Aguilar,S.,A.FuchsandE.Or9z-Juarez.2016.“TheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPovertyinChile.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.46,CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandWorldBank.(forthcoming).
Marynez-Aguilar,S.andE.Or9z-Juarez.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Chile,inprogress.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandWorldBank.
6.Colombia(2010,I):Lus9g,NoraandMarcelaMelendez.2015.“TheImpactofTaxesandTransfersonInequalityandPovertyinColombia”.CEQWorkingPaperNo24,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.Forthcoming.
Melendez,M.andV.Marynez.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Colombia,December17.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank.
35
Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income) 7.CostaRica(2010;I):Sauma,JuanandDiegoTrejos.2014.“Socialpublicspending,taxes,redistribu9onofincome,andpovertyinCostaRica.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.18,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.
Sauma,P.andJ.D.Trejos.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:CostaRica,February.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
8.DominicanRepublic(2006-07,I):Aristy-Escuder,J.,M.Cabrera,B.Moreno-DodsonandM.E.Sánchez-Maryn.2016.“Fiscalpolicyandredistribu9onintheDominicanRepublic.”CEQWorkingPaperNo37,CEQIns9tute.(forthcoming).Note:budgetarydatawasfor2013.
Aristy-Escuder,J.,M.Cabrera,B.Moreno-DodsonandM.E.Sánchez-Maryn.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:DominicanRepublic,May10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
9.Ecuador(2011-12,I):LlerenaPinto,FreddyPaul,MaríaChris9naLlerenaPinto,RobertoCarlosSaáDaza,andMaríaAndreaLlerenaPinto.“SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistribu9oninEcuador.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.28,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.
Llerena,F.,M.C.Llerena,M.A.LlerenaandR.Saá.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Ecuador,November7.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
10.ElSalvador(2011;I):Beneke,M.andJ.A.Oliva.2015.CEQMasterWorbook:Elsalvador,July10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandIns9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.
11.Ethiopia(2011;C):Hill,Ruth,GabrielaInchauste,NoraLus9g,EyasuTsehayeandTassewWoldehanna.forthcoming.“AFiscalIncidenceAnalysisforEthiopia,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).
Hill,R.,E.TsehayeandT.Woldehanna.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Ethiopia,September28.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
36
Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income) 12.EuropeanUnion(2011,I):EUROMODsta9s9csonDistribu9onandDecomposi9onofDisposableIncome,accessedathNp://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/sta9s9cs/usingEUROMODversionno.G2.0.
13.Georgia(2013;I):Cancho,CesarandElenaBondarenko.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinGeorgia,"in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).
Cancho,C.andE.Bondarenko.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Georgia,December31.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
14.Ghana(2012-13;C):Younger,S.,E.Osei-AssibeyandF.Oppong.2015.“FiscalIncidenceinGhana.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.35,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversity,IthacaCollege,UniversityofGhanaandWorldBank.
Younger,S.,E.Osei-AssibeyandF.Oppong.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Ghana,February10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
15.Guatemala(2011;I):Cabrera,MandH.E.Morán.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Guatemala,May6.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity,Ins9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.
16.Honduras(2011;I):Castañeda,R.andI.Espino.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Honduras,August18.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity,Ins9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.
Castañeda,R.andI.Espino.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Honduras,August18.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity,Ins9tutoCentroamericanodeEstudiosFiscalesandInterna9onalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment.
17.Indonesia(2012;C):A|ar,Rythia,JonJellema,andMathewWai-Poi.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinIndonesia,”in:Inchauste,GabrielaandNoraLus9g(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).
Jellema,J.,M.Wai_PoiandR.A|ar.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Indonesia,February26.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
37
Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income)
18.Jordan(2010-11;C):Alam,ShammaA.,GabrielaInchauste,andUmarSerajuddin.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinJordan,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C(forthcoming).
