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Australian Government

STATEMENT

OF

REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 5)

OF

THE ARCHIVES

CT 1983-INCLUDING DECISION ON ACCESS

Record Series: A14039

Control symbol:

7162

Title: Cabinet Memorandum 7162 The

Total number of folios i.e. equivalent separate

International

Terrorist

Threat

to Australia

-

pages) on the record:

11

Decision 13904/SEC

1.

Decision

fter

examining this record I

have decided

to

open

it for public access except for certain

material

which

is identified below.

2.

Basis for decision

I have taken into account:

• the content of the record requested;

•

the

relevant provisions

of the

Archives ct 1983 the Act);

• policy

and

guidelines of

National

Archives of Australia that relate to the access

examination of Commonwealth records; and

• information

provided by

the ustralian

Security Intelligence Organisation

on which

I

have

relied

in

formulating my decision.

3.

Material

withheld

Category of material withheld Total number of folios per

List each folio separately

category by

category of material

withheld

Partially

exempted

folios

5

5, 6,

7, 8 9

certain parts

of

the

text

have

been expunged)

Wholl

y exemp

ted

folios

Folios

not

within the

open 0

access

period

as defined in s3

7)

of

the Act

Folios

withheld pending

0

ag

enc

y

examination

and advice

Statement of Reasons page no. 1 o 3

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4.

Findings

of fact and

reasons

for

decision

A.

Findings

of fact .

In Table A in Annexure 1 I have provided a

summary

of my findings of fact

where

I have

invoked specific provisions under s 33 of the Act. By invoking these provisions I

have

relied

on

material listed in part 2 above in

order

.to arrive at my decision.

B.

Reasons

for decision

In

Table A

in

Annexure 1 I

have

provided the reasons for my decision for each folio

exempted and those reasons are

derived from

the findings of fact.

5. ppeal rights

National

Archives

undertakes

careful examination of a

record

before making a decision to

exempt any part

of a record. As part of

that

process we may consult

with

other agencies

which have

expertise on specific national and international matters.

f you

do

not

agree with

my

decision to

exempt

information under a provision of s 33 of the

Act

you

can contact a reference officer

in

National Archives

and

seek a further explanation.

f

you are still

not

happy with the decision

and within

28 days of receiving it you can

formally appeal by:

1 first applying to Archives for an

internal

reconsideration of my decision;

and

2 if you still do

not

agree with the decision you can

apply

to the Administrative

ppeals Tribunal for a review.

For

more

information please

read

the

National

Archives Fact

Sheet

12-

What

to

do i

we

refuse

y u access You can also lodge a complaint

with

the

Commonwealth Ombudsman in

relation

to the decision.

Decisi<;m

maker

Robert

Newton

Designation

Access Examiner APS 6

Date

1

January

2016

page no.

2

of

3

0

0

0

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Annexure

Table

A

Material exempted by folio number and grouped by the application of exemption provisions

Relevant legislative Folio Findings of

fact

Reasons for ecision

provision invoked

number

nder

s33 of the ct

S 33(1)

a)

-

5 6 7, 8 These records are exempt as they each may contain the

The public disclosure of such details could lead

information or matter

and

9 following references:

to compromise of past

and

current procedures

the disclosure of

and

could reasonably be expected to damage

which under this Act

1 intelligence

and/

or information of continuing

Australia s continuing requirements to

could reasonably be

sensitivity that reveals either intelligence targets,

successfully collect intelligence-related

expected to cause

sources, methodology o r capability.

information. Thus, disclosure could reasonably

damage to the be expected to cause damage to the security of

security, defence or the Commonwealth.

international relations

of the

Commonwealth.

Statement of

reasons

page no 3 of 3

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\._..

CONFIDENTI L

CABINET

IN CON.FIDEN.CE

THIS

CA INET

DOCU

MNT H S H D

A

liMITED

CIRCUL TION

C A B I N E T M I N U T E

Secur i ty

Committee

Canberra

10

Ju ly

1990

o 13904 SEC)

Memorandum 7162 -

The

In te rna t iona l Ter ro r i s t Threat to

us t ra l ia

The

Committee

noted

the

Memorandum.

f l ~

Secre ta ry

to Cabinet

CONFIDENTI L CABINET IN CONFIDEN.CE

7/21/2019 7162


No 13904 SEC)

MINISTERS:

DEPARTMENTS

INTERNAL:

T IS C B I N E T ~

DO UMENT H S H D

LIMITED

1

CIRCUL TION

Secur i ty Committee

Foreign Affa i r s and Trade

Defence

Chief of Defence

Force

Attorney-Genera l s

Finance

ASIO

ASIS

JIO

DSD

ONA

FAS,

In te rna t iona l

AS

OSIC

l

i

Mr

Hazel l d ·

Mr

Ives

: jJ.

