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Australian Government
STATEMENT
OF
REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 5)
OF
THE ARCHIVES
CT 1983-INCLUDING DECISION ON ACCESS
Record Series: A14039
Control symbol:
7162
Title: Cabinet Memorandum 7162 The
Total number of folios i.e. equivalent separate
International
Terrorist
Threat
to Australia
-
pages) on the record:
11
Decision 13904/SEC
1.
Decision
fter
examining this record I
have decided
to
open
it for public access except for certain
material
which
is identified below.
2.
Basis for decision
I have taken into account:
• the content of the record requested;
•
the
relevant provisions
of the
Archives ct 1983 the Act);
• policy
and
guidelines of
National
Archives of Australia that relate to the access
examination of Commonwealth records; and
• information
provided by
the ustralian
Security Intelligence Organisation
on which
I
have
relied
in
formulating my decision.
3.
Material
withheld
Category of material withheld Total number of folios per
List each folio separately
category by
category of material
withheld
Partially
exempted
folios
5
5, 6,
7, 8 9
certain parts
of
the
text
have
been expunged)
Wholl
y exemp
ted
folios
Folios
not
within the
open 0
access
period
as defined in s3
7)
of
the Act
Folios
withheld pending
0
ag
enc
y
examination
and advice
Statement of Reasons page no. 1 o 3
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4.
Findings
of fact and
reasons
for
decision
A.
Findings
of fact .
In Table A in Annexure 1 I have provided a
summary
of my findings of fact
where
I have
invoked specific provisions under s 33 of the Act. By invoking these provisions I
have
relied
on
material listed in part 2 above in
order
.to arrive at my decision.
B.
Reasons
for decision
In
Table A
in
Annexure 1 I
have
provided the reasons for my decision for each folio
exempted and those reasons are
derived from
the findings of fact.
5. ppeal rights
National
Archives
undertakes
careful examination of a
record
before making a decision to
exempt any part
of a record. As part of
that
process we may consult
with
other agencies
which have
expertise on specific national and international matters.
f you
do
not
agree with
my
decision to
exempt
information under a provision of s 33 of the
Act
you
can contact a reference officer
in
National Archives
and
seek a further explanation.
f
you are still
not
happy with the decision
and within
28 days of receiving it you can
formally appeal by:
1 first applying to Archives for an
internal
reconsideration of my decision;
and
2 if you still do
not
agree with the decision you can
apply
to the Administrative
ppeals Tribunal for a review.
For
more
information please
read
the
National
Archives Fact
Sheet
12-
What
to
do i
we
refuse
y u access You can also lodge a complaint
with
the
Commonwealth Ombudsman in
relation
to the decision.
Decisi<;m
maker
Robert
Newton
Designation
Access Examiner APS 6
Date
1
January
2016
page no.
2
of
3
0
0
0
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Annexure
Table
A
Material exempted by folio number and grouped by the application of exemption provisions
Relevant legislative Folio Findings of
fact
Reasons for ecision
provision invoked
number
nder
s33 of the ct
S 33(1)
a)
-
5 6 7, 8 These records are exempt as they each may contain the
The public disclosure of such details could lead
information or matter
and
9 following references:
to compromise of past
and
current procedures
the disclosure of
and
could reasonably be expected to damage
which under this Act
1 intelligence
and/
or information of continuing
Australia s continuing requirements to
could reasonably be
sensitivity that reveals either intelligence targets,
successfully collect intelligence-related
expected to cause
sources, methodology o r capability.
information. Thus, disclosure could reasonably
damage to the be expected to cause damage to the security of
security, defence or the Commonwealth.
international relations
of the
Commonwealth.
Statement of
reasons
page no 3 of 3
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\._..
CONFIDENTI L
CABINET
IN CON.FIDEN.CE
THIS
CA INET
DOCU
MNT H S H D
A
liMITED
CIRCUL TION
C A B I N E T M I N U T E
Secur i ty
Committee
Canberra
10
Ju ly
1990
o 13904 SEC)
Memorandum 7162 -
The
In te rna t iona l Ter ro r i s t Threat to
us t ra l ia
The
Committee
noted
the
Memorandum.
f l ~
Secre ta ry
to Cabinet
CONFIDENTI L CABINET IN CONFIDEN.CE
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No 13904 SEC)
MINISTERS:
DEPARTMENTS
INTERNAL:
T IS C B I N E T ~
DO UMENT H S H D
LIMITED
1
CIRCUL TION
Secur i ty Committee
Foreign Affa i r s and Trade
Defence
Chief of Defence
Force
Attorney-Genera l s
Finance
ASIO
ASIS
JIO
DSD
ONA
FAS,
In te rna t iona l
AS
OSIC
l
i
Mr
Hazel l d ·
Mr
Ives
: jJ.