Abdel-Halim,M.,S.AdeebAlam,Y.Mansur,U.SerajuddinandP.Verme.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Jordan,March8.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
19.Mexico(2010;C&I):ScoN,John.2014.“Redistribu9veImpactandEfficiencyofMexico’sFiscalSystem.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September2013).
ScoN,J.2013.CEQMasterWorkbook:Mexico,September2.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
20.Peru(2009;I):Jaramillo,Miguel.2014.“TheIncidenceofSocialSpendingandTaxesinPeru.”InLus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(May1,2013).
Jaramillo,M.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Peru,August7.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
21.Russia(2010;I):Lopez-Calva,LuisF.,NoraLus9g,MikhailMatytsin,andDariaPopova.forthcoming.“WhoBenefitsfromFiscalRedistribu9oninRussia?,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).
Malytsin,M.andD.Popova.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Russia,March17.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
38
Teams and references by country: (in parenthesis: survey year; C=consump3on & I=income)
22.SouthAfrica(2010-11;I):Inchauste,Gabriela,NoraLus9g,MashekwaMaboshe,CatrionaPurfieldandIngridWollard.forthcoming.“TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinSouthAfrica,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).
Inchauste,G.,N.Lus9g,M.Maboshe,C.Purfield,I.WoolardandP.Zikhali.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:SouthAfrica,March6.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
23.SriLanka(2010;C):Aruna9lake,Nisha,GabrielaInchausteandNoraLus9g.forthcoming.“TheIncidenceofTaxesandSpendinginSriLanka,”in:Inchauste,G.,Lus9g,N.(Eds.),TheDistribu9onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.(forthcoming).
Aruna9lake,N.,C.Gomez,N.PereraandK.ANygalle.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:SriLanka,March10.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank.
24.Tanzania(2011-12;C):Younger,Stephen,FloraMyamba,andKennethMdadila.2016.“FiscalIncidenceinTanzania.”CEQWorkingPaperNo.36,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversity,IthacaCollegeandREPOA.
Younger,S.,F.Myamba,andK.Mdadila.2016.CEQMasterWorkbook:Tanzania,June1st.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
25.Tunisia(2010,C):Shimeles,Abebe,AhmedMoummi,NizarJouiniandNoraLus9g.2016.“FiscalIncidenceandPovertyReduc9on:EvidencefromTunisia,”CEQWorkingPaperNo.38,CommitmenttoEquityIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.(forthcoming).
Shimeles,A.,A.Moummi,N.JouiniandN.Lus9g.2015.CEQMasterWorkbook:Tunisia,October1.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversityandAfricanDevelopmentBank.
26.UnitedStates(2011,I):Higgins,Sean,NoraLus9g,WhitneyRubleandTimothySmeeding(2015),“ComparingtheIncidenceofTaxesandSocialSpendinginBrazilandtheUnitedStates”,ReviewofIncomeandWealth,forthcoming.
27.Uruguay(2009;I):Bucheli,Marisa,NoraLus9g,MáximoRossi,andFlorenciaAmábile.2014.“SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistribu9oninUruguay.”In:Lus9g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScoN.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu6veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa6nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(August18,2014)
Bucheli,M.,N.Lus9g,M.RossiandF.Amábile.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook:Uruguay,August18.CEQIns9tute,TulaneUniversity.