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Title

Date

Originating

Department s)

Cabinet

or

Ministerial

Authority for

Memorandum

Purpose of

Memorandum

R E C ~ = \ D

2 2

JU \990

0

Legislation

Consultation:

Departments

consulted

Is

there

agreement?

Cost :

This fiscal year

0

year

2

0

year

3

CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

SE

CRET

FOR

CABINET

7162

3

MEMORANDUM Noo r

T ······o····· ·· ·

COPY

Noo .U...

:J..:

THE

INTERNATIONAL

TERRORIST THREAT TO

AUSTRALIA

2

June

1990

Australian Security

Intelligence Organization (ASIO)

N/A

To

advise

Cabinet of

the

current externally-generated terrorist threat

to

Australia

N/A

Secretaries

Committee on

Intelligence

and

Security the Departments

of

Prime

Minister

and

Cabinet, Attorney-General, Finance, Foreign

Affairs

and Trade and

Defence,

the

Chief

of the

Defence

Force

,

the

Australian

Security

Intelligence Organization and the Office of

National

Assessments)

Yes

Nil

.

~ S

_

E

_

C

_

R

_

E

_ T

This document is

the property

of

the Australian

Government and is

not

to be copied or reproduced

CABINET IN CONFIDENCE

///;/

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v

~ r ; t ; t t r ; 1

CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE

2

INTRODUCTION

4-

This Memorandum describes the threat to Australia from terrorism

inspired

by

external issues and

events.

In this context,

terrorism

is defined as

premeditated

politically motivated

violence which

is life threatening and

intended

to

create fear beyond the immediate

target.

International terrorism

of this type

threatens foreign interests and

the dissidents

of foreign states

located

here.

OVERVIEW OF

THREAT

2. There have been

fewer

international

terrorist attacks relevant to

Australia

in recent years. The main reasons for

this

are the sustained

commitment to political

means of achieving

Palestinian statehood by the

groups

within

the

Palestine Liberation Organisation

(PLO),

principally

Al

Fatah;

the reluctance of

Libya,

Syria

and Iraq to finance and to use their

tclient

Palestinian terrorist groups outside the

PLO

(usually referred to

as

trejectionist groups); and the fragmentation and quiescence respectively

of

the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and

Justice Commandos

of the Armenian

Genocide

(JCAG). A

more

recent

development is the

loss

of traditional

support from

the Soviet Union

and

Eastern

Europe. Ironically

for

Australia s

security,

this

is

apparently

leading

to

greater interest and

activity in Asia

by

some groups.

3. The terrorist

sources

currently the most relevant to Australia are Iran

and allied

Islamic

terrorist groups; the Palestinian

trejectionist

groups,

notably the

Abu Nidal Organisation ANO); and

the

JCAG.

The

PLO

groups

are also considered

in this

context although

they appear

still

to

represent

a

low

threat.

4. Iran

has

continued

its

campaign

against dissidents abroad. For

example

17 attacks have

been

attributed

to

it since 1987,

the

most recent in

Switzerland in April

1990.

Moreover, since

1983

Iranian

complicity

has

been

shown or is

suspected

in

operations attributed to, or claimed

by

Hizballah

(often

using the name

Islamic

Jihad).

The

seizure

of caches of

weapons

and

explosives

in

1988 and 1989

in

Europe, apparently for use

by Hizballah,

suggests that

further terrorist attacks in

Europe

are planned. Iranian

sponsorship of

the

attack on Pan Am

103

over

Lockerbie in

December

1988

is

suspected.

Iran is now

seen

to be

the

principal

proponent

of

state

terrorism,

ahead of

Libya, Syria and Iraq.

5.

The

ANO has a

long history

of

terrorism

extending back

to

the mid

1970s, although it appears largely to have been operationally inactive since

July 1988. Contributing

factors to

this inactivity include

extensive

internal

CAHJ

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3

dispute

and

the

refusal

of Libya, the ANO s principal

patron,

to

sanction

operations for

fear of international

isolation

and

physical

and economic

retaliation. Nevertheless, the ANO

retains

its operational infrastructure

abroad and,

being

too small

and

isolated to

have

an

effective military or

political role, can assert

itself only through terrorism.

It is a

most dangerous

and brutal group capable

of

almost any outrage. t cannot be expected to

remain passive

indefinitely.

t is one

of the

groups moving into sia

6. Several other rejectionist

group

are considered to

have

the potential

for mercenary attacks on behalf of a wide range of potential employers

as

their traditional sources

of funds,

principally Libya and Syria,

dry up.

One

of

these,

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(General Command)

is

held

responsible for

the

destruction of

Pan

Am 103.

7. The JCAG has carried out some 30 attacks on Turkish targets over the

period 1975

to 1984 but its ruling body, the

Armenian Revolutionary

Federation,

decided

to

seek international recognition

and support by political

means. However, the

continued

quiescence

of

the

JCAG cannot be

relied

on,

and it remains in an excellent position

to

resume terrorism should the

Armenian cause

fail

to gain the recognition the Federation

seeks.