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Title
Date
Originating
Department s)
Cabinet
or
Ministerial
Authority for
Memorandum
Purpose of
Memorandum
R E C ~ = \ D
2 2
JU \990
0
Legislation
Consultation:
Departments
consulted
Is
there
agreement?
Cost :
This fiscal year
0
year
2
0
year
3
CABINET IN CONFIDENCE
SE
CRET
FOR
CABINET
7162
3
MEMORANDUM Noo r
T ······o····· ·· ·
COPY
Noo .U...
:J..:
THE
INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST THREAT TO
AUSTRALIA
2
June
1990
Australian Security
Intelligence Organization (ASIO)
N/A
To
advise
Cabinet of
the
current externally-generated terrorist threat
to
Australia
N/A
Secretaries
Committee on
Intelligence
and
Security the Departments
of
Prime
Minister
and
Cabinet, Attorney-General, Finance, Foreign
Affairs
and Trade and
Defence,
the
Chief
of the
Defence
Force
,
the
Australian
Security
Intelligence Organization and the Office of
National
Assessments)
Yes
Nil
.
~ S
_
E
_
C
_
R
_
E
_ T
This document is
the property
of
the Australian
Government and is
not
to be copied or reproduced
CABINET IN CONFIDENCE
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~ r ; t ; t t r ; 1
CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE
2
INTRODUCTION
4-
This Memorandum describes the threat to Australia from terrorism
inspired
by
external issues and
events.
In this context,
terrorism
is defined as
premeditated
politically motivated
violence which
is life threatening and
intended
to
create fear beyond the immediate
target.
International terrorism
of this type
threatens foreign interests and
the dissidents
of foreign states
located
here.
OVERVIEW OF
THREAT
2. There have been
fewer
international
terrorist attacks relevant to
Australia
in recent years. The main reasons for
this
are the sustained
commitment to political
means of achieving
Palestinian statehood by the
groups
within
the
Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO),
principally
Al
Fatah;
the reluctance of
Libya,
Syria
and Iraq to finance and to use their
tclient
Palestinian terrorist groups outside the
PLO
(usually referred to
as
trejectionist groups); and the fragmentation and quiescence respectively
of
the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and
Justice Commandos
of the Armenian
Genocide
(JCAG). A
more
recent
development is the
loss
of traditional
support from
the Soviet Union
and
Eastern
Europe. Ironically
for
Australia s
security,
this
is
apparently
leading
to
greater interest and
activity in Asia
by
some groups.
3. The terrorist
sources
currently the most relevant to Australia are Iran
and allied
Islamic
terrorist groups; the Palestinian
trejectionist
groups,
notably the
Abu Nidal Organisation ANO); and
the
JCAG.
The
PLO
groups
are also considered
in this
context although
they appear
still
to
represent
a
low
threat.
4. Iran
has
continued
its
campaign
against dissidents abroad. For
example
17 attacks have
been
attributed
to
it since 1987,
the
most recent in
Switzerland in April
1990.
Moreover, since
1983
Iranian
complicity
has
been
shown or is
suspected
in
operations attributed to, or claimed
by
Hizballah
(often
using the name
Islamic
Jihad).
The
seizure
of caches of
weapons
and
explosives
in
1988 and 1989
in
Europe, apparently for use
by Hizballah,
suggests that
further terrorist attacks in
Europe
are planned. Iranian
sponsorship of
the
attack on Pan Am
103
over
Lockerbie in
December
1988
is
suspected.
Iran is now
seen
to be
the
principal
proponent
of
state
terrorism,
ahead of
Libya, Syria and Iraq.
5.
The
ANO has a
long history
of
terrorism
extending back
to
the mid
1970s, although it appears largely to have been operationally inactive since
July 1988. Contributing
factors to
this inactivity include
extensive
internal
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dispute
and
the
refusal
of Libya, the ANO s principal
patron,
to
sanction
operations for
fear of international
isolation
and
physical
and economic
retaliation. Nevertheless, the ANO
retains
its operational infrastructure
abroad and,
being
too small
and
isolated to
have
an
effective military or
political role, can assert
itself only through terrorism.
It is a
most dangerous
and brutal group capable
of
almost any outrage. t cannot be expected to
remain passive
indefinitely.
t is one
of the
groups moving into sia
6. Several other rejectionist
group
are considered to
have
the potential
for mercenary attacks on behalf of a wide range of potential employers
as
their traditional sources
of funds,
principally Libya and Syria,
dry up.
One
of
these,
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(General Command)
is
held
responsible for
the
destruction of
Pan
Am 103.
7. The JCAG has carried out some 30 attacks on Turkish targets over the
period 1975
to 1984 but its ruling body, the
Armenian Revolutionary
Federation,
decided
to
seek international recognition
and support by political
means. However, the
continued
quiescence
of
the
JCAG cannot be
relied
on,
and it remains in an excellent position
to
resume terrorism should the
Armenian cause
fail
to gain the recognition the Federation
seeks.