39
Household surveys by country, year
1. Argen&na(2012-13;I):EncuestaNacionaldeGastodelosHogares2012-2013
2. Armenia(2011;I):IntegratedLivingCondi9onsSurvey2011
3. Bolivia(2009;I):EncuestadeHogares2009
4. Brazil(2008-09;I):PesquisadeOrçamentosFamiliares2008-2009
5. Chile(2013,I):EncuestadeCaracterizaciónSocial2013
6. Colombia(2010,I):EncuestaNacionaldeCalidaddeVida2010
7. CostaRica(2010;I):EncuestaNacionaldeHogares2010
8. DominicanRepublic(2006-07;I):EncuestaNacionaldeIngresosyGastosdeLosHogares2006-2007
9. Ecuador(2011-12,I):EncuestaNacionaldeIngresosyGastosdelosHogaresUrbanoyRural,2011-2012
10. ElSalvador(2011;I):EncuestadeHogaresDePropositosMul9ples2011
11. EuropeanUnion:seeEUROMODsta9s9csonDistribu9onandDecomposi9onofDisposableIncome, hNp://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/sta9s9cs
12. Ethiopia(2010-11;C):HouseholdConsump9onExpeditureSurvey2010-2011andWelfareMonitoringSurvey2011G
13. Georgia(2013;I):IntegratedHouseholdSurvey2013
14. Ghana(2012-13;C):LivingStandardsSurvey2012-2013
15. Guatemala(2011;I):EncuestaNacionaldeCondicionesdeVida2011
Note:TheleNers"I"and"C"indicatethatthestudyusedincomeorconsump9ondata,respec9vely.
40
Household surveys by country, year
16. Honduras(2011;I):EncuestaPermanentedeHogaresdePropósitosMúl9ples2011
17. Indonesia(2012;C):SurveiSosial-EkonomiNasional2012
18. Jordan(2010-11;C):HouseholdExpenditureandIncomeSurvey2010-2011
19. Mexico(2010;C&I):EncuestaNacionaldeIngresoyGastodelosHogares2010
20. Peru(2009;I):EncuestaNacionaldeHogares2009
21. Russia(2010;I):RussianLongitudinalMonitoringSurveyofHigherSchoolofEconomics2010
22. SouthAfrica(2010-11;I):IncomeandExpenditureSurvey2010-2011
23. SriLanka(2009-10;C):HouseholdIncomeandExpenditureSurvey2009-2010
24. Tanzania(2011-12;C):HouseholdBudgetSurvey2011-2012
25. Tunisia(2010;C):Na9onalSurveyofConsump9onandHouseholdLivingStandards2010
26. UnitedStates(2011,I):CurrentPopula9onSurvey2011
27. Uruguay(2009;I):EncuestaCon9nuadeHogares2009
Note:TheleNers"I"and"C"indicatethatthestudyusedincomeorconsump9ondata,respec9vely.
41
• Empiricalresultsfor25(ofwhich10fromCEQ-WBprojects)countriesbasedonfiscalincidencestudiesfromtheCommitmenttoEquityIns9tuteforaround2010• Twolow-incomecountries:Ethiopia(Hilletal.,2016)andTanzania(Youngeretal.,2016)
• Ninelowermiddle-incomecountries:Armenia(YoungerandKhachatryan,2016),Bolivia(Paz-Araucoetal.,2014),ElSalvador(Beneke,Lus9gandOliva,2014),Georgia(CanchoandBondarenko,2016),Ghana(Youngeretal.,2015),Guatemala(Cabrera,Lus9gandMoran,2015),Honduras(CastañedaandEspino,2015),Indonesia(A|aretal.,2016),andSriLanka(Aruna9lakeetal.,2016)
• Elevenuppermiddle-incomecountries:Brazil(HigginsandPereira,2014),Colombia(Lus9gandMelendez,2016),CostaRica(SaumaandTrejos,2014),DominicanRepublic(Aristy-Escuderetal.,2016),Ecuador(Llerenaetal.,2015),Jordan(Alametal.,2016),Mexico(ScoN,2014),Peru(Jaramillo,2014),Russia(Lopez-Calvaetal.,2016),SouthAfrica(Inchausteetal.,2016),andTunisia(Shimelesetal.,2016)
• Twohigh-incomecountries:Chile(Mar9nez-Aguilaretal.,2016),andUruguay(Buchelietal.,2014).