Moreover,

there is the potential of JCAG supporters

to

conduct maverick operations

as

they

did in

Canada

in

1985

and Melbourne in

1986.

There

is

no identifiable

threat

from

AS ALA.

8. The

capacity

of Arafat to adhere

to

his diplomatic strategy is placed in

jeopardy by

the failure of his political campaign, the PLO s

inability

to exploit

the intifada (Islamic

Palestinian

groups

closer to

Iran now

prevail), and

the

prospect

of Soviet Jewish emigration into the Occupied

Territories.

Whether

the pressure on Arafat will lead to

international terrorism

by

one

or

several

of

the PLO

groups

is not clear;

however,

his previous

success in

resisting

such

pressure cannot be guaranteed.

9.

The

trend

is

for

international terrorist groups

to

conduct attacks in

ways

and places

which reduce the risk

of danger to themselves. In this regard

the

increased

number

of

attacks in, or originating from, Asia is significant for

Australia. In recent years the most common targets have been diplomats and

officials of hostile countries, the aircraft

of

those countries and dissidents of

Iran.

This

is likely to continue, with the dissidents

of

Iraq increasingly

targeted. The list

of

such hostile countries is very long given the variety

of

conflicts

overseas, but

Israel,

the United

States,

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, West

Germany, Britain, France

and Turkey would head

the

list.

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4

10. The

preferred terrorist

weapons continue to be guns

and

bombs with

the

latter

increasingly

being used

indiscriminately

and

with

greater loss of

life. Bombs on aircraft

and in

vehicles are

the

major killers.

THE

THREAT

TO

AUSTRALIA

I I Australia has been relatively untouched by international

terrorism.

The reasons for

this

include

Australia s distance from the

Middle

East and the

other

advantages

of its geography which

deter terrorist travel and allow some

control of entry. Also, Australia does not

have

the background of political

and

economic involvement in the Middle East which in other

countries,

particularly Western Europe, has

led

to a high

volume of

Middle Eastern

entry.

Middle

Eastern

terrorists

have easier access to other countries where

the environment is more conducive to their operations, where

targets

are

plentiful,

and where the opportunities for publicity and impact

are as

good

or

better.

12. Nevertheless, in the past 15

years there

have

been

seven

international

terrorist attacks in Australia or

against Australians,

and a further

known or suspected to have been planned here see Attachment A).

13.

The small JCAG support

group

in Sydney

continues to

meet

remains

violently inclined and

susceptible

to

external

and

domestic

provocation.

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u

SECRET


5

20.

To

sum

up

the threat of international terrorism in Australia

is

low but

with the prospect of

isolated

attacks.

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6

CONCLUSION

21.

Despite

some mitigating factors the threat

to

Australia from

international

terrorism has

been

increased

by

a

number

of

significant

developments identified in this Memorandum. Those developments are:

The future terrorist

threat

to Australia is unpredictable. t could come from

several

sources;

it is likely

to

be driven by changes and developments

overseas

and could be directed

against any number of

the

wide range of

potential

targets here.

22.

Australia continues to be at

risk

from international terrorism.

That

threat

is relatively

low and likely

to

be

manifest only episodically

but

it

carries the possibility

of large

loss of life.

CABINET-IN-CONI< IDENCE

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7

ATTACHMENT A

In

the

past

5 years

there have been

seven international terrorist attacks in

Australia or

against

Australians,

and a

further known or

suspected

to

have been planned

here.

The seven

attacks

were:

a) the

bombing

of the

Hilton

Hotel in

Sydney

during

CHOGRM

in

1978-

members of

the Ananda Marga were

suspected;

b) the

distribution

of poisoned sweets at an Assyrian function

in

Sydney

by

an Iraqi

intelligence officer in

1978;

c)

the

murder

of

the Turkish

Consul-General

and

his

bodyguard in Sydney in

1980;

d)

two

bomb attacks, on the Israeli Consulate-General and a

Jewish social

club, in Sydney in

1982

(on

the

same

day

and

probably by

the

same

unknown perpetrators);

e) the bomb at tack

by

JCAG

members

on

the

Turkish

Consulate-General in Melbourne in 1986; and

f)

the

attempted assassination

in Scotland by the Yugoslav

intelligence service

of

Nikola Stedul, an Australian citizen

and leader

of the HDP,

a

Croatian

separatist

organisation.

The

terrorist operations planned

or suspected of

being planned

were:

a)

the

assassination

by the

PFLP of

the

Israeli Ambassador

to

Australia in

1975;

b) the bombing campaign in Sydney by Croatian separatists in

1979

('Lithgow bombers');

c)

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8

d) action

against

presumably) Turkish targets in 1983 and 1985

by

JCAG members;

and

e) the assassinations of prominent Croatian separatists by the

Yugoslav

security

service,

in

1981

and

1985.


SECRET

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Cabinet

Submission Memorandum

No 6z

5 cuh3(

56 OS-sc

Documents

7162