Moreover,
there is the potential of JCAG supporters
to
conduct maverick operations
as
they
did in
Canada
in
1985
and Melbourne in
1986.
There
is
no identifiable
threat
from
AS ALA.
8. The
capacity
of Arafat to adhere
to
his diplomatic strategy is placed in
jeopardy by
the failure of his political campaign, the PLO s
inability
to exploit
the intifada (Islamic
Palestinian
groups
closer to
Iran now
prevail), and
the
prospect
of Soviet Jewish emigration into the Occupied
Territories.
Whether
the pressure on Arafat will lead to
international terrorism
by
one
or
several
of
the PLO
groups
is not clear;
however,
his previous
success in
resisting
such
pressure cannot be guaranteed.
9.
The
trend
is
for
international terrorist groups
to
conduct attacks in
ways
and places
which reduce the risk
of danger to themselves. In this regard
the
increased
number
of
attacks in, or originating from, Asia is significant for
Australia. In recent years the most common targets have been diplomats and
officials of hostile countries, the aircraft
of
those countries and dissidents of
Iran.
This
is likely to continue, with the dissidents
of
Iraq increasingly
targeted. The list
of
such hostile countries is very long given the variety
of
conflicts
overseas, but
Israel,
the United
States,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, West
Germany, Britain, France
and Turkey would head
the
list.
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10. The
preferred terrorist
weapons continue to be guns
and
bombs with
the
latter
increasingly
being used
indiscriminately
and
with
greater loss of
life. Bombs on aircraft
and in
vehicles are
the
major killers.
THE
THREAT
TO
AUSTRALIA
I I Australia has been relatively untouched by international
terrorism.
The reasons for
this
include
Australia s distance from the
Middle
East and the
other
advantages
of its geography which
deter terrorist travel and allow some
control of entry. Also, Australia does not
have
the background of political
and
economic involvement in the Middle East which in other
countries,
particularly Western Europe, has
led
to a high
volume of
Middle Eastern
entry.
Middle
Eastern
terrorists
have easier access to other countries where
the environment is more conducive to their operations, where
targets
are
plentiful,
and where the opportunities for publicity and impact
are as
good
or
better.
12. Nevertheless, in the past 15
years there
have
been
seven
international
terrorist attacks in Australia or
against Australians,
and a further
known or suspected to have been planned here see Attachment A).
13.
The small JCAG support
group
in Sydney
continues to
meet
remains
violently inclined and
susceptible
to
external
and
domestic
provocation.
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CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE
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20.
To
sum
up
the threat of international terrorism in Australia
is
low but
with the prospect of
isolated
attacks.
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CONCLUSION
21.
Despite
some mitigating factors the threat
to
Australia from
international
terrorism has
been
increased
by
a
number
of
significant
developments identified in this Memorandum. Those developments are:
The future terrorist
threat
to Australia is unpredictable. t could come from
several
sources;
it is likely
to
be driven by changes and developments
overseas
and could be directed
against any number of
the
wide range of
potential
targets here.
22.
Australia continues to be at
risk
from international terrorism.
That
threat
is relatively
low and likely
to
be
manifest only episodically
but
it
carries the possibility
of large
loss of life.
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ATTACHMENT A
In
the
past
5 years
there have been
seven international terrorist attacks in
Australia or
against
Australians,
and a
further known or
suspected
to
have been planned
here.
The seven
attacks
were:
a) the
bombing
of the
Hilton
Hotel in
Sydney
during
CHOGRM
in
1978-
members of
the Ananda Marga were
suspected;
b) the
distribution
of poisoned sweets at an Assyrian function
in
Sydney
by
an Iraqi
intelligence officer in
1978;
c)
the
murder
of
the Turkish
Consul-General
and
his
bodyguard in Sydney in
1980;
d)
two
bomb attacks, on the Israeli Consulate-General and a
Jewish social
club, in Sydney in
1982
(on
the
same
day
and
probably by
the
same
unknown perpetrators);
e) the bomb at tack
by
JCAG
members
on
the
Turkish
Consulate-General in Melbourne in 1986; and
f)
the
attempted assassination
in Scotland by the Yugoslav
intelligence service
of
Nikola Stedul, an Australian citizen
and leader
of the HDP,
a
Croatian
separatist
organisation.
The
terrorist operations planned
or suspected of
being planned
were:
a)
the
assassination
by the
PFLP of
the
Israeli Ambassador
to
Australia in
1975;
b) the bombing campaign in Sydney by Croatian separatists in
1979
('Lithgow bombers');
c)
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d) action
against
presumably) Turkish targets in 1983 and 1985
by
JCAG members;
and
e) the assassinations of prominent Croatian separatists by the
Yugoslav
security
service,
in
1981
and
1985.
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Cabinet
Submission Memorandum
No 6z
5 cuh3(
56 OS-sc
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