• Oneunclassified:Argen&na(Rossignolo,2016)
42
Forthecurrent2017fiscalyear,low-incomeeconomiesaredefinedasthosewithaGNIpercapita,calculatedusingtheWorldBankAtlasmethod,of$1,025orlessin2015;lowermiddle-incomeeconomiesarethosewithaGNIpercapitabetween$1,026and$4,035;uppermiddle-incomeeconomiesarethosewithaGNIpercapitabetween$4,036and$12,475;high-incomeeconomiesarethosewithaGNIpercapitaof$12,476ormore.(onsultedonJuly13,2016)
FISCALREDISTRIBUTION
MARKETINCOME
DISPOSABLEINCOME
PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES
PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES
CONSUMABLEINCOME
PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH
FINALINCOME
CEQ Assessment:IncomeConcepts
44
HigginsandLus9g.“AAlloca9ngTaxesandTransfers,Construc9ng Income Concepts, and Comple9ngSec9on C of CEQ Master Workbook” in Lus9g(editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guideto Es6ma6ng the Impact of Fiscal Policy onInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversity,Fall2016.
Inequality
46
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
Marketincomepluspensions Disposableincome Consumableincome Finalincome
GiniCoefficient
Argen&na(2012) Armenia(2011) Bolivia(2009)Brazil(2009) Chile(2013) Colombia(2010)CostaRica(2010) DominicanRepublic(2013) Ecuador(2011)ElSalvador(2011) Ethiopia(2011) Georgia(2013)Ghana(2013) Guatemala(2011) Honduras(2011)Indonesia(2012) Jordan(2010) Mexico(2010)Peru(2009) Russia(2010) SouthAfrica(2010)SriLanka(2010) Tanzania(2011) Tunisia(2010)Uruguay(2009)
Marketincome(pluscontributorypensions)
Disposableincome Consumableincome
Finalincome
Fiscal Policy and Inequality – Contributory pensions as deferred income
Source:Lus9g(2016)
Redistribu3ve effect (Change in Gini points: market income plus pensions and market income to disposable income, circa 2010)
47Source:Lus9g(2016)
0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.800.90
-0.20-0.18-0.16-0.14-0.12-0.10-0.08-0.06-0.04-0.020.00
Red
istribu&
veeffe
ct-m
arketincom
etodispo
sable
(rankedbyredistribu&veeffect(leXhandscale);Ginicoefficientsrighthandscale)
Contributorypensionsasdeferredincome Contributorypensionsasdirecttransfer
Ginimarketincomepluspensions Ginimarketincome
More social spending, more redistribu3on
48Source:Lus9g(2016)
ARG
ARM BOL
BRA
CHLCOL
CRI
DOMECU
SLV
GHAGTM HND
IND JOR
MEX
PER
RUS
ZAF
LKA
TZA
TUN
URYy=0.9253x***-0.0287*
(7.05)(-1.99)R²=0.6933
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Redistrib
u&veeffe
ct
Socialspending
ETH
49
More unequal, more redistribu3on Consistent with Meltzer-Richard Median Voter Theorem - No “Robin Hood Paradox”
Source:Lus9g(2016)
ARG
ARM
BOL
BRACHI
COL
CRIDOMECU
SLVETH
GEO
GHA GTM
HNDINDJOR
MEX
PER
RUS
ZAF
LKA
TZATUN
URY
y=0.0952x*-0.0184(1.76)(-0.70)
R²=0.1183
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.20
0.20 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.80
Red
istribu&
veeffe
ct
Ginimarketincomepluspensions
In sum…
• InNOcountry,inequalityincreasesasaresultoftaxes,subsidiesandsocialspending
Ø Fiscalpolicyisalwaysequalizing
Ø Themoreunequal,themorefiscalredistribu9on
50
Poverty
• Fiscalpolicycanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing(intermsofthepoor’sabilitytoconsumeprivategoodsandservices):Ø 1.25/dayline:Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Tanzania
Ø 2.50/dayline:Armenia,Bolivia,Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Honduras,SriLanka,Tanzania
Ø 4/dayline:alloftheaboveplusArgen9na,Brazil,CostaRicaandTunisia
• Thisworrisomeresultstemsmainlyfromconsump9ontaxes
52
53Source:Lus9g(2016)
Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduc3on (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line $1.25 / day
2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)
-0.2%-1.7%-3.3%-8.3%-10.3%-11.5%-16.1%-16.5%-18.0%-18.5%
-24.9%-31.8%-33.9%-34.6%
-44.9%-45.5%-45.9%-50.6%-56.4%
-69.6%-69.8%-70.7%
-88.2%-97.0%
-36.2%
17.8%13.3%
4.2%2.4%
-12.7%
-8.8%-2.3%
-14.1%-14.1%
-24.6%
-7.5%-15.7%
-35.0%
-53.8%
-37.8%
-22.7%
-53.8%
-36.2%-42.7%
-76.4%
-66.2%
-54.2%
-82.0%-82.6%
-29.4%
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
(rankedbypovertyreduc&onin%;povertyline$1.252005PPP/day)
Market income plus pensions to disposable income Market income plus pensions to consumable income
54Source:Lus9g(2016)
Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduc3on (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line $2.50 / day
2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)
1.5% 1.1% 0.9%
-1.0%-1.8%-2.8%-3.3%-6.5%
-7.0%-7.3%-7.7%-8.3%-10.1%-10.4%-14.9%
-21.4%-22.0%-24.0%-27.8%-28.5%
-35.9%-40.6%
-58.4%-61.0%
-71.4%
-18.7%
9.1%5.7% 3.1%
-2.9%
1.1%5.5%
0.5%
-0.2%
-9.0%-4.4%
11.4%
-25.2%
-0.8%
3.3%
-15.1%-10.6%
-4.7%
-34.8%
-22.2%
-35.1%-29.1%
-23.3%
-51.8%
-35.4%
-51.1%
-12.6%
-80%
-70%
-60%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%(rankedbypovertyreduc&onin%;povertyline$2.502005PPP/day)
Marketincomepluspensionstodisposableincome Marketincomepluspensionstoconsumableincome
55Source:Lus9g(2016)
Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduc3on (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Consumable Income (Poverty line $4.00 / day
2005 ppp; Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income; in %)
4.3%2.0%1.0%0.7%0.4%
-0.1%-0.2%-0.4%
-1.7%-2.1%-2.7%-2.7%-2.9%-4.7%-5.6%-6.2%
-8.0%-8.5%
-12.9%-13.9%
-26.8%
-41.0%-41.2%-42.0%
-9.0%
0.0%2.7%6.6%
2.8%
13.7%
1.0%1.9%
-0.8%
4.1% 4.9%
-2.3%
3.8%0.4%1.9%
-8.4%
4.4%
-3.5%-0.3%
8.1%
-15.6%
2.8%
-12.5%
1.6%
-24.2%-21.8%
-1.2%
0.0%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%(rankedbypovertyreduc&onin%;povertyline$4.002005PPP/day)
Marketincomepluspensionstodisposableincome Marketincomepluspensionstoconsumableincome
Analyzingtheimpactontradi9onalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleading
Ø Fiscalsystemscanshowareduc9oninpovertyandyetasubstan9alshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers
56
HigginsandLus9g(2016)Canapoverty-reducingandprogressivetaxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor?JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75,2016
57
HigginsandLus9g.2016.Canapovertyreducingandprogressivetaxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor?JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75,2016
Fiscal Impoverishment (Market to Consumable Income)
58HigginsandLus9g(2016)
Country(surveyyear)
Marketincomeplus
pensionsPoverty
headcount(%)
Changeinpovertyheadcoun
t(p.p.)
Market
incomepluspensionsinequality(Gini)
Reynolds-Smolensky
Changeininequality(▲Gini)
Fiscally
impoverishedas%of
popula&on
Fiscally
Impoverishedas%
ofconsumableincomepoor
PanelA:Upper-middleincomecountries,usingapovertylineof$2.52005PPPperday
Brazil(2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9
Chile(2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2
Ecuador(2011) 10.8 -3.8 47.8 3.5 -3.3 0.2 3.2
Mexico(2012) 13.3 -1.2 54.4 3.8 -2.5 4.0 32.7
Peru(2011) 13.8 -0.2 45.9 0.9 -0.8 3.2 23.8
Russia(2010) 4.3 -1.3 39.7 3.9 -2.6 1.1 34.4
SouthAfrica(2010) 49.3 -5.2 77.1 8.3 -7.7 5.9 13.3
Tunisia(2010) 7.8 -0.1 44.7 8.0 -6.9 3.0 38.5
Brazil(2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9
Chile(2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2
Country(surveyyear)
Marketincomeplus
pensionsPoverty
headcount(%)
Changeinpovertyheadcoun
t(p.p.)
Marketincomeplus
pensionsinequality(Gini)
Reynolds-Smolensky
Changeininequality(▲Gini)
Fiscally
impoverishedas%of
popula&on
Fiscally
Impoverishedas%
ofconsumableincomepoor
PanelB:Lower-middleincomecountries,usingapovertylineof$1.252005PPPperday
Armenia(2011) 21.4 -9.6 47.4 12.9 -9.3 6.2 52.3
Bolivia(2009) 10.9 -0.5 50.3 0.6 -0.3 6.6 63.2
DominicanRepublic(2013) 6.8 -0.9 50.2 2.2 -2.2 1.0 16.3
ElSalvador(2011) 4.3 -0.7 44.0 2.2 -2.1 1.0 27.0
Ethiopia(2011) 31.9 2.3 32.2 2.3 -2.0 28.5 83.2
Ghana(2013) 6.0 0.7 43.7 1.6 -1.4 5.1 76.6
Guatemala(2010) 12.0 -0.8 49.0 1.4 -1.2 7.0 62.2
Indonesia(2012) 12.0 -1.5 39.8 1.1 -0.8 4.1 39.2
SriLanka(2010) 5.0 -0.7 37.1 1.3 -1.1 1.6 36.4
Tanzania(2011) 43.7 7.9 38.2 4.1 -3.8 50.9 98.6
59
Fiscal Impoverishment (Market to Consumable Income)
HigginsandLus9g(2016)
• Fikeenoftheeighteencountrieswithareduc9oninpovertyandinequalityduetothetaxandtransfersystemexperiencedvariousdegreesoffiscalimpoverishment.• Intencountries—Armenia,Bolivia,Brazil,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,SriLanka,andTunisia—betweenone-quarterandtwo-thirdsofthepost-fiscpoorlostincometothefiscalsystem.• Inthethreecountrieswheretheheadcountra9orose(Ethiopia,GhanaandTanzania),thepropor9onofthepoorwhowereimpoverishedbythefiscalsystemisstaggering(above75%).• InArmenia,Ethiopia,Indonesia,Tunisia,andRussia,between25%and50%ares9llfiscallyimpoverishedwhenthemone9zedvalueofeduca9onandhealthservicesareincludedastransfers
60
Lus9g.2016.“TheSDG’s,Domes9cResourceMobiliza9onandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMee9ng:“Strategiesforeradica9ngpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”BackgroundpaperforWorldDevelopmentReport2017GovernanceandtheLaw,June
Ø Extremecaremustbetakenwithemphasizingdomes9cresourcemobiliza9ontoachieveSDGs
Ø Mustassesstheimpactonthepooroftaxandsubsidyreforms,otherwiseonemaybetakingawayfromthepoormorethanistransferredtothem
Ø Impactonthepoorofincreasingtaxesrequirestheuseofadequateindicators;conven9onalmeasuresofinequalityandpovertycanbeawfullymisleading
Ø FiscalImpoverishmentIndexfulfillsalltherequirementstoobtainanaccurateassessmentoftheimpactoffiscalchangesonthepoor
61
Lus9g.2016.“TheSDG’s,Domes9cResourceMobiliza9onandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMee9ng:“Strategiesforeradica9ngpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”BackgroundpaperforWorldDevelopmentReport2017GovernanceandtheLaw,June
Main messages
1. Analyzingthetaxsidewithoutthespendingside,orviceversa,canbemisleading
Ø Taxescanbeunequalizingbutspendingsoequalizingthattheunequalizingeffectoftaxesismorethancompensated
Ø Taxescanberegressivebutwhencombinedwithtransfersmakethesystemmoreequalizingthanwithouttheregressivetaxes
Ø Transferscanbeequalizingbutwhencombinedwithtaxes,post-fiscpovertycanbehigher
62
Main messages
2. Analyzingtheimpactoninequalityonlycanbemisleading
Ø Fiscalsystemscanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing
63
Main messages
3. Analyzingtheimpactontradi9onalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleading
Ø Fiscalsystemscanshowareduc9oninpovertyandyetasubstan9alshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers
64
How pro-poor is spending on educa3on
and health
Classifica3on • Pro-poorandequalizing,percapitaspending
declineswithincome
• Neutralinabsolutetermsandequalizing,samepercapitaforall
• Equalizingbutnotpro-poor,percapitaspendingasashareofmarketincomedeclineswithincome
• Unequalizing,percapitaspendingasashareofmarketincomeincreaseswithincome
Main results
Educa9onspendingonprimaryandsecondaryschoolingperpersontendstobepro-poororneutralinabsoluteterms…...withtheexcep9onofEthiopiawhere,althoughequalizing,percapitaspendingonsecondaryeduca9onincreaseswithincome
Ø Aremiddle-classesop9ngoutinmiddleandhighincomecountries?
Ter9aryeduca9onspendingisnotpro-poorbutitisequalizing(surprised?)exceptforEthiopia,Ghana,GuatemalaandTanzania,whereitisunequalizing
67Source:Lus9g(2016)
Main results
Healthspendingperpersontendstobepro-poororneutralinabsoluteterms…….exceptforElSalvador,Ethiopia,Guatemala,Indonesia,PeruandTanzaniawherealthoughnotunequalizingpercapitaspendingincreaseswithincome….…andforJordan,wheregovernmentspendingonhealthisunequalizing.
68Source:Lus9g(2016)
In conclusion…
• FiscalsystemsarealwaysequalizingbutcanokenreducethepurchasingpowerofthepoorØ Warning:unintendedconsequenceofthedomes9cresourcemobiliza9onagendacanbemakingthepoorworseoff
• Spendingoneduca9onandhealthisokenpro-poorandalmostuniversallyequalizingØ Warning:isthisfavorableresultbecausemiddle-classesandtherichareop9ngout?
• ReassuringresultsØ Redistribu9veeffectincreaseswithsocialspendingØ SocialspendingasashareofGDPincreaseswithinequalityØ Themoreunequal,themoreredistribu9on
PARTNERSHIPS&COLLABORATION
CEQ Ins3tute can offer
Prepara&onofCEQAssessmentsinfullorcomponentsQualitycontrolofCEQAssessmentsTrainingworkshopsAdvisoryservicesforstaffandgovernments=>Cost-sharingarrangementsvarydependingonthecontribu&onsofpartneringorganiza&on
71
CEQ Ins3tute can offer
DetailedresultsonCEQAssessments
-TheMasterWorkbook(MWB)ofresultsbycountryforcountriesinwhichthepartneringorganiza9onhasnotpar9cipated
=>ForWB,thenumberiscloseto30countries:Argen9na,Bolivia,Brazil,China,Colombia,CostaRica,Ecuador,Egypt,ElSalvador(update),Ghana,Guatemala,Honduras,India,Iran,IvoryCoast,Mexico,Mozambique,Nicaragua,Panama,Peru,Tanzania,Togo,Tunisia,Uganda,Uruguay,Venezuela,andZambia
-Cross-countryMasterdatawhichservestocompareresultswithpeersandothers(CEQMasterdatacurrentlyhasresultsfor28countries)
=>Inexchange,thepartneringorganiza9oncontributestotheCEQDataCenterbysharingMWBoncountriesinwhichCEQIns9tutedidnotpar9cipate
72
Thankyou!
73